Papal Supremacy, Essence/Energies and 

the Filioque: The Inadequacy of Implicit 

Argumentation. 
By Michael Lofton

Much ink has been spilled on how to properly understand the First Vatican 
Council’s teaching on Papal supremacy, which Canon 331 in the ​Code of Canon 

Law​ summarizes as being “supreme, full, immediate, and universal ordinary 

power…”. The profuse number of documents addressing this doctrine are 
abundant, partly due to the problem of ultramontanism within Roman 
Catholicism. For the moment, I’d like to set aside the historical debate between 
maximalist and minimalist interpretations of the council and focus on the 

Eastern Orthodox object to papal supremacy in order to draw some general 

conclusions about the use of implicit argumentation in apologetics. 

Many Orthodox claim the Roman Catholic view of Papal supremacy is novel 
and not in any way reflective of the ecclesiology shared by Roman Catholics 
and Eastern Orthodox in the united church of the first millennium. At best, 
Orthodox say, Vatican 1 ecclesiology can be seen in the first millennium as a 
rarely attested deviation from the predominantly conciliar ecclesiology handed 

down by the Apostles. 

For the moment, let’s assume the Roman Catholic position illegitimately reads 
its ecclesiology back into the first millennium. This does not automatically 

prove the Orthodox position nor does it free Orthodox from the same charge. It 
can be argued that Orthodoxy reads several of its authoritative doctrines back 
into the first millennium. For instance, some might say the Orthodox read the 
essence/energies distinction back into the Third Council of Constantinople. 

The council, in session 18, confesses: 

Preserving therefore the inconfusedness and indivisibility, we make briefly this whole 

confession, believing our Lord Jesus Christ to be one of the Trinity and after the 
incarnation our true God, we say that his t​ wo natures​ shone forth in his one 

subsistence in which he both performed the miracles and endured the sufferings 
through the whole of his economic conversation (δἰ ὅλης αὐτοῦ τῆς 

οἰκονομκῆς ἀναστροφῆς), and that not in appearance only but in very deed, 
and this by reason of the difference of nature which must be recognized in the same 

Person, for although joined together yet each nature wills and does the things proper 
to it and that indivisibly and inconfusedly. Wherefore we confess two wills and ​two 

operations​, concurring most fitly in him for the salvation of the human race. 
(Emphasis mine) 

From the distinction between the phrases “two natures” and “two operations 
[energies]” s
​ ome Orthodox apologists​ argue the council enshrines the 

distinction of God’s essence and energies. Yet, the council was not directly 
addressing whether these concepts are distinct in God, but was directly 
addressing the issue of monothelitism. At best, Orthodox apologists could 
argue it was implied in the phrases used by the council, but that is also what 
Roman Catholics argue when they say the Letter of Agatho, read aloud at the 
Sixth Ecumenical Council, implicitly teaches papal supremacy. If Orthodox 
apologists get to read the E/E distinction into the Sixth Council, why can’t 

Catholics do the same for papal supremacy? 

Another example is the Council of Blachernae (Constantinople) in 1285 uses 

John of Damascus to teach the distinction between an “eternal manifestation” 

(manifestation of the divine energies) of the Holy Spirit and the ​filioque 
(hypostatic origin of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son as from one 

principle). ​Blachernae says​: 

To the same, who say that the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit, and 

who cannot conceive the Father as the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit — giving it 
existence and being — except through the Son; thus according to them the Son is 

united to the Father as joint-cause and contributor to the Spirit’s existence. This, they 
say, is supported by the phrase of Saint John of Damascus, “the Father is the projector 

through the Son of the manifesting Spirit.” John of Damascus, ​De fide orthodoxa​, in 
Kotter, D
​ ie Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos​ II, 36 (= ​PG​ 94.849B): “He Himself [the 

Father], then, is mind, the depth of reason, begetter of the Word, and, through the 
Word, projector of the manifesting Spirit.” This, however, can never mean what they 

say, inasmuch as it clearly denotes the manifestation — through the intermediary of 
the Son — of the Spirit, whose existence is from the Father. For the same John of 

Damascus would not have said — in the exact same chapter — that the only cause in 
the Trinity is God the Father, thus denying, by the use of the word “only,” the 

causative principle to the remaining two hypostases. John of Damascus, D

​ e fide 
orthodoxa​, in Kotter, ​Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos​ II, 36 (= ​PG​ 94.849B) Nor 

would he have, again, said elsewhere, “and we speak, likewise, of the Holy Spirit as 
the ‘Spirit of the Son,’ yet we do not speak of the Spirit as from the Son.” Ibid., 30 (= 

PG​ 94-832B). For both of these views to be true is impossible. To those who have not 
accepted the interpretation given to these t​ estimonia​ by the Fathers, but, on the 
contrary, perceive them in a manner altogether forbidden by them, we pronounce the 

above recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the 
Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God. 

As evident from the way the council argues its case, the distinction provided by 

the council is not explicitly taught by John of Damascus, but is arguably 

implied in his writings. However, if Orthodox can claim their doctrines are 
implied in the fathers, why can’t Catholics do the same? Is not what’s good for 

the goose is good for the gander? 

As it stands, simply arguing that a particular theology is implied in the first 

millennium is inadequate, because it is clear that both sides appeal to conciliar 
and patristic sources for their respective positions. This brings us to the central 
question, if both Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholics can argue their 

doctrines and respective ecclesiologies are at least implied in the councils and 
fathers of the first millennium, then what objective means can be used to 
arbitrate between these different communions? Did Christ leave us orphans, 
without any objective way of settling disputes, or is there an objective way of 
knowing the truth when both sides appeal to ecumenical councils and church 

fathers for their positions? 

For most Orthodox today, the answer would be there isn’t an objective means 

of arbitrating between doctrinal disputes that rise to a conciliar level because 

even the decisions of an ecumenical council are subject to the theory of 
reception, which is ultimately subjective in nature. Some Orthodox might 
argue for an enlightened knowledge given directly to the ​nous​. which may or 
may not be mediated through sacramental grace. This too is subjective and 

begs the question. 

It would seem that Catholics alone offer an objective solution to the question. 
What is this objective means of arbitrating between doctrinal disputes that 

may even rise to a conciliar level? For the Catholic, the objective means would 
be papal ratification of an ecumenical council or a papal teaching taught e
​ x 
cathedra​. However, properly defining what is considered an ecumenical 
council, what is taught ex cathedra or if the objective solutions offered by 

Rome are apostolic in origin are questions left for another day.