9

André Laks

Private matters in Plato’s Laws1

9.1 Introduction: The Greeks and the private

Dealing with „private matters“ or „private life“ in Plato’s Laws requires some cla-
rifications about the scope of the notion of the „private“ in Antiquity in general
and in Plato in particular. It is widely admitted that, from ancient to modern ti-
mes, a fundamental shift occurred in how the „private“, and its relationship to
the „public“, was conceptualized. The nature of this shift, from both a historical
and a philosophical perspective, is the central topic of some extremely inf luen-
tial works, such as Benjamin Constant’s De la Liberté des Anciens comparée à celle
des Modernes (1819), Fustel de Coulanges’ La Cité Antique (1864) and, in the 20th
century, H. Arendt’s chapter „The Public and the Private Realm“ in her book The
Human Condition (1958).2 Contemporary philosophers, in the wake of the debate
about the lost merits of an ethic of virtue, have often drawn a contrast between
„ancient ethics“ and modern ethical theories: whereas the Ancients insisted on
ethical excellence („virtue“) and the means to cultivate it, Modernity tends to in-
sist on individual conceptions of happiness and on the necessity of preserving a

1 Quotations from the Laws are taken from Bury’s translation in the Loeb Classical Library. Passages
from other dialogues are quoted from the translations collected by John M. Cooper in Plato, Complete
Works, 1997.
2 Cf. infra, n. 13.

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space in which they are free from interference (the social and private spheres).3
Recognizing that there is a shift does not imply, of course, that the Greeks did
not know of „private life“ (nor even of „privacy“ – although „privacy“ definitely
sounds more modern than „private life“). It can be argued, on the contrary, that
the Greeks „invented“ private life, in the same breath that they „invented“ pu-
blic life, and that for the obvious reason that „private“ and „public“ are correlates.
The Greek language confirms this: the term commonly translated „private“, na-
mely idios, is regularly paired with – and opposed to – either „public“ (dêmosios)
or „common“ (koinos). The very existence of this pair, and its extreme frequency
in extant Greek literature,4 suggests that the idea that we lead two lives was a
matter of course for the Greeks – as it is for us. Significantly, Isocrates’ client,
in his forensic speach On the team of horses, contrasts the public achievements of
his father (which are military in nature) with „the rest of his life“ (ho allos bios,
lit. „his other life“), which there is no harm in translating (as is commonly done)
„his private life“.5
This does not mean, however, that the Greeks construed the relationship bet-
ween these two lives in the same way we do, especially when we consider that
the range of items that fall under their notion of „private“ and ours do not ex-
actly coincide. One traditional starting point for appreciating the scope of the
pair idios/dêmosios-koinos, and hence of capturing the Greek notion of „private
life“, has been the notion of the oikos, „household“.6 If we assume, as is gene-

3 As Christoph Horn reminded me upon reading a first version of this paper.

4 A useful collection and analysis in Macé 2012.
5 „I am aware that I am omitting many of my father’s exploits as your general; I have not recounted
them in detail because nearly all of you recall the facts. But my father’s private life (ho allos bios) they
revile with excessive indecency and audacity, and they are not ashamed, now that he is dead, to use a
license of speech concerning him which they would have feared to employ while he lived“ (Isocrates
16.22, trans. G. Norlin).
6 Here are two relevant references (among many others): 1) Plato, Prt. 318e1–319a2: [Protagoras
speaking]: „The others [sc. sophists] abuse young men, steering them back again, against their will,
into subjects the likes of which they have escaped from at school, teaching them arithmetic, astronomy,
geometry, music and poetry [...] But if he comes to me he will learn only what he has come for. What
I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters (peri tôn oikeiôn), – how best to manage one’s
household (hopôs an arista tên autou oikian dioikoi) and in public affairs – how to realize one’s maximum
potential for success in political debate and action.“ (trans. Lombardo/Bell); Isocrates, Antidosis, 285:
„They characterize men who ignore our practical needs and delight in the mental juggling of the

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rally admitted, that the oikos includes not only family, but possessions and more
generally everything that might be implied by life within a household, then the
„private“ will include the relationship between husband and wife, the status of
women, sexuality, child-rearing, slaves, „economy“ in the ancient sense of the
term, and other matters such as non-official religious rites and „private justice“.7
One way to conceptualize these „private“, „household“ items is to present the
very distinction between idios and dêmosios-koinos as being in the first place spa-
tial.8 A house has an inside and an outside, and „private“ would be, accordingly,
all that belongs to and happens within a household. We might wonder, however,
whether any such a conception of the private is quite right. To see this, consider
first public life: whereas it is apparent that public life has an important spatial
component, it is by no means restricted to public spaces such as the agora, the as-
sembly, and the courts of justice, but includes a number of social practices, some
taking place in private spaces (e. g. symposia), others, though clearly part of the fa-
bric of public life, taking place in „spaces“ not easy to classify as public or private
(e. g. war, collective hunting).9
Conversely, what goes on inside the household is often of direct public interest,
as is abundantly shown by the use orators make of private considerations; this is
most conspicuous in their willingness to appeal to everything that has to do with

ancient sophists as ,students of philosophy‘, but refuse this name to whose who pursue and practise
those studies which will enable us to govern wisely both our own households and the commonwealth
– which should be the objects of our toil, of our study, and of our every act“ (trans. Norlin).
7 On the meaning of this last expression, cf. infra, n. 31. Interestingly, the link between the notions
„private“ (idios) and „household“ (oikos) also raises a question about the relationship between the words
idios and oikeios, inasmuch as oikeios, while obviously related to oikos (as the passage from Plato’s Prot-
agoras quoted n. 6 shows), is much broader in scope – I shall come back to this important question in
my conclusion.
8 See Cohen 1991, 72. Cf. Solon, fr. 4.12–13, 26–29 West: „sparing neither sacred nor private pro-
perty, they steal with rapaciousness, one from one source, one from another […] And so the public
evil comes home to each man and the courtyard gates no longer have the will to hold it back, but it
leaps over the high barrier and assuredly finds him out, even if he takes refuge in an innermost corner
of his room“ (trans. Gerber). The two paragraphs about the criterion of spatiality (its relevance and
limitations) follow Cohen’s analysis.
9 See esp. Schmitt-Pantel 1992, 112: „dans les cités archaïques, le politique n’est pas cantonné dans
deux ou trois institutions précises, mais plusieurs pratiques sociales semblent remplir une ,fonction
politique‘ [...]: tout ce qui définit la citoyenneté, la qualifie, l’exprime“. Hunting and symposia are men-
tioned p. 110.

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honor and reputation.10 Moreover, one can argue that theoretical activity such
as studying the stars, which may be considered a private activity, breaks the spa-
tial and conceptual limits of the household;11 and one might even maintain (in
particular on the basis of some famous passages in the Republic which discourage
participation in political life), that the cultivation of virtue, which is not restric-
ted to the household, is a fundamentally private matter (see Rep. VI 496b–e with
the occurrence of ta idia at 497a5; cf. ta hautou prattôn: 496d6).12 In any case, the
boundary between private and public becomes fuzzier as the opposition between
inside and outside loosens. As a matter of fact, most interpreters now share the
view that private and public „are more complementary than binary opposites“;
or else that „the boundary between [the two notions] was porous“ (Nagle 2006,
respectively 11 and 309).13 The analogy Weinstein uses in his analysis expresses
this idea in a striking way: „The two notions [dêmosios/idios] are probably best
seen as layers of onion skin, any given layer potentially counting as private in

10 Hence the role of neighbors and friends, who, in Cohen’s terms, constitute a „threshold“ between
private and public (cf. Cohen 1991, 87: „the social functions of friends and neighbors made the Athe-
nian oikos far less private than some scholars have imagined“). Cohen refers to Bourdieu’s study of
Kabyl society (in Bourdieu 1972). But „modern“ societies are concerned as well.
11 That there is a potential conf lict between theoretical activity and the household is well illustrated
by the fact that scholars had to create their own separate space within the household in order to devote
themselves to their studies (cf. Algazi 2003, 25 ff.).
12 Cf. Swanson 1992, 2: „Aristotle’s conception of the private includes both the household and the
meaning of idios, but it goes beyond both, for the private is constituted of activities that cultivate
virtue and discount common opinion“. This argument, which is directed against H. Arendt’s negative
conception of privacy, will be especially attractive to interpreters with Straussian inclinations.
13 Cohen 1991, 77 speaks of fluidity and of the relational quality of the public/private dichotomy. One
and the same action can be viewed either as private or as public depending on the point of view one
adopts. (Hence the rhetorical manipulations we find in the orators). In Anglo-saxon studies, this view
about f luidity and porosity often has H. Arendt’s views as a point of reference and a target. Arendt’s
position (1958, 23 ff.) is based on the idea that „private“ implies privation, namely privation of the
accomplishment which can only be provided by public life (private life comes from privatus which is
or is construed as negative concept: deprived of). Obviously, this analysis is part of her program of
rehabilitation of the political. This is the tradition of Benjamin Constant, with an axiological reversal:
whereas Constant insisted that the Ancients could not provide a model for Modernity, for Arendt, the
Moderns should learn from them. Cf. also Macé 2012, 431, n. 8: „Il faut absolument résister à l’idée
[éminemment représentée par Arendt] que la polis serait le seul lieu public, arraché à la sphère privée
[...] Pour Platon, l’espace privé et l’espace public sont deux domaines qui définissent la polis“.

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relation to the next, that is various publics“ (Weinstein 1971, 34).14 One may
wonder whether this is not true, to a certain extant, of „us“ Moderns, too. But
the important point here is that, given a „layered“ conception of the relationship
between private and public, it might turn out that a whole range of activities that
could be thought as belonging to the „private“ sphere can also be considered „pu-
blic“ as well. As we shall see in a moment, this interpenetration of the „private“
with the „public“ is illustrated in a particularly striking way in Plato’s Laws. But
before turning to the Laws, we need to say something about their relationship in
the Republic.

9.2 Plato’s views on household and the city:

from the Republic to the Laws
The Laws contain abundant material about „private life“, and especially about
marriage and family. This stands in strong contrast with the Republic, where, as
is well known, marriage and family do not loom large. This is partly because in
the Republic family life is (implicitly) restricted to the producers, and these do
not receive much attention in this dialogue; but it is also because family life is
emphatically excluded from the lives of the guardians and magistrates, on whom
Plato’s analysis is mainly focused. At the end of Book III, having now sketched a
program for the guardians’ education, Socrates observes (416c5– 417b2):

Now, someone with some understanding might say that, besides this
education, they must also have the kind of housing and other property
that will neither prevent them from being the best guardians nor en-
courage them to do evil to the other citizens [...]. In the first place, none
of them should possess any private property beyond what is wholly ne-
cessary. Second, none of them should have a house or storeroom that
isn’t open for all to enter at will. Third, whatever sustenance moderate
and courageous warrior-athletes require in order to have neither short-
fall nor surplus in a given year they’ll receive by taxation on the other

14 I owe the reference to Cohen 1991, 74. For some Platonic texts illustrating the continuity between
idia et dêmosia, cf. e. g. Rep. X 599c6–600e3 (about education); Grg. 514a5–d2 (about architecture and
medecine); Lg. IV 713e3–714a8.

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citizens as a salary for their guardianship [...] But if they acquire private
land, houses, and currency themselves, they’ll be household managers
and farmers instead of guardians – hostile masters of the other citizens
instead of their allies. (Trans. Grube, rev. Reeve)

The scheme then develops into the proposal, first mentioned in Book IV and then
f leshed out in Book V, of a so-called community of goods, women and children
(see IV 423e4–424a3; V 449c2–450c5; 457c7–461e9). All this implies, clearly,
that there are no individual households for the guardians in the „beautiful city“
(kallipolis) of Plato’s Republic.
Now this is not the picture we get from the Laws. In a very famous passage of
Laws IV, the Athenian Stranger, in his capacity as legislative adviser, suggests to
his Cretan interlocutors, who are about to found a new city, that they not follow
the scheme of the „first“, absolutely best city, and turn instead to another one
(„second in unity“), designed not for gods, but for men. The starting point of the
new scheme is described as a „retreat“ from an „old saying“, according to which
„what belongs to friends is common“.15 According to the Athenian Stranger,
applying this precept „genuinely“16 would imply that it „gets the widest possible
extension throughout the whole city“. It has already been observed that this was
not the case even for the Kallipolis of the Republic, since the producers do not fall
under the scheme imposed on the guardians (cf. Bobonich 2002, 482, n. 7);17 but
it is even less the case in Plato’s second-best, Cretan city, whose starting point
will be „a division of land and housing“ among all the citizens:

That State and polity come first, and those laws are best, where there is
observed as carefully as possible throughout the whole State the old say-
ing that ,friends have all things really in common‘. As to this condition,
– whether it anywhere exists now, or ever will exist, – in which there is
community of wives, children, and all chattels, and all that is called ,pri-

15 The proverb, possibly of Pythagorean origin (according to a scholion at Ly. 207c10), is quoted at
Rep. IV 424a1 f. and V 449c5 to justify the community of women and children.
16 „Genuinely“: that is, according to Plato’s own interpretation of the saying at this juncture of the
Laws.
17 In this sense, the interpretation which the Republic gives of the „old saying“ is not „genuine“ ac-
cording to the highest possible standard evoked in the Laws (see n. 16).

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vate‘ is everywhere and by every means rooted out of our life, and so far
as possible it is contrived that even things naturally ,private‘ (idia) have
become in a way ,communized‘ (koina gegonenai), – eyes, for instance,
and ears and hands seem to see, hear, and act in common, – and that all
men are, so far as possible, unanimous in the praise and blame they bes-
tow, rejoicing and grieving at the same things, and that they honor with
all their heart those laws which render the State as unified as possible,
– no one will ever lay down another definition that is truer or better
than these conditions in point of super-excellence [...] for the present,
however, what is this second best polity, and how would it come to be
of such a character? First, let them portion out the land and houses,
and not farm in common, since such a course is beyond the capacity of
people with the birth, rearing and training we assume. (V 739b8–740a2)

There is a question about whether the results of this apportioning are fairly de-
scribed as „private property“. They are certainly not „private“ in any of the senses
in which we would usually understand the term, in particular because, in order to
maintain a fixed number of households – a crucial feature of Plato’s Cretan city18
– they have to be inalienable: they cannot be sold or mortaged, and of course not
divided or amplified. They are, rather, a kind of tenure, whose real „proprietor“
remains the city.19 This is clearly indicated in the passage that immediately fol-
lows:

And let the apportionment be made with this intention, – that the man
who receives the portion should still regard it as common property of
the whole State, and should tend the land, which is his fatherland, more

18 Plato’s insistence on the number of families and households (not citizens, who will be more nume-
rous, because they include the grown sons, cf. Morrow 2 1993, 114) derives from his desire to provide a
secure basis for the overall stability of the city. It should be noted, although it is of secundary import-
ance for us, that the number of allotments (5040) and families is not identical with that of households,
of which there are 1080; this results from the fact that each „allotment“ includes two „parcels“, one
located nearer the city, which is to be exploited by the genuine tenant and head of the family, the other
one further away, which will be exploited by one of his sons. For an arithmological justification of the
number 5040, cf. VI 771a6c7.
19 For details of the scheme, and of its relationship to existing practices in antiquity, see Morrow
2 1993, 103–110.

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diligently than a mother tends her children, inasmuch as it, being a

goddess, is mistress over its mortal population, and should observe the
same attitude also towards the local gods and daemons. And in order
that these things may remain in this state for ever, these further rules
must be observed: the number of hearths, as now appointed by us, must
remain unchanged, and must never become either more or less [than
5040]. (740a2–b5)20

Given these declarations, should we not avoid talk of „private property“ altoge-
ther (cf. Pöhlmann 1893, 502 f.; Brisson/Pradeau 2007, 100)? It is certainly true
that it may look as if Plato was taking away with his right hand what he had just
given his left. Still, we should remember that Plato explicitly presents the allot-
ment of land and the institution of households as a retreat from a communitarian
principle; how can this be except by constituting some sort of „ownership“? In-
deed, Plato himself explicitly associates households with the idea of the „private“
(idion): for example at IV 713e8 f. (with an interestingly chiastic formula: dêmo-
siai kai idiai tas t’oikeseis kai tas poleis dioikein) and VII 788a5 (where we find the
expression idiai kai kat’oikias). Again, at IX 855a5 f. he says that it would be „in-
appropriate for a regime in which the allotments must always remain the same
and equal“ for them ever to „become public“ (dêmosia [...] gignesthai; i. e. revert
to the city e. g. as a penalty for a certain crime).
At this point, we might ponder whether it would not be helpful to construe
the idion/dêmosion-koinon distinction in terms of „individual or particular vs.
collective“ rather than in terms of the „private vs. public“. Such a construal
will certainly not dissolve the tension just mentioned, because „individual“
and „collective“ are no more compatible than „private“ and „public“. But it is
certainly useful in two important respects: generally and negatively, it helps by
removing some undesirable („modern“) connotations of the term „private“;21

20 Cf. also IX 877d6–e2: „and they [the Law-wardens and priests responsible for the procedure at
issue] shall bear in mind this principle, that no house of the 5040 belongs as much, either by private
or public right, to the occupier or to the whole of his kindred as it belongs to the State; and the State
must needs keep its own houses as holy and happy as possible.“
21 Cf. Casevitz 1998, 45 who concludes his analysis about the terminology of the private and the
public in Greece with the following observation: „Ce qui semble remarquable, quand on regarde le
vocabulaire, c’est qu’il n’y a pas, à l’origine, de ,vie privée‘. Le privé, c’est le ,particulier‘ [...] Le parti-
culier, c’est la plus petite unité commune du public, du commun“.

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positively and with special attention to the Laws, it so happens – and this is
certainly not by chance – that the order in which legislation is presented in the
Laws follows the various stages of an individual life, from one’s birth to one’s
death.22 And this story, not unexpectedly, will include some episodes that we
would classify as „public“, and other that we would classify as „private“.23
Here is a selection of some of the main topics belonging to the household-bound
(and thus, with due reservations, „private“) aspect of an individual life, in the
sequence in which they appear in the Laws.

1. Marriage (a: the parents): IV 721a6–721d6 (cf. VI 773e5–774a1)

2. Marriage (b: the children): VI 771e1–772a6 (the encounter), 772e7–773e4
(justifying the choice)
3. Procreation: VI 775b4–e4; 783d4–785b9
4. Early education (from the foetus to ten years): VII 788c6–804c124
5. Educating the children after their 10th year: VII 804c2–822d3
6. Hunting: VII 823b1–c1; 824a11–19
7. Sex: VIII 835d3–842a3
8. Religion: X 909d7–910d1 (cf. VII 800c5–d5: public sacrifices)
9. Bequests: XI 923a2–925d6
10. Funerals: XII 958b7–960b1

How do these „private matters“ fare, then, in the Laws?

22 Or, more exactly, from the marriage of the parents to the death of the children. On compositional
principles in the Laws, cf. Laks 2000, 265 f.
23 One relevant passage in this respect is VI 779d1–d6: „And now that these buildings and those of
the market-place, and the gymnasia, and all the schools have been erected and await their inmates, and
the theaters their spectators, let us proceed to the subject which comes next after marriage, taking our
legislation in order“. Especially telling is also the juxtaposition of marriage, procreation, education,
and offices at VII 842d6–e2: „This he will do, now that he has already enacted the most important
laws, which deal with marriage, and with the birth and nurture and education of the children, and
with the appointment of magistrates in the State. For the present he must turn, in his legislating, to
the subject of food and of those whose labors contribute to its supply. First, then, let there be a code of
laws termed ,agricultural‘“. Such a passage not only testifies to the porosity of the boundary between
private and public, it also shows that individual life is just an episode of the life of the polis.
24 There are further subdivisions: from the foetus to three years, 788c6–793e3; from three to six
years, 793e3–794c3; from six to ten years, 794c3–804c1.

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9.3 „Private“ matters

Plato explicitly states very early in the Laws that legislative (public) control must
be exercized over every aspect of the individual life of the citizen of the second-
city:

And in regard to their marriage connections, and to their subsequent

breeding and rearing of children, male and female, both during youth
and in later life (631e) up to old age, the lawgiver must supervise the ci-
tizens, duly apportioning honor and dishonor; and in regard to all their
forms of intercourse he must observe and watch their pains and plea-
sures and desires and (632a) all intense passions, and distribute praise
and blame correctly by the means of the laws themselves. Moreover, in
the matter of anger and of fear, and of all the disturbances which be-
fall souls owing to misfortune, and of all the avoidances thereof which
occur in good-fortune, and of all the experiences which confront men
through disease or war or penury or their opposites, – (632b) in regard
to all these definite instruction must be given as to what is the right
and what the wrong disposition in each case. It is necessary, in the next
place, for the law-giver to keep a watch on the methods employed by
the citizens in gaining and spending money, and to supervise the as-
sociations they form with one another, and the dissolutions thereof,
whether they be voluntary or under compulsion; he must observe the
manner in which they conduct each of these mutual transactions, and
note where justice obtains and where it is lacking. To those that are
obedient he must assign honors by law, but on the disobedient he must
impose (632c) duly appointed penalties. Then finally, when he arrives
at the completion of the whole constitution, he has to consider in what
manner in each case the burial of the dead should be carried out, and
what honors should be assigned to them. This being settled, the framer
of the laws will hand over all his statutes to the charge of Wardens –
guided some by wisdom, others by true opinion – to the end that Re-
ason, having bound all into one single system, may declare them to be

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ancillary neither to wealth nor ambition, but to temperance and justice.

(I 631d6–632d1)25

There is no shortage of texts in the Laws confirming that the regulation of the
citizens’ life takes place not only at a general level (something which would per-
fectly be compatible with modern conceptions of what regulation should be),
but bears on the most minute details of individual behavior. It is perfectly ob-
vious that the share accorded to the private in the Platonic city is rather thin, to
put it mildly. Here are two striking illustrations of the reach of these legislative
regulations:
1) the choice of spouse

In view of the fellowship and intercourse of marriage, it is necessary to

eliminate ignorance, both on the part of the husband concerning the
woman he marries and the family she comes from, and on the part of the
father concerning the man to whom he gives his daughter; for it is all-
important in such matters to avoid, if possible, any mistake. To achieve
this serious purpose, sportive dances should be arranged for boys and
girls; (772a) and at these they should both view and be viewed, in a re-
asonable way and on occasions that offer a suitable pretext, with bodies
unclad, save so far as sober modesty prescribes. Of all such matters the
officers of the choirs shall be the supervisors and controllers, and also,
in conjunction with the Law-wardens, the lawgivers of all that we leave
unprescribed. (VI 771e–772a)

2) the begetting of children

In charge of them there shall be the women-inspectors whom we have

chosen, – more or fewer of them, according to the number and times of
their appointments, decided by the officials; and they shall meet every

25 Cf. also VI 780a1–7 (in relationship with the obligation made to married couples to participate
in public common meals): „Whoever proposes to publish laws for States, regulating the conduct of
the citizens in State affairs and public matters, and deems that there is no need to make laws for their
private conduct, even in necessary matters, but that everyone should be allowed to spend his day just as
he pleases, instead of its being compulsory for everything, public and private, to be done by a regular
rule, and supposes that, if he leaves private conduct unregulated by law, the citizens will still consent
to regulate their public and civil life by law – this man is wrong in his proposal.“

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day at the temple of Eileithyia, for a third of an hour, or more; and

at their meetings they shall report to one another any case they may
have noticed where any man or woman of the procreative age is devo-
ting his attention to other things instead of to the rules ordained at the
marriage sacrifices and ceremonies. (784b) The period of procreation
and supervision shall be ten years and no longer, whenever there is an
abundant issue of offspring; but in case any are without issue to the
end of this period, they shall take counsel in common to decide what
terms are advantageous for both parties, in conjunction with their kind-
red and the women-officials, and be divorced. If any dispute arises as
to what is fitting and advantageous for each party, they shall choose
ten of the Law-wardens, (784c) and abide by the regulations they shall
permit or impose. The women-inspectors shall enter the houses of the
young people, and, partly by threats, partly by admonition, stop them
from their sin and folly: if they cannot do so, they shall go and report
the case to the Law-wardens, and they shall prevent them. If they also
prove unable, they shall inform the State Council, posting up a sworn
statement that they are ,verily unable to reform So-and-so.‘ The man
that is thus posted up, – (784d) if he fails to defeat those who have thus
posted him in the law-courts, – shall suffer the following disqualifica-
tions. (VI 784a1–d2)26

Reading these texts and similar ones is likely to provoke either fear or laughter
– most probably both. Laughter was expected by Plato to be a reaction to his
proposals in the Republic, and it also has a role to play in the Laws, as we shall
see in a moment.27 And whereas our fear is certainly marked by our experience
of modern totalitarianisms and their eugenic policies, it is also a fact that Plato’s
regulations were already repellent to Aristotle, who in Book II of his Politics criti-
cized them by stressing that the conception of unity they presupposed suppressed
the very essence of the city, namely multiplicity (Popper 1945; cf. Arist. Pol. II 2,
1261a14–30, and 5, 1263b29–35).

26 On eugenics, cf. also VI 772e7–773e4.

27 Laughter in the Republic: V 452a7–c2 (concerning the proposal of having naked women exercising
gymnastics in common with men).

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Presenting things in this way is far from wrong. On the other hand, it does
not do justice to a number of features present in Platonic legislation. And it is
on some of these features I would like to concentrate in the rest of this paper, in
part because they are (I think) interesting, and in part because they are somewhat
overlooked in the current literature.28
We have already seen that the idea that there is no private life in the Laws con-
f licts at some level with the move (conceptualized as such) to grant citizens some
kind of property or ownership, in deference to their humanity. Thus from Plato’s
point of view it is important from the start that the family be a foundational ele-
ment of the city and its most basic institution, even if, for that very reason, this
institution has to be handled by the city with the utmost care and attention. The
impact of this move is felt on three different levels.
First, Plato provides us with a number of indications of what an individual
life looks like in Magnesia. I have seen a wonderful young boy or girl in one of
those publicly organized feasts: what next (cf. VI 772d5–e4)? I want to irrigate
my land, how should I proceed (cf. VIII 844a1–d2)?; my cousin has been mur-
dered, I should hasten to take the relevant steps in order that his murderer be
exiled lest my cousin’s phantom shows up at my door and pursues me (see in-
fra, note 38); etc. All these indications are of foundational value for historians of
ancient Greece, but also for an appreciation of Plato’s handling of his historical
heritage, which might be, depending on the cases, either more conservative or
more progressive than we would expect: more conservative, because, contrary to
the general spirit of the Republic, a great number of institutions of the „second“
city ref lect or adapt current (mostly Athenian) practices; and more progressive,
because, perhaps equally against expectation, there are important areas, such as
education and penal justice, where Plato’s proposed reforms are not only for the

28 What I shall not do here is to engage in an anti-popperian defense of Plato, first because this has
been done and well done more than once (see most recently Neschke 2012 with further literature),
second because it seems to me that the interesting question is not to decide whether Plato’s city supp-
resses individual liberty or relies on a truer concept of liberty, but to recognize that these two readings
equally ref lect a crucial aspect of Plato’s thought – which is also a problem, of course. On liberty in
Plato, see Laks 2007c.

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worse, but also for the better. The reader may be referred here to a number of
studies that deal extensively with the historical background of the Laws.29
A second level at which the presence of the family is felt in the Laws is of a more
internal nature and will detain me a bit more. The point here is that in spite of
the extended control that the city has over life in general and over private (i. e.
family) life in particular, family also limits the city’s power over its affairs: that is,
certain aspects of „private life“ simply resist the city’s control, forcing the legis-
lator to make concessions even beyond the „initial“ concession of land-tenure.
Admittedly, there are not many such cases in the Laws, and it is significant that
the most prominent concession of this type is to be found in the public rather
than in the private sphere. The situation is the following: the Athenian legisla-
tor agrees with the „ancient saying“ according to which friendship is founded
on „equality“ (VI 757a5 f.);30 but equality has two different meanings. There is,
first, „arithmetical“ equality, which implies that every citizen is worth the same
as any other, and then there is the „truer and better“ equality (757b5 f.), namely
the „geometrical“ one (cf. Grg. 508a4–8), which implies that those who are un-
equal (in some respect) receive an unequal share of power. Now to understand
that geometrical equality is a form of equality, and that it is, moreover, the more
genuine one, is not an easy task. It requires an education that not every citizen
is going to possess. In order to avoid the result that its enforcement should sim-
ply reproduce, at a higher level, the very disagreement which it was meant to
prevent, the Athenian proposes to grant some (limited) space to the lesser form
of equality (i. e. the arithmetical one) – not much, but enough to leave the mass
of the citizenry content; the way to do this will be to allow some offices to be
distributed by lot.
One can discover a corresponding situation within the private sphere, although
both its identification and its interpretation are less obvious, in part because the
concession remains implicit (whereas it is presented as a concession in the case
of „equality“), in part because it involves a number of intricate juridical details.
The point is here that some of the principles that guide the handling of „pri-

29 Morrow’s book (2 1993), whose subtitle is „A Historical Interpretation of the Laws“, is fundamental
in this respect. For Plato’s legislation on education and justice as based on progressive principles, see
Saunders 1991a.
30 This adage is also of Pythagorean origin, cf. Diogenes Laertius VIII 10. For further references,
see Schöpsdau 2003, 389.

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vate“ suits tend to go against the dialogue’s official penal philosophy.31 In the
case of certain crimes, such as certain types of homicide, the family of the victim
stands under the obligation to get compensation for the crime, lest they themsel-
ves incur the anger of the dead person.32 And since the anger of the dead person
amounts to a simple desire for revenge, taking it into account means disregarding
the principle that punishment should not look towards the past, aiming to ob-
tain compensation for the victim, but should on the contrary look to the future,
being conceived as an educative process aimed at improving the criminal’s soul
(cf. Saunders 1991a, 139 ff. (and passim) and on law molding and improving the
character Morrow 2 1993, 552).
This example shows that and in what sense there is some room in the Laws for
the preservation of a private sphere. Admittedly, this preservation does not occur
where we would have expected or wished it to occur – rather the contrary, for in
this case family values imply a regression to archaic ideas and practices, and that
precisely in the one field – penal legislation – where Plato’s ideas may be classified
as „progressive“.33 Further, and more importantly from a philosophical point of
view, neither is it an open concession, as was the policy to assign certain offices by
lot. Instead we appear to be dealing here with a survival or vestige of past ways
of doing things.34 This should not really cause surprise. For, as I have already
mentioned, one important feature of the Laws is that it accomodates historical

31 This has been shown in a fine article by Saunders 1991b. Private suits are what is refered to under
the heading „private justice“ in Morrow’s 2 1993 index. This is not justice exercised by the members of
the family as opposed to justice exercised by courts (cf. Aeschylus’ Oresteia), but rather concerns harm
done to an individual, as opposed to the community or city (cf. Morrow 1960, 264). The different
levels of juridiction competent for those cases (there are three of them) may be called „private courts“
(see Morrow 2 1993, 256, n. 27). For the distinction between private wrongs and public wrongs, see
Lg. VI 767b4–c2, 767e9–768b3 (cf. also Rep. IV 442d).
32 Cf. Saunders 1991a, 119: „As in Athens, homicide law [in Magnesia] is firmly based on the family:
it is the duty of a relative of the dead person to undertake the prosecution of the killer; and Plato is
insistent that a relative in dereliction of his duty can expect the anger of the dead to arrive at his own
door (866b; 871b), and himself to become liable to prosecution“.
33 On Plato’s „medical penology“, cf. Saunders 1991a, 169 ff.
34 On such survivals in the Laws, cf. Gernet 1917.

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 A L

realities; and, as Marx would have insisted, no one can ever jump over his own
historical horizon.35
By contrast with the two former levels, the third one I wish to pinpoint implies
neither concession nor survival. Here private matters become rather a tool in the
legislator’s hands. Given the overall treatment of private matters in the Laws, this
of course is cause for surprise.
Two cases may be distinguished, the second by far the more interesting. In
the first, the legislator simply makes use of a feature of private life in spite of the
fact that, taken in itself, it escapes his control. In other words, he simply makes
the best of a bad situation. By contrast, in the second case, a feature of private
life downright lends itself to fostering the legislative project – as if some kind of
objective collaboration were taking place between family structure and legislative
expertise. Here are the two cases.

9.3.1 Household as a hiding place

At the end of the long passage regulating sexual relationships, the Athenian sket-
ches two possible laws (VIII 840c11–841c2). The first law, which would be the
best, would require young citizens to

live chaste and celibate lives without sexual intercourse until they arrive
at the age for breeding; and when they reach this age [to] pair off, as
instinct moves them, male with female and female with male; and the-
reafter [840e] [to] live in a way that is holy and just, remaining constant
to their first contracts of love. (VIII 840d5–e1)

But given that „,lawless Love‘ (as it is called)“ is likely to exercise its formidable
power, a second law must be devised which will first foster the practice of sports
and second

regard hiding (lanthanein) in such actions as honorable – sanctioned

both by custom and by unwritten law; and not hiding (mê lanthanein) –

35 It would be interesting to look from this angle at what Plato has to say about the status of women (cf.
Saunders 1995). Aristotle too would present interesting examples of a tension between the implications
of conceptual analysis and historically explainable prejudices.

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 P   P’ L 

yet not the entire avoidance of such actions – as dishonorable. Thus we

shall have a second standard of what is honorable and shameful esta-
blished by law and possessing a second degree of rectitude. (841b2–6)

In other terms, „lawless sex“ (whether this refer to homosexual relationships or

other forms of sexual „deviance“) should be protected by „privacy“ (whether pri-
vacy in this case is provided by households or not). Hiding (lanthanein) is a way
of suppressing, whenever suppressing is not possible (cf. Demosthenes, Against
Aristogiton, 88 f.: „to shut the eyes“).36 Not the best solution for the legislator,
but a useful one nevertheless.

9.3.2 Objective collaboration: the form of the law

Much more refined and deeper is the second type of situation. In order to un-
derstand its importance, it is necessary to realize that one crucial feature of the
work entitled the Laws is that it aims both at establishing the „rule of law“ and
at developing a critique of law. There is no contradiction there, as soon as we
see that Plato considers law under two different aspects – content and form. Law
should rule, as far as its content is concerned, because it is essentially what reason
commands; but law should be abolished as far as its form is concerned, because,
according to the common understanding (which is also Plato’s understanding),
law is an order accompanied by a threat of penalty, and thus a form of violent,
and to that extent un-political, source of motivation37 – whence the idea that
„preludes“, and not laws, are the fundamental political factor, not to mention
the many tensions and complex dialectic that result from this double perpec-
tive.38 But of interest here is the way that private life, though usually a source of
resistance to innovations in law’s content, is a positive resource for innovations
in form.

36 Interestingly, Plato does not here use the root idio-, contrary to what is suggested by Bury’s trans-
lation (which uses the pair privacy/no privacy for lanthanein/mê lanthanein).
37 Law as violent threatening order: Lg. IV 722b4–c1; cf. 722e7–723a2.
38 At IV 722e1–7, the Athenian presents the „preludes“ as the great innovation of the Laws. I have
analysed this conceptual constellation in Laks 2005; cf. also Laks 2000, 285–290.

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 A L

The passage that bears on this most directly is found at the beginning of Book
VII, just after „the children are born“ (which are the first words of the book).
The legislator remarks that he now faces a dilemma: these children must be nu-
tured, but on this matter it is as impossible for him to legislate as it is for him to
keep silent.39 The very multiplicity and frequency of the problems which must be
adressed makes law seem inappropriate, and that in two respects; first, it would be
incapable of producing the many series of detailed prescriptions that particular
situations require, and second, it would be incapable of ensuring that such pre-
scriptions are adhered to by the relevant individuals, namely mothers and nurses
(788b4–6). For example, experience shows that living organisms must compen-
sate for the perturbations resulting from rapid growth: absorption of food must
be compensated for by an equivalent expenditure of energy in the form of physi-
cal exercise (cf. Cra. 414a8–b2; etymology of thallein). Now growth begins even
before birth and progresses in the first five years at a rate far greater than that of
later developmental stages;40 even fetuses should exercise, because they absorb
so much food. Should a law be promulgated, then, directing that fetuses and
children up to three years shall be submitted to continuous movement, first by
their mothers, during gestation, and then by their nurses (790c7 f.), and prescri-
bing penalties for infringement (as seems required by the very nature of law; VII
789e4; cf. 790a1 f.)? The very idea of such a law has the air of the ridiculous about
it (790a5); moreover it would be extremely divisive, in that while mothers and
nurses, to whom such laws are actually addressed, would not „obey“ (peithestai:
790a6),41 the (male) citizens, conscious that such prescriptions are fundamen-
tal for the success of the larger enterprise, would side with the legislator. This
„domestic“ disagreement is the social manifestation of the legislative dilemma.
While the women’s reaction stresses the difficulty of legislating on this topic, that
of responsible minds testifies to the impossibility of keeping silent: left to itself,
the so-called private sphere (idia kai kat’oikias: 788b2) would produce a citizenry

39 There are four references to this dilemma: VII 788a3 f.; 788c1 f.; 793b2 f.; and 822e2–4. The last,
which comes at the end of Book VII, widens the perspective. The dilemma is also the structuring
principle of the confrontation between men and women, cf. infra.
40 According to a common view, between the ages of five and twenty five a man only doubles his size
(cf. Stein 1966, 49).
41 Given that the term in Greek means both „obey“ and „be persuaded“, it also forecasts the only
possible justification of the women’s conduct (see below).

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that was heterogeneous in character, thereby undermining the whole legislative

project. One might expect that the advantage would lie with the fathers, who are
defending the public interest, by contrast with the mothers and nurses, whose
recriminations assert an interest that is essentially personal, particular, and pri-
vate: the fathers’ argument (after all) is correct; it asserts and defends the values
of the city; moreover the fathers are free, and as such are opposed to the servile
minds of the nurses (who are associated with the mothers).
As a matter of fact the legislator does decide to follow the path of „legisla-
tion“ (790b8); but the advantage won by the law is only apparent. For in one
respect at least, it is the reaction of the female component of the household that
is correct: what their reaction suggests (though they themselves do not necessa-
rily understand this) is that „legislation“ on these matters cannot take the form
of law. The solution to the embarrassment that results from the impossibility
of both promulgating such a law and refraining from promulgating it is provi-
ded by the introduction of a type of discourse that, while akin to law, does not
coincide with it. „Unwritten law“ is its traditional name. Transmitted from one
generation to the next, ancestral customs are marked by neither the violence nor
the rigidity characteristic of written legal prescriptions. In fact, being unwritten,
they „speak“, better than any law engraved in stone could do.42
Now, the form of „unwritten laws“ is relevant not only for child-rearing, but
for legislation in general. This is confirmed for example by the case of matrimo-
nial laws. Unwritten law, contrary to „explicit“ law43 , imposes itself by means of
„praise“ (epainos) and „reproach“ (oneidos). These are the typical resources (even if
there are other, both more and less rational) of the legislative „preludes“, which,
contrary to the law, rely on persuasion, and not on constraint (773d6). How this
persuasion works, whether all of it is rhetorical, and thus irrational, or some of it
can be (and should be) rational in nature, is the matter of an interesting debate,
which need not detain us here.44 The relevant and extremely striking point, es-
pecially in a work so fundamentally preoccupied with reducing its own sphere of

42 Obviously, endorsing the traditional notion of unwritten law need not imply adopting their tradi-
tional content (although it does not exclude it either).
43 This I take to be the meaning of dia logou: 773c3.
44 For the debate about the nature of persuasion in the Laws cf. Bobonich 1991; Brisson 2000; Laks
2007b.

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 A L

inf luence, is that „private life“, taken in one of its most private aspects – children’s
„pre-school“ education – offers a paradigm for a new form of legislation.

9.4 Conclusion
The Laws are usually taken, from a modern perspective, and even from some an-
cient ones (Aristotle, as we have seen, is a case in point), as launching a rather
wild attack on private life. This is wholly justified, and can be easily exemplified
in many more passages than those I have quoted or referred to (e. g. X 909d7–
910d: prohibition of private religious practices; XI 923a–b12: recommandations
for writing one’s testament; XII 950d4–e2: interdiction to travel abroad). Ne-
vertheless I have insisted on the positive role that some features of private life –
and especially one of them – play for „legislative“ practice, understood in a Pla-
tonic sense. And this is, I think, an interesting angle. But it is not the only angle
from which the problem of „private life“ in the Laws – and in Plato in general
– can be approached. And I would like to point, by way of a conclusion, to two
directions from which the problematic could and should also be approached –
and the analysis correspondingly complexified.
First, one should not forget that the Laws, in subordinating the individual to
the aims of the community, represents an important moment in a more general
process that has led to a restriction of familial privileges in the name of the pu-
blic interest. In Plato’s time, the main steps in matter of justice had already been
taken, in spite of the survivals that can be spotted (as we have seen above) even
in his own work. But the idea that education was the responsibility of the city,
rather than of the family, was yet to come. In the Laches 179d Laches and Me-
lesias complain that their own fathers „neglected [their] education, while there
were busy with alien business“ (the reference is, as the context shows, to political
affairs). This is a clear indication that education was commonly thought of as a
„private“ matter.45 By the time Aristotle was writing Book VIII of his Politics, the
situation had not evolved:
45 Cf. Nagle 2006, 221: „The principal education of the vast majority of Greeks – men, women,
and children, elite and non-elite, rich and poor – was incidental. It was acquired largely by actual
involvement in the institutions and social, cultural, military and political activities of everyday polis
life; hence, the often-repeated endoxic assertion in the texts that the laws and the institutions of the
state teach“ (with further references).

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And since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education
should be one and the same for all, and its care public (koinên) and not
private (kai mê kat’idian), not as at present, when everyone looks after
his own children separately and give them separate instruction of the
sort he thinks best. The training in things which are of common inte-
rest should be made the same for all. (Pol. VIII 1, 1337a21–27; trans.
Jowett/Barnes)

In this respect as in many others, Aristotle, who had leveled a severe criticism of
Plato’s cities in Book II of his Politics on the ground that he did not leave any space
to the individual, was deeply indebted to the Laws, one of the most convincing
and fruitful insights of which is that it is the city, and not the individual, which
must take in charge the education of children through the development of an
obligatory schooling system.46
A second – and conceptually related – point is that there are, in Plato, two
ways of construing „privacy“, if privacy refers to „what is mine“ or „what be-
longs to me“ – one negative, one positive. In this essay, I have focused on the
term idios, which usually refers to the „private“ in a negative sense – to what has
to do with private interests, egoism, and eventually the irrational drive of plea-
sure and lust. In one of the most famous passages of the Laws, which is commonly
seen (rightly, I think) to put an end to the dream of the philosopher-king,47 Plato
coins a wonderful word in order to refer the principle of self-centered action (in
a certain sense of the term „self“): idiopragia, „acting in one’s own interests“ (Lg.
IX 875b7).48 Allowing for „private allotment“ and „household“ is a way to pay lip

46 Hence the importance of the idea of a „social pedadogy“ (cf. Natorp 1922, 7: „Der Mensch bil-
det sich zum Mensch nur in menschlicher Gemeinschaft. Umgekehrt besteht und entwickelt sich eine
menschliche Gemeinschaft allein durch die menschliche Bildung ihrer Glieder. Sie bedeutet im höchs-
ten Sinn Gemeinschaft des wesentlichen geistigen Inhalts des Daseins: Gemeinschaft der Erkenntnis,
des Wollens, selbst des künstlerischen Empfindens [...] Diese notwendige Wechselbeziehung der Be-
griffe Bildung und Gemeinschaft in Erinnerung zu halten, soll der Ausdruck ‚Sozialpädagogik‘ uns
dienen“). On the history of education in Antiquity, see Marrou 1948.
47 For a discussion of this point, cf. Laks 2012, 29 ff.
48 The term is coupled with pleonexia. Later uses of this or related words registered in the Liddell-
Scott-Jones (in the Ps.-Aristotelician Problemata, Philodemus, Diodorus of Sicily, etc.) probably derive
from this passage (see, e. g., Diodorus 18. 52, pros idiopragian hormomenos: setting on „on a private
venture“). There is an interesting entry in Hesychius: idiopragei = ta idia prassei, hêsuchazei (= to mind

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 A L

service to this kind of motivation, which is really a form of „selfishness“ that leads
to disaster when joined to and abetted by power – monarchic or otherwise.49 On
the other hand, there is my true self. This true self is, in the spirit of the Alcibia-
des, my soul, as indicated by the Athenian at the beginning of the general prelude
to his legislation – the only prelude of the laws which is not followed by a law,
because if it was persuasive, no further law would be necessary (V 726a1–729b1).
What matters here is the most precious of my belongings (to hautou ktêma). Si-
gnificantly, Plato avoids referring to this true self as something „private“, if by
„private“ it is meant what is covered by the term idion. On the other hand, this
self is explicitly and emphatically described as what is most „proper“ to me (pan-
tôn gar tôn hautou ktêmatôn meta theous psuchê theiotaton, oikeiotaton on: 726a2 f.).50
What we are witnessing here is a specifically Platonic process of specializing the
meaning and application of the two adjectives oikeios and idios. Oikeios, which
etymologically refers to the household (oikos), commonly applies not only to the
individual himself, but to his family and relatives. In a kind of inverted extension
of the „household“ terminology (an extension „within“, as opposed to an exten-
sion „outside“), Plato, at the beginning of Book V, uses oikeios to refer to what
„really“ belongs to me – my „innermost“ self. This use stands in an obvious and
strong contrast with that of idios in the idiopragia passage in Book IX. Indeed, the
coining of idiopragia at this crucial juncture in the Laws must deliberately echo
another of Plato’s coining, that of the term oikeiopragia at Rep. IV 434c8 (also ha-
pax in the Platonic corpus), where it refers to the three Platonic kinds of citizen
„doing their own [task] (ta hautou prattontos) in the city“. More generally, when it
does not simply refer to „individual“ life in the descriptive and neutral sense we
spotted above, idios in Plato tends to have negative connotations. It is true that,

one’s own business). This is definitely not the regular Platonic sense of idios, but points exactly to the
problem I am drawing attention to in the present paragraph (i. e. the fact that there in fact are two
Platonic selves).
49 See the passage quoted in the previous note (for monarchic power); cf., on a lesser level, VI 763a:
agronoms should not have anyone attending their personal needs (epi ta idia), but only for the purpose
of the city (eis ta dêmosia).
50 „Of all a man’s own (hautou) belongings, the most divine is his soul, since it is most his own (oikei-
otaton)“. Bury follows England in suppressing the words „after the gods“. Would the gods, if we keep
the transmitted reading, be necessarily thought of as one of my own belongings? The sentence is open
to a weaker reading. Alternatively, the paradox could be precisely Plato’s point. Schöpsdau 2003 does
not comment on this problem.

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 P   P’ L 

in the very passage of Book IX where idiopragia appears, idios also appears, in one
sentence at least, to refer to the „true self“:

No man’s nature is naturally able both to perceive what is of benefit

to the civic life (eis politeian) of men and, perceiving it, to be alike able
and willing to practice what is best. For, in the first place, it is difficult
to perceive that a true civic art (politikê technê) necessarily cares for the
public, not the private interest (ou to idion alla to koinon), – for the public
(to koinon) interest bind States together, whereas the private (to idion)
interest rends them asunder, – and to perceive also that it benefits both
public and private interests alike (tô koinô te kai idiô, toin amphoin) when
the public interest (to koinon), rather than the private (to idion), is well
enacted. (IX 875a2–b1; my italics)

But the italicized sentence in fact confirms, rather than contradicts, the tendency
just mentioned. Plato’s point here is rhetorical. Because of the binary opposition
on which the construction of his sentence relies, his denial of the traditional op-
position between idios and koinos would have been much less effective, had he
used the „proper“ term, oikeios, instead of the „improper“ one, namely idios. But
rhetorical efficiency should not conceal the fact that the „private interest“ fos-
tered by the public interest cannot coincide with the private interest I am after
when I disregard the public one. Another way to make this point is to say that the
individual-cum-healthy-soul is neither a private individual nor a public person,
but stands above and beyond the many layers of the distinction between private
and public.51 The Platonic citizen, because he is his true self, is apt to act vir-
tuously in both the private and the public sphere.52 There is certainly something
to be said in favor of this conception, even if, no less certainly, the manner in
which Plato implements it in his Laws remains highly problematic.53

51 The fact that the article is not repeated before idioi, in the turn tô koinô te kai idiô, toin amphoin, may
be interpreted as ref lecting the inseparability of the two notions.
52 Murgier’s analysis of the uses of oikeios in the Republic (forthcoming) fully confirms this. Murgier
2013 also shows that Plato’s specific version of what oikeion is prepares the way for the Stoic version of
oikeiosis.
53 An earlier version of the present paper was presented in November 2012 at the Ancient Philo-
sophy Workshop of the University of Chicago (Gabriel Lear) and at the Notre Dame Workshop in
Ancient Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame (Sean Kelsey). During these two lively sessions,

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 A L

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I received from my audience many observations which I have taken into account. My special thanks
to two doctoral students at Chicago: John Ellison, who presented the paper and commented on it,
and Dhananjay Jagannathan, for his critical observations about laughter at the beginning of Laws VII;
many thanks also to Sean Kelsey, who revised the English of my final text and suggested a number of
clarifications.

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