Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 1 of 27

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

Case No: 3:17-1953-PAD

AUSTIN TROUT,
Plaintiff,
v.
ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL DE BOXEO, INC.,
Defendant.

ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL DE BOXEO, INC.’S BRIEF IN COMPLIANCE WITH COURT

ORDER OF OCTOBER 7, 2020 (DOCKET NO. 92)

Pietrantoni Méndez & Alvarez LLC Law Offices of Andrew W. Horn, P.A.
Popular Center, 19th Floor 2665 S. Bayshore Drive
208 Ponce de León Avenue Suite 800
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00918 Miami, FL 33131
Tel. 787-274-1212 Tel. 305-373-7789
Fax. 787-274-1470 Fax. 305-372-9180
Oreste R. Ramos Andrew W. Horn
USDC No. 216801 admitted pro hac vice
oramos@pmalaw.com lawofficehorn@msn.com
Christian A. Muñoz Lugo
USDC No. 305813
cmunoz@pmalaw.com

Joseph C. Laws, Jr.

Post Office Box 10143
San Juan, Puerto Rico
Tel. 787-754-7777
Fax. 787-763-5223
Joseph C. Laws, Jr.
USDC No. 120306
lawofficesofjosephlaws@gmail.com

Attorneys for Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc.

November 9, 2020
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 2 of 27

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .......................................................... 1

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .............................. 2

III. ARGUMENT ......................................................................................... 4

A. The Parties’ Intent to Arbitrate their Disputes, Pursuant to

Section 35(e) of the ............... Championship Regulation and the
“Integral” Test ................................................................................. 5

1. The Parties’ Intent to Arbitrate ................................... 5

2. The “Integral” Test ....................................................... 8

B. The Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration through Qualified

and Expert Arbitrators ................................................................... 12

C. The Interplay between the Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration

and State Law................................................................................... 16

1. The Puerto Rico Commercial Arbitration Act and

its Public Policy Favoring Arbitration......................... 16

2. The Interpretation of Contracts Under Puerto Rico

Law.................................................................................. 18

IV. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 19

i
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 3 of 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

A-1 Premium Acceptance, Inc. v. Hunter,

557 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Mo. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1340 (2019) ...................................8

Anderson v. Comcast Corp.,

500 F.3d 66, 77 (1st Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................10

BP Exploration Libya Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Libya Ltd.,

689 F.3d 481, 491 n. 7 (5th Cir.2012) .......................................................................................8

Caguas Plumbing v. Cont'l Const. Corp.,

155 D.P.R. 744, P.R. Offic. Trans., (2001)..............................................................................18

Cherena v. Coors Brewing Co.,

20 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 (D.P.R. 1998)....................................................................................19

Citrin v. Erikson,
918 F. Supp. 792, 798–99 (S.D.N.Y.1996)..............................................................................15

Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, Inc.,

143 F. Supp. 3d 930, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .............................................................................10

Doral Bank v. MAPFRE PRAICO Ins. Co.,

No. KLCE201300859, 2013 WL 5798665, at *4 (P.R. Cir. Sept. 20, 2013). ................... 16-17

Flores v. Municipio de Caguas,

114 D.P.R. 521, 14 P.R. Offic. Trans. 674, 684 (1983)...........................................................18

GGNSC Louisville Mt. Holly, LLC v. Mohamed-Vall,

No. 3:16-CV-136-DJH, 2016 WL 9024811, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 6, 2016) ..........................11

Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC,

724 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2013). .......................................................................................8,13

In re Salomon Inc. S'holders' Derivative Litig. 91 Civ. 5500 (RRP),

68 F.3d 554,560-61 (2d Cir. 1995). ........................................................................................8,9

In re The Travelers Indem. Co.,

No. CIV. 3:04 MC 196(TPS, 2004 WL 2297860, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 8,
2004) ........................................................................................................................................15

Khan v. Dell Inc.,

669 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012)..........................................................................................8,13

ii
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 4 of 27

Kristian v. Comcast Corp.,

446 F.3d 25, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2006) ..........................................................................................10

McCrillis v. Aut. Navieras de P.R.,

123 D.P.R. 113, 23 P.R. Offic. Trans. 109 (1989) ...................................................................19

McMullen v. Meijer, Inc.,

355 F.3d 485, 495 (6th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................................5

McMullen v. Meijer, Inc. (II),

166 F. App’x 164, 168-69 (6th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................... 9-10, 11

Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co.,

714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983) ...........................................................................................14

Morales Garay v. Roldán Coss.,

110 D.P.R. 701, 707 [10 P.R. Offic. Trans. 909, 917] (1981). ................................................18

Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,
748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984).................................................................................................14

Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,

317 F.3d 646, 674 (6th Cir.2003). ..................................................................................... 17-18

Nat'l Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil Co.,

817 F.2d 326, 333–35 (5th Cir.1987) ........................................................................................8

Oakland-Macomb Interceptor Drain Drainage Dist. v. Ric-Man Const., Inc., 304

Mich. App. 46, 60 (2014).........................................................................................................14

Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London Syndicate

53, 615 F. App'x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2015) ....................................................................................14

Ranzy v. Tijerina,
393 Fed. Appx. 174, 176 (5th Cir.2010) ....................................................................................8

Reddam v. KPMG LLP,

457 F.3d 1054, 1059–61 (9th Cir.2006) ....................................................................................8

Rivera v. Samaritano & Co.,

108 D.P.R. 604, 8 P.R. Offic. Trans. 640, 643–44 (1979).......................................................17

Ruiz v. Millennium Square Residential Ass'n,

156 F. Supp. 3d 176,183 (D.D.C. 2016) ...............................................................8, 9, 12, 13,14

Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Herbert H. Johnson Assoc., Inc.,

325 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (D.P.R. 1971)...................................................................................17

iii
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 5 of 27

Serv. Partners, LLC v. Am. Home Assur. Co.,

No. CV-11-01858-CAS EX, 2011 WL 2516411 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2011)..................... 14-15

Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon,

482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) ................................................................................................... 12-13

Sonic Knitting Indus. v. I.L.G.W.U.,

106 P.R. Dec. 557, 6 P.R. Offic. Trans. 783, 811 (1978) (on reconsideration) .......................17

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,

559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010) .........................................................................................................17

Wilson v. Dell Financial Services, L.L.C.,

No. 5:09-cv-00483, 2010 WL 503093 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 8, 2010) ............................................9

World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp.,

125 D.P.R. 352, 358-361, P.R. Offic. Trans., 1990 WL 657504 (1990) .................................13

Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,

742 F. Supp. 1359, 1365-1366, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ..........................................................8,12

Statutes and Rules

Federal Arbitration Act,

9 U.S.C. § 4 ..............................................................................................................................14
9 U.S.C. § 5 ...................................................................................................................... passim

Puerto Rico Civil Code,

31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3272 .......................................................................................................18
31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3471 .......................................................................................................18
31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3478 .......................................................................................................18

Puerto Rico Commercial Arbitration Act,

32 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3201 ........................................................................................................6
32 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3205 .......................................................................................................16
32 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3209 .......................................................................................................17

Secondary Sources

2 Domke on Com. Arb. § 24:3 .......................................................................................................10

iv
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 6 of 27

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

AUSTIN TROUT, CASE NO: 3:17-1953-PAD

Plaintiff,
VIOLATION OF THE MUHAMMAD ALI
vs. ACT; BREACH OF CONTRACT; FRAUD;
DAMAGES
ORGANIZACION MUNDIAL DE
BOXEO, INC., PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY

Defendant.

ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL DE BOXEO, INC.’S BRIEF IN COMPLIANCE WITH

COURT ORDER OF OCTOBER 7, 2020 (DOCKET NO. 92)

TO THE HONORABLE PEDRO A. DELGADO-HERNÁNDEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

COMES NOW, Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc. (hereinafter, “WBO”, by its English

acronym), by and through its undersigned counsel and very respectfully states, alleges and prays

as follows:

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On October 7, 2020 this Honorable Court ordered each of the parties to brief whether the

arbitrator selection clause contained in the WBO’s rules is severable from the remainder of the

arbitration agreement between the parties. (Docket No. 92). As discussed below, the arbitrator

selection provision is severable for two main reasons. First, the arbitrator selection provision is not

integral or central to the WBO’s Rules and Regulations. Second, Section 36 of the WBO’s

Championship Regulations contains a savings clause which further demonstrates the parties’ intent

that allows for the arbitrator selection clause to be severable from the remainder of the WBO’s

Rules. The severability of the arbitrator selection clause clears the way for arbitration to proceed
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 7 of 27

with the arbitrators being appointed in one of two ways. One option is for this Honorable Court,

pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 5, to appoint a panel of three arbitrators that have knowledge and experience

in world championship professional boxing. The other would be for the Court to allow each of the

parties to select an arbitrator with experience in world championship professional boxing, who, in

turn, would name a third arbitrator with the same type of experience. That third arbitrator would

serve as the panel’s chair.

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2018, this Honorable Court issued an Opinion and Order (Docket No.

72) granting the WBO’s motion to compel arbitration. In doing so, the Court relied inter alia on

Section 35(e) of WBO’s Championship Regulations, which provides the following:

All WBO participants acknowledge and agree that the mandatory resort to the
WBO Appeals Regulation is the sole and exclusive remedy for any claim, appeal,
grievance or contest that arises from any right or status that is or could be subject
to these Regulations or which results or could result from or relate to the
interpretation or application of these Regulations. These WBO Grievance
Committee determinations are Arbitrations within the contemplation of the
Arbitration Law of Puerto Rico, 32 LPRA Section 3201 et. seq. and the US
Arbitration Act, Title 9 of the United States Code and the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of July 30, 1975 and the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards of
June 10, 1958. All WBO participants stipulate and agree that the nature of the
sport requires a prompt, final and uniform resolution of all disputes
concerning application of these Regulations by a tribunal experienced with the
application of these Regulations and with special knowledge and experience in
world championship professional boxing.

(emphasis added).

Plaintiff Austin Trout (“Trout”) sought reconsideration from this Order, which the Court

denied on November 26, 2018 (Docket No. 81). Trout then appealed to the United States Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit, challenging the arbitrability of his claims against the WBO (Docket

No. 84). In sum, Trout argued that: 1) Section 35(e) is precluded by Section 35(d) of the

2
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 8 of 27

Championship Regulations;1 2) the WBO implicitly waived its right to invoke arbitration as to his

claims; 3) not all of his claims are arbitrable; and 4) the arbitrator selection clause of the WBO’s

Appeal Regulations does not provide him a “fair opportunity” to pursue his claims because it

permits the WBO to act as “party and judge.” On July 10, 2020, the Court of Appeals issued an

Opinion rejecting Trout’s challenges to the arbitrability of his claims against the WBO. (Docket

No. 85). In doing so, the Court of Appeals validated Section 35(e) of WBO’s Championship

Regulations, explaining that it was not foreclosed by Section 35(d), which “merely provides that

local or federal courts in Puerto Rico … are the only ones that may hear those matters to which it

applies and that section 35(e) does not itself provide must be heard by an arbitral tribunal.”

Opinion, p.8.

The Court of Appeals, however, agreed with one of Trout’s arguments, namely that the

arbitrator selection clause of the Appeal Regulations as it read may not be enforced. Opinion, p.

21. In view of this ruling, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court to determine

if the arbitrator selection provision is severable from the remainder of the arbitration agreement.

In making this determination, the Court of Appeals stated that the District Court needed to take

into consideration: 1) the parties’ intent, 2) the federal policy favoring arbitration, and 3) the

interplay between state law and that federal policy (Opinion, p. 22), and although the Court of

Appeals acknowledged that the WBO discussed the savings clause contained in Section 36 of the

Championship Regulations, it did not feel that the parties had fully engaged the above factors 1, 2

and 3 or the applicability of the savings clause and did not issue a ruling on it as it was not fully

engaged in the briefing; which implicitly suggests that the parties address its applicability at a later

1
Section 35(d) of the Championship Regulations states that “the exclusive venue for any or all action in which the
WBO is made a party… may be maintained only in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or, if
applicable, in the U.S. District Court for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico”.

3
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 9 of 27

stage of the case. The Court of Appeals noted that if the arbitrator selection provision is severable,

the arbitration could move forward as to all of Trout’s claims pursuant to Section 35(e) of the

Championship Regulations, the Appeal Regulations, and 9 U.S.C. § 5, which grants district courts

the power to appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators. Opinion, p. 22.

On September 22, 2020 this Honorable Court ordered the parties to confer and file, no later

than October 7, 2020, a joint motion with their recommendations as to what the next steps in the

litigation should be, particularly in light of the issues that the Court of Appeals referred to at pages

22 and 23 of its July 10, 2020 Opinion (Docket No. 90). In compliance with this Honorable Court’s

Order, on October 6, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion informing the Court that they had

conferred as to what the next steps in the litigation should be and requested the Court to grant them

a term of thirty days to submit separate, but simultaneous briefs with their respective legal positions

on the severability question for this Honorable Court’s consideration. (Docket No. 91).

On October 7, 2020, this Honorable Court ordered the parties to file separate briefs, no

later than November 9, 2020, at 5:00 p.m., including relevant case law, discussing whether the

arbitrator selection clause contained in the WBO’s rules is severable from the remainder of the

arbitration agreement previously agreed to by the parties. (Docket No. 92). The WBO submits the

instant brief in compliance with this Honorable Court’s October 27 Order.

III. ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to this Honorable Court to determine whether the

savings clause in the WBO’s Championship Regulations, Sec. 36, allows the arbitrator selection

provision contained within Article 1 of the WBO’s Appeal Regulations to be severed from the rest

of the arbitration agreement between the parties. Opinion, p. 21-23. As part of this analysis, the

Court of Appeals explained that “[i]n determining whether ‘the [arbitration agreement] should be

4
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 10 of 27

enforced absent the invalid arbitrator selection-mechanism and, if it should, how to select an

arbitrator,’ however, we must consider ‘the parties’ intent,’ the ‘[f]ederal policy favoring

arbitration,’ and ‘the interplay between state law and that federal policy.’” Opinion, p. 22, quoting

McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 495 (6th Cir. 2004). Considering this criteria, it is clear

that―pursuant to the written regulations accepted by the parties and the federal policy favoring

arbitration―the parties’ intention was to promptly resolve their disputes in arbitration, before a

panel with knowledge and experience in world professional championship boxing, following the

Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or its analogous counterpart, the Arbitration Law of Puerto Rico.

Because it was never the parties’ intent to arbitrate their disputes before a specific forum or before

specific arbitrators, the arbitrator selection clause is merely auxiliary or supplemental to the

arbitration agreement and is not central to the arbitration provisions. Thus, the arbitrator selection

clause is severable from the WBO’s arbitration agreement. In fact, the arbitration provisions of the

WBO’s Championship Regulations are independent from the arbitrator selection provisions and

can operate with or without the arbitrator selection clause contained in Article 1 of the WBO’s

Appeal Regulations.

Below we discuss each of the factors cited by the Court of Appeals, explaining the reasons

why the arbitrator selection clause is severable.

A. The Parties’ Intent to Arbitrate their Disputes, Pursuant to Section 35(e) of the
Championship Regulations and the “Integral” Test

1. The Parties’ Intent to Arbitrate

As discussed in the Opinion, the first factor to consider when evaluating the severability of

the provision in dispute is the parties’ intention, as reflected in the arbitration provisions in

question, and whether the arbitrator selection provision was central to the parties’ intent to

arbitrate. In doing so, we must emphasize that there are “two sets” of WBO Regulations that apply

5
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 11 of 27

to the dispute, namely: The Championship Regulations and the Appeal Regulations. The Appeal

Regulations contain the Arbitrator Selection Clause in Article 1 of the WBO Appeal Regulations.

First, the arbitration clause contained within the Championship Regulations, Section 35(e):

1) requires all WBO participants to acknowledge and agree to the mandatory and exclusive

arbitration proceedings under the WBO Regulations of World Championship Contests governed

by the WBO Appeal Regulations; 2) establishes that the WBO Appeals and Grievance Committee

determination are arbitrations within the scope of the Arbitration Law of Puerto Rico, 32 P.R.

Laws Ann. §§ 3201 et. seq., the Federal Arbitration Act, USC, Title 9 and others; and 3) requires

that “[a]ll WBO participants stipulate and agree that the nature of the sports requires a prompt,

final and uniform resolution of all disputes concerning application of these Regulations by a

tribunal experienced with the application of the Regulations and with special knowledge and

experience in world championship professional boxing.” Section 35(e) (emphasis added). In

other words, this Section serves three purposes: the acknowledgement or acceptance of an

arbitration proceeding under the Appeal Regulations; that the arbitration is bound by the federal

and state arbitration legislation; and that all disputes must be resolved promptly by a tribunal forum

that is both experienced and knowledgeable in world championship professional boxing. Section

35(e) of the WBO Championship Regulations does not require that the arbitration be conducted

before a particularly named arbitrator or forum.

As stated above, Trout did not successfully challenge Section 35(e) before the Court of

Appeals. Thus, there is no dispute that Section 35(e) is in effect, that the parties are bound by it,

and that the parties intended that the disputes be resolved promptly by arbitrators who are

knowledgeable and experienced in world championship professional boxing, pursuant to the

Puerto Rico and Federal Arbitration Acts. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals recognized on

6
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 12 of 27

pages 21-22 and 23 of its Opinion, Section 36 of the Championship Regulations contains a savings

clause, which states that “[i]f any of these Rules are determined to be unenforceable, the balance

of these Rules shall remain in full force and effect.”

The Championship Regulations are supplemented by the WBO’s Appeal Regulations. The

Appeal Regulations provide a series of articles that are mostly procedural, regarding various

alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. For example, Article 3 authorizes the President of the

WBO “to attempt to resolve any such Complaint by alternative dispute resolutions such as

negotiation or mediation.” The Appeal Regulations, Article 3, also indicate the requirements or

parameters for filing a Complaint. Also, Articles 4 and 7 establish that all WBO participants

stipulate and agree that the nature of the sport requires a prompt dispute resolution, which should

be resolved as soon as practicable, in a period not to exceed ten business days after a hearing (if

applicable) or thirty days after referral of the Complaint to the WBO President.

Here, the only provision that was invalidated by the Court of Appeals was the separate and

supplemental arbitrator selection provision contained in Article 1 of the Appeal Regulations. The

Court of Appeals’ Opinion should not be construed to invalidate the intention of the parties stated

in other provisions of the Appeal Regulations, much less the arbitration requirement contained in

Section 35(e) of the Championship Regulations.

If the drafters considered that the arbitrator selection provision of the Appeal Regulations

was central to the Championship Regulations’ arbitration clause, they would have included it

directly into its Section 35(e). Instead, they incorporated it by referencing the Appeal Regulations.

Thus, the unenforceability of the supplemental arbitrator selection provision contained in Article

1 for designation of arbitrators in the Appeal Regulations has no force or effect over the

enforceability of the arbitration required by Section 35(e) of the Championship Regulations and

7
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 13 of 27

should not imply that the arbitration clause in Section 35 (e) of the Championship Regulations may

not be enforced. See Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012) (concluding that, to

invalidate an arbitration agreement, “the parties must have unambiguously express[] their intent

not to arbitrate their disputes in the event that the designated arbitral forum is unavailable.”); Ruiz

v. Millennium Square Residential Ass'n, 156 F. Supp. 3d 176, 183 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that the

unenforceability of the arbitrator selection provision is severable, thus, does not doom the

arbitration agreement in its entirety); Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742

F. Supp. 1359, 1365-1366 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (granting motion to compel arbitration before a

substitute arbitrator(s) to be mutually selected by the parties ‒or, in the alternative, by the Court‒

after finding that the unenforceable arbitrator selection provision incorporated from another

regulation is severable).

2. The “Integral” Test

When determining whether an arbitrator selection provision is severable from the rest of

the arbitration clause, various circuits have adopted the “Integral” Test.2 Pursuant to this test, an

entire arbitration clause is unenforceable when one particular forum is chosen as the arbitration

forum but the forum is unavailable―and that particular forum choice was “integral” to the

parties’ intention to arbitrate―and the clause provides no alternative forum. A-1 Premium

Acceptance, Inc. v. Hunter, 557 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Mo. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1340 (2019);

see also Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 Fed. Appx. 174, 176 (5th Cir.2010) (If the specification of a

particular arbitral forum or arbitrator was integral or central to the parties' agreement to arbitrate,

2
In re Salomon Inc. S'holder's Derivative Litig. 91 Civ. 5500(RRP), 68 F.3d 554, 561 (2d Cir.1995); Khan v. Dell
Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354–57 (3d Cir.2012); BP Exploration Libya Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Libya Ltd., 689 F.3d 481, 491 n.
7 (5th Cir.2012); Nat'l Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil Co., 817 F.2d 326, 333–35 (5th Cir.1987); Reddam v. KPMG
LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1059–61 (9th Cir.2006). However, the Seventh Circuit rejected this test after concluding that
Section 5 of the FAA supplements arbitration clauses whether a particular provision within the arbitration clause is
“integral” or not. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2013).

8
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 14 of 27

then the subsequent unavailability of that forum or arbitrator precludes the court from compelling

arbitration.); In re Salomon Inc. S'holders' Derivative Litig. 91 Civ. 5500 (RRP), 68 F.3d 554,

560–61 (2d Cir.1995) (same); Wilson v. Dell Financial Services, L.L.C., No. 5:09-cv-00483, 2010

WL 503093 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 8, 2010) (the unavailability of the chosen arbitrator will invalidate

the agreement only if the choice of forum is an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate, as

opposed to an ancillary logistical concern).

As illustrated by the case law cited above, the entirety of the arbitration clause will be

discarded when the parties agreed to arbitrate before one specific forum or a particularly named

arbitrator which is unavailable. Ruiz, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 183. In other words, pursuant to the

“integral” test, an arbitrator selection provision is not severable if it specifies a particularly named

forum or arbitrator and that specific forum or arbitrator is central to the parties’ intent to arbitrate.

The invalidated arbitrator selection provision of the Appeal Regulations, Article 1, granted

the President of the WBO the authority to appoint arbitrators, but it did not specify the name of

any arbitrator nor did it require that the arbitrators be members of a specific forum or arbitrator

pool. The arbitrator selection provision allowed the President to literally name anyone (except

members of the Executive Committee) who had experience and knowledge in the boxing industry.

Thus, the parties’ intention was not to arbitrate before a specific forum, arbitration panel or

arbitrator, but simply before a knowledgeable and experienced panel.

There is no basis, based upon the relevant case law, to invalidate the balance of the

Arbitration Agreement contained in Section 35(e) of Championship Regulations simply because a

supplemental and auxiliary arbitrator selection provision contained in Article 1 of the supplemental

Appeal Regulations supplementing the arbitration agreement was invalidated. See McMullen v.

Meijer, Inc. (II), 166 F. App’x. 164, 168–69 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that, after interpreting the

9
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 15 of 27

contract, the parties evidenced their intent that the arbitral process was not to be sacrificed even

though the arbitrator selection clause was invalid and there was no severability clause.); 2 Domke

on Com. Arb. § 24:3 (“The designation of an arbitrator is only a step in furtherance of the basic

agreement to arbitrate; the intent to arbitrate is dominant.”). Doing so would contravene the

parties’ main intention to promptly arbitrate their disputes before knowledgeable and experienced

individuals of an industry.

Moreover, the savings clause contained in Section 36 of the Championship Regulations

allows for the severability of the arbitrator selection provision. The First Circuit Court of Appeals

has held that, when a savings clause is incorporated in the agreement, the parties’ intention to

arbitrate must be enforced even when a portion of the clause is severed. See Anderson v. Comcast

Corp., 500 F.3d 66, 77 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the savings clause allows the arbitration to go

forward after severing a statute of limitations provision to preserve “the viability of the arbitral

forum”); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the savings

clause specifically anticipates the severance of the class arbitration bar, which is a significant

portion of the arbitration clause, and explaining that “by applying the savings clause and severing

the class arbitration bar, we are actually saving the arbitral forum-an outcome consistent with the

federal policy favoring arbitration.”); see also Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d

930, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (concluding that the arbitrator selection provision was not integral to

the arbitration clause taking into consideration the existence of a severability clause.). By including

this savings clause the parties’ intention to arbitrate their disputes is protected regardless if the

supplemental and separate arbitrator selection provision is invalidated.

In particular, the savings clause of the Championship Regulations allows the severability

of Article 1 of the Appeal Regulations because the Appeal Regulations were incorporated by

10
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 16 of 27

reference in Section 35(e) of the Championship Regulations. See, e.g., GGNSC Louisville Mt.

Holly, LLC v. Mohamed-Vall, No. 3:16-CV-136-DJH, 2016 WL 9024811, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Apr.

6, 2016) (holding that because the “arbitration agreement contains a severability clause, … the

agreement is still valid although the incorporated reference to NAF [“National Arbitration

Forum”] is unenforceable”). Even if there was no savings clause, the arbitrator-selection provision

on Article 1 of the Appeal Regulations is still severable because it is not integral to the arbitration

provisions of the Championship Regulations. See McMullen (II), 166 F. App'x at 168 (holding that

the arbitrator-selection clause is severable despite the fact that there was no savings clause in the

agreement).

From a practical standpoint, regardless of how the arbitrators are selected, the parties

intended to arbitrate their disputes in a prompt matter, even within thirty days following the referral

of the Complaint to the WBO President. See Article 35(e) of the Championship Regulations and

Article 7 of the Appeal Regulations. In a case like this one where rankings and championships are

at stake, it is essential for parties (and even for non-parties) to solve the dispute in a prompt manner.

The parties should not need to wait months or even years for the resolution of the disputes, which,

may be the time it may takes for a case to go to trial in a judicial forum.

Additionally, the invalidation of the arbitrator selection provision of Article 1 of the Appeal

Regulations does not render the whole Appeal Regulations of no force or effect. Arbitration may

still be achieved by enforcing Section 35(e) of the Championship Regulations including the Appeal

Regulations (excluding the invalid arbitrator selection provision contained in its Article 1). The

arbitrator selection provision may simply be substituted by another arbitrator selection mechanism,

allowing the parties to resolve their disputes over the selection of arbitrators by selecting arbitrators

with knowledge and experience in world championship professional boxing and in the application

11
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 17 of 27

of world championship boxing regulations. Based on the above, the parties’ intent was to arbitrate

their disputes which may be achieved without the Appeal Regulations’ arbitrator selection clause.

See §§, 742 F. Supp. at 1376 (Concluding that the parties agreed to resolve the disputes through

arbitration following certain regulatory procedures which may be followed with or without the

preselected Chicago Board of Trade’s arbitrators.)

Certainly, the WBO does not have a monopoly over the designation of arbitrators with the

knowledge and experience necessary to arbitrate championship boxing disputes. See id., at 1376

(explaining that an entity does not have a monopoly on the skills necessary to arbitrate disputes

arising from securities transactions). There are other organizations and individuals outside of the

WBO that possess such experience and knowledge, including, for example: attorneys and former

arbitrators that have participated in these types of disputes.

Although the President of the WBO can no longer appoint arbitrators in this case, the

parties (or the Court) are not precluded from appointing qualified arbitrators and should be allowed

to find a prompt resolution to their controversies through arbitration. Thus, the parties’ intention

to arbitrate before experienced and knowledgeable arbitrators, pursuant to the local and federal

arbitration acts, should be upheld. See Ruiz, 156 F. Supp. at 183 (“The equitable result, then, is to

sever the arbitrator selection provision while retaining the essence of the parties' agreement: to

arbitrate this dispute.”)

B. The Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration through Qualified and Expert Arbitrators

When determining whether the arbitrator selection clause is severable, the Court of Appeals

also instructed the parties and the District Court to consider the federal policy favoring arbitration.

See Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (explaining that the Federal

Arbitration Act (“FAA”) establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration, which requires the courts

12
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 18 of 27

to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”); World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., 125

D.P.R. 352, 358-361, P.R. Offic. Trans., 1990 WL 657504 (1990) (explaining that there is a

presumption of arbitrability and any doubt regarding the scope of the arbitrability of the

controversies must be resolved in favor of arbitration.).

Consistent with that policy, the FAA enables arbitration, and its Section 5 provides:

If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an

arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no
method be provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall
fail to avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse
in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then
upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate
and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require,
who shall act under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he
or they had been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in
the agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.

9 U.S.C. § 5 (emphasis added). Section 5 of the FAA supplements arbitration clauses if no method

is provided by the parties to pursue the arbitration. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724

F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Khan, 669 F.3d at 354 (pursuant to the FAA’s policy

favoring arbitration, if the parties’ arbitrator selection was not integral to the arbitration agreement,

the FAA requires the appointment of a substitute arbitrator when the arbitrator designated by the

parties was unavailable). If the arbitrator selection provision is severed and the parties are left

“without a mechanism for selecting an arbitrator, this is not fatal.” Ruiz, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 183.

The Court in Ruiz solved this situation as follows:

Section 5 of the FAA provides that “if no method [for appointing an arbitrator] be
provided [in an agreement], or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall
fail to avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse
in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then
upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and
appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require.” 9 U.S.C. §
5; see also Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 792–93 (7th
Cir.2013). Thus, if necessary, the Court could appoint an arbitrator. But it thinks
(and hopes) that such direct involvement is unnecessary. Now that the Court has

13
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 19 of 27

made clear that it will compel arbitration, it is confident the parties will be able to
find a mutually satisfactory selection mechanism. The obvious solution is the one
the Associations have already agreed to: Ruiz picks one arbitrator, the
Associations pick another, and those two arbitrators pick a third. But the parties
are free to choose a different method. And if the parties cannot agree on a method
within 30 days, either party may make an application under FAA § 5.

Ruiz, 156 F. Supp. 3d 176, 183–84 (D.D.C. 2016).

When selecting the arbitrators, Section 35(e) of the WBO Championship Regulations

requires that an arbitrator “be experienced with the application of World Championship Boxing

Regulations and have special knowledge and experience in World Championship Professional

Boxing.” This is a standard type of provision when it comes to selecting arbitrators. See 2 Domke

on Commercial Arbitration § 24:8 (“It is important that the individual be knowledgeable in his

field…” and have “specialized technical knowledge involved in the matters before arbitration.”)

Precisely, parties tend to arbitrate their disputes because arbitrators are generally highly qualified

and knowledgeable experts in an industry or field. See Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City

Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984) (“parties agree to arbitrate

precisely because they prefer a tribunal with expertise regarding the particular subject matter of

their dispute”); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983) (parties

decide to arbitrate because arbitrators have the necessary industry experience.)

If the parties are unable to select qualified arbitrators, the Court may intervene. See

Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London Syndicate 53, 615 F. App'x

22, 23 (2d Cir. 2015) (the FAA requires the Court to appoint arbitrators if a party contests the

qualifications of the proposed arbitrators); Oakland-Macomb Interceptor Drain Drainage Dist. v.

Ric-Man Const., Inc., 304 Mich. App. 46, 60 (2014) (“Pursuant to FAA § 4 and 5, plaintiff may

enforce the precise language of the arbitration contract relating to the qualifications of the

arbitrators…”); Serv. Partners, LLC v. Am. Home Assur. Co., No. CV-11-01858-CAS EX, 2011

14
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 20 of 27

WL 2516411, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2011) (disputes over the qualifications of named arbitrators

fall under the FAA); In re The Travelers Indem. Co., No. CIV. 3:04 MC 196 (TPS, 2004 WL

2297860, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 8, 2004) (“in choosing a neutral arbitrator under 9 U.S.C. § 5, the

court must select the most qualified candidate.”); Citrin v. Erikson, 918 F. Supp. 792, 798–99

(S.D.N.Y.1996) (in selecting a particular arbitrator, the court considered that he was

knowledgeable about the issues in dispute and had experience arbitrating.)

Considering that Section 35(e) of the WBO Championship Regulations is valid and

pursuant to the federal policy favoring arbitration, the WBO requests this Honorable Court to

exercise its authority under 9 U.S.C. § 5 to appoint (or allow the parties to appoint) qualified

arbitrators that have the required expertise and experience in championship boxing and its

regulations. To facilitate this process, the parties could provide a list of qualified potential

arbitrators and their qualifications for the Court (or for the parties themselves) to select from. Also,

the parties could provide a list of unbiased organizations that could assist in the arbitrator

identification and selection process.

Additionally, to facilitate the process, the WBO proposes that each party should name one

arbitrator knowledgeable in world championship professional boxing, and that those two selected

arbitrators agree upon and appoint a third arbitrator to be chairperson of the panel with such

experience that would qualify that person to serve as the chairperson. See 2 Domke on Commercial

Arbitration § 24:1 (“The arbitrator may either act alone, as the sole arbitrator, or there may be a

tribunal of arbitrators, usually three, to hear disputes. Often, when the parties have decided on a

tribunal of arbitrators, each party will appoint an arbitrator and the third arbitrator will be selected

by the two party-appointed arbitrators or by the parties.”) Lastly, since only Article 1 of the Appeal

Regulations was invalidated by the Court of Appeals, the WBO requests that the parties and

15
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 21 of 27

selected arbitrators follow the remaining processes established in the Appeal Regulations, as

applicable.

C. The Interplay between the Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration and State Law

1. The Puerto Rico Commercial Arbitration Act and its Public Policy Favoring Arbitration

The Puerto Rico Commercial Arbitration Act, Section 5, which partially mirrors Section 5

of the FAA, provides, in relevant part, the following:

On petition of any of the parties to the arbitration agreement and upon notice thereof
to the other parties, the court shall appoint one or more referees in any of the
following cases:

(a) When the arbitration agreement does not stipulate the manner of appointing
same.

(b) When the arbitration agreement stipulates the manner of appointing referees,
but none of them has been appointed and the term within which they should have
been appointed has expired.

(c) When a referee fails to act or is unable to act, and his successor has not been
duly appointed.

(d) The court shall, in its discretion, appoint one (1) or three (3) referees, according
to the importance of the dispute involved in any of the preceding cases in which the
agreement is silent as to the number of referees.

The referees appointed by the court shall have the same powers as if appointed in
conformity with the arbitration agreement.

32 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3205.

Like the FAA, Section 5 of the Puerto Rico Arbitration Act grants authority to the Court

to, upon the parties’ request, appoint one or more arbitrators if the arbitration clause establishes

the manner to appoint the same, but they have not been yet named and the period to appoint them

has expired. Doral Bank v. MAPFRE PRAICO Ins. Co., No. KLCE201300859, 2013 WL

16
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 22 of 27

5798665, at *4 (P.R. Cir. Sept. 20, 2013).3 Considering the similarities between this Section and

FAA’s Section 5, both statutes provide this Honorable Court with the authority to appoint

arbitrators (or allow the parties to furnish this process). Parallel with the Federal policy favoring

arbitration, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has also recognized a “policy of favoring arbitration”

in Puerto Rico. Sonic Knitting Indus. v. I.L.G.W.U., 106 D.P.R. 557, 6 P.R. Offic. Trans. 783, 811

(1978) (on reconsideration); see also Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Herbert H. Johnson Assoc., Inc.,

325 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (D.P.R. 1971) (“In Puerto Rico there is a strong public policy favoring

the arbitration of disputes.”).

In view of the above, under Puerto Rico law “[t]he parties have ample liberty to incorporate

into the submission agreement the qualifications they deem proper, and the arbitrator is bound to

comply with them.” Rivera v. Samaritano & Co., 108 D.P.R. 604, 8 P.R. Offic. Trans. 640, 643–

44 (1979); see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010) (The

benefits of arbitration are: “lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose

expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”) (emphasis added).

The Puerto Rico Arbitration Act provides for the challenge of arbitrators. See 32 P.R. Laws

Ann. § 3209 (“The referees may be challenged only for reasons arising after the arbitration

compromise or unknown at the time of the arbitration.”) Pursuant to the above, the parties may

require arbitrators to meet certain qualifications, including the ones established on Section 35(e)

of the Championship Regulations, and if they don’t meet such criteria, they could be removed.

2. The Interpretation of Contracts Under Puerto Rico Law

When determining whether a provision of a contract is severable, the courts must examine

the provisions of the applicable state law. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 674

3
See Certified translation to English attached.

17
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 23 of 27

(6th Cir.2003). Under Puerto Rico Law, agreements must generally be interpreted pursuant to

Article 1207 of the Civil Code, 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3272, “which permits the contracting parties

to establish the agreements, clauses, and conditions convenient to them as long as they are not

contrary to laws, morals, or public order.” Flores v. Municipio de Caguas, 114 D.P.R. 521, 14 P.R.

Offic. Trans. 674, 684 (1983).

Article 1233 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code provides that “[i]f the terms of a contract are

clear and leave no doubt as to the intentions of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its

stipulations shall be observed.” 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3471. Moreover, “[i]f the words should

appear contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail.” Id.

When contractual terms are not clear, “[t]he interpretation of [such] obscure stipulations of a

contract must not favor the party occasioning the obscurity.” 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3478. When

interpreting a contract, the Courts must consider that “[w]hen the parties enter into a contract they

do so to make their covenants and agreements effective, and not seeking illusory or empty

declarations.” Caguas Plumbing v. Cont'l Const. Corp., 155 D.P.R. 744, P.R. Offic. Trans., (2001);

quoting Morales Garay v. Roldán Coss, 110 D.P.R. 701, 707 [10 P.R. Offic. Trans. 909, 917]

(1981).

The arbitration clause in Section 35(e) of the Championship Regulations is clear, free from

any ambiguity, and does not have any obscure stipulations. It clearly reflects the parties’ intention

to arbitrate the disputes at hand in an expedited manner, before a panel of arbitrators with

knowledge and experience in world championship professional boxing and following the FAA

and/or Puerto Rico Arbitration Act guidelines, both of which allow for the arbitration process to

move forward in this case. That is clearly the intention of the parties and can be achieved with or

without the arbitrator selection provision. Therefore, the arbitrator selection provision is severable.

18
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 24 of 27

See, e.g., McCrillis v. Aut. Navieras de P.R., 123 D.P.R. 113, 23 P.R. Offic. Trans. 109 (1989)

(interpreting an agreement with a severability provision and voiding only certain parts of the

contract); Cherena v. Coors Brewing Co., 20 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 (D.P.R. 1998) (declaring null

and void one clause containing the non-competition covenant and enforcing the severability clause

to enforce the rest of the agreement).

Therefore, given the parties’ clear and unambiguous intention to arbitrate and the

severability Clause provided for in Section 36 of the WBO Rules, the WBO respectfully moves

this Honorable Court to confirm the severability of the Arbitrator Selection Clause, and allow the

parties the opportunity to agree on the arbitration panel selection. In the alternative, the WBO

requests the Court pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 5 to appoint the panel, following Section 35(e)

requirements of the Championship Regulations naming persons experienced with the application

of boxing regulations and with special knowledge and experience in world championship

professional boxing.

IV. CONCLUSION

Most federal Circuit Courts of Appeals agree that the “integral” test should be used to

evaluate the severability of an arbitrator selection clause. Under this test, courts evaluate whether

the arbitrator selection provision is integral or central to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate and, if

it is the invalidation of such a provision precludes the courts from compelling arbitration. Under

this test, Courts have invalidated arbitration clauses in their entirety when an arbitrator or forum

is specifically identified in the arbitrator selection provision.

The WBO regulations do not identify or name a special arbitrator and do not specify an

arbitration forum. Instead, the WBO regulations―in, Article 1 of the Appeal Regulations― allow

the appointment of arbitrators (except members of its Executive Committee) so long as they have

19
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 25 of 27

experience and knowledge regarding the regulations of world championship professional boxing.

It is merely a procedural mechanism to select arbitrators, which can be easily substituted by many

other methods of selection of an arbitration panel either agreed to by the parties or as ordered by

Court.

Moreover, the WBO arbitrator selection provision cannot be considered a central or

material provision in the Championship Regulations arbitration clause because it is not included

in it but was merely incorporated by reference from another WBO regulation, namely, the Appeal

Regulations. Therefore, the designation of the actual arbitrators’ and their individual identities

were not integral to the parties’ intent to arbitrate.

Considering the above and in consideration of the federal policy favoring arbitration, the

arbitrator selection clause is perfectly severable from the other arbitration provisions contained

within the WBO regulations as provided for by, the savings clause in Section 36 of the

Championship Regulations, the WBO respectfully submits that the arbitration should be allowed

to move forward and the parties should be allowed the right to pursue their objective to arbitrate

the claims at hand, in a prompt manner, before a panel of arbitrators with knowledge and

experience in world championship professional boxing and following the FAA and/or Puerto Rico

Arbitration Act’s requirements.

The parties may advance the process by providing a list of qualified and unbiased

arbitrators, including former arbitrators, experts, and/or attorneys. If the parties do not reach an

agreement on the panel selection, they are still able to pursue arbitration, even without the

arbitrator selection clause, as the Federal Arbitration Act, Section 5, and 9 U.S.C. § 5 authorizes

the Court to appoint qualified arbitrators. In either event, the arbitrators must meet the experience

20
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 26 of 27

and expertise requirements from Section 35(e) of the Championship Regulations, which has not

been invalidated and is enforceable by this Honorable Court.

WHEREFORE, the WBO respectfully requests that this Honorable Court deems the

WBO in compliance with its order contained in Docket No. 92 and order the parties to arbitrate

the disputes at hand after each party provides a list of qualified arbitrators, each party selects an

arbitrator from those lists, and those arbitrators select a third arbitrator that would serve as the

chairperson. In the alternative or if the parties are unable to timely select the arbitrators, the WBO

requests this Honorable Court to name the panel members, pursuant to Sec. 5 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C.

§ 5. Lastly, the WBO requests that the parties be bound by any and all enforceable and applicable

portions of the arbitration provisions contained in the WBO’s regulations that operate

independently from the invalidated arbitrator selection supplemental provision.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that on this same date we electronically filed the foregoing with

the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the

attorneys of record.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 9th day of November 2020.

Signature block on the following page

21
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 93 Filed 11/09/20 Page 27 of 27

PIETRANTONI MENDEZ & ALVAREZ LLC Law Offices of Andrew W. Horn, P.A.
Popular Center, 19th Floor 2665 S. Bayshore Drive
208 Ponce de León Avenue Suite 800
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00918 Miami, FL 33131
Tel. 787-274-1212 Tel. 305-373-7789
Fax. 787-274-1470 Fax. 305-372-9180

/s/ Oreste R. Ramos /s/ Andrew W. Horn

Oreste R. Ramos Andrew W. Horn
USDC No. 216801 admitted pro hac vice
oramos@pmalaw.com lawofficehorn@msn.com

/s/ Christian A. Muñoz Lugo

Christian A. Muñoz Lugo
USDC No. 305813
cmunoz@pmalaw.com

JOSEPH C. LAWS, JR.

Post Office Box 10143
San Juan, Puerto Rico
Tel. 787-754-7777
Fax. 787-763-5223
/s/ Joseph C. Laws, Jr.
Joseph C. Laws, Jr.
USDC No. 120306
lawofficesofjosephlaws@gmail.com

Attorneys for Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc.

4843-9920-4049v.5

22