Construction of Particular

Statutes
Default Rule: Plain Meaning Rule
 If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
Strict Construction
 Nothing should be included within the scope that does not
come clearly within the meaning of the language used. Its
language must be given its exact and technical meaning, with
no extension on account of its implications or equitable
considerations.

 Its operation must be confined to cases coming clearly within

the letter of the statutes as well as within its spirit or reason.
Liberal Construction
 Here, the meaning of the statute may be extended to matters
which come within the evils which the law seeks to suppress or
correct.
 However, the statute can under no circumstances be given a
meaning inconsistent with or contrary to the language used by
the legislators.
 Thus, any matter reasonably within the statute’s meaning may
be included within the statute’s scope unless the language
excludes it.
People v. Temporada
 Under the wording of the ISL, "attending circumstances" may
be reasonably interpreted as referring to such circumstances
that are applied in conjunction with certain rules in the Code in
order to determine the penalty to be actually imposed based
on the prescribed penalty of the Code for the offense. The
incremental penalty rule substantially meets this standard. The
circumstance is the amount defrauded in excess of
P22,0000.00 and the incremental penalty rule is utilized to fix
the penalty actually imposed. At its core, the incremental
penalty rule is merely a mathematical formula for computing
the penalty to be actually imposed using the prescribed
penalty as starting point.
Thus, it serves the same function of determining the penalty actually
imposed as the modifying circumstances under Articles 13, 14, and 160
of the RPC, although the manner by which the former accomplishes
this function differs with the latter. For this reason, the incremental
penalty rule may be considered as merely analogous to modifying
circumstances. Besides, in case of doubt as to whether the incremental
penalty rule falls within the scope of "attending circumstances" under
the ISL, the doubt should be resolved in favor of inclusion because this
interpretation is more favorable to the accused following the time-
honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. Thus, even if the Dissenting
Opinion’s interpretation is gratuitously conceded as plausible, as
between Gabres and the dissent’s interpretation, Gabres should be
sustained since it is the interpretation more favorable to the accused.
[I]n construing penal statutes, as between two reasonable60 but
contradictory constructions, the one more favorable to the accused
should be upheld, which in this case is Gabres. The reason for this rule is
elucidated in an eminent treatise on statutory construction in this wise:

It is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should

be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to
enforce statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom
penalties are sought to be imposed. This simply means that words are
given their ordinary meaning and that any reasonable doubt about
the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to a criminal
statute. This canon of interpretation has been accorded the status of a
constitutional rule under principles of due process, not subject to
abrogation by statute.
The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed has several
justifications based on a concern for the rights and freedoms of accused
individuals. Strict construction can assure fairness when courts understand it to
mean that penal statutes must give a clear and unequivocal warning, in
language people generally understand, about actions that would result in
liability and the nature of potential penalties. A number of courts have said:

'the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed - is a fundamental

principle which in our judgment will never be altered. Why? Because the
lawmaking body owes the duty to citizens and subjects of making
unmistakably clear those acts for the commission of which the citizen may lose
his life or liberty. Therefore, all the canons of interpretation which apply to civil
statutes apply to criminal statutes, and in addition there exists the canon [of
strict construction] '. The burden lies on the lawmakers, and inasmuch as it is
within their power, it is their duty to relieve the situation of all doubts.
Additionally, strict construction protects the individual against arbitrary discretion by officials
and judges. As one judge noted: "the courts should be particularly careful that the bulwarks
of liberty are not overthrown, in order to reach an offender who is, but perhaps ought not to
be, sheltered behind them."

But also, for a court to enforce a penalty where the legislature has not clearly and
unequivocally prescribed it could result in judicial usurpation of the legislative function. One
court has noted that the reason for the rule is "to guard against the creation, by judicial
construction, of criminal offenses not within the contemplation of the legislature." Thus the
rule requires that before a person can be punished his case must be plainly and
unmistakably within the statute sought to be applied. And, so, where a statute is open to
more than one interpretation, it is strictly construed against the state. Courts further
rationalize this application of the rule of strict construction on the ground that it was not the
defendant in the criminal action who caused ambiguity in the statute. Along these same
lines, courts also assert that since the state makes the laws, they should be most strongly
construed against it.

Thus, in one case, where the statute was ambiguous and permitted two reasonable
interpretations, the construction which would impose a less severe penalty was adopted.62
Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan
 Criminal and administrative cases separate and distinct

Significantly, there are three kinds of remedies that are available against a
public officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the
discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative. These
remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or
successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three
kinds of remedies.21

Defeat of any of the three remedies will not necessarily preclude resort to
other remedies or affect decisions reached thereunder, as different
degrees of evidence are required in these several actions. In criminal
cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas a mere
preponderance of evidence will suffice in civil cases. In administrative
proceedings, only substantial evidence is required.
 Preventive suspension not a penalty

Imposed during the pendency of proceedings, preventive

suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of
precaution so that the employee who is charged may be
separated, for obvious reasons, from office. Thus, preventive
suspension is distinct from the penalty. While the former may
be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the
charges against him, the latter may be meted out to him at
the final disposition of the case.
 Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019 not a penal provision but a procedural one

It is petitioners’ contention that as a penal statute, the provision on preventive

suspension should be strictly construed against the State and liberally in their
favor.

We cannot agree. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 on preventive suspension is not

a penal provision. It is procedural in nature. Hence, the strict construction rule
finds no application. The Court expounded on this point in Buenaseda v.
Flavier:

Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally
construed The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is
imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an
injury to an individual. A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is
not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally.
STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Provincial Chapter of Laguna, NP v. COMELEC

No elective public officer may change his political party

affiliation during his term of office, and no candidate for any
elective public organization may change his political party
affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an
election (Sec. 10, Art. XII [C]).
The contention of petitioner that private respondent switched
party affiliation during his term of organization,'as and hence
guilty of "turncoatism" is not tenable. It is appropriate to note
that private respondent was elected governor on November 8,
1971 for a frameup term or up to 1975. As correctly pointed out
by private respondent, that the term of office of those elected
in the November 1971 elections expired on December 31,
1975, the period intended by the framers to be covered by the
constitutional prohibition, can be gleaned from among the
questions asked during the February 27, 1975 referendum and
from one of the whereases of P.D. No. 1296, also known as "The
1978 Election Code."
WE take the view that the evident intention of the new
Constitution was to apply the prohibition, as to party switching
(turncoatism) to the term of office for which one was previously
elected in relation to the political party under which he ran
and won. In the present case, the prohibition, should only
apply to the term for which private respondent was elected
governor as a Liberal Party candidate from January 1, 1972 to
December 3l,1975.
It must be noted that the new Constitution was ratified on January
17, 1973 when the term of office of local elective public officials,
who were elected as such under the two major political parties, the
Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, had not expired. Having been
elected in the November, 1971 local elections, their term of
organization has expired on December 31, 1975.
It is worth noting that private respondent was allowed to continue in
office at the pleasure of the President by virtue of the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions and supplemented by the results of the
referendum on February 27, 1975, thru which the people opted for
appointment by the President as the manner of choosing the
successors of local office whose terms were to expire on December
31, 1975.
The period beyond December 31, 1975 is no longer within the
coverage of the phrase "term of office" for which respondent
was elected as a Liberal candidate for purposes of applying
the constitutional prohibition.
Finally, to make the constitutional prohibition, applicable to the
period beyond the frameup. term to which public officials
were elected in the 1971 local elections under their respective
political parties would work manifest injustice and unduly
impinge on the freedom of association guaranteed to all
individuals. Incumbent public officials who ran during the last
election (1971 elections) prior to the 1973 Constitution which
embodies the said novel provision, would be undoubtedly
unjustifiably prejudiced if the party under the banner of which
they ran and won, would no longer
participate in the succeeding elections after the effectivity of
the new Constitution, such as the Liberal Party in the case at
bar which boycotted all elections during and after the lifting of
martial law. In the present case, it appears that most of the
prominent LP leaders who participated in the elections held
after the effectivity of the new Constitution, campaigned and
ran under new opposition groups such as the Lakas ng Bayan
(LABAN), National Union for Liberation (NUL) Mindanao
Alliance (MA) Pusyon Bisaya, Bicol Saro and other new political
aggrupations. This We believe was not the manifest intention of
the framers.
Indeed, "of two reasonably possible constructions, one of
which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people
and the other of which would not do so, latter construction
must be adopted.” Hence, the more logical interpretation is
that which gives effect to Section 10 of Article XII (C) of the
1973 Constitution and does not violate the individual's basic
right to association.
Genaro V. Reyes Construction v. CA

The discretion, therefore, of the DPWH to terminate or rescind the

contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have
incurred a negative slippage of 15% or more. In the instant case, the
negative slippage of petitioners at the time they were served the
notice of termination was only 9.86%. Hence, respondents violated
the law and committed an illegal act and abused their discretion
when they terminated petitioners’ contract based on negative
slippage of only 9.86%. Such wrongful and illegal act is in derogation
of petitioners' right not to be deprived of property without due
process of law. Petitioners' contract with the DPWH covering the
project in question is a proprietary right within the meaning of the
Constitution and can only be rescinded strictly in accordance
with the governing law, Presidential Decree No. 1870, as
implemented by DPWH Circular No. 102. And relative to this
axiom, it has been previously emphasized that courts may
declare an action or resolution of an administrative authority to
be illegal because it violates or fails to comply with some
mandatory provision of the law or because it is corrupt,
arbitrary, or capricious (Borromeo vs. City of Manila and
Rodriguez Lanuza, 62 Phil. 512; 516 [1935]; Annotation on the
Power of Judicial Review of Public Bidding and Awards of
Government Contracts, 50 SCRA 491; 498 [1973])
RULES OF COURT

Sec. 6, Rule 1, ROC:

Section 6. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally

construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
RULES OF COURT

Sec. 6, Rule 1, ROC:

Section 6. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally

construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
Vette Industrial Sales v. Cheng

Petitioners claim that the motion for reconsideration of Sui was procedurally
defective because it was not served three days before the date of the
hearing and no proof of service was given to the court, in violation of
Sections 4 and 6 of Rule 15. Petitioners also aver that they received the
Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration of Sui on May 27, 2004 but
the hearing was scheduled on May 28, 2004. Thus, it is nothing but a scrap
of paper because it violated the three-day notice rule.

We are not persuaded.

In the instant case, we find that the purpose of a notice of hearing had been
served. In Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we enumerated
the exceptions to the rule on notice of hearing, to wit:

The Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meet the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a
worthless piece of paper, which the clerk of court has no right to receive and
the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion
containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a
mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these
requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However, there are
exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are as follows:
x x x Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court
in cases (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure
or miscarriage of justice; especially if a party successfully shows that
the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is
not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2)
where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the
resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and
judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the
adverse party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due
process intended to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is
resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is permitted time to study
and answer the arguments in the motion.

Circumstances in the case at bar show that private respondent was not denied
procedural due process, and that the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been
served. On the day of the hearing, Atty. Desierto did not object to the said Motion for lack
of notice to him; in fact, he was furnished in open court with a copy of the motion and
was granted by the trial court thirty days to file his opposition to it. These circumstances
clearly justify a departure from the literal application of the notice of hearing rule. In
other cases, after the trial court learns that a motion lacks such notice, the prompt
resetting of the hearing with due notice to all the parties is held to have cured the defect.
Verily, the notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed
blindly. Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanistic
and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably
fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote
their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding. For the
foregoing reasons, we believe that Respondent Court committed
reversible error in holding that the Motion for Reconsideration was a
mere scrap of paper.
When the trial court received Sui’s Manifestation and Motion
for Reconsideration, it did not immediately resolve the
motion. Instead, it allowed petitioners to file their comment
and also leave to file a rejoinder if Sui files a reply. These
circumstances justify a departure from the literal application of
the rule because petitioners were given the opportunity to
study and answer the arguments in the motion.
When the trial court received Sui’s Manifestation and Motion
for Reconsideration, it did not immediately resolve the
motion. Instead, it allowed petitioners to file their comment
and also leave to file a rejoinder if Sui files a reply. These
circumstances justify a departure from the literal application of
the rule because petitioners were given the opportunity to
study and answer the arguments in the motion.
It is the policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the amplest
opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly
determined, free from the constraints of technicalities. It should
be remembered that rules of procedure are but tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid
application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their
operation.
PNB v. Deang Marketing

It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of

time to file a pleading must be filed before the expiration of
the period sought to be extended. The courts discretion to
grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon such motions
timeliness, the passing of which renders the court powerless to
entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed
after the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more
period to extend.
PNB v. Deang Marketing

It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of

time to file a pleading must be filed before the expiration of
the period sought to be extended. The courts discretion to
grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon such motions
timeliness, the passing of which renders the court powerless to
entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed
after the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more
period to extend.
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be done, have often been held as
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The bare
invocation of the interest of substantial justice is not a magic
wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules.
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal
construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect
substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not
mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or
disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law
has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely,
to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by
providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism,
or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory
to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must
be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved.
Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except
only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant
to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain his
failure to abide by the rules.
There is no arguing that all complaints of whatever nature can
only be determined if the parties are heard. There is, however,
a standing rule set in place for a declaration of default, in
cases where there is no justification for the belated action, and
there is showing that the defendant intended to delay the
case. In this case, the party lackadaisically squandered its
opportunity to file a responsive pleading and, worse, made
deceptive moves in an obvious attempt to redeem itself.
The Court is duty-bound to observe its rules and procedures
and uphold the noble purpose behind their issuance. Rules are
laid down for the benefit of all and should not be made
dependent upon a suitors sweet time and own bidding.
REVENUE/TAX LAW

Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner

We agree with the petitioner that there is actually no cause here calling for
an administrative definition or interpretation of Section 186-A. For no reason
exists to read into the provision a qualification that is not there, nor to give
to the phrase "tax-free product" a meaning other than what it ordinarily and
commonly conveys - a material or article exempted from payment of tax.

The respondent Commissioner himself could supply no plausible reason for

excluding tax-free imported raw materials from the coverage of the term
"tax-free" product other than the lame argument that wheat grains are not
a "product" because they are not made out of another article (V. B.I.R.
Circular No. V-252, 15 July 1957).
The Commissioner's stand, upheld by the Tax Court, runs
contrary to the legal definition of the term "product" which
covers "anything that is produced, whether as the result of
generation, growth, labor or thought" (Molina vs. Rafferty, 38
Phil. 171; 50 C.J.S., pages 631632). If, as held in the case cited,
fish were agricultural product, no reason is seen why wheat
grains should not equally be products of agriculture.
Further, it must not be overlooked that the exemption granted to the
petitioner covered not only the sales tax of the manufactured product but
also the sales tax "on raw materials and supplies to be used exclusively in
the manufacture of such (exempt) products" (Brief for Appellee, page 1). To
bar the deductibility of the value of such raw materials is to tear away the
tax exemption from sales tax on said materials. Indeed, if, as is conceded,
these wheat grains were allowed to enter in 1958 as exempt from paying
advance sales tax, no reason exists why the value of this same material
should be subjected to tax just because they were milled in 1959 and not in
the year of importation.

That petitioner's manufactured flour would be subject in 1959 to only a part

of the normal sales tax, pursuant to Republic Act 901, would not alter the
principles herein established.
It is true that in the construction of tax statutes tax exemptions (and
deductions are of this nature) are not favored in the law, and are
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. However, it is equally
a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear
and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's
seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of
judicial addition or subtraction. In this case, we find the provision of
Section 186-A — "whenever a tax free product is utilized, etc." — all
encompassing to comprehend tax-free raw materials, even if
imported. Where the law provided no qualification for the granting of
the privilege, the court is not at liberty to supply any.
Serfino v. CA

The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the

prescribed procedure in auction sales of property for tax
delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be
followed punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax
sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but
also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer
and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of
sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in general is an
essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of
which vitiates the sale.

We give our stamp of approval on the aforementioned ruling of the

respondent court.
Serfino v. CA

The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the

prescribed procedure in auction sales of property for tax
delinquency being in derogation of property rights should be
followed punctiliously. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax
sales is imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers, but
also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer
and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice of
sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in general is an
essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-fulfillment of
which vitiates the sale.

We give our stamp of approval on the aforementioned ruling of the

respondent court.
In the case at bar, there is no evidence that Nemesia Baltazar,
who had obtained a transfer certificate of title in her name on
January 18, 1946, was notified of the auction sale which was
scheduled on October 30, 1956. Neither was she furnished as
the owner of the delinquent real property with the certificate
of sale as prescribed by Sec. 37 of Commonwealth Act No.
470. These infirmities are fatal. Worth mentioning also is the fact
that Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in its
payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes were paid
for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor was obtained
in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros
Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses Serfinos was
void since the
Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of the
property thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title which has
been derived from that of the Province of Negros Occidental is
likewise void. A purchaser of real estate at the tax sale obtains
only such title as that held by the taxpayer, the principle
of caveat emptor applies. Where land is sold for delinquency
taxes under the provisions of the Provincial Assessment Law,
rights of registered but undeclared owners of the land are not
affected by the proceedings and the sale conveys only such
interest as the person who has declared the property for
taxation has therein.
People v. Castaneda

Accused Valencia argued that the People were estopped from

questioning his entitlement to the benefits of the tax amnesty,
considering that agents of the BIR had already accepted his
application for tax amnesty and his payment of the required fifteen
percent (15%) special tax.
This contention does not persuade. At the time he paid the special
fifteen percent (15%) tax under P.D. No. 370, accused Francisco
Valencia had in fact already been subjected by the BIR to extensive
investigation such that the criminal charges against him could not
be condoned under the provisions of the amnesty statute. Further,
acceptance by the BIR agents of accused Valencia's application for
tax amnesty and payment of the fifteen percent (15%) special tax
was no more than a ministerial duty on the part of such agents.
Accused Valencia does not pretend that the BIR had actually ruled
that he was entitled to the benefits of the tax amnesty statute. In any
case, even assuming, though only arguendo, that the BIR had so
ruled, there is the long familiar rule that "erroneous application and
enforcement of the law by public officers do not block, subsequent
correct application of the statute and that the government is never
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agent." 9 which finds
application in the case at bar. Still further, a tax amnesty, much like
to a tax exemption, is never favored nor presumed in law and if
granted by statute, the terms of the amnesty like that of a tax
exemption must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority.10 Valencia's payment of the
special fifteen percent (15%) tax must be regarded as legally
ineffective.
Commissioner v. BF Goodrich and CA
G.R. No. 104171; 24 February1999

For the purpose of safeguarding taxpayers from any

unreasonable examination, investigation or assessment, our tax
law provides a statute of limitations in the collection of taxes.
Thus, the law on prescription, being a remedial measure,
should be liberally construed in order to afford such protection.
As a corollary, the exceptions to the law on prescription should
perforce be strictly construed.
For the purpose of safeguarding taxpayers from any
unreasonable examination, investigation or assessment, our tax
law provides a statute of limitations in the collection of taxes.
Thus, the law on prescription, being a remedial measure,
should be liberally construed in order to afford such protection.
12 As a corollary, the exceptions to the law on prescription
should perforce be strictly construed.
Sec. 15 of the NIRC, on the other hand, provides that "[w]hen a
report required by law as a basis for the assessment of any
national internal revenue tax shall not be forthcoming within
the time fixed by law or regulation, or when there is reason to
believe that any such report is false, incomplete, or erroneous,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall assess the proper
tax on the best evidence obtainable." Clearly, Section 15 does
not provide an exception to the statute of limitations on the
issuance of an assessment, by allowing the initial assessment to
be made on the basis of the best evidence available. Having
made its initial assessment in the manner prescribed, the
commissioner could not have been authorized to issue,
beyond the five-year prescriptive period, the second and the
third assessments under consideration before us.
Nor is petitioner's claim of falsity sufficient to take the
questioned assessments out of the ambit of the statute of
limitations. The relevant part of then Section 332 of the NIRC,
which enumerates the exceptions to the period of prescription,
provides:
Sec. 332. Exceptions as to period of limitation of assessment
and collection of taxes. — (a) In the case of a false or
fraudulent return with intent to evade a tax or of a failure to file
a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for
the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment,
at any time within ten years after the discovery of the falsity,
fraud, or omission: . . . .
xxx
Since the BIR failed to demonstrate clearly that private
respondent had filed a fraudulent return with the intent to
evade tax, or that it had failed to file a return at all, the period
for assessments has obviously prescribed. Such instances of
negligence or oversight on the part of the BIR cannot prejudice
taxpayers, considering that the prescriptive period was
precisely intended to give them peace of mind.
CIR v. Standard Chartered Bank
G.R. No. 192173; 29July 2015

The law prescribing a limitation of actions for the collection of

the income tax is beneficial both to the Government and to its
citizens; to the Government because tax officers would be
obliged to act properly in the making of the assessment, and
to citizens because after the lapse of the period of
prescription, citizens would have a feeling of security against
unscrupulous tax agents who may find an excuse to inspect
the books of taxpayers, not to determine the latter's real
liability, but to take advantage of every opportunity to molest
peaceful, law-abiding citizens. Without such a legal defense,
taxpayers would furthermore be under obligation to always
keep their books and keep them open for inspection subject to
harassment by unscrupulous tax agents. The law on
prescription being a remedial measure should be interpreted
in a way conducive to bringing about the beneficent purpose
of affording protection to the taxpayer within the
contemplation of the Commission which recommends the
approval of the law.
Labor Laws

Villabert v. ECC

However, the Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of

Investigation stated that the exact cause of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown despite extensive
researches in this field, although most research data are
agreed that physical and mental stresses are strong causal
factors in the development of the disease.
From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N.
Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was
directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he
performed as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk
typist of the Philippine Constabulary. There is no evidence at all
that Marcelino N. Villavert had a "bout of alcoholic
intoxication" shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing
that he used drugs.
It should be noted that Article 4 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended, provides that "All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation

Commission sought to be reviewed is set aside and judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the Government Service Insurance
System to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of
SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00).
Abella v. NLRC

The purpose of Article 284 as amended (payment of separation pay) is

obvious — the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated
because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.
Without said law, employees like private respondents in the case at bar will
lose the benefits to which they are entitled — for the thirty three years of
service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco.
Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda,
in the absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the
responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new
employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing.
Moreover, to come under the constitutional prohibition, the
law must effect a change in the rights of the parties with
reference to each other and not with reference to non-parties.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Article 284 as

amended refers to employment benefits to farm hands who
were not parties to petitioner’s lease contract with the owner
of Hacienda Danao-Ramona. That contract cannot have the
effect of annulling subsequent legislation designed to protect
the interest of the working class.
In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be
the primordial and paramount consideration. It is the kind of
interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the
liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in
Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that `all doubts
in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
this Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall
be resolved in favor of labor."
The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a
greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits
under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy
of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.
Social Security Law

Vicente v. ECC
In the case at bar, the petitioner's permanent total disability is
established beyond doubt by several factors and
circumstances.1âwphi1 Noteworthy is the fact that from all
available indications, it appears that the petitioner's
application for optional retirement on the basis of his ailments
had been approved. The decision of the respondent
Commission even admits that the petitioner "retired from
government service at the age of 45.
Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he
retired and still entitled, under good behavior, to 20 more years
in service, the approval of his optional retirement application
proves that he was no longer fit to continue in his employment.
For optional retirement is allowed only upon proof that the
employee-applicant is already physically incapacitated to
render sound and efficient service.
Further, the appropriate physicians of the petitioner's employer,
the Veterans Memorial Medical Center, categorically certified
that the petitioner was classified under permanent total
disability. On this score, "the doctor's certification as to the
nature of the claimant's disability may be given credence as
he normally would not make a false certification."16 And, "[N]o
physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far-reaching
and serious effect that his statements would cause on a
money claim filed with a government agency, would issue
certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own
interests and protection."
The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding
concern for the welfare of government workers, especially the
humble rank and file, whose patience, industry, and
dedication to duty have often gone unheralded, but who, in
spite of very little recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their
appointed tasks. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the
law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law,
by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in
their favor. It is likewise for this reason that the Court disposes of
this case and ends a workingman's struggle for his just dues.
Amora v. COMELEC

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any

of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the
foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify
that a defective notarization (since merely presented CTC) is a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the
COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish
claim that it is a petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of
qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification.
Amora v. COMELEC

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any

of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the
foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify
that a defective notarization (since merely presented CTC) is a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the
COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish
claim that it is a petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of
qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification.
Apart from the qualifications provided for in the Constitution,
the power to prescribe additional qualifications for elective
office and grounds for disqualification therefrom, consistent
with the constitutional provisions, is vested in Congress.
However, laws prescribing qualifications for and
disqualifications from office are liberally construed in favor of
eligibility since the privilege of holding an office is a valuable
one. We cannot overemphasize the principle that where a
candidate has received popular mandate, all possible doubts
should be resolved in favor of the candidates eligibility, for to
rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people.
Loong v. COMELEC

As the facts show, it was inutile for the COMELEC to use other
machines to count the local votes in Sulu. The errors in
counting were due to the misprinting of ovals and the use of
wrong sequence codes in the local ballots. The errors were not
machine-related. Needless to state, to grant petitioner's prayer
to continue the machine count of the local ballots will certainly
result in an erroneous count and subvert the will of the
electorate.
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide
a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related
for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that
the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from
levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of
the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall."
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to have
COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this
Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of
powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections. Thus, we
held in Sumulong v. COMELEC:
"Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be
dealt with realistically - not from the standpoint of pure theory.
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities,
its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived
from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in
a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political
questions x x x. There are no ready made formulas for solving
public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the
matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of
election, x x x we must not by any excessive zeal take away from
the Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional
and legal mandates properly belongs to it."
In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was
not only reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive
local votes in the six (6) municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi,
Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The bottom line is that by means of
the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly
determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by
giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not
prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work.
Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election
which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It
ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a
COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
Home Insurance Co. v. Eastern Shipping Lines

To repeat, the objective of the law (Sec. 68, Corporation Law)

was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our
courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not
an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the
development of trade relations and which fosters friendly
commercial intercourse among countries.
Our ruling that the lack of capacity at the time of the execution
of the contracts was cured by the subsequent registration is
also strengthened by the procedural aspects of these cases.
Alpha Insurance v. Castor

In denying respondent’s claim, petitioner takes exception by

arguing that the word "damage," under paragraph 4 of
"Exceptions to Section III," means loss due to injury or harm to
person, property or reputation, and should be construed to
cover malicious "loss" as in "theft." Thus, it asserts that the loss of
respondent’s vehicle as a result of it being stolen by the latter’s
driver is excluded from the policy.

We do not agree.
If the intention of the defendant-appellant was to include the term "loss"
within the term "damage" then logic dictates that it should have used the
term "damage" alone in the entire policy or otherwise included a clear
definition of the said term as part of the provisions of the said insurance
contract. Which is why the Court finds it puzzling that in the said policy’s
provision detailing the exceptions to the policy’s coverage in Section III
thereof, which is one of the crucial parts in the insurance contract, the
insurer, after liberally using the words "loss" and "damage" in the entire policy,
suddenly went specific by using the word "damage" only in the policy’s
exception regarding "malicious damage." Now, the defendant-appellant
would like this Court to believe that it really intended the word "damage" in
the term "malicious damage" to include the theft of the insured vehicle.

The Court does not find the particular contention to be well taken.
True, it is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that the
terms of a contract are to be construed according to the sense
and meaning of the terms which the parties thereto have used.
In the case of property insurance policies, the evident intention
of the contracting parties, i.e., the insurer and the assured,
determine the import of the various terms and provisions
embodied in the policy. However, when the terms of the
insurance policy are ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain, such
that the parties themselves disagree about the meaning of
particular provisions, the policy will be construed by the courts
liberally in favor of the assured and strictly against the insurer.
Lastly, a contract of insurance is a contract of adhesion. So,
when the terms of the insurance contract contain limitations on
liability, courts should construe them in such a way as to
preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation.
Thus, in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. Philippine
American Life Insurance Company,11 this Court ruled –It must
be remembered that an insurance contract is a contract of
adhesion which must be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer in order to safeguard the
latter’s interest. Thus, in Malayan Insurance Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, this Court held that:
Indemnity and liability insurance policies are construed in
accordance with the general rule of resolving any ambiguity
therein in favor of the insured, where the contract or policy is
prepared by the insurer. A contract of insurance, being a
contract of adhesion, par excellence, any ambiguity therein
should be resolved against the insurer; in other words, it should
be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against
the insurer. Limitations of liability should be regarded with
extreme jealousy and must be construed in such a way as to
preclude the insurer from non-compliance with its obligations.
In the more recent case of Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, we reiterated the above ruling, stating that:
When the terms of insurance contract contain limitations on
liability, courts should construe them in such a way as to
preclude the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation.
Being a contract of adhesion, the terms of an insurance
contract are to be construed strictly against the party which
prepared the contract, the insurer. By reason of the exclusive
control of the insurance company over the terms and
phraseology of the insurance contract, ambiguity must be
strictly interpreted against the insurer and liberally in favor of the
insured, especially to avoid forfeiture.
Fielmens Insurance v. Vda. De Songco
As much, if not much more so than the Qua Chee Gan decision,
this is a case where the doctrine of estoppel undeniably calls for
application. After petitioner Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. had
led the insured Federico Songco to believe that he could qualify
under the common carrier liability insurance policy, and to enter
into contract of insurance paying the premiums due, it could
not, thereafter, in any litigation arising out of such representation,
be permitted to change its stand to the detriment of the heirs of
the insured. As estoppel is primarily based on the doctrine of
good faith and the avoidance of harm that will befall the
innocent party due to its injurious reliance, the failure to apply it
in this case would result in a gross travesty of justice.
That is all that needs be said insofar as the first alleged error of
respondent Court of Appeals is concerned, petitioner being
adamant in its far-from-reasonable plea that estoppel could not
be invoked by the heirs of the insured as a bar to the alleged
breach of warranty and condition in the policy. lt would now rely
on the fact that the insured owned a private vehicle, not a
common carrier, something which it knew all along when not
once but twice its agent, no doubt without any objection in its
part, exerted the utmost pressure on the insured, a man of scant
education, to enter into such a contract.
Even if it be assumed that there was an ambiguity, an excerpt
from the Qua Chee Gan decision would reveal anew the
weakness of petitioner's contention. Thus: "Moreover, taking into
account the well known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must
be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them, the
'memo of warranty' invoked by appellant bars the latter from
questioning the existence of the appliances called for in the
insured premises, since its initial expression, 'the undernoted
appliances for the extinction of fire being kept on the premises
insured hereby, ... it is hereby warranted ...,' admits of
interpretation as an admission of the existence of such
appliances which appellant cannot now contradict, should the
parol evidence rule apply."
Retirement and Pension Laws
GSIS v. De Leon
The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is that social legislation must
be liberally construed in favor of the beneficiaries. Retirement
laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree
because their objective is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance
and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the
capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to
achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that
efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees
may be enhanced.
Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered
in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts
are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian
purpose.
[A.M. No. 6484-Ret. May 15, 1989.]

Re: APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT UNDER R.A. NO. 910 OF

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RAMON B. BRITANICO OF THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT.

Retirement laws should be liberally construed and applied in

favor of the persons intended to be benefitted thereby, for, as
We again held in the Ortiz case:
". . . . To a public servant, pension is not a gratuity but rather a form
of deferred compensation for services performed and his right
thereto commences to vest upon his entry into the retirement
system and becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon
fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be paid. Similarly,
retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable
parts of the consideration for entrance into and continuation in
public employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary
objective in establishing them is to induce able persons to enter
and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and
efficient service while so employed." (Ortiz v. COMELEC, supra,
pp. 10-11; Emphasis ours.)
Tantuico Jr. v. Domingo

Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension
to the Auditor General and the Chairman or Any Member of the
Commission of Elections), the benefits granted by said law to the
Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy
or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as
amended (The Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977), the benefits granted thereunder "shall not be subject,
among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other
processes."
Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally
interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to
provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is no
longer capable of earning his livelihood (Profeta vs. Drilon, 216
SCRA 777 [1992]).
It has been seven years since petitioner's retirement. Since then
he was only paid half of his retirement benefits, with the other
half being withheld despite the issuance of two clearances and
the approval of his retirement application. As of the filing of this
petition on December 21, 1990, no criminal or administrative
charge had been filed against petitioner in connection with his
position as former Acting Chairman and Chairman of the COA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to compel

respondent Chairman of the COA to pay petitioner's retirement
benefits in full and his monthly pensions beginning in March 1991.
Agrarian Laws

Estolas v. Mabalot

PD 27 specifically provides that title to land acquired pursuant to

its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the
government shall not be transferable except to the grantees
heirs by hereditary succession, or back to the government by
other legal means. The law is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation.
Upon the promulgation of PD 27, farmer-tenants were deemed
owners of the land they were tilling. Their emancipation gave
them the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding
for themselves. These rights were granted by the government to
them as the tillers and to no other. Thus, to insure their continuous
possession and enjoyment of the property, they could not, under
the law, effect any transfer except back to the government or,
by hereditary succession, to their successors.
Furthermore, this Court has always ruled that agrarian laws must be
interpreted liberally in favor of the grantees in order to give full
force and effect to the clear intent of such laws: to achieve a
dignified existence for the small farmers; and to make them more
independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of
genuine strength in our democratic society.

Neither are we convinced that an award under PD 27 may be

transferred to another in case the grantee abandons it. The law is
explicit. Title acquired pursuant to PD 27 shall not be transferable
except to the grantees heirs by hereditary succession, or back to
the government by other legal means.
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation.[13] This
rule rests on the presumption that the words employed by the
legislature correctly express its intent and preclude the courts from
construing the law differently.[14] Similarly, a statute should be so
construed as to effectuate its intent, advance the remedy and
suppress any mischief contemplated by the framers.[15]
 This Court is not unaware of the various subterfuges resorted to by
unscrupulous individuals, who have sought to deprive grantees of
their land by taking advantage of loopholes in the law and the
ignorance of poor beneficiaries. Consequently, the farmers who
were intended to be protected and uplifted by these laws find
themselves back to where they started, sometimes worse. This
vicious cycle must be stopped.
Naturalizartion Laws

Republic v. Ong
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization
proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to
show full and complete compliance with the requirements of
law.
Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for
naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from
reviewing the factual existence of the applicants qualifications.
In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the
naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal to
this Court.[100] Indeed, [a] naturalization proceeding is so
infused with public interest that it has been differently
categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in
ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for
naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case
and giving the government another opportunity to present new
evidence.
A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute
res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent
judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already
granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently
procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the
lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters
brought to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts
contained in the disputed decision of the lower court and
admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present
proceeding may be considered adequate for the purpose of
determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in
the light of the law and extant jurisprudence.[
A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute
In the case at bar, there is even no need to present new
evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to
hold that respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to
qualify for naturalization.
Wills

Testate Estate of Late Paula Toray v. Abaja

Among the formalities prescribed by law (Section of Act 190, as
amended by Act 2645) to a valid will is the requirement that the
attestation clause should state "the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or cause some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of
three witnesses." This requirement was not complied with in the
present case, for the attestation clause fails to state that fact.
"Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a
strict interpretation. In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca
(43 Phil., 405) this court, speaking of the construction to be
given to said section, said:

"Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the

execution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40
Cyc., at page 1097, 'A will must.be executed in accordance
with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All
these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be
observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of
a will. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to super
add other conditions or dispense with those enumerated in the
statutes.’ “
In the Matter of the intestate estate of Andres and Bibiana De
Jesus v. De Jesus, Jr.

This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict
and literal application of the statutory requirements regarding
the due execution of Wills. We should not overlook the liberal
trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the
purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy .
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal
requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but
without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary
privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been
executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the
law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise
thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate
The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of
Wills has been expounded by this Court in Abangan v. Abanga
40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is

to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity. ...
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against
such contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on
the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on
which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There
is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found
no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was
there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no
question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the
testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no
question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the
children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the
holographic Will of their mother and that she had the
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will.
The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz
Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because
the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not
sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This
objection is too technical to be entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should
include the day, month, and year of its execution. However,
when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud,
bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of
the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the
date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the
holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.