Adams v Ursell [1913] 1 Ch D was in the trade of selling fried fish.
ish. The shop was located in the residential part
269
Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC
358 House of Lords
A-G v P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd.
(1957)
Alcock v. The Chief
Constable of South Yorkshire
[1992] 1 AC 310
Alexander v North Eastern
Railway (1865) 6 B&S 340
Al-Kandari V J R Brown & Co
Allen v Gulf Oil Refinery
[1981] AC 1001 House of
Lords
of a street. Faced with a claim for an injunction, he argued that his business
benefited the public, especially the poor and therefore the smell produced by his
trade was justified.
Held: Court rejected the defense as P’s comfort and convenience also had to be
considered
The defendant owned View Park Colliery which was situated in a field adjacent to a
road. There was a fence around the perimeter of the field although there were
large gaps in the fence. The field was frequently used as a short cut to a railway
station and children would use it as a playground. The defendant would often warn
people off the land but the attempts were not effective and no real attempt was
made to ensure that people did not come onto the land. A child came on to the
land and was killed when he climbed onto a piece of haulage apparatus.
Held:
No duty of care was owed to trespassers to ensure that they were safe when
coming onto the land. The only duty was not to inflict harm wilfully.
Viscount Dunedin:
"In the present case, had the child been a licensee, I would have held the
defenders liable; secus if the complainer had been an adult. But, if the person is a
trespasser, then the only duty the proprietor has towards him is not maliciously to
injure him; he may not shoot him; he may not set a spring gun, for that is just to
arrange to shoot him without personally firing the shot. Other illustrations of what
he may not do might be found, but they all come under the same head—injury
either directly malicious or an acting so reckless as to be tantamount to malicious
acting."
Held that “…any nuisance is public which materially affects the reasonable comfort
and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty’s subjects.”
Relatives of those killed or injured at a football stadium claimed damages against
the police for causing them nervous shock resulting in psychiatric illness. The
relatives saw and heard the tragedy via live television or radio broadcasts. The
police admitted liability in negligence but denied any duty of care to the plaintiffs.
The issue was whether the relatives were entitled in law to damages. The House of
Lords held that a claimant for damages for psychiatric injury must pass two tests.
The injury must be reasonably foreseeable (shown by a close tie of love and
affection between the individuals). Second, the claimant must have been proximate
to the incident or its aftermath at the time the incident occurred and the shock must
have resulted from seeing or hearing the incident or its aftermath.
The Defendants published a notice at their train station saying the Claimant had
been caught riding on a train without a ticket and was sentenced to £1 fine or three
weeks imprisonment. In actual fact it was 14 days imprisonment if he failed to pay
the fine. The Claimant complained that the overstatement made it appear as if the
offence he had committed was worse than it was. The jury found for the
Defendants.
Recognized the duty of a lawyer towards 3rd arty only because the lawyers
byundertaking to keep the Client's passport with them had assumed the
responsibility to make sure that harm did not come to the 3rd party. Since the client
had somehow obtained the passport the lawyers had breached this assumed duty
towards the 3rd party
The claimant brought an action in nuisance for the smell, noise and vibration
created by an oil refinery which had been constructed by the defendant on their
land. The defendant’s action in constructing the oil refinery was authorised by an
Act of Parliament.Held:The defendant was not liable as it had a defence of
statutory authority.
Allied Maples v Simmons &
Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907
AMF International Ltd v
Magnet Bowling Ltd (1968)
Anns v Merton London
Borough Council [1978] AC
728
Ashdown v Samuel Williams
& Sons Ltd (1957)
The defendant solicitors were acting for the claimant in a takeover of the Gillow
group of companies. The defendant's failed to warn the claimant of potential
liability that may arise under the transaction. The transaction was completed and
risk of liability became a reality leaving the claimant liable to pay substantial sums.
The claimant sought to recover some of this from the defendant arguing that if they
had been advised correctly there was a chance that they would have been able to
negotiate out of the liability.
Held:
The claimant was entitled to recover a sum to reflect their loss of a chance of
negotiating out of liability.
Where the result depends on what a third party would have done in a hypothetical
situation, the claimant only has to demonstrate that there was a more than
speculative chance rather than on the balance of probabilities. The assessment of
the chance will be reflected in the damages.
The contractor was to provide and install valuable timber and other specialised
bowling alley equipment. On July 21, 1964 an exceptionally heavy rainstorm
flooded the building and the timber for the building work was seriously damaged.
The court held that the contractor and the building owner were both occupiers of
the building.
The claimants were tenants in a block of flats. The flats suffered from structural
defects due to inadequate foundations which were 2ft 6in deep instead of 3ft deep
as required. The defendant Council was responsible for inspecting the foundations
during the construction of the flats. The House of Lords held that the defendant did
owe a duty of care to ensure the foundations were of the correct depth. Lord
Wilberforce introduced a two stage test for imposing a duty of care. This has since
been overruled by Caparo v Dickman.
Lord Wilberforce's two stage test:
"in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not
necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in
which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be
approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged
wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient
relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable
contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause
damage to the latter—in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if
the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether
there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the
scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to
which a breach of it may give rise."
Held that it is sufficient for an occupier to post a “clear and unequivocal notice” at
the point of entry excluding liability with respect to non-contractual entrants.
Attia v British Gas plc
Attorney General v Corke
[1993]
Attorney General v Hartwell
(British Virgin Islands) [2004]
Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC
467
The plaintiff brought an action for damages from the defendants for nervous shock.
She alleged that she had suffered a psychiatric illness caused by witnessing the
destruction of her home by a fire caused by the defendants' negligence while
installing central heating to her home. The judge decided as a preliminary issue on
assumed facts that the plaintiff could not recover damages and dismissed the
action.The plaintiff appealed.David Tucker (instructed by Fremont & Co) for the
plaintiff. Janet Turner (instructed by the solicitor, British Gas plc (North Thames))
for the defendants.Dillon LJ said that the issues at trial, assuming the facts pleaded
including the psychiatric illness were proved, would have been (a) causation and
(b) foreseeability of the damage as a question of remoteness. If the plaintiff could
surmount those two hurdles there was no good reason why the law should refuse
to allow her to recover damages for nervous shock. His Lordship was not prepared
to hold that the fact that the shock which caused the plaintiff's psychiatric illness
was caused by damage to property must preclude her from recovering damages
for nervous shock, even if it was reasonably foreseeable that she might suffer
psychiatric illness as a consequence of the defendants' negligence in causing the
fire in her house. Whether the plaintiff's assumed illness caused by the shock was
or was not a foreseeable consequence of the defendants' negligence must depend
on the actual evidence given at the trial. His Lordship would set aside the judge's
order and allow the action to proceed to trial.Woolf and Bingham LJJ delivered
judgments concurring with Dillon LJ.Appeal allowed.
The Defendant allowed people onto his land to live in caravans. These people
engaged in anti social activities which took place off Defendant's land. The court
held that these people were 'dangerous' within the meaning of Rylands v Fletcher.
PC Laurent was the sole police officer stationed on the island of Jost Van Dyke,a
small island with a population of about 135 people in the British Virgin Islands.
Laurent was still on probation and was subject to daily supervisory visits by a
police sergeant from a nearby larger island. As the sole officer, PC Laurent had a
key to the police station's strongbox which contained a gun. One night he took the
gun and went to a restaurant where his wife was associating with another man (the
Claimant). He then fired four shots injuring the two in addition to a tourist in the
restaurant. The claimant brought an action against the police for allowing a
probationary officer to have access to a gun.
Held:
A duty of care is owed by the police authorities in entrusting officers with guns.
Lord Nicholls:
"In the view of their Lordships the appropriate analysis is that when entrusting a
police officer with a gun the police authorities owe to the public at large a duty to
take reasonable care to see the officer is a suitable person to be entrusted with
such a dangerous weapon lest by any misuse of it he inflicts personal injury,
whether accidentally or intentionally, on other persons. For this purpose no
distinction is to be drawn between personal injuries inflicted in the course of police
duties and personal injuries inflicted by a police officer using a police gun for his
own ends. If this duty seems far-reaching in its scope it must be remembered that
guns are dangerous weapons. The wide reach of the duty is proportionate to the
gravity of the risks."
The claimant suffered an injury to his leg when the defendant ran into him in his
car. He suffered pain and loss of amenity and had to take a lower paid job. He tried
various different employments some of which he had to discontinue because of his
injury. He was employed sorting through scrap metal when he sustained a further
injury to his leg. He was on his own when two men came in and demanded money.
When he refused they shot him in his injured leg. As a result of the shooting, the
claimant had to have his leg amputated. The defendant argued that the second
injury removed the very limb from which the earlier disability had stemmed, and
thattherefore no loss suffered thereafter can be attributed to the defendant's
negligence. Arguing that the second injury submerged or obliterated the effect of
the first and that all loss thereafter must be attributed to the second injury. The trial
judge rejected this argument which he said was more ingenious than attractive. But
it was accepted by the Court of Appeal.House of Lords held:The defendant
remained liable for the loss of amenity and lower earning capacity even after the
amputation.
Barker v Corus, [2006] 3 All
ER 785
Barker v Saint Gobain
Pipelines [2004] EWCA Civ
545 Court of Apeal
Barnett v Chelsea &
Kensington Hospital [1969] 1
QB 428
Berkoff v. Burchill
Barker was exposed to asbestos in his course of employment with several
employers, but also in the course of self-employment. He developed mesothelioma
and sued for damages. He was unsuccessful at the lower courts and appealed to
the House of Lords.
Does it matter that the plaintiff was one of the parties that might have contributed
to the injury?
Hoffman, in the majority, states that the purpose of Fairchild can be applied here.
He states that it does not matter that Barker was one of the parties that helped
cause the injury - the liability of the other two parties depends only on their own
actions and not on those of other parties. Therefore, the other two parties are still
liable – however the damages are divided according to the probability of each
respondant causing the harm.
In the dissent, Rodger of Earlsferry states that Fairchild cannot apply here because
it tips the scales too far in favour of Barker. It is essentially stating that in cases
exactly like this a plaintiff recovers unconditionally, however if the case only differs
a little bit then plaintiffs cannot recover for suffering the increased risk of an injury.
He also talks about how dividing damages is bad, because claimants often end up
with only a small proportion of the damages that they deserve. Appeal allowed.
Fairchild applies even if the plaintiff himself is one of the causes of the injury, but
the damages are divided up based on the probability of each party’s actions
causing the harm.
Mr Barker contracted mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos. He worked for the
defendant between 1960-68. He worked for a different employer for 6 weeks where
he was also exposed to asbestos. After 1968 he became self-employed as a
plasterer for 20 years. Whilst self employed he was exposed to asbestos on three
occasions. The defendant argued that his exposure to asbestos whilst self-
employed prevented him from being able to rely on the causation principle
established in Fairchild v Glenhaven whereby the claimant is able to demonstrate
that the defendant's breach of duty materially increased the risk of contracting the
disease.Held:Fairchild did apply and the claimant was thus successful in
establishing causation. His damages would be reduced under the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect the periods where he exposed
himself to risk during the course of his self-employment.
Mr Barnett went to hospital complaining of severe stomach pains and vomiting. He
was seen by a nurse who telephoned the doctor on duty. The doctor told her to
send him home and contact his GP in the morning. Mr Barnett died five hours later
from arsenic poisoning. Had the doctor examined Mr Barnett at the time there
would have been nothing the doctor could have done to save him.
Held:
The hospital was not liable as the doctor's failure to examine the patient did not
cause his death.
Introduced the 'but for' test ie would the result have occurred but for the act or
omission of the defendant? If yes, the defendant is not liable.
A libel civil action which he brought against Sunday Times journalist Julie Burchill,
after she published comments suggesting that he was "hideously ugly"; the judge
ruled for Berkoff, finding that Burchill's actions "held him to ridicule and contempt
Blake v Galloway [2004] 3 All
ER 315
Bliss v Hall [1838] 4 Bing NC
183
Blyth v Birmingham
Waterworks (1856) Exch
Bolam v Friern Hospital
Management Committee
[1957] 1 WLR 583
The claimant, a 15 year old boy, was out with four of his friends including the
defendant. The boys started throwing pieces of bark chippings and twigs at each
other. The claimant did not join in at first but then threw a piece of bark chipping at
the defendant hitting him in the leg. The defendant picked it up and threw it back at
the claimant. The piece of bark struck the claimant's eye resulting in serious injury.
The claimant brought an action contending that the injury was caused by the
battery and or negligence of the defendant. The defendant raised volenti non fit
injuria. The trial judge rejected the defence of volenti but held that the damages
should be reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act
1945. The defendant appealed contending that there was no breach of duty and
that the judge was wrong to reject the defence of volenti.Held:Appeal allowed. In
the context of 'horseplay' there is a breach of the duty of care only where the
defendant's conduct amounts to recklessness or a very high degree of
carelessness. The defendant had consented to the risk of injury occurring within
the conventions and understanding of the game. Lord Justice Dyson:"If the
defendant in the present case had departed from the tacit understandings or
conventions of the play and, for example, had thrown a stone at the claimant, or
deliberately aimed the piece of bark at the claimant's head, then there might have
been a breach of the duty of care. But what happened here was, at its highest, "an
error of judgment or lapse of skill" (to quote from Diplock LJ), and that is not
sufficient to amount to a failure to take reasonable care in the circumstances of
horseplay such as that in which these youths were engaged. In my view, the
defendant's conduct came nowhere near recklessness or a very high degree of
carelessness." The game was played on the basis that the objects were thrown at
no particular part of the body. It follows that an object thrown in the general
direction of a participant, without negligence and without intent to cause injury, but
which happened to hit him in the face, was being thrown in accordance with the
understandings and conventions of the game, and in a manner to which the
participants had consented.
D managed a factory for 3 years and during this time smoke, smell and other
remittance came from the factory. P moved into a house near the factory.
Held: A defence that an activity has been going on before an action brought to halt
the activity is inapplicable as P had his rights too, one of which is clean air.
Defendants had installed water mains along the street with hydrants located at
various points. One of the hydrants across from Plaintiff’s house developed a leak
as a result of exceedingly cold temperatures and caused water damage to the
house. Plaintiff sued for negligence.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The
defendants might have been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted
to do that which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person
taking reasonable precautions would not have done.
The claimant was undergoing electro convulsive therapy as treatment for his
mental illness. The doctor did not give any relaxant drugs and the claimant
suffered a serious fracture. There was divided opinion amongst professionals as to
whether relaxant drugs should be given. If they are given there is a very small risk
of death, if they are not given there is a small risk of fractures. The claimant argued
that the doctor was in breach of duty by not using the relaxant drug.Held:The
doctor was not in breach of duty. The House of Lords formulated the Bolam test:"a
medical professional is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with
a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that
particular art . . . Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is
acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of
opinion who would take a contrary view."
Bolitho v City & Hackney
Health Authority [1997] 3
WLR 1151
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850
Bonnington Castings Ltd v
Wardlaw [1956] AC 613
House of Lords
Bourhill v Young [1943] AC
92
A 2 year old child was admitted to hospital suffering from breathing difficulties. A
doctor was summoned but did not attend as her bleep was not working due to low
battery. The child died. The child's mother brought an action claiming that the
doctor should have attended and intubated the child which would have saved the
child's life. The doctor gave evidence that had she attended she would not have
intubated. Another doctor gave evidence that they would not have intubated. The
trial judge applied the Bolam test and held that there was no breach of duty. The
claimant appealed.
Held:
In applying the Bolam test where evidence is given that other practitioners would
have adopted the method employed by the defendant, it must be demonstrated
that the method was based on logic and was defensible.
Miss Stone was injured when she was struck by a cricket ball outside her home.
She brought an action against the cricket club in nuisance and negligence. The
cricket field was surrounded by a 7 foot fence. The pitch was sunk ten feet below
ground so the fence was 17 feet above the cricket pitch. The distance from the
striker to the fence was about 78 yards and just under 100 yards from where the
claimant was standing. A witness who lived in the same road as the claimant but
close to pitch said that five or six times during the last 30 years he had known balls
hit his house or come into the yard. Two members of the Club, of over 30 years'
standing, agreed that the hit was altogether exceptional to anything previously
seen on that ground.
Held:
No breach of duty. The likelihood of harm was low the defendant had taken all
practical precautions in the circumstances. The cricket ground had been there for
90 years without injury and provided a useful service for the community.
The claimant contracted pneumoconiosis by inhaling air which contained
minuteparticles of silica during the course of his employment. The defendant was
in breach of a statutory duty in failing to provide an extractor fan. Had they installed
an extractor fan the number of particles of silica that the claimant was exposed to
would have been reduced, however, there would still be some particles present.
There were thus two possible causes: the guilty dust, which should not have been
in the working environment and the innocent dust, which would have been present
in any event. The trial judge held that where the duty arose by statute then it was
for the defendant to show that his breach of duty (the guilty dust) did not cause the
disease. As the defendant was unable to do this they were liable. The defendant
appealed contending the burden of proof rests on the claimant.Held:The burden of
proof remains on the claimant. However, the claimant only had to demonstrate that
the guilty dust had made a material contribution to the disease. He did not have to
demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the guilty dust was the sole cause
of the disease
The claimant was a pregnant fishwife. She got off a tram and as she reached to
get her basket off the tram, the defendant drove his motorcycle past the tram at
excessive speed and collided with a car 50 feet away from where the claimant was
standing. The defendant was killed by the impact. The claimant heard the collusion
but did not see it. A short time later, the claimant walked past where the incident
occurred. The body had been removed but there was a lot of blood on the road.
The claimant went into shock and her baby was still born. She brought a
negligence claim against the defendant's estate.
Held:
No duty of care was owed by the defendant to the claimant. There was not
sufficient proximity between the claimant and defendant when the incident
occurred.
Box v Jubb LR 4 EX Div 76 The defendant had a reservoir on their land. There was another reservoir situated
at a higher level than the defendant’s. The owner of this other reservoir emptied it
through a drain connected to the defendant’s reservoir causing the defendant’s
reservoir to overflow and damage the claimant’s land. The claimant brought an
action under Rylands v Fletcher contending that there was a non natural user of
the land and that there had been an escape of water that caused damage.

Held:
The defendant was not liable for the damage as it was caused by the act of a third
party over which the defendant had no control.
Bradford Corporation v [Tort – negligence - duty of care - proving fault - malice not normally relevant]D
Pickles [1895] HL owned land containing underground streams which fed C's (Bradford Corporation)
waterworks. D began to sink shafts for the alleged purpose of draining certain
beds of stone. The effect of D’s operations was to affect seriously the supply of
water to appellant’s springs. The corporation alleged that defendant was not acting
in good faith, but to compel them to purchase his land. Held: D has the right to
divert or appropriate the water within his own land so as to deprive his neighbour of
it. His right is the same whatever his motive may be, whether genuinely to improve
his own land, or maliciously to injure his neighbour, or to induce his neighbour to
buy him out.No use of property which would be legal if due to a proper motive can
become illegal if it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious.
British Railways Board v A six year old boy was electrocuted and suffered severe burns when he wondered
Herrington [1972] AC 877 from a play park onto a live railway line. The railway line was surrounded by a
House of Lords fence however, part of the fence had been pushed down and the gap created had
been used frequently as a short cut to the park. The defendant was aware of the
gap in the fence which had been present for several months, but had failed to do
anything about it. Under existing authority of Addie v Dumbreck no duty of care
was owed to trespassers. However, the House of Lords departed from their
previous decision using the 1966 Practice Statement and held that the defendant
railway company did owe a duty of common humanity to trespassers.

Lord Pearson:

"It seems to me that the rule in Addie v. Dumbreck has been rendered obsolete by
changes in physical and social conditions and has become an incumbrance
impeding the proper development of the law. With the increase of the population
and the larger proportion living in cities and towns and the extensive substitution of
blocks of flats for rows of houses with gardens or back yards and quiet streets,
there is less playing space for children and so a greater temptation to trespass.
There is less supervision of children, so that they are more likely to trespass. Also
with the progress of technology there are more and greater dangers for them to
encounter by reason of the increased use of, for instance, electricity, gas, fast
moving vehicles, heavy machinery and poisonous chemicals. There is
considerably more need than there used to be for occupiers to take reasonable
steps with a view to deterring persons, especially children, from trespassing in
places that are dangerous for them.

In my opinion the Addie v. Dumbreck formulation of the duly of occupier to

trespasser is plainly inadequate for modern conditions, and its rigid and restrictive
character has impeded the proper development of the common law in this field. It
has become an anomaly and should be discarded."
Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB The Defendants owned a golf club where illegal gambling machines were kept.
818 Someone told the police and they were removed. Shortly after a piece of paper
appeared on one of the walls saying but 'he who gave the game away, may he
byrnn in hell and rue the day'. Did these words defame the claimant in the sense
that he was guilty of underhand disloyalty to his fellow club members by telling the
police about the machines. The Court of Appeal held that even though some
people may consider that the fruit machines were so trivial that they weren't really
criminal, the right-thinking man cannot ever view the reporting of crime as
defamation. To report crime, however trivial, cannot be a source of scorn or ridicule
in the eyes of the law
Cambridge Water v Eastern
Counties Leather plc [1994] 2
AC 264 House of Lords
Candler v Crane, Christmas &
Co
Caparo Industries Plc v
Dickman
The defendant owned a leather tanning business. Spillages of small quantities of
solvents occurred over a long period of time which seeped through the floor of the
building into the soil below. These solvents made their way to the borehole owned
by the Claimant water company. The borehole was used for supplying water to
local residents. The water was contaminated at a level beyond that which was
considered safe and Cambridge Water had to cease using the borehole.
Cambridge Water brought actions based on negligence, nuisance and the rule in
Rylands v Fletcher.Held:Eastern Counties Leather were not liable as the damage
was too remote. It was not reasonably foreseeable that the spillages would result
in the closing of the borehole. The foreseeability of the type of damage is a pre-
requisite of liability in actions of nuisance and claims based on the rule in Rylands
v Fletcher in the same way as it applies to claims based in negligence. The Wagon
Mound No 1 case applies to determine remoteness of damage.
Donald Ogilvie was the director of a company called Trevaunance Hydraulic Tin
Mines Ltd, which mined tin in Cornwall. He needed more capital, so he put an
advertisement in The Times on July 8, 1946, which said,
"£10,000. Established Tin Mine (low capitalization) in Cornwall seeks further
capital. Instal additional milling plant. Directorship and active participation open to
suitable applicant - Apply"
Mr Candler responded, saying he was interested in investing £2000, if he could
see the company's accounts. Mr Ogilvie instructed Crane, Christmas & Co, a firm
of auditors, to prepare the company’s accounts and balance sheet. The draft
accounts were shown to Mr Candler in the presence of Crane, Christmas & Co’s
clerk. Mr Candler relied on their accuracy and subscribed for £2,000 worth of
shares in the company. But the company was actually in a very bad state. Ogilvie
used the investment on himself and then went bankrupt. Mr Candler lost all the
money he invested. He brought an action against the accountants, Crane,
Christmas & Co. for negligently misrepresenting the state of the company. As there
was no contractual relationship between the parties, the action was brought in tort
law for pure economic loss.
The majority of the Court of Appeal (Sir Lionel Cohen and Sir Cyril Asquith) relied
on the case of Derry v Peek to refuse a remedy to the plaintiff, holding that loss
resulting from negligent misstatement was not actionable in the absence of any
contractual or fiduciary relationship between the parties.
FactsA company called Fidelity plc, manufacturers of electrical equipments, was
the target of a takeover by Caparo Industries plc. Fidelity was not doing well. In
March 1984 Fidelity had issued a profit warning, which had halved its share price.
In May 1984 Fidelity's directors made a preliminary announcement in its annual
profits for the year up to March confirming the negative outlook. The share price
fell again. At this point Caparo had begun buying up shares in large numbers. In
June 1984 the annual accounts, which were done with the help of the accountant
Dickman, were issued to the shareholders, which now included Caparo. Caparo
reached a shareholding of 29.9% of the company, at which point it made a general
offer for the remaining shares, as the City Code's rules on takeovers required.
Once it had control, Caparo found that Fidelity's accounts were in an even worse
state than had been revealed by the directors or the auditors. It sued Dickman for
negligence in preparing the accounts and sought to recover its losses.IssueWhat
test should be employed in determining negligence? DecisionThe majority of the
Court of Appeal (Bingham LJ and Taylor LJ, O'Connor LJ dissenting) held that a
duty was owed by the auditor to shareholders individually, and although it was not
necessary to decide that in this case and the judgment was obiter, that a duty
would not be owed to an outside investor who had no shareholding. Bingham LJ
held that, for a duty owed to shareholders directly, the very purpose of publishing
accounts was to inform investors so that they could make choices within a
company about how to use their shares. But for outside investors, a relationship of
proximity would be "tenuous" at best, and that it would certainly not be "fair, just
and reasonable". Appeal allowed.ReasonsBridge of Harwich, writing for a
unanimous court, states that the two part test employed in Dobson should not be
used, and subsequently it has been abandoned in England. He reasons that when
deeming if negligence has occurred one should compare cases to precedent cases
with similar facts, rather than simply having an overarching test.RatioEngland
abandons the Anns test for negligence.
Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis
Carslogie Steamship Co v.
Royal Norwegian
Government
Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929]
2 KB 331
Century Insurance v.
Northern Ireland Road
Transport Board 1942 House
of Lords
Chaplin v Hicks
[Tort – negligence - duty of care - public policy – duty owed in operational matters]
D a Local Authority employed a teacher who left a 4-year-old child alone for about
ten minutes while she did other things. The child left the classroom onto a busy
road, where he caused a lorry driver to swerve and collide with a telegraph pole.
The lorry driver was killed and his widow sued the education authority.
Held: The education authority had taken charge of the child and had a duty to take
reasonable care to prevent him from causing harm to others.
C won.
On 26 November 1949 the vessel Heimgar, while under time charter to the Ministry
of Transport, suffered damage in a collision with the Carslogie. It was admitted that
the Carslogie was solely to blame. The Heimgar had temporary repairs done in a
port in England before proceeding to a port in the United States where permanent
repairs could be carried out. During the voyage across the Atlantic, the ship
sustained heavy weather damage, which necessitated immediate repair. The ship
remained in dock for fifty days during which the repairs due to the collision and
those due to the weather damage were carried out concurrently. It had been
agreed that ten days would be allocated to the collision repair and thirty days for
the weather damage. The owners of the Heimgar claimed damages for the ten
days attributable to the collision damage while at port.The owners of the Carslogie
were only liable for such loss of profit suffered by the Heimgar as resulted from the
Carslogie’s wrongful act. During the time that the Heimgar was detained in dock
she had ceased to be a profit-earning machine because the heavy weather
damage had rendered her unseaworthy. Therefore, the respondents had sustained
no damage by reason of the fact that for ten days the vessel was undergoing
repairs in respect of the collision damage, as the heavy weather damage was the
sole reason the Heimgar had to dock for repairs before reaching its destination.
The Defendants took a photograph of Mr Cassidy (a racehorse owner) with a
woman who was not his wife. Mr Cassidy, who often used a different name, told a
reporter that he was going to marry her and the image had a caption saying they
were engaged, using his alternative name. Mrs Cassidy, the lawful wife, brought an
action for defamation. Although they lived separately, Mr Cassidy sometimes came
to visit her. She alleged that people would see him arriving at her house thinking
he is the man from the photo (where his alternative name was used) and assume
that they were living together immorally and only pretending to be his wife. The
Court of Appeal said that words published about one person can sometimes
defame another person and that Mrs Cassidy had in fact been defamed. By people
seeing this man coming to her house who is supposed to be marrying another
woman, she looks like she was simply pretending to be his wife. The blame here
was on the newspaper but arguably, the fact that a lawful wife existed may have
been difficult to discover.
A patrol lorry driver smoked a cigarette while driving, which caused an explosion.
Is the smoking of a cigarette in the course of employment or not?
It was not too far from the employment, the driver did act as an employee.
Chaplin, along with 6,000 others, entered a nation wide beauty contest and got
through to the final stage where only 50 contestants were left. Hicks was to select
the twelve winners from these remaining contestants. The winners were to be
given theatrical engagement by him for three years at £5 per week. Hicks, in
breach of his contract with Chaplin, prevented her from taking part in the final
selection stage. The judge and jury awarded her damages of £100 for the
opportunity she lost in being prevented from taking part in the final selection stage.
Where by contract a man has a right to belong to a limited class of competitors for
a prize, a breach of that contract by reason of which he is prevented from
continuing a member of the class and is thereby deprived of his chance of
obtaining the prize is a breach in respect of which he may be entitled to recover
substantial, and not merely nominal, damages.
The existence of a contingency which is dependent on the volition of a third person
does not necessarily render the damages for a breach of contract incapable of
assessment.
Charleston v News Group
Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65
Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1988]
3 All ER 718
Chester v Afshar [2004] 3
WLR 927 House of Lords
Christie v Davey (1893) 1 Ch
316
Two popular characters from the tv show Neighbours were portrayed on the front
cover of a newspaper naked except for black leather engaged in sexual
intercourse. The title read "Strewth! What's Harold up to with out Madge? Porn
shocker for Neighbours stars" however the captions on the pictures made clear
that the images were false. The image was taken from a sordid computer game
which had computer-generated the images. The rest of the article condemned the
game in a tone which can be contrasted with the prominence given to the image.
The House of Lords accepted that the image must have deeply offensive but said
that it was not defamatory since a publication has to be read as a whole. Even
though the image and headline were libellous the remainder of the article had a
neutralising effect.
the court of appeal held that the duty of care will arise on the defendant who are
the friend of plaintiff that give a negligent advice to the plaintiff to selection of a
second car. The defendant will liable on it, although defendant not as a
professional in the mechanic area. This is an exception existed the duty of care in
a social relationship. Because the Court of Appeal clearly measure that the case
above was an unusual case, the judgment in this case was made in a special facts.
The claimant had suffered back pain for 6 years. This became quite severe and at
times she was unable to walk or control her bladder. An MRI scan revealed that
there was disc protrusion into her spinal column and she was advised to have
surgery. The surgery carried a 1-2% risk that even if it was performed without
negligence the operation could worsen rather than improve her condition. Her
consultant neurosurgeon Mr Afshar was under a duty to warn her of this risk
although he failed to do so. The claimant had the operation and unfortunately it
worsened her condition. The trial judge found that the surgeon had not been
negligent in performing the operation but his failure to warn her of the risk was a
breach of duty. The claimant argued that if she had been warned she would not
have taken the decision to have the operation straight away but would have taken
time to consider other options and discuss the risks with her family and would thus
not have had the surgery on the day which she did have it. She did not say she
would never have had the operation. The judge held that if she had the operation
on another occasion it may have been successful. He therefore found for the
claimant. The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and
the defendant appealed to the House of Lords on the grounds of causation in that
she was likely to have consented to the operation and that even if it had been on a
different occassion it carried the same risk.
Held:
3:2 decision (Lord Bingham & Lord Hoffman dissenting) appeal dismissed.
Lord Hope:
"To leave the patient who would find the decision difficult without a remedy, as the
normal approach to causation would indicate, would render the duty useless in the
cases where it may be needed most. This would discriminate against those who
cannot honestly say that they would have declined the operation once and for all if
they had been warned. I would find that result unacceptable. The function of the
law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when duties have
been breached. Unless this is done the duty is a hollow one, stripped of all
practical force and devoid of all content. It will have lost its ability to protect the
patient and thus to fulfil the only purpose which brought it into existence. On policy
grounds therefore I would hold that the test of causation is satisfied in this case.
The injury was intimately involved with the duty to warn. The duty was owed by the
doctor who performed the surgery that Miss Chester consented to. It was the
product of the very risk that she should have been warned about when she gave
her consent. So I would hold that it can be regarded as having been caused, in the
legal sense, by the breach of that duty."
The claimant was a music teacher. She gave private lessons at her home and her
family also enjoyed playing music. She lived in a semi-detached house which
adjoined the defendant’s property. The defendant had complained of the noise on
many occasions to no avail. He took to banging on the walls and beating trays and
shouting in retaliation.Held:The defendant’s actions were motivated by malice and
therefore did constitute a nuisance. An injunction was granted to restrain his
actions.