SECTION 1.

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

SECTION 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by

law.

SECTION 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.

SECTION 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law.

Poe vs. COMELEC

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in
Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos,
consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability
and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on
the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the
country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines.
Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her
candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

Tecson v. COMELEC

Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.

Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate”
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth,
provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines."

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870.
In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being
so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen,
was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth
certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s
citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents
presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Mercado v. Manzano

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local
position.

RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per
se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood
as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.

AASJS v. Datumanong

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional

2. Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance

RULING:

No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No.
9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does
not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed
clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the
other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

RE: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar VicenteD.Ching, B.M. No. 914,
October 01, 1999

ISSUE: Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time."
RULING: The Court holds that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of
fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of
the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no
reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained
delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only
an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
Therefore, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the
Philippine Bar.

Begzon v. HRET

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.

Labo v. COMELEC

Issue:

Is the petitioner a Filipino citizen?

Ruling:

NO. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among
these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3)
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. All
of which are applicable to the petitioner. In connection with this, Article IV, Section 5, of the
present Constitution provides that, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law.”

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled
after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance
alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country.
What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship
and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he
may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has
been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by

direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor
does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.
He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725,
providing that:

… (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization
created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and
Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-
dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to
public office.
Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.

Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided
that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a
parallel provision to Section 16.

Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings,
is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino
citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same
privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to
treat them differently.

As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such
procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine
citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not
have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that
the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos.

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative

case.

Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such

citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand.

Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January
1962.

Board of Immigration Commissioners v. Callano

To the other questions relied upon by herein petitioners, the following portions of the decision of
the Court of Appeals would seem to be sufficient answer:

"The question, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth subsequently
acquired Chinese citizenship under the Chinese Law of Nationality by reason of recognition or a
prolonged stay in China, is a fit subject for the Chinese law and the Chinese court to determine,
which cannot be resolved by a Philippine court without encroaching on the legal system of
China. For, the settled rule of international law, affirmed by the Hague Convention on Conflict of
Nationality Laws of April 12, 1930 and by the International Court of Justice, is that "Any question
as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular state should be determined in
accordance with the law of that state." (quoted in Salonga, Private International Law, 1957 Ed.,
p. 112.) There was no necessity of deciding that question because so far as concerns the
petitioners' status, the only question in this proceeding is: Did the petitioners lose their
Philippine citizenship upon the performance of certain acts or the happening of certain events in
China? In deciding this question no foreign law can be applied. The petitioners are admittedly
Filipino citizens at birth, and their status must be governed by Philippine law wherever they may
be, in conformity with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as follows:
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." Under Article
IV, Section 2, of the Philippine Constitution, "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in
the manner provided by law.", which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his
Philippine citizenship shall be determined by no other than the Philippine law.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides that a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country; express
renunciation of citizenship; subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or
laws of a foreign country; rendering service to, or accepting a commission in, the armed forces
of a foreign country; cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; declaration by competent
authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a
woman, by marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's country, she
acquires his nationality. Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among the
grounds for losing Philippine citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the
petitioners lost their former status by reason of such recognition. About the only mode of losing
Philippine citizenship which closely bears on the petitioners' case is renunciation. But even
renunciation cannot be cited in support of the conclusion that petitioners lost their Philippine
citizenship because the law requires an express renunciation, which means a renunciation that
is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication; a renunciation
manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is inferred from
conduct. (Opinion No. 69 of the Secretary of Justice, Series of 1940.) Indeed, as the Supreme
Court held in U.S. v. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, a case for deportation, where Ong, a natural
child of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, born in the Philippines, was brought by his
parents to China when he was 4 years old, where he remained for 18 or 19 years, returning to
the Philippines at 25 years of age, "The fact that a minor child in those conditions was taken to
China and remained there for several years is not sufficient ground upon which to hold that he
has changed his nationality, when, after reaching his majority, he did not express his desire to
choose the nationality of his father." The import of the foregoing pronouncement is that of itself
a protracted stay in a foreign country does not amount to renunciation. Moreover, herein
petitioners were all minors when they were brought to China in 1946. They were without legal
capacity to renounce their status. Upon their return to the Philippines only Beato Go Callano
had attained the age of majority, but even as to him there could not have been renunciation
because he did not manifest by direct and appropriate language that he was disclaiming
Philippine citizenship. On the contrary, after he has attained the age of majority, he applied for
registration as a Philippine citizen and sought entry into this country, which are clear indicia of
his intent to continue his former status. The foregoing shows that the petitioners have not lost
their Philippine citizenship."
Lastly, petitioners claim that the private respondents are barred from questioning the decision of
the Board of Immigration Commissioners dated August 21, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration on the same date, because they did not appeal from
either to the Secretary of Justice.

We find this to be without merit for the reason that, as stated before, both orders were issued
without previous notice and hearing and were, therefore, in violation of due process. As a
matter of fact, even in the case of an Alien, decisions of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners, like that of any other administrative body, do not constitute res judicata so as to
bar a re-examination of the alien's right to enter or stay (Ong Se Lun et al., vs. Board of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954), and the courts can grant relief if said
Board abused its powers, or committed serious legal errors, or denied the alien a fair hearing
(Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682).

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby affirmed, with costs.