VALID WAIVER Whether there was consent on the part of the person
who was the occupant of the hotel room then rented
LOPEZ VS. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS [GR L-
27968, 3 DECEMBER 1975
Facts:
M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict
surveillance by the combined team of agents of the
NBI, PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior to its
apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa,
Davao City. M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by
Capt. Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by Mr.
Tomas Velasco. During the period from the latter part
of August to September 18, 1966, the said vessel was
in Indonesian waters where it loaded copra and coffee
beans from Taruna, Pitta, and Mangenito, all of
Indonesia. In its trip to Indonesia it brought various
merchandise from the Philippines which were
exchanged and/or bartered for copra and coffee
beans and subsequently taken to Davao City. Said
vessel passed Marore, Indonesia on 18 September
1966 on its a way to Tahuna, Indonesia before
proceeding to Davao City where it was apprehended
on 19 September 1966. At about 3:00 p.m. of the said
day, when the vessel was searched and after Captain
Pantinople informed the team that Velasco, the
charterer of the vessel, had other documents showing
that vessel came from Indonesia carrying smuggled
copra and coffee, a combined team of Constabulary
and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center operatives
headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of
Davao, proceeded to the Velasco’s room at the
Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said
document. Velasco was not inside the hotel room
when they entered the room. There are conficting
claims whether the manicurist Teofila Ibañez or
whether Velasco’s wife, who was allegedly inside the
room at that time, voluntarily allowed the police
officers to enter; and whether the police officers
“forcibly opened luggages and boxes from which only
several documents and papers were found, then
seized, confiscated and took away the same,” or
whether Mrs. Velasco volunteered to open the
suitcases and baggages of Velasco and delivered the
documents and things contained therein to Reynolds.
The Collector of Customs of Davao seized
1,480 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee from the
M/V motor vessel Jolo Lema. The seizure was
declared lawful by the Court of Tax Appeals, and its
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court on 29
November 1974 in Nasiad vs. Court of Tax Appeals
(GR L-29318, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 238). In
the present special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus; the only question left then
is whether the search conducted by a party headed
by Reynolds without the search warrant for the hotel
room of Velasco, who entered into a contract with
Jose G. Lopez, the awardee of such Philippine
Reparations Commission vessel, for its operation and
use ostensibly for fishing, is violative of such
constitutional provision.
Issue:
by Velasco.
Held:
There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and
Velasco to counteract the force of the recital of the
written statement of Teofila Ibañez (allegedly wife of
Tomas Velasco) by an affidavit of one Corazon Y.
Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of
Velasco, and another by Velasco himself; reiterating
that the person who was present at his hotel room
was one Teofila Ibañez, “a manicurist by occupation.”
If such indeed were the case, then it is much more
easily understandable why that person, Teofila
Ibañez, who could be aptly described as the wrong
person at the wrong place and at the wrong time,
would have signified her consent readily and
immediately. Under the circumstances, that was the
most prudent course of action. It would save her and
even Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo.
Nor could the officers of the law be blamed if they
would act on the appearances. There was a person
inside who from all indications was ready to accede to
their request. Even common courtesy alone would
have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to
why she was there. Under all the circumstances,
therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was
consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for
a search warrant
PEOPLE V. RAMOS [GR 85401-02, 4 JUNE 1990]
Facts:
On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer
came to the Narcotics Command Office in Olongapo
City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the name
of “Mama Rose” (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling
marijuana at the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal
Avenue in Olongapo City. Tests buys were made
using marked money. The Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) team proceeded to the place where
appellant was selling cigarettes, and arrested the
latter for illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos was
requested to take out the contents of her wallet. The
four marked five-peso bills used in the test buys were
found among her possessions and were confiscated
after the serial numbers were confirmed. Search of
Ramos’ stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana cigarettes
in a trash can placed under the small table where
Ramos displayed the wares she was selling. Ramos
was thereafter brought to the station. At the station,
Ramos executed a statement confessing to her
crimes which she swore to before Assistant City
Fiscal.
The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to
the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL)
for analysis, and thereafter were confirmed to be
marijuana. The defense contends however that she
assented to the invitation of the NARCOM operatives
for investigation, after search of her buri bags (which
she stores the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She
claimed that she was forced to affix her signature on
the four 5-peso bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly
to be the same money which was used to buy
marijuana from her, but which she insists was her
money being saved for the rentals. She was later
brought to the Fiscal’s Office after investigation,
where she signed a document. She claimed she was
not assisted by any counsel during the investigation,
neither during the time she signed the document at
the Fiscal’s Office. Two informations were filed
against Ramos, one for sale (Criminal Case 5991)
and the other for possession of marijuana (Criminal
Case 5990). After trial, the RTC Olongapo City
(Branch 73) found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt
in Criminal Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA
6425 and sentenced her to imprisonment of 6 years
and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She was likewise
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA 6425 and was
sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.
Ramos sought reversal of the decisions with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Ramos waived her right against the
warrantless search of the trash can, where illegal
drugs were found, under her control.
Held:
The trash can (where the contraband were
found) was found under the table where her legitimate
wares were being sold. Ramos he was the only
person who had access to the trash can. The same
was under her immediate physical control. She had
complete charge of the contents of the trash can
under the table to the exclusion of all other persons.
In law, actual possession exists when the thing is in
the immediate occupancy and control of the party. But
this is not to say that the law requires actual
possession. In criminal law, possession necessary for
conviction of the offense of possession of controlled
substances with intent to distribute may be
constructive as well as actual. It is only necessary that
the defendant must have dominion and control over
the contraband. These requirements are present in
the situation described, where the prohibited drugs
were found inside the trash can placed under the stall
owned by Ramos.
In fact, the NARCOM agents who conducted
the search testified that they had to ask Ramps to
stand so that they could look inside the trash can
under Ramos’ papag. The trash can was positioned in
such a way that it was difficult for another person to
use the trash can. The trash can was obviously not for
use by her customers. Therefore, the twenty sticks of
marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial
court’s finding that Ramos is guilty of possession is
correct.
VEROY V. LAYAGUE [GR 95630, 18 JUNE 1992]
Facts:
Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy are husband
and wife residing in Davao City. When Veroy was
promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of
the Social Security System sometime in June 1988,
he and his family transferred to Quezon City. The
care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was
left to 2 houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos,
who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the
premises. The Veroys would occasionally send
money to Edna Soquilon for the salary of the said
houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their
house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior
of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the
circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna
Soquilon to give her access in case of an emergency.
On 12 April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the
Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP raided Veroy’s house
in Davao City on information that the said residence
was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers.
They were able to enter the yard with the help of the
caretakers but did not enter the house since the
owner was not present and they did not have a
search warrant. Permission was requested by phone
to Ma. Luisa Veroy who consented on the condition
that the search be conducted in the presence of Major
Macasaet. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Maj.
Macasaet met at the Veroy’s house to conduct the
search pursuant to the authority granted by Ma. Luisa.
Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a
magazine containing 7 live bullets in a black clutch
bag inside an unlocked drawer in the children’s room.
3 half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of
RAM-SFP were also found in the children’s room.
A search of the children’s recreation and study
area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted
clothing, a small black bag containing a book entitled
“Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation”, a road
map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag
containing assorted medicines and religious
pamphlets was found in the master’s bedroom.
Inventory and receipt of seized articles were made.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to
the Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor , who was
designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao
City by the DOJ through Department Order 88 (16
May 1990). In a resolution dated 6 August 1990, the
Fiscal recommended the filing of an Information
against the Veroys for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in
Furtherance of Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August 1990,
an Information for the said offense was filed by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the
RTC Davao City). No bail was recommended by the
prosecution. The fiscal’s resolution was received by
the Veroys on 13 August 1990. The latter filed a
motion for bail on the same day which was denied for
being premature, as they have not been arrested yet.
The Veroys voluntarily surrendered to Gen. Pantaleon
Dumlao, but who refused to receive them o the
ground that his office has not received copies of their
warrants of arrest. In the meantime, on 15 August
1990, the Veroys were admitted to the St. Luke’s
Hospital for various ailments brought about or
aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the
filing of the criminal complaint. On 17 August 1990,
Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they be
allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed
under guard thereat. Upon arraignment on 1 October
1990, the Veroys pleaded not guilty and filed a motion
for hospital confinement, which was denied.
The court ordered their commitment at the
Davao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on the
merits. At the conclusion thereof, the court issued a
second order denying their motion for reconsideration.
The Veroys were returned to the St. Luke’s Hospital
where their physical condition remained erratic. Gen.
Dumlao informed the Veroys that he had issued a
directive for their transfer from the St. Luke’s Hospital
to Camp Crame on the basis of the 2 October 1990
Order. They would proceed with their transfer
pursuant to the order of the trial court, unless
otherwise restrained by the court. The Veroys filed the
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
Issue:
Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy
for ascertaining thereat the presence of alleged “rebel
soldiers” include the authority to conduct a room to
room search once inside the house.
Held:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution). However, the rule that searches and
seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not
an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions
thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a
search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing). The
necessity of the permission obtained from Ma. Luisa
underlines the recognition of Capt. Obrero of the need
of a search warrant to enter the house. The
permission granted by was for the purpose of
ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged
“rebel” soldiers.
The permission did not include any authority
to conduct a room to room search once inside the
house. The police officers had ample time to procure
a search warrant but did not. Warrantless searches
were declared illegal because the officials conducting
the search had every opportunity to secure a search
warrant. The items taken were, therefore, products of
an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights.
As such, they are inadmissible in evidence in the
criminal actions instituted against them. The offense
of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum
but it does not follow that the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala
prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may
not be summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence,
the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the articles seized were confiscated
illegally and are therefore protected by the
exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as
evidence against the Veroys in the criminal action
against them for illegal possession of firearms.
Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search
warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need
of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the
same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness
there is no crime.
PEOPLE VS. DAMASO [GR 93516, 12 AUGUST
1992]
Facts:
On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a
Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the
152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and
some companions were sent to verify the presence of
CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang,
Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group
apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba,
Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When
interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that
there was an underground safehouse at Gracia
Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating
with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group
proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found
subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45
firearm and other items. After the raid, the group
proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under
surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie
Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier
arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a
visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she
worked with Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso. She
guided the group to the house rented by
Damaso(@Mendoza). When they reached the house,
the group found that it had already vacated by the
occupants.
Since Morados was hesitant to give the new
address of Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked
for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested
him to point out the new house rented by Damaso
(@Mendoza). The group again required Morados to
go with them. When they reached the house, the
group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that
they already knew that she was a member of the NPA
in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw
Morados she requested the group to go inside the
house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as
the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets
entitled “Ang Bayan,” xerox copiers and a computer
machine. They also found persons who were
companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita
Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric
Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados).
The group requested the persons in the house
to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco
opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for
subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and
ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of
the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and
other items. They confiscated the articles and brought
them to their headquarters for final inventory. They
likewise brought the persons found in the house to the
headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed
that Damaso (@Mendoza) was the lessee of the
house and owned the items confiscated therefrom.
Thus, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an
information filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree
1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of subversion, together with
Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita
Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa
y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @
Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz
Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz. Such information
was later amended to exclude all other persons
except Damaso from the criminal charge. Upon
arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution rested its case and offered its
exhibits for admission. The defense counsel
interposed his objections to the admissibility of the
prosecution’s evidence on grounds of its being
hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of
a search warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he
was not presenting any evidence for the accused. On
17 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision,
finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
sentencing the latter to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Damaso appealed.
Issue:
Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to
allow the warrantless search of his house.
Waiver of right is the consent given in entering
the house, resulting to seizure of evidence in plain
view.
The peace officers, while on patrol, heard
bursts of gunfire and they proceeded to investigate
the matter. This incident is considered an offense and
"an offense is committed in the presence or within the
view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY
AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE
THEREOF."

While on routine patrol duty, the Philippine

Held:
Constabulary officer patrolling heard gunfire within the
Damaso was singled out as the sole violator
vicinity. When they came upon the source, Rosillo
of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
was firing a gun into the air.
connection with the crime of subversion. There is no
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby
substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact
house of appellant Evaristo prompting the lawmen to
that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the
pursue him. Upon approaching the house, the patrol
lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other
saw appellants, Evaristo and Carillo, who were drunk.
subversive items were found or the owner of the said
Inquiring as to the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police
items. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
patrol were told that he had already escaped.
Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case against
Vallarta noticed a bulge on Carillo’s waist and
him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law
subsequently frisked him revealing .38 caliber
enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a
revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a
valid search and seizure proceedings.
member of the military nor had a valid license to
The constitutional immunity from
possess the said firearm, the gun was confiscated
unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
and Carillo invited for questioning.
personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the
Romeroso sought the consent of Evaristo for
person whose rights are invaded or one who is
entry into the latter’s house to search for Rosillo and
expressly authorized to do so in his or her . The
Evaristo consented.
records show that Damaso was not in his house at
Upon entry they found various firearms,
that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his
paraphernalia, and other effects, which became the
alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it.
basis for the charge of illegal possession of firearms.
There is no evidence that would establish the fact that
For their part, the appellants alleged that they
Luz Morados was indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was
were forcibly taken into custody. They denied
true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given
ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms,
her authority to open his house in his absence. The
contending that these were planted in their
prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco
possession by the prosecution witnesses and other
has such an authority. Without this evidence, the
police authorities.
authorities’ intrusion into Damaso’s dwelling cannot
be given any color of legality. While the power to
Issue:
search and seize is necessary to the public welfare,
Whether the firearms are considered illegally seized
still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
evidence? NO.
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
Ruling:
importance to justify indifference to the basic
The Court ruled that doctrine of seizure of
principles of government. As a consequence, the
evidence in plain view, objects inadvertently falling in
search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It
the plain view of an officer, who has a the right to be
would have been different if the situation here
in the position to have that view, are subject to
demanded urgency which could have prompted the
seizure and may be introduced as evidence.
authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the
In this case, Romerosa was granted
record is silent on this point. The fact that they came
permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his
to Damaso’s house at night time, does not grant them
house. The officer's purpose was to catch Rosillo
the license to go inside his house.
whom he saw had sought refuge inside. Therefore, it
is clear that the search for firearms was not
PEOPLE V. EVARISTO, G.R. NO. 93828, 216 SCRA
Romerosa's purpose in entering the house, thereby
431, DECEMBER 11, 1992
rendering his discovery of the firearms as accidental.
"Heard gunshots therefore an offense is being
The plain view doctrine will apply to the seizure of the
committed"
firearms and effects because their discovery was
unintentional.
Facts: The Court sustains the validly of the firearm's
seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the
rule on authorized warrantless arrests. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Valid warrantless arrests
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b)  When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In this case, the second circumstance “an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it” is applicable. The
peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire
and this proceeded to investigate the matter. This
incident is considered an offense and "an offense is
committed in the presence or within the view of an
officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or HEARS THE
DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND
PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF."
As for the existence of personal knowledge,
the gunfire, the bulge in Carillo’s waist, and the peace
officer’s professional instinct are more than sufficient
to grant him personal knowledge of the facts of the
crime that has just been committed. Consequently,
the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have
been seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest.
PEOPLE V. OMAWENG [GR 99050, 2 SEPTEMBER
1992]
Facts:
In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC
constables with the Mt. Province PC Command put up
a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to
Sagada and the other to Bontoc. They stopped and
checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint.
At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a cream-colored Ford
Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion
and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven
by Conway Omaweng and had no passengers. The
Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to
inspect the vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to.
When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they
saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by
the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on
the right side of the vehicle. They asked permission to
see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng
consented to. When they opened the bag, they found
that it contained 41 plastic packets of different sizes
containing pulverized substances. The constable
gave a packet to his team leader, who, after sniffing
the stuff concluded that it was marijuana. The
Constables thereafter boarded the vehicles and
proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the
incident to the PC Headquarters.
The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the
evidence custodian. The PC Forensic Chemist at
Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2
chemistry examinations of the substance contained in
the plastic packets taken from appellant and found
them to be positive for hashish or marijuana.
Omaweng was indicted for the violation of Section 4,
Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972),
as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the
MTC Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September
1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits
despite the granting of an extension of time to do so,
the court declared that he had waived his right to a
preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause
against Omaweng, ordered the elevation of the case
to the proper court. On 14 November 1988, the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province filed an
Information charging Omaweng with the violation of
Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended (Crim Case 713). After his motion
for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial
Fiscal, Omaweng entered a plea of not guilty during
his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on
the merits, the prosecution presented 4 witnesses.
Omaweng did not present any evidence other than
portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement,
dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution witnesses
Joseph Layong and David Fomocod.
On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated
its Judgment convicting Omaweng of the crime of
transporting prohibited drugs (Section 4, Article II of
RA 6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which
violates his Constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Held:
Omaweng was not subjected to any search
which may be stigmatized as a violation of his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to the
search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on
his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of the
PC Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-
examination or rebutted by Omaweng for he chose
not to testify on his own behalf. Omaweng waived his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures
when he voluntarily submitted to a search or consents
to have it made in his person or premises. He is
precluded from later complaining thereof right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be made either
expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid
search 41 packages of drugs were found, it behooved
the officers to seize the same; no warrant was
necessary for such seizure.
PEOPLE vs BARROS
Reference: GR 90640, 29 March 1994
FACTS
On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as
and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C.
Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus
bearing Plate ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan,
Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan,
Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both
M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at
the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton,
board the bus and seated himself on seat 18 after
putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus
continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-
as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their
station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the
carton under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected
the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana
and he asked the passengers who the owner of the
carton was but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C
Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and
C2C Bongyao invited Barros to the detachment for
questioning as the latter was the suspected owner of
the carton containing marijuana. Upon entering the
detachment the carton was opened in the presence of
Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the carton
of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus
conductor who pinpointed to Barros as the owner of
the carton of marijuana. Barros was charged with
violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After trial, the trial
court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of
Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed.
ISSUES
Whether or not the failure of the carton bearer to
object to the search made in the moving vehicle,
resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a
waiver?
RULINGS
NO.
The general rule is that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The evidence
secured thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search and
seizure — will be inadmissible in evidence "for any
purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a
judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying
out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute.
There are certain exceptions recognized in our law,
one of which relates to the search of moving vehicles.
Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of
moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. —
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to
secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle,
since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of
moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited
to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither
really searched nor their occupants subjected to
physical or body searches, the examination of the
vehicles being limited to visual inspection. When,
however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law offender or the contents or cargo of
the vehicle are or have been instruments or the
subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal
offense.
The Court has in the past found probable cause
to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive
search of moving vehicles in situations where (1)
there had emanated from a package the distinctive
smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics
Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National
Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from
informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would
be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or
"tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration"
agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into the
country on a particular airline flight on a given date;
(4) Narcom agents had received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province,
had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian,
because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he
failed to present his passport and other identification
papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom
agents had received confidential information that a
woman having the same physical appearance as that
of the accused would be transporting marijuana.
Herein, there is nothing in the record that any
circumstance which constituted or could have
reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace
officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by
Barros. The testimony of the law enforcement officers
who had apprehended the accused, and who had
searched the box in his possession, simply did not
suggest or indicate the presence of any such
probable cause.
The accused is not to be presumed to have
waived the unlawful search conducted on the
occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he
failed to object."
To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that
the right exists; secondly, that the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
The fact that the accused failed to object to the
entry into his house does not amount to a permission
to make a search therein. As the constitutional
quaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy
of the law. Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.
Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box
was equally nonpermissible and invalid. The "fruits" of
the invalid search and seizure — i.e., the 4) kilos of
marijuana — should therefore not have been admitted
in evidence against Barros.
People vs. Correa [GR 119246, 30 January 1998]
Facts:
A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo
Dulay was placed under surveillance by the Police
Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Western Police District Command (DEU-WPDC) on
account of confidential and intelligence reports
received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around
Bambang Street, Tondo, Manila. The police
surveillance brought forth positive results and
confirmed Dulay’s illegal drug trade. On 17 June
1994, operatives were alerted that Dulay would
transport and deliver a certain quantity of drugs that
night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948).
Thereafter, the operatives, together with the informer
proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board 3 vehicles,
and inconspicuously parked along the side of North
Cemetery and waited for the suspect. The police
informant spotted Dulay’s vehicle at 3:00 am. The
operatives tailed the subject jeepney until they
reached Bambang extension and Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, where they accosted the passengers of said
jeepney. The team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El
Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard, about two feet high,
loaded in the vehicle of the appellants. The can
contained 8 bundles of suspected dried marijuana
flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic
tapes. The team seized the suspected contrabands
and marked each bundle consecutively. The 3
suspects were brought to the police headquarters at
DEU-WPDC for investigation.
The packages of suspected marijuana were
submitted to the NBI for laboratory analysis to
determine their chemical composition. The tests
confirmed that the confiscated stuff were positive for
marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms. The
defense, however, contends that the 3 accused were
arrested without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City,
enroute to Dulay’s house to get the things of his child
allegedly rushed previously to the Metropolitan
Hospital, for an alleged charge of trafficking on
’shabu,’ and were brought to the WPDC headquarters
at U.N. Avenue, where they were detained. On 12
July 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC
Manila (Branch 35) indicting Antonio Correa y Cayton
@ “Boyet,” Rito Gunida y Sesante @ “Dodong,” and
Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ “Boy Kuba” for having
violated Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended.
When arraigned, the 3 accused pleaded not guilty.
After trial and on 3 March 1995, the lower court found
the appellants guilty as charged and were sentenced
to death and a fine of P10 million.
Issue:
Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the
warrantless search and seizure, due to waiver on their
part.
Held:
Antonio Correa y Cayton @ “Boyet,” Rito
Gunida y Sesante @ “Dodong,” and Leonardo Dulay
y Santos @ “Boy Kuba” are precluded from assailing
the warrantless search and seizure when they
voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation
during the search and seizure. They never protested
when the police officer opened the tin can loaded in
their vehicle, nor when he opened one of the bundles,
nor when they, together with their cargo of drugs and
their vehicle, were brought to the police station for
investigation and subsequent prosecution. When one
voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it
made on his person or premises, he is precluded from
later complaining thereof The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived
and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.”
Further, they effectively waived their
constitutional right against the search and seizure by
their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon
arraignment and by participating in the trial.
CABALLES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt.
Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a
routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan,
Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered
with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was
loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle.
The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y
Taiño. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he
did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous.
With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked
the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively
owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR).
The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and
valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where
the wires came from and Caballes answered that they
came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers
away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the
vehicle with the highvoltage wires were brought to the
Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures
of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which
were turned over to the Police Station Commander of
Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7
days in the Municipal jail.
Caballes was charged with the crime of theft
in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the
arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence,
trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional
Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment,
finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November
1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes
appealed the decision by certiorari.
Issue:
WON the warrantless search and seizure made by
the police officers, and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virtue thereof was valid.

Held:
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable
right of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III
thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2),
Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4)
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps
prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court must be complied with. In the
exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter
cannot be performed except without a warrant, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place
or thing searched and the character of the articles
procured.
It is not controverted that the search and
seizure conducted by the police officers was not
authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobility of
these vehicles, however, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate
searches without warrants if made within the interior
of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
Herein, the police officers did not merely
conduct a visual search or visual inspection of
Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It
thus cannot be considered a simple routine check.
Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down
because the police officers who were on routine patrol
became suspicious when they saw that the back of
the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which,
according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The
fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because
it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati
leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would
justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In addition, the police authorities do not claim
to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable
wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have
sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is
replete with cases where tipped information has
become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none
exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is
lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his
right against unreasonable searches.
The manner by which the two police officers
allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to
conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When
Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja
approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive." By uttering those words, it cannot be said
the police officers were asking or requesting for
permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle
of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were
informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will
search his vehicle. The "consent" given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent
within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In
addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity
of consented search, it will be noted that the police
authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for
the consent of the accused to be searched. And the
consent of the accused was established by clear and
positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive
submission be construed as an implied acquiescence
to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable
wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record
are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His
guilt can only be established without violating the
constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable search and seizure.
PEOPLE vs ASIS
Reference: GR No. 142531 October 15,
2002
Facts:
Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y
Saricon were charged in an Information; the
information stating "That on or about February 10,
1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain
and by means of force and violence upon person, to
wit: by then and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN
@ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the
different parts of the body thereafter take, rob and
carry away the following, to wit: Cash money in the
amount of P20,000.00; 1 wristwatch' 1 gold necklace;
and undetermined items; or all in the total amount of
P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING
GUAN @ ROY CHING against his will, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid
amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine
Currency, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal
stab wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death." When arraigned, both accused
pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were
assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but also by
an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. The
prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although none of
them had actually seen the crime committed, strong
and substantial circumstantial evidence presented by
them attempted to link both accused to the crime.
After due trial, both accused were found guilty
and sentenced to death. RTC of Manila held that the
"crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide
under Article 294, No. 1 of the RPC," ruled that
"although no witnesses to the actual killing and
robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence
including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from
both accused definitely proved that the two (2)
committed the crime," and appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence,
superior strength and treachery and thus sentenced
both accused to the supreme penalty of death.
Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme
Court. Both the accused do not question the legality
of their arrest, as they made no objection thereto
before the arraignment, but object to the introduction
of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered
from the bag of Formento; arguing that the search
was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair
of shorts illegal and taints themas inadmissible.
The prosecution, on the other hand, contends
that it was Formento's wife who voluntarily
surrendered the bag that contained the bloodstained
trousers of the victim, and thus claims that her act
constituted a valid consent to the search without a
warrant.
Issues:
Whether or not Formento, a deaf-mute, has given
consent to the recovery of the bloodstained pair of
short, in his possession during the warrantless
search?
Rulings:
NO. Primarily, the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the
person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly
authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the
present case, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair
of shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his
wife and mother, was present.
Being the very subject of the search, necessarily,
he himself should have given consent. Since he was
physically present, the waiver could not have come
from any other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of
Customs does not apply as the accused therein was
not present when the search was made.
Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it must be
shown that first, the right exists; second, the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and third, the person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right. Herein,
Formento could not have consented to a warrantless
search when, in the first place, he did not understand
what was happening at that moment. There was no
interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the
arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case
Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. "as the
constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place
the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer’s authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the
law," becomes even more pronounced in the present
case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there
was no interpreter to explain to him what was
happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search
without a warrant may be attributed to plain and
simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained
pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the
occasion of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is
tainted and should thus be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In the language
of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly,
as to evidence vis-a-is the case in its totality,
circumstantial evidence that merely arouses
suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not
sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise
the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It must
engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the
constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and
the accused deserves acquittal.
Title: PEOPLE vs TUDTUD
GR No. 144037 September 26,
2003
Facts:
Sometime during the months of July and August
1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a
report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier
about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his
neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who
was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1
Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their
superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the
Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station,
conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in
Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered
information and learned that Tudtud was involved in
illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was
engaged in selling marijuana.
Solier informed the police that Tudtud had
headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day
with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud
as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At
around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed of
PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan
posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and
McArthur Highway to await Tudtud’s arrival. All wore
civilian clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked
from a bus and helped each other carry a carton
marked “King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away
from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta
observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s description.
The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1 Floreta
and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and
identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto
informed them that the police had received
information that stocks of illegal drugs would be
arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s
description denied that he was carrying any drugs.
PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents
of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright.”
Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion
looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish,
beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a
striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1
Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They
contained what seemed to the police officers as
marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud
and his companion, informed them of their rights and
brought them to the police station. The two did not
resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for
examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from
the confiscated items confirmed the police officers’
suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of
marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained
another 890 grams.
Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong,
were subsequently charged before the RTC of Davao
City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon
arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The
defense, however, reserved their right to question the
validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence
against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud,
denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.
Swayed by the prosecution’s evidence beyond
reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting both accused as charged and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of P500,000.00.
On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong
assign, among other errors, the admission in
evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim
were seized in violation of their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Tudtud’s implied
acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s all right”
when the police officers requested that the box be
opened) be considered a waiver?
RULINGS
NO. The right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless search
of appellants’ belongings under the first exception, as
a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search
incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules
of Court. It is significant to note that the search in
question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence
holds that the arrest must precede the search; the
process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause
to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
The question, therefore, is whether the police
herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with
a great degree of consistency, is that “reliable
information” alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he “has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.” For the exception in Section 5
(a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable
information alone is insufficient. Thus, herein, in no
sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers that
Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described
as “personal,” having learned the same only from their
informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he
obtained his information only from his neighbors and
the friends of Tudtud. Solier’s information is hearsay.
Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police
perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own
“surveillance.”
This “surveillance,” it turns out, did not actually
consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of
plying his illegal trade, but of a mere “gathering of
information from the assets there.” The police officers
who conducted such “surveillance” did not identify
who these “assets” were or the basis of the latter’s
information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay,
not of personal knowledge. Finally, there is an
effective waiver of rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures only if the following requisites
are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2)
The person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second
and third requisites. Records disclose that when the
police officers introduced themselves as such and
requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the
carton box supposedly containing the marijuana,
Tudtud said “it was alright.” He did not resist and
opened the box himself.
Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity given
under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is,
thus, considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently,
Tudtud's lack of objection to the search and seizure is
not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or
a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come
under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained
thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is
no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the
arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of
Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.