Sartrean Self-Consciousness

and the Principle of Identity

Sartre’s Implicit Argument for
the Non-Self-Identity of the Subject

MAIYA JORDAN

Abstract: I address the problem of what grounds Sartre’s paradoxi-

cal claim that consciousness is non-self-identical, and his equally
paradoxical gloss on that claim—that the nature of consciousness is
to be what it is not and not to be what it is. I argue that there is an
implicit argument in Being and Nothingness, which both entails and
elucidates Sartre’s claim that consciousness is non-self-identical, and
which also maps on to, and clarifies, the explicit argument that Sartre
provides for this conclusion. This implicit argument presupposes that
we attribute to Sartre a distinctive theory of pre-reflective self-con-
sciousness—what I call the non-iterative theory. I argue that we
should attribute the non-iterative theory to Sartre.
Keywords: identity, iteration, pre-reflection, self-consciousness,
translucency

S artre defines consciousness as “being what it is not and not being

what it is,”1 a claim he takes to be logically equivalent to the thesis
that consciousness lacks self-identity (BN, 47–84).2 This paradoxical
mode of expression yields genuine paradox when we find that, by
this expression, Sartre does not simply intend the diachronic claim
that I, the self-conscious subject, am not identical with my past or
future consciousnesses. He intends also the synchronic claim that
consciousness fails to satisfy the principle of identity: ∀x(x = x).3
This claim has perplexed many—regarding not only its content
but also Sartre’s reasons for holding it. Such a bold conclusion
warrants an exceptional argument. Yet, the explicit argument Sartre
provides for this conclusion seems weak. Moreover, this explicit
argument does not obviously speak to the substantive claims that
© UKSS and NASS Sartre Studies International Volume 23, Issue 2, 2017: 98–113
doi:10.3167/ssi.2017.230207 ISSN 1357-1559 (Print) • ISSN 1558-5476 (Online)
 Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity

Sartre makes about non-self-identical consciousness. Crucially, it

does not tell us how pre-reflective self-consciousness relates to the
experience it apprehends, which merits its being so paradoxically
described as “being what it is not and not being what it is” (BN, xli).
I propose an interpretation that will, I hope, dispel some of the
confusion that has surrounded Sartre’s position. I suggest that
Sartre’s explicit argument for the conclusion that consciousness is
non-self-identical masks an implicit argument for that conclusion.
This implicit argument clarifies—in a manner that his explicit argu-
ment does not clarify—Sartre’s view of the relation of pre-reflection
to experience. That clarification is simultaneously a clarification of
his paradoxical formula that the nature of consciousness “is to be
what it is not and not to be what it is” (BN, 70). The presupposition
of this implicit argument is that Sartre holds a distinctive theory
regarding the nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness.

Iterative Pre-reflection and Non-iterative Pre-reflection

To state Sartre’s implicit argument for the non-self-identity of con-

sciousness, I need to introduce a distinction between iterative and
non-iterative pre-reflection. I am iteratively aware (of) my experi-
ence, E, just in case I am aware (of) E and aware (of) my awareness
(of) E.4 In iterative pre-reflection, the (of) is iterated. I am non-itera-
tively aware (of) my experience, E, just in case I am aware (of) E, but
not aware (of) my awareness (of) E. In non-iterative pre-reflection,
the (of) is not iterated. Correlatively, I shall deem an iterative theory
of pre-reflection to be a theory that posits pre-reflection as iterative,
and I shall deem a non-iterative theory to be a theory that posits
pre-reflection as non-iterative.
I suggest that Sartre’s position will be illuminated if we recognize
that he is a non-iterative theorist. The Sartrean “for-itself” is a con-
sciousness (of) experience, but it is not conscious (of) being so con-
scious. To show this will be my first task. My second task will be to
show how this yields the conclusion that the for-itself is non-self-
identical. It will be clear that Sartre is at least logically committed to
a non-iterative theory of pre-reflection, if we show that an iterative
theory is committed to the strict self-identity of the subject. That
will also show that questions about iteration and questions about the
self-identity of consciousness are closely related.
Edmund Husserl advances a paradigmatic iterative theory of pre-
reflection.5 He distinguishes experiences (Erlebnisse) from the experi-
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encing (Erleben) of those experiences. This experiencing of experi-

ence—what Husserl terms the “flow” of self-consciousness—has two
aspects. On the one hand, it is a pre-reflective awareness (of) experi-
ence (it is, for example, an awareness (of) one’s perceptions, desires,
hopes, or wishes). Husserl terms this awareness (of) experience a
“transverse awareness” (Querintentionalität). On the other hand, it
is an awareness (of) itself, as an awareness (of) experience. Husserl
terms this awareness (of) awareness (of) experience a “longitudinal
awareness” (Längsintentionalität). Because he insists on such longi-
tudinal self-awareness, Husserl advances what I have termed an itera-
tive theory of pre-reflection.6
The crucial question here is this: What is the relation between my
awareness (of) my experience, E, and my awareness (of) my aware-
ness (of) E? Husserl’s answer is that, in distinguishing my awareness
(of) E from my awareness (of) my awareness (of) E, we make an
aspectual (and hence a conceptual) distinction. But we do not
thereby distinguish between distinct acts of self-consciousness:
“There is one, unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity
of [experiences] in immanent time and the unity of the flow of con-
sciousness become constituted at once.”7 What Husserl calls “lived-
experience” thus involves the following identity:
(I) My awareness (of) E = my awareness (of) my awareness (of) E.

Indeed, without this identity, the iterative theory would open a

regress of pre-reflections. Using subscripts “1” and “2” to distin-
guish between distinct pre-reflections, my consciousness (of)1 E
would appear, not (to) itself but (to) the distinct pre-reflection, my
consciousness (of)2 my consciousness (of)1 E. That would secure
iteration for the pre-reflection, my consciousness (of)1 E. But, since
(by assumption) my consciousness (of)1 E is distinct from my con-
sciousness (of)2 my consciousness (of)1 E, the latter pre-reflection
would lack iteration. Consequently, the assumption that iteration
informs all pre-reflections will require that my consciousness (of)2
my consciousness (of)1 E appear (to) a distinct pre-reflection—and
so forth. To halt the regress, the iterative theorist is committed to an
identity between some pre-reflection, n, and the pre-reflection that
appears (to) n. Simplicity requires that this identity be (I).8
Consequently, for Husserl—and indeed, for all iterative theo-
rists—there is an identity between pre-reflection and pre-reflection’s
appearance (to) itself—for that is what (I) holds. Or again, in terms
that Sartre later appropriates, there is a “coincidence” of the subject
with its appearance (to) itself: “There extends throughout the flow a
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 Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity

[longitudinal self-awareness] that, in the course of the flow, continu-

ously coincides with itself.”9
The iterative theorist, therefore, is committed to the strict self-
identity of the subject. Consequently, one holding that pre-reflection
is non-self-identical is logically committed to the non-iterative the-
ory. Since Sartre holds that pre-reflection is non-self-identical, Sartre
is logically committed to the non-iterative theory. That goes some
way to showing that Sartrean pre-reflection is (by Sartre’s under-
standing) non-iterative. To strengthen the case, I need to show that
the non-iterative theory is entailed by the premises of the explicit
argument that Sartre gives for the non-self-identity of consciousness.
I also need to show that the following argument—which, I maintain,
is implicit in Sartre—is (non-trivially) valid:
(1) Consciousness is non-iterative.

Consciousness is non-self-identical.

Hereafter, I shall refer to this as the “implicit argument.” Clearly, a

core task will be to make explicit what suppressed premises are at
work in this implicit argument. Finally, I need to show how passages
in Being and Nothingness, which discuss the relation of pre-reflection
to experience, can be elucidated in terms of the non-iterative theory.
So, I shall proceed as follows. I first reconstruct Sartre’s explicit
argument for the non-self-identity of consciousness and then subject
that argument to criticism. That reconstruction and critique provide
the suppressed premises for the implicit argument and show that
Sartre is logically committed to the implicit argument. Finally, I
show how this implicit argument yields the conclusion that con-
sciousness is non-self-identical, and maps on to Sartre’s texts, thus
confirming that Sartre does, indeed, hold a non-iterative theory of
self-consciousness.

Sartre’s Explicit Argument

for the Non-Self-Identity of the Subject

I begin, then, by considering Sartre’s explicit argument for non-self-

identity. Sartre says, “What can properly be called subjectivity is con-
sciousness (of) consciousness” (BN, xxxvii):
[But] presence (to) always implies duality, at least a virtual separation. …
Presence (to) self … supposes that an impalpable fissure has slipped into
being. If being is present (to) itself, it is because it is not wholly itself.
Presence is an immediate deterioration of coincidence, for it supposes

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 Maiya Jordan

separation. … [Hence, the subject’s being present (to) himself] separates

the subject from himself [that is, precludes self-identity for the subject].
(BN, 77; parentheses added; emphasis in original)10

Sartre’s presentation of the argument is overly concise. As stated,

it is not wholly clear what its premises are and what its structure is.
However, what is stated is sufficient to support a reconstruction,
with the addition of a suppressed premise that Sartre accepts. And
the reconstruction will validly yield Sartre’s desired conclusion that
consciousness is non-self-identical. The reconstructed, explicit argu-
ment runs as follows:
(1) The self-conscious subject just is a consciousness (of) an experience
E (“What can properly be called subjectivity is consciousness (of)
consciousness” [BN, xxxvii]).
(2) Consciousness (of) (or presence (to)) “implies duality” (BN, 77)—that
is, the relation x is present (to) y is irreflexive: x is present (to) y just
in case x is not identical to y.
(3) A self-identical subject must appear (to) itself, and it must be identi-
cal with that self-appearance (premise suppressed).
The self-conscious subject is not self-identical.

Let me first elucidate why this argument is valid. That will require
me also to remark on its premises. I shall deal first with premises (1)
and (3), since premise (2) will invite objections.
Premise (1). According to premise (1), subjectivity just is pre-
reflective self-consciousness, and conversely. This premise will (or, at
least, can) be accepted by iterative and non-iterative theorists alike.
Correlatively, it can be accepted by those who hold that conscious-
ness is self-identical and by those who follow Sartre in denying this
self-identity. It is not a premise that is viewed as controversial by
those who endorse the view that consciousness’s necessary self-
awareness is pre-reflective in structure.11
Premise (3). This premise, too, is uncontroversial. A subject, by
definition, must somehow appear to itself. That is what a subject
does—it apprehends itself. Granting premise (1), the relevant notion
of appearance to here is appearance (to). So, we can say a subject must
appear (to) itself, which in turn means that a subject must, in some
sense, be its self-appearance. Otherwise, it would not appear to itself,
after all. In the case where we have a non-self-identical subject,
although that subject will (by definition) not be identical with its self-
appearance, it must in some sense be its self-appearance. The term
“be” here will not express strict identity, but it will express a sense
that somehow identifies that which appears with that (to) which there
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 Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity

is this appearance. Otherwise, we would not have in play anything

that merits the term “subject.” In the case of a self-identical subject,
the term “be” will express strict identity (“=”). The subject will be
identical with its appearance (to) itself. Or, in Sartre’s terminology,
the subject will “coincide with itself” (BN, 78).
So, premise (3) is uncontroversial; it must be accepted by all par-
ties. The iterative theorist accepts it, since the iterative theorist is
committed to the strict identity of the subject with its appearance
(to) itself. Sartre accepts it, since he holds that a self-identical subject
would “coincide with itself,” would be strictly identical with its
appearance (to) itself. Indeed, that is what Sartre means by the
expressions “self-coincidence” and “coincidence with self.” Denying
self-identity to consciousness, Sartre says, “The for-itself is the being
which determines itself to exist inasmuch as it cannot coincide with
itself” (BN, 78; translation modified).
Premise (2) This premise is controversial. According to it, there
cannot be a strict identity linking consciousness with its appearance
(to) itself. It should be clear that, once we grant premises (1) and (3)
(as I have elucidated those premises), premise (2) will yield Sartre’s
desired conclusion. Granting premise (1), the subject of experience
just is a pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a consciousness (of)
consciousness. And granting premise (3), this self-consciousness will
be self-identical only if consciousness is identical with its appearance
(to) itself. But granting premise (2), consciousness cannot be identi-
cal with that which appears (to) it. Consequently, consciousness is
not self-identical. It is its appearance (to) itself in a manner that is
not that of identity.
Sartre’s explicit argument for the non-self-identity of conscious-
ness, then, is valid. However, the argument (both as Sartre presents
it and as I have interpreted it) is too concise to convince, and invites
some substantial objections. First, the argument seems not to pro-
vide any substance to its conclusion. It seems not to inform us as to
the nature of this non-self-identical subject, other than saying it is
non-self-identical. It tells us only that consciousness cannot be iden-
tical with its self-appearance—that it is thus “ruptured from itself.”
As such, it does not enlighten us as to how its premises are supposed
to yield the substantive claims that Sartre makes about the subject—
in particular, that its subjectivity consists in “being what it is not and
not being what it is” (BN, xli).
Second, no one who holds the general position that everything is
self-identical will be convinced by Sartre’s argument. They will sim-
ply reject premise (2). This objection, however, points the way to
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 Maiya Jordan

answering the first objection. Recall that the iterative theorist is com-
mitted to the strict self-identity of the subject. She can accept
Sartre’s premise (2) only by opening a vicious regress of distinct pre-
reflections. The iterative theorist is, therefore, committed to denying
premise (2). In other words, premise (2) commits Sartre to a non-
iterative theory of consciousness. This yields the promise that a
revised presentation of Sartre’s position—which unpacks the notion
of pre-reflection advanced in premise (1) in terms of the notion of
non-iteration—might elucidate what the subject’s being “self-rup-
tured” consists in. It might elucidate how this “self-rupturing”
relates an experience, E, to the consciousness (of) E. I shall provide
this modified (or implicit) argument later.
This new, implicit argument will not convince those objectors
who are committed to the view that everything is self-identical. It
should, however, convince them that they can sustain this view only
if they reject non-iterative accounts of self-consciousness. My aim in
this article is not to settle this dispute between iterative and non-iter-
ative theorists. Mine is the more modest aim of articulating the
break from identity in terms of non-iteration.
A third objection to the argument comes from within Sartre’s
own ranks. A defender of non-iteration might claim that the con-
sciousness (of) E is self-identical, for she might claim that non-itera-
tive self-consciousness just is an experience E’s being literally aware
(of) itself, in the sense of strict identity. She too, then, will deny
Sartre’s premise (2), that presence (to) “implies duality.” As it turns
out, this objector is mistaken. We shall see that non-iteration does
preclude the self-identity of the subject. But the point is, Sartre’s
explicit argument does not show this; it does not even address it.
We shall, then, avoid begging the question against this third
objection if we modify Sartre’s argument by replacing premise (2)
with the premise that consciousness is non-iterative. Although modi-
fying his argument, this will not misrepresent Sartre’s position, for
we have seen that Sartre’s original premise (2) entails that conscious-
ness is non-iterative. The rejection of iteration, however, must count
as a new premise, for it does not follow from (1) and (3).

Sartre’s Implicit Argument for the

Non-Self-Identity of the Subject

The revised argument—what I have called Sartre’s implicit argu-

ment—will thus take the following form:
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 Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity

(1) The self-conscious subject just is a consciousness (of) an experience,

E.
(2*) Self-consciousness is non-iterative.
(3) A self-identical subject must appear (to) itself, and it must be identi-
cal with that self-appearance.
The self-conscious subject is not self-identical.

Evidently, this new, implicit argument differs from Sartre’s explicit

argument only by having premise (2*) replace Sartre’s original
premise (2). Furthermore, we have seen that premise (2*) is entailed
by Sartre’s original premise (2). So, Sartre is committed to this
implicit argument.
I have urged that premises (1) and (3) are noncontroversial. All
parties—iterative and non-iterative theorists—will (and should)
accept them. That renders the argument general in this sense. If by
conjoining premise (2*) to premises (1) and (3) we can deduce the
conclusion that consciousness is non-self-identical, then that result
will be independent of the particular nuances of Sartre’s philosophy.
It will hold for all non-iterative accounts. Sartre’s position will thus
emerge as one that correctly takes the non-iterative position to its
logical conclusion. So, I turn now to showing that this implicit argu-
ment is, indeed, valid.
According to premise (2*), the consciousness (of) E cannot be con-
scious (of) itself as a consciousness (of) E. For, if it were, then it would
be iterative. It would be a consciousness (of) consciousness (of) E. Yet,
E is all that is present (to) the non-iterative consciousness (of) E. Two
important consequences follow. These will be deduced, respectively, by
the following arguments, Argument A and Argument B.

Argument A
It follows, first, that the non-iterative consciousness (of) E cannot be
identical with E. This follows via the following argument. For any x,
y, z, if x is identical to y, then x is present (to) z if and only if y is pre-
sent (to) z. Consequently, if E is identical with the consciousness (of)
E, then E is present (to) the consciousness (of) E if, and only if, the
consciousness (of) E is present (to) the consciousness (of) E. But
whereas E is, the consciousness (of) E is not, present (to) the con-
sciousness (of) E. This follows from the definition of “non-itera-
tion.” Therefore, by modus tollens, the consciousness (of) E is not
identical with E.
Consider the following objection to this argument: x might satisfy
distinct descriptions, “D” and “D*,” and be present (to) z under the
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 Maiya Jordan

description “D,” but not under the description “D*.” Then D (i.e.,
x under “D”) is present (to) z, but D* (i.e., x under “D*”) is not
present (to) z. But we cannot conclude that D is distinct from D*.
On the contrary, D = D*. Likewise, we cannot conclude that E is
distinct from the consciousness (of) E on the grounds that E is, but
the consciousness (of) E is not, present (to) the consciousness (of)
E, for E might satisfy the distinct descriptions “E” and “the con-
sciousness (of) E,” and be present (to) the consciousness (of) E
under the first, but not the second description.
However, this objection conflates pre-reflective presence (to) with
reflective presence to. My desire, for example, appears to my reflec-
tive consciousness in profile, “under a description.” Thus, I can
reflectively misdescribe my desire. But, unlike reflective presence to,
pre-reflective presence (to) is immediate. If x is present (to) z, then x
is present (to) z immediately, as it is, without profile and not under a
description. If the consciousness (of) E is to be present (to) the con-
sciousness (of) E, then the consciousness (of) E must apprehend the
consciousness (of) E immediately, as it is, without profile. It must
apprehend it as a consciousness (of) E. However, that requires itera-
tion. It requires that the consciousness (of) E be a consciousness (of)
consciousness (of) E. But that contradicts premise (2*), which holds
that consciousness is non-iterative. Therefore, the non-iterative con-
sciousness (of) E—that is, the non-iterative subject—cannot be iden-
tical with E. This will serve as a lemma in establishing the second
consequence.

Argument B
It follows, second, that the non-iterative consciousness (of) E cannot
be self-identical. For, granting premise (3)—
(3) A self-identical subject must appear (to) itself, and it must be identi-
cal with that self-appearance.

—the non-iterative consciousness (of) E is self-identical only if it

appears (to) itself and it is identical with that self-appearance. Yet all
that appears (to) it is E. Consequently, the non-iterative conscious-
ness (of) E is self-identical only if it is identical with E. But Argu-
ment A shows that the non-iterative consciousness (of) E cannot be
identical with E. Consequently, the non-iterative consciousness (of)
E is not self-identical.
This revised, implicit argument seems to me to be valid and makes
no appeal to Sartre’s original premise (2), that presence (to) “implies
duality” (BN, 77). Granting its validity, we must conclude that con-
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 Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity

sciousness is non-self-identical if, and only if, it is non-iterative. For,

as I showed earlier, the iterative theorist must accept self-identity.
She can reject self-identity only on pain of a regress of pre-reflec-
tions. Since Sartre avows a commitment to the non-self-identity of
consciousness, and since the implicit argument maps on to, and
elucidates, Sartre’s explicit argument for non-self-identity, we have a
strong case for the claim that Sartre is, by his own understanding,
committed to the non-iterative theory.

To Be What One Is Not and Not to Be What One Is

We can confirm this result if we now turn to some of the more chal-
lenging passages of Being and Nothingness. Earlier, I criticized
Sartre’s explicit argument for the non-self-identity of consciousness
for failing to articulate how this break from identity yields the sub-
stantive and paradoxical claims that Sartre makes about non-self-
identical consciousness. In particular, Sartre’s explicit argument fails
to relate the non-self-identity of consciousness to its “being what it
is not and not being what it is” (BN, xli). If, however, we attribute
to Sartre a non-iterative theor y of self-consciousness, then it
becomes possible to articulate Sartre’s paradoxical claim.
As I have observed, if we assume that self-consciousness is non-
self-identical, then we must say that I am my consciousness (of) E in
a new sense of “am,” a sense that acknowledges that the subject is
somehow dual, in some sense “ruptured from itself.” Term this new
sense “am*.” Then—drawing from the above, implicit argument—to
unpack what it means to be what one is not, and not to be what one
is, the key exegetical keys are, I suggest, the following.
(a) In general, a subject must appear (to) itself and it must, in the
relevant sense, be its self-appearance. Consequently, non-iterative pre-
reflection—qua subject of experience—must, in the relevant sense, be
its self-appearance. Otherwise, it would not be a subject at all.
(b) Recall that the iterative theory asserts the following identity:
(I) My awareness (of) E = my awareness (of) my awareness (of) E.

(I) asserts an identity between iterative pre-reflection (my awareness

(of) my awareness (of) E) and its self-appearance (my awareness (of)
E). It thus meets the demands of condition (a) and satisfies the prin-
ciple of identity. Debarred from instancing that identity, the only
possibility a non-iterative self-consciousness has of being self-identi-
cal, while meeting condition (a), is to be identical with the experi-
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 Maiya Jordan

ence, E, which it apprehends, for E is all that appears (to) it. That is,
its self-identity is possible only if
(II) My awareness (of) E = E.

However, we have seen that, on the non-iterative theory, (II) is false.

My awareness (of) E cannot, on the non-iterative theory, be identical
with E. For, we saw in Argument A of the implicit argument that my
awareness (of) E “transcends” (is other than) E in the following
sense. Whereas E does, my awareness (of) E does not, appear (to)
my awareness (of) E. Or again, my awareness (of) E “escapes” my
self-awareness, but E does not. So, my awareness (of) E and E can-
not be strictly identical, since they instance distinct properties.
(c) As a consequence of (a) and (b), the relevant sense in which a
non-iterative consciousness (of) E must be E is this. It must be* E.
Applying the above, if my self-consciousness is non-iterative, then
I am* my experience, E, since a subject must appear (to) itself, and E
is all that appears (to) me. Yet, since I also am* my consciousness
(of) E, I “transcend” (am* other than) what appears (to) me, and
cannot be identical with E. In this sense, I am* not what I am* (BN,
xli). I am* E, yet am* not E.
Again, addressing the being of consciousness, Sartre says, “If
being is present (to) itself, it is because it is not wholly itself” (BN,
77; parentheses added). That is, what is presented (to) consciousness
in self-awareness “is not wholly itself.” I am* what is presented (I
am* E). Yet, being* also a consciousness (of) E, I “transcend” (am*
other than) what is presented.
But also, I am* what I am* not (BN, xli). That is, I am* E. First,
because the consciousness (of) E cannot, as a matter of structure,
distinguish itself from E: “consciousness (of) belief, while irreparably
altering belief, does not distinguish itself from belief” (BN, 75).
This calls for some elucidation. For an iterative theory, I am
distinct from my first-order experiences (say, from my desires, per-
ceptions, actions, hopes, and wishes). I am conscious (of) my con-
sciousness (of) E, and the fact that I am so conscious enables me to
distinguish my consciousness (of) E from E. (For the iterative theo-
rist, I can make this distinction as readily as I can make a distinction
between my perception and my perceptual object.) Moreover, the
iterative theorist will claim that the translucency of pre-reflection
guarantees that E and my consciousness (of) E are as discrete as they
are apprehended as being.12 On no account, then, is an iterative sub-
ject to be identified with her experiences. However, the non-iterative
subject cannot be aware (of) any such distinctness, since the con-
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 Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity

sciousness (of) E cannot appear (to) itself as a consciousness (of) E.

All that is present (to) the non-iterative subject is E.
Consequently, the non-iterative subject does not—cannot—
apprehend E as distinct from itself. Its apprehension (of) E must
rather, somehow, identify itself with E, or be neutral regarding any
such identification. But it cannot be neutral. For, I am* what I am*
not, second, because I, this consciousness (of) E, can be nothing
other than E’s self-awareness: “belief is nothing other than the con-
sciousness (of) belief” (BN, 77). “Belief … must [be*] its own pres-
ence (to) itself” (BN, 78; parentheses added; emphasis in original).
Since a subject must appear (to) itself, and since E is all that appears
(to) the subject, the subject must be* E. So, I—the non-iterative
subject—do not apprehend my belief as mine as an iterative subject
apprehends itself as owning its (distinct) experience. My “owner-
ship” of my belief is closer than that, since I am not strictly distinct
from my belief: I am* my belief. We are, then, once more forced to
say that I, the non-iterative subject, must be* E—that is, be* what I
am* not.
Hence Sartre’s paradoxical conclusion—I am* what I am* not
and am* not what I am*—a paradoxical conclusion, moreover, to
which any non-iterative theorist is driven. I am* E, but (since I am
other than E, because I am conscious (of) E) I am* not E. I am* the
consciousness (of) E, but am* not the consciousness (of) E (since I
am* E, and the consciousness (of) E is* not E).
Neither identical with, nor wholly distinct from one another, E
and the consciousness (of) E constitute a “unity” which is* a “dual-
ity.” A unity: “Consciousness (of) [E] and [E are*] one and the
same being” (BN, 75). A duality: because, without iteration—with-
out the identity, (I), stated above—the consciousness (of) E can be
self-identical only if by “coinciding with” (being identical with) E.
And that, we have seen, is impossible: “The for-itself is the being
which determines itself to exist inasmuch as it cannot coincide with
itself” (BN, 78; translation modified).13
But we must not lose sight of the fact that it is my non-iterative
awareness (of) my experience that precludes self-identity for my
experience. And it is my non-iterative awareness (of) my experience
that precludes self-identity for me. Sartre says, for example:
Thus by the sole fact that my belief is apprehended as belief, it is no
longer only belief; that is, it is already no longer belief, it is troubled belief.
Thus the ontological judgment “belief is consciousness (of) belief” can
under no circumstances be taken as a statement of identity. (BN, 74–75;
emphasis in original)

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 Maiya Jordan

Being non-iteratively aware (of) my belief, I “trouble” my belief.

That is, I preclude the possibility of its being self-identical. Hence,
being non-iteratively apprehended as my belief, my belief “is already
no longer [self-identical] belief, it is troubled belief.” An iterative
awareness (of) belief would not thus “trouble” belief. An iterative
self-awareness, we have seen, is self-identical and distinct from the
experiences it apprehends. So, the self-identity of my belief is not
compromised (or “troubled”) by my iterative awareness (of) it.
I suggest, therefore, that the assumption that Sartrean pre-reflec-
tion is non-iterative elucidates, and is required to elucidate, those
parts of Being and Nothingness that seek to articulate the relation
between pre-reflection and experience—between the consciousness
(of) E, and E. It is that relation, between pre-reflection and experi-
ence, that involves the break from identity and that informs the
meaning of the formula “I am what I am not and am not what I am.”

Concluding Remarks

This article sought to show that a commitment to non-iteration

underpins Sartre’s claim that the for-itself is non-self-identical. Pro-
vided this discussion is cogent, it shows that the for-itself is non-self-
identical if, and only if, it is non-iterative. It also yields the more
general thesis that non-iteration brings non-self-identity with it. This
was shown by the fact that, in addition to the premise that con-
sciousness is non-iterative, Sartre’s implicit argument contains only
two further premises, each of which is unobjectionable; indeed, each
of which would (and should) be accepted by the iterative theorist.
Sartre’s position thus emerges as one that correctly takes the non-
iterative theory to its logical conclusion.
I have not sought to assess the truth of the non-iterative theory of
pre-reflection. My aims have been purely explicatory and exegetical.
The scope of my discussion has also been limited to the theory of
self-consciousness. I have not enquired whether constraints from
other areas of interest—for example, self-deception, the lived body,
freedom—might have imposed a non-iterative theory on Sartre. To
assess such putative constraints, and the problems incurred by the
non-iterative theory, will require another occasion.

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 Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editors and to two anonymous referees for

Sartre Studies International.

M AIYA J ORDAN is a PhD student at McGill University working

under the supervision of Professors Alia Al-Saji, David Davies, and
Ian Gold. She received a BA honours (2010) and an MA (2011) in
philosophy from the University of Sheffield. Her main research
interests are in philosophy of mind and phenomenology. She is cur-
rently finishing her dissertation on issues surrounding self-awareness
and self-deception, where she puts forward a Sartrean (literalist)
account of self-deception. She also defends (Husserl Studies, 2017) a
pre-reflective account of self-awareness against representationalist
accounts.

Notes

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (London: Rout-
ledge, 1990), xli (hereafter cited in text as BN).
2. Throughout, “awareness” and “consciousness” are used synonymously. I also fol-
low Sartre’s usage and treat the terms “consciousness” and “the for-itself” syn-
onymously. (This is not Sartre’s sole use of the term “for-itself.” Sometimes he
uses “being-for-itself” to describe the mode of being of consciousness.) Finally
(as is explained later), I follow Sartre in treating pre-reflective self-awareness as
the self-conscious subject: “What can properly be called subjectivity is conscious-
ness (of) consciousness” (BN, xxxvii). So, one can speak equally of the non-self-
identity of consciousness, or of the non-self-identity of the self-conscious subject.
3. For any x, x is identical with itself. Sartre expresses this principle, somewhat infor-
mally, as “A is A” (BN, 74). Throughout, I deal only with Sartre’s claim that
consciousness is non-self-identical. I do not address Sartre’s richer claim that con-
sciousness lacks self-identity (BN, 73–105, 557–615). According to this richer
claim, the position, in brief, is this. Not only is consciousness non-self-identical.
From its own perspective, it lacks self-identity: “What the for-itself lacks is …
itself as in-itself” (BN, 89). Consequently, consciousness is somehow structurally
geared toward “attaining” self-identity while remaining consciousness. It “seeks”
a “coincidence with itself”: “Each human reality is at the same time a direct pro-
ject to metamorphose its own For-itself into an In-itself-For-itself” (BN, 615).
But such a self-coincidence is impossible. Consciousness is thus deemed a futile
passion—a perpetual “attempt” at this impossibility of self-coincidence.
4. I throughout adopt Sartre’s useful device of using parentheses to distinguish pre-
reflective awareness (of) experience from reflective awareness of experience.
5. See esp. Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal
Time, trans. John Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).

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 Maiya Jordan

6. Sartre, of course, accepts Husserl’s notion of transverse self-awareness. In The

Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New
York: Noonday Press, 1960), 39, Sartre says, “It is consciousness which unifies
itself, concretely, by a play of ‘transversal’ intentionalities which are concrete and
real retentions of past consciousnesses.” Yet, in this passage, the notion of longi-
tudinal self-awareness is notable by its absence. Neither here, nor (to my knowl-
edge) anywhere else, does Sartre endorse it.
7. Husserl, On the Phenomenology, 84. Again, Husserl says (ibid., 393): “[Longitu-
dinal consciousness and transverse consciousness are] two inseparably united
intentionalities, requiring one another like two sides of one and the same thing,
[and] interwoven with each other in the one, unique flow of consciousness.” In
other words, transverse consciousness (of) experience and longitudinal conscious-
ness (of) consciousness (of) experience are two distinct aspects of one and the
same thing: the flow, or pre-reflective self-awareness.
The distinctness of aspects here does not, of course, impugn the identity:
(I) My awareness (of) E = my awareness (of) my awareness (of) E.
In (I), one and the same pre-reflection is referred to under each of its two neces-
sary aspects. Analogously, consider the case of lying. My lying to S regarding P
and my misrepresenting (to S) my lying as a sincere endorsement of P are two neces-
sary and distinct aspects of the one act of lying. A lie is always, in that sense, dou-
ble. Hence, we can refer to the same action, under each of its two aspects, in the
following true identity:
(A) My lying to S regarding P = my misrepresenting, to S, my lying as a
sincere endorsement of P.
Indeed, without this identity, we would open a regress of acts of lying. My mis-
representing, to S, my act of lying that P would itself be a distinct lie and, conse-
quently, would also need to be misrepresented, to S, as a sincere endorsement of
the truth, and so on. Assuming iteration, the parallel regress of pre-reflections
will open unless the identity (I) is accepted.
8. Formally, let b denote my experience, and let a denote my pre-reflective appre-
hension of b. Also, let Rxy range over my conscious episodes, meaning “x is
aware (of) y.” Finally, let “[]” be a nominalization operator. “[]” renders “Rab (a
is aware (of) b)” as “[Rab] (a’s being aware of b).” Then the following formal
identity models Husserlian lived-experience:
[Lived-Experience] [Rab] = [Ra[Rab]].
Granting [Lived-Experience], any substitutional regress formed by substituting
“[Ra[Rab]]” for “[Rab]” in [Lived-Experience]—to yield: [Rab] =
[Ra[Ra[Rab]]]; [Rab] = [Ra[Ra[Ra[Rab]]]]; etc.—is trivial and non-vicious. It
corresponds to no ontological regress. To see this, consider that, in the alleged
regress, the series members “[Rab] = [Ra[Ra[Rab]]]” and “[Rab] =
[Ra[Ra[Ra[Rab]]]]” successively follow the first series member, “[Rab] =
[Ra[Rab]].” But, since “[Rab] = [Ra[Rab]]” is true, we can substitute “[Rab]”
for “[Ra[Rab]]” in “[Rab] = [Ra[Ra[Rab]]]” to yield “[Rab] = [Ra[Rab]].”
By the same substitutional move, we can reduce the next member of the series,
“[Rab] = [Ra[Ra[Ra[Rab]]]],” first to “[Rab] = [Ra[Ra[Rab]]],” and then to
“[Rab] = [Ra[Rab]].” That is, any series member of the alleged regress can be
reduced back to “[Rab] = [Ra[Rab]].” An important consequence of this is that,
though the (of) is iterated in iterative self-consciousness, it cannot be reiterated.

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 Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity

There is no logical room for (ontological) reiteration. The series of (of)s necessar-
ily terminates at two.
9. Husserl, On the Phenomenology, 391.
10. Sartre is inconsistent in applying his own device of adding parentheses around the
term “of” to express pre-reflection. The context makes clear that here parenthe-
ses are implicit.
11. Premise (1) does not exclude (what is doubtless true) the claim that self-con-
sciousness must supervene on some distinct physical base. It does not exclude the
possibility that such a supervenience base will be needed to ensure my identity-
through-time on those occasions when I lose self-consciousness. The attack on
premise (1) will come not from physicalism (in its various forms) but from reflec-
tive (or “representational”) accounts of self-consciousness. Higher-order repre-
sentational accounts are defended by David M. Rosenthal, “Higher-Order
Thoughts and the Appendage Theory of Consciousness,” Philosophical Psychology
6, no. 2 (1993): 155–166; and William G. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). Self-representational theories are defended
by Uriah Kriegel, “The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness,” Syn-
thesis Philosophica, 44 (2007): 361–384; and Kenneth Williford, “The Self-Repre-
sentational Structure of Consciousness,” in Self-Representational Approaches to
Consciousness, ed. Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2006), 111–149. I defend pre-reflective accounts of self-consciousness
against reflective accounts in Maiya Jordan, “Representation and Regress,”
Husserl Studies 33, no. 1 (2017): 19–43.
12. According to the translucency of pre-reflection, if I am aware (of) my experience
as F, then my experience is F. For, my awareness (of) my experience, not being an
intention, has no intentional content that might misrepresent my experience (to)
me. Pre-reflectively, I apprehend my experience immediately, as it is, qua experi-
ence. Both iterative and non-iterative theorists accept this notion of translucency.
For the iterative theorist, therefore, if I pre-reflectively apprehend my conscious-
ness (of) E as being distinct from E, then my consciousness (of) E is, indeed, dis-
tinct from E.
13. For Sartre, nothingness is the “fissure” that “separates” the consciousness (of) E
from E (BN, 78).

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