U.S.A vs.

Reyes

HELD: YES.

[T]he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed
the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

Since it is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or personal
capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official
functions, said complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on the
grounds relied upon by the petitioners because as a consequence of the hypothetical
admission of the truth of the allegations therein, the case falls within the exception to the
doctrine of state immunity.

The Holy See v. RTC

Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition and the complaint against the petitioner
is dismissed.

Reason: Generally, there are two accepted concepts of sovereignty: a) classical or

absolute theory, wherein a sovereign cannot be made as respondent to courts of
another sovereign without its consent and; b) restrictive theory, which puts conditions on
when to recognize immunity.
Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity is only recognized with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii (or those in pursuant to governmental functions) . If the act is
private or acts jure gestionis (those that are for profit), then immunity cannot be invoked.
In this case, the petitioner had denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of
the Lot 5-A were made for profit. It claimed that it acquired the property for its mission or
the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The lot, allegedly, was acquired by donation
from the Archdiocese of Manila for the purpose of building official residence of Papal
Nuncio. However, when the informal settlers refused to leave the property, the petitioner
decided to dispose the property, not for commercial purpose. The DFA intervened as
they established in a Memorandum and Certification the privilege of sovereign immunity
of the petitioner, stating that they are a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the
Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and has title to all rights, privileges and
immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in the country. When the plea of
immunity has been recognized by the executive department, such shall be conclusive to
courts.
SEAFDEC vs. NLRC

HELD: Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture

Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of
public respondent NLRC.

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD),

enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory
its office is located.

In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a
distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they
are situated. As such, according to one leading authority “they must be deemed to
possess a species of international personality of their own.” (Salonga and Yap, Public
International Law, 83 [1956 ed.])

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local

jurisdiction, i.e.,that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in there operations or
even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such
subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.

WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the

jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned
decision and resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989,
respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.

Callado v. IRRI

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship?

Held: No.

P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal,
civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a
categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys
immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held
to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political
department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government or other officer acting under his direction.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of
their functions by the agencies concerned.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying
that such waiver is discretionary on its part.

DFA v. NLRC

Issues:

1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit

2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies,
ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving
rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit

Held:

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal
process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee
operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s
officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their
official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these
immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed
by the Philippine government which must be respected.

Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB
is independent of the municipal law. "One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs
and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious
reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local
courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere
in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of
such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial
transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by
entering into service contracts with different private companies. “There are two
conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent,
be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure
gestionis.

“Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical
question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it
is not undertaken for gain or profit.”

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the
ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not
attach.

Municipality of San Fernando v. Judge Firme

ISSUE: Are municipal corporations suable?

HELD:

1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they
are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence
to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by
them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities
to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was
not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his
way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump
truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

Farolan v. CTA

On the third issue, we opine that the Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual
damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to
permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for
actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is
obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.[29]

On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent,"
categorically applies.[30] As an unincorporated government agency without any
separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from
suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the
governmental function collecting revenues which is definitely not a proprietary function.
Thus, private respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs
must fail.

City of Angeles v. CA

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is immune from suit.

HELD:

The Court ruled that public officials are not immune from damages in their personal
capacities arising from acts done in bad faith.
City of Angeles vs. Court of Appeals
In theory, the cost of such demolition, and the reimbursement of the public funds
expended in the construction thereof, should be borne by the officials of the City of
Angeles who ordered and directed such construction.

Otherwise stated, a public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the public officials concerned deliberately violated the law and
persisted in their violations, going so far as attempting to deceive the courts by their
pretended change of purpose and usage for the center, and “making a mockery of the
judicial system.”
City of Angeles vs. Court of Appeals
Indisputably, said public officials acted beyond the scope of their authority and
jurisdiction and with evident bad faith.

However, as noted by the trial court, the petitioner’s mayor and members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Angeles City were sued only in their official capacities,
hence, they could not be held personally liable without first giving them their day in
court.
City of Angeles vs. Court of Appeals
Prevailing jurisprudence holding that public officials are personally liable for damages
arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been
sued both in their official and personal capacities.

Veterans Manpower v. CA
Issue: whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit
against the State without its consent

Held:

Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of
the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that,
being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental
function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or
security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not
be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s
complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but
worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of
P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as
attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of
its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to
appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.

While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if
the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself
although it has not been formally impleaded.

A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he
acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the
acts for which the PC Chief and PC¬-SUSIA are being called to account in this case,
were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence,
or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.

The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract
by the State but the legal nature of the act.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued
only when it enters into a business contract. It does not apply where the contract relates
to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and
PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of
security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental
function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A.5487,
as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective,
watchmen or security guard agencies.

Wylie v. Rarang

ISSUE:

Whether or not the officials of the United States Naval Base are immune from suit.

HELD:

The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions a
certain "Auring" as " a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal."
Wylie vs. Rarang
The same article explicitly implies that Auring was consuming and appropriating for
herself confiscated items like cigarettes and foodstuffs.

There is no question that the Auring alluded to in the Article was the private respondent
as she was the only Auring in the Office of the Provost Marshal.

Moreover, as a result of this article, the private respondent was investigated by her
supervisor.
Before the article came out, the private respondent had been the recipient of
commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties.
It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of the naval base
is far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be
asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.

This may be true as a general rule.

In this particular case, however, the records show that the offensive publication was
sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it.

The factual findings of the two courts below are based on the records.

The petitioners have shown no convincing reasons why our usual respect for the
findings of the trial court and the respondent court should be withheld in this particular
case and why their decisions should be reversed.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a
person's act or omission constituting fault or negligence, to wit:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent."
Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be
recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty
party moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or
exemplary damages.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a
defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent.
Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly
recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published.

The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the
publication without deleting the name "Auring."

Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty.
It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent.

As a result of the petitioners' act, the private respondent, according to the record,
suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, specially so, since the article was baseless and false.
Wylie vs. Rarang
The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they
caused the private respondent.

Republic v. Feliciano
ISSUE#1: Would the doctrine of non-suability of the State find application in an action
for recovery and possession of parcel of land?

HELD#1: YES.

The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The
plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court
just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for
the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an
action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only
such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is
directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.

By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the
State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that
the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use
of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.There is no such showing in the
instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.
This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been
dismissed.

ISSUE#2: Would the invocation of Proclamation No. 90 be considered as a waiver of

State Immunity?

HELD: NO.

No such consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of
existing private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 can not
be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity,
being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in
strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the
State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can
only be made by an act of the legislative body.

Meritt v. Gov't. of the Phil. Islands

ISSUE: Did the Government of the Philippine Islands, in enacting the above quoted Act,
simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?

HELD: The Act only waived state immunity from suit.

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.

It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government’s
liability to any cause not previously recognized.

Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping

Issue: Whether the Philippines is immune from suit

Held: No. By filing its complaint in intervention, the government in effect waived its right
of non-suability.
The immunity of the state from the suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private
parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, in taking the initiative in an action against a
private party, the sate surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of
the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits the right to set up
whatever claims and other defense he might have against the state.

No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an action is by the
United States to recover money in the hands of a party who has a legal claim against
them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in
a court of justice, ant turn him around to an application to congress.

It is however contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in
favor of the plaintiff against whom the complainant in intervention was directed. This
contention is untenable. As already state, the complainant in intervention was in a
sense in derogation of the defendant’s claim over the possession of the vessel in
question.

Fontanilla v. Maliaman

ISSUE

Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held
liable for the damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent

HELD: YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or
constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of
sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of
proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.

The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local
government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the
government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not
make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was
created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all
national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation
projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the
services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim
of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct
from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 3601 provides:

Sec. 1. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known
as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after
the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila
and shall have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business.
(Emphasis for emphasis).

Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:

(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems
constructed by or under its administration, such fees or administration charges as may
be necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover
the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with
government policy; to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction
and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a
special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof;

Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon the
land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference
over all other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred liens shall not be
removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon
and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .

The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.

It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a
Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): . . . and to transact such business, as are
directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above
powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and
in general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law,
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a

government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing
proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the
negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

Republic v. Villasor

ISSUE:
Whether or not the notices of garnishment are null and void.
HELD:
The Republic of the Philippines did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding.

What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives
its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so.
In the classic formulation of Holmes:
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar.

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the
revised charter.

It is therein expressly provided:

The State may not be sued without its consent.
A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that
public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged.

Municipality of San Miguel v. Fernandez

ISSUE:
Whether the funds of the municipality in the hands of the Provincial and Municipal
Treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively are public funds which are exempt
from execution?
HELD:YES.
Municipal funds in possession of municipal and provincial treasurers are public funds
exempt from execution. The reason for those was explained in the case of Municipality
of Paoay vs. Manaois ‗that are held in trust for the people intended and used for the
accomplices of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created and that to
subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede, even
defeat and in some instance destroy said purpose. Thus it is clear that all the funds of
petitioner municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel as
well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan are also public
funds and as such they are exempt from execution. Besides PD 447, known as the
Decree on Local Fiscal Administration, provides in section 3 (a) that ―no money shall
be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other
specific statutory authority. Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding
appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not
been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed any ordinance to this effect.

Municipality of Makati v. CA

Issue :Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding ?
Held:
The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with
PNB. Account A was the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B
is primarily intended for financing governmental functions and activities. Because
account A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the remaining amount of its balance for
the expropriation proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining balance from Account B
without an ordinance appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose. Thus the court
ruled that account A maybe levied but not account B. The respondents are without
recourse however should the petitioner refuse to pay its remaining obligation. Where a
municipality refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money
judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail the remedy of mandamus in order
to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and
the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose.

Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit.

HOLDING: NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the
recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge
against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one
against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly
entertained by the court except with the consent of said Government. In as much as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials
or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights,
is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.

NOTE: When the government takes any property for public use, which is condition upon
the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it
submits to the jurisdiction of a court. The Court may proceed with the complaint and
determine the compensation to which the petitioner is entitled.

Arigo et.al v Swift

Issue: Whether there was waiver of immunity from suit.

Held:
The waiver of state immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. A
ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA
to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian,
would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines to promote “common security interests” between the
US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits
of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the
Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. The
invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering
that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew
navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.

USA vs. Ruiz

Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental
functions to be able to invoke state immunity

Held:
Yes.
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International
Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary
acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued
only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates
to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a
State but the legal nature of the act.

Buisan vs. COA

The fundamental law of the land provides that the State cannot be sued without its
consent. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the State, as well as its government, is immune from suit
unless it gives its consent. The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that
the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The doctrine only conveys that
"the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State
may at times be sued. Suits filed against government agencies may either be against
incorporated or unincorporated agencies. In case of incorporated agencies, its suability
depends upon whether its own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be
sued in Court.
As the State's engineering and construction arm, the DPWH exercises governmental
functions that effectively insulate it from any suit, much less from any monetary liability.
The construction of the Project which was for the purpose of minimizing the perennial
problem of flood in the area of Tunggol, Montawal, Maguindanao, is well within the
powers and functions of the DPWH as mandated by the Administrative Code of 1997.

Hence, the Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH from being held responsible for
alleged damages it performed in consonance with its mandated duty. Nowhere does it
appear in the petition that the State has given its consent, expressly or impliedly, to be
sued before the courts. The failure to allege the existence of the State's consent to be
sued in the complaint is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, should cause the
dismissal of the complaint.