Plotinus' Theory of Matter and Evil Critically Analyzed

07_Opsomer_7.
QXD 28-04-2008 10:19 Pagina 165
Jan Opsomer1
Some Problems with Plotinus’ Theory

of Matter/Evil. An Ancient Debate Continued
In Ennead I,8 [51] Plotinus famously claims that matter, more precisely inferior
matter (which is to be distinguished from intelligible matter, but also from «rela-
tive» or «designated» matter), is evil itself. Evil can be predicated of it, and evil
is what it causes in other things. This view is attacked by Proclus in his treatise
De malorum subsistentia (= DMS)2. I have examined Proclus’ arguments in more
detail elsewhere and refer the reader to my previous discussion of these issues
for references to the relevant texts3. What I want to do here is to address some
issues that have been brought up in attempts to bolster Plotinus’ position against
Proclus’ criticism.
The attractiveness of Proclus’ arguments against Plotinus resides in the fact
that both philosophers belong to the same school of thought and are committed
to roughly the same metaphysical assumptions. When Proclus refutes Plotinus,
or thinks he does, Plotinus is held to be proven wrong on his own premises. In
order to give a fair assessment of the debate we should examine whether indeed
Plotinus is committed to principles that undermine his own views on matter and
evil. A good deal of the arguments are exegetical in nature. They pertain to the
question whether the views held are in agreement with the letter of the Platonic
texts. A related but not identical question is which author is closer to Plato’s spir-
it. Interesting as these questions may be, I will pay no attention to them here4.
1 I thank David Schweikard for checking the English.

2 In the relevant section of DMS Proclus does not mention Plotinus by name, but there can be no doubt
that he is Proclus’ opponent. Cf. J. OPSOMER / C. STEEL, Proclus. On the Existence of Evils, Duckworth, Lon-
don / Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2003, pp. 15-16. DMS is cited according to the following edition:
PROCLI DIADOCHI Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo). Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeka vertente et
Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta, ed. H. Boese, de Gruyter, Berolini 1960
(«Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie», 1).
3 J. OPSOMER, Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter (De mal. subs. 30-7), «Phronesis», 46 (2001), pp. 154-
188.
4 Exegetical questions are dealt with in J.F. PHILLIPS, Platonists on the Origin of Evil, in H. TARRANT
«Quaestio», 7 (2007), 165-189 • 10.1484/J.QUAESTIO.1.100153

07_Opsomer_7.QXD 28-04-2008 10:19 Pagina 166
166 Jan Opsomer
Instead I address the problem from within the Neoplatonic system and examine
which position best fits the general metaphysical principles of Neoplatonism.
Proclus criticises Plotinus for making the following claims:

(1) that matter is evil;
(1*) that matter is the ultimate evil;
(2) that matter causes all secondary evils, i.e. evils in bodies and souls.
Proclus seems to ignore the subtleties of Plotinus’ argument by which the lat-
ter avoids the view that matter is a sufficient condition for the evil of the soul5. I
shall come back to that thorny issue later, and propose to start with (1) and (1*).
Plotinus argues that as the last stage of the emanation6 proceeding from the Good
(i.e. from the One) matter must be evil7. Proclus objects. He does not only reject
the view that matter is primary evil, but even denies that it is evil in any sense.
At the core of Plotinus’ argument is the idea that the last stage of the emana-
tion proceeding from the One contains no goodness at all. He presents his main
argument succinctly in Enn. I,8 [51] 7,16-23:
«One can grasp the necessity of evil in this way too. Since not only the Good exists,
there must be the last end to the process of going out past it, or if one prefers to put it
like this, going down or going away: and this last, after which nothing else can come
into being, is evil. Now it is necessary that what comes after the First should exist, and
therefore that the Last should exist; and this is matter, which possesses nothing at all
of the Good. And in this way too evil is necessary»8.
/ D. BALTZLY (eds.), Reading Plato in Antiquity, Duckworth, London 2006, pp. 61-72. See also PLOTIN,
Traité 51. I, 8. Introduction, traduction, commentaires et notes par D. O’Meara, Cerf, Paris 1999 («Les
Écrits de Plotin»), p. 33 and OPSOMER, Proclus vs Plotinus cit., pp. 166-167, 169, 179-180, and passim.
5 See OPSOMER, Proclus vs Plotinus cit., pp. 157-158 for a brief summary of Plotinus’ position, and
p. 169 for Proclus’ simplification of Plotinus’ causal explanation. For more extensive analyses of Plotinus’
views, see esp. D. O’BRIEN, Plotinus on Evil. A Study of Matter and the Soul in Plotinus’ Conception of
Human Evil, in P.-M. SCHUHL (éd.), Le néoplatonisme. Royaumont 9-13 juin 1969, Centre National de
la Recherche Scientifique, Paris 1971 («Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique. Sciences humaines», 535), pp. 113-146; ID., Plotinus on the Origin of Matter. An exercise in
the interpretation of the Enneads, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1991 («Elenchos», 22); ID., La matière chez Plotin:
son origine, sa nature, «Phronesis», 44 (1999), pp. 45-71; D.J. O’MEARA, Das Böse bei Plotin (Enn. I,8), in
T. KOBUSCH / B. MOJSISCH (Hrsg.), Platon in der abendländischen Geistesgeschichte. Neue Forschungen zum
Platonismus, Wissenschaftlichte Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1997, pp. 33-47; O’MEARA, Traité 51 cit.
6 I use the words «emanation» and «derivation» without any difference in meaning intended.
7 Cf. I,8 [51] 7,19-20: to; e[scaton, kai; meq’ o} oujk h\n e[ti genevsqai oJtiou'n, tou'to ei\nai to; kakovn. Cf.
C. HORN, Plotin über Sein, Zahl und Einheit. Eine Studie zu den systematischen Grundlagen der Ennea-
den, Teubner, Stuttgart-Leipzig 1995 («Beiträge zur Altertumskunde», 62), p. 171: «[S]ie bildet das let-
ztmögliche, nicht weiter unterbietbare Produkt der gesamten Derivation».
8 All translations from Plotinus are A.H. ARMSTRONG’s (LCL). The Greek is cited from the editio mi-
nor: PLOTINI Opera, ed. P. HENRY / H.-R. SCHWYZER, 3 vols, e typographeo Clarendoniano, Oxonii 1964-
1982 («Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis») [= H-S2], also taking into account later emen-
Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 167
This argument has been examined in detail by D. O’Meara9. In his careful re-
construction of this argument he breaks it down into eleven steps10. I shall base
my own discussion on his analysis and use his numbering of the different prem-
ises. It will not be possible, given the constraints of space, to do justice to all as-
pects of O’Meara’s interpretation. O’Meara is obviously sympathetic to Plotinus,
but does not appear as his unconditional advocate. While fully realising the force
of Proclus’ arguments11, O’Meara endeavours to make Plotinus’ position as
strong as possible in the face of Proclus’ criticisms, for he also recognises in-
sights of great value in Plotinus’ treatment of evil12. Despite O’Meara’s argu-
ments in support of Plotinus, I am still not convinced of the tenability of his po-
sition, as I shall explain below.
Essentially Plotinus’ argument states that everything good necessarily pro-
duces, but produces something less good than itself13; that a stage will be
reached where that which is produced has nothing of goodness any more; that
this stage is the last stage in the emanation series, and that it is evil. It is quite
evident that this argument is not cogent without additional premises. For in-
stance, it is not clear why there should be a last stage in the productive series
generated by the initial premises of the argument. In principle it would be pos-
sible for there to be an infinite series of stages comprising increasingly dimin-
ishing portions of goodness, without there ever being a level that contains no
goodness whatsoever14. However, Plotinus has good reasons to think that the em-
anation must consist of a limited number of stages. This is also the view of Pro-
dations. The line numbers, however, are those of the editio maior: PLOTINI Opera, ed. P. HENRY /
H.-R. SCHWYZER, 3 vols, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris-Leiden / L’Édition universelle, Bruxelles 1951-1973
[= H-S1].
9 D.J. O’MEARA, The Metaphysics of Evil in Plotinus: Problems and Solutions, in J.M. DILLON (ed.), Ag-
onistes. Essays in Honour of Denis O’Brien, Ashgate, Aldershot 2005, pp. 179-185. In this article O’Meara
further develops and refines ideas put forward in Das Böse cit., pp. 42-47.
10 O’MEARA, Metaphysics of Evil cit., p. 180.
11 See, e.g., O’MEARA, Das Böse cit., pp. 45-46.
12 Cf. O’MEARA, Das Böse cit., p. 46: «[V]orausgesetzt, daß es irgendwie sinnvoll ist, von transzen-
dentalen Werten zu reden, ist es auch sinnvoll, von der Einheit der differenziert ausgerichteten morali-
schen Bosheit zu reden, einer wirkungsvollen Wirklichkeit, welche eine vermittelte oder unmittelbare Er-
fahrung des Bösen einschließt. Die unmittelbare Erfahrung des absolut Bösen, von dem Plotin spricht, ist
strukturell vergleichbar mit der mystischen Erfahrung des Einen Guten und wirft ein interessantes Licht
auf Plotins Denken. Plotin ist offensichtlicht sehr von der Wirklichkeit und vom einheitlichen Wesen des
Bösen überzeugt und will dies nicht mit unserer Natur – als Seele – identifizieren».
13 O’Meara identifies the following principles as the initial premises of the argument: 1. The Good ex-
ists. 2. Whatever is good necessarily produces. 3. Whatever, as good, produces, produces something less
good than it. These premises are not derived from I,8 [51] 7,16-23 alone. See, e.g., V,4 [7] 1,23-34; V,1
[10] 6,30-39. See also PORPH., Sent. 13, ed. Lamberz.
14 For those keen on a mathematical analogon: one could think for instance of the infinite series 1,
1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16... [1/2n].

168 Jan Opsomer
clus and the other Neoplatonists. Let us therefore grant that the series is finite
and accept the identification of its last member with matter. Even then it does
not follow that the last member of the series is evil. For the premise that anything
which still has some portion of goodness must produce entails that the last mem-
ber of the series – if there is indeed a last member – has no residual goodness
left, not that the series ends with evil. It should be emphasised that according to
both Plotinus and Proclus a decrease in perfection is not in itself evil, for other-
wise the fact that there is something besides the Good itself would already be
evil. But the very existence of Intellect, Soul, or the world is not evil. Quite the
contrary, these realities are all good15. Plotinus, however, does not equate evil
with dwindling goodness, but with complete absence of goodness. We have grant-
ed that it is possible for the derivation series to end with a stage characterised
by complete absence of goodness, but the question is whether that stage is there-
by evil16.
Up to step 9 of O’Meara’s reconstruction, Plotinus’ argument is unproblem-
atic from a Neoplatonic perspective. Plotinus comes to the conclusion that the
last member of the series, matter, has nothing of goodness. But that is just an in-
termediate, not the final conclusion of the argument. Step 10 states that matter
is evil and the argument ends with the conclusion that evil necessarily17 exists
(step 11). Steps 1 through 9 merely refer to goodness and absence of goodness,
but with step 10, supposedly a conclusion from the previous steps, an entirely
new quality is introduced: evil. Why would one accept that absence of goodness
is evil and that its complete absence equals absolute evil?
Proclus, for one, rejects that conclusion: matter as the last stage of the ema-
nation is not evil. But it is not good either18:
«If we consider matter itself from this perspective, we will see that it is neither good
nor evil, but only necessary; in having been produced for the sake of good it is good,
but taken on its own it is not good; and as the lowest of beings it is evil – if indeed what
15 Cf. II,9 [33] 13,25-33. See O’BRIEN, Plotinus on Evil cit., pp. 128, 133; ID., Théodicée plotinienne,
théodicée gnostique, Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln 1993 («Philosophia antiqua», 57), pp. 31, 35; OPSOMER,
Proclus vs Plotinus cit., pp. 157, 176; C. STEEL, Proclus on the Existence of Evil, «Proceedings of the Boston
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy», 14 (1998), pp. 88-89.
16 Plotinus is not committed to the view that any partial absence of goodness is evil, for otherwise he
would have had to condemn the principle of derivation itself. But he appears to be committed nonethe-
less to the premise that complete absence of goodness equals absolute evil.
17 The «necessarily» of the final premise is tricky. If it is to signify metaphysical necessity, the
necessity should be already included in the first premise of the argument: «The Good necessarily ex-
ists» (O’Meara has the argument start with «the good exists»). Otherwise the conclusion of the argument
could only be that evil exists as a fact. Plotinus brings in necessity because he wants to explain Theaet.
176A5-8.
18 DMS 36,4.
is most remote from the good is evil – but taken on its own it is not evil, but necessary»
(DMS 34,1-6)19.
Matter is neither good nor evil. As an answer to Plotinus that will do. In this
passage Proclus argues that good and evil are not contradictories, but contraries
that do not exclude a middle. One could call matter good because it serves some
function in the whole. One could call it evil, if what is most remote from the good,
i.e. the lowest of beings, is considered to be evil. This last concession to Ploti-
nus’ viewpoint is superfluous and obfuscates the issue. It is counterbalanced,
however, by the preceding suggestion that matter is in a sense good20. Proclus’
own view is that matter is «necessary», by which he means that it is needed for
the fabrication of the world. The necessary is here considered as a category in-
termediate between good and evil. Proclus’ version of the derivation therefore
runs differently from Plotinus’:
«For the cause of all good things had to produce not only beings that are good and that
are good by themselves, but also the nature that is not absolutely and intrinsically
good, but that desires the good and through its desire – and, as it were, by itself – gives
other things the possibility of coming into being» (DMS 36,23-27).
The talk of a desire of matter is of course metaphorical21 and brings Proclus
19 All translations from DMS are mine and C. Steel’s (Proclus. On the Existence of Evils cit.).
20 Proclus’ reasons for saying this are the following: (1) whatever contributes to the good of the world
(or hence even to the good of the whole, which includes the higher realities, as it is good for the whole that
there is a material world; cf. DMS 5-6) is good (i.e. for something else). (1b) This is manifested in the fact
that matter is ready to receive form and even desires form. (2) Everything that is produced by the One (and
matter is even directly produced by it) is to some extent good (i.e. in itself). (1b) stands in direct contra-
diction to Plotinus’ view of matter according to which matter is not able truly to receive form, but resists
form. Regarding (2), Proclus’ view of the production of matter differs from that of Plotinus. According to
the former matter is produced by the One itself (DMS 35; in Tim., 1,384.30-385,17, ed. Diehl; cf.
OPSOMER, Proclus vs Plotinus cit., pp. 173-175), according to the latter by the lowest manifestation of soul
(V,2 [11] 1,18-21; III,9 [13] 3; cf. D. O’BRIEN, The Origin of Matter and the Origin of Evil in Plotinus’ Crit-
icism of the Gnostics, in R. BRAGUE / J.-F. COURTINE (éd.), Herméneutique et ontologie. Mélanges en hom-
mage à Pierre Aubenque, FRONIMOS ANHR, Puf, Paris 1990 («Épiméthée»), pp. 181-202; O’BRIEN, Plo-
tinus on the Origin cit.; O’BRIEN, Théodicée plotinienne cit., pp. 19-27; and O’MEARA, Metaphysics of Evil
cit., pp. 184-195, n. 12). Proclus’ thesis that matter is somehow good is problematic, as it is inconsistent
with the premises (a) that matter is the last stage of the emanation and that (b) whatever is good neces-
sarily produces. It would have been easier to stick with the statement that matter is not evil, yet, on the
other hand, the fact that matter is produced by the One entails that it is good. Proclus would need to qual-
ify (b) by saying that not everything that is good is good enough to produce another good. In order to do
justice to Proclus’ point of view we should here refer to Proclus’ triadic account of causation, according
to which a thing attains its goodness only by reverting upon its cause (Elem. theol., 31-32 Dodds). Matter,
however, lacks the power to revert all by itself (also according to Plotinus: II,5 [25] 1,30; III,4 [15] 1,6-
12). Therefore it cannot produce anything below itself. I shall not here go into Proclus’ own conception of
matter, including his characterisation of matter as «necessary».
21 Plotinus, too, seems to attribute a kind of will to matter, but is also alive to the metaphorical char-
170 Jan Opsomer
close to saying that matter has some residual form of goodness. Yet in the end
Proclus’ position is clear and firm: in itself matter is neither good nor evil. And
this, I think, is what Plotinus too should have said, not only on the basis of the
argument outlined above but also in order to remain true to his own basic meta-
physical intuitions. Any Platonist wanting to remain a metaphysical monist
should wisely refrain from making matter a principle of evil22.
Yet Plotinus has his reasons for equating matter and evil. He wants to explain
the occurrence of evil in the world and thinks he needs a principle of evil23. It
seems only natural that a metaphysical principle should itself exhibit the char-
acter it brings about in other things. Therefore the required principle should it-
self be evil. Such a principle should of course not belong to the first realities.
This rules out the One, Intellect, but also Soul as possible principles of evils.
Matter, however, seems to be a suitable candidate24.
Matter for Plotinus is not just in itself evil, it indeed causes evil in other
things, more precisely in bodies and souls (this point will need some qualifica-
tion). The latter evils are secondary evils, so Plotinus argues25, and since they
are only secondary, they must derive from something primarily evil. Proclus
acter of this way of speaking. Cf. VI,7 [38] 28, with P. HADOT, Plotin. Traité 38. VI, 7. Introduction, tra-
duction, commentaire et notes, Cerf, Paris 19992 («Les Écrits de Plotin»), p. 309, and F. FRONTEROTTA,
Plotin. Traités 38-41, Flammarion, Paris 2007, p. 153, n. 192. Yet it is remarkable that Plotinus’ language
becomes more poetic and suggestive where the ideas expressed are problematic, more precisely where he
attributes some kind of agency to matter. In III,6 [26] 7,13 (also 11,31-33; VI,7 [38] 28,3-8) he even at-
tributes a «yearning for substantial existence» (uJpostavsew" e[fesi") to matter (see also PORPH., Sent. 20,
ed. Lamberz, p. 11.5). For the connection between privation and yearning, see D. O’BRIEN, Matière et pri-
vation dans les Ennéades de Plotin, in A. MOTTE / J. DENOOZ (éd.), Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges offerts
à Christian Rutten, C.I.P.L., Liège 1996, pp. 211-220, in part. pp. 215-220; ID., La matière chez Plotin
cit., pp. 63-67. The yearning for true being (for form) could be seen as a residual glimmer of goodness in
matter, which, on the one hand, would bring Plotinus’ conception of matter closer to that of Proclus and,
on the other, give fuel to the latter’s argument according to which matter must be good in virtue of its re-
version to its cause (the good). It is, however, essential for Plotinus’ theory that the yearning of matter is
never fulfilled. Matter necessarily fails; it cannot revert. See O’BRIEN, La matière chez Plotin cit., pp. 67-
69. Plotinus may seem to be conducting a balancing act, but at least in this part of the exercise he man-
ages to stay on his tight-rope. The fact that matter has a desire for being does not prevent it from being
evil; it is rather because of its permanent failure to fulfil its desire that it is evil (see below).
22 I fully agree with the conclusion of O’BRIEN, Plotinus on Evil cit., p. 146: «[I]n his account of mat-
ter as intrinsically evil, Plotinus has left embedded in his philosophy a remnant of the old Platonic and
Aristotelian dualism of two eternal and independently existent principles. Proclus offers a clearer notion
of the total dependence of finite existence upon the One. He achieves this, by freeing matter from its role
as the primary evil and as cause of evil in the soul. From this broader point of view, we may like to say
that Plotinus’ conception of matter as evil, and as part cause of evil in the soul, is at odds with the gener-
al direction of his metaphysics. Taken more narrowly, however, Plotinus’ conception of matter and the
soul’s weakness as part causes of sin is skilful and consistent».
23 The denial that there is a single principle of evil belongs to the core of Proclus’ solution.
24 Body would have been another candidate. This agrees with the view attributed to Harpocration (ap.
IAMBLICHUS, De anima, ap. Stob. 1,375).

25 I,8 [51] 4.
roughly agrees on the extension of evils – if we leave matter out of the picture for
a moment. He too thinks that evils can be found in bodies and souls, but not in
anything higher than the human soul26. Yet he does not call bodily and psychic
evils secondary, since he accepts no primary evil upon which they would depend.
For Plotinus this is different: he describes matter as the primary evil and «evil
itself» and claims that other things become evil because they participate in this
principle of evil.
This is exactly how Proclus depicts Plotinus’ position: matter is the primary
evil, which means that it is completely evil, which can only be the case if it is evil
in its very essence. For anything not evil in its essence would fail to be entirely
evil27. This is how Proclus describes Plotinian matter:
«Evil is unmeasuredness, absolute unlimitedness, imperfection and indeterminate-

ness. Now all these things, are primarily in matter; they are not other beings besides
matter, but matter itself and what it is to be matter. Hence matter is the primary evil,
the nature of evil, and the last of all things» (DMS 30,11-14).
Because of its utterly bad characteristics matter is the ultimate evil. Hence
it can be the principle of evil. That means that it is the primary evil from which
secondary evils are derived. The relation obtaining between the Good and
beings is mirrored in the relation between matter and evils in other things. In
other words, matter is a cause of evil; and things that become evil do so because
they participate in the evil of matter, i.e. assimilate themselves to it:
«Evil [...] will be twofold, the one being as it were absolute evil and the primary evil
and nothing else but evil, the other being evil in something else and some evil, i.e.,
that which is evil because of that <first> evil, by participation in or assimilation to it.
And just as the good is the first, the absolute evil will be the last of beings. For it is
not possible for anything to be better than good nor worse than evil, since we say that
all other things are better or worse by virtue of these. But matter is the last of beings:
for all other things are disposed to act or to undergo, whereas matter does neither, as
it is deprived of both these potencies28. Hence the absolute and primary evil is mat-
ter» (DMS 30,16-24).
This captures quite well what Plotinus in Enn. I,8 [51] says about matter and
its role as a principle of evil. Plotinus repeatedly and emphatically says that mat-
26For more details see DMS 11-39.

27DMS 30,5-7.
28 This is a sure sign that Proclus does not describe matter according to his own conception, but dia-
lectically presents the view of his opponent(s). It is Plotinus, not Proclus, who holds that matter does not
even have passive dynamis.
172 Jan Opsomer
ter is not accidentally, but essentially evil29. He speaks of a substance or form of

evil, though not without hesitation30: he prefers the word «nature»31. This nature
is intrinsically32 and utterly evil, and constitutes the reason why other things be-
come evil. The latter are secondary evils33, and become evil through participa-
tion in, or assimilation to, matter34, the primary evil. Matter is even called the
«evil itself»35, in a way that is clearly reminiscent of how Platonists talk about
the Good and the Forms.
Something extraordinary is happening here. Plato introduced Forms to ex-
plain properties that characterise a plurality of things. A Form is a One-over-
Many, «F itself» by participation in which the many f’s are f. Plotinus here ap-
plies the same model to primary and secondary evil. The problem is that Forms
are supposed to be ontologically prior, i.e. have a higher ontological status. But
Plotinian matter has the lowest ontological status possible and is still supposed
to act as a formal cause of sorts. At the same time it functions as an efficient
cause. Inevitably this amounts to a form of dualism, as there are now active prin-
ciples at both ends of the scale36. A full-blooded dualism is avoided by making
matter a product of the derivation series37. Yet once matter is there (a logical pos-
29 To use the term «essential» in this context is of course not unproblematic, as supposedly only
Forms, qua determinate, can constitute essences. Matter, on the contrary, is pure indeterminacy. Still, if
this is what matter really is, it should be possible to call it its essence in some sense. Since Plotinus speaks
of matter as an «evil nature» and indirectly as «that what it is to be evil» (see the following footnotes and
n. 108) we can safely drop the quotation marks that are placed around «essential».
30 Cf. I,8 [51] 3,17 (oi|on oujsiva aujtou'); 3, 22 (ka]n mh; oujsiva ti" h/)\ ; 3, 38 (kakou' dh; oujsivan, ei[ ti" kai;
duvnatai kakou' oujsiva ei\nai); and for «form of non-being», see I,8 [51] 3,4-5 (oi|on ei\dov" ti tou' mh; o[nto"
o]n) and 5,16-17 (secondary evils as having specific forms contrasted with primary evil: ejkei'no o} oujde;n mevn
pw touvtwn, tau'ta de; oi|on ei[dh ejkeivnou prosqhvkai" eijdopoiouvmena). See, however, also 10,15-16 and
infra.
31 Cf. I,8 [51] 3,30-32: Kai; ou\n ei\naiv ti kai; a[peiron kaq’ auJto; kai; ajneivdeon au\ aujto; kai; ta; a[lla ta;
provsqen, a} th;n tou' kakou' ejcarakthvrize fuvsin. See also 6,33 (h{ti" ejsti; kakou' fuvsi"); 34; 10,4-5 (ouj mh;n
ou{tw", wJ" mhdemivan fuvsin e[cein).
32 I,8 [51] 10,13 (kakhv); 10,5-6 (tiv kwluvei kakh;n ei\nai); 10,13.
33 Cf. I,8 [51] 4,1-5 (kako;n a]n ouj prw'ton ei[h [ ...] deuvteron kakovn); 8,40-41 (kai; prwvtw" me;n to; skov-
to", to; de; ejskotismevnon deutevrw" wJsauvtw"); 11, 17-18 (oujk a[ra oujde; prwvtw" kakovn); 8,41-42 (kakiva dh;
a[gnoia ou\sa kai; ajmetriva peri; yuch;n deutevrw" kako;n kai; oujk aujtokakovn).
34 I,8 [51] 3,18-20 (ta; d’ a[lla, o{sa a]n aujtou' metalavbh/ kai; oJmoiwqh/,' kaka; me;n givnesqai oujc o{per de;
kaka; ei\nai); 3,33; 4,1 (kaqovson metevcei u{lh"); 4,21-22; 8, 43 (wJmoivwtai h] meteivlhfen).
35 Cf. I,8 [51] 3,39-40 (kako;n ei\nai prw'ton kai; kaq’ auJto; kakovn); 3,42 (secondary evil as oujk auj-
tokakovn); 13,9 (secondary evil as oujd’ aujtokakovn).

36 Cf. I,8 [51] 6,33-34: h{ti" ejsti; kakou' fuvsi" kai; ajrchv: ajrcai; ga;r a[mfw, hJ me;n kakw'n, hJ de; ajgaqw'n.
37 Cf. HORN, Plotin über Sein cit., p. 171: «Für Plotin kann die untere Materie deswegen kein allge-
meines Abschwächungsprinzip bilden, weil sie selbst schon das Resultat wachsender Abschwächung
darstellt. Die Materie ist innerhalb des Ableitungsdenken eine Folge, kein Prinzip». See also P. MERLAN,
Monismus und Dualismus bei einigen Platonikern, in K. FLASCH (Hrsg.), Parusia. Studien zur Philosophie
Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger, Minerva, Frank-
furt a. M. 1965, p. 149.
teriority), it becomes a principle of evil (cf. I,8 [51] 14,50-53). Although there is
just one ontologically first principle, matter assumes the role of a principle for
evils, i.e. it is the principle of a «series of evil», just as the One is the principle
of the series of the good. Whereas the good trickles downwards, evil radiates up-
wards into the emanation from the One.
Plotinus of course denies that matter is a form in the strict sense. What is
more, he claims it is the opposite of form38. Hence bodies do not become evil by
participating in something that is a formal principle, but because they are relat-
ed to some entity that is nothing but absence of form. What character can this
principle bestow upon them? Well, only the absence of any character, i.e. form-
lessness. But would it then not be more accurate to say that it does not give them
anything, but rather takes something away from them? And even that would be
saying too much, as it would attribute agency to matter. A safer expression would
have been to say that due to matter, i.e. because of its mere presence, bodies lose
some positive characteristics.
Although matter is not a Form, it seems to play the role of a Form, because
sensible things intermittently participate in it and derive their evilness from it.
True Forms, however, have a special relation to the Good. This is stated unam-
biguously in the Republic, whatever one takes the Form of the Good and its func-
tion to be. For orthodox Neoplatonists there can be no doubt that all Forms are
good and that it is good for things to participate in them. Forms do not only ex-
plain that things have a certain character, but also that it is good for those things
to be thus characterised. Plotinian matter obviously does not have this relation
to the good. To be affected by matter, therefore, is not a good thing. To the extent
a thing undergoes the influence of matter, the good is absent from it. But should
that mean that matter instils evil? Platonists have always had a strong propensi-
ty towards this view, which in Plotinus’ day was no doubt reinforced by Gnostic
ideas39. Even Proclus acknowledges that things tend to go wrong in the presence
of matter40, yet comes up with some counterexamples showing that matter cannot
be the place where all evils originate41. Surely one finds less and less good as one
moves down the ontological scale, but absence of good is not yet evil. Another ex-
planation is needed to account for the fact that in bodies and souls things some-
times get positively evil. Proclus moreover points out that if Plotinus were right
and matter were the contrary of form, the ultimate source of evil should be even
beyond matter, i.e. lower than matter, just as the good is beyond. i.e. higher than,
38 I,8 [51] 10,15-16.

39 Cf. PHILLIPS, Platonists cit., p. 64.
40 DMS 29,16-30,3; 31,1-5.
41 DMS 33,1-12.
174 Jan Opsomer
the Forms42. Proclus distinguishes clearly between «contrary to Form/sub-

stance/being» and «contrary to the good». Even if he were to grant Plotinus his
definition of matter as total absence of form, pure privation43 and the contrary of
substance, that would still not be enough to call matter evil. Rather, Plotinus
would merely be justified to regard it as «not good». Proclus further objects to the
idea that matter is an active principle44. Plotinus himself characterises matter as
something apoion, meaning both qualityless and inert45. It can neither be a for-
mal (paradigmatic) nor an efficient cause. Yet Plotinus seems to treat it this way.
In Platonism, particulars are supposed to be ontologically deficient with re-
spect to Forms. Beautiful particulars never instantiate beauty perfectly. The
Form of beauty, on the contrary, is perfect. But what if the characteristic to be
explained is negative? Matter according to Plotinus is indeed more perfectly
evil46 than bodies or souls could ever be. If one treats evil as a positive charac-
teristic (which is not to be understood axiologically, but in the sense of possess-
ing, or consisting in, certain features or qualities, rather than being charac-
terised by the lack of these), one can only say that matter is better at being evil
than secondary evils. This sounds paradoxical, but it is as paradoxical or absurd
as the attempt to make absence itself into a positive quality.
Plotinus is not unaware of this paradox, and explicitly addresses the question
how something qualityless can be evil47:
«But if matter is without quality, how can it be evil? [“Apoio" de; ou\sa pw'" kakhv;]» (I,8
[51] 10,1).
42 Cf. DMS 30,14-24 (reporting Plotinus’ view; compare I,8 [51] 3,20-24, quoted in n. 102): «If good
is twofold – one being the absolute good and nothing other than good, the other being the good in some-
thing else, a particular good, that is, and not the primary good – then evil as well will be twofold, the one
being as it were absolute evil and the primary evil and nothing else but evil, the other being evil in some-
thing else and some evil, i.e., that which is evil because of that <first> evil, by participation in or assim-
ilation to it. And just as the good is the first, the absolute evil will be the last of beings. For it is not pos-
sible for anything to be better than good nor worse than evil, since we say that all other things are better
or worse by virtue of these. But matter is the last of beings: for all other things are disposed to act or to
undergo, whereas matter does neither, as it is deprived of both these potencies. Hence the absolute and
primary evil is matter». But according to Proclus there is no primary evil (DMS 37,7-8). Earlier on Pro-
clus has argued that absolute evil, if it existed, would be beyond absolute non-being (which does not ex-
ist), just as the good is beyond being (i.e. the being of the Forms): DMS 3,1-10.
43 On Plotinus’ equation of matter with privation, cf. O’BRIEN, La matière chez Plotin cit., pp. 63-66.
Proclus carefully distinguishes between the two: cf. DMS 38,1-2; OPSOMER, Proclus vs Plotinus cit., pp.
162-164.
44 DMS 33,15-17.
45 I,8 [51] 10,1 (a[poio" [...] ou\sa); 10,10; 10,13; II,4 [12] 8,1-3; 13,7; 20-23.
46 For a Platonist this is an oxymoron.
47 Compare PLUT., De an. procr., 1015A: ouj ga;r oi|ovn te to; a[poion kai; ajrgo;n ejx auJtou' kai; ajrrepe;"
aijtivan kakou' kai; ajrch;n uJpotivqesqai to;n Plavtwna kai; kalei'n ajpeirivan aijscra;n kai; kakopoiovn.
His answer merely exacerbates the paradox: it is evil because it has no qual-
ities.
«So it is rightly said to be both without quality and evil; for it is not called evil because
it has, but rather because it has not quality, in order to avoid that it were perhaps evil
as a form, and not as a nature opposed to form [ojrqw'" a[ra levgetai kai; a[poio" ei\nai kai;
kakhv: ouj ga;r levgetai kakh; tw/' poiovthta e[cein, ajlla; ma'llon tw/' poiovthta mh; e[cein, i{na
/ i[sw" kakh; ei\do" ou\sa, ajlla; mh; ejnantiva tw/' ei[dei fuvsi"]» (I,8 [51] 10,12-15).
mh; h\48
The idea is that matter is essentially qualityless, which makes it incapable of

receiving form, i.e. beauty and goodness. Matter is not qualified, because that
would mean it would have accidents. Since it is itself the substrate, it cannot
have accidents as part of what it is to be matter49. That, however, does not pre-
vent it from being evil in its very nature, so Plotinus argues. Its nature is to re-
main deprived of form, despite all efforts to inform it. It is pure absence, pure
privation50, «poverty» or, to use an even more flowery language, «a decorated
corpse»51 (the garlands being the forms entering the receptacle). And that is why
Plotinus feels justified in calling it evil52.
Plotinus is stretching the concept of privation. Normally privation is in some-
thing else, but Plotinus regards these classic cases of privation as partial priva-
tions, which he opposes to the total privation which is matter53. That is highly
problematic. Regardless of the technicalities involved, privation is normally un-
derstood as the absence of something that ought to be present. If it is the essence
of matter to be without quality, then there is nothing which ought to be there. As
a consequence it makes no sense to speak of privation in this case54.
However, also if we ignore privation and focus on absence the problems re-
main. For absence is not a positive characteristic and therefore not positively
bad, nor does it do anything. Plotinian matter is typically characterised by a se-
ries of words prefixed by an alpha privativum55. It is unmeasuredness, unlimit-
48H-S2 and Armstrong read h\n. I have modified his translation.

49Cf. O’MEARA, Traité 51 cit., p. 147.
50 Cf. n. 21 and 43, and II,4 [12] 13,7-13; 20-23; II,4,14; 16,20; III,6 [26] 7,20.
51 II,4, [12] 5,18: nekro;n kekosmhmevnon.
52 Cf. I,8 [51] 5,8-9: ajll’ o{tan pantelw'" ejlleivph/, o{per ejsti;n hJ u{lh, tou'to to; o[ntw" kako;n mhdemivan
e[con ajgaqou' moi'ran.

53 OPSOMER, Proclus vs Plotinus cit., pp. 162-163.
54 This is part of the reason why C. Schäfer claims that matter can only be called evil in relation to
something else. See below.

55 Cf., e.g., I,8 [51] 6,41-43 (pevrati dh; kai; mevtrw/ kai; o{sa e[nestin ejn th/' qeiva/ fuvsei, ajpeiriva kai;
ajmetriva kai; ta; a[lla, o{sa e[cei hJ kakh; fuvsi", ejnantiva); 8,21-22 (to; aujth'" ajneivdeon prosavgousa kai; th;n
ajmorfivan). See also PORPH., Sent. 20, ed. Lamberz, pp. 10.11-11.2.
176 Jan Opsomer
edness etc. As Proclus remarks, these words indicate an absence, but sometimes
also an active opposition56. Plotinus seems to confound these usages or rather to
reinterpret absence as an active opposition57.
In order better to understand what kind of property evil is – a positive prop-
erty or the absence of a property – it may be helpful to look at some of the im-
agery associated with it. Traditionally, evil is compared with darkness. The rea-
son for this comparison is of course that even long before the dawn of philoso-
phy but of course also in Platonism the good is associated with light58. This com-
parison suggests that evil consists in the absence of the good, and nothing more.
That is to say, we know that darkness is nothing but lack of light. In the archaic
mythical world view, however, darkness is considered a positive force fighting
the light. A remnant of this view may still be at play in Plotinus’ use of the
metaphor. Plotinus is indeed fond of the idea that when soul looks down towards
matter, she «sees darkness»59. This expression is vulnerable to the reply that we
do not see darkness. When light is absent, we do not see anything. Plotinus him-
self seems to think that this is the more accurate way of putting it60, yet this does
not prevent him from alluding to darkness as a positively malignant force. Nat-
ural science adepts may call this nonsense, yet something is to be said in favour
of the metaphor. From a phenomenological point of view, one might reply, we do
see darkness. Indeed, «darknesse visible» continues to inspire poets and com-
56 DMS 32,9-18: «Again, we speak in many senses of ‘unmeasured’ and ‘unlimited’ and all those
things. For we may call ‘unmeasured’ (1) that which opposes measure, or (2) its absence and removal, or
(3) the substrate of measure and indeed the need for measure and limit. Now matter is not disposed to (1)
oppose nor, in general, to effectuate anything, since it is neither capable by nature of undergoing an ef-
fect because of the lack of the potency to undergo [not Proclus’ view, but a dialectical formulation of Plo-
tinus’ position]. Nor is it (2) a removal of measure and limit, for it is not identical with privation, because
privation does not exist when measure and limit are present, whereas matter keeps existing and bearing
their impression. Hence the unlimitedness and measurelessness of matter must consist in (3) the need for
measure and limit».
57 E.R. DODDS, Provklou Diadovcou Stoiceivwsi" qeologikhv. Proclus. The Elements of Theology. A Re-
vised Text with Translation, Introduction and Commentary, Clarendon, Oxford 19632, p. 231, speaks of an
active power of resistance resident in Plotinian matter, but it would be better to speak of «passive» resis-
tance. Matter does not do anything nor does it actively oppose anything. Its resistance consists in the fact
that it is incapable of undergoing qualitative change.
58 See, e.g., II,4 [12] 5,6-8: to; de; bavqo" eJkavstou hJ u{lh: dio; kai; skoteinh; pa'sa, o{ti to; fw'" oJ lovgo".
I,8 [51] 5,2-3.

59 I,8 [51] 4,30-32 (ajoristiva" plhrwqei'sa skovto" oJra/' kai; e[cei h[dh u{lhn blevpousa eij" o} mh; blevpei,
wJ" legovmeqa oJra'n kai; to; skovto"); 5,1-2 (tou' oJra'n kai; sunei'nai tw/' skovtei – on this passage, see O’MEARA,
Traité 51 cit., p. 115); 9,19-23: w{sper o[mma ajposth'san auJto; fwtov", i{na i[dh/ to; skovto" kai; mh; i[dh/ – to;
katalipei'n to; fw'", i{na i[dh/ to; skovto", meq’ ou| oujk h\n ijdei'n aujtov: oujd’ au\ a[neu touvtou [H-S3] oi|ovn te h\n
ijdei'n, ajlla; mh; ijdei'n – i{na gevnhtai aujtw/' wJ" oi|ovn te ijdei'n ktl.
60 Cf. I,8 [51] 4,30-32, quoted in the previous footnote, and II,1 [40] 6,39-41 (ouj ga;r dh; to; skovto"
oJra'sqai, ajlla; mh; oJra'sqai fatevon, w{sper th;n ajyofivan mh; ajkouvesqai). See also II,4 [12] 12,28-33.
posers. I conclude that this first comparison does not offer much enlightenment,
since it can be taken in different ways61.
A second popular comparison is that with coldness. Proclus on more than one
occasion compares evil with coldness, referring to a passage from the Republic
also hinted at by Plotinus62. A modern reader might suppose that this supports
the view of evil as absence. At the bottom of the scale, where the good has ceased
to exert any influence at all, what is left is a temperature of zero kelvin (i.e. no
temperature at all)63. Yet that is not what Proclus thinks. For him, cold is not the
absence of warmth. Cold and warm are warring contraries. Cold is not reduced
to absence of warmth, but is its contrary. Hence the presence of one destroys the
other. Proclus even argues that whereas hot and cold are contraries, good and
less good are not, and neither are evil and less evil64. Proclus thus implicitly us-
es the comparison with warmth and cold to lend support to his view that evil is
not to be equated with absence of good. A relation of contrariety obtains between
good and evil, but not between good and less good. The comparison of evil with
coldness is thus potentially damaging for Plotinus’ view, and that is perhaps why
Plotinus is not so keen on it. For he, too, for the most part regards cold and warm
as contrary powers65. But interestingly, in III,6 [26] 9 he plays with the idea that
cold could after all be just absence of warmth66. At I,8 [51] 8,18-22, however,
Plotinus says very clearly that matter does not oppose warmth by using cold, but
by opposing its own formlessness to the form that is warmth.
Proclus construes the following objection against the view that matter is evil.
61 Plotinus himself appears to describe darkness predominantly as absence of light (see above), yet
also as a positive force able to darken other things: I,8 [51] 8,40: kai; prwvtw" me;n to; skovto", to; de; ejsko-
tismevnon deutevrw" wJsauvtw". One would almost get the impression Plotinus loves the image for its very
ambiguity.
62 PROCL., DMS 35,26-27; 41,7-8; PLOT., IV,7 [2] 4,28-29; IV,3 [27] 10,30-31 (puro;" me;n ga;r qerma;
poiei'n, kai; to; yuvcein a[llou). Cf. PLATO, Resp., I, 335D3-4; 8.

63 See, however, R.G. COLLINGWOOD, An Essay on Philosophical Method, Thoemmes, Bristol 1995
(«Key Texts. Classic Studies in the History of Ideas»), pp. 74-76, where the author distinguishes two ways
of conceiving the relation between coldness and warmth, and that between good and evil.
64 Cf. DMS 4,33-35; 6,22-23, with OPSOMER / STEEL, On the Existence of Evils cit., p. 108, n. 33.
65 III,2 [47] 16,44-45; IV,7 [2] 4,25-26.
66 III,6 [26] 9,23-24: ejpiskeptevon de; peri; th'" yucrovthto" mhvpote ajpousiva kai; stevrhsi". Cf. B.
FLEET, Plotinus. Ennead III.6. On the Impassivity of the Bodiless, Clarendon, Oxford 1995, commentary
ad loc. (p. 191). Cf. ARIST., De caelo, 2,3, 286a25-26, ed. Moraux (th'" sterhvsew" provteron hJ katavfasi":
levgw d’ oi|on to; qermo;n tou' yucrou', and De gen. et corr., 1,3, 318b6-7, ed. Rashed, but see also De caelo,
3,8, 307b6), and Simplicius’ commentary, in De caelo, 400.10-13 (eij ga;r e[stin hJ stevrhsi", ajnavgkh
prou>pavrcein th;n e{xin, h}n aujto;" katavfasin ejkavlese: stevrhsin de; nu'n levgei to; cei'ron ejn th/' tw'n ejnan-
tivwn fuvsei, wJ" to; yucro;n tou' qermou' stevrhsi", to; de; qermo;n tou' yucrou' e{xi" h] katavfasi"). Plutarch of
Chaironeia has devoted an entire treatise to the question whether cold is a privation or a force of its own:
De primo frigido (e.g. 945F, 946B-D, ed. Hubert / Pohlenz / Drexler).
178 Jan Opsomer
Combined with the notion that matter is produced by the One – whether medi-
ately or immediately is of no importance – it contaminates the first principle with
evil. The problem is not just that the first principle, i.e. the Good, would be ul-
timately responsible for evil, but even that it would itself contain evil and hence
be evil67. The causal principle invoked is that the cause contains the effect68 in
an eminent way; or, in other words, that it possesses to a larger extent the char-
acter it passes on. Causation is typically seen as the transferral of a certain pow-
er or characteristic (yet without loss for the producer).
This brings us back to the argument analysed by D. O’Meara. He defends
Plotinus against his critic on this point too. According to his analysis the argu-
ments rests on the axiom
«In each genus, the cause is more that which its products are in the genus [Axiom
1]»69.
The «genus» in this case is what A.C. Lloyd70 termed a quasi-genus, name-
ly the ordered series constituted by the derivation from the One/Good down to
matter. O’Meara explains that this series is not such that all its members share
in goodness. It rather reaches from a maximum degree of goodness, unity and
power down to the complete loss of goodness, unity and power71. This is indeed
how we should envisage this series. The problem now is that Proclus infers
«Good, as the cause of Evil, must be more evil than Evil».
from the application of the aforementioned principle [O’Meara’s Axiom 1] to

Plotinus’ view that matter is the product of the derivation from the One, i.e. that
matter is mediately72 produced by the Good73. O’Meara calls the conclusion
67 I shall not discuss Proclus’ other line of attack (the other horn of a dilemma), which constitutes the
mirror image of the first point, namely that, since products return to their causes and assimilate them-
selves to them, evil will become good. See, however, n. 21.
68 Cf. VI,2 [43] 13,9: ejnupavrcei ta; u{stera ejn protevroi".
69 O’MEARA, Metaphysics of Evil cit., p. 183. See also ID., Das Böse cit., p. 45: «Im allgemeinen muß
Plotin die zwei Axiome, die Proklos als Grundlage seiner Kritik benutzt, annehmen, weil er ihnen gewöhn-
lich eine große metaphysische Bedeutung beimißt, ohne sie allerdings ganz so scholastisch zu for-
mulieren».
70 A.C. LLOYD, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Clarendon, Oxford 1990, pp. 76-97.
71 O’MEARA, Metaphysics of Evil cit., pp. 184-185.
72 In fact, no hypostasis is produced «directly» by the preceding level, but only because something
that goes out from its cause reverts upon it. The inability of matter to do so explains why it is not good. It
does not explain, however, why it is evil, although Plotinus thinks it does.
73 I bracket the question of how the production of evil by soul is to be assessed, i.e. the question of a
possible guilt of the soul. Plotinus wants to explain why the production of matter is not already morally
drawn by Proclus tendentious and incorrect. Instead we should read the conse-
quence of the application of Axiom 1 as
«The Good, as the cause of all existents (including matter), exists at a higher degree
of goodness, unity and power than they».
I do not contest that this is what Plotinus intends, yet this conclusion does
not follow from the application of the aforementioned axiom to his views on mat-
ter/evil. For axiom 1 says that the cause is more that which its products are. But
what is matter? Plotinus makes it very clear that matter is nothing but evil (or
unmeasuredness, privation etc.). Everything it is is bad; it is essentially evil. So,
if the cause is to a higher degree that which the product is, only one conclusion
seems to be possible: the One is evil – indeed, more evil than matter. O’Meara
explains why he thinks this conclusion is wrong:
«Proclus ignores the point that Evil is the complete loss of any goodness, unity and
power: as such, it cannot be possessed to a greater degree, but only, if possessed by
others, to a lesser degree»74.
This is the crux of the issue. If matter is indeed complete loss of goodness75,
the problem is solved. For then we have a derivation series in which the last item
produced contains nothing which is not in the first cause. As a matter of fact, it
does not contain anything. In this case there is no violation of Axiom 1. Unfor-
tunately, however; this solution does not work. For Plotinian matter is not just
the complete loss of goodness, but something worse: it is evil76.
This is exactly the point Proclus makes77: absence of goodness is not the same
reprehensible, for, if it were, there would be evil prior to matter (see, e.g., O’BRIEN, Plotinus on Evil cit.,
pp. 126, 128; ID., Origin of Matter cit., pp. 194-195). This introduces further complications, yet does not
change anything fundamental for our problem (a free decision of the soul does not discharge the One; if
the production of matter were evil, one would have to explain whence the soul got its wicked inclination;
Plotinus, however, wisely denies that the generation of matter is itself evil). Nor does the fact that the pro-
duction of matter is mediated by other hypostases. If the production of matter/evil is indeed entirely the
result of the emanation from the good (that is, if one wants to steer clear off the idea that evil is uncaused),
its cause or causes are to be found in the higher realms and ultimately reside with the good itself, no mat-
ter how intricate the various intermediate steps needed for its production are. Cf. IV,8 [6] 5,14-16: Kai;
ga;r ajf’ h|" ajrch'" e{kasta, eij kai; ta; metaxu; pollav, kai; ta; e[scata eij" aujth;n ajnafevretai. Essential is
that the one is the principle (the origin) of the other: cf. I,8 [51] 1,18-19: to; me;n ajrchv, to; de; e[scaton (here
formulated as a hypothesis, but this is also Plotinus’ own view).
74 O’MEARA, Metaphysics of Evil cit., p. 185.
75 Cf. Enn., III,6 [26] 14,11-12: o{ti ajgaqou' e[rhmo".
76 It does not help to object that evilness is not a property of matter. Since matter is essentially evil
evilness is at least a characteristic or quasi-property of matter.

77 Apart from that Proclus thinks that the lowest stage of the emanation should contain some residue
of goodness. Cf. n. 20.

180 Jan Opsomer
as evilness. Absence does not cause anything, nothing can participate in it or

«possess» it. Evil, on the contrary, is a characteristic in its own right, and if
matter is evil, that which produces it must be evil too, under the application of
axiom 1. But if matter is completely inert and qualityless – if it lacks measure
as well as other nice things – there is no reason why one should call it evil. If
it has no qualities, it can have no bad qualities. If it does not do anything, it
cannot do anything wrong.
Plotinus, however, is compulsively drawn towards making matter into a prin-
ciple of evil, and, in order to do so, equates «not good» with «bad»78. The con-
cluding words on lower matter in Enn. II,4 [12] are telling:
«Anything which lacks something, but has something else, might perhaps hold a mid-
dle position between good and evil, if its lack and its having more or less balance; but
that which has nothing because it is in want, or rather is want [peniva o[n], must neces-
sarily be evil [ajnavgkh kako;n ei\nai]. For this thing is not want of wealth but want of
thought, want of virtue, of beauty, strength, shape, form, quality. Must it not then be
ugly? Must it not be utterly vile, utterly evil? [Pw'" ou\n ouj duseidev"; Pw'" de; ouj pavnth
aijscrovn; Pw'" de; ouj pavnth kakovn;]» (16,17-23).
No, there is no good reason why we should answer these rhetorical questions79
the way Plotinus wants us to80. If matter is complete absence it cannot be evil.
That evil cannot consist in absence can also be shown by looking at typical
cases of evil. Proclus has a plausible answer to the question where evils exist:
essentially it is in bodies and in souls. Evils of the first type are illness and de-
cay, whereas vices constitute the second class81. One could be tempted by the
78 O’MEARA, too, appears to regard the shift from «not good» to «evil» as unproblematic, or is perhaps
not even aware of it. Cf. Metaphysics of Evil cit., p. 181: «reaching a last degree from which is absent any
form of goodness, unity and power: matter, or absolute evil». See also ID., Das Böse cit., p. 44: «Warum
könnte nicht die Verminderung des Guten nur bis zum letzten Echo des Guten weitergehen? Das letzte
Glied der Reihe wäre also das letzte Echo des Guten und nicht das Gegenteil des Guten. Wie kann über-
haupt das absolute Böse Teil der Ableitungsreihe des Guten sein?». According to this reasoning the last
member of the series must be either absolute evil or «the last echo from the good». O’Meara wonders why
it should be the former instead of the latter. But there is of course a third possibility: it could be some-
thing that is not good without therefore being evil, i.e. it could be complete absence of the good.
79 Cf. D.C. DENNETT, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. Evolution and the Meanings of Life, Simon & Schus-
ter, New York-Toronto-London-Sydney 1995, p. 178: «I advise my philosophy students to develop hyper-
sensitivity for rhetorical questions in philosophy. They paper over whatever cracks there are in the argu-
ments».
80 Or to put the issue differently: I fail to understand how something that has no form (ajneivdeon I,8
[51] 3,14; 8,21) can have an ugly form (duseidev", II,4 [12] 16,23). Cf. O’BRIEN, Plotinus on Evil cit., p.
116.
81 To be more precise, Proclus distinguishes the following occurrences: bodily evils, evils of the irra-
tional soul, evils of the rational soul. Cf. DMS 11-39, summarised in 55,1-4; OPSOMER / STEEL, On the Ex-
istence of Evils cit., pp. 21-23.
idea that bodily evils do not constitute an independent class. It would not make
much sense, so one might argue, to talk of bodily evils in the absence of a soul
that is able to feel them or be affected by them. Still Proclus thinks it is useful
to treat them as different categories of evil, because bodily evils originate inde-
pendently of the soul. More important for our purpose is the question what these
cases of evil have in common. They need an environment that is intrinsically
good: if there is no body that is still functioning, there can be no disease; if there
is no beautiful order, there can be no decay; vices presuppose a soul that rea-
sons and desires, sets itself goals, is alive, briefly, that is oriented towards the
good82. Evil is parasitic upon the good, or, as Proclus also says, it needs and us-
es the power of the good83. This means that there can be no evil where there is
no good at all. Evil cannot consist in pure absence84. It is never unmixed. This
way of reasoning excludes matter from the realm of things that can be meaning-
fully called evil.
Remarkably, Chr. Schäfer is led by the same intuition when he argues that Plo-
tinian matter is not absolutely evil in itself, but only through the effects it has on
the soul85. Only in relation to the whole produced by the Good does it make sense
to characterise matter as evil86. Considered in isolation from the rest of the em-
anation it should not be evaluated negatively. On Schäfer’s reading, Plotinus’
theory of evil matter does not entail that matter is evil, but rather that it is a prin-
ciple of evil, which only means that it has evil effects87. Moreover, strictly speak-
82 This is explained by Plotinus himself: I,8 [51] 11. But the conclusion he draws from it, is that the
soul can therefore not be primary evil: e[cei a[ra tw/' eJauth'" lovgw/ zwhvn: w{ste ouj stevrhsin e[cei th;n tou'
ajgaqou' par’ aujth'". ajgaqoeide;" a[ra e[cousav ti ajgaqo;n nou' i[cno" kai; ouj kako;n par’aujth'": oujk a[ra oujde;
prwvtw" kako;n oujde; sumbebhkov" ti aujth/' to; prwvtw" kakovn, o{ti mhde; a[pestin aujth'" pa'n to; ajgaqovn (11,15-
19). Plotinus does not let go of the idea that there is a primary evil. Compare Procl. DMS 38,13-17: «For
the presence of privation does not yet entail that there is evil, whereas total privation implies that the evil
nature has disappeared. What I mean is this: the body is diseased, when there is disorder, yet not total
disorder. For the total privation of order at once destroys the subject and the evil present in it».
83 Cf. DMS 53,1-4 et passim.
84 A famous Epicurean argument is based on this intuition. Non-existence is not something bad. This
is uncontroversial as far as the time before our birth is concerned. For the time after our death the ques-
tion may be somewhat trickier.
85 See already W. HIMMERICH, Eudaimonia: die Lehre des Plotin von der Selbstverwirklichung des Men-
schen, Triltsch, Würzburg 1959 («Forschungen zur neueren Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte», N.F., 13),
p. 118: «Es ist allerdings nicht böse an sich, sondern wird es erst durch die Art der seelischen Zuwen-
dung. Es wird dann ein ‘Böses für’ die Seele».
86 Cf. C. SCHÄFER, Unde malum. Die Frage nach dem Woher des Bösen bei Plotin, Augustinus und
Dionysius, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, p. 133.

87 Cf. C. SCHÄFER, Das Dilemma der neuplatonischen Theodizee. Versuch einer Lösung, «Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie», 82 (2000), pp. 20-23, 32-33 (matter is not evil «in actu») and SCHÄFER, Unde
malum cit., p. 138: «Es ist [...] derselbe Grund, der es verbietet, die Materie zusammenhangslos und für
182 Jan Opsomer
ing one should not say that it causes evil, since it does not actively produce any-
thing. By its very presence, however, other things, in the first place souls, turn
evil. I let the question of how exactly these evils of the soul (and the body) are
brought about rest for a moment and address Schäfer’s most controversial claim:
that matter is not intrinsically evil, but only in relation to other things88, i.e. in
its effects. This is a very sensible view indeed, one that would partially disarm
the critics of Plotinus89. Unfortunately, it is at odds with what Plotinus says. Sure-
ly, matter has evil effects, but Plotinus does not argue that matter is evil just be-
cause of what it does to other things. Plotinus emphatically claims that matter is
evil90 and explains why he thinks this is so. He even goes to great lengths in or-
der to explain why something that lacks all qualities can nevertheless – or more
accurately, for that very reason – be evil. The reasons with which he comes up
refer to what matter is in itself, i.e. to its own characteristics (quasi-properties,
one could say; not «properties», since matter consists in the absence of proper-
ties).
But maybe it is possible to find reasons to believe that Plotinus does not lit-
erally mean what he writes?91 Schäfer points to the broader context of Plotinus’
sich, allein in ihren ‘Eigenschaften’ (also rein ‘gegenständlich’, unter Mißachtung jeder ‘aktualen’ Im-
plikation im Systemganzen) untersucht, als ‘das Böse’ zu bezeichnen: Die Materie ist ja reine Möglichkeit,
passive duvnami", durch keinen auch no so geringen Wirklichkeitsbeitrag vorbegrenzte Indeterminiertheit
und mithin für sich genommen unmöglich selbst schon böse». See already J.M. RIST, Plotinus: the Road
to Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1967, p. 128 (matter is evil only in its effects).
88 Cf. SCHÄFER, Unde malum cit., p. 121: «Ähnlich möchte ich vorschlagen, die prima facie für den
modernen Leser durchaus schockierende Identifikation von Urbösem und Materie bei Plotin weniger von
einer der Materie eigenen ‘Strukturiertheit’ her zu begreifen, von dem, was eine isolierte Untersuchung
der Materie allein für sich betrachtet erbringen würde, sondern von der Wirkung dieser Struktur auf den
Prozeß der Wirklichkeitskonstituierung, insbesondere auf die Seele» (Schäfer’s italics); p. 122: «daß das
Böse vor allem in bezug auf eine Handlung oder Wirkung gesehen als solches identifiziert wird; p. 124:
«Es läßt sich mithin festhalten: Nicht ‘sein’ [...], sondern ‘bewirken’ bestimmt also die Materie als Bö-
ses»; p. 129: «der Materie, das heißt dem vermeintlich Ur-Bösen» (my italics). Compare HORN, Plotin über
Sein cit., pp. 172-173.
89 Proclus would still have something to nag about: according to him, matter does not play any role in
the causal explanation of evil. How could it? If it is inert, as Plotinus thinks, it cannot produce anything;
if it «desires» the good and is «necessary» for the generation of the world, as Proclus himself believes, its
effects are good. Proclus further counters the idea that matter makes other things bad by its mere pres-
ence: if that were so, that which is closer to matter would be more evil than that which is at a further re-
move from it. But as it is, the evils of the souls are worse than those of the body, although bodies are clos-
er to matter than souls.
90 E.g. I,8 [51] 14,40.
91 Chr. Schäfer is well aware of the fact that his interpretation requires us to understand certain pas-
sages as not meaning what they literally say, and to some extent even as meaning the very opposite of what
they say. Cf. SCHÄFER, Unde malum cit., p. 140: «Diese Interpretation scheint im Gegensatz zu einigen
Aussagen des Kap. 13 der Enn. 1.8 [51] zu stehen»; ID., Matter in Plotinus’s Normative Ontology, «Phrone-
sis», 49.3 (2004), p. 287: «I am quite aware of the fact that my interpretation seems to contradict some
Plotinian utterances to be found (especially) in ch. 13 of Enn. I,8 [51]».
argument, more particularly to the complex narrative that serves to explain how
vices arise in the soul. He rightly argues that this too is an essential part of Plo-
tinus’ theory and that it would be wrong to ignore it. Plotinus is indeed most con-
cerned with what happens to the soul when it gets corrupted by matter. Yet what
happens in that case falls under the category of secondary evils. Plotinus sharply
distinguishes between secondary and primary evil. And when he discusses pri-
mary evil it is clearly matter in itself which is called evil – intrinsically evil, that
is, and absolute evil. That, too, is a part of Plotinus’ theory, one that does not dis-
appear just by looking at it from a broader perspective.
Chr. Schäfer may have overstated his point, but he is definitely on to some-
thing. At the origin of his interpretation lies the thought that it does not make
sense to call matter evil as long as it is considered in isolation from the rest of
the emanation from the good92. This can be made clearer, I think, by the follow-
ing thought experiment. Suppose matter were everything there is. In other words,
there would be no intelligible Forms, no souls, no reason-principles (logoi)93. If
there were nothing which tries to inform matter, the presence of matter would in
no way be something bad. Its existence would not be evil. It would still be a na-
ture that is recalcitrant to form, but there would be no forms trying to impose
themselves upon matter and change it for the better. Matter’s talent for disorder
would have no object94. Matter would lie inert and qualityless and that would be
all there were to say about it. But since there are souls and reason-principles try-
ing to inform matter, inability to cooperate with form is a bad thing95. This argu-
ment, as I understand it, does not prove as much as is needed for Schäfer’s in-
terpretation. It does not pertain to matter insofar as it effectuates changes in oth-
er things, but to matter insofar as it is not capable of being altered for the good96
92SCHÄFER, Unde malum cit., pp. 133-134, SCHÄFER, Matter cit., p. 274.
93I disregard the fact that matter would not have existed in that case. Mine is a purely counterfactu-
al argument.
94 There are some tricky issues here about potentiality and possibility, which can be safely ignored
for the present purpose.

95 The soul’s efforts are in vain, it cannot unite with matter: I,8 [51] 14,31-33.
96 I,8 [51] 3,36-37; 14,38-40; II,4 [12] 8,14-18; 13,8-9; 14,22-28; III,6 [26] 9,20-23; 32-37; 10,3-5,
11-13 (w{ste, eij dei' u{lhn ei\nai, w{sper ejx ajrch'" h\n, ou{tw" ajei; dei' aujth;n ei\nai th;n aujthvn: wJ" tov ge
ajlloiou'sqai levgein oujk e[stin aujth;n u{lhn throuvntwn); 11,18 (mevnei ga;r o} ejx ajrch'" h\n); 11,24-29 (eij
toivnun aijscra; ou\sa hJ u{lh kalh; ejgevneto, o} h\n provteron to; aijscra; ei\nai oujkevt’ ejstivn: w{ste ejn tw/' ou{tw
kekosmh'sqai ajpolei' to; u{lhn ei\nai kai; mavlista, eij mh; kata; sumbebhko;" aijscrav: eij d’ ou{tw" aijscra; wJ"
ai\sco" ei\nai, oujd’ a]n metalavboi kovsmou, kai; eij ou{tw kakh; wJ" kako;n ei\nai, oujd’ a]n metalavboi ajgaqou');
11,37-41; 41-45 (metalambavnousa ga;r o[ntw" kai; ajlloioumevnh o[ntw" uJpo; tou' ajgaqou' oujk a]n h\n th;n
fuvsin kakhv. w{ste ei[ ti" th;n u{lhn levgei kakhvn, ou{tw" a]n ajlhqeuvoi, eij tou' ajgaqou' ajpaqh' levgoi: tou'to de;
taujtovn ejsti tw/' o{lw" ajpaqh' ei\nai); 13,2. See also SCHÄFER, Matter cit., p. 274: «[W]hat makes us talk of
evil as equivalent to matter is the fact that amorphous matter, in its powerlessness, begs and bothers soul
for the communication of form. But at the same time, matter is not able in any way to receive and to hold
and contain form».
184 Jan Opsomer
– to the intrinsic nature of matter, that is. It leaves matter inherently evil, which
is what Chr. Schäfer wants to deny97.
Schäfer insists on the fact that it is important never to talk of matter in isola-
tion; we should instead always understand that matter is called evil only because
of the relation it has to the soul and body. But when he talks about this relation-
al aspect of Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil98, Schäfer, in his monograph Unde
malum (2002) does not distinguish clearly between what can be predicated of
matter because of its effects on other things («evil in its effects») and an intrin-
sic property of matter that becomes manifest only in its relation to other things
(e.g. its recalcitrance to form)99. In a recent article he adopts an even more rad-
ical position, as he expressly refuses to make a distinction between «being» and
«effect»100. He claims that the expression «matter itself» or «matter as such» is
an oxymoron for Plotinus101. That may be true, but it keeps Plotinus neither from
frequently using expressions that refer to matter as an entity nor from examining
what matter itself is102. Yet Schäfer insists that talking about matter as something
kaq’ auJtov is dubious and claims that when Plotinus himself does so, he has
«something else specifically in mind»103. Plotinus supposedly discusses matter
exclusively from the perspective of the soul. All Plotinus wants to show is «the
failed coming together of soul and matter». And when he speaks of matter itself
this is to be understood counterfactually as an unreal assumption to shortcut the
97SCHÄFER, Unde malum cit., pp. 133-134 et passim.

98 See also L.P. GERSON, Plotinus, Routledge, London-New York 1994 («The Arguments of the
Philosophers»), p. 192: «That ‘evil’ and ‘matter’ refer to the same thing means that they are merely con-
ceptually distinct. [...] The conceptual distinctiveness of evil is that it is matter viewed in relation to Form
and the Good, its ajrchv [...]. It is a nature (fuvsi") considered in its absolute privation of both».
99 See, e.g., SCHÄFER, Unde malum cit., p. 123: «Das Böse bekommt seine Qualifizierung als Böses
also offenbar über seine Wirkung oder ‘Handlungsweise’, oder besser [my italics]: durch seine Resistenz
gegenüber der wirklichkeitsschaffenden Handlung der geistigen Hypostasen innerhalb des dynamischen
Emanationsprozesses» (the author presumably has in mind the opposition activity/passivity; that is why
he corrects his remark about matter as an efficient cause in a remark about the passive resistance of mat-
ter; both remarks are held to support the view that matter is not evil in itself but only in its effects; I ar-
gue that the resistance of matter should be understood as saying something about matter itself); p. 139.
100 SCHÄFER, Matter cit., p. 287: «On the contrary, ‘passive’ or ‘negative’ effect and ‘potential’ or ‘meon-
tic’ being are taken to be necessarily the same in the special case of evil» (Schäfer’s italics); p. 285: «there
is no such thing as matter itself that is to be identified with ‘evil’».
101 SCHÄFER, Matter cit., p. 287.
102 One passage used by SCHÄFER (Matter cit., p. 285, n. 36) to prove his point actually shows the op-
posite. In I,8 [51] 14,49-51 Plotinus distinguishes matter as (part) cause of evil for the soul from matter as
itself evil, as an evil prior to the evil of the soul (u{lh toivnun kai; ajsqeneiva" yuch/' aijtiva kai; kakiva" aijtiva.
Provteron a[ra kakh; aujth; kai; prw'ton kakovn). This is even clearer in I,8 [51] 3,20-24: tivni ou\n uJpostavsei
tau'ta pavrestin oujc e{tera o[nta ejkeivnh", ajll’ ejkeivnh; Kai; ga;r eij eJtevrw/ sumbaivnei to; kakovn, dei' ti
provteron aujto; ei\nai, ka]n mh; oujsiva ti" h/.\ wJ" ga;r ajgaqo;n to; me;n aujtov, to; de; o} sumbevbhken, ou{tw kai; kako;n
to; me;n aujtov, to; de; h[dh kat’ ejkei'no sumbebhko;" eJtevrw/.
103 SCHÄFER, Matter cit., p. 284.
demonstration, «an ‘agent-neutral’ shorthand» way of talking, whereas Plotinus’

philosophy is essentially «agent-relative»104. We should realise, Schäfer adds,
that Plotinus considers matter as non-being. That is of course correct, but Plo-
tinus also says that this is not to be understood as «the non-existent»105. Schäfer’s
interpretation thus verges on the denial of the very existence of matter. But Plo-
tinus neither denies its existence nor refuses to talk about matter itself, thus iso-
lating it in thought. In Enn. I,8 Plotinus repeatedly talks about matter as such,
independently of the effects it has. In addition to that he talks about matter as
evil in its effects, and he carefully distinguishes between both cases. The fact
that matter never exists on its own I regard as a different issue (see below): it
does not exist on its own but it is possible to isolate it conceptually. This is to be
distinguished from a counterfactual hypothesis, such as the one discussed
above, in which I tried to see what would be the case if nothing but matter ex-
isted.
The idea that the nature of matter itself is evil, when seen in relation to the
rest of reality, is brought out nicely by the following passage:
«At this point one might be able to arrive at some conception of evil as a kind of un-
measuredness in relation to106 measure, and unboundedness in relation to limit, and
formlessness in relation to formative principle, and perpetual neediness in relation to
what is self-sufficient; always undefined, nowhere stable, subject to every sort of in-
fluence, insatiate, complete poverty: and all this is not accidental to it but in a sort of
way its essence; whatever part of it you see, it is all this; and everything which partic-
ipates in it and is made like it becomes evil, though not essentially evil» (I,8 [51] 3,12-
20).
Plotinus establishes a connection between the evil nature of matter and its
relation to form and measure107, but adds that this evil character constitutes the
104SCHÄFER, Matter cit., p. 290.

105I,8 [51] 3,6-7; 15,1-3.
106 In OPSOMER, Proclus vs Plotinus cit., p. 157, I inaccurately paraphrased this phrase as «unmea-
suredness in comparison with measure», and so on. In itself that is a correct rendering of prov", but Plo-
tinus makes a stronger point, I now think. Matter is evil because in its relation to form, measure etc. it
fails to be benefited by them. Cf. SCHÄFER, Unde malum cit., p. 134, n. 255.
107 A weaker reading is possible, according to which the relation to form and measure is needed on-
ly for us to reach an understanding of what matter is: h[dh ga;r a[n ti" eij" e[nnoian h{koi aujtou' oi|on ajmetrivan
ei\nai pro;" mevtron ktl. (I,8 [51] 3,12-13). In I,8,2 Plotinus has explained the nature of the good, and from
there he arrives at a first description of evil in I,8,3. He will refine this in I,8,4 and I,8,5. I actually pre-
fer this weaker «didactic» reading as I think it is closer to Plotinus’ intention and takes into account his
textual strategy, but have developed the stronger reading as this passage has been invoked to claim that
matter is only evil insofar it has bad effects (esp. SCHÄFER, Unde malum cit., pp. 122, 134; SCHÄFER, Mat-
ter cit., p. 280). I argue that even on the stronger «ontological» reading the reference to measure, form,
limit and self-sufficiency expressions does not warrant the conclusion that matter is not intrinsically bad.
186 Jan Opsomer
intrinsic nature of matter108. Consequently he distinguishes this intrinsic nature

neatly from the effects matter has on other things.
This reasoning, I think, captures Plotinus’ basic intuitions about evil and mat-
ter. An indispensable component of his theory, which I have not discussed up to
this point, is his insistence on the idea that matter/evil never exists on its own.
«Matter or evil is what is left when in thought we separate out whatever is think-
able in the thing», as L. Gerson puts it109. Plotinus even concludes his treatise
on evil with the idea that evil/matter is never to be found in isolation, but always
already mixed with the good110. So even in this respect Plotinus concurs with
Proclus: evil never exists in an unmixed form111. Plotinus, however, maintains
that it is the presence of matter in or near other things that corrupts them, as can
be seen in the case of fire. Whereas the fire as a pure logos is not destructive,
fire combined with matter is. These formative principles are altered, suffer a loss
of perfection, by their contact with matter112. Proclus denies that matter plays
108 Plotinus hesitates to call this an essence or substance, hence the «in a sort of way»: oi|on oujsiva.
See also I,8 [51] 3,21-22: kai; ga;r eij eJtevrw/ sumbaivnei to; kakovn, dei' ti provteron aujto; ei\nai, ka]n mh; ouj-
siva ti" h/.\ But this is merely a terminological issue. Instead of «substance» he prefers «nature» (fuvsi").
Cf. supra, n. 31. Implicitly, Plotinus admits that he is speaking about the essence of matter, when he says
that (contrary to matter, one may add) secondary evils are not «what it is to be evil» (o{per de; kaka; ei\nai
– see n. 34). Moreover he denies that the characteristics he has summed up (unmeasuredness etc.) are ac-
cidents (ouj sumbebhkovta). Further on he explicitly compares this structure to that of the good: wJ" ga;r
ajgaqo;n to; me;n aujtov, to; de; o} sumbevbhken, ou{tw kai; kako;n to; me;n aujtov, to; de; h[dh kat’ ejkei'no sumbebhko;"
eJtevrw/ (I,8 [51] 3,22-24). See also II,4 [12] 15,16-17.
109 GERSON, Plotinus cit., p. 192. Even size and extension should not be attributed to matter: cf. III,6
[26] 16-18; II,4 [12] 11. Motion, too, is excluded: III,6 [26] 6,49-50.
110 I,8 [51] 15,18-23.
111 As remarked also by SCHÄFER, Matter cit., pp. 283-284. The passage he quotes in support of this
(I,8 [51] 10,13-11.2), however, is interpreted tendentiously. It is misleadingly presented as expressing a

single idea, but in fact the passage contains the conclusion of an argument followed by the beginning of
an objection. At the end of I,8,11 Plotinus states that matter is evil because it has no quality, that it is not
a form but the opposite of form. In I,8,12,1-2 he says that if it is the opposite of form it is privation and if
it is privation it only exists in something else and has no being of its own (stevrhsi" de; ajei; ejn a[llw/ kai;
ejp’ aujth'" oujc uJpovstasi"). He does not want to argue in this chapter, pace Schäfer, that matter has no in-
dependent being, but rather that a privation in something else can only be a relative evil. He distinguishes
between a soul, which can suffer partial privation (i.e. an evil that does not exist in itself: w{ste kaq’ eJau-
to; oujk e[stai, 11,4), and matter which is total privation (I,8,11-12; cf. I,8,5,5-13). If this passage proves
anything, it is that Plotinus sharply distinguishes between secondary and primary evil (between relative
evils and absolute evil). It is moreover incorrect to say that Plotinus here comes close to Proclus’ notion
of evil as a parhypostasis. Parhypostasis does not so much refer to «co-existence» as to a specific causal
analysis. See J. OPSOMER / C. STEEL, Evil without a Cause. Proclus’ Doctrine on the Origin of Evil, and its
Antecedents in Hellenistic Philosophy, in T. FUHRER / M. ERLER / K. SCHLAPBACH (Hrsg.), Zur Rezeption der
hellenistischen Philosophie in der Spätantike. Akten der 1. Tagung der Karl-und-Gertrud-Abel-Stiftung vom
22.-25. September 1997 in Trier, Steiner, Stuttgart 1999 («Philosophie der Antike», 9), pp. 229-260; OP-
SOMER / STEEL, On the Existence of Evils cit., pp. 23-28.
112 Cf. I,8 [51] 8,11-17 (esp. l. 15: lovgoi e[nuloi fqarevnte" ejn u{lh/), invoked by GERSON, Plotinus cit.,
p. 192, and SCHÄFER, Unde malum cit., p. 125. See also II,6 [12] 14,12-14.
this causal role and claims that it is rather the mutual opposition of particular113
forms that is destructive114. Matter plays no role at all, except as a general con-
ditio sine qua non for the world of generation115. The difference separating Pro-
clus from Plotinus remains radical. Surely Plotinus holds that matter does not
exist on its own. Yet if we isolate it in thought, so his argument goes, we must
come to the conclusion it is intrinsically evil and «evil itself». We do not char-
acterise it thus independently of the relation it has to other things. Yet it is more
appropriate to say that its evil nature manifests itself in those effects than it is to
say that it consists in them. When Plotinus claims that evil is a nature that is in-
trinsically evil, that it is evil itself, the primary evil and that because of which
(through the participation in which) secondary evils are evil, he is saying that in
addition to being a source of evil for other things matter is a level of being that
is in itself evil116. One could object that Plotinus should not have expressed him-
self thus. But that does not alter the fact that he did.
I would like to conclude with a remark about the causal analysis of secondary
evils. According to the Neoplatonic analysis of causation anything that causes a
property f is itself f. Neoplatonists regard causation fundamentally as produc-
tion, more precisely as production by the good. Whatever is good has both an in-
ternal and an external activity117, the latter being a spin-off of the former. The
external activity consists in the fact that something other is produced, something
that will be less good than its cause118. Needless to say that this will not work for
matter. Matter does not produce because it is good and there is no hypostasis
lower than matter. But maybe there is some other form of efficient causation at-
tributable to matter? After all Plotinus does say that matter produces secondary
evils. The way in which evils of the soul (i.e. the vices) are produced has been
113In the sense of non-universal.

114Cf. DMS 48,1-5; 16-18; 49,5-7; 18; 60,5-3, and OPSOMER / STEEL, On the Existence of Evils cit., pp.
15-16; p. 52, n. 82 and n. 96; p. 121 n. 244; p. 130, n. 397.
115 Compare PLOT., I,8 [51] 7,1-5.
116 I,8, 4,20-22 (hJ u{lh" fuvsi" ou{tw" ou\sa kakh; wJ" kai; to; mhvpw ejn aujth/,' movnon de; blevyan eij" aujthvn,
ajnapimplavnai kakou' eJauth'";) 10,6; 10,13; II,4 [12] 16,24; III,6 [26] 11,43 et passim.
117 E.g. Enn. II,9 [33] 8,22-26; V,1 [10] 6,30-39; V,4 [7] 1,23-34; 2,27-33.
118 In his reconstruction of Plotinus’ argument O’Meara lists as premise 3. «Whatever, as good, pro-
duces, produces something less good than it» (my italics). The qualification obtained by inserting the
words «as good» is needed to prevent the undesirable conclusion that secondary evils are worse than pri-
mary evil (if everything that is produced is worse than its cause). In other words, it actually plays no role
for the argument reconstructed by O’Meara (and it does not seem to correspond directly to anything in the
text of Plotinus, at least not in I,8 [51] 7; see, however, V,1 [10] 6,37-38), but anticipates a counter-argu-
ment that could otherwise have been constructed using Plotinus’ (O’Meara’s) own premises. Implicitly
O’Meara thus admits that there is another form of production than that by the good. It is, however, causal
dualism which proves to be one of the main problems for Plotinus’ account.
188 Jan Opsomer
carefully analysed by D. O’Brien. He shows that there is no straightforward cau-

sation of these evils by matter. The presence of matter causes weakness in the
soul, but not necessarily so (because some souls are strong enough not to be
tempted by matter119). Moreover, to be weak is not yet to be evil. If the soul is
weak, however, and turns to matter, it becomes evil. In that case the presence of
matter and the weakness of the soul jointly produce evil in the soul. On their own
weakness and matter are just part causes. One of them, however, is ultimately
produced by the other120. The process described comprises two distinct mo-
ments: one in which the soul becomes weak in the presence of matter, and a sec-
ond in which the soul, now weak, returns to matter, becomes fascinated by it and
gets corrupted.
So matter is part of the causal story explaining the origin of the evils of the
soul, but its causality is rather complex and not on a par with, say, the genera-
tion of beauty by the idea of beauty (as an efficient and formal/paradigmatic
cause). However, evils of the soul are not the only secondary evils. After all, there
are also the evils of the body. I do not know of any complex causal explanation
of secondary evils of bodies comparable to that offered for the vices of the soul.
At the beginning of I,8,4 Plotinus merely states that evils of the body are sec-
ondary and links them to the participation in matter. Bodies appear to be evil in-
sofar as they participate in matter121. Had Plotinus wanted to avoid making mat-
ter into a simple efficient cause of evil, i.e. a producer of evil, he would have
needed to offer an account of the origin of bodily evils analogous to that of the
evils of the soul. Or else he should have argued that bodily evils are not real evils.
But he does neither122. It cannot be denied that Plotinus is not really interested
in bodily evils, but he clearly treats them as a category of their own123. More im-
portantly, he seems to have no qualms about describing matter as an efficient,
productive cause124. So perhaps the complex causal explanation of the vices of
the soul is intended not so much in order to water down the causal role of mat-
ter in general but rather to draw the attention to the precarious situation of the
119Cf. I,8 [51] 4,24-26; O’BRIEN, Plotinus on Evil cit., pp. 129-132, 141.
120Cf. I,8 [51] 14,49-50: u{lh toivnun kai; ajsqeneiva" yuch/' aijtiva kai; kakiva" aijtiva.
121 I,8 [51] 4,1-2: swmavtwn de; fuvsi", kaqovson metevcei u{lh", kako;n a]n ouj prw'ton ei[h.
122 See also V,9 [5] 10; I,8 [51] 14,10-13.
123 One might think the existence of bodily evils depends on the soul’s capacity to be aware of them,
but that is not what is at issue. Fact is that according to Plotinus there is an independent causation of bodi-
ly evils (compare what was said above about Proclus, supra p. 181). They are not caused by the soul, but di-
rectly by matter. Of course it is true that if neither soul nor intellect nor the one existed (see the thought ex-
periment discussed above) bodily evils would be without any meaning and there would be no reason to call
them (or matter) evil. This counterfactual argument moreover disregards the fact that neither matter nor
bodies would exist in the absence of the higher hypostases.
124 I,8 [51] 4,21-25; 6,58-59 (ta; ejnantiva poiei').
human soul125. Plotinus above all wants to explain that the pernicious influence
of matter on the soul leaves intact its responsibility and freedom of choice. Vices
of the soul are causally related to the presence of matter but at the same time the
soul is morally responsible for them.
From the passages in which Plotinus describes the nature of matter and those
in which he highlights its role as cause and principle I can draw no other con-
clusion than that Plotinus regards matter as an evil principle of evils. There is
no way of knowing whether he meant what he said, but what he said was quite
clear and it invited the justified criticism of his successors.
125 Cf. O’BRIEN, Plotinus on Evil cit., p. 144: «Plotinus’ own preoccupation was probably to avoid mak-
ing either matter or the nature of the soul an exclusive cause of sin. He was probably reluctant to make
matter sole and sufficient cause of evil in the soul, because this would have subjected soul to matter, the
higher to the lower. Equally, Plotinus was probably reluctant to make the soul’s weakness sole and suffi-
cient cause of sin, because this would have given evil a place among the first realities». In support of the
thought expressed in the last sentence many texts can be adduced. E.g. I,8 [51] 4,5-6; 5,26-28; 11,17. By
situating the origin of evils at the level of rational souls (and independently at the level of bodies), Pro-
clus bites the bullet and resolutely gives evils a place among the higher realities. In return he emphasis-
es that it merely has a parasitic existence and is never directly intended (whether this last bit is plausi-
ble is an entirely different matter). Evils occur, but they are not related to any principle of their own.

Plotinus' Theory of Matter and Evil Critically Analyzed

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Plotinus' Theory of Matter and Evil Critically Analyzed

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

07_Opsomer_7.

QXD 28-04-2008 10:19 Pagina 165

Some Problems with Plotinus’ Theory

1 I thank David Schweikard for checking the English.

«Quaestio», 7 (2007), 165-189 • 10.1484/J.QUAESTIO.1.100153

166 Jan Opsomer

Proclus criticises Plotinus for making the following claims:

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 167

11 See, e.g., O’MEARA, Das Böse cit., pp. 45-46.

1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16... [1/2n].

168 Jan Opsomer

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 169

The talk of a desire of matter is of course metaphorical21 and brings Proclus

170 Jan Opsomer

IAMBLICHUS, De anima, ap. Stob. 1,375).

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 171

«Evil is unmeasuredness, absolute unlimitedness, imperfection and indeterminate-

26For more details see DMS 11-39.

172 Jan Opsomer

ter is not accidentally, but essentially evil29. He speaks of a substance or form of

tokakovn); 13,9 (secondary evil as oujd’ aujtokakovn).

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 173

38 I,8 [51] 10,15-16.

174 Jan Opsomer

the Forms42. Proclus distinguishes clearly between «contrary to Form/sub-

46 For a Platonist this is an oxymoron.

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 175

The idea is that matter is essentially qualityless, which makes it incapable of

48H-S2 and Armstrong read h\n. I have modified his translation.

51 II,4, [12] 5,18: nekro;n kekosmhmevnon.

e[con ajgaqou' moi'ran.

something else. See below.

176 Jan Opsomer

I,8 [51] 5,2-3.

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 177

poiei'n, kai; to; yuvcein a[llou). Cf. PLATO, Resp., I, 335D3-4; 8.

65 III,2 [47] 16,44-45; IV,7 [2] 4,25-26.

178 Jan Opsomer

«Good, as the cause of Evil, must be more evil than Evil».

from the application of the aforementioned principle [O’Meara’s Axiom 1] to

71 O’MEARA, Metaphysics of Evil cit., pp. 184-185.

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 179

75 Cf. Enn., III,6 [26] 14,11-12: o{ti ajgaqou' e[rhmo".

evilness is at least a characteristic or quasi-property of matter.

of goodness. Cf. n. 20.

180 Jan Opsomer

as evilness. Absence does not cause anything, nothing can participate in it or

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 181

Dionysius, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, p. 133.

182 Jan Opsomer

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 183

for the present purpose.

184 Jan Opsomer

97SCHÄFER, Unde malum cit., pp. 133-134 et passim.

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 185

demonstration, «an ‘agent-neutral’ shorthand» way of talking, whereas Plotinus’

104SCHÄFER, Matter cit., p. 290.

186 Jan Opsomer

intrinsic nature of matter108. Consequently he distinguishes this intrinsic nature

(I,8 [51] 10,13-11.2), however, is interpreted tendentiously. It is misleadingly presented as expressing a

Some problems with Plotinus’ theory of matter/evil 187

113In the sense of non-universal.

188 Jan Opsomer