Among the legitimate purposes of criminal law is the punishment of those who violate the rights of others through

the commission of felonies. As the Framers understood, however, the matter does not end there because an
important inquiry immediately arises: How do we ensure that people are not convicted of crimes they haven’t
committed?

RULE 115 enumerates the rights of an accused. These are the rights and the privileges of a person accused of a
crime, guaranteeing him a fair trial. Well, at least on paper.

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the
following rights:

(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

An accused in a criminal prosecution is to be presumed innocent until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The presumption of innocence under the Rules is of a constitutional origin and a mere substantial reiteration of sec.
14 of the Constitution.

This constitutional guarantee cannot be overthrown, unless the prosecution has established by such quantum of
evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption of innocence and prove that a crime was committed and that the
accused is guilty thereof. And this presumption prevails over the presumption of regularity of the performance of
official duty.

In its latest decision, the SC acquitted Ameril and ordered him released from jail because the High Court found that
the authorities who conducted the buy-bust operation were not able to prove the integrity of the drugs, or in legal
terms, the corpus delicti in the case. (People vs Ameril, 2019)

Presumption of regularity is the theory always invoked by the police force whenever involved in controversial
operations, particularly when a drug suspect ends up dead.

“This Court has stressed that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands only when no
reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that
instance, the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused.”

This presumption of innocence has given rise to a jurisprudential rule referred to as the EQUIPOSE RULE. The
equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption
of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.

(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

To inform the accused of the nature and cause of accusation against him, it is necessary for the complaint or
information to contain those matters required by the Rules of Court. The rule is that aggravating and qualifying
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the information.

A violation of the right under discussion is exemplified in People v. Lagarde, where the accused-appellant was
charged with simple rape but was sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to the maximum penalty of death, taking
into account his use of a bladed weapon in an uninhabited place. The court, in lowering it to simple rape punishable
by reclusion perpetua, stated that “it is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellant’s basic right to due process if
he is charged with simple rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying circumstances which were not
alleged in the information.”

However, an information which lacks essential allegations may still sustain conviction when the accused fails to
object to its sufficiency during trial, and the deficiency cited by competent evidence presented.

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the
 trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the
court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial
of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an
accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all
subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed
to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his
right without the assistance of counsel.

The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of counsel to an accused. The accused has the right to defend in person and
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgement.

One need not, however, be an accused to avail of the right to counsel and the right to counsel and the right to
counsel does not commence only during the trial. Every person under the custody of the law enjoys the right.

RA 7438 provides two requisites for a valid custodial investigation report. First is that the report shall be reduced to
writing by the investigating officer, and second, is that if the person arrested does not know how to read and write, it
shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel in the language or dialect
known to such arrested.

The importance of the right to counsel is so vital, that it is absolute. Under the existing law, “in the absence of any
lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the
investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.”

If a case has been delayed for refusal of the accused to secure a counsel de parte, the Court shall appoint a counsel
de officio.

But Eugenio vs. People (549 SCRA 433) shows us that failure to inform the suspect of her right to counsel during
custodial investigation attains significance only if the person under investigation makes a confession in writing
without aid of counsel and which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during trial. In such case, the
tainted confession obtained in violation is inadmissible in evidence against the accused.

The Court has consistently held that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must conform to the
following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant’s choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4)
the confession must be in writing.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by
direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.

If the accused does not want to testify in his behalf and choses to remain silent, his silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him. The questions that may be asked of the accused in a cross-examination is limited to the matters
covered by the direct examination. This contrasts with the much wider scope of the cross-examination of an ordinary
witness (who is not the accused).

In addition, it is a settled rule that to gain conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence rather
than on the weakness of the defense. This right is further supported by the right against self-incrimination.

The right to remain silent, however, is not absolute. Unexplained failure of the accused to testify or his silence and
omission are admissible in evidence against him.

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

Historically, the legal protection against self-incrimination was directly related to the question of torture for
extracting information and confessions. This privilege rests upon the principle that forcing a man to be a witness
against himself is at war with the fundamentals of a republican government.
Justice Sarmiento in People vs. Olvis declared that the constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection
against testimonial compulsion, but this has since been extended to any evidence “communicative in nature”
acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition
and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish
the missing evidence necessary for his conviction.

He continues that it should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute
not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation.

One example would be the case of People vs Tolentino, where the accused was later found guilty of statutory rape.
As a part of his defense, he averred that his identification at the police line-up was unreliable and contended that his
constitutional rights were violated when the police required him to join the line-up.

It was held that in determining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court have
adopted the totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into consideration: (1) the
witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.

Note that the right against self-incrimination does not apply to physical examination but only to those questions that
requires “intelligence”.

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part
of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse
party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.

This is also known as of confrontations. With it, no accusation against the accused is permitted to be made in his
absence, nor are any derogatory information accepted if made anonymously.

The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her accuracy, to expose falsehoods or half-truths, to
uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress and demonstrate
inconsistencies in substantial matters, which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus, give
substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront witnesses against him.

This right to cross examine is part of due process, but, like the other rights, it can be waived. If the party has been
given the opportunity to cross-examine but did not avail of it, the testimony of the witness could no longer be
stricken off the record.

Nonetheless, denial of the right to confront and examine the witnesses renders incomplete testimony inadmissible in
Court.

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other
evidence in his behalf.

In connection with this right, the accused may move the court for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or a
subpoena duces tecum. In case of unjustified failure of the witness to comply, the court or judge issuing a subpoena,
upon proof of the service of such subpoena and proof of his failure to attend, may issue a warrant for his arrest.

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

This right to a speedy trial has consistently been defined by the Court substantially "as one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, its purpose being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety
and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.

In People vs. Anonas, the preliminary investigation of the respondent for the offenses charged took more than four
years. He was apprehended for the offenses charged on November 19, 1996. Having been arrested without a warrant
of arrest and not having been afforded a formal investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial
court, in an Order dated January 28, 1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was terminated only on February 16,
2001. The cases held that accused persons are guaranteed a speedy trial by the Bill of Rights and that such right is
denied when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

It bears stressing, however, that the determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be
based on a mere mathematical reckoning of time. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. As a guideline, the Court in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan mentioned certain factors that should
be considered and balanced, namely: 1) length of delay; 2) reasons for the delay; 3) assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and 4) prejudice caused by the delay.

(h) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. (1a)

An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review and the appellate court may correct even unassigned
errors.

This is in contrast to the rule in a civil case, where an unassigned error will not be considered by the appellate court
unless such error affects the jurisdiction of the court, affects the validity of the judgement appealed from, or the error
is closely related to or dependent upon the assigned error properly argued in the brief, or when the error is simply
plain or clerical.

To deny the accused their rights is a large step away from what our legal system was built on. Without those rights,
you have authoritarianism.