Statcon Finals Notes PDF

ATTY.
ARSENIK PAGADUAN Statutory Construction FINALS
LINGUISTIC CANONS OF INTERPRETATIONS
take note: These are only rules of thumb. If there is a legislative intent contrary to these, then such will prevail notwithstanding
these rules.
F. Last Antecedent Rule

w Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated not those which are distantly or
remotely located. Otherwise stated, qualifying words or phrases refer to the language immediately preceding the qualifier, unless
common sense shows that it was meant to apply to something more distant or less obvious.
w Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context requires otherwise .
w RULE: Use of comma to separate an antecedent from the rest exerts a dominant influence in the application of the doctrine of
antecedent
w DOCTRINE OF ANTECEDENT RULE: When a qualifying word or phrase is used with a group of obligations or conditions, the
qualifying words are presumed to modify only the condition or obligation that immediately precedes it (the “last antecedent”). If a
comma separates a modifying phrase from a list of prior antecedents, then the modifying phrase modifies each of the prior antecedents.
If there is no comma, then the modifying phrase modifies only the final antecedent.
 Thus, if a statute applied to “dentists, nurses, and doctors in a hospital,” pursuant to the doctrine of last antecedent, the limiting
phrase “in a hospital” would modify only “doctors” and not “dentists [and] nurses,” unless a contrary legislative intent were
found.
 In contrast, if the statute applied to “dentists, nurses, and doctors, in a hospital,” the limiting phrase “in a hospital” would modify
all of the professionals because a comma separates “in a hospital” from all three antecedents. Notice how one, simple comma
can significantly affect the meaning under this doctrine.
w This doctrine is not absolute. It is meant to be an aid to interpretation, especially as it conflicts with general comma rules. The choice to
put a comma between the qualifying phrase and the preceding list of antecedents is grammatically optional. For this reason, judges will
ignore the doctrine when applying it would result in an absurd result or would make no sense.
w Exception: Where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be
made extensive to the whole.
w Remember: The legislature is presumed to know the rules of Statutory Construction. It should be taken against them when the judge is
misled with regard to the interpretation of the law due to the sloppiness in the wordings of the law.
CADAYONA v CA
Court of Appeals dismisses the petition for review filed by Cadayona on the ground that three annexes attached to it were mere xeroc and not certified true
copies. Cadayona maintains that Administrative Circular 1-95 requires that only copies of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from and material
points of record referred in the petition shall be certified; said circular does not require that the annexes be certified true copies. Under the so-called doctrine of last
antecedent, the phrase "certified true copies" does not qualify the remote phrase "other supporting papers"; the qualifier phrase "certified true copies" only refers to the
immediately succeeding phrase "such material portions of the record as referred to therein". Cadayona begs that this court liberally construe the rules in his favor given
that his appeal was dismissed on a technicality. Sm
"Sec. 6. Contents of the Petition. The petition or review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or
agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b ) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for
the review;
(c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from,
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and
(d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the
specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein."
Supreme Court says that the proper application of the doctrine shows that the phrase "certified true copies" qualifies the words nearest to it i.e. "such material
portion of the record as are referred to therein, and other supporting papers."
MAPA v ARROYO
We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of the so-called doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of
Section 21. He would thereby have the enumeration of "facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development" interpreted to mean that the
demonstrative phrase "which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other forms of development" and not to "facilities,
improvements and infrastructures."
While this subserves his purpose, such bifurcation whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set apart from the antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous.
The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it
be prevented by the context. In the present case, the employment of the word "and" between "facilities, improvements, infrastructures" and "other forms of
development," far from supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or union.
G. Reddendo Singular Singuilis

w “rendering each to his own,”or “by referring each to each,”each phrase or expression to its corresponding object
w Referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the word should be taken
distributively.
w This canon is appropriate when a complex sentence has multiple subjects and either multiple verbs or objects that are incorrectly
placed. “Under the canon reddendo singula singuilis, where a sentence contains several antecedentsand several consequents they
are to be read distributively. In other words, the words are to be applied to the subjects that seem most properly related by
context and applicability.”
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ATTY. ARSENIK PAGADUAN Statutory Construction FINALS
w By “rendering,”or associating, each object or verb to its appropriate subject, the sentence is correctly understood.
 Ex. 1. A will provides, “I devise and bequeth any real property and personal property to UST.”
→ “devise” refers to “real property” while “bequeth” refers to “personal property”
 Ex. 2. A contract might say “for money or other good consideration paid or given.”
→ “money” refers to “paid” while “other good consideration” refers to “given”
AMADORA v CA
On April 13, 1972, while in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, Pablito Daffon shot to death Alfredo Amadora, his classmate. Daffon was
convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two
other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees . On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved . In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that
Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the
students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and
that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.
The pertinent part of Article 2180 reads as follows: Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except
where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
CITY OF MANILA v LAGUIO, JR.

Mayor Lim signed an ordinance, PD 499, which prohibits establishments such as beerhouses, karaoke bars, motels, inns from operating in the Malate District.
Malate Tourist Dev’t Corporation averred that the ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional. Under the Local Gov’t Code of ’91, ordinances may be valid if it
conforms to subsantive requirements. PD 499 contraverted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area and allowed establishment and operation of all
kinds of commercial establishments except those specified therein.
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can
be gleaned from another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of
massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the contractors defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section
also defined amusement as a pleasurable diversion and entertainment, synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun; and amusement
places to include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself
by seeing or viewing the show or performances.
Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim r eddendo singula
singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect,
and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under
consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.
FORTICH v CORONA
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated November 17, 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate MRs of its earlier
Decision of April 24, 1998, as a result of which the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions for reconsideration inasmuch as the
matter should have been referred to the Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution. Respondents pray that the case be referred to
this Court en banc. Article 8, Section 4(3) provides:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
The Court says that the word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved must refer to matters, applying the rule of reddendo
singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these
words appear.

The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to
dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion
for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. The assailed decision is not
reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed.
/// In practice, what happened in Fortich case is not always followed. Sometimes, a justice may modify it according to what he feels like. If faced in
that situation, you may file an MR citing a precedent which will strengthen your claim that the change was made ultra vires or beyond one’s legal
authority considering that particular provision in the Constitution. If there is an unauthorized modification made by a division, you could say that the
precedent should not be applied to your case in the first place because the same was rendered beyond the authority of the division of the
Supreme Court. ///
H. Use of “Shall” or “Must” or “Ought”
w The terms shall, must and ought are mandatory in nature.
 Mandatory – commands that something be done or not be done in a particular way; requires obedience
 Directoty – permissive or discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from
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ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same result
obtained
w The word “shall” loses its mandatory import if there is a proviso/condition connected to it.
MIRASOL v CA
It is basic legal construction that where words of command such as shall, must, or ought are employed, they are generally and ordinarily
regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the word shall is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, which the courts ought
to enforce.
SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. In any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be
notified by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the
validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that,
contrary to petitioners stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that
such notice is required in any action and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for
construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
BERCES v GUIGONA
We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and
the two laws must in fact be read together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." As
worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer
therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.
The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to
order a stay of execution, such authority can provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in administrative cases.
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire provisions in which it is
found, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In
the case at bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might
be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the execution of the decision is in order.
DIOKNO V REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION

The appeal involves the interpretation of section 2 of Republic Act No. 302, which provides:
. . . And provided, also, That investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to
the availability of loanable funds, and any provision of the their charters, articles of incorporation's, by-laws, or rules and regulations to the
contrary notwithstanding, accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate for the following
purposes only: (1) the acquisition of real property for use as the applicant's home, or (2) the building or construction of the residential house of the
payee of said certificate: . . .
It is first contended by the appellant that the above provision is mandatory, not only because it employs the word "shall", which in its ordinary signification is
mandatory, not permissive, but also because the provision is applicable to institutions of credit under the control of the Government, and because otherwise the
phrases "subject to availability of loanable funds" and "any provisions of this charter, . . . and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding" would be superfluous.
It is true that its ordinary signification the word "shall" is imperative. However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as "many", when so
required by the context or by the intention of the statute.
In the provision subject controversy, it is to be noted that the verb-phrase "shall accept or discount" has two modifiers, namely, "subject to availability
of loanable funds" and "at not more that two per centum per annum for ten years." As to the second modifier, the interest to be charged, there seems to be
no question that the verb phrase is mandatory, because not only does the law use "at not more" but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of
the backpay certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as
to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. The phrase "subject" means
"being under the contingency of" (Webster's Int. Dict.) a condition. If the acceptance or discount of the certificates to be "subject" to the condition of the availability of a
loanable funds, it is evident that the Legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are "available loanable funds." In other words,
acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds.
ABBAS v ABALOS
Petitioner’s posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory import of the word "shall" is misplaced. It is petitioner’s view that the language of Section 12 is
permissive and therefore the mandate in Section 7 has been transformed into a matter within the discretion of the DOJ. To support this stance, petitioner cites a
portion of Agpalo’s Statutory Construction which reads:
For instance, the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act 304 which states that "banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the Government
shall, subject to availability of funds xxx, accept at a discount at not more than two per centum for ten years such (backpay) certificate" implies not a mandatory, but a
discretionary, meaning because of the phrase "subject to availability of funds." Similarly, the word "shall" in the provision to the effect that a corporation violating the
corporation law "shall, upon such violation being proved, be dissolved by quo warranto proceedings" has been construed as "may."
After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes apparent that the same is not applicable to the provision in question. In the cited passage, the word
"shall" departed from its mandatory import connotation because it was connected to certain provisos/conditions: "subject to the availability of funds" and "upon such
violation being proved." No such proviso/condition, however, can be found in Section 7 of the subject circular. Hence, the word "shall" retains its
mandatory import.
/// History on whether or not petition for review could still be filed in DOJ despite the fact that the accused has already been arraigned, the
landmark case will be Crespo v Mogul. Crespo in that case is Mark Jimenez. Mark Jimenez is a billonaire, computer-genius, who has set up a
computer business in the US. However, he was in prison due to illegal campaign contributions. He offered money left and right. His children
petitioned to restrain him from giving out money. He was declared a prodigal. Once you are declared a prodical, you can no longer have the
disposition of your assests. ///
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I. Use of the Word “May”

w The use of the word “may” is to be determined in each case from the apparent intention of the statute as gathered from the context.
w This is PERMISSIVE in nature; meaning it is directory or discretionary.
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS v INCIONG

In re Guarina, this Court had this to say on the proper interpretation of the use of this word in a statute, viz-
Whether the word "may", a statute is to be construed as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring
discretion, is to be determined in each case from the apparent intention of the statute as gathered from the context, as well as from the
language of the particular provision. The question in each case is whether, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, it can be
said that a purpose existed on the part of the legislator to enact a law mandatory in his character. If it can, then it should be given a mandatory effect; if not, then it
should be given its ordinary permissive effect. ....
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION V CA

Rago argued that the word may as used in Section 5, Rule VI concerning the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the SSCs 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure
is not mandatory but merely permissive: The party aggrieved by the order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission may file a motion for
reconsideration thereof within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the same. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed any party.
The ordinary acceptations of the terms may and shall may be resorted to as guides in ascertaining the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions.
As regards adjective rules in general, the term may is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion, while the word shall is imperative and operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced. However, these are not absolute and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration of
the entire provision, its nature, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other, the convertibility of said terms either as
mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory construction.
Conformably therewith, we have consistently held that the term may is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of
that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply with the
conditions attached thereto.
Applying these guidelines, we can construe Section 5, Rule VI as granting Rago, or any member of the System aggrieved by the SSCs resolution, the option of
filing a motion for reconsideration which he may or may not exercise. Should he choose to do so, he is allowed to file only one motion for reconsideration within fifteen
days from the promulgation of the questioned resolution.
J. Use of the Word “Or”

w the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated unless the context
requires a different interpretation (People v. Martin, 39 SCRA 340)
GUZMAN V COMELEC
Section 261 (w) covers not only one act but two, i.e., the act under subparagraph (a) above and that under subparagraph (b) above. For purposes of the
prohibition, the acts are separate and distinct, considering that Section 261(w) uses the disjunctive or to separate subparagraphs (a) and (b). In
legal hermeneutics, or is a disjunctive that expresses an alternative or gives a choice of one among two or more things. The word signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another thing in an enumeration. It should be construed, as a rule, in the sense that it ordinarily
implies as a disjunctive word. According to Black, too, the word and can never be read as or , or vice versa, in criminal and penal statutes, where
the rule of strict construction prevails. Consequently, whether or not the treasury warrant in question was intended for public works was even of no moment in
determining if the legal provision was violated.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

SECTION 1. — Municipal License Tax On Proprietors Or Operators Of ... Breweries, ... Proprietors or operators of ... breweries, ... within the territorial limits of this
municipality shall pay a graduated quarterly fixed tax based on the gross value in money or actual market value at the time of removal, of the manufactured articles
from their factories ... during the preceding quarter in accordance with the following schedules: ...: (Ordinance No. 23 (1966), as amended by Ordinance No. 25 (1967))
Considering that the phrase "gross value in money" is followed by the words "or actual market value", it is evident that the latter was intended to explain and
clarify the preceding phrase. For the word "or" may be used as the equivalent of "that is to say" and gives that which precedes it the same
significance as that which follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes interpretative or expository of the preceding word. Certainly,
we cannot assume that the phrase "or actual market value" was a mere surplusage, for it serves to clarify and explain the meaning and import of the preceding phrase.
In any event, it is the duty of the courts, so far reasonably practicable, to read and interpret a statute as to give life and effect to its provisions, so as to render it a
harmonious whole.
K. Use of the Word “And”

w the word and is a conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added or taken along with the first
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ariete, G.R. No. 164152, 21 January 2010)
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v ARIETE

On 27 November 1997, the CIR issued RMO No. 63-97 and clarified issues related to the implementation of the VAP. RMO No. 63-97 provides:
3. Persons/cases not covered:
The following shall be excluded from the coverage of the VAP under this Order:
xxx
3.4 Persons under investigation by the Tax Fraud Division and/or the Regional Special Investigation Divisions as a result of verified information
filed by an informer under Section 281 of the NIRC, as amended, and duly recorded in the Official Registry Book of the Bureau before
the date of availment under the VAP; (Underscoring in the original, boldfacing supplied)
It is evident from these RMOs that the CIR was consistent in using the word “and” and has even underscored the word in RMO No. 63-97. This denotes
that in addition to the filing of the verified information, the same should also be duly recorded in the Official Registry Book of the BIR. The conjunctive word “and”
is not without legal significance. It means in addition to. The word “and”, whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentences,
must be accepted as binding together and as rela ting to one another. “And” in statutory construction implies conjunction or union.
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L. Use of the Word “And/Or”
CHINA BANKING CO v HDMF

The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words and/or.
In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words and/or should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., either and or; e.g. butter and/or
eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs.
The term and/or means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and and the disjunctive or; or that one word or the other
may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered
from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive or alone will exclude the
combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive and will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing
alone.
It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term and/or is that the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably.
PRESUMPTIONS IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
Presumptions. These are aids to the reasoning and argumentation, which assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of some given
inquiry. They may be grounded to general experience, or probability of a kind; or merely on policy and convenience. (Prof. James Bradley Thayer)
These are legal inferences or assumptions that a fact exists based on the known or proven existence of
some other fact or group of facts. Most of presumptions are rules of evidence calling for certain result in a given case unless the adversely
affected party overcomes it with other evidence. A presumption shifts the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party, who can then
attempt to overcome the presumption.
TWO KINDS OF PRESUMPTIONS

1) REBUTTABLE (or DISPUTABLE). Meaning that they are rejected if proven to be false or at least thrown into sufficient doubt
by the evidence.
9 Ex. presumption of innocence. If you will be able to present the correct quantum of evidence, then the presumption will be
overturned.
2) CONCLUSIVE. Meaning that they must be accepted to be true without any opportunity for rebuttal. No matter how solid your
evidence is, you cannot overturn the presumption.
a. Title of the lessor with respect to the lessee
Ò As to the title of the land, it is conclusive to the tenant (the lessee cannot say that the lessor has no claim or title to the land
and thus has no right to demand payment; lessee cannot dispute that the lessor does not own the property wherein s/he
is a lessee of)
b. By virtue of the application of estoppel
Ò You led someone to believe something, and based on that belief he acted pursuant to that belief, you cannot disavow it
because it will be prejudicial/it would cause damage on his part. This is the doctrine of equity.
Ò estoppel is primarily based on the doctrine of good faith and the avoidance of harm that will befall the innocent party due to
its injurious reliance, the failure to apply it in this case would result in a gross travesty of justice. (25 SCRA 70)
PRESUMPTIONS AFFECT THE BURDEN OF PROOF

A He who alleges must prove. He who claims to the contrary has the duty to present evidence necessary to establish the amount of
evidence required by law.
A Prima facie case, “on its face,”which means that there is enough evidence to convict the accused
A Quantum of Evidence – amount of evidence
9 Criminal Case: Proof beyond reasonable doubt
9 Civil Case: Preponderance of Evidence
9 Administrative Case: Substantial Evidence; there are exceptions as there times when the evidence needed must be clear and
convincing, not just substantial
A. Presumption of Validity and Constitutionality of Laws

w Inconsistency between laws is never presumed. There must be clear showing of repugnance, that there was indeed an inflation of the
Constitution
w All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt
w Liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted
Remman Enterprises v. Professional regulatory Board of Real Estate Service

R.A. No. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was signed into law on June 29, 2009 by Pres. GMA. Real estate service practitioners were under
the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its
consumer regulation functions, but was transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate
Service (PRBRES) created under the new law. IRR of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on July 21, 2010 by the PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of
2010. Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association (CREBA sought to declare as void and unconstitutional the
provisions of Secs. 28(a), 29, and 32 of R.A. No. 9646.
5

The Supreme Court ruled that RA No. 9646 did not violate the "one title-one subject" rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution, due
process, and equal protection clause, nor was in conflict with P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648.
Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of
the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the
challenged act must be struck down.
Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which
supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted."
B. Presumption against Injustice
Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines

Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, detained and raped Karen Salvacion. He was criminally charged with the crime of Serious Illegal Detention and four counts of
rape. Subsequently, a civil case for damages with preliminary attachment was also filed against him. The issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment was granted.
Central Bank of the Philippines and China Banking Corporation invoked the provision of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 ,which was copied verbatim from
a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246, to the effect that the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli are exempted from attachment or garnishment.
The SC said that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted at a time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and
presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if
not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of
those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so
doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the
Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of
a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny. We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Tecla Padua

INTENT OF THE LAW: A thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unles swithin the intent of the lawmakers.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered. Celestino Padua and Eustaquia Paua sold their shares to Carlos
and Casimira Alonzo in 1963 and 1964, respectively. Mariano Padua and Tecla Padua sought to redeem the area sold. Mariano’s was dismissed because he was a
US citizen. The right of redemption of Tecla had already lapsed not having been within 30 days from the notice of sales in 1963 and 1964.
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of
the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be
sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation,
we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
The Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.
The right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. when the first complaint for redemption was filed,
the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. The co-heirs in this case were
undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14
years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.
So we have done in this case.
C. Presumption against Implied Repeal
Lledo v. Lledo
Cesar Lledo was an employee of GSIS and was dismissed from the service. His son, Cesar, Jr., sought only the return of his father’s personal contributions to
the GSIS, and not claiming any of the benefits that Cesar would have been entitled to had he not been dismissed from the service, such as retirement benefits.
Sec. 9 of C.A. No. 186 states: Effect of dismissal or separation from service. Upon dismissal for cause of a member of the System,
the benefits under his membership policy shall be automatically forfeited to the System, except one-half of the cash or
6

surrender value, which amount shall be paid to such member, or in case of death, to his beneficiary. Xxx
In 1951, R.A. No. 660 amended a couple of sections of CA 186. Thus, Section 11(d) of R.A. No. 660 should be deemed to have amended C.A.
No. 186: Upon dismissal for cause or on voluntary separation, he shall be entitled only to his own premiums and voluntary
deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly.
In 1977, P.D. No. 1146, an act Amending, Expanding, Increasing and Integrating the Social Security and Insurance Benefits of Government
Employees and Facilitating the Payment thereof under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, and for other purposes, was issued. No
provision dealing specifically with GSIS members dismissed from the service for cause, or their entitlement to the premiums they have paid.
Subsequently, R.A. No. 8291 was enacted in 1997, expressly amending P.D. No. 1146. R.A. No. 8291, Sec. 4: A member separated from the
service shall continue to be a member, and shall be entitled to whatever benefits he has qualified to in the event of any contingency compensable
under this Act.
None of the subsequent laws expressly repealed Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended. None of the subsequent laws
expressly repealed the earlier laws. The inevitable conclusion then is that Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, continues to govern.
GR: Implied repeals are not favored.

XPNs: Two Instances of Implied Repeal
1. When the provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, in which case, the later act,
to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
è In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent with and repugnant to the existing law
that they cannot be reconciled and made to stand together.
2. When the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute; thus, it will operate to
repeal the earlier law.
D. Presumption against Ineffectiveness
Paras v. COMELEC
Here is petition for recall with regard to the incumbent Punong Barangay Danilo Paras who won the regular barangay elections in 1994. Paras cited Section
74(b) of RA 7160, of the LGC, which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election; insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election
was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter.
Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is,
during the second year of his term of office.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and
the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under
which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained
away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
E. Presumption against Absurdity
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.

ESSO overpaid its income tax in 1959, and was given tax credit. CIR found they were short of income tax payment in 1960. CIR demanded it be paid. ESSO
paid in protest and argued that their tax credit should have been subtracted from the amount due.
CIR: tax credit could not be so considered until it has been finally approved and the taxpayer duly notified thereof. ESSO tax credit was only approved in 1964, it
could not be availed of in reduction of ESSO’s earlier tax deficiency for the year 1960. Invokes Sec. 51 of Tax Code.
To interpret the words of the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply can not and should not be countenanced. "Nothing is better settled
than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. That is a principle that goes back to In re Allen (2 Phil.
630) decided on October 29, 1903, where it was held that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."
"Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd
conclusion."
F. Presumption against Undesirable Consequences Never Intended by the Legislative Measure
Ursua v. CA
Caesar Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez in order to get a copy of the complaint. He was charged guilty for violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by
R.A. No. 6085, An Act ro Regulate the Use of Aliases. The Court says that Ursua made the use of the name of Oscar Perez in an isolated transaction where he was
not even legally required to expose his real identity. Under said act, an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority. His act does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142, as amended under which he is prosecuted.
There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of
which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
G. Presumption against Irrepealable Laws

w One legislature cannot enact irrepealable legislation or limit or restrict its own power or the power of its successors as to the repeal of
statute. The act of one legislature is not binding upon and does not tie the hands of future legislatures.
7

The City of Davao v. RTC Davao

It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws.
Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative
milieu. Their allowance promotes an unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive to the times. As
Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, [t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions.
Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change.
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body,
considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
The Courts position is aligned with entrenched norms of statutory construction. In Duarte v. Dade, the Court cited with approval Lewis Southerland on
Statutory Construction, which states:
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial
jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or
restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may
modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original
act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to
a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes. (Emphasis supplied.)
Datu Kida v. Senate

Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article
XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as majority
of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a
quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage
of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.
CONSTRUCTIONS OF PARTICULAR STATUTES
take note: The default rule in construction of statute is the PLAIN-MEANING RULE. If a statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
A. Strict Construction
w Your interpretation must be in accord with the letter and purpose of the law
w Giving exact and technical meaning and clearly within the letter and purpose of the law
B. Liberal Construction
w Go for the intent, but do not break the words of the law
w One can stretch it but must not break it, must not be inconsistent with or contrary to the intention of the law.
w The meaning of the statute may be extended to matters which come within the evils which the law seeks to suppress or correct.
C. Penal Statutes
w Time-honored principle: penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
w In construing penal statutes, as between two reasonable but contradictory constructions, the one more favorable to the accused
should be upheld
People v. Temporada GR No. 173473

The reason for this rule is elucidated in an eminent treatise on statutory construction in this wise:
It is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking
to enforce statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are sought to be imposed. This simply means that
words are given their ordinary meaning and that any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected
to a criminal statute. This canon of interpretation has been accorded the status of a constitutional rule under principles of due process, not
subject to abrogation by statute.
The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed has several justifications based on a concern for the rights and freedoms of
accused individuals. Strict construction can assure fairness when courts understand it to mean that penal statutes must give a clear and
unequivocal warning, in language people generally understand, about actions that would result in liability and the nature of potential
penalties. A number of courts have said:
the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed is a fundamental principle which in our judgment will never
be altered. Why? Because the lawmaking body owes the duty to citizens and subjects of making unmistakably clear those
acts for the commission of which the citizen may lose his life or liberty. Therefore, all the canons of interpretation which
apply to civil statutes apply to criminal statutes, and in addition there exists the canon [of strict construction] . The burden
lies on the lawmakers, and inasmuch as it is within their power, it is their duty to relieve the situation of all doubts.
xxxx
Additionally, strict construction protects the individual against arbitrary discretion by officials and judges. As one judge noted: the
8

courts should be particularly careful that the bulwarks of liberty are not overthrown, in order to reach an offender who is, but perhaps ought not to
be, sheltered behind them.
But also, for a court to enforce a penalty where the legislature has not clearly and unequivocally prescribed it
could result in judicial usurpation of the legislative function. One court has noted that the reason for the rule is to guard against the
creation, by judicial construction, of criminal offenses not within the contemplation of the legislature. Thus the rule requires that before a person
can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute sought to be applied. And, so, where a statute is open to more than
one interpretation, it is strictly construed against the state. Courts further rationalize this application of the rule of strict construction on the ground
that it was not the defendant in the criminal action who caused ambiguity in the statute. Along these same lines, courts also assert that since the
state makes the laws, they should be most strongly construed against it. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Villase ñor v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 180700

Imposed during the pendency of proceedings, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is
charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from office. Thus, preventive suspension is distinct from the penalty. While the former may be imposed on a
respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter may be meted out to him at the final disposition of the case.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 on preventive suspension is not a penal provision. It is procedural in nature. Hence, the strict construction rule finds no
application.The Court expounded on this point in Buenaseda v. Flavier:
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory Construction,
Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is
imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory
Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People
v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644). (Underlining supplied)
As We have already established, preventive suspension is not, in actual fact, a penalty at all. It is a procedural rule.
D. Statutes in Derogation of Fundamental Rights

w Anything against fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution shall be strictly construed against their violators. The liberal
construction of the fundamental rights must be adopted, none must restrict one’s fundamental rights.
Prov’l. Chapter of Laguna, Nacionalista Party vs. COMELEC, 122 SCRA 423, No. L-53460 May 27, 1983
Allegedly, Felicisimo T. San Luis is guilty of “turncoatism,” in violation of Section 10, Article XII (C) of the 1973 Constitution in relation to Section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 and P.D. No. 1661, as amended by P.D. No. 1661-A after switching party affiliation during his term of office. Supreme Court said that contention of
the petitioner is not tenable. It is appropriate to note that private respondent was elected governor on November 8, 1971 for a four-year term or up to 1975. As correctly
pointed out by private respondent, that the term of office of those elected in the November 1971 elections expired on December 31, 1975, the period intended by the
framers to be covered by the constitutional prohibition, can be gleaned from among the questions asked during the February 27, 1975 referendum and from one of the
whereases of P.D. No. 1296, also known as “The 1978 Election Code.”
In fine, what is essential is the political party of the elective public official as of the date of his election and during the four-year term to which he had been elected
and not his political inclinations after the said four-year term expires.
Indeed, “of two reasonably possible constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of
which would not do so, latter construction must be adopted” (16 C.J.S., 69 footnote). Hence, the more logical interpretation is that which gives effect to
Section 10 of Article XII (C) of the 1973 Constitution and does not violate the individual’s basic right to association.
Genaro R. Reyes Construction, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 116, G.R. No. 108718 July 14, 1994
Bill of Rights; Equal Protection Clause; Though the law be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet if it is applied and administered by the public
authorities charged with their administration with an evil eye and unequal hand so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination, the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that under Paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1870, the DPWH may take over or award a project to another
contractor whenever work is not done on schedule, meaning anywhere from zero slippage to 15% slippage. This would lead to hopeless contradiction between
Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 2. A law cannot possibly negate in one paragraph what it grants in another. Paragraph 2 can only be interpreted as allowing
discretion after the 15% limit in Paragraph 1 is exceeded. It cannot be doubted that in cases of force majeure, revolution, anomalous transactions in the DPWH itself,
and other similar reasons, the Department Head may still extend the contract beyond 15% slippage. Only then may sound discretion come in.
E. Rules of Court
w Sec. 6, Rule 1, Rules of Court: These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
 Rationale: According to the Court, no one has vested right in the rules of procedure.
w Anything about procedure must be liberally construed. The only exceptions are the provisions in connection with the acquisition of
the jurisdiction of courts:
1. Service of Summons – summons must be served by those within the list
2. Payment of Docket Fees – payment must be in full
w Rules of Procedure < Injustice
 Only tools to facilitate attainment of justice and if rigid application would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the
Court is empowered to suspend their operation
 Meant only to preserve order in litigation but must not be violated by the parties unless a showing of one party tried his best to
comply with the rules.
A Bare invocation of substantial justice is not a magic wand that would suspend the operation of the rules and dependent on the
party invoking liberally to explain his failure to abide by the rules.
 The Court is duty-bound to observe its rules and procedures and uphold the noble purpose behind their issuance. Rules are laid
down for the benefit of all and should not be made dependent upon a suitor’s sweet time and own bidding.
A While the Court frowns upon default judgments, it does not condone gross transgressions of the rules and perceptible vestiges
of bad faith.
9

Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc. vs. Cheng G.R. No. 170232. December 5, 2006.
Lack of jurisdiction, if respondent does not have the legal power to determine the case
Excess of jurisdiction, where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is
performing a function in excess of his jurisdiction
Procedural Rules and Technicalities: While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural
lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of
litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the
parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in the instant
case, should no longer be subject to cavil.
Philippine National Bank vs. Deang Marketing Corporation 573 SCRA 312 , December 08, 2008
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The bare invocation of the interest of substantial justice is not a
magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.
Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not mean, however, that procedural
rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of
justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism,
or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each
other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights
of the litigants.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be
properly presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may
be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal
application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide by the
rules. (Underscoring supplied)
F. Revenue/Tax Laws
w Must be strictly construed against the State (taxing authority) and liberally construed in favor of the taxpayers
Republic Flour Mills, Inc, vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 31 SCRA 520, No. L-25602 February 18, 1970
In the construction of tax statutes tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the law, and are construed strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer. However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the
court’s seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.
Serfino v. CA
Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible
suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners
and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of which vitiates the sale. Notice of sale to the
delinquent land owners and to the public in general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of which vitiates the
sale.
People vs. Casta ñeda, Jr.

Still further, a tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor presumed in law and if granted by statute, the terms of the amnesty like that of
a tax exemption must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority .
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

Codal provisions on withholding tax are mandatory and must be complied with by the withholding agent. The taxpayer should not answer for the non-
performance by the withholding agent of its legal duty to withhold unless there is collusion or bad faith. The former could not be deemed to have evaded the tax had the
withholding agent performed its duty. This could be the situation for which the amnesty decree was intended. Thus, to curtail tax evasion and give tax evaders a
chance to reform, it was deemed administratively feasible to grant tax amnesty in certain instances. In addition, a “tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is
never favored nor presumed in law and if granted by a statute, the terms of the amnesty like that of a tax exemption must be construed strictly
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.”The rule on strictissimi juris equally applies. So that, any doubt in the application of an
amnesty law/decree should be resolved in favor of the taxing authority.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Standard Chartered Bank

It must be remembered that the execution of a Waiver of Statute of Limitations may be beneficial to the taxpayer or to the BIR, or to both. Considering however,
that it results to a derogation of some of the rights of the taxpayer, the same must be executed in accordance with preset guidelines and procedural requirements.
Otherwise, it does not serve its purpose, and the taxpayer has all the right to invoke its nullity. For that reason, this Court cannot turn blind on the importance of the
Statute of Limitations upon the assessment and collection of internal revenue taxes provided for under the NIRC. The law prescribing a limitation of actions for the
collection of the income tax is beneficial both to the Government and to its citizens; to the Government because tax officers would be obliged to act properly in the
making of the assessment, and to citizens because after the lapse of the period of prescription, citizens would have a feeling of security against unscrupulous tax
agents who may find an excuse to inspect the books of taxpayers, not to determine the latter’s real liability, but to take advantage of every opportunity to molest
peaceful, law-abiding citizens. Without such a legal defense, taxpayers would furthermore be under obligation to always keep their books and keep them open for
inspection subject to harassment by unscrupulous tax agents. The law on prescription being a remedial measure should be interpreted in a way
conducive to bringing about the beneficent purpose of affording protection to the taxpayer within the contemplation of the Commission which
recommends the approval of the law.
G. Labor Laws
w Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that “All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this
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Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.”
w Abella v. NLRC : In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the working man's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. (Volshel Labor
Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 137 SCRA 43 [1985]). It is the kind of interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the
liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor
of labor." The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the
benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and
protection to labor.
w If there are doubtful provisions, the law looks with tenders eyes to the less fortunate.
w Must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer
 Rationale: Employer-Employee Relationship. There is an inequality with regard to money between the employer and the employee.
The employee is the weaker party.
 However, it must not be used as a license to oppress the management as it is the goose that lays golden eggs. Should they leave,
it would also result to the detriment of the laborers.
 Interpretation, hence, must be in a sensible way.
H. Social Security Laws

w Vicente vs. Employees' Compensation Commission : The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for
the welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and file, whose patience, industry, and dedication to duty have often
gone unheralded, but who, in spite of very little recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed tasks. It is for this reason that the
sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a
construction of utmost liberality in their favor. It is likewise for this reason that the Court disposes of this case and ends a
workingman’s struggle for his just dues.
I. Election Laws
w Generally, it must be liberally construed to the end that the choice of the electorate is respected.
Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

Apart from the qualifications provided for in the Constitution, the power to prescribe additional qualifications for elective office and grounds for disqualification
therefrom, consistent with the constitutional provisions, is vested in Congress. However, laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications from office are liberally
construed in favor of eligibility since the privilege of holding an office is a valuable one. We cannot overemphasize the principle that where a candidate has
received popular mandate, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate’s eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the
will of the people.
Loong vs. Commission on Elections

Automated Election. During the election it was noticed that there was an error in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated
machines failed to read them correctly. COMELEC ordered manual counting of votes.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was not only reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive local votes in the six (6)
municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was
honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual
counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It
ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
J. Corporation Laws
w Home Insurance Company vs. Eastern Shipping Lines: The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly
harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial
intercourse among countries.
Any economic provision must be liberally construed and must not restrict trade, but promote trade among nations.
K. Insurance Laws
w Fortune Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals: It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that the terms of
a contract are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties thereto have used. In the case of
property insurance policies, the evident intention of the contracting parties, i.e., the insurer and the assured, determine the import of the
various terms and provisions embodied in the policy. However, when the terms of the insurance policy are ambiguous,
equivocal or uncertain, such that the parties themselves disagree about the meaning of particular provisions, the
policy will be construed by the courts liberally in favor of the assured and strictly against the insurer.
w It must be liberally construed against insurer and in favor of the insured if ambiguous and unclear, taking into account the
well known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them.
Alpha Insurance and Surety Co. vs. Castor

Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties themselves have used. If
such terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Accordingly, in interpreting the exclusions in an
insurance contract, the terms used specifying the excluded classes therein are to be given their meaning as understood in common speech.
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A contract of insurance is a contract of adhesion . So, when the terms of the insurance contract contain limitations on liability, courts should construe
1
them in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation. It must be remembered that an insurance contract is a contract of
adhesion which must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer in order to safeguard the latter’s interest.
Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Vda. de Songco

For, to borrow once again from the language of the Qua Chee Gan opinion: "The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith (uberrima
fides) not for the insured alone, but equally so for the insurer; in fact, it is more so for the latter, since its dominant bargaining position carries with it stricter
responsibility." However, it is a well-known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them.
L. Retirement and Pension Laws

w It must be liberally construed in favor of the retiree.
Government Service Insurance System vs. De Leon

The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is that social legislation must be liberally construed in favor of the beneficiaries. Retirement laws, in particular, are
liberally construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when
he no longer has the capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency,
security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons
intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.
Re: Application For Retirement Under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the IAC
Justice Ramon B. Britanico wrote a letter to this Court on January 20, 1989, requesting that he be granted retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 910, as
amended, in addition to, or in lieu of, the benefits he received under Republic Act 1616 upon the termination, on July 31, 1986, of his service in the Judiciary by the
acceptance of his courtesy resignation by Her Excellency, President Corazon C. Aquino.Justice Britanico falls under the category of justices or judges who have to
resign by reason of their incapacity to discharge the duties of their office.
Retirement laws should be liberally construed and applied in favor of the persons intended to be benefitted thereby, for, as We again held in
the Ortiz case:
“x x x. To a public servant, pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred compensation for services performed and his right thereto
commences to vest upon his entry into the retirement system and becomes an enforcible obligation in court upon fulfillment of all conditions
under which it is to be paid. Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the consideration for entrance into
and continuation in public employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to
enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service while so employed.” (Ortiz vs. COMELEC, supra, pp. 10-11;
emphasis ours.)
M. Agrarian Laws
w Interpreted liberally in favor of the grantee.
w Estolas vs. Mabalot : Agrarian laws must be interpreted liberally in favor of the grantee, in order to give full force and effect
to their clear intent, which is “to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers” and to make them “more independent, self-
reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.”
w Taking into account the discrepancy in status and standing between farmaers and the higher class, it follows that those who have less in
life must have more in law.
N. Naturalization Laws
w They must be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
 Rationale: So as not become the State’s additional burden. This is because once naturalization is granted, one becomes citizen of
the Philippines, and he will be the responsibility of the State to give its protection to.
w Republic vs. Ong : The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law.
O. Wills
w Very strictly construed
w Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40
Cyc., at page 1097, "A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these
requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No power
or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those enumerated in the statutes. (Uy Coque vs.
Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407.)
w In the matter of the intestate estate of Andres and Bibibana De Jesus v. De Jesus, Jr.: If a Will has been executed in
substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said
Will should be admitted to probate. If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is
not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed
by the testator
w 2 KINDS OF WILLS
1) Notarial Will – governed by the provisions under Arts. 805-806 of the Civil Code. In sum, a notarial will requires the
subscription of the person making the will, attestation of at least three (3) disinterested and credible witnesses, and the same

1
contract of adhesion – the other party, the insured, will only have to adhere to the contract which means s/he only has to give his/er signature. The words in the contract are from the insurer
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should be acknowledged before the notary public in order to ensure that it was, in fact, made by the person making the will.
2
2) Holographic Will – written document which is dated and signed by hand of the testator himself
w testate proceeding: person who has died has a will.
w intestate proceeding: person who has died has NO will.
CONFLICTING STATUTES
w Reconcile or harmonize them first. If there is an irreconcilable difference, there may be an existence of an implied repeal.
w Legal hermenuetics: A special law is always considered as an exception to the general law.
 Would it matter or what would happen if the special law is passed before the general law?
A Opinion No: 17-09
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9 A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging
to such class, while a special act is one which relates to a particular persons or things of a class.
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly be read together and
4
9
harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one which is special and
particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act,
the special must previal since it envinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must be taken as
intended to constitute an exception to the general act.
9 The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the
special law is later, it will be regarded as an exeption to, or qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act
is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed
expressly or by necessary implication. The reason for the rule is, the legislative in passing a law of special character has
its attention directed to the special facts and circumstances which the special act is intended to meet.
A The Manila Railroad Company v. Rafferty:
9 In the case of McKenna vs. Edmundstone (91 N.Y., 231) the court said: "It is well settled that a special and local
statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general
in its terms, provisions and application , unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of
the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." That rule is but the
application of the larger rule that a statute is not to be deemed repealed, by implication, by a subsequent Act upon the same
subject unless the two are manifestly inconsistent with, and repugnant to, each other, or unless a clear intention is disclosed on
the face of the later statute to repeal the former one.
9 It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior
special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.
9 Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the terms of the general broad enough to
include the matter provided for in the special — the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that
the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the
other as the law of a particular case.
w In the case where two consecutive provisions are conflicting, the second one shall be considered as an exception to the first one. In the case
of Nuñez v GSIS Family Bank, the Court ruled that the strategic location of Article 1142 immediately right after Article 1141 of the same Code,
which speaks of real actions, indicates that it is an exception to the rule in the previous article.
CONSRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
take note: There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction: first, verba legis , that is, wherever possible, the
words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed; second,
where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima , meaning that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers; and third, ut magis valeat quam pereat , meaning that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole.
1. Requisites before the court can exercise its power of judicial review in relation to constitutional issues
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?

1) There must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. The question involved must be ripe for
adjudication.
2) The person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge. He/she must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

2
Acosta, Persida. Difference between notarial will and holographic will: https://www.manilatimes.net/difference-notarial-will-holographic-will/368933/
3
https://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2017Opinion_17-09.pdf
4

That which relates to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. The word par must not be confounded with the word similes. It is used in opposition to it – intimating not likeness merely but identity. It is a
phrase applicable to public statutes or general laws made at different times and in reference to the same subject. 13

A Proper party/locus standi/legal personality

3) The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
A General Rule: Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, such that if it is not raised in the
pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered in trial, cannot be considered on appeal.
A The earliest possible opportunity of raising the constitutional question is in the pleading.
4) The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. (The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself)
A lis mota: the critical issue of the case. The constitutional question must be the main issue of the controversy. There is no way
that the Court may resolve the entire case, unless it first resolves the constitutional question raised.
A Necessity of decision to the constitutional inquiry/necessity of deciding the constitutional issue.
2. Intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it given effect
Nitafan v. Commissioner, 152 SCRA 284

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed
that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that
intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers. Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder: "The salary
of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased." (Italics supplied). It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices
and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its
approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
3. Language of the Constitution construed in the ordinary meaning
Ordillo v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Ifugao is a province by itself.
The keywords—provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that "region" is to be made up of
more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen
(13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are\ groupings of contiguous provinces.(Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which
was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics.
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in
the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action.
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
// ff. fr. LEGRES notes //

REMEMBER: As a rule, all commisions of the Constitution are self-executory. It means that they are a source of right on their own; they can be
implemented without an enabling law passed by the Congress.
XPN: If the provisions of the law is incomplete such as most of the provisions in Article 2 of the Constitution.
EXAMPLE: A ban in political dynasties (Art. 2, Sec. 26)
GR: All provisions of the Constitution are SELF- EXECUTORY.
Rationale: A contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute
(Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997).
XPN: When it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate; or those provisions which lay down general
principles are usually NOT self-executory (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997):
a. Art. II: "Declaration of Principles and State Policies"
b. Art. XIII: "Social Justice and Human Rights"
c. Art. XIV: "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture end Sports”
NOTE: Such provisions are not ready for enforcement through the courts but are used by the judiciary as aids or guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws. (Tondo Medical Employees Association v. CA, G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007)
XPN to the XPN: Sec. 16, Art. II – Right of to a balanced and healthful ecology (Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993), Right to information
in Art. III, and Filipino First Policy. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997)
NOTE: In case of doubt, the provisions of the Constitution should be construed as self-executing; mandatory rather than directory; and prospective rather than retroactive. (Cruz
14

and Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 8)

5
4. Rules of Construction in relation to issue of constitutionality
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union, 59 SCRA 54

All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be
upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a
liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
Manila Trading v. Reyes, 62 Phil 461

The only question presented is the validity of Act No. 4122, known as the Installment Sales Law
The question of the validity of an act is solely one of constitutional power. Questions of expediency, of motive, or of results are irrelevant. Nevertheless it is not
improper to inquire as to the occasion for the enactment of a law.
Most constitutional issues are determined by the court's approach to them. The proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all
presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the constitution. All doubts should be resolved in
its favor.
We rule that Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable.
5. Construction of Statute to Harmonize it with the Constitution
Yee Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil 385

The issue in these proceedings is the validity of Act No. 2972 of the Philippine Legislature, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law. It is a question
which, extensive argument and original investigation disclose, stands in the shadowland betwixt constitutionality and unconstitutionality, to the solution of which we
propose to give careful consideration.
The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. As the United States Supreme Court in a case of Philippine origin said: "xxx The function of the
legislature is primary, its exercise fortified by presumption of right and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of its wisdom or
propriety”. Mr. Justice Sutherland of the US, said: This court, by an unbroken line of decisions from Chief Justice Marshall to the present day, has steadily adhered to
the rule that every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of an act of Congress until overcome beyond rational doubt. But if, by clear and indubitable
demonstration, a statute be opposed to the Constitution, we have no choice but to say go.
It may be said to be an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal rule of construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is
susceptible of two constructions one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. Whenever a law can
be so construed as to uphold it, it will be so construed although the construction which is adopted does not appear to be as natural as another construction. But
where the meaning of the Act is plain, words cannot be read into it or out of it in order to save the law.
A literal application of the law would make it unlawful for any Chinese merchant to keep his account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or a
local dialect. A second interpretation Is that the Chinese merchant, while permitted to keep his books of account in Chinese, must also keep another set of books in
either English, Spanish, or a native dialect. A third construction which is permissible in view of the history of the legislation and the wording of the statute, is, that the law
only intended to require the keeping of such books as were necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection for tax purposes. Let us repeat: Act No. 2972 is a
fiscal measure. It should be so construed if possible as to effectuate legislative intent, as collected from the occasion for the law, the circumstance under which it was
enacted, the mischief to be remedied, and the policy which dictated its passage. We hold Act No. 2972 valid and constitutional.
Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons 76 Phil 756

The proviso of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 (People's Court Act) regarding bail must be read and understood in the light of such provisions of the
Constitution as may bear on the subject so as to harmonize the former with the latter and avoid their conflicting with each other. Of course, where harmonization is
impossible and conflict inevitable, the statute gives way to the Constitution. This is in consonance with the well-settled rule that "in construing statutes with
relation to constitutional provisions, the courts take into consideration the principle that every statute is to be read in the light of the
Constitution and that the Constitution and a statute involving constitutional rights will be construed together as one law. " (11 Am. Jur.,
Constitutional Law, sec. 96.)
It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that "all statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing
condition of the law and with reference to it. They are, therefore, to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of a general
and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with
reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts * * *." (59 C. J., 1038.)
6. Supremacy of the Constitution

w Remember the hierarchy of laws. The Constitution is the Supreme and Fundamental Law of the land.
Ferrer v. City Mayor Bautista - G.R. No. 210551, 30 June 2015

An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though is open to judicial inquiry. For an ordinance to be valid though, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to six
requirements, first of which is that it must not be contrary to the Constitution or any statute.
An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. If not, it is void. Ordinance should
uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. As to conformity with existing statutes, Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals has this to say:
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An
ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently
expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a
state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction
that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.

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p. 4, Political Law, Golden Notes 2017 15

7. The Doctrine of Operative Fact

w The doctrine recognizes that there were things that happened before the law becomes void ab initio. The law operated before the
declaration of its unconstitutionality on the presumption that it was valid.
w The invalidation of the law does not invalidate acts of the people who relied on its constitutionality before its declaration of
unconstitutionality.
w The law, prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the judiciary, shall be presumed to be constitutional so as not to prejudice the
acts of the people who relied on its constitutionality.
Belgica v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. - G.R. No. 20856, 19 November 2013
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court’s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions,
(b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1)“and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects”under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a
certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly
enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, the doctrine merely
“reflect[s] awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is
valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.”“In the language of an American Supreme Court
decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored.’”
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Araullo v. Aquino - G.R. No. 209287, 03 February 2015

As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification
of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the
beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the nullification of the P144.378 Billion worth of infrastructure projects, social and economic
services funded through the DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts and practices
under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. For this reason, we cannot sustain the Motion
for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442.
Carpio, J., Separate Opinion: The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. An unconstitutional act confers no
rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. An unconstitutional act is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The exception to this rule is
the doctrine of operative fact. Under this doctrine, the law or administrative issuance is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law or
administrative issuance, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. As a rule of equity, the doctrine of operative fact
can be invoked only by those who relied in good faith on the law or the administrative issuance, prior to its declaration of nullity. Those who acted in bad faith or with
gross negligence cannot invoke the doctrine. Likewise, those directly responsible for an illegal or unconstitutional act cannot invoke the doctrine. He who comes
to equity must come with clean hands, and he who seeks equity must do equity. Only those who merely relied in good faith on the illegal or
unconstitutional act, without any direct participation in the commission of the illegal or unconstitutional act, can invoke the doctrine.
Del Castillo, J ., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion : The doctrine of operative fact mitigates the harshness of the declared total nullity and
recognizes that the unconstitutional law, prior to the declaration of its nullity, was an operative fact that the citizenry followed or acted upon. This doctrine, while
maintaining the invalidity of the nullified law, provides for an exceptional situation that recognizes that acts done in good faith and in reliance of the law prior to
its invalidity , are effective and can no longer be undone.
16

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ATTY.

ARSENIK PAGADUAN Statutory Construction FINALS

LINGUISTIC CANONS OF INTERPRETATIONS

F. Last Antecedent Rule

G. Reddendo Singular Singuilis

CITY OF MANILA v LAGUIO, JR.

DIOKNO V REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION

I. Use of the Word “May”

FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS v INCIONG

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION V CA

J. Use of the Word “Or”

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

K. Use of the Word “And”

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v ARIETE

L. Use of the Word “And/Or”

CHINA BANKING CO v HDMF

PRESUMPTIONS IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

TWO KINDS OF PRESUMPTIONS

PRESUMPTIONS AFFECT THE BURDEN OF PROOF

A. Presumption of Validity and Constitutionality of Laws

Remman Enterprises v. Professional regulatory Board of Real Estate Service

B. Presumption against Injustice

Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines

Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Tecla Padua

C. Presumption against Implied Repeal

GR: Implied repeals are not favored.

D. Presumption against Ineffectiveness

E. Presumption against Absurdity

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.

F. Presumption against Undesirable Consequences Never Intended by the Legislative Measure

G. Presumption against Irrepealable Laws

The City of Davao v. RTC Davao

Datu Kida v. Senate

CONSTRUCTIONS OF PARTICULAR STATUTES

People v. Temporada GR No. 173473

Villase ñor v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 180700

D. Statutes in Derogation of Fundamental Rights

People vs. Casta ñeda, Jr.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Standard Chartered Bank

H. Social Security Laws

Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

Loong vs. Commission on Elections

Alpha Insurance and Surety Co. vs. Castor

Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Vda. de Songco

L. Retirement and Pension Laws

Government Service Insurance System vs. De Leon

CONSRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?

A Proper party/locus standi/legal personality

Nitafan v. Commissioner, 152 SCRA 284

3. Language of the Constitution construed in the ordinary meaning

Ordillo v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408

// ff. fr. LEGRES notes //

GR: All provisions of the Constitution are SELF- EXECUTORY.

and Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 8)

4. Rules of Construction in relation to issue of constitutionality

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union, 59 SCRA 54

Manila Trading v. Reyes, 62 Phil 461

5. Construction of Statute to Harmonize it with the Constitution

Yee Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil 385

Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons 76 Phil 756