C ase Study

of the Month

Er. P.K.Pattanaik, is presently

working with OPTCL as Dy.
General Manager (Elect) in E & MR
Division, Bhubaneswar- Odisha and
associated with the Protection and
Control schemes of Electrical systems.
He is having 25 years of technical
experience in Designing, Testing and Commissioning
of Protection Control and operational Schemes,
project Implementation, co-ordination, operations & VARIOUS CASE STUDIES
maintenance of Electrical Equipments at various LT/ HT/
EHT level Grid Sub- Stations. He has also published ON OPERATION AND CONTROL
around 70 technical papers in different national/ SCHEMES FOR GRID SUB-STATION
international seminars/journals.
Contd….
ele.pkpattanaik@optcl.co.in

1. Introduction: For the last few months, the response of the readers
to the case studies on various incidents is overwhelming. Hence this
month we are again choosing the write up on similar kind of studies
for developing the synchronisation of practical observation to the
theoretical concepts. The analysis of each incident being supported
by actual observations had been described during the situation to
add awareness amongst the operation, testing and commissioning
engineers to know the cause of problems and be helpful for easy
rectification of the problems. This can also help to develop economic
schemes for the smooth running of the operation and control system
in the Grid Sub-Station.
2.1. Arcing on Breaker Limb: At one of the 220/132 Kv Grid
Sub-station it was found with tripping of one 132 KV outgoing
feeder with fault on R phase.
Observations:
1. The disturbance report was found with fault current rise on
R phase and corresponding voltage dip on its phase.
2. The current being found 14.7 KA and tripping on Zone-1.
3. As it was found with severe sound in the system, the system
was not allowed for charging and kept with observations.
4. The field visit was done and found with arcing on Y phase
breaker limb as like shown in the figure 2.1.1.
5. The tripping was instant in nature, the reason of Y phase
arcing could not be established.

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 6. The Line patrolling engineer was asked to patrol the line
for any eventualities, but found with no any abnormality.
Fig 2.1.1 Arcing of Y phase Limb
7. The Breaker limb and operation of the breaker was
checked thoroughly and tested before taking into the
system.
8. On detail investigation and testing the system was charged
and stood OK.
Technical Analysis
1. In this condition R Phase fault with ground had been
resulted causing voltage dip on the respective phase.
2. As per 3 Phase principle, during fault condition and dip
in voltage for any of the pages shall be causing the rise
of voltage on the healthy phase. Here this might have
been happened.
3. The dust deposition might have tracked this due to
decrease of Creepage distance. As tripping of the breaker
of this limb might have been slight delayed causing the
re-striking voltage and external arcing as like shown in
the figure 2.1.1.
2.2. 33 KV Bird Fault: one of the 33 KV feeder tripped on R
phase to ground fault. But the line was nearby to the electrical
collection center.
Observations:
1. The 33 KV pole structure was extended with extra portion
and the disc was connected to the internal part of the
cross arm as like shown in the figure 2.2.1.
2. One bird sitting on this extra portion comes in contact
to the live wire and electrocuted, resulting with tripping
of the line. To the surprise, though the bird got burnt,
but remained sticking to the conductor.
3. The construction design of the pole was changed with
no extra extension for sitting of any bird or creature.
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Technical Analysis:
1. The bird on touching by the beak has some resistance as
the start current path and again the skin on its leg has
also some resistance path. So the current flow though
high is not like direct conducting path.
w w w. e l e c t r i c a l m i r r o r. n e t
Fig 2.2.1 Bird Fault
2. Moreover this pole on investigation was also found with
no dedicated earthing for quick flow of current.
3. However the current was sufficient for tripping of the
33 KV line on Phase to ground fault.
4. In some instances, the fault current does not become
sufficient for the tripping of the line due to the impedance
fault in the system.
5. However it was advised to the discom wing not to provide
any extra extension for any creature to sit on the arm
and to be in contact with the live wire.
2.3. Effect of CT terminal opening: In one of the GIS grid and
due to space constraint and to meet the customer’s requirement,
4 sq.mm wires were in connection to the CT terminal block.
The TBs were found burnt along with cables due to CT opening
at one of the terminal.
Observations:
1. 33 KV GIS blocks are generally provided with combined
enclosed with less space area.
2. The LCC (Local control Cubicle) panels are usually provided
as integrated part of the GIS module.
3. In this grid Sub-station, this pattern of combined module
system was there with less space.
4. The secondary wires of the CT had been terminated to
the terminal block in the LCC with less space.
5. But due to customer’s specific requirement, the internal
wires had been provided with 4 sq. mm wires with that
limited space. The cables had also been routed in the
limited space region. The multi wires had also been run
for secondary CTR control at the TBs in the LCC. So the
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Case Study
total system was clumsy.
6. The TBs as shown in the figure 2.3.1 were also not strong
enough to accommodate the multi-wire interconnection
at on terminal.
7. But the executor and supervisor for completion of the
job, attempted the wiring and accommodated all the
wires with the TBs.
8. In due course of service, it was found opening of one
Case Study of the month
CT terminal of the protection core during in-service
condition.
9. It was observed with high voltage and burning of the
particular terminal. Its further effect resulted the burning
of the cables and other adjacent TBs.
10. The root cause of such incident was due to space constraint
and accommodation of more wires in the limited space.
Technical Action:
1. The TBS were changed and 4 sq.mm wires were also
changed with 2.5 Sq.mm.
2. The space and number of TBs were reduced, due to
shifting of CTR control to the CT secondary box.
3. The number of cables were also reduced as CTR control
were shifted.
4. The shorting Link facility was also changed.
5. So the stress upon the TBs was reduced and system was
allowed to run smooth.
Fig 2.3.1 Clumsy TB Fig 2.3.2 Clean TB
arrangement arrangement
Recommendation:
1. The CT cables/ wires should be chosen as required. In
present days as we are using low burden numerical
relays and indicating meters, it is preferably to use 2.5
sq.mm instead 4 sq.mm.
50 ELECTRICAL MIR ROR || September 2020 ||
2. The secondary CTR control should be at CT secondary
Box, where space is factor to adjust.
2.4.1: Mistake in CT circuit: At one of 63 MVA AUTO transformer,
the facility of TURRET CT was available for developing of any
protection circuit. Problem developed during stability check
before commissioning of the transformer.
Observations:
1. This transformer was having two cores as the BCT (Bushing
CT) in each of the TURRET as like shown in the figure
2.4.1.
2. Each core has separate marking of s1 and s2. The wires
connected from terminal finally marked with nomenclature
as 1s1, 1s2, 2s1, 2s2 from each of the secondary core.
Core one as 1s1 and 1s2, core 2 as 2s1 1nd 2s2.
3. The protection engineer as per the marking on the
external terminal developed the wiring connection for
the SEF (Sensitive Earth fault) relay connection as like
shown in fig 2.4.2 from core no-1. Core no 2 as not in
use was kept shorted.
4. But during stability checking, it was observed with some
peculiar behavior of reading as mentioned in the table
A.
5. R phase wire reading came ZERO, Y, B phase and neutral
reading came of same magnitude.
6. So to know the possibility of wrong connection, the joint
reading was taken by the combination wire by clamp
on ammeter. The values are mentioned in the table A.
The vector diagram, suspecting the possible interchange
of 1s2 and 2s1 were also drawn as shown in fig 2.4.5
7. This was simply confirmed that some problem is there in
the R phase wire coming out of the BCT. It was suspected
about the shorting of the terminals at BCT secondary Box.
So, BCT box was opened and found with no abnormality.
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 Wires had been taken from 1s1, 1s2 and 2s1 and 2s2
were kept short.
8. Now the external wire connections from the R phase
BCT terminals at the secondary box were opened for
resistance checking of the windings.
9. The results were found with OPEN circuit for both the
core. So suspect was on the internal wires regarding
non-connection to the terminals or breakage of wire in
between. But obtaining of same result of OPEN circuit
for both the cores were not thought of impossible.
10. As actual circuit was taken with shorting of the 2nd
core and utilization of the first core, so, it was decided
for measurement of the resistance of the first core in
the same fashion. On doing so, when measurement for
first core was taken, the resistance value came double
as that of the value obtained with Y and B phase BCT
core.
11. So suspect was concentrated on the interchange of the
wires coming from BCT terminals and reporting to the
BCT secondary box.
12. The measurement of the combination wire readings were
also analysed and confirmed as the interchange of 1S2
with 2S1. (Refer fig 2.4.3 (This might have been done
by the electrician due to wrong way reading 1s2 as 2s1 14. Now the rectification in the form of original change of
and 2s1 as 1s2). wire internally was not possible. So with the external
13. The wrong way of reading 1s2 and 2s1 as 2s1 and 1s2 terminal, the shorting was done between 1S2 & 2S2
has been explained in fig 2.4.4. and wires to the relay was taken from 1S1 & 2S1.
15. After rectification, it was found with correct measurement
in the stability check of the transformer.
16. The transformer was successfully commissioned with the
system.
Table-A
Phase / Wire Current in m Ref. from Remarks
No. Amp. Vector Diagram
R ph. A111 0 Doubt?
Y ph. A131 18 OC O.K
B ph. A151 19 OE O.K
Neutral A71 18 OD=OC Doubt?
A111+ A131 18 OC O.K
A131+ A151 19 OD O.K
A111+ A151 18 OE O.K
A171+ A111 19 OD Doubt?
A171+ A131 32 OG=√3OC Doubt?
A171+ A151 31 OH=√3OE Doubt?

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Case Study
Case Study of the month
2.5. Development of more CO2 in Main Tank Oil: One of the
new 20 MVA 132/11KV transformer in the process plant was
found with development more carbon dioxide content during
DGA testing of the oil.
Observations:
1. This transformer had been commissioned for the last 8
months.
2. The transformer was used for the process plant and
provided with AVR (Automatic Voltage Controller Relay)
to maintain the output voltage within the allowable limit,
by changing of the tap position by the OLTC provided.
3. In an average, the OLTC used to run for 5 to 6 times
daily.
Fig 2.5.1 Equalization pipe with valve
4. As per the normal practice, DGA of the transformer had
been prescribed to do with time span of 1. Commissioning
time, after 1 Month, after 3 Months and 6 months and
52 ELECTRICAL MIR ROR || September 2020 ||
1 year to study the evolution of any objectionable gas
in the transformer.
5. The commissioning DGA value was kept for reference.
But surprisingly it was found with rise of CO2 gas in
the oil for all the testing conditions in drastic increasing
trend.
6. The result after one month was found more and again
at 3 month and 6 month.
7. As normal practices, the diverter switch oil is required
to be changed after every 6 months.
8. So in this case also, after 6 months of operation, the
diverter switch oil was planned for replacement.
9. The planned shutdown was availed. But when the operator
climbed top of the transformer for closing of the equalizing
pipe valve, to his surprise he found the valve was closed
from the day of commissioning.
10. Now the valve was closed for the replacement of the
OLTC tank oil.
11. As Carbon dioxide content was also found dissolved with
the main tank, the main tank oil was also decided for
the total filtration with few days.
12. After filtration, the transformer was charged and taken
into service. But this time, the closure of the equalization
was done before allowing for taking the transformer into
service.
13. The mistake of non-closure of the equalization valve,
caused the mixing of diverter switch oil with main tank.
( The interconnecting pipe between Main Tank and OLTC
tank is called equalization pipe as shown in the figure
2.5.1)
14. Then due to frequent operation of OLTC to maintain
output voltage constant, the CO2 was getting generated
and getting mixed to the main tank oil.
15. This transformer was having OLTC conservator at the
same level of main tank conservator being partition of
the main conservator tank.
16. If it could have been taken with separate tank at low
level position, then it would have caused overflowing
of oil from the OLTC breather, indicating about the
interconnection of both main and OLTC oil tank.
17. So the status of equalization valve could not be known.
Only it was confirmed during time of attempt for
replacement of OLTC tank Oil.
Recommendations:
The equalization pipe need to be kept in CLOSED condition
during the service of the transformer.
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