1. Manila Golf & Country Club v.

IAC In the final analysis, petitioner has no way of

and Fermin Llamar (G.R.
No. 64948)
Facts:
Respondent Fermin Llamar and his fellow
caddies filed with the Social Security
Commission for coverage and availment of
benefits under the Social Security Act.
Subsequently, all but 2 of the original 17
petitioners withdrew their claim for social
security coverage. The case continued and
was adjudicated by the SSC only as regards
the 2 holdouts dismissing their petition and
stating that the caddies were never
employees of petitioner. An appeal was taken
to the IAC but the other caddy’s appeal was
dismissed at his instance, leaving respondent
Llamar the lone appellant. The IAC found for
Llamar finding employer-employee
relationship between him and petitioner.
Issue:
compelling the presence of the caddies as
they are not required to render a definite
number of hours of work on a single day.
Even the group rotation of caddies is not
absolute because a player is at liberty to
choose a caddy of his preference regardless
of the caddy’s order in the rotation. It can
happen that a caddy who has rendered
services to a player on one day may still find
sufficient time to work elsewhere. Under such
circumstances, he may then leave the
premises of petitioner and go to such other
place of work that he wishes. Or a caddy who
is on call for a particular day may deliberately
absent himself if he has more profitable
caddying, or another, engagement in some
other place. These are things beyond
petitioner’s control and for which it imposes
no direct sanctions on the caddies.
G.R. No. L-26844             September 30,
1969

Whether or not respondent Llamar is an 2. FELIPE DE LEON, BALDOMERO

employee of petitioner. SALVADOR, MARTINIANO
EVANGELISTA, VICENTE
Ruling: NO. PANLAQUI, CASTOR TUASON,
FRANCISCO GONZALO, ENRIQUE
The various matters of conduct, dress,
PAGCU, CLAUDIO SICHON,
language, etc. covered by the petitioner’s
ESTANISLAO SICHON, RUBEN
regulations, does not, in the mind of the
ICBAN, ABONDINO ISIP, LUIS P.
Court, so circumscribe the actions or
ISIP, DIOSDADO P. GONZALES,
judgment of the caddies concerned as to
MAXIMO PAULE, FAUSTINO
leave them little or no freedom of choice
DIMATULAC, MATEO BAUTISTA,
whatsoever in the manner of carrying out
WILFREDO AYCARDO, HORACIO
their services.
OCAMPO, FABIAN MENESES,
The Court agrees with petitioner that the FLORENTINO GARCIA and JOSE D.
group rotation system so-called, is less a GALANG, petitioners,
measure of employer control than an vs.
assurance that the work is fairly distributed, a PAMPANGA SUGAR
caddy who is absent when his turn number is DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
called simply losing his turn to serve and INC., respondent.
being assigned instead the last number for
the day.
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CASTRO, J.:
Review on certiorari of the resolution dated
October 14, 1966 of the Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR) dismissing the petitioners'
complaint in case 38-V.
The respondent Pampanga Sugar
Development Company (PASUDECO)
operates a sugar central at San Fernando,
Pampanga. The petitioners, 21 all told, were
its security guards required to work eight
hours a day, seven days a week. On
November 28, 1961 the petitioners filed with
the CIR a complaint seeking payment to them
of premium or differential pay in the total
amount P49,581.79, plus attorney's fees of
P3,000 and costs of suit. Upon the finding
that the "petitioners were paid their monthly
salaries plus 25% additional compensation
for work on Sundays and Holidays as
provided for by law and that work on said
days is one of the terms and conditions of
their employment as security guards." CIR
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador dismissed the
case. Acting on the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, the court en banc affirmed
Judge Salvador's order. Hence this appeal.
The petitioners' claim, in essence, is that
under the authority of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 444 as amended (Eight-
Hour Labor Law), for a Sunday or legal
holiday work of not more than eight hours,
each of them is entitled to his monthly salary
and his premium or differential
compensation, i.e., his wage for the said
Sunday or legal holiday plus at least 25%
thereof.
Sec. 4 of C.A. 444, as amended, reads:
No person, firm, or corporation, business
establishment or place or center of labor shall
compel an employee or laborer to work
during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he
is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-
five per centum of his regular
remuneration: Provided, however, That this
prohibition shall not apply to public utilities
performing some public service such as
supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or
providing means of transportation or
communication.
The issue which the petitioners here pose is
not one of novel perception. In Manalo vs.
Pampanga Sugar Development Company,
Inc., L-26776, June 30, 1969, this Court
disposed of a similar contention, thus:
The law is plain and unambiguous. It directs
payment for work done not exceeding eight
hours during Sundays and legal holidays by
an employee or laborer not falling under the
exception "an additional sum of at least
twenty-five per centum of his regular
remuneration." And we already said in one
case that "(t)he minimum legal additional
compensation for work on Sundays and legal
holidays is — 25% of the laborer's regular
remuneration." Thus, if said employee or
laborer regularly receives P6 a day for an
eight-hour work on an ordinary day and he is
made to work for eight hours on Sunday or
legal holiday, he is entitled to his base pay of
P6 plus P1.50 (25% of P6), or a total of
P7.50. His premium pay is P1.50, the
"twenty-five per centum of his regular
remuneration of P6. It does not include his
base pay of P6. He gets that P6 for an eight-
hour work performed any day. And he gets
the extra P1.50 if such eight-hour work is
rendered on a Sunday or legal holiday. This is
the most logical and reasonable import of the
law. The CIR did not err in following it.
The same signification is, contrary to
petitioners' contention, given to the term
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"premium pay" by the Department of Labor,
as may be gleaned from the following
formula it devised in determining the daily
wage of monthly-salaried employees, except
those employed by public utilities, working
the whole year round, including Sundays and
legal holidays:
Monthly salary multiplied by 12 (months)
equals yearly salary; yearly salary divided by
380.5 (days) equals daily wage.1awphîl.nèt
The figure 380.5 above is the sum of the 303
ordinary days of the year and the 62
Sundays, and legal holidays of the same year
and 15.5 (25% of 62). Stated otherwise, the
last figure 15.5 is the difference between
380.5 (theoretically, the number of days
worked by the employee in one year) and
365 days (the actual number of days in a
year). It is, in short, the equivalent in days of
the employee's 25% premium pay for 52
Sundays and 10 legal holidays in one year.
The premium pay is not, therefore, 125% as
petitioners want us to believe. Thus, if the
employee's daily wage is P6, his total
premium pay for one year is P93 (P6 times
15.5). Computed in another way, with the
same daily wage, his premium pay for one
Sunday or legal holiday is P1.50 (25% of P6);
multiplying P1.50 by 62 (the number of
Sundays and legal holidays in one year), we
get the same amount of P93. This is the
amount of premium pay to which he is
entitled in one year in addition to his fixed
yearly salary.
Petitioners postulate that the monthly salary
or, for that matter, the yearly salary applies
only to the ordinary working days and does
not take into account the Sundays and legal
holidays found in a given calendar month or
year.
The position thus taken by petitioners-
appellants, that they are entitled to 125%
premium, or extra pay, for work done in each
Sunday and holiday, would only apply if it is
shown that the monthly or yearly salaries
stipulated are intended to cover work on
ordinary working days only or where the
nature or conditions of employment do not
require work on Sundays and holidays. But
where, in agreeing to the monthly or yearly
stipend, the parties knew, or had reason to
know, that the work would be continuous,
without interruption on Sundays and
holidays, then the wage earner would only be
entitled to the 25% supplement (or extra
pay) provided by section 4 of the Eight-Hour
Labor law, as the regular monthly or yearly
wage already covered the work done on
Sundays and holidays.
The import of the law and the decision
in Manalo is that for work on Sundays and
legal holidays, the employer must pay the
employee: (1) his regular remuneration, or
100%; and (2) an additional sum of at least
25% of the regular remuneration, which is
called the "premium pay." In other words,
the pay for Sundays and legal holidays is
125% of the pay for ordinary days, but only
the excess of 25% is premium pay. With
respect to employees paid on a monthly
basis, the first 100% (of the 125%),
corresponding to the regular remuneration,
may or may not be included in the monthly
salary. If it is, then the employee is entitled
to collect only the premium of 25%. If it is
not, then the employee has a right to receive
the entire 125%.
The question that thus emerges is whether
the petitioners' monthly salaries already cover
the 100% regular remuneration for Sundays
and legal holidays. 1
From the allegations in paragraph 3 of the
petitioners' complaint it can be clearly
inferred that such regular remuneration of
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100% is already encompassed in the
petitioners' monthly salaries. We hereunder
quote the itemization of the claim (which is
essentially the same in respect to the other
petitioners) of the petitioner Felipe de Leon:
Period of employment for which claim is
based January 1, 1946 to October 31,
1957
Salary per month from
January 1, 1946 to
December 31, 1950 P95.00
Number of Sundays
and Holidays from
January 1, 1946 to
December 31, 1950 300
Rate per day plus 25% P3.95
300 Sundays and
Holidays multiplied by
P3.95 rate per each
Sunday and Holiday P1,185.00
From the particular precise statement, "Rate
per day plus 25% - P3.95," 2 it follows that
the regular rate per ordinary day is P3.1666,
which is 1/30th of the monthly salary of P95.
This means that in computing the daily wage,
each of the petitioners divided his monthly
salary by 30, the average number of days in
a month, which includes Sundays and legal
holidays. This is an effective admission, or at
least demonstrates awareness on the part of
the petitioners, that their monthly salaries
covered work not only on ordinary days but
also on Sundays and legal holidays. 3 The
allegation, "300 Sundays and holidays
multiplied by P3.95 rate per each Sunday and
Holiday — P1,185.00," is correct. However, it
must be remembered that of the amount of
P1,185, the sum of P948 had already been
paid to De Leon as part of his salary for the
five-year period from January 1, 1946 to
December 31, 1950.
The only question remaining is whether the
25% premium pay has also been paid. In the
order of Judge Salvador, affirmed by the
court en banc, there is a finding that the
"petitioners were paid their monthly salaries
plus 25% additional compensation for work
on Sundays and holidays." The factual
findings of the trial judge, unaltered or
unmodified by the court en banc, cannot be
reviewed by this Court. 4 The findings of fact
of the CIR are conclusive on this Court,
where they are supported by substantial
evidence, and the lower court has not acted
with grave abuse of discretion in reaching
them. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a
quo dismissing the complaint is affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 146775. January 30, 2002
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS-
FORMER THIRTEENTH DIVISION, HON.
UNDERSECRETARY JOSE M. ESPAÑOL,
JR., Hon. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO,
and HON. REGIONAL DIRECTOR ALLAN
M. MACARAYA, respondents.
Facts:
The Department of Labor and Employment
conducted a routine inspection in San Miguel
Corporation, Iligan City and it was discovered
that there was underpayment by SMC of
regular Muslim holiday pay to its employees.
DOLE sent a copy of inspection result to SMC
which the latter contested the findings. SMC
failed to submit proof and hence the Director
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of DOLE of Iligan District Office issued a
compliance order to pay both its Muslim and
non-Muslim employees the Muslim Holidays.
SMC appealed to DOLE main office but
dismissed for having been filed late but later
on reconsidered because it is within
reglementary period but still dismissed for
lack of merit. Hence, this present petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not non-Muslim employees
working in Muslim areas is entitled to Muslim
Holiday Pay.
Held:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition
and ordered the petitioner to pay its non-
Muslim employees. The basis for this decision
were Articles 169 and 170 of P.D. No. 1083
“Code of Muslim Personal Laws” which listed
all official Muslim holidays and provincies and
cities where officially observed. In this case,
SMC is located in Iligan which is covered in
the those provisions. Also Article 169 and 170
of PD No. 1083 should be read in conjunction
with Article 94 of Labor Code which provides
for the right of every worker to be paid of
holiday pay.
Petitioner asserts Art.3(3) of PD No. 1083
provides that it shall be applicable only to
Muslims. However, the Court said that said
article declares that nothing herein shall be
construed to operate to the prejudice of a
non-Muslim. There should be no distinction
between Muslims and non-Muslims as
regards payment of benefits for Muslim
holidays.
It was said also that the The Court of Appeals
did not err in sustaining Undersecretary
Español who stated: “Assuming arguendo
that the respondent’s position is correct, then
by the same token, Muslims throughout the
Philippines are also not entitled to holiday
pays on Christian holidays declared by law as
regular holidays. We must remind the
respondent-appellant that wages and other
emoluments granted by law to the working
man are determined on the basis of the
criteria laid down by laws and certainly not
on the basis of the worker’s faith or religion.”
[CASE DIGEST] JOSE RIZAL COLLEGE v.
NLRC (G.R. No. L-65482 )
FACTS:
·         In behalf of the faculty and personnel
of Jose Rizal College (JRC), the National
Alliance of Teachers and Office Workers
(NATOW) filed a complaint before the
Ministry of Labor against JRC for its non-
payment of  holiday pay to its employees
from 1975 to 1977. 
·         The Labor Arbiter ruled that: (a)
faculty and personnel who are paid a uniform
salary per month are no longer entitled to
separate payment for regular holidays; (b)
personnel who are paid their wages daily are
entitled to be paid the 10 unworked regular
holidays according to the pertinent provisions
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code; and (c) collegiate faculty
who are paid compensation on a per hour
basis are not entitled to unworked regular
holiday pay considering that these regular
holidays have been excluded in the
programming of the student contact hours.
  On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA's
ruling on the first two types of employees but
modified the ruling pertaining to the third
type. The NLRC held that teaching personnel
paid by the hour are also entitled to holiday
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pay. Hence, the instant petition.
ARGUMENTS:
·         JRC: Private school teachers paid by
the hour are required to hold classes for a
particular number of hours. In the
programming of these student contract
hours, legal holidays are excluded and
labelled in the schedule as "no class day. "
On the other hand, if a regular week day is
declared a holiday, the school calendar is
extended to compensate for that day. As
such, the advent of any of the legal holidays
within the semester will not affect the
faculty's salary because this day is not
included in their schedule while the calendar
is extended to compensate for special
holidays. 
·         SolGen: Under Article 94 of the Labor
Code (P.D. No. 442 as amended), holiday pay
applies to all employees except those in retail
and service establishments. To deprive
therefore employees paid at an hourly rate of
unworked holiday pay is contrary to the
policy considerations underlying such
presidential enactment, and its precursor, the
Blue Sunday Law (Republic Act No. 946)
apart from the constitutional mandate to
grant greater rights to labor (Constitution,
Article II, Section 9).
·         NLRC: The purpose of a holiday pay is
obvious; that is to prevent diminution of the
monthly income of the workers on account of
work interruptions. In other words, although
the worker is forced to take a rest, he earns
what he should earn. That is his holiday pay.
It is no excuse therefore that the school
calendar is extended whenever holidays
occur, because such happens only in cases of
special holidays.
RULING: 
NLRC ruling dismissed and a new one
rendered: (a) exempting JRC from paying
hourly paid faculty members their pay for
regular holidays, whether the same be during
the regular semesters of the school year or
during semestral, Christmas, or Holy Week
vacations; and (b) ordering JRC to pay said
faculty members their regular hourly rate on
days declared as special holidays or for some
reason classes are called off or shortened for
the hours they are supposed to have taught,
whether extensions of class days be ordered
or not; in case of extensions said faculty
members shall likewise be paid their hourly
rates should they teach during said
extensions.
Whether or not private school teachers paid
by the hour are entitled to payment on
unworked regular holidays. – NO.
·         Regular holidays specified as such by
law are known to both school and faculty
members as "no class days." Certainly, the
latter do not expect payment for said
unworked days, and this was clearly in their
minds when they entered into the teaching
contracts.
Whether or not private school teachers paid
by the hour are entitled to payment on
unworked special public holidays. – YES.
·         The law and the Implementing Rules
governing holiday pay are silent as to
payment on Special Public Holidays.
Nonetheless, it is readily apparent that the
declared purpose of the holiday pay – which
is the prevention of diminution of the monthly
income of the employees on account of work
interruptions – is defeated when a regular
class day is cancelled on account of a special
public holiday and class hours are held on
6|Page
another working day to make up for time lost
in the school calendar.
·         When a special public holiday is
declared, the faculty member paid by the
hour is deprived of expected income, and it
does not matter that the school calendar is
extended in view of the days or hours lost,
for their income that could be earned from
other sources is lost during the extended
days. Similarly, when classes are called off or
shortened on account of typhoons, floods,
rallies, and the like, these faculty members
must likewise be paid, whether or not
extensions are ordered.
Whether or not JRC was deprived of due
process when it was not notified of the
appeal made to the NLRC against the
decision of the labor arbiter. – NO.
·         The records show petitioner JRC was
amply heard and represented in the instant
proceedings. It submitted its position paper
before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and
even filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the latter, as well as an "Urgent
Motion for Hearing En Banc." Thus, JRC's
claim of lack of due process is unfounded.
·         The Court has already set forth what
is now known as the "cardinal primary"
requirements of due process in administrative
proceedings, to wit: "(1) the right to a
hearing which includes the right to present
one's case and submit evidence in support
thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented; (3) the decision must
have something to support itself; (4) the
evidence must be substantial, and substantial
evidence means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion; (5) the decision must
be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the
tribunal or body of any of its judges must act
on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) the board or body should in all
controversial questions, render its decisions
in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered. " (Doruelo vs. Commission on
Elections, 133 SCRA 382 [19
WELLINGTON INVESTMENT AND
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Under-
Secretary of Labor and Employment,
ELMER ABADILLA, and 34 others,
respondents
Facts:
The case arose from a routine inspection
conducted by a Labor Enforcement Officer on
August 6, 1991 of the Wellington Flour Mills,
an establishment owned and operated by
petitioner Wellington Investment and
Manufacturing Corporation (hereafter, simply
Wellington). The officer thereafter drew up a
report, a copy of which was "explained to and
received by" Wellington's personnel manager,
in which he set forth his finding of "non-
payment of regular holidays falling on a
Sunday for monthly-paid employees."
Wellington sought reconsideration of the
Labor Inspector's report, by letter dated
August 10, 1991. It argued that "the monthly
salary of the company's monthly-salaried
employees already includes holiday pay for all
regular holidays . . . (and hence) there is no
legal basis for the finding of alleged non-
payment of regular holidays falling on a
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Sunday."
It expounded on this thesis in a position
paper subsequently submitted to the
Regional Director, asserting that it pays its
monthly-paid employees a fixed monthly
compensation "using the 314 factor which
undeniably covers and already includes
payment for all the working days in a month
as well as all the 10 unworked regular
holidays within a year."
Wellington's arguments failed to persuade the
Regional Director who, in an Order issued on
July 28, 1992, ruled that "when a regular
holiday falls on a Sunday, an extra or
additional working day is created and the
employer has the obligation to pay the
employees for the extra day except the last
Sunday of August since the payment for the
said holiday is already included in the 314
factor," and accordingly directed Wellington
to pay its employees compensation
corresponding to four (4) extra working days.
Issue:
Whether or not a monthly-paid employee,
receiving a fixed monthly compensation, is
entitled to an additional pay aside from his
usual holiday pay, whenever a regular holiday
falls on a Sunday.
Ruling:
Every worker should, according to the Labor
Code, "be paid his regular daily wage during
regular holidays, except in retail and service
establishments regularly employing less than
ten (10) workers;" this, of course, even if the
worker does no work on these holidays. The
regular holidays include: "New Year's Day,
Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of
April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the
fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the
twenty-fifth of December, and the day
designated by law for holding a general
election (or national referendum or
plebiscite).
Particularly as regards employees "who are
uniformly paid by the month, "the monthly
minimum wage shall not be less than the
statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365
days divided by twelve." 12 This monthly
salary shall serve as compensation "for all
days in the month whether worked or not,"
and "irrespective of the number of working
days therein." 13 In other words, whether
the month is of thirty (30) or thirty-one (31)
days' duration, or twenty-eight (28) or
twenty-nine (29) (as in February), the
employee is entitled to receive the entire
monthly salary. So, too, in the event of the
declaration of any special holiday, or any
fortuitous cause precluding work on any
particular day or days (such as transportation
strikes, riots, or typhoons or other natural
calamities), the employee is entitled to the
salary for the entire month and the employer
has no right to deduct the proportionate
amount corresponding to the days when no
work was done. The monthly compensation is
evidently intended precisely to avoid
computations and adjustments resulting from
the contingencies just mentioned which are
routinely made in the case of workers paid on
daily basis.
WHEREFORE, the orders complained of,
namely: that of the respondent
Undersecretary dated September 22, 1993,
and that of the Regional Director dated July
30, 1992, are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE,
and the proceeding against petitioner
DISMISSED.
PAL vs. NLRC G.R. No. 85985, August
13, 1993
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Full Text : pal v nlrc gr no 85985 (1993) employees are at least properly informed of
its decisions or modes of action. Indeed,
FACTS: On March 15, 1985, the Philippine
industrial peace cannot be achieved if the
Airlines, Inc. (PAL) completely revised its
employees are denied their just participation
1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was
in the discussion of matters affecting their
circulated among the employees and was
rights.
immediately implemented without notice and
prior discussion with the Philippine Airlines
Employees Association (PALEA) by the
Management. Some employees were
subjected to the disciplinary measures
embodied therein.

On August 20, 1985, PALEA filed a complaint

before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the formulation of a

Code of Discipline among employees is a
shared responsibility of the employer and the
employees.

RULING: To achieve industrial peace, the

employees must be granted their just
participation in the discussion of matters
affecting their rights. It is the policy of the
State to promote the enlightenment of
workers concerning their rights and
obligations as employees. The New Code of
Discipline containing disciplinary measures
cannot be implemented in the absence of full
cooperation of the employees as it affects
their rights, duties and welfare. Management
cannot exclude labor in the deliberation and
adoption of rules and regulations that will
affect them. Workers have the right to
participate in decision and policy making
process affecting their rights, duties and
welfare.

Participation in Decision-Making Process –

A line must be drawn between management

prerogatives regarding business operations
per se and those which affect the rights of
the employees. In treating the latter,
management should see to it that its
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