PLATO'S 'NOBLE' LIE

Author(s): D. Dombrowski
Source: History of Political Thought , Winter 1997, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter 1997), pp.
565-578
Published by: Imprint Academic Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26217435

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History of Political
Thought

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PLATO'S 'NOBLE' LIE

D. Dombrowski

I
Introduction

Very few contemporary philosophers would agree with what was apparently
Kant's position — that lying is always morally impermissible. Two sorts of lie
are now generally seen as morally permissible. First, lies that prevent cata
strophic effects from occurring, as in the inquiring murderer case made famous
by Kant himself. Second, 'white' lies, whose consequences are insignificant,
are also generally considered morally permissible, provided they do not become
habitual and are not conducive to morally bothersome lies. Much more contro
versial among philosophers, however, is the moral status of a species of
paternalistic lie derived from Plato called 'the noble lie'.
Not all paternalistic lies will be considered in this article. It is easy to imagine
why some would defend some paternalistic lies, say if one were literally a pater
who could prevent harm being done to his child by telling him/her a lie. But
there are problems here in that it is also easy to imagine even greater harm being
done to the child if there were some means of preventing the initial harm being
done without resorting to a lie. If it is difficult to justify paternalistic lies to
children, as surely it is, it is even more difficult to justify paternalistic lies when
the person lied to is a sound-minded adult. Perhaps it is impossible to do so, at
least if we assume that the lie is not told in order to save a life, once again as
in the inquiring murderer case.
The purpose of this article is both to examine Plato's own use of the noble
lie in politics and to examine it within the context of contemporary political
philosophy, a context wherein at least three different assessments of the noble
lie are possible. First I will consider the strengths of those (e.g. Karl Popper)
who see the noble lie as part of, or at least leading to, totalitarian politics. Second
I will also consider the degree to which contemporary (Leo Straussian) defend
ers of Plato can adequately defend the noble lie. Thirdly, I will articulate and
defend a third (John Rawlsian) view that mediates between the above two
views, albeit in a way that finds the noble lie morally objectionable even if it
is not necessarily seen as part of totalitarian political aspirations. In effect, I
lean more towards the Popperian assessment of the noble lie than towards the
Straussian one, even if it must be admitted that the Popperian assessment is
hyperbolic.

HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XVIII. No. 4. Winter 1997

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 566 D. DOMBROWSKI

π
Totalitarianism

The key passage in Plato regarding the noble lie is Republic 414b-c, which has
always been one of the most controversial passages in his corpus. This is the
section where he introduces his version of the myth of the metals (taken from
Hesiod), in which those of the golden generation will rule, while the silvery
types will be soldiers, and the bronze and iron people will be workers. What
causes the turmoil is the possible intent that Plato has in using this myth. The
controversial passage goes as follows, where the character Socrates says:
How, then, said I, might we contrive one of those opportune (deonti) false
hoods (pseudon) of which we were just now speaking, so as by one noble lie
(gennaion ti en pseudomenous) to persuade if possible the rulers themselves,
but failing that the rest of the city?1

Popper infers from this passage that Plato was both a racist and a totalitarian.2
For Popper, the myth is a fraud designed to reconcile the common citizens
(those supposedly of bronze and iron blood) to their lot. It is significant that
this interpretation hinges on Popper's translation of the passage in question. He
translates gennaion as 'lordly' and pseudomenous as 'lie'.3 The 'lordly lie' that
Γΐϋΐυ ilUVULillCîi IS UlUltailVC UI ridlU S IdtlM OlidlULiatJ' aiiu dlIUUlu nui ut/

confused with a truly noble lie, Popper thinks (e.g. Tom Sawyer's,
he took Becky's guilt upon himself). Furthermore, Popper translate
'handy',4 thereby showing a quasi-fascist or Machiavellian side of
resists all idealization.
Equally negative are the interpretations of R.H.S. Crossman and W
The former translates the important words in question as 'noble l
nothing noble in this lie.5 In fact, he sees Plato as another Hitler
because, according to Crossman, Plato's lying propaganda is really o
consumption of the ruled. Fite translates gennaion as 'pious' andpseu
as 'lies' or 'fictions', and deonti as 'opportune'.6 These opportune, p
are used by Plato to create a myth of 'brotherhood' when policies
general sacrifice on the part of the people. Fite contends that we
Socrates and Glaucon laughing in the background as the gullible ma
the audacious story about the golden types, i.e. the philosophers.

1 See the translation of the Republic by Paul Shorey in The Collected

Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, 1973). Also see
edition of Plato, Platonis Opera, ed. J. Burnet (Oxford, 1977), Vol. 4.
2 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies: The Spell of Plato (Lon
1st published 1945).
3 Ibid., pp. 270-1.
4 Ibid., p. 140.
5 R.H.S. Crossman, Plato Today (Oxford, 1939), p. 130.
6 Warner Fite, The Platonic Legend (New York, 1934), p. 29.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PLATO'S 'NOBLE' LIE 567

This negative tendency reached its zenith

World War, and at least initially it appears
follow Popper's interpretation and compar
Inquisitor.7 But even before the war, Arn
and Ralph Waldo Emerson, the Platophile w
and philosophy Plato', also said, concerni
that Plato:

... throws a littlè ... dust in our eyes. I am so

superiorities, permitting the lie to governor
with the baser sort, as people allow themsel

Emerson's view has been reiterated more

correctly notes that little serious study ha
cially as regards one of the most importan
Hpalincr with thp sn-pfl11p.H nnhlp. lip Although hp Hops not mp.ntinn Tptptipp

Irwin's fine book on Plato's moral theory, no harm is done in that Irwin does
not treat the present passage in any detail.
Ferguson isolates three conflicts that appear in this passage: (a) The funda
mental dichotomy is between Plato's stance that all falsehood is ethically wrong
and his suggestion that the rulers can tell a pseudos in rder to inculcate
obedience in the subject citizens for, as Ferguson puts it, 'the sake of the
stability of the society'. Ferguson seems to go a bit too far, however, in claiming
that the mlers cannot only tell a pseudos, but also use 'whatever means' to
inculcate obedience. Much is at stake here, because it is only by assuming that
the rulers can use 'whatever means' possible to inculcate obedience that Fer
guson can make the Popperian claim that Plato was a totalitarian, (b) There is
a dichotomy between the 'absolutism' of Plato's stance that all falsehood is
ethically wrong and his admission that falsehood springing from knowledge is
ethically preferable to falsehood springing from ignorance, (c) There is a
dichotomy between Plato's stance that the rulers must possess to the full
intellectual and moral virtue and the pseudos the mlers must tell, specifically
because full intellectual and moral virtue limits the means the mlers have at
their disposal to inculcate obedience.

7 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 1971), p. 454.

8 Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. 1 (London, 1934), pp. 247-9.
9 Ralph Waldo Emerson, 'Plato', in The Essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson (New York,
1944), p. 417.
10 J. Ferguson, 'The Ethics of the gennaion pseudos', Liverpool Classical Monthly,
6, 10 (December, 1981), pp. 259-67.
11 Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford,
1977).

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 568 D. DOMBROWSKI

Ill
Apologia
There are good reasons, however, for thinking that Popper, Crossman, Fite,
Emerson, Toyhbee and Ferguson should be criticized even if they are ultimately
on the right track. I would like to start this criticism by responding to the
conflicts in Plato detailed by Ferguson, often relying, ironically enough, on
Ferguson himself, whose intellectual honesty in alerting us to other points of
view supplies us with enough evidence to refute the thesis that Plato's ethics is
in serious trouble because of the above alleged conflicts, and that Plato's noble
lie is part of, or that it leads to, totalitarianism. I will make three points of my own.
My first point deals with Ferguson's use of F.M. Cornford.12 Ferguson rightly
cites Cornford's contention that the Greek pseudos has a much wider sense than
our 'lie' in that it applies to all works of imagination, fictitious narratives, etc.,
and onlv sometimes refers to lies. Fersuson asrees that Cornford is too solid a
scholar to talk nonsense, because at 376e-377a pseudos is used of fairy-tales
told to children. In fact, the value of these stories lies precisely in the truth
(aletheia) they contain. Even though Ferguson is right that usually when Plato
uses the term pseudos (or its cognates) it is in adverse ethical judgments, and
in opposition to aletheia, there is nothing contradictory, as I will show below,
in having aletheia contained in a pseudos. In any event, it is strange that
Ferguson should first admit Cornford's point concerning how wide the term
pseudos is, and then go on to translate pseudos throughout the rest of the article
as 'lie' without much further comment.
I can find only two spots in Ferguson that attempt to dismiss Cornford's
important point, both of which involve the fact that the pseudos in question is
gennaion. First, Ferguson thinks that one can speak of a 'thumping lie' but not
of a 'thumping story'. His point seems to be that if we take the negative value
judgment out of pseudos, as defenders of Plato presumably wish to do, we
deprive it of its ability to be called gennaion. Why? We are not told. I do not
rind a "thumping story or a nonie story Dotnersome rrom me perspective oi
ordinary language, nor from various other perspectives. Second, Ferguson
claims that 'it will not do to underplay the irony of the oxymoron gennaion
pseudos'. But to admit that Plato is ironic does not establish the case that he
contradicts himself. One can grant Ferguson's point here without seeing how
it enables us to escape Cornford. In sum, the wideness of the scope of pseudos
helps the defender of Plato to somewhat avoid the conflicts in (a) and (c) above.
Nor does the concept of gennaion pseudos run counter to the metaphysical
system of the Republic, as Ferguson says. This will become apparent below.
The whole purpose of the Republic is to educate Glaucon, et al., and to educate
one must not only gaze at the eternal forms, but also at this world, in which as
much knowledge as possible is to be obtained (see 501b).

F.M. Cornford, The Republic of Plato (Oxford, 1975 ; 1st published 1941).

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PLATO'S 'NOBLE' LIE 569

My second point deals with Ferguson's ch

understand the pseudos. For Ferguson, the
pseudos is found at 389b-c, where it is sug
the gods but may be useful to human bein
is correct in this judgment, but hasty in assu
or the richest one, upon which the genna
prefer instead to try an educational analog
textual support, as we have seen, from 37
pseudos is a teaching device, then by consid
able better to preserve Plato's consistency i
alleged conflicts.
With respect to (b), if the pseudos is an e
much ashamed of knowingly using it. Fergu
see the pseudos as innocent to study 381e-
between the true pseudos (alethos pseudos),
or where one has deceived oneself, and the
kind of imitation and is not unruly (akrato
clear that the latter pseudos is not only usefu
(me axion einai misous). Only the true pseud
gods themselves also avoid pseudos in words
do not need (N.B. deonti at 414b) apseudos in
An example will get at the heart of the ma
Plato's use of the noble lie. When I was a st
in physics, of which there were two sectio
for non-science majors. I fell into the latte
majors included a knowledge of calculus
course I took was taught by a man who spo
with many pictures in it of inclined planes,
the course to be nicknamed 'Funny Book Ph
was a totalitarian, dividing the campus into
But he was a good teacher and without him I
than I do.

Plato, it could be argued, was aware of som

to rule one must not only have knowledge
ι cina^s suuic van miuw aiiu unucisiaiiu wimi Kiiuwieuge is wiinoui me aia 01
images and hypotheses, but some can do so only with the aid of a model, with
its pseudo-truth (e.g. the divided line); and some others cannot understand even
this model, much less reality and knowledge itself. They must be told stories
(e.g. the allegory of the cave), because that is all they can understand. These
stories must ultimately rest on some truth so as to avoid the true pseudos, but
because they are stories they can only deliver a pseudo-truth. We must recog
nize, Plato seems to be saying, the differences in form in which truths are held;
and one of the jobs of the teacher is to make forms adequate for everyone.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
570 D. DOMBROWSKI

My third point has to do with Fergus

much to be thankful. He has made sever
that even if the pseudos (Ferguson sa
pseudos in words, this does not mean th
oddest part of this passage is the sugge
persuaded by the gennaion pseudos — a
that even the citizens, although they d
soul-chariots, and reason must hold the
Plato is a curious mix of idealist and pra
to move from 'the ethically right action
'the action which leads to the most desi
For all of these points Ferguson's seriou
Richard Rorty has stated:

The permanent fascination of the man

Western philosophy — Plato — is that w
philosopher he was ... the fact that after
knows which passages in the dialogues a

We really do not know whether Plato is

done it elsewhere, some have claimed.14
one point says that 'Plato's use of irony
taking these words at their face value. Th
element of ethical surprise about the g
to go beyond this limit when he calls Pla
D.E. Hahm has written on this passage
the pseudos, not without irony, the nece
more than their own interest in mind.1
inculcation of obedience in the citize
Ferguson notes, but also the care of eac
thai),16 Plato establishes through the ps
nity of playful men'. The unlikelihood o
message (harsh, at least, to Ferguson
showing a similarity to Aristophanes' s
are told that their youth was a dream (o
of the earth itself. When Socrates is told
pseudos, he agrees, and then taunts his l

13 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirr

14 See, e.g. Robert Zaslovsky, Ά Hither
Apeiron, 15 (1981), pp. 115-16; and Danie
Republic 372', Ancient Philosophy, 9 (1990
15 D.E. Hahm, 'Plato's Noble Lie and Pol
aevalia, 30 (1969), pp. 211-27.
16 Plato, Republic, 415d.
17 Ibid., 414d.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PLATO'S 'NOBLE' LIE 571

heard the half of it!18 He then tells the inc

admits must fly away on the wings of ru
doubts as to whether the rulers themselv
use this pseudos.
Indeed, as Rorty has suggested, Plato is s
see him as a totalitarian thinker, and othe
likely to see him as an endless source of d
phrase 'bold flight of invention'20 is a cu
captures the lightheadedness that Plato may
lie is a contradiction in terms, hence he
harmless allegory, similar to those foun
Ronald Levinson sees Plato offering an 'e
Even those who climb as high as the thir
images and the distortion they contain in
circle as ODDOsed to the Dronerties of circularitv itself). Human beings, includ

ing philosophers, are somewhat childlike in that they need images of reality and
their pseudo-truth in order to know. To deny the level of pseudo-truth appro
priate to a certain level of intelligence would prevent a person at that level from
knowing at all.21
Thus far in this article I have argued that both the interpretation of Plato's
noble lie as a totalitarian device and the efforts to defend Plato's noble lie are
defective. In the remainder of this article, however, I will try to show that the
graver defects are to be found on the Straussian side, such that it is best, as in
the title to the present article, to refer to Plato's 'noble' lie; or to be fair to Plato,
to the 'noble' 'lie'.

IV
The Straussians

It must be admitted that in his famous essay on 'Plato' in History of Political

Philosophy, Leo Strauss does not explicitly treat the 'noble' lie, but because he
treats all of the other major elements in Plato's political philosophy in some
detail, it seems fair to conclude that Strauss is not very much bothered by the
'noble' lie. He is correct to emphasize that there is no small degree of anach
ronism involved in claiming that Plato was a communist or a fascist. Nor should
we expect Plato to be a political liberal in the contemporary (say Rawlsian)
sense. But much can be gained, I think, by analysing the 'noble' lie from the
perspective of contemporary (Rawlsian) political liberalism, so as to isolate
exactly what the problem is with this device. That is, Strauss does not find the

18 See Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (London, 1892), 415a.
19 Ibid., 415d (Jowett trans.).
20 Cornford, Republic of Plato, p. 106.
21 See Plato, Laws, 663d-664a.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 572 D. DOMBROWSKI

'noble' lie problematic because he does

liberal freedom to be sound; the alle
democracy, he thinks, are not real ones
Likewise, although Strauss does not e
Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy,
Platonic philosophers are a different k
intellectually and morally superior to th
and demanding way of life in the searc
understand Strauss correctly, when ph
would rather be communing with the
carte blanche they have to tell a 'noble
about a just society.23 Strauss's nonch
however, only makes sense if he think
intellectual and moral superiority to th
it is unlikely that such can be both foun
one cannot remain nonchalant regardin
would rather constitute a scandal.
It is only in The City and Man that Strauss explicity treats the 'noble' lie, a
device that he does not think is terribly bothersome in that all Platonic dialogues
are 'radically fictitious'; that is, they are all beautiful falsehoods. He does,
however, like his lollower Allan Bloom, translate pseudos m this context as lie .
Despite Strauss's (peculiar) interpretation of Plato's dialogue format, Strauss
realizes that the gennaion pseudos is not so much a beautiful falsehood as a
device that is needed to bring about the Republic. It should be noted that it is
the 'city of pigs', the preliminary city from Book Two of the Republic, that is
described as the true or the truthful city. Only in that preliminary city was there
no need for untrue stories told to children and to adults alike.25 That is, the
Republic itself is not exactly a Utopian place in that the philosophers there need
to resort to lies about the gods, which is ironic when it is realized that the gods
do not lie at all, not even when dealing witn interior beings." ay way or
contrast, human rulers must lie if they wish to be just. To make this view
plausible, however, Strauss would have to supply reasons (that he does not
supply) why justice and truth are at times in inverse relationship to each other.
In effect, on Straussian grounds, if a ruler wishes to be just the ruler must, at
times, lie; and if the ruler wishes to be truthful the ruler must, at times, be unjust.

22 LeoStrauss, 'Plato',in L. Strauss, History of Political Philosophy (Chicago, 1972),

pp. 9, 47.
23 See Leo Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (Chicago, 1983).
24 See Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago, 1964), pp. 60-1, 98-9, 102-3,
124—5. Also see Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato (New York, 1968).
25 Plato, Republic, 377c-d.
26 Ibid., 382d.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PLATO'S 'NOBLE' LIE 573

In The City and Man Strauss seems quite c

that the good city cannot exist without a 'fu
in the element of truth'. Strauss cites two
citizens must be made to believe that the distinction between nature and
convention is a blur; this is accomplished by the philosophers telling the citizens
that they are brothers by virtue of the fact that they all have the same mother,
the earth. That is, although there is not really a fraternity of all fellow citizens,
the citizens must be convinced that there is such if a good city is to result.
Second, the citizens have to be convinced of the fundamental inequality of the
brothers: the fraternity is traced to the earth and the inequality to the gods, who
put a stamp on natural differences among the citizens. Strauss readily grants
Plato's point regarding the natural inequality among the citizens, and does not
care to analyse the different senses of the terms 'equality' and 'inequality' that
have been painstakingly distinguished by liberal political thinkers. For example,
contemporary liberal thinkers have a tendency to think that in one important
respect all human beings (and, some think, all animals with central nervous
systems) are equal: they are sentient beings who are subjects of lives that can
go well or ill for them as individuals, hence they each deserve that equal
consideration of their interests be taken into account, even if other factors might
lead us to conclude that they do not deserve equal treatment. In contrast to
nutiai uniijvcia, ouauaa anuwa iiu ui a wnijuigiicaa tu caii nnu ljucôuuii

Plato's own radically inegalitarian view.

It does not seem hyperbolic to claim that Strauss (explicitly
Man and implicitly in other works) shares Plato's view of no
cave-dwellers who see only shadows of the truth, hence the f
told lies by the philosophers is not bothersome as long as these
or noble or heroic, however one translates gennaion.
Seth Bernadete is a Straussian who reiterates Strauss's view of the 'noble'
lie: there is no reason to be bothered by the noble lie if it gives assurance to
those of baser metals that they will not be gobbled up by the rulers.27 Likewise,
Thomas Pangle is a Straussian who emphasizes that genuine wisdom belongs
to a few rare individuals such that political life is largely composed of an
approximation to wisdom, and since popular consent is necessarilv consent of
the less wise, it is 'always consent colored by deception and self-deception'
(my emphasis). Quite a negative view! We will see in the next section, however,
that there are good reasons not to be so pessimistic, and not to think it necessary
to be wary of the open society. That is, the open society defended by political
liberals need not be, as Pangle and other Straussians think, a 'deluded libera
tion'.28

27 Seth Bernadete, Socrates' Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic (Chicago, 1989).

28 Thomas Pangle, The Ennobling of Democracy (B altimore, 1992), pp. 127,210-11.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 574 D. DOMBROWSKI

It is not the purpose of this article

and idiosyncratic view of Plato's Repu
Rather, I have concentrated in this se
nonpolitical nature of Plato's and Str
lie: it involves the implementation of
public life of any sort of disagreemen
characteristic of modern liberal (e
teristics of liberal political life are actu
and Strauss, hence it is morally perm
wise to tell lies so as to prevent the a
even goes out of his way to say that
philosopher from lying, etc. is to bu

ν
Political Liberalism

Two commentators in particular are worthy of consideration in order to further

point out the defects in Straussian attempts to defend the 'noble' lie; then I will
finally move to the implications of Rawls' version of political liberalism for the
'noble' lie.
Even if the 'noble' lie is told in the interest of the common people, and even
if the common people do not mind this state of affairs, Julia Annas's conclusion
that there is something manipulative and morally bothersome about the 'noble'
lie carries a great deal of weight;30 and the fact that the rulers are not conde
scending does not change the fact that they treat others in (im)morally relevant
ways they do not treat each other. Their superior expertise does not, she thinks,
justify their being less than truthful with others even if they are 'fanatically'
truth-loving among themselves. At the very least, our ordinary moral assump
tion or intuition is that we do not think that superior knowledge gives one the
right to lie. For example, we would not grant that God would remain omni
benevolent if God lied, nor would we grant that intellectually superior visitors
from another planet or the Nazis — wiser than us by self-proclamation — can
be morally permitted to lie.
Consider the following line of reasoning from Annas. At Republic 382c it
seems that Plato is saying that as long as one takes care not to be deceived
oneself, then telling falsehoods is not really lying, but is instead a mere image

29 For a summary and helpful criticism of Strauss's view of the Republic see Dale
Hall, 'The Republic and the "Limits of Politics" Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 293
313; for a defence of Strauss against Hall see Allan Bloom, 'Response to Hall', Political
Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 315-30. Also see S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston, 1960).
30 Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford, 1982), pp. 107-8,
166-7; also see Nicholas White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis, 1988),
p. 104.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PLATO'S 'NOBLE' LIE 575

of lying. But if Plato's view here is correct

soul by lying in words with bad intent as w
intent. Or again, at 485c-d and 490a-d it s
tirelessly for the truth, yet at 459c-460a t
straightforwardly; etc. In effect, Annas is rig
many passages where pseudos or its cogna
such that efforts to deliver an apologia for
at some point or other to break down. (Re
themselves translate pseudos at 414b-c as
Plato is clear, however, that what it would
be to establish as fact that the rulers are a
to notice that for Plato it is right for the ru
because it is for the public good — even a c
rather because of the kind of individual t
'η/νΚΙο' lia \\7V1 r\ oro trorlitianolietc Ctroiiocion r*r rvlViariiiioa mipp tV«c* knot an tkip

crucial point. Plato's rulers can lie only because they are truth-lo
and possess noticeably superior intellectual and moral abilities to th
general population. In effect, any contemporary attempt to defend th
pseudos is only as strong as the effort to demonstrate that the rule
superior, both intellectually and morally, to those who are deceived
point in Emersonian terms, any contemporary attempt to permit o
the gennaion pseudos would have to do more than show (as in a cru
of utilitarianism) that the lie was for the common good; on Platon
one must show that the one who told the lie had the intellectual and moral
superiority (as a moral agent rather than as a moral patient) a rational human
being has to an animal. This demonstration is not likely to be forthcoming.
Political liberals, by way of contrast, are to be commended for following Kant
in thinking that our rulers can only come from the ranks of human beings with
the same sort of intellectual abilities and moral predispositions as those that the
rest of us possess. We now claim to know — accurately, I think — that our
rulers can be only marginally brighter or better than the rest of us, and we are
lucky if even these sorts of leaders can be found, hence the agent-centred
dimension of classical and Straussian justifications of the 'noble' lie is likely
to cause such iustificatinns to fail Rcvardintr nnhlie nnlirv matters nn nnlitieal

leader is likely to have the intellectual superiority over his/her subjects the way
a PhD in physics might have such a superiority over eighteen-year-old freshmen
with little or no background in physics; and no political leader (not even Gandhi,
by his own admission) is likely to have the moral superiority needed to justify
anything less than an attitude of truthfulness towards the citizens. However,
Plato is to be thanked for at least this much: he has shed light on the casuistry
needed in order for a virtuous ruler to justify a gennaion pseudos. This ruler
needs to ask not merely 'Will the lie foster the common good?' but also 'Am I
intellectually and morally superior to those to whom I am about to lie?'

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 576 D. DOMBROWSKI

The point I wish to make in this section

to defend Plato's use of the 'noble' lie
pseudos can be put, and by viewing th
device) are more successful when seen
racist and a totalitarian than they are wh
Plato's deceptive politics.
This point can be reiterated through
addition to Annas. Sissela Bok is not co
order to persuade them to accept class
harmony is justifiable. She translates g
to what Disraeli had in mind when he s
when to tell the truth and when not to
she disagrees with Erasmus when he tol
were only temporary in that they wer
common people little by little.32 Bok's
perspective of the deceived when one is

If we assume the perspective of the de

consequences of government deception
sive. We cannot take for granted either
those who lie to us, no matter how muc
learned that much deceit for private ga
interest. We know how deception, eve
corrupts and spreads. And we have liv
told for what were believed to be noble

We might think of the secret war in

States in the early 1970s. When the decei
about this secret war many of them wer
having been deceived by Richard Nixo
government lies might be justifiable s
this does not necessarily provide a jus
as Bok makes clear:

We have every reason to regard government as more profoundly injured by

a dismissal of criticism and a failure to consider standards than by efforts to
discuss them openly. If duplicity is to be allowed in exceptional cases, the
criteria for these exceptions should themselves be openly debated and pub

31 Sissela Bok, Lying (New York, 1989), p. 167. Also see The Republic of Plato, ed.
James Adam (Cambridge, 1902), who translates gennaion as 'heroic', but pseudos as
'falsehood' or 'lie'.
32 Bok, Lying, p. 168. See Erasmus, Responsio ad Albertum Pium, in Opera Omnia,
Vol. 9 (Hildesheim, 1962).
33 Bok, Lying, p. 169.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PLATO'S 'NOBLE' LIE 577

licly chosen. Otherwise government leaders w

and distort the facts and thus escape accounta

We can thus see why Hastings Rashdall's vi

when he said in 1924 that government fraud
quences of such frauds were socially benefic
VI
Rawls and the 'Noble' Lie

The call to return to an ethics of virtue and to classic political ideals has recently
been made by many traditionalists and conservatives, including the Straussians.
I would like to make it clear that as a political liberal I am not necessarily
opposed to such a return. But such a return is defensible only if the worst aspects
of ancient political philosophy, in this case Plato's 'noble' lie, are carefully
QntilvepH anrl r>rlfipi7pH Tn tViic t-p*rrarrl tfip Qtranocionc epptn tn liQttP faîlpH TVipxî

have left more than an impression to the effect that they are not bother
Plato's use of the gennaion pseudos.
John Rawls however, as we have seen, is bothered by this device. It i
purpose of this last section of the article to supplement the efforts of Anna
Bok — as well as the hyperbolic efforts of those who see Plato as a pro
totalitarian because of his use of the 'noble' lie — to criticize the 'noble' lie. I
will be interested specifically in Rawls' most recent book, Political Liberal
ism,36 which has not received anywhere near the attention it deserves by
Straussians or other political traditionalists or conservatives.
The key distinction in this book, I think, is that between the comprehensive
moral doctrines that may govern citizens' private lives and the principles of
public reason that would be agreed to by reasonable persons in a fair decision
making process, a process enshrined in Rawls' now-famous concept of justice
as fairness. The truth, if there is such, may well be found in the comprehensive
doctrines held by private citizens,37 doctrines that may very well include ethics
of virtue similar to those found in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, etc. But
holding a political conception as the truth, and for that reason the one suitable
basis for public reason, is sectarian and exclusive, and hence likely to foster
political division.38 Unless, of course, at least some reasonable citizens are
forced to obey the political conception deemed to be the truth, or unless they
are lied to so as to win their allegiance.
When we are dealing with reasonable people who may very well disagree
regarding the comprehensive views that govern their moral lives (say because

34 Ibid., p. 170.
35 Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil (Oxford, 2nd edn., 1924), Book
, p. 195.
36 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 1993).
37 Ibid., pp. xx, 94,116,126, 153.
38 Ibid., p. 129.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 578 D. DOMBROWSKI

they are members of different religion

be members of different races or ge
public reason has to fall short of the
there is such a thing as the truth. Po
same thing as comprehensive liberalis
very well be of two minds at some d
practice is morally wrong but noneth
where reasonable people disagree abo
position regarding the political permi
pregnancy, despite his Catholic beliefs
That is, although public reason is no
the truth, it is nonetheless the place w
in direct contrast to Plato's view wh
themselves but can lie in public. Politi
important senses,41 all of which requir
is the reason of citizens as such in th
the good of the public in matters of f
content are public and open to view o
to lie to them, is at odds with the val
citizenship, an ideal detested by both
IStraussians.

The ideal of democratic citizenship, enhanced by the objectivity provided

Rawls' original position, is built on the shared reason of citizens, a sharing th
involves publicity at several levels.42 The most basic of these levels is that t
principles of justice that govern a just society should be adopted publicly in
procedure that should at least asymptotically approach the Rawlsian origin
position. This publicity requirement is blatantly violated by a telling of th
gennaion pseudos. In the just society defended by political liberals, as oppose
to that defended by Plato or Strauss, nothing need be hidden; there is no ne
for the 'illusions and delusions of ideology'. By 'ideology' here I assume tha
Rawls refers to Plato's and Strauss's belief that the philosophic rulers can
confident that their views really do mirror the truth in ways that the views
others do not, or cannot, mirror it.
Political liberals cannot hope that nothing will be hidden from the citizens
that there is much that no one, not even conscientious and bright rulers, ca
know in the effort to make good political decisions. That is, it is always possi
that we can be unwittingly misled. But this is a far cry from actually attempti
to justify a lie to the citizens.

Daniel Dombrowski SEATTLE UNIVERSITY

39 Ibid., pp. 242-3. 41 Ibid., p. 213.

40 Ibid., p. 9. 42 Ibid., pp. 66-71.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Tue, 07 Feb 2023 23:45:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms