Rule 57 - Preliminary Attachment

1. PCL Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147970, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA
214

Facts:
Private respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for Sum of Money with Preliminary
Attachment against herein petitioner for the latter's failure to comply with the terms of
the sale of various ink materials, and to pay its obligations despite repeated verbal and
written demands.

Apparently thereafter, petitioner was served with summons together with the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment which propriety of its issuance attachment stood as it was as the
motion to discharge the writ was denied.

In the meantime, petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim claiming that the various
printing ink materials delivered to it by private respondent were defective but nothing
was done to solve the matter.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision favoring herein appellee,
which judgment was appealed to the CA. The appellate court affirmed the RTC judgment,
holding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that herein petitioner had the intention
of defrauding private respondent when it contracted the obligation because it agreed to
pay within 30 days from the date of purchase but once the merchandise was in its
possession, it refused to pay.

Thus, this petition.

Issue: Whether the mere failure to pay an obligation upon falling due and despite
several demands is enough to warrant the issuance of the harsh provisional remedy of
preliminary attachment under Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling: The issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was improper. To

sustain an attachment on Section 1(d), Rule 57, it must be shown that the debtor in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The
fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason
which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise
given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is
fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan
or intention not to pay. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be proved by direct evidence
but may be inferred from the circumstances attendant in each case .

Fraudulent intent not to honor the admitted obligation cannot be inferred from the
debtor's inability to pay or to comply with the obligations.

Petition partly GRANTED. Writ of Preliminary Attachment is ordered LIFTED. In all other
respects, the CA Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
 2. Professional Video v. TESDA, G.R. No. 155504, 26 June 2009, 591 SCRA 83

FACTS: In 1999, TESDA, an instrumentality of the government established under R.A.

No. 7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) and attached to the DOLE to develop and establish a
national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country.

To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification

polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees who have passed the certification process.

Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) signed and executed the “Contract Agreement Project PVC ID
Card issuance” for the provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of the PVC
cards. PROVI was to provide TESDA with the system and equipment compliant with the
specifications defined in the proposal. In return, TESDA would pay PROVI a specified sum of
money after TESDA’s acceptance of the contracted goods and services. PPOVI alleged that
TESDA has still an outstanding balance and still remains unpaid.

TESDA claims that it entered the Contract Agreement and Addendum in the performance of its
governmental function to develop and establish a national system of skills standardization,
testing, and certification; in the performance of this governmental function, TESDA is immune
from suit.

ISSUE: Can TESDA be sued without its consent?

HELD: TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent. The rule
that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution. It is as
well a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs
from the jurisdiction of another state.

The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It
also rests on reasons of public policy. That public service would be hindered, and the public
endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every
citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.

The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a
suit against the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit
against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agencys performance of
governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the
ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was
issued against a government agency covered by its own charter.

As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications
is a task within its function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization,
testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for
the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason that the performance of
governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use
and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.
 3. Metro Inc. et al v. Lara’s Gifts, G.R. No. 171741, 27 November 2009, 606 SCRA
175

FACTS:
 Laras Gifts and Decors Inc. (LGD) and Metro, Inc. are corporations engaged in the business
of handicrafts. Luis and Lara Maria R. Villafuerte are the president and vice-president of LGD.
Frederick Juan and Liza Juan are the principal officers of Metro, Inc.
 Petitioners and respondents agreed that respondents would endorse to petitioners
purchase orders received by respondents from their buyers in the United States of America in
exchange for a 15% commission, to be shared equally by respondents and James R. Paddon (JRP),
LGDs agent.
 R filed a complaint against petitioners for sum of money and damages with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
 R filed an amended complaint alleging that petitioners defrauded them in the amount of
$521,841.62.
 R also prayed for P1,000,000 as moral damages, P1,000,000 as exemplary damages and
10% of the judgment award as attorney’s fees. Respondents also prayed for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment
 The TC granted R prayer and issued the writ of attachment against the properties and
assets of petitioners
 P filed a motion to discharge the writ of attachment
 P argued that the writ of attachment should be discharged on the following grounds: (1)
that the 2001 agreement was not a valid contract because it did not show that there was a
meeting of the minds between the parties; (2) assuming that the 2001 agreement was a valid
contract, the same was inadmissible because R failed to authenticate it in accordance with the
Rules on Electronic Evidence; (3) that R failed to substantiate their allegations of fraud with
specific acts or deeds showing how petitioners defrauded them; and (4) that respondents failed
to establish that the unpaid commissions were already due and demandable.
 TC granted P motion and lifted the writ of attachment.
 R filed a motion for reconsideration, however denied by TC.
 R filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 2 March 2006 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion.
 TC respondents failed to sufficiently show that petitioners were guilty of fraud either in
incurring the obligation upon which the action was brought, or in the performance, found no
proof that petitioners were motivated by malice in entering into the 2001 agreement
 CA - the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the discharge of the writ
of attachment without requiring petitioners to post a counter-bond

Issue: Whether the writ of attachment issued by the trial court was improperly issued such that
it may be discharged without the filing of a counter-bond

Ruling: No merit.
 The writ of attachment was improperly issued because respondent’s amended complaint
failed to allege specific acts or circumstances constitutive of fraud.
 To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting
the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to
the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party
into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for
attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon
contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of
contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case
 The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the
debtor’s mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.
 The rule that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same
time the applicants cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a
counter-bond[21] is applicable in this case. It is clear that in respondents amended complaint of
fraud is not only alleged as a ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, but
it is also the core of respondent’s complaint. The fear of the Court of Appeals that petitioners
could force a trial on the merits of the case on the strength of a mere motion to dissolve the
attachment has a basis.
 4. Torres v. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, 25 November 2009, 605 SCRA 453

Facts:
Siblings Torres (petitioners) each owned adjacent 20,000 square meters track of land in
Dasmariñas, Cavite. Nicanor Satsatin, through petitioners’ mother Agripina Aledia, was able to
convince the siblings to sell their property and authorize him via SPA, to negotiate for its sale.
Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources, to which Solar allegedly agreed to buy the
three parcels of land plus the property of one Rustica Aledia for P35,000,000. Petitioners claimed
that Solar has already paid the entire purchase price, however Nicanor only remitted P9, 000,000
out of the P28, 000,000 sum they are entitled to and that Nicanor had acquired a house and lot and
a car (which he registered in the names of his children). Despite the repeated verbal and written
demands, Nicanor failed to remit the balance prompting the petitioners to file a complaint for sum
of money against the family Satsatin.

Petitioners filed an Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among other
things, that respondent was about to depart the country and that they are willing to post a bond
fixed by court. After filing a Motion for Deputation of Sheriff, which the RTC granted, it issued a Writ
of Attachment (WOA) on November 15. On November 19, after serving a copy of the WOA upon the
Satsatins, the sheriff levied their real and personal properties. On November 21, the summons and
copy of complaint was served upon the respondents. Respondents filed their answer and a Motion
to Discharge Writ of Attachment, claiming, among others, that: the bond was issued before the
issuance of WOA, the WOA was issued before the summons was received. Respondents posted a
counter-bond for the lifting of WOA, which was denied along with MR. Aggrieved, they filed with CA
a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and TRO under
Rule 65. CA ruled in favor of respondents and denied petitioners’ MR hence the petition for review
on certiorari with the SC.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in finding that RTC was guilty of GADALEJ in the issuance and
implementation of the WOA

Held:
No. A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the
court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant
therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever
judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by
petitioners despite the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were complied with. In
accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise,
the bond should be rejected.

Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction

between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to
the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant should be acquired in order to validly implement the writ of
attachment upon his person.

In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second,
the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no
power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court
will not bind the defendant.

At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to do
so since the motion for its issuance can be filed “at the commencement of the action or at any time
before entry of judgment.” However, at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since no summons was yet served upon
them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the
writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order for the trial court
to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even
if the writ of attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and,
therefore, cannot bind and affect the respondents.
Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the
trial court later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by service of the summons upon them,
such belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal
defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process
on respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person. The preliminary writ
of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the
defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted
by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a
retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction
 5. Lim v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 185734, 3 July 2013, 700 SCRA 547

FACTS: Petitioner Lim Jr filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment against the respondent Sps Lazaro. The RTC granted the writ of
preliminary attachment application and upon the posting of the required bond issued the
corresponding writ on October 14, 2005. 3 parcels of land owned by the respondent spouses
were levied upon.

The parties later entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim,
Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis, following a schedule of payments
covering the period from September 2006 until October 2013. The RTC rendered a decision on
the basis of the compromise.

Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of preliminary attachment
annotated on the subject TCTs.

In granting the Motion, the RTC ruled that a writ of preliminary attachment is a mere provisional
or ancillary remedy, resorted to by a litigant to protect and preserve certain rights and interests
pending final judgment. Considering that the case had already been considered closed and
terminated by the rendition of the decision based on the compromise agreement, the writ of
preliminary attachment should be lifted and quashed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted.

HELD: NO. By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57),
is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize
upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure
auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency which may
be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim,
awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also
availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the
property in those instances where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant
cannot be effected.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence
dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution
issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or
vacated in the same manner provided by law.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment
against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper.
Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had
already been approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the obligations
thereunder have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the total
compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the
attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have continued to subsist.
In the earlier case of Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. CA, the Court ruled that a writ of
attachment is not extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement between the
parties. In that case the Court held thus:
x x x x
The case at bench admits of peculiar character in the sense that it involves a compromise
agreement. Nonetheless, x x x. The parties to the compromise agreement should not be deprived
of the protection provided by an attachment lien especially in an instance where one reneges on
his obligations under the agreement, as in the case at bench, where Antonio Garcia failed to hold
up his own end of the deal, so to speak.
xxxx

If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect create a back door by which a debtor can easily
escape his creditors. Consequently, we would be faced with an anomalous situation where a
debtor, in order to buy time to dispose of his properties, would enter into a compromise
agreement he has no intention of honoring in the first place. The purpose of the provisional
remedy of attachment would thus be lost. It would become, in analogy, a declawed and toothless
tiger. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

In fine, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment subject of this case should be
restored and its annotation revived in the subject TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim, Jr. his preferential
lien over the properties covered by the same as it were before the cancellation of the said writ.
Lest it be misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by an attachment even before judgment,
is in the nature of a vested interest which affords specific security for the satisfaction of the debt
put in suit.30 Verily, the lifting of the attachment lien would be tantamount to an abdication of
Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps. Lazaro’s properties which the Court, absent any justifiable ground
therefor, cannot allow.
 6. Olib v. Pastoral, G.R. No. 81120, 20 August 1990, 188 SCRA 692

FACTS:
On November 13, 1981, Corazon M. Navia sued Petitioners, for dissolution of their partnership and
other reliefs, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of a preliminary attachment. 1 The petition was
granted resulting in the attachment of 6 parcels of land belonging to the petitioners, along with stocks
of merchandise in their bodega. The writ was amended excluding the merchandise.
On May 16, 1985, the petitioners filed a motion to discharge the preliminary attachment on the ground
that the attachment bond executed for one year from November 1983 had already lapsed. Judge Miguel
S. Rallos of the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City ruled in favor of Petitioners.
On July 20, 1987, the petitioners moved for the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment. Navia
filed an opposition, contending that as she had perfected her appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial
court no longer had any jurisdiction over the case.
On August 24, 1987, Judge Edelwina C. Pastoral, who had succeeded Judge Rallos denied the motion on
the ground invoked in the opposition.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration however it was denied. Petitioners filed another MFR
insisting that (a) the attachment had been automatically discharged under Rule 57, Section 19; and (b)
the attachment bond had already lapsed for non-payment of the premiums. They were rebuffed again.
They then came before this Court, contending that the respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying their motion.

ISSUES:
1. WON the attachment bond had already lapsed for non-payment of the premiums.
2. WON the attachment had been automatically discharged under Rule 57 Section 19

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: NO
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into
legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. 8

It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart from the main suit or claim
instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant. 9 Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the
attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be
justified.

The consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have been
issued as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from the
jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate case
independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action.

Coming now to the argument that the attachment was automatically lifted because of the non-payment
of the premium on the attachment bond, the Court feels it is time again to correct a common
misimpression. The rule is that the bond is not deemed

SECOND ISSUE: NO
the order of attachment is considered discharged only where the judgment has already become final
and executory and not when it is still on appeal. The obvious reason is that, except in a few specified
cases, execution pending appeal is not allowed.
7. Traders Royal Bank v. IAC, L-66321, 31 October 1984, 133 SCRA 141

FACTS: Sometime on March 18, 1983 herein petitioner Traders Royal Bank instituted a
suit against the Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc. REMCO before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, for recovery of the sum of P2,382,258.71 obtaining therein a writ of pre attachment
directed against the assets and properties of Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc.

On May 12, 1982, private respondent La Tondeña, Inc. filed a complaint-in- intervention in said
Civil Case No. 9894, alleging among others, that 'it had made advances to Remco Distillery Inc.
which totalled P3M and which remains outstanding as of date' and that the 'attached properties
are owned by La Tondeña, Inc.

Subsequently, private respondent La Tondeña, Inc., without the foregoing complaint-in-

intervention having been passed upon by the Regional Trial Court, Branch CX, (Pasay City),
filed in Civil Case No. 9894-P a "Motion to Withdraw" dated October 8, 1983, praying that it be
allowed to withdraw alcohol and molasses from the Remco Distillery Plant and which motion
was granted per order of the Pasay Court dated January 27, 1983, authorizing respondent La
Tondeña, Inc. to withdraw alcohol and molasses from the Remco Distillery Plant at Calumpit,
Bulacan.

On July 19, 1983, private respondent La Tondeña Inc. instituted before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch IX, Malolos, Bulacan presided over by Respondent Judge, Civil Case No. 7003-M, in
which it asserted its claim of ownership over the properties attached in Civil Case No. 9894-P,
and likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction.

A Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the application for a writ of Preliminary Injunction by
herein respondent La Tondeña Inc. was filed by petitioner on July 27, 1983.

Thereafter, petitioner Traders Royal Bank filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, with application for a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul and
set aside the Order dated September 28, 1983 of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch IX, issued in Civil Case No. 7003-M; to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction dated October 6, 1983 issued pursuant to said order; to prohibit respondent Judge
from taking cognizance of and assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 7003-M, and to compel
private respondent La Tondeña, Inc., and Ex- Oficio Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to return the
disputed alcohol to their original location at Remco's ageing warehouse at Calumpit, Bulacan.

In its decision, the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of legal and
factual basis, holding that the respondent Judge did not abuse his discretion in issuing the Order
of September 28, 1983 and the writ of preliminary injunction dated October 3, 1983. citing the
decision in Detective and Protective Bureau vs. Cloribel (26 SCRA 255). Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the respondent court denied the same in its resolution dated February 2,
1984.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction in authorizing the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction, which enjoined the
sheriff of Pasay City from interferring with La Tondeña's right to enter and withdraw the barrels
of alcohol and molasses from Remco's ageing warehouse and from conducting the sale thereof.
HELD: There is no question that the action filed by private respondent La Tondeña, Inc.,
as third-party claimant, before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan wherein it claimed ownership
over the property levied upon by Pasay City Deputy Sheriff Edilberto Santiago is sanctioned by
Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Thus —

If property taken be claimed by any person other than the party against whom attachment
had been issued or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or
right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves such
affidavit upon the officer while the latter has possession of the property, and a copy
thereof upon the attaching creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property
under the attachment, unless the attaching creditor or his agent, on demand of said
officer, secures aim against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of
the property attached. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be decided
by the court issuing the writ of attachment. The officer shall not be liable for damages,
for the taking or keeping of such property, to any such third-party claimant, unless such a
claim is so made and the action upon the bond brought within one hundred and twenty
(120) days from the date of the filing of said bond. But nothing herein contained shall
prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by proper action ...

The foregoing rule explicitly sets forth the remedy that may be availed of by a person who
claims to be the owner of property levied upon by attachment, viz: to lodge a third- party claim
with the sheriff, and if the attaching creditor posts an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff, to
file a separate and independent action to vindicate his claim (Abiera vs. Court of Appeals, 45
SCRA 314). And this precisely was the remedy resorted to by private respondent La Tondeña
when it filed the vindicatory action before the Bulacan Court.

Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or
decrees of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive
relief sought by injunction, is applied in cases where no third-party claimant is involved, in order
to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process of another court of the same rank or
category, a power which devolves upon the proper appellate court . 2 The purpose of the rule is
to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a
harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.

It is further argued that since private respondent La Tondeña, Inc., had voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the Pasay Court by filing a motion to intervene in Civil Case No.
9894-P, the denial or dismissal thereof constitutes a bar to the present action filed before the
Bulacan Court.
 8. Luzon Development Bank v. Krishnan, G.R. No. 203530, 13 April 2015, 755
SCRA 358

FACTS:
 Petitioners Luzon Development Bank, Tomas Clemente, and Oscar Ramirez are the
respondents in the complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages filed by respondent
Erlinda Khrishnan
 Erlinda claimed that she is a client of respondent bank wherein she maintained several
accounts including time deposits.
 Erlinda presented her Time Deposits Certificates amounting to P28,597,472.70 for
payment because they have become due, petitioners refused to honor them for the reason that
they were fraudulent.
 Respondent Erlinda likewise applied for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment which the RTC
granted
 By virtue of the writ, petitioner bank's accounts in BPI Family Bank, Calamba, Laguna and
in the Central Bank were garnished.
 P filed an urgent ex-parte Motion to Recall Quash and/or Lift Attachment or Garnishment
(in excess of amounts in the writ).
 R opposed the motion.
 P filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the substitution of their garnished account
 RTC resolved the pending incidents and required the petitioners to justify their motion to
discharge the attachment
 During pre-trial, respondents requested additional time to file a supplemental motion to
justify their earlier motions which was granted and gave petitioners ten (10) days from receipt
within which to comment or opposed it
 RTC issued an order lifting the attachment to which respondent Erlinda filed a motion for
reconsideration
 Petition for certiorari is granted
 P subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
 R judge issued an Order directing respondent Erlinda to file a new attachment bond in
the amount of P35,000,000.00 and petitioners to file a counterbond within ten days from notice
of the filing and approval of the bond of respondent Erlinda. Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the said Order which respondent judge denied and granted a period of fifteen
days for respondent Erlinda to file an attachment bond
 Erlinda filed her attachment bond on June 25, 2009 in the amount of P35,000,000.00
 P filed a motion for extension of time to comply and/or file the appropriate pleading and
to hold in abeyance the reinstatement of the writ of attachment
 P filed a motion to admit bank property in lieu of counterbond which was opposed by
respondent Erlinda
 R judge denied petitioners' motion in the assailed Order, issued an Order reinstating the
Writ of Attachment dated March 1, 2001 for failure of petitioners to file the required
counterbond, and issued an amended Reinstated Writ of Attachment directing respondent
Sheriff Oscar L. Rojas (hereafter respondent Sheriff) to attach the real estate or personal
properties of petitioners in the amount of P28,597,472.70. On June 30, 2011, the sheriff served
the Notice of Garnishment and the Amended Reinstated Writ of Attachment
 P filed an urgent motion to recall, suspend or hold in abeyance and re-examination of the
amended reinstated writ of preliminary attachment
 P filed this petition for certiorari
 CA–dismissed petitioners' certiorari petition and affirmed the Orders of the RTC
reinstating the Writ of Attachment for failure of petitioners to file the required counter-bond.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's decision which denied petitioners' motion
praying that bank property be deposited in lieu of cash or a counter-bond

Ruling:

We rule in the negative.

Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that "[a]n order of attachment may be
issued either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is
pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the
court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued,
not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless such
party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed
in the order, which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value
of the property to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs."
it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the
petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond
Rule 58 - Preliminary Injunction

1. Filipino Metals v. Secretary of Trade and Industry, G.R. No. 157498, 15 July
2005, 463 SCRA 616

FACTS: EO 156 issued by President Arroyo on December 12, 2002, imposes a partial ban on the
importation of used motor vehicles. The ban is part of several measures EO 156 adopts to
"accelerate the sound development of the motor vehicle industry in the Philippines." In Executive
Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. and two related petitions, we found EO 156 a valid
executive issuance enforceable throughout the Philippine customs territory, except in the Subic
Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Zambales by virtue of its status as a "separate customs
territory" under Republic Act No. 7227.

Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. (respondent), a corporation engaged in the

importation of used motor vehicles via the ports of Aparri, Cagayan and San Fernando, La Union,
sued the government in the RTC of Appari, to declare invalid EO 156, impleading petitioner public
officials as respondents. Respondent attacked EO 156 for (1) having been issued by President
Arroyo ultra vires; (2) trenching the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution;
and (3) having been superseded by Executive Order No. 418 (EO 418), issued by President Arroyo
on 4 April 2005, modifying the tariff rates of imported used motor vehicles. Respondent sought a
preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis pendentia, the enforcement of EO 156.

RTC: Acting on respondent’s application for preliminary injunctive remedy, the trial court granted
relief, initially by issuing a TRO followed by a writ of preliminary injunction granted in its Order of
27 November 2008. On petitioners’ motion, however, the trial court reconsidered its Order and
lifted the injunctive writ on 7 July 2010. The trial court grounded its ruling on Southwing which it
considered as negating any "clear and unmistakable legal right" on the part of respondent to
receive the "protection of a writ of preliminary injunction."

Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals in a certiorari petition.

CA: Granted the certiorari and set aside the RTC’s order reinstated its Order of 27 November 2008.

Petitioners are now before the CA with having committed an error of law in reinstating the
preliminary injuctive writ for respondent. They argue that Southwing controls the case, precluding
the CA from recognizing a clear legal right of respondent to import used motor vehicles.

Respondent counters that the doctrinal import of Southwing was weakened by the subsequent
issuance of EO 418, allegedly repealing EO 156. Respondent invokes our minute Resolution of 15
November 2010 denying the petition as judicial confirmation of the supposed repeal.

ISSUE: The question is whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting preliminary injunctive relief
to respondent to enjoin enforcement of EO 156.

HELD: Yes

It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive writ under
Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of the applicant’s "clear legal right" being violated or under
threat of violation by the defendant. "Clear legal right," within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates
a right "clearly founded in or granted by law." Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal
right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or
issuances with the force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief
bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or
issuances. These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on
the equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the
course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against them.

Respondent sought preliminary injunctive relief as ancillary to its principal cause of action to
invalidate EO 156. Respondent’s attack on EO 156, however, comes on the heels of Southwing
where we passed upon and found EO 156 legally sound, albeit overextended in application. We
found EO 156 a valid police power measure addressing an "urgent national concern":

There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable
exercise of police power. The deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms due to the influx
of imported used motor vehicles is an urgent national concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by
the President. In the exercise of delegated police power, the executive can therefore validly
proscribe the importation of these vehicles

2. Power Sites v. United Neon, G.R. No. 163406, 24 November 2009, 605 SCRA
196

In Power Sites and Signs, Inc. vs. United Neon, the Supreme Court
stated that there is no “irreparable injury” as understood in
law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely,
“immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients”
and the cost of the billboard which is “a considerable amount of
money” is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within
the concept of irreparable damage or injury as described in Social
Security Commission v. Bayona, 115 Phil. 105, 110 (1962)
 3. Hernandez v. NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 145328, 23 March 2006, 485 SCRA 166

Chapter 33
HERNANDEZ v NAPOCOR

INJUNCTION AGAINST HIGH VOLTAGE LINES ADJACENT TO RESIDENCES

FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, Respondent National Power Corporation
began the construction of 29 steel poles in connection with its 230 kilo-volt
Sucat-Araneta- Balintawak Power Transmission Project. These poles, each of
which was 53.4 meters high, were to support overhead tension cables that would
pass through Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, where petitioners’ homes were
located.
Trouble ensued when petitioners discovered some scientific studies,
finding that electromagnetic fields created by high-voltage power lines could
cause a range of illnesses from cancer to leukemia. In a privileged speech,
Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero denounced the cavalier manner
in which Napocor had ignored safety and consultation requirements. An
explanation was demanded by Representative Arnulfo Fuentebella,
chairperson of the House Committee on Energy. Respondent admitted that it was
still negotiating with petitioners, and that it had come up with four options to
address the problem: transfer the line, maintain a 12-meter distance from the
village, construct an underground line, or reroute along C-5 and South Luzon
Expressway. These negotiations resulted in an impasse.
On March 9, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against Napocor. Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an
Order temporarily restraining it from energizing and transmitting high-voltage
electric current through the project. This Order was extended from 2 days to 18
days.[1]
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari
with Prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction and sought the dismissal
of the Complaint, on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction.[2] It cited
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, which states:
 Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure
project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development
project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government,
including among other public utilities for transport of the goods or
commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or government official from proceeding with or continuing the
execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such
public utility or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution,
implementation or operation.

While the Petition was pending before the CA, the trial court
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Napocor
from installing high- voltage cables and from energizing and transmitting
high-voltage electric current through those cables.[3]
On May 3, 2000, the CA reversed the trial court’s Order on the ground
that Section 1 of Presidential Decree 1818 clearly proscribed injunctions
against infrastructure projects. It further cited Supreme Court Circulars 2-91 and
13-93 dated March 15, 1991, and March 5, 1993, respectively.[4]

Petitioners filed the instant Petition, contending that the proscription in

PD 1818 should not be applied to cases of extreme urgency, such as when the
right to health and safety was hanging on the balance.[5]
THE ISSUE:

The issue was whether the trial court may temporarily restrain or
preliminarily enjoin Napocor from constructing and operating the 29 steel
poles or towers, notwithstanding Presidential Decree 1818

THE COURT’S RULING

In a unanimous Decision penned by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[6]

the Court granted the Petition. It held that the prohibition contained in
Presidential Decree 1818 extended only to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts, in controversies involving facts
or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. It did not cover controversies
involving questions of law, as those involved in the instant case.
 What Presidential Decree 1818 aimed to avert was the untimely frustration
of government infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies.
Otherwise, the greater good would suffer from the disruption of the pursuit
of essential government projects or the frustration of the economic
development effort of the nation. PD No. 1818, however, was not meant to be
a blanket prohibition that would disregard the fundamental right to the health,
safety and well-being of a community, guaranteed by the Constitution.[7]
Indeed, the prohibition was not absolute. It only prohibited the courts
from issuing injunctions against administrative acts involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. Outside this dimension, the Supreme
Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power
to restrain or prohibit administrative acts in cases involving questions of law.[8]

The instant controversy involved questions of law. Petitioners raised the

issues of whether there was a violation of their constitutionally protected right to
health,[9] and whether respondent had indeed violated the Local Government Code
provision[10] on prior consultation with affected communities. These questions of
law removed the case from the protective mantle of Presidential Decree 1818.[11]

Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction found

legal support in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,[12] which merely
required a probable violation of the applicant’s rights and a tendency to
render the judgment ineffectual. In the case at bar, there was adequate evidence
on record to justify the conclusion that the Napocor project would probably
imperil the health and safety of petitioners.
First, petitioners presented copies of studies linking the incidence of
illnesses, such as cancer and leukemia, to exposure to electromagnetic fields.
Second, the Napocor brochure on its Quezon power project had a provision
that power lines should be located within safe distances from residences
because of the danger concomitant with high-voltage power.

Third, documents on record showed that respondent had made

representations that it was looking into the possibility of relocating the project,
and that it had even undertaken a series of negotiations and meetings with
petitioners. These documents and negotiations suggested that their health
concerns were far from imaginary. If there was indeed no cause for concern,
it would not have come up with options to address their woes. Neither would
Representative Escudero have fired away strong words of censure in his
privileged speech.[13]
While it was true that the issue of whether the transmission lines were
safe was essentially evidentiary in nature and pertained to the very merits
of the action below, the Court found that the possibility of health risks
from exposure to electromagnetic radiation was within the realm of a
scientific scale of probability. It held that there was sufficient basis on
record engendering a cloud of doubt over the danger posed by the project
upon the lives of petitioners. Indeed, probability was enough for
injunction to issue as a provisional remedy. In contrast, injunction as a
main action was resorted to when one needed to establish absolute
certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction. Pending the
final determination of the trial court on the main case, it was
prudent to preserve the status quo.[14]
The Supreme Court held that its circulars on the observance of PD 1818
did not suggest an unbridled prohibition on the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining orders. What these circulars prohibited
was the indiscriminate issuance of court injunctions.[15] They simply enjoined
judges to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in issuing
temporary restraining orders and in granting writs of preliminary injunction, so
as to avoid any suspicion that these measures were for considerations other than
the strict merits of the case.[16] Thus, there was nothing in the circulars that
would tie the hands of the courts from issuing a
writ of preliminary injunction.[17]
This Decision did not seek to undermine the purpose of the Napocor
project, which was aimed at the common good of the people. But the Court
recognized, too, that the primordial concern should be the far-reaching irreversible
effects to human safety, rather than the economic benefits presumed by
respondent. Of what use would modernization be if it proved to be a scourge
to an individual’s fundamental right, not just to health and safety, but to the
preservation of life itself in all of its desired quality?[18]
 4. G.G. Sportswear v. BDO, G.R. No. 184434, 8 February 2010, 612 SCRA 47

FACTS: On April 22, 1994 petitioners G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corp.

(G.G. Sportswear) and Naresh Gidwani mortgaged a lot in Aranda, Makati, and a
house and lot in Bel-Air Village, also in Makati, to Equitable-PCI Bank, now the
respondent Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO), to secure a P20,357,000.00 loan to
G.G. Sportswear. On April 25, 1996, to secure an additional P11,643,000.00 loan that
BDO gave G.G. Sportswear, the parties amended the real estate mortgages to include
such loan. Petitioner G.G. Sportswear was unable to pay its loans.

On March 15, 2005 respondent BDO told G.G. Sportswear in a letter that the bank
transferred on that date its past due loan obligation with the bank, totaling
US$12,257,581.31 as of December 31, 2004, to Philippine Investment One (SPV-
AMC), Inc. (PIO), including all interest, fees, charges, penalties, and
securities/collaterals, if any. This was followed by BDO Certification[2] dated April
21, 2005 that it has assigned, conveyed, transferred and sold to PIO, on a without
recourse basis, all its rights, title, benefits and interest to the Loan Receivables of G.G.
Sportswear.

Subsequently, however, respondent BDO applied with the Ex Officio Sheriff of

Makati for the foreclosure of the properties that petitioners G.G. Sportswear and
Gidwani mortgaged with the bank. The notice of sheriffs sale scheduled the auction of
the properties on May 31, 2007 but this was subsequently rescheduled to July 18,
2007. At any rate, the sheriff auctioned off the Aranda property to BDO on June 21,
2007.

On July 16, 2007, two days before the rescheduled auction of the Bel-Air property,
petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani filed an action with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, in Civil Case 07-631,[4] to annul the foreclosure, hold respondent
BDO in indirect contempt, award damages, and enjoin further foreclosure by TRO
and preliminary injunction. They alleged that, as a result of BDOs transfer of G.G.
Sportswears loan receivables to PIO in 2005, BDO lost the right to foreclose.

In its answer, respondent BDO denied transferring petitioner G.G. Sportswears loan
receivables to PIO, stating that the April 21, 2005 Certification it issued was a mere
general certification that did not specify which of several loan receivables were sold
to PIO. BDO in fact transferred to Philippine Asset Investment, which entity was
subsequently taken over by respondent PIO, only P290,820.00 out of G.G.
Sportswears total loan.[6] BDO attached Certifications from itself and from PIO to the
effect that the credits secured by the Aranda and Bel-Air properties had not been
transferred to PIO. The latter filed an answer of the same tenor.

On August 7, 2007 the RTC issued an order,[9] denying petitioners G.G. Sportswear
and Gidwanis applications for TRO and preliminary injunction. They filed a motion
for reconsideration and a motion to inhibit the presiding judge, but on October 11,
2007 the RTC denied both motions. This prompted G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani to
file a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
101799, assailing the RTC orders mainly based on the proposition that respondent
BDO had lost its right to foreclose the mortgages when it assigned its rights to PIO.

On June 26, 2008 the CA rendered judgment, dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
It denied on August 29, 2008 petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwanis subsequent
motion for reconsideration, prompting them to file the present petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it denied petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwanis
application for TRO and preliminary injunction despite the banks apparent assignment
of its credit to another entity.

HELD: Petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani point out that BDOs March 15,
2005 letter and its April 21, 2005 certification show that the bank already transferred
to PIO all its rights to the loan receivables of G.G. Sportswear. Thus, BDO lost its
right to foreclose the mortgages on the properties that secured the unpaid loans, thus,
entitling petitioners to an order enjoining the foreclosures. Further, petitioners claim
that BDO bloated G.G. Sportswears outstanding obligation such that it was being
made to pay more through the foreclosure than was actually due.

The test for issuing a TRO or an injunction is whether the facts show a need for equity
to intervene in order to protect perceived rights in equity.[14] In general, a higher
court will not set aside the trial courts grant or denial of an application for preliminary
injunction unless it gravely abused its discretion as when it lacks jurisdiction over the
action, ignores relevant considerations that stick out of the parties pleadings, sees the
facts with a blurred lens, ignores what is relevant, draws illogical conclusions, or
simply acts in random fashion.

Injunction may be issued only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the main
relief he asks in his complaint. This means that the plaintiffs allegations should show
clearly that he has a cause of action. This means that he enjoys some right and that the
defendant has violated it. And, where the defendant is heard on the application for
injunction, the trial court must consider, too, the weight of his opposition.

Did the allegations of the parties and the documents they attached to their pleadings
give ample justification for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction order to
stop the foreclosure sale of the Bel-Air property? Two considerations militate against
it:

First. The mortgaged properties were due for foreclosure. Admittedly, petitioner G.G.
Sportswear had defaulted on the loans secured by the subject mortgages. Petitioners
had, therefore, no right to complain about losing their properties to foreclosure.

Second. The issue of which party owns the loan receivables and, consequently, had
the right to foreclose the mortgages is essentially an issue between BDO and PIO.
This issue is the concern of petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani but only to the
extent that they are entitled to ensure that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale were
paid to the right party.

For the above reasons, it cannot be said that petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani
have established a right to the main relief they want, namely, the arrest of the
foreclosure sale of their mortgaged properties after they had admitted not paying their
loans. As for their claim that BDO had bloated G.G. Sportswears outstanding
obligation, the remedy if this turns out to be true is to direct BDO to return the excess
proceeds with damages as the circumstances may warrant.

What is more, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted
to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation. Here, since there is a valid cause to
foreclose on the mortgages, petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani cannot claim
that the irreparable damage they wanted to prevent by their application for preliminary
injunction is the loss of their properties to auction sale. Their real injury, if it turns out
that the right to foreclose belongs to PIO rather than to BDO, is payment of the
proceeds of the auction sale to the wrong party rather than to their creditor. But this
kind of injury is purely monetary and is compensable by an appropriate judgment
against BDO. It is not in any sense an irreparable injury.
 5. Borja v. Salcedo, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1746 (formerly OCA IPI No. 10-
1225-RTJ), 26 September 2003, 412 SCRA 110

FACTS:
 In a Complaint, Roger F. Borja accuses Presiding Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo of the RTC (Br
32) of San Pablo City of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion in issuing a
temporary restraining order (TRO) in Civil Case No. SP-5775 (01), without complying with the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 Complainant claims that the procedure followed by respondent Judge violated Rule 58
Section 4 [b-c-d], 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the following grounds:
(a) Being a multi-sala court, it is the Executive Judge that may issue an ex-parte TRO good
for 72 hours
(b) The notice of raffle was not preceded or contemporaneously accompanied, by service
of summons, with the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicants affidavit and bond.
(c) Respondent Judge who was assigned to the case did not conduct the required
summary hearing with notice and in the presence of the parties within 24 hours after the Sheriffs
return of service and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle.
(d) The TRO was issued ex-parte without the required bond and without alleging that the
matter is of extreme urgency and applicant would suffer grave or irreparable injury.
(e) Complainant did not ask for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on January 4, 2001
in the morning.
 Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, informed complainant that the subject matter of
his complaint is judicial in nature hence it shall be denied due course as there are judicial
remedies available under the Rules of Court yet to be exhausted.
 Complainant argues that when the law transgressed is elementary, as in the instant case,
the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law
 respondent judge submitted her comment and apologized for the delay in its submission
explaining that she, as well as her husband, underwent cataract operation
 She likewise emphasized her denial of partiality, ignorance of the law, bias and so forth
being attributed to her by complainant for the reverse is true as it has been (her) desire to always
observe impartiality, fairness, and dedication in the administration of justice
 Judge Salcedo issued a Temporary Restraining Order
 Defendant Borja filed a Motion to Inhibit Judge Herradura [Salcedo] from the case and
which the latter granted
 Defendant Brion filed a Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order anchored on the
ground that the TRO was issued in violation of Rule 58, Section 4(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and is therefore a patent nullity
 The undersigned resolved the Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order; The
undersigned dissolved the TRO because it was issued in violation of Supreme Court
 The undersigned humbly submits that as aforestated, Judge Salcedo inhibited herself
from the case which was thereafter re-raffled to the sala of the undersigned. The motion to
Dissolve TRO had to be resolved.
 this Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation
 R judge failed to comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95. No order setting a
summary hearing on the application for temporary restraining order was furnished the
defendants
 A TRO may however be issued ex-parte if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such
circumstances, the executive judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours
from its issuance. But such a procedure is not applicable to respondent judge because she is
not the executive judge of RTC, San Pablo City
 Recommendation of OCA
(1) OCA IPI No. 01-1225-RTJ be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
(2) Respondent Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo, RTC, Branch 32, San Pablo City be fined for her failure
to comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95, with a warning that a repetition of similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely; and
(3) The explanation of Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali, then RTC Judge, Branch 30, San Pablo City
be ACCEPTED for being meritorious

Issue: Whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing in the pending
application for preliminary injunction can be conducted

Ruling:
 The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary
hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch
selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle.
 A TRO can be issued ex parte if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice
and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such circumstance,
the executive judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from its
issuance. The executive judge is then required to summon the parties to a conference, during
which the case should be raffled in their presence. Before the expiry of the seventy-two hours,
the presiding judge to whom the case was raffled shall conduct a summary hearing to determine
whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing on the pending application
for preliminary injunction can be held
 In the present case, there is neither allegation nor proof that respondent judge was
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or any other ill-motive.
 Where this Court pronounced that the failure of respondent therein, as an Executive
Judge, to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the TRO constituted grave abuse
of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice for
which reason, a fine of P5,000.00 was imposed on respondent judge
there is neither allegation nor proof that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, corruption or any other ill-motive
 Respondent judge had earlier been apprised of the provisions of Administrative Circular
No. 20-95 and therefore, it cannot be said that she is ignorant of the law. For her conscious
disregard of a a basic rule on the issuance of a TRO, Judge Salcedo must be held administratively
liable not for gross ignorance of the law but for grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial
to the proper administration of justice
 6. Solid Builders, Inc. v. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 179665, 3 April 2013, 695
SCRA 101

FACTS:
China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI). To
secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety
agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land in the Loyola Grand Villas in
Quezon City and New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal. Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme
through which SBI would sell the mortgaged properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50
basis until such time that the whole obligation would be fully paid. SBI also proposed that there be
partial releases of the certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without the burden of updating
interests on all loans.

In a letter dated March 20, 2000 addressed to CBC, SBI requested the restructuring of its loans, a
reduction of interests and penalties.

In response, CBC sent SBI a letter dated April 17, 2000 stating that the loans had been completely
restructured effective March 1, 1999 when SBI signed a new promissory note. Since interest
payment has not been made, no re-pricing is possible.
Subsequently, in a letter dated September 18, 2000, CBC demanded SBI to settle its outstanding
account within ten days from receipt thereof.

On October 5, 2000, claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were
iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and
MFII filed a Complaint “To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order” in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was granted.

Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged properties shielded from a possible
foreclosure by CBC on the ground that the interest rate and penalty charges imposed by CBC on the
loans availed of by SBI are iniquitous and unconscionable.

ISSUE: whether or not plaintiffs have the right to ask for an injunctive writ in order to prevent
defendant bank from taking over their properties.

HELD: NO. This Court has recently reiterated the general principles in issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction in Palm Tree Estates, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank:
At times referred to as the “Strong Arm of Equity,” we have consistently ruled that there is no power
the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance
of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford
an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; “in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is
very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor;
where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance,
the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to
reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and
arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.”

A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of
actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an
injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is
issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite
conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would
cause an irreparable injury.
The basis of the right claimed by SBI and MFII remains to be controversial or disputable as there is
still a need to determine whether or not, upon consideration of the various circumstances
surrounding the agreement of the parties, the interest rates and penalty charges are unconscionable.
Therefore, such claimed right cannot be considered clear, actual and subsisting. In the absence of a
clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them from
availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. SBI’s default or failure to settle its obligation
is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands and disqualified it from availing of the
equitable remedy of preliminary injunction.

As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The accessory
follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation mortgagor and surety is
tied to SBI’s principal obligation to CBC and arises only in the event of SBI’s default.
Rule 60 – Replevin

1. Rivera v. Vargas, G.R. No. 165895, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 529

FACTS: Petitoner avers that the writ of replevin was served upon and signed by the security
guard on duty where the rock-crushing plant to be seized was located contrary to the sheriff’s
return stating that both the writ and the summons was served upon petitioner. Nine (9) days
after the writ was served on the security guard, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint
accompanied by a prayer for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the
redelivery bond for having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory period prescribed in
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60.

Petitioner argues in the case at bar via the petition on Rule 45 that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying her counterbond on the ground that it was filed out of time. She
contends that the mandatory five-day period did not even begin to run in this case due to the
improper service of the writ of replevin, contrary to Section 4 of Rule 60.

Issue: WON the denial of counterbond filed beyond the 5 day mandatory period is erroneous
considering the writ was improperly served.

Held: Yes.

Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of
law. The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin. However, a
person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid down in the
statute, since the remedy is penal in nature. When no attempt is made to comply with the
provisions of the law relating to seizure in this kind of action, the writ or order allowing the
seizure is erroneous and may be set aside on motion by the adverse party.

The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is
unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the
property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with
the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are simple, i.e., to
provide proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with
the court’s order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party
to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty
on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.

In the case at bar since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending that
there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to run.

The writ must satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed
to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not
only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or agent of a
party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a
personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this
case.

Petitioner’s proper remedy should have been to file a motion to quash the writ of replevin or a
motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioner’s filing of an application for a
redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to question the improper
service.

The trial for the main action shall continue. Respondent may, however, file a new application
for replevin should he choose to do so.
Rule 61 - Support Pendente Lite

1. Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, 18 March 2004, 426 SCRA 29

FACTS:
The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch
109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of
said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then
apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration of the
marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible
activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; in order to save what was left
of the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties; said agreement was
approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February
28, 1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of
their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage
between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of
their child, John Paul.
Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22, 1994. Despite the lapse of fifteen days
after service of summons, no responsive pleading was filed by him. Hence, the trial court issued
an Order dated April 13, 1994, directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an
investigation for determination whether or not there was collusion between the parties and to
submit his report thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor Barrera filed his Report
stating that there seems to be no collusion between the parties.[2]
The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana herself. She testified
that her marriage with Jose was arranged by her parents in the traditional Chinese way; that her
married life was abnormal because Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a living and
instead kept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars; that she was also the one spending
for all the expenses of their only child, John Paul.[3] After her testimony, counsel for Adriana
formally offered the documentary evidence. No evidence was presented regarding the amount of
support needed by John Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support.
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open[4] on the ground that she was
able to secure additional new evidence which were significant, material and
indispensable.On July 6, 1994, the trial court granted the motion to re-open the case and held a
hearing for the reception of additional evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the
Marriage Contract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago, and another
Marriage Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock,[5] showing that Jose
had been married twice before he married Adriana in 1984.
RTC- declares the marriage between petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and
void for being bigamous by nature.
On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration[8] thereof but only insofar as the
decision awarded monthly support to his son in the amount of P20,000.00. He argued that there
was already a provision for support of the child as embodied in the decision[9] dated February
28, 1994 of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute P250,000.00 each to a
common fund for the benefit of the child, to wit:
8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with respect to their
son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall retain care and custody, subject to
visitation rights by the First Party to be exercised through mutual arrangements.
9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Party and the Second
Party shall initially contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund, to be increased as required,
to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of their son. Said common fund shall be
managed and administered by the Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until the son
reaches majority age.[10]
Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fund had even amounted
to P500,000.00.
On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lams motion for
reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and approved
by the Makati RTC before the marriage was declared null and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC,
is of no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by the latter court.
CA- On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision in all respect.

ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement between petitioner and Adriana is a bar to the to
any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul?
HELD:
Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and
Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated February 28, 1994
in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to any further
award of support in favor of their child John Paul. The provision for a common fund for the
benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement between herein
parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be considered final and res
judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification, depending upon the
needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support.
Having settled the issue on the authority of the trial court to award support for the child in an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage of the childs parents, this Court will now discuss the
propriety of the proceedings conducted by the Pasay RTC and the decision it rendered, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of the proceedings and the decision
rendered by the trial court.
First, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
Adriana with the Pasay RTC is the psychological incapacity of Jose without any prayer for the
support of her child. Adriana presented, formally offered her evidence in support of the petition
and submitted the case for decision as of May 12, 1994.[14] But on a motion to re-open filed by
her on June 23, 1994, the trial court set the case for reception of evidence on July 6, 1994 and
subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of two previous marriages contracted by Jose
with other women to prove that the marriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for
being bigamous. It is only at the July 6, 1994 hearing that respondent Adriana first claimed
support for John Paul when she testified in open court.
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by the admission of the additional
evidence. The ground relied on for nullity of the marriage was changed from the psychological
incapacity of Jose to that of existence of previous marriages of Jose with two different women
with an additional claim for support of the child. Such substantial changes were not reflected in
the petition filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment was ever made by Adriana except
the insertion of the handwritten phrase And for respondent to support the child of petitioner in an
amount this Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable[15] found at the ultimate paragraph
of the petition, as allowed by the Pasay RTC. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner
Jose was notified of the substantial changes in the petition of Adriana.
Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be present on July 6, 1994 for the
presentation of evidence by Adriana and to refute the same. Although copy of the motion filed
on June 23, 1994 with a notice of hearing on June 27, 1994 was sent to Jose, the record does not
show that he received the notice in due time; neither does the record show that he was notified of
the subsequent hearing held on July 6, 1994 where Adriana presented the marriage certificates
and claimed for the support of their child sans the presence of Jose.
Third, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of the Order dated July 6,
1994 wherein the trial court granted the Urgent Motion to Re-Open of respondent Adriana and
forthwith allowed her to present her evidence to prove that petitioner herein contracted previous
marriages with different women.
Fourth, the evidence presented by respondent regarding her claim for support for John Paul is
glaringly insufficient and cannot be made a valid basis upon which the Pasay RTC could have
determined the monthly amount of P20,000.00 for the support to be given to John Paul by
petitioner Jose.
A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of substantially amended or
supplemental pleadings.[16] Considering that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage or
annulment of marriage, there can be no default pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised
Rules of Court[17] in relation to Article 48 of the Family Code,[18] it is with more reason that
petitioner should likewise be entitled to notice of all proceedings.
Furthermore, the lower courts are reminded of the ruling of the Court in Asian Transmission
Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates,[19] to wit:
It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to
decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided
beyond them is coram non-judice and void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards
relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not
merely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to collateral attack.
The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a subject within its general
jurisdiction, but which is not brought before it by any statement or claim of the parties, and is
foreign to the issues submitted for its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court to have rendered
judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The
amendment of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims against Jose was, therefore,
indispensable so as to authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of Jose and
Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should have been awarded for
the support of John Paul. When the trial court rendered judgment beyond the allegations
contained in the copy of the petition served upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and deprived petitioner Lam of due process.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana and Jose for being
bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for
having been issued beyond its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not assail the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his motion for reconsideration which he
filed with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals and with us, he
likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to receive evidence and render
judgment on his previous marriages with other woman which were not alleged in the petition
filed by Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC
declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous. It is an axiomatic
rule that while a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this, however, admits of an
exception where estoppel has supervened.[20]
Consequently, the Court will only resolve the lone issue raised by Jose in the present petition for
review on certiorari which is the award of support for his child, John Paul.
The matter of support is a question that may be raised and threshed out before the Makati RTC as
it was the court that approved the Compromise Agreement, or before the Pasay RTC where the
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is filed. In the interest of orderly
administration of justice, the Court deems it proper that the issue on support should be resolved
by the Pasay RTC where the claim for support of the child was initiated by Adriana.
The trial courts action of merely ordering in open court during the July 6, 1994 hearing that a
prayer for support be written and inserted in the petition filed by respondent Adriana does not
constitute proper amendment and notice upon petitioner Jose. Consequently, herein petitioner
Jose was deprived of due process when the trial court proceeded to hear the case on a motion to
re-open and render judgment without giving Jose the requisite notice and the opportunity to
refute the new claim against him.
Verily, the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount of support awarded to John
Paul was whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis.
Such being the case, the Court has no other recourse but to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and Pasay RTC insofar as the award of support is concerned and order the remand of the
case to Pasay RTC for further proceedings as to the issue regarding support.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107, dated June 11, 1997 and October 27,
1997, dismissing the appeal and denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively, are
hereby SET ASIDE but only insofar as the award of support in favor of John Paul Chua Lam is
concerned. The Decision dated August 4, 1994 and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City (Branch 109), dated August 22, 1995, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being
null and void, likewise only insofar as the matter on support is concerned.
Let the records of Civil Case No. 94-0331 be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
(Branch 109) which is DIRECTED to reopen the trial of Civil Case No. 94-0331 with respect to
the claim of Adriana Chua against Jose Lam for the support of John Paul Chua Lam and conduct
hearings for further reception of evidence for the proper determination of the proper amount of
support to be awarded to the child John Paul Chua Lam.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 62 – Interpleader

1. Makati Dev’t. Corp. v. Tanjuatco, G.R. L-26443, 25 March 1969, 27 SCRA 401

FACTS: On February 21, 1963, said plaintiff and defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered
into a contract whereby the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water
reservoir, office and pump house and water main at Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, furnishing, inter
alia, the materials necessary therefor. Before making the final payment of the consideration
agreed upon, plaintiff inquired from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to
unpaid bills therefor of Tanjuatco, whether the latter had settled his accounts with them. In
response to this inquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the Supplier —
made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing the cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly
delivered to Tanjuatco. With his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final payment
made to him and, in view of his subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon with the Supplier,
on September 16, 1955, plaintiff instituted the present action, in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel them "to interplead their conflicting
claims."

On October 4, 1965, Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation, the amount involved therein being less than
P10,000.00. 1 Finding this motion "to be well-taken", the lower court granted the same, over
plaintiffs opposition thereto, and, accordingly, issued an order, dated November 16, 1965,
dismissing the case, without costs. Hence, this appeal, in which plaintiff maintains that the
subject-matter of this litigation is not the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75, but the right to
compel the defendants "to litigate among themselves" in order to protect the plaintiff "against a
double vexation in respect to one liability."

HELD: We find no merit in this contention. There is no question in this case that plaintiff
may compel the defendants to interplead among themselves, concerning the aforementioned sum
of P5,198.75. The only issue is who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is
the object of the action, which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court. As a matter of
fact, on May 25, 1966 the Supplier sued Tanjuatco, in Civil Case No. 149173 of the Municipal
Court of Manila, for the recovery of said amount of P5,198.75, and the decision therein will
settle the question as to who has a right to the sum withheld by plaintiff herein.

The latter relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases
of interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court, which, unlike section 19 of
Rule 4 of the Old Rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading among those made applicable to
inferior courts. This fact does not warrant, however, the conclusion drawn therefrom by plaintiff
herein. To begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable
controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which 2 municipal
courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive
of interest, or the value of the property in controversy", amounts to not more than "ten thousand
pesos." Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts" belongs to Congress 3 and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which
is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law. 4 Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of
Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the
same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply
thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.
 2. Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma, G.R. No. 193494, 12 March 2014, 719 SCRA
88

FACTS:
 On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-
year contract of lease4over a parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao City.
 Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to
be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly
 Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader
 Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental
payments and that Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications be ordered to
litigate their conflicting claims
 Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer
 Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged
representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the
corporation
 Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was only authorized to "initiate and represent [Zuellig Pharma] in
the civil proceedings for consignation of rental payments to be filed against Lui Enterprises, Inc.
and/or [the Philippine Bank of Communications
 Lui Enterprises filed nullification case against the Philippine Bank of Communications with
respect to several properties it dationed to the bank in payment of its obligations
 The property leased by Zuellig Pharma was among those allegedly dationed to the
Philippine Bank of Communications
 Lui Enterprises cited a writ of preliminary injunction
 By virtue of the writ of preliminary injunction, Lui Enterprises argued that it should
continue collecting the rental payments from its lessees until the nullification of deed of dation
in payment case was resolved
 Judge orders, the Philippine Bank of Communications and all its attorneys,
representatives, agents and any other persons assisting the bank, are directed to restrain from
conducting auction sale on the Properties of Lui Enterprises
 Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to
dismiss should be denied for having been filed late
 Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss should
be filed within the required time given to file an answer to the complaint, which is 15 days from
service of summons on the defendant
 Lui Enterprises’ claim that the interpleader case was filed without authority, Zuellig
Pharma argued that an action interpleader "is a necessary consequence of the action for
consignation
 With respect to the nullification of deed of dation in payment case, Zuellig Pharma argued
that its pendency did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
 Under the writ of preliminary injunction, auction sale of Lui Enterprises’ properties, the
proceeds of which were supposed to satisfy its obligations to the Philippine Bank of
Communications
 The Regional Trial Court of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to
dismiss within the reglementary period
 Lui Enterprises did not move for the reconsideration thus heard the interpleader case
without Lui Enterprises’ participation
 Despite having been declared in default, Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation with
prayer
 Plaintiffs move for execution or implementation of the Order
 status quo order was a necessary implement of the writ of preliminary injunction follows
the plaintiff's right to collect and receive rental payments which he enjoyed prior to the filing of
this case, must be respected and protected and maintained until the case is resolved
 Status quo simply means the last actual peaceable uncontested status that preceded the
actual controversy
 Lui Enterprises appealed to the Court of Appeals, however found insufficient
 As to the denial of Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals sustained the
trial court. The Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to dismiss four days
late
 With respect to Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order of default, the Court of Appeals
found that Lui Enterprises failed to show the excusable negligence that prevented it from filing
its motion to dismiss on time
 the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court since "Zuellig Pharma x x x was constrained
to file the action for interpleader with consignation in order to protect its interests
 Lui Enterprises filed a motion for reconsideration

Issue: Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial Court
of Davao barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati

Ruling: The nullification of deed in dation in payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
Litis pendentia is not present in this case.
 Lui Enterprises allegedly filed for nullification of deed of dation in payment with the Regional Trial
Court of Davao. It sought to nullify the deed of dation in payment through which the Philippine Bank of
Communications acquired title over the leased property. Lui Enterprises argued that this pending
nullification case barred the Regional Trial Court of Makati from hearing the interpleader case. Since the
interpleader case was filed subsequently to the nullification case, the interpleader case should be
dismissed.
Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be
filed on the ground of litis pendentia:

Section 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(e)That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

Litis pendentia is Latin for "a pending suit."140 It exists when "another action is pending between
the same parties for the same cause of actionx x x.” The subsequent action is "unnecessary and
vexatious"142 and is instituted to "harass the respondent [in the subsequent action]."

The requisites of litis pendentia are:

(1)Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;
(2)Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and
(3)The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.144
All of the requisites must be present.145 Absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia.146
In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification case
filed in the Davao trial court.
 There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the first case
to nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of the Philippine Bank of Communications.
Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the interpleader case to consign in court the rental payments and
extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader case was necessary and was not instituted to harass
either Lui Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of Communications.
Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
 Lui Enterprises cited Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals147 as authority
to set aside the subsequently filed interpleader case. In this cited case, petitioner Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. entered into a lease contract with Westin Seafood Market, Inc. The latter
failed to pay rent. Thus, Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. repossessed the leased premises,
inventoried the movable properties inside the leased premises, and scheduled the public sale of the
inventoried properties as they agreed upon in their lease contract.
 In this case, the nullification of deed of dation in payment case was filed by Lui Enterprises against
the Philippine Bank of Communications. The interpleader case was filed by Zuellig Pharma against Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications. A different plaintiff filed the interpleader case
against Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications. Thus, there is no identity of parties,
and the first requisite of litis pendentia is absent.
Since two requisites of litis pendentia are absent, the nullification of deed of dation in payment
case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
Rule 63 - Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

1. Aquino v. Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, 29 September 2014, 737 SCRA 145

FACTS: Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove
Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a
zoning compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While the company was already
operating a resort in the area, and the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering
the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio
Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.

Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build
zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was
ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal
government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of
Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s
hotel.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the
order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion.

PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per
se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the Municipality of
Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor
has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally
constructed buildings.

CA RULING: The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the special writ of certiorari can only be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since
the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-
judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner, according to
the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA through the challenged Resolution.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

a. Whether or not declaratory relief is still available to petitioner;

b. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the respondent mayor was performing neither a
judicial nor quasi-judicial function when he ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay West
Cove’s hotel;
HELD:

a. Declaratory relief no longer viable

Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find merit in petitioner’s contention that the
special writ of certiorari, and not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As
provided under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance
or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and
for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. x x x (emphasis added)

An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is
to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to
settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a
practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is
immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest
before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.4

In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement
and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible
guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying outthe directives in the challenged EO
10. Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a
situation.
 2. Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 189571, 21 January 2015,
746 SCRA 508

FACTS:

1. The Philippine Veterans Bank, pursuant to its mandate to provide financial assistance to
veterans and teachers under Republic Acts 3518 and 7169, established pension loans for
bona fide veterans and beneficiaries, as well as salary loan products for teachers. As these
clientele do not have security other than their continuing good health or employment, to
secure their loans, the PVB devised a program by charging a premium, a higher fee known
as Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) from the borrowers. Special Trust Funds were
established by PVB for the loans of its clientele and in case of death of the borrower, the
fees charged from him and credited to the trust funds will be used to fully pay the loan.
2. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas found that PVB’s collection of the CRF violated Section 54 of
Republic Act No. 8791 which prohibited banks from directly engaging in insurance
business as insurer. Thus, it wrote the PVB to inform it that CRF is a form of insurance,
based on opinion by the Insurance Commission and should be discontinued. PVB then
stopped collecting the fees.
3. The Monetary Board issued MB Resolution No. 1139 directing the PVB’s Trust and
Investment Department to return to the borrowers all the balances of the CRF; and to
preserve the records of borrowers who were deducted CRF pending resolution of ruling
of the Office of the General Counsel of the BSP. The BSP denied PVB’s request for
reconsideration, hence it filed a petition for declamatory relief before the RTC of Makati
City.
4. The Monetary Board moved to dismiss the petition, citing that the petition should not
prosper because of the prior breach of PVB by Section 54 of RA 8791. The RTC dismissed
the petition for declaratory relief, ruling that the issue of whether or not PVB violated
Section 54 of Republic Act 8791 should be resolved in an ordinary civil action, not a
declaratory relief.
5. Almost year later, it filed a Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration, stating that it
did not receive a copy of the order until September 3, 2008, which the Monetary Board
opposed, alleging that per certification by the Philippine Postal Corporation, the order
was served on respondent on October 17, 2007.
6. The RTC ruling on the motion for reconsideration, reversed itself and ruled that the
collection of the CRF by PVB did not constitute engaging in the issuance business as an
insurer, hence not a violation of Section 54 of RA 8791. Accordingly, it declared MB
Resolution No. 1189 null and void. Its motion for reconsideration denied, it filed before
the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari to contest the RTC decision, on the
issue of whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.

ISSUE: Was the petition for declaratory relief proper?

HELD:
 Declaratory relief is an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may
be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute
 In CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, the SC that in the same
manner that court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for declaratory
relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a petition for
declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision
either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by
the Rules of Court.
 In this case, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter
for a petition for declaratory relief. The BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency and
the MB resolution it issued was in its exercise of quasi-judicial powers or functions.
o The authority of the petitioners to issue the questioned MB Resolution emanated
from its powers under Section 37 of RA No. 7653 and Section 66 of RA No. 8791
to impose, at its discretion, administrative sanctions, upon any bank for violation
of any banking law.
o The nature of the BSP Monetary Board as a quasi-judicial agency, and the
character of its determination of whether or not appropriate sanctions may be
imposed upon erring banks, as an exercise of quasi-judicial function

 A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a court and other
than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication
or rule making. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested
with quasi-judicial powers.
o It recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in
matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies,
which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.

 A “quasi-judicial function” is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

 Lastly, also worth noting is the fact that the court a quo’s Order dated September 24,
2007, which dismissed respondent’s petition for declaratory relief, had long become final
and executory.
o To recall, said Order was duly served on and received by respondent on October
17, 2007, as evidenced by the Certification issued by the Philippine Postal
Corporation. Almost a year later, however, or on October 15, 2008, respondent
moved for reconsideration of the court a quo’s Order of dismissal, claiming it
received a copy of said Order only on September 3, 2008.
o Thus, respondent’s self-serving claim should not have prevailed over the
Certification issued by the Philippine Postal Corporation. It was error for the trial
court to entertain it for the second time despite the lapse of almost a year before
respondent filed its motion for reconsideration against said Order.
 3. SJS v. Lina, G.R. No. 160031, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 462

Facts:
 Petitioner, a registered political party, filed a petition for declaratory relief
against Sec Lina (later on impleaded other respondents; look at the title) for
the proper construction of Section 90(a) of LGC which provides:

o “All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from

practicing their profession or engaging in any other occupation other
than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.”

 The DILG, thru OSG, moved for the dismissal arguing that (1) petitioner had
no legal standing, (2) there is no judicial controversy, (2) declaratory relief is
not the propert remedy.
 RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory relief. Hence this petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON THE PETITION FOR Declaratory relief will prosper – NO. Petition
denied.

In the petition filed with the trial court, petitioner failed to allege the ultimate facts which satisfy
these requisites. Not only that, as admitted by the petitioner, the provision the interpretation of
which is being sought has already been breached by the respondents. Declaratory relief cannot
thus be availed of.

Ruling:
1. The Court agrees that petitioner has locus standing; however, the action for
declaratory relief is an inappropriate remedy to enforce compliance with
Section 90 of LGC.

2. The appearance of incumbent city or municipal mayors and provincial

governors, who are actors in movies and TV programs enhances their income
but reduces considerably the time they should devote their constituents.
This in violation of Section 90 of LGC and Sec 7 of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standars for Public Officials and Employees. Their appearance
further gives them undue advantage in future eletions over their opponents
who are not actors. (take note that there is nothing in the dispositive
portion ordering the respondents to desists from being actors. Kasi mali
remedy)
3. Indeed, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a
deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is
to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder

For the action to prosper, it must be shown that (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.
Rule 64 - Review of Judgments and Final Orders and Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit

1. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, 21 January 2015, 747 SCRA 1

FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
"IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic
Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while
those who voted against it form "Team Buhay".

During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored
nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains
names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the
passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as

Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials
addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer
ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by
three feet (3’)

On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10 requesting, among others, that (1)
petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding
the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the
tarpaulin be allowed to remain.
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter12 ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election
offense against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton the
remedies available to petitioners.

ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS

DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENTIAL RULES GOVERNING APPEALS FROM
COMELEC DECISIONS.

HELD: Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is
applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion
resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.22 As a special civil action, there must also be a
showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
the law.

Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by
this court, whose power to review is "limited only to final decisions, rulings and
orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial power." Instead, respondents claim that the assailed notice and letter are
reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the
Constitution24 on COMELEC’s power to decide all questions affecting elections.

In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their
petition is filed to assert their fundamental right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in
the implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and letter, the
COMELEC was allegedly enforcingelection laws.
Rule 65 – Certiorari

1. Aquino v. Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, 29 September 2014, 737 SCRA 145

DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial
powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the
LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the
LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR.
The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the
administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking,
is not an issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the
maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather
than treating this as an environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted from the
root cause of this debacle compliance.

FACTS
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove
Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove) in which applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.
While the company was already operating a resort in the area, and the application
sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel
over a parcel of land located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay,
Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes issued
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay
West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction
site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow
up, no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was
issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June
7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the
closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion. However,
the CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari
can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive
functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the
proper remedy for the petitioner, according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory
relief with the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA. on February 3,
2014 through the challenged Resolution. Hence, the instant petition raising arguments on
both procedure and substance.

PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a

nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
And the Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the
municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings are conducted first before the LGU can order the
closure and demolition of the property in question.
2. Whether or not declaratory relief is still available to petitioner;

RULING
1. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such
a thing is a nuisance per se.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still
find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This
is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights
of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives
of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote
the general welfare.
Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after
satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders.
Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function
as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution
thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which empowered the
mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing
to secure the necessary permits.
2. Declaratory relief no longer viable
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find merit in petitioner's contention
that the special writ of certiorari, and not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for
assailing EO 10. As provided under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or...
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder. x x x (emphasis added)
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action
for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations
of... the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement
thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or
contract to which... it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for
ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately
available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest
before they lead to... a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission
of wrongs.[4]
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10's
enforcement and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile
any possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives
in the... challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief
is the proper remedy given such a situation.
Petitioner could have filed, as an alternative, a petition for mandamus to compel the
respondent mayor to exercise discretion and resolve the controversy pending
before his office. There is indeed an exception to the rule that... matters involving
judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such
writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. Whether or
not the decision would be for or against petitioner would be for the respondent
mayor to decide,... for while mandamus may be invoked to compel the exercise
of discretion, it cannot compel such discretion to be exercised in a particular
way.[21] What would have been important was for the respondent mayor to
immediately resolve the case for petitioner to... be able to go through the motions
that the zoning clearance application process entailed
 2. Villanueva v. Judicial & Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, 7 April 2015, 755 SCRA
182

FACTS:
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region
XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City;
Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated
December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the
petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same
date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-
inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who
did not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC
Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and
reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his
name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the
chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have
served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a
judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to
take recourse to this Court

ISSUE:
WON the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing
its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary
because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function

HELD:
The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two
special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening
applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto
itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the
formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is
necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination
must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's
power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is
the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it
that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC
are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the
duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules
The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. It
is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform
the act required. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion
and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an
applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it
involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC

The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be
filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and
whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity
of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties
thereunder."

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the
petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be
included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement
policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the
Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The
opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person

Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved.18 The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by R.A.No. 7691

Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its
expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any
event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities
 3. Clark Investors and Locators Association, Inc. v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No.
200670, 6 July 2015, 761 SCRA 586

FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA No. 7227 which mandated the accelerated
conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations into special economic zones.
Based on Section 12 (c) of the said law, in lieu of national and local taxes, all
businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall pay
a preferential gross income tax rate of five percent (5%). In addition, Section 12 (b)
also provides that such businesses and enterprises shall be exempt from the payment
of all taxes and duties on the importation of raw materials, capital, and equipment into
the Subic Special Economic Zone. This tax and fiscal incentives under RA No. 7227was
further extended to the Clark Freeport Zone upon enactment of RA No. 9400 on March
20, 2007. This made the businesses and enterprises within the Clark Freeport Zone
exempt from the payment of all taxes and duties on the importation of raw materials,
capital and equipment.

On February 17, 2012, the Dept. of Finance, upon recommendation of the BIR, issued
RR 2-2012 which imposed VAT and excise tax on the importation of petroleum and
petroleum products from abroad and into the Freeport or Economic Zones.
Herein petitioner, which represents the businesses and enterprises within the Clark
Freeport Zone, filed the instant petition alleging that respondents acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing RR 2-2012. It argues that by imposing the VAT and excise
tax on the importation of petroleum and petroleum products from abroad and into the
Freeport or Economic Zones, RR 2-2012 unilaterally revoked the tax exemption granted
by RA No. 7227 and RA No. 9400 to the businesses and enterprises operating within the
Subic Special Economic Zone and Clark Freeport Zone.
This petition for certiorari prays for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to annul and set aside RR 2-2012 issued by the Department of Finance upon
recommendation of the BIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Secretary of Finance acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing RR 2-2012 that imposes VAT and excise tax on the importation of petroleum
and petroleum products from abroad and into Freeport or Economic Zones, as it is
claimed to have unilaterally revoked tax exemption granted by RA 7227 and RA 9400.

HELD: The SC denied the petition for being an improper remedy.

FIRSTLY, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, is a special civil action that may be invoked ONLY against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Before a tribunal, board,
or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law
that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is
brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to
determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending
parties.
In determining whether a Revenue Regulation is quasi-legislative in nature, the legal
basis of the Secretary of Finance in the issuance thereof must be examined. RR 2-2012
was issued by the Secretary of Finance based on Section 244 of the NIRC. Section
244 is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the
NIRC. And since RR 2-2012 was issued by the Secretary of Finance based on
Section 244 of the NIRC, such administrative issuance is therefore quasi-
legislative in nature which is outside the scope of a petition for certiorari.
SECONDLY, Supreme Court explained that it could not be denied that even if the
petition is filed as a certiorari, in real essence, it seeks the declaration by the High
Court of the unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned rule, thus
partaking the nature, in reality, of one for declaratory relief over which the
SC has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.
LASTLY, although the SC, the CA and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, as hierarchy of courts must be
respected. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also
serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established
policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.
 4. Tagle v. Equitable PCI, G.R. No. 172299, 22 April 2008, 552 SCRA 424

FACTS: Tagle was assailing RTC order granting writ of possession ifo
Equitable, alleging the property was a family home. Filed a petition for certiorari
under R65...

HELD: A petition for certiorari under R65 was not the proper remedy.
Should be under R45, in trying to assail the decision of the CA because

GR: R45 should be the rule resorted to, whatever the proceedings before the CA
was, in going up to the SC
+ requisites for Certiorari should be complied...
HERE: there was still sufficient remedy that Tagle could have resorted to (R45)
hence there was a plain, speedy remedy still available. (even if there was
GADALEJ)
*Note: distinguished errors of judgment from errors of jurisdiction!
*can you avail of both?
GR: No. Mutually exclusive, not alternative, cumulative or successive
X: If comply with the period to file, and in other requirements, under both rules
45 and 65
*make a table of the differences!
*Certiorari is an original remedy, while petition for review under Rule 45 is an
appellate remedy
*what are the two pleadings that should be filed if RTC to CA: Notice of Appeal
plus appellant's brief
*if you lose in the CA, then would want to go to SC: file MR (but not required if
ordinary appeal); but can go right away with R45 - in R65, assure that there was
no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy
-note also that when you file a motion before CA, there is no need for hearing
5. Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166755, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA
562

FACTS: On December 6, 1995, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage and custody
of minor children before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, docketed as
Civil Case No. 95-194. The trial court resolved to grant the annulment of the marriage based on
private respondents psychological incapacity, award to petitioner the custody of the minor
children, and order the liquidation of the conjugal properties.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial and to Admit Answer which
the trial court granted in an order dated February 12, 1997. In addition, private respondent was
awarded visitation rights over the minor children.

Petitioner moved to reconsider the February 12, 1997 Order which was granted by the trial court
in the Order of October 10, 1997. The trial court set aside the February 12, 1997 Order and
affirmed the December 13, 1996 Resolution granting the annulment of the marriage and directed
the parties to submit an inventory of their conjugal assets.

Thereafter, private respondent submitted an inventory of conjugal assets which included their
Ayala Alabang Village house and lot. Petitioner manifested that the conjugal abode be
adjudicated in his favor considering that he was awarded the custody of the children while
private respondent was adjudged to be the party in bad faith.

The trial court ordered that the conjugal properties which include the conjugal abode, certificate
of stock and motor vehicle, should be sold and the proceeds thereof be divided equally between
the parties. Respondent filed a motion for execution of the August 4, 1999 resolution,while on
November 18, 1999, petitioner prayed for its reconsideration. On March 15, 2000, the trial court
declared that the August 4, 1999 resolution has become final. A writ of execution was
accordingly issued on March 17, 2000.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
August 4, 1999 Resolution and the March 17, 2000 Writ of Execution.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and held that the August 4, 1999 Resolution of the
trial court had long become final and executory for failure of petitioner to file a timely motion
for reconsideration or appeal. It also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
Manifestation and Motion clarifying that what he filed on September 22, 2003 was a motion to
forfeit the share of the private respondent in the net profits of the conjugal properties and not a
motion to amend an order, and praying that the same motion be resolved by the trial court.
Petitioner contends that filing a motion for reconsideration before recourse to the special civil
action of certiorari would be futile because the trial court had already ordered the execution of
the judgment, citing the case of Guevarra v. Court of Appeals. He claims that the trial court was
amply given opportunity to correct itself when he filed the Manifestation and Motion clarifying
the August 2, 2004 Order.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 65 applies in the case at bar.

HELD: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

As held in Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga, the plain and adequate remedy
referred to in the foregoing Rule is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or
Resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action
for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions, to wit:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

An examination of the records, specifically the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals, reveals that petitioner not only failed to explain his failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the August 27, 2004 Order of the trial court; he also failed to show sufficient
justification for dispensing with the requirement. Neither did he show that the case falls under
any of the above exceptions. It was only in the motion for reconsideration of the November 22,
2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals and in the instant petition that he explained why he
dispensed with the filing of prior motion for reconsideration.

It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter
of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of
certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of
the law and the Rules.[24] Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a
motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a
motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for
doing so,[25] which petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the
petition.

Moreover, petitioners reliance in the case of Guevarra v. Court of Appeals[26] to justify the
failure to file a motion for reconsideration is misplaced. Although we held in Guevarra that a
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases of urgency like when the trial court
had ordered the execution of the judgment, this circumstance must be clearly shown by the
petitioner as a concrete, compelling and valid reason, and not just leave it for the courts to
ascertain.
 6. Concepcion v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178624, 30 June 2009, 591 SCRA 420

Facts: A petition for certiorari filed by Jose Concepcion, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set
aside the En Banc Resolution dated 02 April 2007 and Order dated 8 May 2007 of
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

The petition cites and quotes the assailed rulings, then recites that on January 5,
2007, the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for
Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick Count with the COMELEC. The present
petitioner then the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City
was one of the signatories of the NAMFREL petition in his capacity as the National
Chairman of NAMFREL.

Records of past political exercises show that on election day, the Commission on
Elections usually receive numerous complaints against barangay officials entering polling
places and interfering in proceedings of the BEIs thereby causing not only delay in the
proceedings, but also political tension among the BEIs, the voters and the watchers in the
polling place.
Thus, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7798 that provides the following:
Section 3 of EO No. 94 - No barangay official shall be appointed as member of
the Board of Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly registered major
political party or any socio-civic, religious, professional or any similar organization of
which they may be members.
…and then prohibiting:
1. The appointment of barangay officials which includes the Punong
Barangay, Barangay Kagawad, Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer, and Barangay
Tanod, as Chairman/person and/or Member of the BEIs or as official watcher of any
candidate, duly registered major political party, or any similar organization, or any socio-
civic, religious, professional [sic], in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. The
prohibition extends to barangay officials, employees and tanods, who are members of
accredited citizen’s arms.
2. The barangay officials, employees and tanods from staying inside any polling
place, except to cast their vote. Accordingly, they should leave the polling place
immediately after casting their vote.
The COMELEC ruled on NAMFRELs petition for accreditation and find it
meritorious. There is, however, one important condition that must be fulfilled by the
petitioner before its accreditation as citizens’ arm could legally take effect. Accordingly,
Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., the National Chairman of NAMFREL, must first be removed
both as a member and overall Chairman of said organization. As correctly pointed out by
the oppositor, Mr. Concepcion, being the Barangay Chairman
of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City, cannot be a member much more the overall
chairman of the citizens arm such as NAMFREL. This is explicitly provided for in
COMELEC Resolution No. 7798

NAMFREL filed a Manifestation and Request for Re-Examination that: (1) contains
information regarding NAMFRELs reorganization and its new set of officers showing that
the petitioner had stepped down as National Chair and had been replaced by a new
Chair; (2) manifests NAMFRELs acceptance of the conditional grant of its petition for
accreditation; and (3) includes NAMFRELs request for a re-examination without further
arguments of the April 2, 2007 Resolution as it specifically affected the petitioners
membership with NAMFREL. In this Manifestation and Request for Re-examination,
NAMFREL outlined its various objections and concerns on the legality or validity of
Resolution 7798.

The COMELEC, in its Order noted the information relating to NAMFRELs current officers,
and denied the request to examine its (COMELECs) interpretation. The COMELEC reasoned out
that Resolution is clear, and NAMFREL had not presented any convincing argument to warrant
the requested examination.

Instead of a direct reaction from NAMFREL, the petitioner filed the present petition,
ostensibly questioning the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution, but actually raising
issues with respect to Resolution 7798.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) defends the validity of Resolution 7798.

The courts dismiss the petition for blatant misuse of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
petition mentions three legal instruments related with the case, namely: (1) EO No. 94,
(2) COMELECs Resolution (3) COMELEC Resolution 7798, issued pursuant to EO No. 94 and
which in turn is the basis of the COMELEC’s Resolution.

The petitioner now seeks to assail, in his individual capacity, a

COMELEC adjudicatory resolution (i.e., the April 2, 2007 Resolution) for its adverse effects on
him when he was not a party to that case. NAMFREL is not a party to the present petition. Thus,
the present petition is clearly the petitioners own initiative, and NAMFREL, the direct party in the
COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution, has absolutely no participation.

Issue: Whether the petitioner misuse Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling: The above features of the petition render it fatally defective. The first defect lies in the
petitioner’s personality to file a petition for certiorari to address an adjudicatory resolution of the
COMELEC in which he was not a party to, and where the direct party, NAMFREL, does not even
question the assailed resolution. It would have been another matter if NAMFREL had filed the
present petition with the petitioner as intervenor because of his personal interest in the COMELEC
ruling. He could have intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected party in NAMFRELs
Manifestation and Request for Examination. As a last recourse, the petitioner could have
expressly stated before this Court the procedural problems he faced and asked that we suspend
the rules based on the unusual circumstances he could have pointed out. None of these actions,
however, took place. Instead, the petitioner simply questioned the COMELECs April 2, 2007
Resolution without explaining to this Court his reason for using Rule 65 as his medium, and from
there, proceeded to attack the validity of COMELEC Resolution 7798. Under these questionable
circumstances, we cannot now recognize the petitioner as a party-in-interest who can directly
assail the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution in an original Rule 65 petition before this Court.

Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may
be availed of by a "person aggrieved" by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term
"person aggrieved" is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by
the lower courts order or decision can question the said courts disposition via certiorari.
To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless
litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more
importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court.

The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not available to any person who feels
injured by the decision of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The person aggrieved under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil
action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party in the proceedings before the court a quo.
 The real party in interest who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit must
prosecute or defend an action. We have held that interest means material interest, an interest in
issue that the decision will affect, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest.

The second fatal defect lies in the petitions thrust; it opened with and professed to be an
express challenge to the COMELECs adjudicatory April 2, 2007 Resolution, but in its arguments
solely attacks and prays for the partial nullity of COMELEC Resolution 7798 issued in the exercise
of the COMELECs rule making power. This approach is fatally defective because the petition
thereby converts an express challenge of an adjudicatory resolution made without the requisite
standing into a challenge for the nullity of a regulation through an original Rule 65 petition
for certiorari.

What is significant in appreciating this defect in the petition is the legal reality that the
petitioner was not without any viable remedy to directly challenge Resolution 7798. A stand-alone
challenge to the regulation could have been made through appropriate mediums, particularly
through a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate Regional Trial Court under the terms
of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, or through a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to prevent the
implementation of the regulation, as the petitioner might have found appropriate to his
situation. As already mentioned, a challenge can likewise be made in the course of validly
contesting an adjudicatory order of the COMELEC. Such challenge, however, cannot be made in
an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 dissociated from any COMELEC action made in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
 7. Worldwide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. Nos. 161106 and 161266, 13
January 2014, 713 SCRA 18

FACTS:
Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
Decision and the Resolution of the CA reversing the quashal of the search warrants previously
issued by the RTC.

The applications for warrants to search the office premises of petitioner WWC, and of petitioner
Planet Internet, alleged to be conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and
violation of PD No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and
prejudice of PLDT.

Petitioners also committed theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and
equipment and with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and revenues that rightly
belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of access and bypass charges
in its favor while “piggy-backing” on its multi-million dollar facilities and infrastructure, thus
stealing its business revenues from international long distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in
gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment (CPE) without first securing
type approval license from the latter.

The RTC granted the application for search warrants. Accordingly, the warrants were issued against
the office premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items.

Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors,
numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even
personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of
international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage
regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.

Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet filed their respective motions to quash the
search warrants.

The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of
general warrants. Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to
petitioners.

PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on the ground that it had failed to get
the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling which was subsequently denied.

ISSUES: PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

RULING: An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the filing of
a criminal action, partakes of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.

Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was interlocutory, it cannot
be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT should have filed a Rule 65 petition instead.
Petitioners cite, as authority for their position, Marcelo v. de Guzman. The Court held therein as
follows:

But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the search warrant and to return
the properties seized thereunder final in character, or is it merely interlocutory?

In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:
Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the return of goods seized, the order of
restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory and hence, not appealable; likewise, a denial, by the
US District Court, of defendant’s petition for the return of the articles seized under a warrant is such
an interlocutory order.

A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined; on the other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely,
but leaves something more to be done upon its merits.

Tested against this criterion, the search warrant issued xxx is indisputably of interlocutory
character because it leaves something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the
determination of the guilt of the accused therein.

Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main
criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal
case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is
significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to
quash a search warrant.

Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo,
the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still “something more to be done in
the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein.”

In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to
be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant)
ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications for
search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal
actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was
nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders,
not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
 8. Kalipunan v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, 22 July 2014, 730 SCRA 322

PETITIONER: Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. represented by its VP, Carlito

Badion, et al
RESPONDENTS: Jessie Robredo in his capacity as Secretary of DILG, et al

SUMMARY: Petitioners reside in the cites of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon. LGU has
a infrasture project that requires the eviction and demolition of illegally occupied areas
by the petitioners. Petitioners filed a case which argues that respondents must first
secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their implementation
of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 and argued that the said RA was unconstitutional.

DOCTRINE: To justify judicial review to be conducted by the Judicial department, the

petitioners must establish facts that are necessarily linked to the jurisdictional problem
they presented in this case.

FACTS:
 The members of petitioners were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located in
the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon

 These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28
(a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and construction of
infrastructure projects in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners

 Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court
order when:
o persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places suchas
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and
o persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with
available funding are about to be implemented.

 On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
before the Court, seeking to compel the respondents to first secure an eviction and/or
demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of
RA 7279.

 Petitioners argue that they have:

o No plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
o the respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and
(b) of RA 7279 which are patently unconstitutional for warranting demolition
without any court order. (Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly
prohibits the impairment of liberty of abode unless there is a court order.)
o Violate their right to adequate housing, a universal right recognized in Article 25
of Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279.
o Insist that they stand to be directly injured by the respondents’threats of evictions
and demolitions had previously conducted evictions and demolitions in a violent
manner, contrary to Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
o Also contend that the transcendental public importance of the issues raised in this
case clothes them with legal standing.
  Respondent’s case:
o Respondents prays for the outright dismissal of the petition for its serious
procedural defects:
 Petitioners Ignored the hierarchy of courts
 Petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and
mandamus in assailing the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279

o For a writ of prohibition is merely to prevent the public

respondent’s usurpation of power or improper assumption of
jurisdiction, on the other hand, a writ of mandamus only
commands the public respondent to perform his ministerial
functions.

 the petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of discretion that
the Mayor of Navotas allegedly committed.
 the petition does not present any justiciable controversy since the City of
Navotas had already successfully evicted the petitioners in San Roque,
Navotas
 petition was filed out of time since the petitioners were personally notified
of the intended eviction and demolition on September 23, 2011
 He further asserts that his faithful implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b)
of RA 7279, which are presumed to be constitutional, cannotbe equated to
grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petition should be dismissed for serious procedural defects – YES
(2) Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution - NO
(3) Whether or not the petion may be subject to Judicial Review –NO

RULING: Petition is Dismissed

RATIO:
(1).
 The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they directly filed the
petition before the Court.
 The petitioners appear to have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort,
not a court offirst instance.
 The petitioners wrongly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus.
For a writ of prohibition is merely to prevent the public respondent’s
usurpation of power or improper assumption of jurisdiction, on the other hand,
a writ of mandamus only commands the public respondent to perform his
ministerial functions.

 The use of the permissive word "may" implies that the public respondents have
discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall be performed.
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
(2).
 The resolution of the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 is not the
lis mota (the cuase of the suit or action) of the case.
(3).
 The petition fails show the essential requisites that would warrant the Court’s exercise
of judicial review which are:
(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination;
(2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part ofthe party raising
the constitutional question;
(3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision
of the case.

 the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing
first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question
that he raised is unavoidable.

 Petitioners fail to show the necessity of examining the constitutionality of Section 28

(a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution. In the case of Magkalas v. NHA, this Court had already ruled on the
validity of evictions and demolitions without any court order.

 the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely
abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead,
theymerely imputed jurisdictional abuse to the public respondents through general
averments in their pleading, but without any basis to support their claim.
Mandamus

1. Calim v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 156527, 5March 2007, 517 SCRA 412

CALIM VS GUERRERO
FACTS:
 Petitioner Nemesio M. Calim operates Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services
in Siniloan, Laguna. Private respondent Roberto J. Acoba was the Vice-Mayor of Siniloan,
Laguna. On the other hand, private respondents Paul Simon Z. Go, Homer R. Serrano,
Felipe A. Em, Eligio R. de Leon, Felipe V. Castro, Gaudencio C. Salay, Andres V. Quintero,
Hector A. Maneja, and Sedfrey B. Realeza were councilors of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna.
 On 23 November 2001, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against private respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713. The case was docketed as OMB-1-01-
1121-K.
 Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that on or about 22 July 2001, he was given a mayors permit
from the municipal government of Siniloan, Laguna, for his tours and tourist services
business. On 31 July 2001, he applied for the registration of his business name with the
Regional Office of the Department of Trade and Industry in San Pablo City, initially
indicating therein as first priority the name, Mabuhay Tours and Tourist Services for his
business. He was, however, advised by the aforesaid office to change the name to Eastern
Laguna Tours and Tourist Services, and thereafter, was issued a Certification of
Registration thereon on 29 August 2001. He informed Municipal Mayor Guillermo
L. Acero, through the Municipal Business License Office, of the fact of change of the
name Mabuhay Tours and Tourist Services to Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services.
 On 1 February 2002, six of the eleven private respondents, namely, Felipe A. Em,
Noel Laberinto, Homer Serrano, Eligio de Leon, Hector A. Maneja,
and Sedfrey Realezafiled a joint Counter-Affidavit.
 Meanwhile, private respondents Vice-Mayor Roberto J. Acoba, Paul Simon
Go, Gaudencio Salay and Andres Quintero filed a Rejoinder,[8] averring similar
arguments as raised in the Counter-Affidavit previously filed by their co-private
respondents. Reiterating their prayer that the Complaint against them be dismissed for
utter lack of merit, they maintained that their action taken as members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna, in recommending the cancellation of the
mayors permit granted to petitioner was a product of due deliberation and
investigation.[9] They insisted that petitioner failed to prove that he was authorized to
engage as a common carrier to offer daily tours to Metro Manila
and Baguio from Siniloan, Laguna. Hence, in openly engaging in the business of transport
services, petitioner violated the terms and conditions of the mayors permit.
 Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended the dismissal of petitioners
Complaint for lack of probable cause.
 petitioner filed the instant Petition for Mandamus, seeking to compel the public
respondents to file the appropriate information for violation of Section 5(a) of Republic
 Act No. 6713, against private respondents Sangguniang Bayan members of Siniloan,
Laguna.
 Sol-Gen dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office?
HELD: NO.
It is elementary that mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioners right is founded
clearly on law and not when it is doubtful.[20] In varying language, the principle echoed and
reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined,
clear and certain.[21] A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioners legal right to the
performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. [22] A
clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of
law.[23] Mandamus, therefore, is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty.[24]

Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where
the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference
to any matter in which he is required to act.[25] It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court.[26]

Essentially, what petitioner attacks in the instant Petition for Mandamus is the order of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in admonishing the private respondents. The case partakes
of an administrative disciplinary nature.

Herein, petitioner was not able to establish his entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Petitioner fails
to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to compel the public respondents to file a criminal
information against the private respondents. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not
interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without
good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.[27] Said exercise of powers is based upon
his constitutional mandate[28] and the courts will not interfere in its exercise.[29] Courts have
upheld the wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers that the Ombudsman enjoys;
and such powers are virtually free from executive, legislative or judicial intervention.[30] The
rationale of this rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
that the Office of the Ombudsman is granted under the present Constitution,[31] but upon
practicality as well; otherwise, the functions of the courts would be perilously bound by
numerous petitions assailing the result of the investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office,
in much the same way that the courts would be saturated if compelled to review the prosecutors
exercise of discretion each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a
complaint.[32] The discretion to prosecute or dismiss a complaint filed before it is lodged in the
Office of the Ombudsman itself. To compel the Ombudsman to further pursue a criminal case
against the private respondents, as petitioner would have it, is outside the ambit of the courts.

Corollarily, Section 2, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which
runs:

SEC. 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend
whether it may be:

a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

b) referred to respondent for comment;

c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;

d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;

e) referred for administrative adjudication; or

f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.

and is reinforced by Section 3, Rule III of the same Rules, hereby quoted:

SEC. 3. How initiated. An administrative case may be initiated by a written complaint under oath
accompanied by affidavits of witnesses and other evidences in support of the charge. An
administrative proceeding may also be ordered by the Ombudsman or the respective Deputy
Ombudsman on his initiative or on the basis of a complaint originally filed as a criminal action
or a grievance complaint or request for assistance.

clearly provides the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude of discretion in determining
what and which acts to prosecute criminally and/or administratively. In the instant case, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman opted, based on the evidence on hand, to only administratively
admonish the private respondents, a penalty which is in fine tune with the mandate of Rule IV,
Section 52 (C) (13) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,[33] which provides:

SEC. 52. Classification of Offenses. Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are
classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on
the government service.

xxxx
C. The following are light offenses with corresponding penalties:

xxxx

13. Failure to act promptly on letters and requests within fifteen (15) days from receipt, except as
otherwise provided in the rules implementing the code of conduct and ethical standards for
public officials and employees: Ist Offense > Reprimand; 2nd Offense > Suspension for one (1)
to thirty (30) days; 3rd Offense > Dismissal.

A graver reason that impels this court to reject petitioners plea is the mode taken by petitioner in
elevating the case to this court. In the case of Fabian v. Desierto,[34] this court ruled that
appeals, if availing,[35] from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule
43[36] of the Rules of Court. In Lanting v. Ombudsman,[37] we underscored the catena of cases
subsequent to the Fabian ruling, thus:

In Fabian v. Desierto, we held that only appeals from the decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
the provisions of Rule 43 (of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure). We reiterated this
ruling in Namuhe vs. Ombudsman and recently in Barata vs. Abalos,
Jr. and Coronel vs. AnianoDesierto, as Ombudsman, and Pedro Sausal, Jr.[38]
There is, verily, a limited applicability of this courts pronouncement in Fabian. The Fabian ruling
does not extend to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. Kuizon v.
Ombudsman[39] and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),[40] instructed that
petitions for certiorari questioning the Ombudsmans orders or decisions in criminal cases should
be filed in the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals.[41] This is the prevailing
rule.[42] The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, in admonishing the private respondents,
deemed the matter to be one in the nature of an administrative disciplinary case. The petitioner,
in filing the instant Petition for Mandamusbefore this Court, took a route that is antagonistic to
prevailing rules and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant Petition
for Mandamus is DISMISSED.
 2. Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, 15 January 2010, 610 SCRA 211

FACTS: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother
Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the
holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be
instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s
estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so
without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original
holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the
presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her
son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first,
denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence,
the petition was dismissed.

Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the
appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the
motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the
payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial
evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of
events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left
with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main
that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used
by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

HELD: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of
the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation
of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the
idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which
the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public
right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if
the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not
his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or
as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will
be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in
the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against
whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer,
board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce
contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract
rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or
quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an
individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise,
justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the
government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character,
mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual
modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a
legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by
equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the
court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved
here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private
duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there
lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that
respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state
that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
Rule 67 – Expropriation

1. National Housing v. Heirs Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, 19 June 2003, 404
SCRA 389

Facts:
Ø NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding the eminent
domain against Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case.
Ø The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al were the rightful private owners of the
land which the petitioner intends to develop a socialized housing project.
Ø The respondent heirs filed a manifestation of waiving their objections to petitioners
power to expropriate their properties, thereafter trial court declares plaintiff has a right to
expropriate the properties of the defendant heirs and appointed 3 commissioners who
ascertain the just compensation of the said properties be fixed at PHP 11, 200.00 per
square meter.
Ø Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13
and 19 as well as the amount of just compensation, however the respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration of the trial courts partial judgment but the trial court issued an
omnibus order to deny the motion of respondent granting the petitioner’s motion and of
just compensation.
Ø Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed
a motion for execution since the trial court move for the entry of the partial judgment as
modified by the omnibus order.
Ø The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground of
partial judgment and omnibus order became a final and executory when petitioner failed
to appeal.
Ø The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but then it was denied by the court.
The courts of appeals serve on petitioner for a notice of levy pursuant to writ of Execution
and a Notice of third garnishment from the Land bank of the Philippines.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to continue
with its inherent power of eminent domain.
2. Whether or not judgment has become final and executory and if estoppel or laches
applies to government.
3. Whether or not writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the state
in an expropriation where in the exercise of power of eminent domain will not serve public
use or purpose

Ruling:
Ø The state as represented by the NHA for housing project can continue its inherent
power of eminent domain provided that the just compensation for the property sought is
taken. After the rendition of such order the plaintiff shouldn’t be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue such proceedings except on such terms of the court be equitable.
Ø The order was final after the non-appealing of the petitioner as the lawful right to
expropriate the properties of respondent heirs of Guivelondo.
Ø Petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution, although it is public in
character since it is arbitrary and capricious for a government entity to initiate
expropriation proceedings that seize a private owner’s property.
Ø Petition was DENIED and the trial court’s decision denying petitioner’s motion to
dismiss expropriation proceeding was AFFIRMED. Its injunctive relief against the levy
and garnishment of its funds and personal properties was also DENIED. The temporary
Restraining Order was LIFTED
Ø In order to resolve the issue of the propriety of the garnishment against petitioners’
funds and personal properties, there is a need to first determine its true character as a
government entity. Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot be the
object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously
granted and the state liability adjudged
Ø The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered
by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Ø However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or
controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct
from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment
 2. Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, 23 January 2006, 479 SCRA 391

Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an
area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig,
respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter
portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational
activities" of the residents... of Barangay Caniogan.

On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended
expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of
her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our... community."
In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the
expropriation of petitioner's property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to
its poor residents."
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint
for expropriation

On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint

On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss,[5] on
the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports
and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig.

Issues:
whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property

Ruling:
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the
necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity.

the very foundation of... the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and
that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the
necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.

necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be
necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such
as would combine the greatest benefit to the public... with the least inconvenience and
expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit.

Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property.
Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification[14] issued by the Caniogan
Barangay
Council, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan. It... can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of
having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner's lot is the
nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically
public. The necessity has not... been shown, especially considering that there exists an
alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which
is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of
Caniogan.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED.

Principles:
Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small
community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding
that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking... cannot
be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid.
3. Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership, G.R. No. 171496, 3 March 2014,
717 SCRA 601
Rule 68 - Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

1. BPI Family v. Coscolluela, G.R. No. 167724, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 472

FACTS.
 Respondent and her late husband Oscar obtained an agricultural sugar crop loan from Far
East Bank & Trust Co. (later merged with BPI) for crop years 1997 and 1998. In the book of
Far East, the loan account was treated as a single account, and evidenced by 67 promissory
notes.
 Sps. Coscolluela executed a real estate mortgage in favor of FEBTC over their parcel of land
as security of loans on credit accommodation obtained and those that may be obtained.
 Under the terms and conditions of the real estate mortgage, in the event of failure to pay
the mortgage obligation or any portion thereof, the entire principal, interest, penalties, and
other charges shall be immediately due; and Far East mat foreclose the same extra
judicially.
 For failure to settle outstanding obligation on the maturity dates, Far East sent a final
demand letter to respondent demanding payment.
 Since respondent failed to settle her obligation, Far East filed a petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged property, but only only for 31 of the promissory notes.
 During pendency of said case, Far East filed a complaint for collection of money
representing the amounts for the 36 other promissory notes.
 In respondent’s answer, she alleged that the complaint was barred by litis pendentia for
the pending petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM.
 Petitioner presented a loan officer as sole witness, who testified that respondent were
granted a loan, which was a “single loan account.”
 Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence contending that the loan officer’s admission, that
there is only one loan account secured by the REM thus barred the personal action for
collection. She insisted that the filing of said complaint should be dismissed.
 Petitioner opposed the demurrer, stating that each promissory note constituted a separate
contract.
 The trial court denied the demurrer on the ground that each note covered a loan distinct
from the others.
 Respondent filed MR but denied, prompting her to file a certiorari petition under Rule 65
with CA.
 CA granted the petitioner, stating that the remedies sought are alternative and not
cumulative. Thus, in denying the demurrer, RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
 Petitioner filed MR but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON collection suit should be dismissed – YES

Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may not institute one
suit for a single cause of action, and, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground
for the dismissal of others. The law does not permit the owner of a single of entire cause of action
or an entire or indivisible demand to divide and split the cause to make it the subject of several
actions.
The true rule which determined whether a party has only a single and entire cause of action is
whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract or the several parts
arise from distinct and different acts. As gleaned from the plain terms of the REM, the real estate
of respondent served as a continuing security liable for obligations already obtainer and
obligations obtained thereafter. In this case, the action of petitioner is anchored on one and the
same cause: the nonpayment of respondent. Though the debt may be covered by several
promissory notes and is covered by a real estate mortgage, the latter is subsidiary to the former
and both refer to one and the same obligation. A mortgage creditor may institute two alternative
remedies against the debtor, either to collect debt or to foreclose mortgage, but not both.

DECISION.
WHEREFORE instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
 2. Monzon v. Sps. Relova, G.R. No. 171827, 17 September 2008, 565 SCRA 514

FACTS: On 18 October 2000, the spouses James and Maria Rosa Nieves Relova and the
spouses Bienvenido and Eufracia Perez, respondents before this Court, filed against Atty. Ana
Liza Luna, Clerk of Court of Branch 18 of the RTC of Tagaytay City, and herein petitioner
Teresita Monzon an initiatory pleading captioned as a Petition for Injunction. The case, which
was filed before the same Branch 18 of the RTC of Tagaytay City, was docketed as Civil Case
No. TG-2069.

In their Petition for Injunction, respondents alleged that Monzon executed a promissory note in
favor of the spouses Perez for the amount of P600,000.00, with interest of five percent per
month, payable on or before 28 December 1999. This was secured by a 300-square meter lot in
Barangay Kaybagal, Tagaytay City. Denominated as Lot No. 2A, this lot is a portion of Psu-
232001, covered by Tax Declaration No. 98-008-1793. On 31 December 1998, Monzon executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in favor of the spouses Perez.

On 23 October 1999, the Coastal Lending Corporation extrajudicially foreclosed the entire
9,967-square meter property covered by Psu-232001, including the portions mortgaged and
subsequently sold to respondents. According to the Petition for Injunction, Monzon was indebted
to the Coastal Lending Corporation in the total amount of P3,398,832.35. The winning bidder in
the extrajudicial foreclosure, Addio Properties Inc., paid the amount of P5,001,127.00, thus
leaving a P1,602,393.65 residue. According to respondents, this residue amount, which is in the
custody of Atty. Luna as Branch Clerk of Court, should be turned over to them pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 68 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Decision also mentioned that the Order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by
respondents was due to the continuous and incessant absences of petitioner and counsel.

On 25 April 2002, Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal, which was approved by the trial court.
Monzon claims that the RTC gravely erred in rendering its Decision immediately after
respondents presented their evidence ex parte without giving her a chance to present her
evidence, thereby violating her right to due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether respondents Petition for Injunction had failed to state a cause of action.

HELD: Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which is the basis of respondents alleged cause
of action entitling them to the residue of the amount paid in the foreclosure sale, provides as
follows:

SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of
the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the
person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or residue, after
paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in
the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be no such
encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to the
mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.

However, Rule 68 governs the judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Extra-judicial foreclosure of

mortgages, which was what transpired in the case at bar, is governed by Act No. 3135,[11] as
amended by Act No. 4118, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7353, Section 18 of Republic Act No.
7906, and Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791. A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, issued on 14 December
1999, provides for the procedure to be observed in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale. Thus, we clarified the different types of sales in Supena v. Dela Rosa, to wit:

Any judge, worthy of the robe he dons, or any lawyer, for that matter, worth his salt, ought to
know that different laws apply to different kinds of sales under our jurisdiction. We have three
different types of sales, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial foreclosure sale, and an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. An ordinary execution sale is governed by the pertinent provisions
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments. Rule 68 of
the Rules, captioned Foreclosure of Mortgage, governs judicial foreclosure sales. On the other
hand, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the
Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages," applies
in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages.

Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial foreclosure sales, neither Act No. 3135 as amended, nor
A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 grants to junior encumbrancers the right to receive the balance of the
purchase price. The only right given to second mortgagees in said issuances is the right to
redeem the foreclosed property pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, which provides:

Sec. 6. Redemption. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special
power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial
creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is
sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the
date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections
four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty- six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with this Act.

Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages, such right can only be given to second mortgagees who are made parties to the
(judicial) foreclosure. While a second mortgagee is a proper and in a sense even a necessary
party to a proceeding to foreclose a first mortgage on real property, he is not an indispensable
party, because a valid decree may be made, as between the mortgagor and the first mortgagee,
without regard to the second mortgage; but the consequence of a failure to make the second
mortgagee a party to the proceeding is that the lien of the second mortgagee on the equity of
redemption is not affected by the decree of foreclosure.

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. A cause of
action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[17] In view
of the foregoing discussions, we find that respondents do not have a cause of action against Atty.
Ana Liza Luna for the delivery of the subject amounts on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of the
Rules of Court, for the reason that the foregoing Rule does not apply to extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgages.
Rule 69 – Partition

1. Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 227

Facts:
A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with Damages was
filed by private respondent Josefina Garrido against petitioners before the RTC. She
alleged in her COMPLAINT that: Private respondent and petitioners are the co-owners of
undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga, Leyte.
The described parcels of lands were originally owned by the spouses Eugenio
Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo and they were survived by their 2 children: Ulpiano, Sr.
and Maximino (deceased)
The lands were inherited into two (2) equal shares by their 2 children;
Plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao, who after her
father’s death, had inherited her father’s share of the inheritance;
Ulpiano Balo, Sr. aside from being the son of Eugenio Balo, Sr., is married to Felicidad
Superio, and is the father of all the other defendants in this case;
Immediately upon the death of Eugenio Sr., petitioners took possession of the
properties without her knowledge and consent.
She requested for the properties’ fair and equal partition, but petitioners refused
her proposal.
In lieu of an Answer, petitioners filed a MTD on the following grounds:(1)Failure to
state a COA for failing to allege that she is a legitimate child and to allow her to inherit
from the estate in representation of her father would be to permit intestate succession
by an illegitimate child.(2)The complaint does not show that the estate of the spouses
Eugenio and Maria Balo have been settled and its obligations have been paid.(3)The
properties enumerated in the Complaint were proceeded against by way of execution
to satisfy a judgment against Eugenio and Maria Balo. Subsequently, defendant Ulpiano
repurchased the said properties and has been, together with his children, openly,
exclusively and adversely in possession of the real estate properties in question.
The RTC denied the MTD for lack of merit.
No evidence may be alleged or considered to test the sufficiency of the complaint
except the very facts pleaded therein. It would be improper to inject into the allegation,
facts not alleged and use them as basis for the decision on the motion.
The Court is not permitted to go beyond and outside of the allegations in the
complaint for data or facts.
Therefore, the allegation of illegitimacy and claim of absolute ownership are
modifications and unreasonable inferences. If there is doubt to the truth of the facts
averred in the complaint, the Court does not dismiss thecomplaint but requires an answer
and proceeds to hear the case on the merit.
COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING (PetCert): CA accordingly dismissed the same
because: An order denying a MTD is basically interlocutory in character and cannot be
the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. The proper procedure is to proceed with the
trial and if the decision be adverse to the movant, the remedy is to take an appeal from
said decision, assigning as one of the errors therefore the denial of the motion to dismiss.
CA denied the MR. Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 of the ROC.

Issue: Whether or not the action for judicial partition and accounting has prescribed, was
waived, or was otherwise abandoned.
Ruling:
No. It is noteworthy that the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, did, not Ipso
facto establish prescription. Dismissal prior to answer is premature. An
action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation
and conveyance of a determine portion of the properties involved. If the defendant asserts
exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather,
the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status
as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was
availed of, but because no basis for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. If, on
the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the
parties, the court may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action.
 2. Quintos v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 201252, 16 June 2014, 726 SCRA 482

Petitioners and respondents are siblings. In 1999, both their parents passed away,
leaving to their 10 children ownership over the subject property. An action for
partition was subsequently brought before the RTC. However, for failure of the
parties and their counsels to appear despite due notice, the case was dismissed.

Thereafter, the respondent siblings executed a Deed of Adjudication to transfer

the property in favor of the 10 siblings. As a result, the old TCT was cancelled and
the Registry of Deeds issued a new one. The respondents subsequently sold their
7/10 undivided share in favor of the spouses Candelario.

The petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against the
respondents.

Respondents countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by

estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10
undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point out that this is an
admission on the part of petitioners that the property is not entirely theirs. In
addition, they claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra mortgaged the
property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had
to redeem the property in their behalf. Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and
Escolastica, the Candelarios accepted from their co-respondents their share in the
subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim,
the partition of the property.

The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint, ruling that the respondent siblings
were entitled to their respective shares and that the subsequent transfer of
interest in favor of the respondent spouses Candelario was upheld. Likewise, the
court ordered the partition of the subject lots between the herein plaintiffs and
the defendants-spouses Candelarios.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the
property;

2. Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred

by laches or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as
basis for the partition of the property.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious in part.

1. Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the
property

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest
in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy. In
the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action must
necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.

Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the

subject property is belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered
into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot
without any objection from the petitioners.

The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence

2. The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment

Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat
the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no
actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of
the Civil Code.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to
co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe
otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the
promulgation of procedural rules. Substantive law cannot be amended by a
procedural rule. This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold that Art.
494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect
that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or
not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.

In the case at bar, the co-ownership, as determined by the trial court, is still
subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario. Consequently, there
is no legal bar preventing herein respondents from praying for the partition of the
property through counterclaim.

3. The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision

Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario

and petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial
order, herein respondents admitted that the agreement was a falsity and that
petitioners never took part in preparing the same. It, therefore, lacked the
essential requisite of consent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The

assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919
dated July 8, 2013 and November 22, 2013, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in
Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of partitioning the subject property in accordance
with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 70 - Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

1. Acaylar v. Harayo, G.R. No. 176995, 30 July 2008, 560 SCRA 624

FACTS: Danilo Harayo filed a complaint with the MTCC against Pablo Acaylar, son of the
spouses Acaylar for forcible entry. He alleged that he acquired the property from the
spouses Acaylar by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on September 14 2004 and took
possession of the property at the same day.

Pablo countered that the subject property is a portion of the entire property owned by his
parents. He is in possession the entire property since 1979 and he built his house on the
property and farmed the land. Harayo cannot definitely claim which portion of the entire
property he was able to buy from the spouses since the same was not clearly delineated. He
presented an Affidavit of Zoila Acaylar attesting that she sold the subject property to him
for consideration and she did not give Pablo authority to either administer or remain on
the subject property.

MTCC rendered a Decision awarding to Danilo the possession of the property, giving
credence to Danilo's claim that he took immediate possession after the execution of the
Deed of Sale. On appeal, RTC affirmed the award of possession in favor of Harayo and
declared that the sale of the subject property by spouses Acaylar vested ownership and
possession of said property in Harayo, thus Acaylar's acts of entering of subject property
constitute forcible entry. CA denied Acaylar's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

RULING:
No. We had long settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment
proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property; and
they should not involve the question of ownership or of possession de jure, which is to be
settled in the proper court and in a proper action. Hence the Deed of Sale conferring
ownership of the subject property upon Harayo is irrelevant in the case presented. The
Deed of Sale did not automatically place him in physical possession of the property.

In Affidavits of Zoila Acaylar, we find that Pablo was in peaceful possession of the subject
property prior to its sale to Harayo. Even if Pablo was not authorized by Zoila as
administrator, his possession was not opposed and was, thus, tolerated by his parents.

In Arcal v. Court of Appeals, The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such
possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the
possessor by torelance refuses to comply with such demand.

In this case, there is no showing that either Zoila or Harayo made an express demand upon
Pablo to vacate the property. In the absence of an oral or written demand, Pablo’s
possession of the subject property has yet to become unlawful. The absence of demand to
vacate precludes us from treating this case, originally instituted as one for forcible entry, as
one of unlawful detainer, since demand to vacate is jurisdictional in an action for unlawful
detainer.
 2. Ross-Rica v. Sps Ong, G.R. No. 132197, 16 August 2005, 467 SCRA 35

FACTS:
The spouses Ong are the original owners of 3 parcels of land which they occupy. They sold it to
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, which then sold it to Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. The spouses
Ong filed an action to annul the sale and transfer of property to Mandaue Prime Estate Realty
and at present, the case is still pending. In the meantime, an ejectment case was filed against
spouses Ong in the MTC, which ruled against the latter. On appeal to the RTC, the judgment
was affirmed by a decision dated March 1, 1997. The spouses Ong received a copy of the
decision on April 28, 1997.

The spouses Ong first filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC (May 8, 1997) but on the very next
day filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on June 23, 1997. The spouses Ong
received a copy of the order on July 9, 1997. On July 24, 1997 respondents filed with the CA a
motion for an additional 10 days to file their Petition for Review, which they would eventually
file on July 30, 1997.

The CA gave their petition for review due course and reversed the decision of the RTC on the
finding that the action filed was not one for unlawful detainer based on two grounds: that the
allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the
parties that would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer.

ISSUES/HELD

Whether the complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer
properly cognizable by the MTC

- YES. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. In Javelosa vs. Court of the Appeals, it was held that the allegation in the complaint that
there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful
detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Hence, the phrase “unlawful withholding”
has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning,
having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right
and is being withheld by defendant. In Rosanna B. Barba vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession
from plaintiff is sufficient. Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:

“. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said
lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs
of the use of their lots;” is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.

Likewise, the case of Co Tiamco vs. Diaz provides for a liberal approach in considering the
sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, thus:

“. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and
detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be
restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should
be carefully avoided.”

Whether the case should be considered as one for accion reivindicatoria, and thus the
jurisdiction would lie with the RTC

- NO. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property.
This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or
possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession
de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial, while the
issue of ownership is generally unessential. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to
recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership
over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment
case. Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the
conclusion would be the same, for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an
ejectment case will not oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This Court in
Ganadin vs. Ramos stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it
does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in
Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case.

In Drilon vs. Gaurana, this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over
the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC
of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being
that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the
suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for
are not the same.

The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.
In Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to clarify this:

“. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding
for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents
can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the
petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.”
 3. Zacarias v. Anacay, G.R. No. 202354, 24 September 2014, 736 SCRA 508

FACST: The present controversy stemmed from a complaint4 for Ejectment with
Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her
son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above-named respondents, Victoria
Anacay and members of her household. Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land
with an area of seven hundred sixty-nine (769) square meters, situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st,
Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and
issuedby Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.

The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center pursuant to Section 2(a),
Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and thus
the case was returned to the court.

The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential elements of an
action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents’
occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the
demand letter sent by petitioner’s counsel that respondents entered the property through stealth
and strategy, and in petitioner’s own "Sinumpaang Salaysay", are more consistent withan action
for forcible entry which should have been filed within one year from the discovery of the alleged
entry. Since petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her property through illegal
means and the complaint was filed after the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the
MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.

On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer was the proper remedy
considering that she merely tolerated respondents’ stay in the premises after demand to vacate
was made upon them, and they had in fact entered into an agreement and she was only forced to
take legal action when respondents reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the
lapse of the period agreed upon.

In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did not state that
respondents entered her property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful
possession and acceded to the request of respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008 but
respondents’ reneged on their promise to vacate the property by that time. It held that the suit is
one for unlawful detainer because the respondents unlawfully withheld the property from
petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for one year.

The MCTC and CA both ruled that the allegations in petitioner’s complaint make out a case for
forcible entry but not for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE: Whether the MTCT and CA was correct?

HELD: In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by toleranceof the
plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination ofthe latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.16
In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:
3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite with
an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE METERS, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 18-026-01182 issued by the Municipal Assessor of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said
tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B";
4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject property. She had it planted to
Bananas and other fruit bearing trees. However, sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the
defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the same;
5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The defendants requested for
time toleave and she acceded to said request. The defendants committed to vacate the subject
property by the end of May, 2008;
6. Inspite of several repeateddemands, defendants unjustifiably refused to vacate the subject
premises prompting the Plaintiff to seek the assistance of a lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL
and FINAL DEMAND to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for their
illegal use and occupancy of the subject property. A copy of the DEMAND LETTER is hereto
attached as Annex "C";
7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay Lalaan 1st for
possible conciliation but to no avail as the defendants still refused to vacate the subject property.
Thus, the said Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION, as evidenced by a copy
thereto attached as Annex "D";
x x x x17
The above complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not
describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and
which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of suchlawful possession. Petitioner’s
insistence that she actually tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of
their entry into the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered
respondents’occupation in May 2007. Such possession could not have been legal from the start
as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it based on any contract, express or
implied. We stress that the possession ofthe defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case. Thus:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction
should be made.

If right at the incipiencydefendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt
that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under
Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that
would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without
any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said
land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how
respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express
contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional
facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case.It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly
found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was
effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the
defendants have enterep the subject property and occupied the same", as correctly found by the
MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon
clandestinely and without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC
clearly erred in reversing the lower court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.

Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and executory
judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.

It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority
of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.20 Indeed, a void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor
the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is
void.
 4. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs of Abella, G.R. No. 143510, 23
November 2005, 476 SCRA 1

Facts:
The property in dispute is a parcel of land with an area of one hectare located beside the
Peñafrancia Basilica in Naga City.It is covered by Tax Declaration No. 004.1152 in the name of
herein respondents, the heirs of Don Manuel I. Abella. According to herein petitioner Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Caceres (petitioner) said parcel of land had been donated to him by
respondents sometime in 1981, in exchange for masses to be offered once a month in perpetuity
for the eternal repose of the soul of Don Manuel I. Abella. Respondents, on the other hand,
vehemently deny such allegation and counter that petitioner encroached and fenced off the
subject parcel of land without their consent.

In the action for forcible entry instituted by the Heirs of Manuel Abella (ABELLA, for short)
against the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Nueva Caceres (ARCHBISHOP, for short) before the
Municipal Trial Court of Naga City.

The complaint is ordered dismissed for lack of merit and the petition for preliminary
mandatory injunction is denied for being already moot and academic.

The RTC affirmed the court’s decision. Abella appealed its decision to the CA. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of this Court (Branch 22) by denying Abella’s petition for review.

ABELLA filed another case against the ARCHBISHOP, for "Quieting of Title" involving the
same property subject matter of MTC Civil Case No. 8479 (Forcible Entry). The Court (Branch
24) rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 89-1802 in favor of ABELLA.

The Decision in Civil Case No. 89-1802 was appealed by the ARCHBISHOP to the Court
of Appeals and was affimed.

The ARCHBISHOP appealed the Decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
The appeal was dismissed in a minute resolution holding that there was "no reversible error
committed by the appellate court."

The ARCHBISHOP moved to execute the Decision in the Forcible Entry case, but the
respondent MTC denied the motion for execution. Upon denial by the MTC of petitioner’s motion
for execution, he filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Herein petitioner again elevated the case straight to CA via a petition for review
on certiorari. The CA held that the decision for Forcible Entry has become final and executory
earlier than in Civil Case for Quieting of Title. The finality of the decision in the quieting of title,
declaring the respondents as the true owner of the subject property is a supervening event that
renders the judgment in the forcible entry, awarding possession to petitioner, notwithstanding its
finality, unenforceable by execution. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision but, a
Resolution was issued denying the same.

Issue: Whether or not the final and executory judgment in the case for quieting of title wherein
respondents were adjudged to be the owners of the subject property is a supervening event that
justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the final judgment in the previous case for forcible
entry.
Ruling: The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

The theory advanced by petitioner from the very beginning is that he is entitled to
possession of the disputed property as the owner thereof because the property was transferred
to him by virtue of an onerous donation made by respondents. Thus, petitioner’s alleged right of
possession is premised on his claim of ownership. He cannot change his theory when the case
is on review, by presenting another theory that is inconsistent with his allegations during the
proceedings below. Petitioner cannot contradict himself by saying first that respondents had
agreed to transfer to him the ownership over the property, only to say later that what respondents
granted to him was the right to possess the property. Petitioner is bound by the statements he
made while the case was being heard in the lower courts.

The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

Disquisition on the issue of ownership in ejectment cases, as in the case at bar, is only
provisional to determine who between the parties has the better right of possession. It is,
therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject matter of a separate
case of annulment of title filed by respondent.

One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of
supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has
become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has
acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial
as they were not yet in existence at that time.

In the case at bar, the new circumstance which developed after the finality of the judgment
in the forcible entry is the fact that the decision in the case for quieting of title had also attained
finality and conclusively resolved the issue of ownership over the subject land, and the
concomitant right of possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in the forcible
entry case would work injustice on respondents who had been conclusively declared the owners
and rightful possessors of the disputed land.
 5. Sunflower Neighborhood Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136274, 3
September 2003, 410 SCRA 318

FACTS:
Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as executrix of the testate estate of
Macaria Maglaqui, filed on March 16, 1993 a complaint for unlawful detainer (Civil Case No.
8550) against Alfredo Mogar and 46 other persons[4] who were occupying several parcels of
land (Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United Paraaque Subdivision IV, Metro
Manila. These parcels of land are covered by individual transfer certificates of title[5] registered
in the name of Macaria Maglaqui, private respondents mother.

The MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, eventually decided in favor of private respondent. On
appeal, the decision of the MeTC was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 66. Mogar et al. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but their petition was
dismissed by the appellate court on December 12, 1994. After the dismissal became final, a writ
of demolition was issued by the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78. The writ, however, was not
immediately implemented because the case was transferred to Branch 77 of the same court. On
February 6, 1997, Mogar et al. filed a petition with the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257,
presided over by Judge Rolando G. How, to enjoin the implementation of the writ of demolition.
However, this petition was denied and subsequently, an alias writ of demolition was issued by
Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of MeTC Branch 77, the court of origin.

The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this time due to the ex parte issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction by Judge Amelita Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation
case (Civil Case No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of Paraaque against the Testate Estate of
Macaria Maglaqui.

Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots I-F and I-
G) subject of the unlawful detainer case, organized themselves into the Sunflower Neighborhood
Association (Sunflower), the petitioner herein. On November 18, 1996, Sunflower, represented
by one Floro Aragan, filed a complaint for prohibition/injunction with preliminary injunction
against private respondent also with the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 257. Sunflower argued
that its members should be excluded from the demolition order as they were not parties to the
original unlawful detainer case. To include their houses in the demolition would be to deprive
them of due process. This time Judge How granted the injunction and ordered the exclusion of
the houses belonging to petitioner from demolition.

Thus, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court
of Appeals (CA GR SP No. 46861) assailing both the injunction orders issued by Judge
Tolentino in the expropriation case and by Judge How in the prohibition case.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent holding that, as the judgment in the
unlawful detainer case had already become final, the execution could not be enjoined.
Consequently, the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 77 issued another alias writ of demolition on
September 14, 1998.

In order to stay the execution of the writ of demolition, Sunflower filed on January 7, 1999 an
urgent motion in this Court for the issuance of a status quo order. This we granted in a resolution
dated January 20, 1999. Prior to the issuance of our resolution, however, the writ of demolition
was implemented on January 14, 1999. Petitioner thus filed a motion to allow its members to
return to the premises, which we granted in another resolution dated April 28, 1999. Thereafter,
we required both parties to submit their memoranda.
Sometime in November 1998, the group of Mogar et al. filed in this Court a petition for review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR SP No. 46861. However, we dismissed the
same on January 18, 1999 for failure of said petitioners to comply with certain procedural
requirements, including their failure to submit a certification of non-forum shopping.
For its part, petitioner Sunflower likewise assailed the same decision of the Court of Appeals in
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners members, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer case, may be ejected
from the land subject of this case?

HELD:
YES. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the
judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be
heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a)
a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate
the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a
transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or
privy of the defendant.[9]
In the case at bar, the records show that petitioners members are trespassers or squatters who do
not have any right to occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the
ownership of the parcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that the subject property is
owned by Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private respondent.[10] Petitioner failed to establish any
right which would entitle its members to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as lessees,
tenants and the like. Petitioners only defense against the eviction and demolition orders is their
supposed non-inclusion in the original detainer case. This defense, however, has no legal support
since its members are trespassers or squatters who are bound by the judgment.
Petitioners argument that the parcels of land occupied by its members (Lots I-F and I-G) were
not included in the original ejectment complaint has no basis. The complaint private respondent
filed with the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, clearly included Lots I-F and I-G as part of the
subject matter under litigation in the unlawful detainer case.[11] Thus, petitioners members,
together with all the parties in the unlawful detainer case, must vacate the disputed land.
The Court commiserates with respondent, already in her twilight years, who has been unlawfully
deprived of her land for a good number of years. Thus, we exhort the court of origin to execute
this decision with reasonable dispatch, consistent with the requirements of Section 28 of RA
7279 and EO 152, [12] on eviction and demolition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR SP No. 46861 is AFFIRMED.
Rule 71 - Contempt
1. Inonog v. Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, 28 July 2009, 594 SCRA 168

Facts:

This administrative complaint came about when Judge Francisco B. Ibay cited complainant in
contempt of court simply because the latter parked his vehicle at the parking space served for him.
In the exercise of his contempt power, not only did respondent deny the complainant his right to be
heard but also convicted him in contempt of court based on a very loose and flimsy reason.

Respondent judge initiated the proceeding for indirect contempt by issuing an order
dated March 18, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-392-393,
entitled People v. Glenn Fernandez, et al., directing the complainant to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt. The said order read:

For intentionally parking car with plate no. WDH 804 at the parking space reserved for the
undersigned Presiding Judge, thereby causing the delay in the promulgation of the Decisions
in the above-entitled cases driver Butch Inonog, c/o Permit Division, this City, is hereby
ordered to appear before this Court at 10:30 A.M., March 18, 2005 and show cause why he
should not be cited for Contempt for delaying the administration of justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion?

RULING:
The phrase “improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice” is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of
acts that could constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of complainant in parking his
car in a slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There
was no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly
motivated to delay the proceedings of the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly
reserved for respondent judge. We cannot also say that the said act of complainant
constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and
inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding.
 2. Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 616

Facts: The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal filed before
the Labor Arbiter by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc.
(EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and General Manager Jose E. Barin. The Labor Arbiter
ruled that respondent Go was illegally dismissed from employment. The NLRC rendered a
Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision and declaring that respondent Go’s separation
from employment was legal for it was attended by a just cause and was validly effected by EHSI,
Kunack and Barin. Aggrieved, respondent Go elevated the adverse decision to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision setting aside the ruling of the NLRC and
reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter adjudging EHSI, Kunack and Barin guilty of illegal
dismissal.

EHSI, Kunack and Barin were able to receive a copy of the decision through registered mail on
17 July 2003 while respondent Go received his copy on 21 July 2003.

On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but prior to the
receipt of the parties of their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and
signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of the Labor Arbiter. In view of the
amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the same day, issued an Order dismissing the illegal
dismissal case with prejudice. After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision,
respondent Go, through counsel, filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify
the Release Waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. Acting
on the motions, the appellate court issued a Resolution annulling the Order of the Labor Arbiter
dated 16 July 2003 for lack of jurisdiction.

Held: Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by
the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined must be complied with.

In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated by respondent Go through
a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion. It was based on the aforesaid Motion that the appellate
court issued a Resolution dated 19 November 2003, requiring petitioner Atty. Regalado to show
cause why she should not be cited for contempt.

Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set
everything in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was respondent Go
who brought to the attention of the appellate court the alleged misbehavior committed by
petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on the part of respondent Go, no indirect
contempt charge could have been initiated at all.

We cannot, therefore, argue that the Court of Appeals on its own initiated the indirect
contempt charge without contradicting the factual findings made by the very same court which
rendered the questioned resolution.

In the present case, the appellate court could not have acquired knowledge of petitioner Atty.
Regalado’s misbehavior without respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion
reiterating the alleged deceitful conduct committed by the former. Thus, the instant case was
not initiated by the court motu proprio.

The manner upon which the case at bar was commenced is clearly in contravention with the
categorical mandate of the Rules (a verified petition which has complied with the requirements
of initiatory pleadings must be filed). Respondent Go filed a Manifestation with Omnibus
Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting particulars and documents. Such
procedural flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the motion and directed
petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt. Upon
petitioner Atty. Regalado’s compliance with the appellate court’s directive, the tribunal
proceeded in adjudging her guilty of indirect contempt and imposing a penalty of fine,
completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the commencement of the indirect contempt
action.

Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the conviction of petitioner Atty. Regalado for indirect
contempt suffered a serious procedural defect to which this Court cannot close its eyes without
offending the fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules that we, ourselves, had
promulgated.