KIDNAPPING

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27352            October 31, 1969

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
RUBEN ABLAZA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Hector C. Fule for plaintiff-appellee.
Capistrano and Toledo for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Crim. Case No. 13526)
convicting therein accused Ruben Ablaza for kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death with all the accessory penalties set by law.

In an information filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Ruben Ablaza, John Doe and Peter Doe
were accused of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention, said to have been committed
as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of March 1963, in the municipality of Makati, province of Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
being then private individuals, conspiring, and confederating together and mutually helping
and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, take
and carry away and detain one Annabelle Huggins a female, 20 years of age, against her will
and consent.

Contrary to law, with the aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle.

The prosecution, through its lone witness, complainant Annabelle Huggins, tried to establish that in
November, 1962 accused Ruben Ablaza forcibly took her from her aunt's place in Caloocan City and
brought her to a house in a barrio in Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she was criminally abused by her
abductor. After her rescue by the Philippine Constabulary men, a criminal case for forcible abduction
with rape was filed against Ablaza in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

On 22 March 1963, and while that case in Bulacan was still pending, Annabelle Huggins, who was
sweeping the front of her aunt's house in Makati, Rizal, was again grabbed by two men and forcibly
taken to a taxicab where a third man, who turned out to be Ablaza, was waiting. Then the vehicle
sped away before anybody could come to the aid of the struggling girl. Inside the cab, Annabelle
was seated at the rear between Ablaza and a companion; her head was pressed down to the floor of
the taxi, with Ablaza covering her mouth with his hand to prevent her from crying out for help. She
was first brought to the house of Ablaza's compadre in Caloocan, but then, informed that the police
were already in their pursuit, she was moved to the house of another compadre, where she was kept
for a week. Later, at the instance of Ablaza, Annabelle was taken to Bulacan to ask for the complaint
against him be dropped. This did not materialize, because when they were inside the Malolos
municipal building Annabelle's uncle, in company of Constabulary men, came and took her. She also
testified that for the duration of her detention the accused and his compadres were always guarding
her to prevent her escape.1

For the defense, only accused Ruben Ablaza took the witness stand, and gave an entirely different
version of the incident. According to this accused, in 1962, he and complainant Annabelle Huggins
were sweethearts; that as Annabelle was complaining of being maltreated by her aunt, they decided
to elope, which they did in November, 1962. He and Annabelle stayed in the house of his uncle in
Hagonoy, Bulacan, where they were later found by the police authorities. Thereafter, he was
charged for abduction with rape before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

Sometime in March, 1963, he received a letter from Annabelle asking him to get her from her aunt's
residence in Makati, Rizal (Exhibit "1"). The accused took a taxicab and went to the place indicated
in the letter, and there he saw Annabelle; that, at his call, she came near and entered the cab with
him; that they agreed to get married, but upon complainant's suggestion, they first went to Malolos
so she could drop the case against him; that when they were in the municipal building, however, the
Philippine Constabulary men and the aunt arrived and Annabelle changed her mind. With the above
testimonies, both parties rested their cases.

On 7 March 1967, the court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, and
sentenced him to death. In reaching this verdict, the lower court said:

In deciding and resolving the question of guilt or innocence of the accused, Ruben Ablaza,
this Court more than ever realizes its grave responsibility of ascertaining the truth and finding
the real facts as the accused is charged with a capital offense. The task of fact-finding in this
particular case is delicate and difficult because all that the Court has before it are the directly
conflicting testimonies of the complaining witness, Annabelle Huggins, and the accused,
Ruben Ablaza, and our Decision will essentially be predicated on testimonial credibility.

Simply stated, the question is: who of the two, Annabelle or Ruben Ablaza, is telling the
truth?

Several factors or circumstances lead us to believe and find that Annabelle Huggins is the
one who told the truth.

The decision then went on to state that it was the complainant's sincerity and frankness while she
was on the witness stand, coupled by her timidity and modesty, that convinced the court that the
events as narrated by her were the true facts.

As correctly designated by the accused himself, the issue in this review of the aforesaid judgment of
the court below revolves around the credibility of witnesses, i.e., whether or not the trial court was
correct in giving more weight to the testimony of the complainant and in finding the accused guilty of
the offense charged and sentencing him to death.

The rule in this jurisdiction on the matter of credibility of witnesses is by now settled. Unless there is
a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the appellate
court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court. 2 For, having had the opportunity of
observing the demeanor and behavior of the witness while testifying, the trial court more than the
reviewing tribunal, is in a better position to gauge their credibility, and properly appreciate the
relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties. 3

In the present case, there is no reason for us to overrule the judgment of the trial judge giving
credence to the declarations of the complainant. The records of the case are convincing that the
complainant's testimony on the facts of her kidnapping on 22 March 1963, and of her detention for a
week, rang of truth. Not only was her narration of the events coherent and plausible, and remained
unshattered by the cross examination by the defense counsel, but also no motive has been adduced
by this witness, who, since the first incident in 1962, had got married and, therefore, would have
wanted least public exposure of her harrowing experiences, would come out and undergo another
legal scrutiny of her unfortunate encounters with the accused, other than the desire to tell the truth.
Her reluctance after her marriage to publicize her harrowing experiences with the accused is
attested by the warrant for her arrest, issued by the trial court on 16 January 1967 (Record, Court of
First Instance, pages 90-91), that left her no alternative but to take the witness stand on 18 January.

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code —

Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him
of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days;

xxx           xxx           xxx

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be minor, female, or a public officer.

xxx           xxx           xxx

The accused, however, assails the decision finding him guilty of kidnapping defined and penalized
by the above-quoted provision. It is being claimed that considering the testimony of complainant that
she was raped by the accused while in the house of the latter's compadre in Caloocan, and again
while in the house of his uncle in Bulacan, he (the accused) should have been adjudged guilty of
abduction with rape instead.

There is no merit in the allegation. The accused stood trial for kidnapping with serious illegal
detention, and the deprivation of complainant's liberty, which is the essential element of the
offense,4 was duly proved. That there may have been other crimes committed in the course of the
victim's confinement is immaterial to this case. The kidnapping became consummated when the
victim was actually restrained or deprived of her freedom, and that makes proper the prosecution of
the herein accused under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The surrounding circumstances
make it clear that the main purpose of Annabelle's detention was to coerce her into withdrawing her
previous charges against appellant Ablaza, thus obstructing the administration of justice. The acts of
rape were incidental and used as a means to break the girl's spirit and induce her to dismiss the
criminal charge.

While the accused presented a letter which he claimed to have been sent him by the complainant
asking him to take her away, the authorship of said missive was not established. Appellant's
personal belief that it came from her is not enough, considering that he made no attempt to even
show his familiarity with her handwriting or her signature. Hence, the lower court was correct in
giving no weight to said document.
It is likewise contended that it was error for the lower court to consider the aggravating circumstance
of motor vehicle as attending the commission of the crime, the prosecution allegedly having failed to
substantiate this allegation of the information. The contention is untenable. Contrary to the
protestation of the accused, the fact of use of motor vehicle, which facilitated the taking away of the
complainant and her consequent detention, was established not only by the latter's declaration in
court but also by the accused's own admission that he took away the said complainant from her
aunt's residence in Makati, Rizal, in a taxicab.5

Considering, therefore, the extant evidence on record, we fully agree with the trial court that accused
Ruben Ablaza has committed the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention of the person of
complainant Annabelle Huggins. The offense being attended by one aggravating circumstance, the
use of motor vehicle, with no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the penalty provided in Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code should be imposed in its maximum period. The Court is thus left no
alternative but to confirm the death penalty imposed by the court below.
ROBBERY

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2923 December 4, 1906

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO PALMADRES, defendant-appellant.

Antonio M. Opisso for appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta for appellee.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

The complaint in this case is as follows: 

lawphil.net

That on or about the 29th day of May, 1904, in the barrio of Isabang, of the Municipality of
Lucena, Province of Tayabas, P. I., the said Pedro Palmadres, and two others, armed with
bolos, robbed one Jose Alconaba and a certain boy of a small sum of money, and that for
this purpose they killed the said Jose Alconaba.

As to the two companions of the defendant Palmadres, it appears that Florentino Desembrana was
found dead on the same day in question a short distance from the body of the deceased Jose
Alconaba, the bodies being identified by the cedulas that ever found upon their persons,
Desembrana's head having been severed from his body.

The boy referred in the complaint was a nephew of the deceased, Alconaba, named Locerio
Alconaba, a student of 16 years of age. He testified that on the morning of the day in question he
and his uncle, while together, were attacked, taken to the mountains, tied to a tree, blindfolded, and
robbed of the money they had in their possession, amounting to 2 reales and 4 cuartos; that they
managed to freed themselves, and while on their way to Lucena they were again attack by the
defendants; that his uncle who carried a pocketknife resisted the attack, while the witness hid
himself in the grass, and then ran to Lucena to notify the police, and that when he returned to the
place in question, accompanied by the police, they found his uncle and one of the robbers dead on
the ground.

The evidence of the prosecution against the defendant, Palamadres, although circumstancial, is
convincing, it being passed upon facts which were fully established by the testimony of Licerio
Alconaba, Maria Espinosa, the wife of the deceased Desembrana, Lope Capistrano, and Carlos
Capistrano, and this identification by an old man, Catalino Sevilla, who had about the same time
been attacked by the same three individuals and who, like Alconaba, was tied to a tree in the
mountains and robbed of 4 pesos, he having been found in this position by the police who were
called by Licerio Alconaba.

The findings of the court below do not seem to be in conflict with the evidence, nor do we find therein
any error either by the law or fact. The court below convicted the defendant of the crime charged in
the complaint — to wit, robbery with homicide — under paragraph 1, article 503 of the Penal Code,
committed with the aggravating circumstances of alevosia and despoblado, and sentence the
defendant to death.

The Attorney-General,  in his brief, classifies the crime in the same way, but is of the opinion that the
1awphil.net

aggravating circumstance of alevosia is not present. He recommends, however, that the penalty of
death be sustained under rule 1, article 80 of the Penal Code, for the reason that the commission of
the crime was accompanied by another aggravating circumstance as found by the court below which
was established by an inspection made by the court itself of the place where the bodies were found.

There may be some doubt as to whether the defendant in this case can be convicted of the complex
crime of robbery with homicide, in view of the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in Spain in
its judgment of the 23d of May, 1899, and the 19th of October, 1894.

In the first judgment above referred to that court said:

The nature of the crime of robbery as defined in article 515 of the code (502 of the Philippine
Code) implies violence or intimidation of the persons or the employment of force upon
property, as the case may be, at the time of the commission of the crime or in order to
facilitate its commission, and it would not be proper to consider these circumstances after the
criminal had fully accomplished his purpose, whatever the extent of his acts or the nature of
the crime committed may have been.

Article 516 (503 of the Philippine Code) refers to robberies committed with violence or
intimidation of the persons and punishes such offense with a more or less severe penalty
according to the importance or consequences of these circumstances upon the theory that
the same were present at the very time of the commission of the robbery. The phrase "on
account or on the occasion of the robbery" employed in the code not having any other
meaning.

And in the second judgment above cited the court said:  lawphil.net

It can not be said in the case at bar that the crime of homicide was committed on account or
on the occasion of the robbery, as the latter offense had already been consummated when
the killing occurred. Gonzalez killed Perez when he went back to the house robbed, for the
purpose of getting a shotgun which he had left there. The existence of juridicial relation
either direct or indirect required by the nature of the complex crime defined and penalized in
article 516, case 1 (503, par. 1 of the Philippine Code) is not clearly established by the
evidence.

But in our opinion this doctrine is not applicable to the case at bar, where a direct relation between
the robbery and the killing has been satisfactorily shown. In the two cases referred to in the above
quoted decisions of the supreme court of Spain it appears that after the robbery had been completed
without any difficulty or further consequence, one of the robbers committed an act which had not the
slightest relation to the robbery, which, as above stated, had already been consummated. In the first
case it developed that one of the robbers returned to the place where the robbery had been
committed for the purpose of closing the gate of a corral form which the cattle had been stolen, in
order that the remaining cattle might not get out. He was seen by the man in charge of the cattle,
who, up to that time, had not noticed that any of the cattle had been stolen. He upbraided the robber,
and the robber went back to the house in order to get a shotgun which he had left there and met a
person who reproached him, whereupon a fight ensued in which the latter was killed. The return of
the robber in order to close the gate of the corral in the first instance, and in order to get the shotgun
which he had forgotten in the second instance, were acts absolutely independent on the robbery,
whereas in the case at bar the robbers, while still on the ground, as soon as they noticed that the
deceased, Alconaba, and the boy had freed themselves, again attacked them with their bolos, killing
one of them, one of the robbers having been also killed, and his head severed from his body and hid
away, probably for the purpose of preventing identification. On account of and on the occasion of the
robbery and in order to conceal the same the crime of homicide was committed.

The judgment of the supreme court of Spain bearing upon the case at bar is the one of the 21st of
August, 1873, in which the robbery and the killing, according to the appellant, should not be
considered together as constituting one single but two separate acts. This was a case where a priest
was robbed of the money which he carried with him at the time, and tied to a tree. One of the
robbers fearing that he was recognized by the priest turned back, shot him and cut his throat with a
razor. The supreme court said: "The two crimes of robbery and homicide herein charged constituted
one single offense and the court below in so holding committed no error upon which this appeal
might be sustained."

The judgment of the court below is accordingly hereby affirmed, except in so far as it is therein
declared that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance of alevosia, as to which
there is no evidence to support such a circumstance, the defendant to pay the costs of these
proceedings and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Alconaba, in the sum of P1,000, Philippine
currency. After the expiration of ten days from the rendition of final judgment the case will be
remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29356          December 29, 1928

THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., for appellant.
City Fiscal Guevara and Assistant City Fiscal Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The Manila Electric Company appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila which
condemns it to pay to the City of Manila the sum of P1,788.27, with legal interest from September
10, 1927, and with costs. While the case in its fundamentals the cause suggested important
questions which possibly the parties have not entirely grasped. By way of preliminary statement, it
also remains to be said that the numerous deliberations of the court on the case have disclosed
conflicting views which it is difficult to reconcile. The present decision, therefore, will aim to present
as best it may, the principles for which a majority of the court stand, leaving it to the individual
member to dissent or other wise explain his vote as to him seems fit and proper.

On June 8, 1925, in the City of Manila, there occurred a collision between a street car of the Manila
Electric Company, of which Sixto Eustaquio was the motorman, and a truck belonging to the City of
Manila. As a result of the collision, the truck was damaged in the sum of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio
was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence.
He was convicted by final judgment and was sentenced to pay a fine P900, to indemnify the
offended party, the City of Manila, in the sum of P1,788.27, with subsidary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. Not being able to collect the indemnity from the accused, the City
of Manila began an action to obtained payment from the Manila Electric Company. An allegation of
the complaint was "That the defendant Manila Electric Company as master of the said agent and
servant, Sixto Eustaquio, by virtue of its relation with the latter and by express provisions of law, is
subsidiarily liable to the herein plaintiff for the sum of P1,788.27, representing the damages caused
by its agent and servant, the said Sixto Eustaquio, in the discharge of his duties as motorman of the
defendant's electric car." The principal special defense set up in the answer to the complaint was
that the defendant had used all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
suffered by plaintiff. At the trial, the parties agreed on certain stipulations and admissions. The
Assistant City Fiscal also offered to present two witnesses, but the trial judge thought this
unnecessary and so took judicial cognizance of the decision and the record in the criminal case
which convicted the motorman, all against the protest of counsel for the Manila Electric Company
who noted his exceptions. The adverse judgment is now contested on the ground that the trial court
committed two errors, the first in admitting in evidence the documents marked Exhibits A, B, C, D, E
and F, constituting the record in the case of the People of the Philippine Islands vs. Sixto Eustaquio;
and the second in not absolving the appellant from the complaint.

I. The first error plainly has merit. As a general rule, a record in a criminal action cannot be admitted
in evidence in a civil action except by way of inducement or to show a collateral fact. The very
obvious reason is that the parties and the issues in a criminal action and a civil action are not the
same. It is rudimentary that due process must be followed in the trial of all causes. No man or entity
may be condemmed without a day in court. (Almeida Chantangco and Lete vs. Abaroa [1910], 218
U. s., 476; 40 Phil., 1056; Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs. Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co. [1918], 38
Phil., 514.)

It needs to be repeated that the Manila Electric Company was not a party at the trial of the criminal
case. There is extant in the record no indication that the Manila Electric Company had any control
over the proceedings in the criminal case. All that the record in the criminal case showed was that
the "abogado defensor" (Attorney for the defense) was Antonio Carrascoso. All that the record in the
civil case showed was "Comparecieron: . . . Por la entidad demandada The Manila Electric Co., los
abogados senores Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., y Guillermo Cabrera" (Appearances: . . . For the
defendant Manila Electric Company attorneys Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr., and Guillermo Cabrera).
By a coincidence, Attorney Carrascoso was both counsel for the defendant in the civil action. But
there is lacking any proof showing that the Manila Electric Company supplied the lawyer for the
accused in the criminal action and so is concluded by the judgment there rendered. (By way of
parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements just made are offered to meet the argument
advanced during our discussion to the effect that the court should treat the interests of the Manila
Electric Company as involved in both litigations and should thus consider the company as a real
party without right now to protest against the judgment.)

It is our ruling that prejudicial error was committed in the admission by the trial court of Exhibits A to
F, but that since the plaintiff made the proper offer to present its witnesses, the case should be
remanded for a new trial.

II. It has been suggested that having passed on the first error that would be sufficient. Theoretically,
that is true. Practically, it is a fallacious argument. A new trial left unguided would immediately raise
questions which would need to be passed upon eventually by this court. Also if the customary
defense in civil actions for damages is to be held sufficient, the new trial would be fruitless and the
appeal might just as well be dismissed now as later, in view of the stipulations appearing in the
record.

We desire to pay our respect to the second error assigned and to the point of whether or not a case
of this character should be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code or by the provisions of the
Civil Code.

The Penal Code authorizes the imposition of subsidiary liability in default of the persons criminally
liable. Article 20 of the Penal Code provides that this subsidiary liability shall "apply to masters,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies and misdemeanors
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties." It is under this provision that the City of Manila is attempting to collect damages from the
Manila Electric Company. If the Philippines still lay beneath the dominion of Spain, the
pronouncement of primary and subsidiary liability would be takenn much as a matter of course. (See
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 10, 1884, January 3, 1887, June 15, 1989,
March 6, 1897, December 14, 1894, February 19, 1902; 2 Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5th ed.,
pp. 487-497; 1 Hidalgo Codigo Penal, pp. 331-334; 1 Groizard Codigo Penal, pp. 736-738; Opinion
of the Fiscal of the Supreme Court of Justice of Spain of January 17, 1865, 22 Revista de
Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, p.412; Codigo Penal of Spain of 1928, art. 78.) The Penal Code then
takes cognizance of the Civil Code when in article 133 it is provided: "Civil liability arising from
felonies or misdemeanors shall be extiguished in the same manner as other obligations, in
accordance with the rules of civil law."

In connection with the Penal Code, there must be taken into view certain provisions of the Civil
Code. Book IV, Title XVI, Chapter II, of the Civil Code concerns obligations which arise from fault or
negligence. It is provided in article 1903 that the obligation imposed for the damage to another
caused by fault or negligence is enforcible against those persons for whom another is responsible.
But it is added that "The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject
thereto prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage." Found prior to these articles of the Civil Code in the Chapter of Title I, Book IV, pertaining
to general provisions of obligations, are articles 1092 and 1093. The first provides: "Civil obligations
arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code." The
last mentioned provides: "Those arising from wrongful or negligent acts or ommissions not
punishable by law shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter second of Title sixteen of this book."
— that is among others to the provisions of article 1903 above-mentioned.

Manresa, speaking of article 1092 of the Civil Code, offers the following comment:

The Penal Code treats of this matter, first, in Chapter II, Title 2, of Book I, determining therein
who are civilly liable for crimes or misdemeanors and in what manner, and stating in Title 4
of the same Book the extent and purposes of said obligations. Said Book I ends with article
135, which makes express references to the civil legislation, which reference, as may be
seen, is also made in other provisions.

In those mutual references of one legislation to another, there is no doubt as to the

application of one or the other, nor can they be criticized, since they are well grounded.

The Civil Code refers to the Penal Code as the rule applicable in the first place, since the
latter determines and punishes the acts giving rise to said obligations, or creates said
obligations, thereby determining their existence and is, therefore, for that reason of
preferential application. But, then, as the Penal Code is concerned with, and is interested
only in determining how the civil obligation it creates comes into existence and develops
under the influence of the illicit character, it lays down only those rules inspired by those
motives; and once the connection of that obligation with the criminal liability is established in
its provisions, with the consequences that may be inferred from the fact that the former is
based on the latter; and after an effort has been made, within the sphere of that civil
responsibility, toward making the indemnification coextensive with the effects of the crime,
and a special necessity, which is characteristic of punishment and is the subject matter of the
Penal Code, has been shown in the provisions regulating said liability, the Penal Code, could
not, without going beyond its one sphere, give all the rules relative to said obligations, nor
did it have any necessity for doing so, because once the peculiar nature of said obligations is
saved by its provisions, the essence thereof common to the other obligations must, as in the
latter, be defined by the civil law, which will thus become an important source, although
suppletory, of those derived from crime.

The peculiar rules of the Penal Code, as may be seen, are inspired by those motives which,
as we have stated, might make them necessary for said Code to establish, as distinguished
from the criterion of the civil law with regard to obligations in general. Thus, the fundamental
 declaration of article 18 gives the connection of civil obligation with criminal liability and
explains the origin of the former: article 19 solves the doubt which that connection, among
certain liabilities, may create, and determining its limits in the nature and consequences of
the act, it mentions those which are of a civil nature, basing the civil liability upon principle of
justice, and rather upon casualty than upon liability of a criminal character. The intention to
make indemnification proportionate to the nature and effects of the act, from which the
obligation arises, inspires the provisions contained in articles 121 to 124, both inclusive; the
necessity to distiguish, in order to give the consequences which the crime may produce
within the sphere of civil law, whether or not the persons thereby bound are guilty, prevails in
article 128 and partly in article 122; article 125 gives the essential difference between the
civil obligation and the personal criminal liability, and dissipates a doubt which, due to the
latter's instranmissibility, might arise as to the former by reason of its accessory character in
connection with the other, and by the intimate connection between both which the crime or
misdemeanor creates and the criminal law declares; the influence of the severity on the
punishment is noted in articles 20 and 21, even though the latter coincide with the criterion
followed in analogous cases by the Civil Code, and already deviating from the latter's
criterion by reason of that severity founded on the illicit origin of the obligations which it
declares, it provides for the latter a necessary solidarity in article 127; and abandoning also
the criterion of the civil law in article 126, it establishes within that solidarity, not the
presumption of equal division which the latter provides in such a case, but a prudent division
which may, and generally must be, unequal, in order that the influence of the different
participation in the crime or misdemeanor which is the origin of the former may also reach
the Civil obligation.

In all other respects, and even in some of those same features, either by the express
reference of the articles which provide for them, or by the latter's influence, the civil
obligation shall be subject to the Civil Code, which even in some of those peculiar rules has
supposed a modification in so far as it does not establish the benefit of exemption to the
extent needed for support, as provided for in the Penal Code.

While the Civil Code, in its article 1092, simply makes reference to the Penal Code, yet, it is
beyond doubt that by this reference it means those rules of a general nature which regulate
the civil liability arising from the particular crimes or misdemeanors therein mentioned, and
that, in connection therewith, they shall have the preferential application which this article
recognizes in favor of the Penal Code. (8 Manresa Codigo Civil Espanol, 3d ed., pp. 28-32.)

The case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), is one of the widest known
authorities on the subject of damages. But that was strickly a civil action not predicated on or related
to a criminal action. It was said: "Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing
out of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code cannot affect this action. This
construction renders it necessary to finally determine here whether this subsidary civil liability in
penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American
civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines." That such subsidiary civil liability in
penal actions has not been abrogated by later laws, seems fairly well established. Section 107 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure recognizes the rights of persons injured by the offense to take part in
the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages. It is there provided that "the court upon
conviction of the accused may enter judgment against him for the damages occasioned by his
wrongful act." Authoritative decisions have also leaned in the direction of taking it for granted that
civil liability could be fixed in the criminal action. While the law of criminal procedure is silent on the
subject of subsidiary liability, so far as we can see, there could exist no good reason for not
permitting the action to eb carried forward to the second stage and there to fix subsidiary liability.
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of
the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the
determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil
obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal
Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal
Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or ommision not punishable by
law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the
Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its
jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of
civil negligence.

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Almeida Chantangco and Lete vs.
Abaroa, supra, should be read in connection both with the discussion of the first assignment of error
and the question now before us. In that decision, Mr. Justice Lurton, delivering the opinion of the
court, said:

The case is, however, one which we conceive must be governed by the local law of the
Philippine Islands, and the single question to which we need address ourselves is as to
whether that law was right applied by the local tribunals.

Article 1902 of the Civil Code in force in the Philippine Islands reads thus: "A person who, by
an act or omission, causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done." By articles 1092 and 1093 of the same Code
provision is made for the enforcement of civil liability, varying in character according to the
origin of the liability. Thus, article 1092 provides that civil obligations arising from crimes and
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. On the other hand,
article 1093 provides that "those arising from acts or omissions, in which fault or negligence,
not punished by law, occurs, shall be subject to the provisions of chapter second of title
sixteen of this book." The action here involved comes directly under article 1092, above set
out, and is not an action arising from "fault or negligence, not punished by law." The
complaint alleges that the act of burning was "malicious and unlawful," and not that it was the
result of any "fault or negligence." This was the construction placed upon the complaint by
both the courts below, and is a construction not challenged here. It follows that he must turn
to the Penal Code to discover when a civil action arises out of a crime or misdemeanor, and
the procedure of the enforcement of such civil liability. Article 17 of the Penal Code reads as
follows: "Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable." May
this civil liability be enforced without a prior legal determination of the fact of the defendant's
guilt of crime? Does civil liability exist at all if the defendant has been found not guilty of the
acts out of which the civil liability arises? The opinion of the Court below was that a judgment
of conviction was essential to an action for indemnification under the applicable local law. To
this conclusion we assent, upon the following considerations:

First, by the positive legislation of the Philippine Codes, civil and criminal, a distinction is
drawn between a civil liability which results from the mere negligence of the defendant and a
liability for the civil consequences of a crime by which another has sustained loss or injury.

Second, the plain inference from article 17, above set out, is that civil liability springs out of
and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime or misdemeanor.

Third, the Philippine Code of Procedure plainly contemplates that the civil liability of the
defendant shall be ascertained and declared in the criminal proceedings. 1awphi1.net
 Thus, section 742 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, after requiring that, in the criminal
proceeding, all of the minor or incidental offenses included in the principal crime shall be
decided, adds: "All questions relating to the civil liability which may have been the subject-
matter of the charge shall be decided in the sentence.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The foregoing considerations eliminate any question of the effect of such a judgment of
acquittal undere the principles of the common law and require an affirmance of the judgment
of the court below as properly based upon the applicable substantive law of the Philippine
Islands, which has not been superseded by legislation since the establishment of the present
Philippine Government.

The facts here are distinguishable from those in Chaves and Garcia vs. Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Company ([1915], 31 Phil., 47). In the cited case, while the motorman was prosecuted and
convicted, his sentence included no imposition of civil liability. So the court correctly held, although
without discussion, that the employer was not liable in damages resulting from the criminal
negligence of his employee, when he has exercised the care of a good father of a family in selecting
said employee.

In the later decision of this court in Francisco vs. Onrubia ([1924], 46 Phil., 327), the court gave
attention to a similar question. Speaking through Mr. Justice Villamor, the court reached the
following conclusions:

Article 1902 of the Civil Code has no application in the instant case, first, because said article
presupposes the existence of fault or negligence upon which the action is based, and
second, it refers to a fault or negligence not punishable by law, because if the fault or
negligence is punished by law, it ceases to be the quasi crime of negligence having purely
civil effects, and becomes a crime or misdemeanor, according to the gravity of the penalty
imposed by the law, and in that case it comes within the purview of article 1092 of the Civil
Code. Under the facts set forth in the complaint, if there was any fault or negligence on the
part of the defendant, it must necessarily be a fault punishable by law (arts. 586, 590, and
604 of the Penal Code), for through said fault he caused the death of the plaintiff's son.
Homicide through reckless imprudence is punished as a crime, and therefore the provisions
applicable would be those of the Penal Code and the Law of Criminal Procedure above
cited.

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code.
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would premit the master to escape scot-
free by allging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of
its servants to prevent the damage. That would be good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or
might not be to a civil action or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the
statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the
effect that article 1092 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903
applied.)

In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be set aside, and the record
remanded to the lower court for a new trial. Without special finding as to costs in this instance, it will
be so ordered.
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