Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus: Some More Specifics

Rist, John M.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 27, Number 2, April 1989,

pp. 183-197 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.1989.0045

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v027/27.2rist.html

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 Back to the Mysticism of
Plotinus: Some More Specifics
JOHN M. R I S T

1. INTRODUCTION

PHILOSOPHERS DIFFER in their accounts o f their p r e d e c e s s o r s - - b u t unevenly:

there are m o r e versions o f Plato than o f H u m e . In the last half century at least
two Plotinuses have e m e r g e d : one a mystic with philosophical pretensions,
some o f which are increasingly held to be well-founded; the o t h e r a latter-day
Greek rationalist fighting for his Hellenic life against variegated a p p r o a c h i n g
theophanies. N o w h e r e does this contrast a p p e a r m o r e striking than in accounts
o f Plotinus' "mystical" experiences themselves. Are they the catalyst for his
philosophical activities, the key he was vouchsafed to unlock the puzzles o f the
r a t h e r arid Platonism o f his day, o r did they arise (like acts o f levitation) as a
kind o f bonus, or even as an accident o f his metaphysical success? Part o f the
difficulty in getting b e y o n d such c r u d e alternatives is that when we say that
Plotinus held that o u r soul rises to the level o f n o u s and t h r o u g h n o u s to union
with the One, we are either not sure what we m e a n by n o u s or we are not sure
what we m e a n by u n i o n . T h e p r o b l e m about n o u s is highlighted by o u r collective
scholarly failure to reach an a g r e e d translation (or even at least an agreed set of
connotations) for the word. I shall r e t u r n to this a little later. As for the o t h e r
question, about the m e a n i n g o f " u n i o n , " I a r g u e d some twenty years ago that it
refers to a union o f the theistic type,' that is, that it does not suggest or imply
that we are in fact ("in reality") identical with the One itself. As H a d o t has again
put it recently, "L'fime, dans l'exp~rience mystique, ne coincide donc pas avec
l'Absolu (ce serait impossible)."~ T o many this has always seemed obvious,s and

J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road of Reality (Cambridge, x967), 213-3o.

P. Hadot, "L'union de l'~me avec I'intellect divin dans l'exp~rience mystique plotinienne,"
in Produs et son Influence (Ztirich, 1987), 17-
In a review of my Plotinus H. J. Blumenthal (Phoenix 23 [1969]: 326) described my discus-
sion of Plotinus' mysticism as "a convincing demonstration of the almost obvious that is, but

[183]
184 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 27:2 APRIL 1989
certainly it is hard to suppose that any sensitive reader of the Enneads could
come away imagining Plotinus yelling (or even thinking) from time to time, "I
am the One," or even "I was the One." But since there has been at least one
substantive attempt to re-formulate the still surviving belief that Plotinus' mysti-
cism is monistic, not theistic# I will begin with a brief resum6 of some of the
arguments I used in favor of a theistic interpretation and then add a few f u r t h e r
points of expansion and clarification.

2. " T H E I S T I C " AND " M O N I S T I C " MYSTICISM

By "theistic mysticism" I refer to the explanation of mystical experience in
terms of the union of the soul with a transcendent being: the theistic mystic
insists that despite his experience of union, the soul and that transcendent
being cannot "ultimately," or "in the last resort," be identical. By a "monistic"
explanation I mean an explanation given by a man who believes that he is
"ultimately" identical with God, the One, the Absolute, or whatever such name
he gives to the first cause o f the universe. Needless to say theistic mystics, on
my account, can belong to many different religious faiths, or to none. Plotinus
belonged to none in any serious sense; he is legitimately to be called both a
theistic mystic and a non-practising pagan.5
My principal original arguments, which I shall not now repeat at length,
that Plotinus was a theistic mystic--some of which were foreshadowed by
A r n o u - - w e r e as follows:
1. T h a t Plotinus talks of the One making all things and leaving them outside
himself, that is, that his One is both transcendent and immanent.
2. That, although h u m a n souls have no temporal beginning or end, the One
(alone) is infinite being.
3. T h a t Plotinus' language about two becoming one and returning to two
suggests that the separateness of the soul as what I called a "spiritual
substance" cannot be lost.

should not have been, necessary." More recently (in Aufsteig und Niedergang der r6mischen Welt 36.1
[553]), in a survey entitled "Plotinus in the Light of Twenty Years' Scholarship, 1951-1971,"
Blumenthal raises the question whether "both kinds of mystic experience are basically similar and
that the difference comes only in the subject's interpretation." I allude to this sort of problem
below but my concern is with what Plotinus believed to be the necessary philosophical explanation
ofh/s own experiences, not with whether he is correct in such an explanation.
4 p. S. Mamo, "Is Plotinian Mysticism Monistic?" in The Significance of Neoplatonism, ed. R.
Baine Harris (Norfolk, Virginia, 1976), 199- 215.
5 Note Plotinus' cavalier attitude to "institutional" religion in Porphyry's Vita Plotini [hereafter
VP], chap. ~o, with the comments ofR. Goulet, in "L'oracle d'Apollon dans la Vie dePlotin," Porphyre,
La Vie de Plotin by L. Brisson, M.-O. Goulet-Caz~, R. Goulet, D. O'Brien (Paris, 1982),408,
 T H E M Y S T I C I S M OF P L O T I N U S 18 5

4. T h a t the O n e is "other" than the soul, t h o u g h all otherness resides in the

s o u l - - a n d does so necessarily. 6

T o all this I implicitly a d d e d (5) that self-abandonment by the soul means

trust, lack o f fear, moral and spiritual but not existential self-abnegation.
I did not, however, argue or imply (6) that by "theistic" I was using some
kind o f code-word for Christian, or more-or-less Christian. O f course, Chris-
tian mysticism is explained theistically, but not all theistic mysticism is Chris-
tian. Non-Christian varieties, however, will have certain similarities, as well as
certain i m p o r t a n t differences, f r o m the Christian variety. In fact, since I
would a r g u e that a p r o p e r l y Christian use o f the word "God" is importantly
different f r o m a p r o p e r l y Neoplatonic interpretation o f the One as God, it is
inconceivable that Neoplatonic mysticism should be specifically Christian,
whether it is theistically conceived or not.
In my original statement o f the case that Plotinus' mysticism is theistic, I
could certainly have used expressions like " T h e transcendent One is the
source and origin o f all things," or "It is not identical with them." But the
words I have just q u o t e d were in fact not mine; they were written by a critic,7
who claimed, rightly, that they r e p r e s e n t Plotinus' position. H e also r e m a r k e d
o f that position that "the O n e is not cut off" and that "its transcendence is
compatible with its immanence." Such statements too are appropriate to the
a u t h o r o f the Enneads. Why then does this critic--whose hesitations I take to
be not untypical--insist that Plotinus' system is a "qualified monism"? s My
attempt to answer a particular critic may be construed as an attempt to relieve
a m o r e general and persistent unease.
Mamo's principal worries seem to be related to two claims which, in the
footsteps o f A r n o u , I was p r e p a r e d to defend: (1) that the soul and the One
are two spiritual substances, and (~) that the finite soul and the infinite One
can m e r g e (in union) and separate afterwards. Mamo thinks that neither the
One n o r the soul should be called a spiritual substance. T h e One is not,
because it is "beyond being." But "beyond being" does not mean simply "be-
yond the world," u n d e r s t o o d , as Mamo seems to want to u n d e r s t a n d it, as
beyond the world o f Wittgensteinian "facts."9 By "beyond being," as I ex-

6 For "otherness," in addition to my comments in Plotinus (note 1 above), 219, see J. M. Rist,
"The Problem of 'Otherness' in the Enneads," Le N~oplatonisme, Colloque international du
C.N.R.S., Royaumont 1969 (Paris 1971), 77-87, reprinted in Platonism and its Christian Heritage
(London 1985), essay 8, and W. Beierwaltes, "Andersheit: Grundriss einer neuplatonischen
Begriffsgeschichte,"Archivfiir Beg~ffsgeschichte 16 ( x972): 166- 97.
7 See Mamo, 2o~.
8 See Mamo, 2o6.
9 See Mamo, 913, note 15.
186 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 27:2 A P R I L 1 9 8 9
plained, 1~Plotinus means "beyond finite being," not "beyond existence." T h u s
the O n e is an infinite substance. Perhaps the word "substance" is bothersome,
but only to those who insist on some special Aristotelian or Wittgensteinian
sense for it. As for the soul, however, I shall argue below in what sense it is a
spiritual substance, as it is, and what sort o f union between infinite and finite
Plotinus claims to have experienced.
Mamo thinks that talk o f "spiritual substances" must be w r o n g because
such phrases d o not belong with the images required to r e p r e s e n t the mystical
union. According to Mamo "the great monistic image is the river losing m o r e
and m o r e shape in the sea, ''1, and, he adds, "although Plotinus does not use it,
it would be appropriate, as the sea is the source o f the river to which the river
returns." But the fact that Plotinus does n o t use this image is worth reflection.
Perhaps he did not think o f it at all. O r if he had t h o u g h t o f the image, he
might have rejected it as misleading. For although he regards the One as the
source o f the soul (as o f all else), there is little reason to assume that he would
have t h o u g h t the sea an ideal image o f that source, and he would have
t h o u g h t far less o f the claim that "losing m o r e and m o r e shape" is an apt and
complete description o f the u n i o n o f the soul with the One. But perhaps, says
Mamo, the "image o f the stream being gathered back into the spring" would
be better, for it would present the r e t u r n to o u r fatherland o f which Plotinus
speaks (1.6.8.16 cf. 6.9.9.38; 5.1.1.1). But perhaps this is a different image. I f
the water r e t u r n s to the spring, it would be p o u r e d forth again. But perhaps,
as f r o m the sea, it would not be the same water? In that case Plotinus would
not have accepted the image o f a spring either, for w e are the same person
after u n i o n with the O n e - - w e continue, that is, t h r o u g h time, and have the
same personal identity. We do not become something else, n o r are we like a
Heraclitean stream or even a Hobbesian "ship o f Athens" (entirely rebuilt,
that is, by a gradual process, with new timbers). Both in body and in soul we
are the same people; we relate the tale o f o u r own "union." We may be
benefitted by what we have experienced, but both Plotinus and P o r p h y r y
t h o u g h t that it is "we" who have benefitted, that it is the same Plotinus walking
about and describing his e x p e r i e n c e and indeed leading his o r d i n a r y "de-
scended" life.
But the image o f a r e t u r n to one's source is easily explained in what I have
called theistic terms. It alludes to o u r awareness o f ontological d e p e n d e n c e on
the One. T h e O n e is at the center o f the soul, but not identical with that
center. We are, each o f us, spiritual substances, but o u r being is caused by the
existence o f the One, and when we r e t u r n to the source, we identify, t h o u g h

~5-37-
~o Plotinus,
" See Mamo, eo3.
 THE MYSTICISM OF PLOTINUS 18 7
briefly, with o u r g r o u n d . We lose all awareness o f ourselves as distinct but
what we lose is awareness, not existential reality. It is a m o m e n t not o f realiza-
tion that we are the One, but o f the interiorization o f the fact that the One is in
us as the cause and reality o f o u r being what we are. Not that realization is a
matter o f self-awareness--that is surpassed, as we shall s e e - - b u t simply o f
e x p e r i e n c e itself. A n d although o u r " u p p e r soul" lives at the level o f nous,
Plotinus does not envisage even the possibility that in this life any union with
the O n e could be a p e r m a n e n t condition---even if the notion o f p e r m a n e n c y
could be u n d e r s t o o d in some n o n - t e m p o r a l way. And if a p e r m a n e n t union is
possible after this life (cf. 6. 9. l o . 2 - 3 ) , its quality, as distinct f r o m its duration,
will be identical to what is already available to us.
A curious, but significant, feature o f Mamo's arguments against Plotinus'
system being what I have called "theistic" is his claim that theism implies a
"gap between creator and creature. '',~ T h a t indeed is true, but Mamo himself
has n o t e d such a gap in Plotinus, for the One is not identical with any o f the
others, including souls. Rather, he left them "apart f r o m himself" (6.8. x9.18,
cf. 5.5.12.47ff.). W h e r e uncertainty may arise, however, is over the nature o f
the "gap" between creator and creatures. T h e "gap" can be m o r e or less wide,
and certainly it is far less wide in Plotinus than in any f o r m o f traditionally
o r t h o d o x Christianity. For Plotinus does not know, nor would he accept, any
notion o f ex nihilo creation. But smaller t h o u g h the gap may be, it is still
significant. For the O n e is the cause o f all else, and nothing else is the cause o f
all else. T h e "gap" between the O n e and all the others is perhaps obscured for
the casual r e a d e r o f the Enneads by the fact that Plotinus seems to concentrate
m o r e on the t h e o r y o f the three hypostases and their interrelations. But the
positing o f such a gap between the One and the many is Plotinus' way o f
treating one o f the most f u n d a m e n t a l themes o f all Greek philosophy, and to
recognize this is basic to any u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the ideas o f the Enneads. (We
may note that certain later Neoplatonists, such as Iamblichus and Damascius,
seem to have t h o u g h t that although Plotinus was well aware o f the gap, he had
not m a d e it quite big enough.)
In the long r u n it is no explanation o f the fact that Plotinus never claims, in
any way, that "I am God," merely to assert that such language would a p p e a r
"too c r u d e and inaccurate": that if I were to talk in this way I might (mistak-
enly) be claiming that "this o r d i n a r y man, this pitiful f r a g m e n t o f the cosmos,
is the One." For, runs the objection, Plotinus' claim is that we can "become"
the O n e only after the most a r d u o u s purification and simplification o f the
soul. But if we (more o r less rightly) attribute that attitude to Plotinus, we
thereby assert that we are not the O n e now. T h u s the claim would be that we

~' See Mamo, ~oo.

188 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 97:~ APRIL 1989
b e c o m e the One, but we are not the One. A n d the best interpretation o f that
idea is that " b e c o m e " m e a n s " b e c o m e m o r e one-like" in the sense that al-
t h o u g h we c a n n o t distinguish ourselves or even be distinguished f r o m the
O n e at that time (or better in that m o d e o f being), we are not the One:
m o m e n t a r i l y , a n d as far as we are able, we are characterized by it. M a m o
"confessed" that h e could not u n d e r s t a n d the view that the soul is "wholly
characterized so as to b e c o m e infinite." How, he asks, can its f o r m e r identity
still remain? T h e answer is that that identity, that h u m a n core, is itself given
(irrevocably) by the O n e a n d is always m a i n t a i n e d in its being by the One.
W h a t we e x p e r i e n c e in u n i o n is to some extent i n e x p r e s s i b l e - - t h o u g h I shall
indicate a limited u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f it b e l o w - - b u t that is just what is m e a n t by
o u r designating Plotinus a theistic mystic. I f reality could be fully expressed,
t h e r e would be no "mysticism" at all. Plotinus' claim is precisely that u n i o n
does occur, that in that u n i o n we transcend o u r own finite limitations and that
o u r individual identity is m a i n t a i n e d in time. T h e only alternative "solution"
to the puzzle o f u n i o n would be to say that in o u r o r d i n a r y lives we are simply a
m61ange o f the O n e a n d s o m e t h i n g else, a n d that in the union, this "some-
thing else" is sloughed off. But Plotinus n e v e r describes h u m a n psychology in
t e r m s o f such a m61ange, a n d if he did, he could n e v e r imply, as he does, that I
have seen the G o o d (1.6.7.9; 6.9.9.46; cf. P o r p h y r y , V P 23), only that the O n e
has seen itself. Recent scholarship has m a d e it clear that o u r soul is indeed
what I have called a spiritual b e i n g - - b u t only one a m o n g m a n y such s o u l s - -
a n d that the world-soul is its elder sister (9.9.18. I6; 4.3.6.13).'3 T h e o t h e r
souls are o u r kin, but we are not even identical with them, let alone with the
O n e itself. T h e diversity o f such souls is not an illusion, for souls are, in
Plotinus' language, "real beings." E n n e a d 4.9 considers, a n d rejects, the thesis
that all souls are one, while maintaining, o f course, that each soul is a unity.~4
It is false that t h e r e is only o n e soul; Plotinus' claim is that every soul is at once
similar to a n d distinct f r o m any other.
I f t h e n the evidence a b o u t what, p e r h a p s a little rashly, I called the u n i o n o f
spiritual substances, is as clear as I believe it to be, and if passages like 6. 9.1 1
indicate that the self-realization o f the soul in union with the O n e is the realiza-
tion o f a natural but dependent immortality, why does the notion that Plotinus is a
"qualified monist" still retain its curious appeal? Is it wishful thinking? O r
habit? Part at least o f the e x p l a n a t i o n m a y be that it is easy to assume that

~s Cf. W. Helleman-Elgersma, Soul-Sisters (Amsterdam, 198o) and A. H. Armstrong, "The

Apprehension of Divinity in the Self and Cosmos in Plotinus," in Harris, The Significance of
Neoplatonism, 191, reprinted in Plotinian and Christian Studies (London, 1979), chapter x8.
,4 Cf. H.J. Blumenthal, "Soul, World-Soul and Individual Soul in Plotinus," Le N~oplatonisme,
55-66, and "Nous and Soul in Plotinus: Some Problems of Demarcation," Plotino ed il Neoplato-
nismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Rome, 1974), 2o3-19-
 THE MYSTICISM OF PLOTINUS 18 9
"spiritual substance" must be w r o n g because it suggests the m o d e r n concept o f
separate person, particularly if we accept that Plotinus believes that there are
Forms o f individual m e n (as in 5.7).'5 T h u s the a r g u m e n t would be that, if
spiritual substances are persons, then Plotinus is no monist, but if they are not,
he must be read monistically. As A r m s t r o n g has shown, ~6what we now usually
m e a n by "person," let alone "personality," is not what Plotinus means either by
o u r " u p p e r soul" (5.1.10.13--i8; 6.2.22.31--33; 4.8.8.~) or by the F o r m of an
individual man. Plotinian "spiritual substances" are not to be thought o f as
persons. For, in Plotinus' view, the F o r m is an already "established" perfection,
whereas we would say that if there is a perfect "me" he is in the making; he is
what I shall b e c o m e when I "beatify" my individual character, which is, itself,
f o r m e d by a combination o f genetic and environmental/social factors (plus the
exercise o f some d e g r e e o f free will). T h u s "person" will tend to designate my
unique and p e r h a p s ultimately private self,17 something almost sacrosanct and
the m o d e o f my u n i q u e dignity. This "combination" could perhaps become a
perfect "me," whereas Plotinus' view would be that most o f my genetically or
environmentally conditioned qualities (what we should call my "personality")
are m e r e accidentals, in fact to be sloughed o f f when the ideal "me" remains
pure. A n d o f course that bit o f theory d e p e n d s on the view that I (i.e., my
individual Form) have always existed, a view which I (and presumably most o f
us) would r e g a r d as false. We conclude that Plotinus' "spiritual substances" are
not persons.
Now since Plotinus thinks that "Socrates-himself" has always existed, he
can then a r g u e that when Socrates "becomes" the One, he is "becoming some-
thing" that he is already. Hence, it can look as t h o u g h he is already the One in
some sense: at least the real "Socrates" is. But this is an illusion, despite the fact
that for Plotinus Socrates-himself has always existed, and that "spiritual sub-
stances" are not persons. For although Plotinus thinks all that, he does not also
think that the immortal Socrates-himself has always been the causative One,
only that he has always been "caused" by the One. For Plotinus' theory sug-
gests that although Plotinus respects my "individuality," his "individuality" is
not the individuality o f persons, n o r indeed an individuality that should be

,5 For some of the debate recently see J. M. Rist, "Forms of Individuals in Plotinus," CQ n.s.
13 0963) 223- 31; H.J. Blumenthal, "Did Plotinus Believe in Ideas of Individuals?" Phronesis 11
(1966): 61-8o; J. M. Rist, "Ideas of Individuals in Plotinus: A Reply to Dr. Blumentha!," Revue
Internationale de Philosophie 24, no. 92 (197o): 298-3o3; A. H. Armstrong, "Form, Individual and
Person in Plotinus," Dionysius a ( 1977): 49-68, reprinted in Plotinian and Christian Studies (London,
a979), chapter 2o.
'n Armstrong, 6o.
J7 The O.E.D. (s.v. "person") quotes from the Straits Times of 1911 the curious (modern) legal
extreme to which this notion of privacy has gone: "he let go my arms, held me round the waist
with his right arm and used his left hand. He stooped to it. He put his hand on my person."
19o JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 97:2 APRIL 1989
acceptable as plausible, let alone factual. But this is not the place to consider
Plotinus' non-historical account of human nature.

2. THE NATURE OF NOUS

But the "mysticism" of Plotinus is not simply the claim that our soul can be
united with the transcendent One; it is also the claim that our soul ascends
through nous to the One, and commentators seem to have found that concept
of nous hard to explicate. The rest of this paper will therefore be largely
concerned with this problem, with nous and with the Plotinian reality to which
it refers. First of all, granted that any single one-word translation will be
inadequate, how do we best render nous in English? A glance at some of the
attempts in various modern European languages will immediately reveal the
chief difficulty. The new Sleeman-Pollet Lexicon Plotinianum offers "mind,"
"reason," "intellect"--a variegated start, but obviously compilers of lexicons
have special problems: they are trying to find something for all the extant
examples. And there may also be the "ordinary Greek" translation (like "com-
mon sense"), which will do for some passages, but not for all. No one would
want to say that our souls ascend through common sense to union with the
One. To a modern philosophical reader "mind" may suggest the mind-body
problem, but it would be generally agreed that if Plotinus has a "problem" of
this sort, it would rather be the soul-body problem, the problem all Platonists
inherited from the Stoics of the relationship between the soul and the body if,
as Plato has it, the soul is an immaterial substance.
Quite apart from that, "mind" suggests a faculty by which we work things
out, resolve problems, do logic, and so on. None of that would be appropriate
to Plotinus' nous. Rather, these are characteristic activities of his soul, which
works by calculation or reasoning (dianoia, logismos). It is the special nature of
soul thus to operate "discursively" or by the use of propositions. ~8Nous and its
objects are certainly not Aristotelian premisses, or Stoic propositions or
"sayables" (meanings?, lekta), says Plotinus (5.5.1.39ff.), for in Plotinus' version
premisses and propositions involve predicating one thing of another; they
involve a progression of thought. Or again we read that "The gods do not see
p r o p o s i t i o n s . . , but all of what is said to be there (scil. in the higher world) are
beautiful i m a g e s . . , not painted but real" (5.8.5.2off.). Plotinus explains him-
self further (5.5.1-4o) by implying, rightly or wrongly, that the reason nous
cannot be identified as propositional knowledge o f any kind (not merely that it
is not propositions as understood by the Stoics) is that propositions tell us, for
example, that Justice is beautiful, that is, they say something about the subject;

~a Cf. Blumenthal, "Nous and Soul"; also J. Trouillard, "The Logic of Attribution in
PIotinus,"IPQ 1 0960:125-38.
 THE MYSTICISM OF PLOTINUS ~9 ~
they do not concentrate our attention on the subject itself. And this is also
because n o u s is timeless, but in propositional thinking the mind is spread out;~9
it involves a logical, if not a chronological, transition from a to b. N o u s , on the
other hand, is "all-together."
But the question is more complicated, as has been shown in a recent
series o f exchanges about whether, or in what sense, Plotinus offers us "non-
discursive thought" as the activity o f nous. A. C. Lloyd has also raised the
wider question o f whether "thought" can in fact be non-discursive or non-
propositional in any philosophically useful sense. ~~ He concludes, indeed,
that Plotinus does offer us non-discursive "thinking," but that he is mistaken
and regressive in doing so: he is a star instance of those deploying a well-
known "enigma" in Greek philosophy. Richard Sorabji, on the other hand,
while agreeing that t h o u g h t must be propositional--hence contact with the
one is n o t a kind of thinking--argues that, despite the E n n e a d s ' apparent
insistence to the contrary, Plotinus' "thought" (at the level of nous) is propo-
sitional, but the propositions are propositions of identity. Plotinus, says
Sorabji, argues that "the identity of intellect and its object guarantees self-
thought. ''~ This, he continues, is confirmed by Plotinus saying that the self-
thinking o f n o u s is self-thinking in the proper sense (xvQ6c0g, 5.3.6. a-5). This
is an interesting suggestion, and Sorabji may in fact have expressed some-
thing of what Plotinus would have wished to say. T h e difficulty, however, is
that Plotinus does not seem to consider propositions of identity need be
t h o u g h t of "propositionally." We may wonder why this should be so, and
Plotinus' answer may be that although "self-thinking" involves the recogni-
tion of identities, the formulation of such a recognition as a proposition of
identity is not to be t h o u g h t o f as an act o f nous. T h u s the thinking of a
proposition of identity is rather to be viewed as a mental experience which
might at a lower level be formulated as a proposition. Sorabji's talk of the
identity of intellect and its object conceals the problem that Plotinus does not
say that the identity o f intellect and its object generates propositions, or that
the self-thinking o f n o u s involves the most correct sense of self-thinking, 2~
where self-thinking is still propositional. For where Sorabji has "intellect,"
and "thinking," Plotinus, of course, has nous. But if "thinking" and "intellect"
are incomplete or even misleading renderings of n o u s for m o d e r n r e a d e r s - -
though mediaevals would not have wol r i e d - - t h e n we do not have to join

,9 R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (London, 1983), 152.

'~ R. Sorabji, 139-55; A. C. Lloyd, "Non-DiscursiveThought--An Enigma of Greek Philoso-
phy," PAS 7~ (1969-7o): 261-74, and "Non-Propositional Thought in Plotinus," Phronesis 31
(1986): 258-65 .
" Sorabji, 153.
J" Lloyd, "Non-PropositionalThought," ~59-6o.
192 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 27:2 APRIL ~989
Sorabji in seeing Plotinus' "self-thinking" as essentially or primarily proposi-
tional activity. For although "propositions of identity" may for Plotinus guar-
antee the intelligibility of other kinds of propositions, they are not to be
classified as ordinary propositions, nor is their formulation the distinctive act
of nous. On the other h a n d we do not have to join Lloyd in worrying that,
although the activity of nous is non-propositional, it is also the enigmatic and
indeed unintelligible p h e n o m e n o n , non-propositional thought. For indeed, in
Plotinus' view, to assume that thought must exist as propositions, even proposi-
tions of identity, is to beg the question.
Most of the English- and French-speaking translators of Plotinus want to
assert, with Lloyd and Sorabji, that above all else nous "thinks." Armstrong
uses "thinking" and "intellect" in the Loeb translation; MacKenna had Intellec-
tual Principle; H a d o t uses "intellect" or "pens6e";~ Arnou uses "pens~e
pure."~4 These are some selected examples. Reale is willing to use "pensiero"
in Italian;~5 I myself have gone for "divine mind" and have even committed
"intellection" at times. ~6 Inge, of course, chose "Spirit" and Cilento uses
"spirito",~v but, using a r a n d o m sample, I notice that he translates the title of
Ennead 5.6 (~t~p[ ~o9 ~6 ~x~• ~o9 6vxog tx~lvo~v, etc.) as "ci6 che st~ al di l~t
dell'essere non pensa." So "pensa," "pensiero" and the rest are back. Is there
no way of avoiding them? Indeed, is there any reason why we should avoid
them? ~8O f course one reason is that all the "thinking" words seem to moderns
to assert something "propositional," so that Plotinus' non-propositional "think-
ing" becomes unintelligible. But we need not assume he is unintelligible in
advance. T h e case needs to be heard.
Let us go back to the Enneads and see what vo~v, vogg and their cognates
seem to mean in the relevant contexts. T h e earlier history of such words
indicates that a variety of meanings are possible, offering such ideas as non-

~ For example in "L'union de l'fime."

94 R. Arnou, Le d~sir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin (Paris, 192 l).
~ G. Reale, "I f o n d a m e n t i della Metafisica di Plotino," in Graceful Reason, ed. L. P. Gerson
(Toronto, 1983), x64. Reale's attitude is nuanced, but it is not clear that he is aware o f the
discursive/non-discursive problem. His remark "II Nous 6 e essere e pensiero," is helpful, but still
remains a translation o f the problem o f Plotinus' Greek, not a resolution o f it.
,6 For a legitimate objection to this "neologism" see Lloyd, "Non-Discursive Thought," 266.
97 W. R. Inge, The Philosophy ofPlotinus, 3 d e d . (London, 1999); V. Cilento, Enneadi (Bari,
1947-49).
,8 "Geist" will often appear in German, but the problem o f how to translate the activity o f
Geist remains---somewhat similarly to the difficulties in English. Again in the revised H a r d e r
translation, the title o f Ennead 5.6 appears as "Was jenseits des Seienden liegt, denkt nicht." A. H.
A r m s t r o n g seems to think that the problem is insignificant (or to assume that it does not exist)
when he writes on "Spiritual or Intelligible Matter in Plotinus and St. Augustine" in Augustinus
Magister (Paris, 1954), 277 (reprinted in Plotinian and Christian Studies, chapter 7)- In the course o f
his discussion he speaks o f "spiritual or intellectual being."
 T H E M Y S T I C I S M OF P L O T I N U S x93
perceptual "seeing," as in mathematics, or "realizing," or "intending to reach
an intelligible goal."'9 But only when we see what Plotinus himself says about
nous and its cognates can we see whether what he says is intelligible and
whether we can find the right word to translate them into English or any other
language. Plotinus' understanding of nous is, of course, much influenced by
Plato's usage in the Timaeus and by Aristotle, but we should not assume that
the primary sense he wishes to attach to the word will be limited by Aristote-
lian precedents---even granted that he had a correct understanding of Aris-
totle. Notice, furthermore, that, as we have seen, the Latin for Neoplatonic
nous is often inteUectus (though spiritua and inteUigentia are early alternatives),3o
but we cannot argue from what the ambiguous inteUectus means ("thinking,"
"understanding") to what nous means, any more than we can argue from what
essentia means to what ~b T~ r e~vtxt means in Aristotle. For originally at least
the possibly special meaning of essentia (we hope) depended on knowing what
96 ~r ~ e~wtt meant. And the ambiguities of intellectus depend in part on the
complexities of Neoplatonic nous.
One of the most informative features of Plotinus' world of nous is its
beauty. "Many times have I awoken to myself out of my body and have come
into myself, going out of other things." "I have seen a marvellous beauty"
(4.8.~.~-3).3 ~ "But there the blooming colour is beauty, rather all is colour
from the bottom up" (5.8.IO.3O). "The beauty has penetrated through their
whole soul; they are not just spectators" (5.8. io.35-36 ). " I f he sees it as some-
thing other, he is not yet in beauty" (5.8. ~i.go). It is what we should expect;
Porphyry has told us that his master taught the ascent of the soul along the
road prescribed by Plato in the Symposium (VP ~3). Above all the ascent to nous
enables us to see the singularity and the unity of the living forms and to
recognize their beauty. We find a world we hardly dreamed of.
But as Plotinus himself says in 4.8. ~, we are awakened to that world. We

~9 For something of this history see K. von Fritz, "No'g, vo((v and Their Derivatives in
Homer," CP 38 (1943): 79-83; "NSvg, v o ~ v and Their Derivatives in Presocratic Philosophy," CP
4 ~ 0945): 223-42 and 4 a 0946): 12-34; R. B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought (Cam-
bridge, 1954): 82-83; D. G. Frame, The Origins of Greek Nous (Harvard Ph.D. diss. 1971); J. H.
Lesher, "The Meaning of NOYZ in the Posterior Analytics," Phronesis 18 0973): 44-68; and, of
particular value for Plotinus, R. T. Wallis, "Nous as Experience," in Harris, The Szgnificance of
Neoplatonism, 12 a-3o. Von Fritz' basic position, which is rightly influential, is that the "original
meaning" is "realization through perception," from which develop the notions of "planning" and
"intending." Lesher rightly emphasizes the varieties of possible senses by the time of Aristotle. But
none of these prevents us from recognizing a basic sense in Plotinus.
3o Notice the language of Marius Victorinus.
3, See especially Hadot, 14-15. In Plotinus (56, with note 4, and 195-96 ) I argued that 4.8.1
referred to the ascent of the One, ignoring the force of the 6kko in 6 ~ Q Jt6v xb 6kko vo'qTbv
~tctvTbv s In this I followed the interpretation of the Arabic author of the Theology of
Aristotle (and of Ambrose), whom I now believe to have been deceived in the same way as I was.
194 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 27:2 A P R I L 1 9 8 9
cannot use analogy, or deductive reasoning, to describe it fully. It is not
merely a world whose existence we simply infer; it is a reality which we come
to experience empirically, not purely by reasoning. We must see what is there
by a kind o f awakening (4.4.5.9). If you climb up to a high viewpoint, you see
what those who have not climbed have not seen and cannot see. It is simply
beyond dispute that we awaken to nous, that we realize that such beauty exists;
our "mind's eye" sees it. But what do we see? We see the living forms and we
realize that we ourselves belong a m o n g them. I awake to myself; I see a
marvellous beauty of which I am a part ( ~ 0 e ~ e~g ~ct~6v yeyevrD~vog,
4.8.1.5). Such passages can only be construed as the realization that each of us
has a n o t h e r dimension, a spiritual dimension. When we awake we realize that
we are spiritual beings. I say "spiritual" after some deliberation. For we need a
wide e n o u g h term. A "spiritual dimension" will give us something of what
Plotinus seems to see as an all-embracing spiritual sense (which is normally
dormant, or, as he would prefer, of whose regular operations we are not
normally aware). It is a sense in virtue of which we feel joy at beauty, at beauty
out there as an existent of which we are a part. It does not comport a telling of
what beauty is, but of a being beauty. To tell is to descend to reasoning
(4.9.1.8, ~.oyto~t6v). It is an "inner sight" (1.6.9.1) by which beauty is recog-
nized, and you get it by seeing that you have it yourself; you have a beautiful
dimension 0.6.9.8ff. ). "This eye alone sees great beauty" (1.6.9.95). This
beauty is not the One, however; it is a screen before the One or God (1.6.9.39).
But t h r o u g h the recognition that we are this beauty, that we have beyond our
ordinary experience of ourselves something that is beauty, we can come to the
One itself.
It is hard indeed not to r e n d e r such ideas in English by saying that we are
normally unaware of the supreme importance of our possessing a spiritual
dimension, but that when we are awakened to the truth, all that is not directly
illumined by the beauty o f nous seems trivial in comparison. T h e seeing of this
beauty is an experiencing, a being above our ordinary moral life. Hence, in so
far as there is any awareness at this level, it is experiential awareness of the
nature of oneself. W h e n I look away from a mountain top I cannot express the
beauty I see, but I "know" it is beautiful without reflection, without proposi-
tions, simply, as Plotinus would put it, by vision and contact. It is not the
sudden flash o f insight by which we "see" the answer to a problem~2--though
this may be one o f the sources of Plotinus' n o t i o n - - f o r that realization is
propositional, despite its flashing immediacy at times. Plotinus calls the vision
perfect self-awareness, but there are two ways in which "Know thyself" can be
achieved (5.3.4.7): t h r o u g h the soul (that is, propositionally) or kata noun, by

3, Wallis, 127.
 THE MYSTICISM OF P L O T I N U S 195

first-hand experience. Yet it is not that realization o f a situation which von Fritz
recognized as part o f the original m e a n i n g o f the word nous, t h o u g h such a
realization may be s u d d e n both in H o m e r and in Plato. In Plotinus we "awake"
to the awareness o f what we are. But we are not aware that we are aware (cf.
1.4-1 o.2 2ff.), for that would involve a weakening o f the experience itself. Nous
would seem to have awareness o f itself, but not o f what it is "doing" or that it is
aware (cf. 4.4.2.3off.). For its awareness cannot include a progression o f con-
cepts, but a view, a c o m p r e h e n s i o n , a possession o f the intelligible world o f
itself.
O f course this awareness o f itself cannot be mistaken (5.8.1.1-2), n o r can it
be forgotten. ( T h a t would be a bit like forgetting the difference between right
and wrong.) T h a t is, if my general interpretation is right, once we discover by
experience that we are spiritual b e i n g s - - n o t merely by knowing proposi-
tionally o r notionally--we cannot lose such e n l i g h t e n m e n t or spiritual "truth"
(5.5.3.2). Above all the e n c o u n t e r with nous is not primarily a matter o f know-
ing something, or having an intuition o f it, or mentally grasping it; it is the
e x p e r i e n c e o f meeting what we would call a new and all-encompassing dimen-
sion within us, what Plotinus calls seeing the spiritual cosmos, or the cosmos o f
u n c h a n g i n g value. For let it never be forgotten that the denizens o f the kosmos
no~tos are Platonic Forms, living Platonic Forms, and that these Forms, as in
Plato himself, are the sources o f o u r h u m a n values in the moral world "be-
low." Without t h e m we would have no objective and u n c h a n g i n g values at all.
So that "discerning" within ourselves o f a spiritual world, which we have
called by the c r u d e m o d e r n locution a spiritual "dimension," involves realizing
that the world o f nous is also the g r o u n d o f o u r moral and aesthetic words and
propositions. We c a n n o t think u p an u n c h a n g i n g good as the source o f value;
we recognize it. So when Plotinus wants to say that we can wake up and realize
that we are spiritual beings, beings who recognize u n c h a n g i n g values and
objective truths (~v x~ x6o~t~ x~ vo~3x~ dtk~10w~l o{~o~a, 4.1. I. 1), what better
way can he have o f saying it than to say "Each o f us is a spiritual world"
(• VO~lX6g, 3.4.3.22)? For spiritual goods are i m p o r t a n t to all o f us (like it
or not) if they are i m p o r t a n t to any o f us. And they are beautiful precisely
because they exist. I f they did not exist, they would be nothing; hence, thinks
Plotinus, to exist as a good and a source o f value like a Platonic Form is ipso
facto to be beautiful. But again these forms are not static and inanimate goods,
let alone m e r e propositions about the right and the good. T h e y are living
beings, and as such the goal and the achievement o f o u r living desire. When
we realize that we are spiritual, we have at the same time awoken a desire to be
spiritual. W h e n we realize that there is within us a world o f goods, we want to
get at that world, to grasp it, to be it ourselves.
But when we are that which we seek, when we live as spiritual beings, what
i96 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 97:2 APRIL i989
then? T h e r e is no more. Hence, there is quietness. Plotinus speaks of the union
with the One as self-surrender (6. 9.11.23). I f we have done that, we have no
more to do, and the preparation for it is quietness and silence. We wake to the
spiritual world, the source of value; we look at it, we lose ourselves in it--but
quietly. T h u s we have flovx~ct; we busy ourselves no more (x .3.4-17ft.). We give
up logic as t h o u g h we no longer know how to write. For we are not in the realm
of deduction a n d inference, but of self-evident first principles. O u r goods are
such principles (] .3.5.2). We no longer need a busy nature.~3 N o u s will not need
to bustle (5-3. ] 0.47)-
For Plotinus we do not need to realize our full spiritual nature in order to
be able to lead an ordinary, decent moral life. On the other hand, if we do
attain an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this higher nature, we do not transcend the need
for ordinary "goodness." As Plotinus points out in the course of his attack on
the Gnostics, ordinary morality is not something to outgrow (2. 9.15.38ff.). But
granted that moral goodness is not something to outgrow, we should not allow
the "aesthetic" aspects of the recognition of ourselves as spiritual beings to
assume too large an importance either. Although "beautiful" is a very incom-
plete translation o f the Greek k a l o n , there is no doubt that we are drawn by the
splendor (the ~y~.c~(ct, to use Plotinus' archaizing term [5.3.8.32; cf. 6.9. 4. a 8])
of the world of n o u s . But not only is no "Gnosticizing" contempt for the
ordinary moral life allowed to "those who have seen"; Plotinus also warns, in
an apparently but not essentially unplatonic fashion, against our being misled
by the excitements of spiritual beauty itself (5.5.12). This is not an attack on
"intellectual p r i d e " - - t h a t is a sin at the level of soul (cf. 5.1.1); it is a warning
against spiritual pride. T h e love of the beauty of n o u s presupposes, argues
Plotinus, that we are awakened to it; the desire for the G o o d (which is thus
beauty's prior) springs from o u r very existence. All find the Good, he adds,
ultimately satisfying. Whereas seeming beauty may satisfy, seeming Goodness
does not and cannot. T h e a r g u m e n t seems to slide dangerously between sensi-
ble beauty and "spiritual" beauty, but Plotinus' main point is clear. Spiritual
beauty is something we awaken to; it stirs us to pursue our goal, but it is not
ultimately the goal to which o u r existence is directed. For whereas such beauty
may seem to inspire excitement, Goodness more fundamentally inspires calm
and peace. I f any word apart from silence is appropriate to the final state of
the ascended soul, it may be e6:tdt0eta (6.7.35.26; 6.7.34.30; cf. 6.9.9.38).
Hadot has rightly emphasized once again that the life of n o u s has two
stages, and that the higher stage that is n o u s in love (6.7.35. ]9-33) involves the
re-identification of n o u s with itself as the primary outflow from the One. T h u s
our finite souls identify not with the One's infinite nature, which would be

3s Contrast Enn, 3.7. l a. 15 on ~lboe~g~o~.v~q&y~aovog.

 THE MYSTICISM OF P L O T I N U S 197

impossible, but with and within the first showing of the One's infinite power.
We return and receive ('E~q3o)~ ~ v t • ~ctQct6ox~, 3.8.9.21; 6.7.35.21). Be-
yond that there is nowhere to go, and the aspirations of the soul are satisfied at
last. It is a return to nous before it is nous (5.5.8.24).a4 At this level the One may
be called Beauty (often • 1 . 6 . 6 . 2 1 , 24; 6.2.18.1; 6.7.33.22 ), but this is
the Beauty of Goodness which causes and surpasses all genuine moral, aes-
thetic, intellectual, and spiritual goods (1.6.8.34).~5
It seems then unacceptable to limit our translation of nous to words associ-
ated primarily with thinking rather than with being: being, that is, in a state of
awareness of metaphysical reality, or rather, for Plotinus, of the living spiri-
tual reality of the universe. I f "thinking" in English means "thinking about,"
then it is even misleading as a rendering of nous. And the experience of the
union with the One is the identification of the spiritual self (the nous) with its
source as far as possible. Anything further, anything "monistic," would be
impossible. It would be to deny the most basic axiom of Plotinus' metaphysical
world, that the Good is productive of others. Identity of self and One is
logically impossible, but we may live again the life of the nearest and first
showing of the One in the very joy of its first "moment" of existence. T h u s
there is really no English word capable of bearing the twin notions of "non-
propositional" thinking and of spiritual experience which nous serves to ex-
press; "enlightened or illumined self," which once might have done the trick,
is now too debased by other connotations. "Spiritual self" is perhaps the best
we can do and the activity of a "spiritual self" is to live on the spiritual plane.a 6
If we assert that nous "thinks," we must add that for a m o d e r n it may seem to
be a very special sort of thinking.37

University o f Toronto

34 Hadot, 2 4.
35 Cf. my Plotinus, 53-65.
36 Cf. T. A. Szlez,'tk, Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins (Basel/Stuttgart, x979), 167:
"Das Wort 'Nus' bezeichnet fiir Plotin prim~ir die Gesamtheit der geistigen Wirklichkeit."
37 I should like to thank the referees o f theJHP for some constructive comments; they have
improved this p a p e r - - I hope sufficiently. A n d I should like to thank Laura Westra for provoking
me to write it in the first place.