Prior Attitudes, Salient Value Similarity, and Dimensionality:

Toward an Integrative Model of Trust in Risk Regulation1

WOUTER POORTINGA2 AND NICK F. PIDGEON

Welsh School of Architecture
Cardiff University

Although it is widely recognized that trust plays an important role in people’s

responses to various risks, there is still considerable conceptual disagreement about
the different aspects of trust. There are at least 3 different approaches to trust: (a)
dimensional, (b) salient value similarity, and (c) associationist. Three British
datasets on genetically modified food were used to test the plausibility of a causal
model that integrates these approaches. It appears that value similarity can be
predicted by a combination of prior attitudes and perceived attitudes of the other,
and that value similarity precedes other important trust judgments. The study
suggests that various risk-relevant judgments are expressions of a more general
attitude toward genetically modified food, and raises questions about the usefulness
of detailed modelling.

The last decade has seen a surge in interest in the role of trust in people’s
responses to environmental and technological risks from the academic and
policy communities (e.g., Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 2002; Cvetkovich &
Löfstedt, 1999; Frewer, Howard, Hedderly, & Shepherd, 1996; Interdepart-
mental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment [ILGRA], 1998; Johnson, 1999;
Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003a; Renn &
Levine, 1991; Slovic, 1993). A number of risk controversies, such as the BSE
crisis (Jasanoff, 1997); the Brent Spar affair (Löfstedt & Renn, 1997); the
continuing debate about genetically modified (GM) food (Simmons & Wel-
don, 2000); the British foot-and-mouth crisis (Poortinga, Bickerstaff, Lang-
ford, Niewöhner, & Pidgeon, 2004); and more recently fears about the

1
Work reported in this paper was partly supported by the Programme on Understanding
Risk, funded by a grant of the Leverhulme Trust (RSK990021); and partly supported by two
grants from the Economic and Social Research Council, including a grant from the ESRC
Science in Society programme (L144250037).
2
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Wouter Poortinga, Welsh
School of Architecture, Cardiff University, Bute Building, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff,
CF10 3NB, United Kingdom. E-mail: PoortingaW@cardiff.ac.uk

1674

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2006, 36, 7, pp. 1674–1700.

r 2006 Copyright the Authors
Journal compilation r 2006 Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1675

link between autism and the combined measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR)
vaccine (Bellaby, 2003) have made policymakers aware that the public has
become a key player in many controversial risk issues.
It is recognized widely that trust plays an important role in public per-
ceptions of technological risks, as well as in people’s responses to risk com-
munication. However, there is surprisingly little agreement on the definition,
meaning(s), and properties of trust. For example, after an extensive review
of the trust literature, McKnight and Chervany (1996) concluded that al-
most every study has its own definition of trust.
The diverging definitions of trust show that there is still no consensus on
what it actually means, not even within different academic disciplines. This
has made some scholars remark that the notion of trust ‘‘is an elusive con-
cept’’ (Gambetta, 1988, p. ix) that ‘‘comes in so many flavours, packages,
and subspecies that it seems to be swallowed up in a conceptual quagmire’’
(Metlay, 1999, p. 100), ‘‘is a verbal and conceptual morass’’ (Barber, 1983,
p. 1), and ‘‘has resulted in a confusing potpourri of definitions’’ (Shapiro,
1987, p. 625). There is still considerable conceptual disagreement about
the nature, causes, and consequences of trust. While various researchers
have tried to identify different dimensions of trust (e.g., Frewer et al., 1996;
Metlay, 1999; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003a), some have argued that trust
is based predominantly on feelings of agreement and sympathy, rather than
on carefully reasoned arguments or direct knowledge (e.g., Earle &
Cvetkovich, 1995). Others stress the importance of people’s prior at-
titudes (Eiser, Miles & Frewer, 2002), or have questioned the importance
and feasibility of increasing trust in institutions altogether (Trettin &
Musham, 2000).
In the research reported here, we try to integrate a number of different
empirical approaches to trust. After an extensive literature review of trust
(see Poortinga, 2004), three important theoretical social psychological
perspectives on trust were identified, namely: (a) the dimensional approach
to trust, which aims to identify the basic components of trust (e.g., Frewer
et al., 1996; Kasperson et al., 1992; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003a; Renn &
Levine, 1991); (b) the salient value similarity approach (SVS), which
holds that people base their trust judgments on the heuristic of per-
ceived value similarity (e.g., Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995; Siegrist, Cvetkovich,
& Roth, 2000); and (c) the associationist view of trust, which stresses
the importance of prior attitudes (e.g., Eiser et al., 2002; Poortinga &
Pidgeon, 2005).
In the following section, we succinctly describe the three approaches to
trust. Subsequently, we propose a structural model that integrates the dif-
ferent lines of trust research. The plausibility of the proposed causal model
will be tested using three recent British datasets on public perceptions of
1676 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

GM food. GM food is an appropriate issue to test the model, as this has

been one of the most contentious risk cases in Britain in recent years. The
reluctance of the public to embrace GM food is often linked to a lack of
trust in the government’s ability to regulate GM food (e.g., Gaskell & Bauer,
2001; Siegrist, 1999; Simmons & Weldon, 2000).

Approaches to Trust

The Dimensional Approach

Trust is usually conceptualized as complex and multifaceted (e.g.,

Kasperson et al., 1992; Renn & Levine, 1991), and there have been many
debates on what actually constitutes and contributes to trust. Trust is
often thought to be based on expectations of technical competence
and fiduciary responsibilities (Barber, 1983). Since the seminal work of
Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953), various empirical studies have confirmed
that trust is mainly a two-dimensional concept based on competence and
care (cf. Johnson, 1999). Jungermann, Pfister, and Fischer (1996) demon-
strated that trust in information sources could best be described by two
factors representing the honesty and competence of the management of a
chemical plant. Similarly, Metlay (1999) found that trust in the U.S.
Department of Energy was based on a tightly interconnected set of affective
beliefs about institutional behavior (which can be seen as reflecting
perceptions of overall trustworthiness or care) and on perceptions of the
competence of the institution.
Recently, however, a different empirical model has emerged. Frewer
et al. (1996) found a two-factor structure, comprised of a general trust
(encompassing both competence and care elements) and a vested interest or
accountability dimension. Using a selection of items, French, Maule, My-
then, and Wales (2002) found a largely comparable factor solution. In a
large-scale study of five environmental and technological risk issues, Poor-
tinga and Pidgeon (2003a) confirmed that trust in risk regulation can be
described best by a general trust dimension (which again was concerned with
a wide range of trust-relevant aspects, such as competence and care) and a
skepticism dimension reflecting a skeptical view regarding how risk policies
are brought about and enacted.
The second dimension largely resembles Frewer et al.’s (1996) vested-
interest factor. The studies by Frewer et al. (1996), French et al. (2002), and
Poortinga & Pidgeon (2003a) show that different degrees of general trust
could coexist with different degrees of skepticism. Even when someone is
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1677

willing to rely on information about a particular issue, this still may be

accompanied by some degree of skepticism about how risk policies are
brought about (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003a; Walls, Pidgeon, Weyman, &
Horlick-Jones, 2004).

Salient Value Similarity

In the mid-1990s, Earle and Cvetkovich (1995) proposed an alternative

theoretical perspective on trust. They argued that, for most people, it is far
too demanding to base trust on evidence of competence and fiduciary
responsibilities. It is more likely that under complex circumstances, people
use heuristics for their trust judgments (Langford, 2002).
According to Earle and Cvetkovich’s (1995) salient value similarity (SVS)
hypothesis, trust in institutions is based on whether an organization is seen
as having similar values. In other words, people base their trust judgments
on whether they feel that the other person or organization has the same
understanding of a specific situation. From this perspective, value similarity
could be seen as an assessment of the attitudinal distance between one’s own
and the other person’s attitudes. The SVS approach has been applied suc-
cessfully in a number of studies (e.g., Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995; Siegrist
et al., 2000; Siegrist, Cvetkovich, & Gutscher, 2001). However, others have
found little evidence for perceived value similarity having an additional
value to more conventional components in explaining trust in risk regulation
(Metlay, 1999; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003a).
Although the SVS approach could be seen as an alternative to the tra-
ditional dimensional approach to trust, they are not necessarily in conflict.
Even if conventional trust concepts (e.g., competence) are often used in
discourses on trust, Earle and Cvetkovich (1995) reason that this is without
regard to whether they really are the critical factors in people’s trust judg-
ments. Rather, people may use these concepts to provide an explanation for
their general agreement, sympathy, or trust in an institution because espoused
value similarity may not be regarded as a socially acceptable response.
Additionally, Siegrist et al. (2000) argued that the SVS approach should
not be seen as a substitute for other models of trust. Rather, SVS allows for
the operation of multiple influences. In this interpretation, social trust can
be based on any value that is salient to a person, at a specific time, in a given
context. SVS does not exclude the conventional aspects of trust if those are
considered salient in a particular situation. This line of reasoning suggests
that, instead of an additional component of trust, perceived value similarity
could be seen as driving other trust-relevant evaluations, such as competence
and care.
1678 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

Prior Attitudes and Trust

The third approach to trust distinguished here is the so-called associa-

tionist view of trust (Eiser et al., 2002). The associationist view of trust holds
that, in many cases, trust is an expression or indicator of a more general
attitude toward that technology. Eiser et al., as well as Poortinga and
Pidgeon (2005), found support for the associationist view that, rather than
determinants, both trust and perceived risk are consequences of the accept-
ability of a certain activity or technology.
The importance of prior attitudes for people’s expressed trust is recog-
nized increasingly in the field of risk research. For example, Frewer, How-
ard, and Shepherd (1998) found that respondents with a more positive
attitude toward genetic engineering not only evaluated (persuasive) infor-
mation about the benefits of genetic engineering more favorably, but also
viewed the information sources as more knowledgeable and trustworthy
than did people with less favorable attitudes.
White, Pahl, Bühner, and Haye (2003) found that prior beliefs mode-
rated the effects of differently valenced messages on trust. Whereas negative
messages were neither trusted nor distrusted regardless of prior attitudes,
positive messages were more trusted by those with positive views than by
people with negative views on the issues in question. Poortinga and
Pidgeon (2004b) showed that there is a strong interaction between the ex-
pressed impacts of various events on trust and people’s attitudes in the
context of GM food. They concluded that people with strong precon-
ceived ideas may not change their existing attitudes and attributions of trust
easily, as they largely interpret events in line with their prior attitudinal
positions.
It is worth noting here that affect is seen increasingly as playing an
important role in the way laypeople construct and perceive risk (Finucane,
Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch,
2001; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor,
2002; Zajonc, 1980). Although there are some conceptual and methodolog-
ical difficulties associated with the measurement of affect (e.g., Crites,
Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994), it could be conceptualized as a fuzzy, overall
valenced (positive or negative) evaluation of a particular situation or
object.
Affective responses can be distinguished from more cognitive attitudes in
the sense that they are more spontaneous and more easily accessible. More-
over, because affective responses tend to be instantaneous, affect is seen to
guide other judgments and influences subsequent information processing
(Petty, Gleicher, & Baker, 1991; Zajonc, 1980). Recently, Poortinga and
Pidgeon (2005) found that, consistent with the associationist view, people’s
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1679

general affective evaluation of GM food drives other more specific risk

judgments, among which was trust in risk regulation.
The idea that people’s responses to information are colored by their prior
beliefs is well established in social psychology. In classic work from the
1960s, Sherif and Hovland (1961) had recognized that the way people in-
terpret social information can be understood only by taking into account
people’s prior attitudes. They argued that, when confronted with new in-
formation, people need a frame of reference to make sense of that infor-
mation.
In many cases, people already have taken a stance on a particular issue.
The individual’s own standpoint then may serve as an anchor for the in-
terpretation of new information (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). More specifical-
ly, Sherif and Hovland argued that people’s reactions to communications
are dependent on the distance between the advocated position and the per-
son’s attitude prior to the exposure. There are some interesting commo-
nalities between this and the SVS approach. As noted earlier, the SVS
hypothesis holds that we trust and cooperate with people whom we perceive
are like us in a certain way, and may depend on whether the other person is
seen as having similar attitudes. If this is the case, then perceptions of value
similarity should be related to people’s prior attitudes or affect, and more
specifically the (perceived) attitudinal distance between one’s own and the
other person’s attitudes.

Causal Model of Trust

Based on a review of the previous work on trust, we propose a causal

model that combines the three approaches to trust discussed here (see Figure
1). This model has three distinct features.
First, the relationship between value similarity and the conventional as-
pects of trust may be more complex than is often assumed. As argued earlier,
perceived value similarity could well drive other trust-relevant evaluations,
which all contribute to people’s overall trust in the regulation of GM food.
Second, in line with the associationist view of trust, the model posits that
various trust judgments are influenced by people’s prior attitudes. That is,
the different trust judgments all could be expressions of a more general
attitude toward GM food. More specifically, as value similarity can be
conceptualized as the perceived attitudinal distance between the ‘‘truster’’
and the ‘‘trustee,’’ the model holds that there is a link between perceptions of
value similarity and people’s prior attitudes toward GM food. For example,
if it is widely known or suspected that the government is in favor of pro-
moting biotechnology and one’s attitude is hostile to the technology, the
1680 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

Evaluation of Government

General
Trust

Affect (Prior Value Trust in

Acceptability
Attitudes) Similarity Regulation

Skepticism

Figure 1. Proposed model of trust.

person might conclude that the government does not share the same values
regarding this issue.
Third, as is commonly assumed, the acceptability of GM food is de-
pendent on trust in risk regulation. Putting these characteristics together
produces the model as presented in Figure 1.

Analysis

The EQS (Bentler, 1995) multivariate software package for structural

equation modeling (SEM) is used to test the proposed model of trust. Be-
cause all variables in the three studies are distributed normally, model pa-
rameters are estimated using the maximum likelihood (ML) approach. The
Bentler–Bonnet (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980) normed fit index (NFI) and the
generally more robust Bentler (1988) comparative fit index (CFI) are used to
assess goodness of fit. Both the NFI and CFI range from 0 to 1, representing
the proportion of variance explained by the specified model compared to the
independence model. Generally, NFI values over .90 and CFI values over
.95 are considered sufficient (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Although the reported chi
square also could be used to test goodness of fit, it should be treated with
caution. Chi square is sensitive to small residuals in large samples.
The modeling consists of two subsequent stages. First, a confirmatory factor
analysis tests whether the measured variables can be used as indicators for the
model factors. Factor loadings higher than .50 are deemed to be sufficient.
The second part of SEM is commonly known as the structural model. The
structural model is concerned mainly with the relationships between the
latent variables. That is, the structural model specifies the regression struc-
ture among the model factors (Byrne, 1994). The Lagrange multiplier (LM)
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1681

test is used to identify which parameters could be added to improve the fit of
the model. Conversely, the Wald test shows which parameters can be deleted
without affecting goodness of fit.
As subsequent models are nested, the difference in chi square is used to
assess whether the added parameters contribute to a significantly better
fitting model. Changes to the model should not be based only on the LM
test, as it is a purely statistical method of improving the fit of the model.
Adjustments should only be made if there are also sound theoretical reasons
to do so (Byrne, 1994).

Study 1
Method

Data from a large-scale British survey conducted in July 2002 were

used to test the proposed causal model of trust in Figure 1.3 The overall
sample of 1,547 respondents consisted of separate quota samples, each cov-
ering one of five environmental or technological risk cases (i.e., climate
change, radiation from mobile phones, radioactive waste, GM food, and
human genetic testing). In the present paper, we only use the GM food
subsample of 296 respondents. Although this first study was not specifically
designed for this purpose, the data can be used to explore the proposed
model of trust.
The survey contained a number of items that could be used to measure
the different model constructs. Fourteen items were used to measure affect,
value similarity, general trust in government, skepticism about government
policy, trust in risk regulation, and acceptability (see Table 1). Items were
rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree), unless otherwise indicated. The factor loadings were sufficiently high
to use the variables as indicators for the model factors.

Results

Table 2 shows that the initial model (Model 1) had an acceptable but
modest fit. The NFI had the recommended value of .90, but the CFI had a
value below the suggested value of .95 (.92). The fit of the model could be
improved significantly by, first, adding a path between affect and accept-
ability (Model 2); and, second, by adding a path between affect and trust
in risk regulation (Model 3). These paths were added because they are

3
For details of the survey methodology, see Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003b).
1682 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

Table 1

Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Study 1

Factor
Model factors and indicators loading
Factor 1: Affect
On the whole, how would you describe your feelings about .73
GM food?b,e

Factor 2: Value similarity

The government has the same opinion as me about GM .76
food.a
The government has the same ideas as me about GM food. .95

Factor 3: General trust in government

The government is doing a good job with regard to GM .90
food.a
The government listens to concerns about GM food raised .66
by the public.
I feel that the way the government makes decisions is fair. .82

Factor 4: Skepticism about government policies

The government distorts facts in its favor regarding GM .80
food.a
The government changes policies regarding GM food with- .83
out good reasons.
The government is too influenced by the biotechnology .71
industry regarding GM food.

Factor 5: Trust in regulation

I feel that current rules and regulations in the UK are .70
sufficient to control GM food.a
I feel confident that the British government adequately regulates .96
GM food.
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1683

Table 1. Continued

Factor
Model factors and indicators loading
Factor 6: Acceptability
Weighting of risks and benefitsa,c .80
On the whole, how acceptable or unacceptable is GM food to .92
you?d
I personally would be happy to eat GM food. .84
Note. GM 5 genetically modified.
a
In the structural model, these regression coefficients were fixed for statistical
identification.
b
Scale ranged from 1 (very bad thing) to 5 (very good thing).
c
Scale ranged from 1 (the risks far outweigh the benefits) to 5 (the benefits far outweigh
the risks).
d
Scale ranged from 1 (very unacceptable) to 5 (very acceptable).
e
Factor loading for this single-indicator factor was estimated by constraining the
variance to 1.

theoretically congruent with the associationist view that specific risk judg-
ments (e.g., trust in risk regulation) are driven by more general evaluative
judgments. Although the chi square of the latter model is still significant, the
other statistics indicate a well-fitting model. The final model (Model 3) is
presented in Figure 2.
Table 2 presents the standardized regression coefficients for the three
consecutive models. Most specified relationships are highly significant.
Conspicuously, adding the two new paths to the model renders an initial
strong relationship between trust in risk regulation and acceptability non-
significant. The relationship between skepticism and trust in risk regulation
was nonsignificant in all three models. Indeed, the Wald test shows that
removing this path would not affect the fit of the model.
Affect explained a significant but modest amount of variance in value
similarity (31.4%). Value similarity explained most of the variance in
general trust (91.3%), as well as of skepticism (59.4%). As the relation-
ship between skepticism and trust in risk regulation was nonsignificant,
most of the variation in trust in the regulation of GM food could be
explained by the general trust factor (62.1%). The greater part of the
variation in acceptability was explained by the specified model varia-
bles (86.9%).
1684 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

Table 2

Standardized Regression Coefficients, Disturbances, and Test Statistics of

Three Subsequent Models: Study 1

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Path
Affect–Value similarity .63 .54 .56
Value similarity–General trust .96  .96  .96
Value similarity–Skepticism .77 .77 .77
General trust–Trust in regulation .83  .80  .68
Skepticism–Trust in regulation .02, ns .03, ns .03, ns
Trust in regulation–Acceptability .67 .25 .15, ns
Affect–Acceptability F .76  .84
Affect–Trust in regulation F F .20
Disturbance
Value similarity .78 .84 .84
General trust .27 .29 .30
Skepticism .64  .64  .64
Trust in regulation .59 .63 .62
Acceptability .75  .45  .36, ns
Test statistics
w2 (df ) 274.44 133.25 126.33
(71) (70) (69)
NFI .90 .95 .95
CFI .92 .98 .98
2
Dw (Ddf ) F 141.19 (1)  6.92 (1)
Note. NFI 5 Bentler–Bonnett normed fit index; CFI 5 comparative fit index.
Independence model w2(91) 5 2699.89.
p o .05. p o .01. p o .001.

Study 2

Method

Data for the second study were collected during April and May 2003 (see
Poortinga, 2004). Six hundred questionnaires were distributed in three areas
of Norwich (United Kingdom) with different socioeconomic profiles. People
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1685

.30*

.84*** General .62*** .36n.s.

.96*** Trust .68***

.56*** .15n.s.
Value .64*** Trust in
Affect Acceptability
Similarity Regulation
-.77*** .03n.s.

Skepticism

.84**

.20*

Figure 2. Final model of trust: Study 1. p o .05. p o .01. p o .001. ns 5 nonsignificant.

from every third house were asked to participate in a study on GM food,

with the researchers returning on subsequent evenings to collect the ques-
tionnaires in person. In total, 396 respondents completed and returned the
questionnaires, representing a response rate of 66.0%.
The second questionnaire survey was designed specifically to test more
thoroughly the proposed causal model of trust. The model was adjusted
slightly based on the results of Study 1.
First, because affect explained only a modest part of the variation in
perceived value similarity in the first study, a factor representing the per-
ceived government position on GM food was added to the model (see Figure
3). As value similarity can be conceptualized as an assessment of the at-
titudinal distance between the ‘‘truster’’ and the ‘‘trustee,’’ we expect that the
combination of people’s own attitudinal positions (affect) and the perceived
position of the government on GM food (government position) will better
predict the perceived value similarity with the government.
Second, Study 1 found that the initial strong relationship between trust
in risk regulation and acceptability disappeared after adding two paths to
the model. Although this suggests that trust and acceptability are both ex-
pressions of a more general attitude toward GM food (cf. Eiser et al., 2002;
Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005), it may be a spurious result. Affect and ac-
ceptability are conceptually and technically rather similar constructs. Both
are general evaluations of GM food. In order to avoid conceptual confusion
in Study 2, the acceptability factor was replaced by a behavioral intentions
factor. While the intention to eat GM food still reflects the acceptability of
1686 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

.37***

Government .52*** General .50*** .31***

.51*** -.93*** .66***
Position Trust

Value
.15*
-.42*** .52*** Trust in Behavioral
Similarity Regulation Intention
-.51*** .85*** -.05n.s.

Affect Skepticism

.84***

.23**

Figure 3. Final model of trust: Study 2. p o .05. p o .01. p o .001. ns 5 nonsignificant.

this new technology, it is conceptually clearly distinct from people’s affective

evaluation of GM food.
Table 3 shows the indicators for the seven model factors of affect, gov-
ernment position, value similarity, general trust in government, skepticism
of government policies, trust in risk regulation, and behavioral intentions.
Unless otherwise indicated, participants rated the items on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Confirmatory factor
analysis found that the variables could be used as indicators for the model
factors (see Table 3).4

Results

Table 4 presents three successive models comparable to those presented

in Study 1. The fit of the initial model (Model 1) was insufficient (neither the
NFI nor the CFI exceeded .90), but could be improved by adding a path
between affect and behavioral intentions (Model 2), and between affect and
trust in risk regulation (Model 3). The final model, depicted in Figure 3, fits
the data well. The NFI had a value of .93, and the CFI had a value of .96.
The results of Study 2 are largely comparable to those of Study 1.
Table 4 shows that the strong relationship between trust in risk regu-
lation and behavioral intentions dropped significantly after adding the two
extra paths to the model, even if the model was slightly adapted. The

4
The item ‘‘The government is too influenced by the biotechnology industry regarding GM
food’’ had a factor loading lower than .50, so this item was omitted from further analyses.
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1687

Table 3

Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Study 2

Factor
Model factors and indicators loading
Factor 1: Affect
How do you feel about GM food?ab .89
To what extent is GM food a good or a bad thing?c .79

Factor 2: Government position

The government is in favor of GM food.a .55
The government does not want to promote GM food. .76

Factor 3: Value similarity

The government assesses the risk of GM food differently .65
than I do.a
The government has completely different ideas than I have .84
about GM food.
The government has the same opinion as me about GM .56
food.

Factor 4: General trust in government

The government is acting in the public interest with regard .87
to GM food.a
The government is competent enough to deal with GM .78
food.
The government cares about what normal people think .78
about GM food.

Factor 5: Skepticism about government policies

The government changes policies regarding GM food with- .96
out good reasons.a
The government distorts facts in its favor regarding GM .70
food.

Factor 6: Trust in regulation

I feel confident that the government adequately regulates .96
GM food.a
1688 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

Table 3. Continued

Factor
Model factors and indicators loading
The regulation of GM food is in safe hands with the .76
government.

Factor 7: Behavioral intentions

I personally would be happy to eat GM food.a .87
I would buy GM food if it tasted better. .74
I would sign a petition against GM food. .86
I would try to avoid purchasing GM food products. .88
Note. GM 5 genetically modified.
a
In the structural model, these regression coefficients were fixed for statistical
identification.
b
Scale ranged from 1 (very negatively) to 5 (very positively).
c
Scale ranged from 1 (very bad thing) to 5 (very good thing).

relationship between skepticism and trust in risk regulation was again non-
significant in all three models.
As expected, the combination of people’s general (affective) evaluation of
GM food and the perceived government position on GM food explained a
large part of the variance in value similarity (72.7%). Value similarity
explained most of the variance in general trust (86.1%) and skepticism
(73.0%).
General trust and skepticism were mutually unrelated, as in the first
study. Trust in the regulation of GM food could be explained largely by
general trust (75.5%). Finally, most of the variation in behavioral intentions
could be explained by the specified model variables (90.5%). As behavioral
intentions were associated only weakly with trust in risk regulation, the bulk
of the variation in behavioral intentions was explained by affect.

Study 3

Method

The third study was conducted between July 19 and September 12, 2003
among a representative sample of the British population of 1,363 adults
aged 15 years or older (see Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004a). This study was
aimed at examining public attitudes toward GM food and to explore the
general public’s levels of awareness, understanding, and perceived value of a
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1689

Table 4

Standardized Regression Coefficients, Disturbances, and Test Statistics of

Three Subsequent Models: Study 2

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Path
Affect–Value similarity .55 .52 .51
Government position–Value .48 .50 .51
similarity
Value similarity–General trust .97 .94 .93
Value similarity–Skepticism .83 .85 .85
General trust–Trust in regulation .96 .84 .66
Skepticism–Trust in regulation .04, ns .04, ns .05, ns
Trust in regulation–Behavioral .80 .17 .15
intentions
Affect–Behavioral intentions F .85 .84
Affect–Trust in regulation F F .23
Covariance
Affect–Government position .40 .41 .42
Disturbance
Value similarity .51 .52 .52
General trust .25 .34 .37
Skepticism .56 .53 .52
Trust in regulation .38 .50 .50
Behavioral intentions .60 .31 .31
Test statistics
w2 (df ) 618.63 349.12 333.42
(127) (126) (125)
NFI .87 .93 .93
CFI .89 .95 .96
Dw2 (Ddf ) F 269.51 (1) 15.70 (1)
Note. NFI 5 Bentler–Bonnet normed fit index; CFI 5 comparative fit index. Inde-
pendence model w2(153) 5 4790.45.
p o .05. p o .01. p o .001.
1690 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

Table 5

Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Study 3

Factor
Model factors and indicators loading
Factor 1: Affect
On the whole, how would you describe your feelings about .73
GM food?ab
In general, how do you feel about GM food? .81

Factor 2: Government position

The government wants to promote GM food.a .61
The government is not in favor of GM food. .73

Factor 3: Value similarity

The government has the same opinion as me about GM .74
food.a
The government has the same ideas as me about GM food. .97

Factor 4: General trust in government

The government is competent enough to deal with GM .77
food.a
The government listens to what ordinary people think .77
about GM food.
I feel that the way the government makes decisions about .87
GM food is fair.

Factor 5: Skepticism about government policies

The government distorts facts in its favor regarding GM .74
food.a
The government changes policies regarding GM food with- .79
out good reasons.
The government is too influenced by the biotechnology .68
industry regarding GM food.

Factor 6: Trust in regulation

I feel confident that the government adequately regulates .79
GM food.a
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1691

Table 5. Continued

Factor
Model factors and indicators loading
I am confident that the development of GM crops is being .65
carefully regulated.

Factor 7: Behavioral intentions

I personally would be happy to eat GM food.a .92
I would try to avoid purchasing GM food products. .82
Note. GM 5 genetically modified.
a
In the structural model, these regression coefficients were fixed for statistical
identification.
b
Scale ranged from 1 (very bad thing) to 5 (very good thing).
c
Scale ranged from 1 (very negatively) to 5 (very positively).

national public debate on the commercialization of agricultural biotechnol-

ogy held in the summer of 2003 (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003).
The plausibility of the proposed causal model was investigated through a
secondary analysis of this national study. The questionnaire contains 16
items to test the model of trust. The items were rated on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), except for the two
variables measuring affect. The high factor loadings presented in Table 5
indicate that all 16 items could be used to measure the seven model factors
as presented in Figure 4.

Results

It appears that most relationships in the three successive models were

significant (see Table 6). As in Studies 1 and 2, the relationship between
skepticism and trust in risk regulation was nonsignificant from the start.
Adding the two extra paths to the model once again rendered the relationship
between trust in risk regulation and behavioral intentions nonsignificant.
Affect and government position explained 58.0% of the variance in value
similarity. In turn, value similarity explained 82.8% of the variance in gen-
eral trust and 44.9% of the skepticism about government GM policies. The
identified model variables could explain the bulk of the variation in beha-
vioral intentions (92.0%). As the relationship between trust in risk regula-
tion and behavioral intentions was nonsignificant, this can be attributed
completely to affect.
1692 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

.41***

Government .65*** General .25* .28***

-.25** .91*** .64***
Position Trust

.05n.s.
-.40*** Value .74** Trust in Behavioral
Similarity Regulation Intention
.63*** -.67*** -.06n.s.

Affect Skepticism

.96***

.37***

Figure 4. Final model of trust: Study 3. p o .05. p o .01. p o .001. ns 5 nonsignificant.

General Discussion

Although it is now widely recognized that trust plays an important part

in people’s responses to various controversial risk cases, there is still con-
siderable disagreement about the meaning, role, and properties of trust.
Within the field of risk research, there are at least three different empirical
approaches to trust, each focusing on different aspects. The aim of the
present study was to assess the plausibility of a model of trust that integrates
elements of the three distinct lines of research.
In summary, the proposed model hypothesizes that, rather than being a
substitute for the conventional dimensional approach, perceived value sim-
ilarity precedes other trust-relevant evaluations. In other words, if an
organization is seen as having the same understanding of a particular sit-
uation, it is evaluated more positively on other trust-relevant aspects. The
model also proposes that perceptions of value similarity are, to some extent,
dependent on people’s prior attitudes. That is, the feeling that an organ-
ization has the same understanding of a situation may well be based on
whether the other is seen as having similar specific attitudes. This could be
the case especially in a polarized issue, such as GM food. Moreover, as is
often assumed, the model holds that the acceptability of GM food is related
to the degree to which people trust the regulation of this controversial ap-
plication of modern biotechnology.
The plausibility of the model was tested using SEM. All three studies
found some support for the proposed model of trust. Although initially
modest to poor, the addition of two extra paths (between affect, on the one
hand, and trust in risk regulation and acceptability or behavioral intentions,
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1693

Table 6

Standardized Regression Coefficients and Disturbances of Three Subsequent

Models: Study 3

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Path
Affect–Value similarity .66 .63 .63
Government position–Value .26  .26  .25
similarity
Value similarity–General trust .94 .93 .91
Value similarity–Skepticism .67  .67  .67
General trust–Trust in regulation .90 .90 .64
Skepticism–Trust in regulation .05, ns .09, ns .06, ns
Trust in regulation–Behavioral .71  .02, ns .05, ns
intentions
Affect–Behavioral intentions F .94 .96
Affect–Trust in regulation F F .37
Covariance
Affect–Government position .31 .38 .40
Disturbance
Value similarity .63 .64 .65
General trust .33  .38  .41
Skepticism .74 .74 .74
Trust in regulation .37  .31  .25
Behavioral intentions .71 .31 .28
Test statistics
w2 (df ) 1112.83 643.37 566.02
(98) (97) (96)
NFI .86 .92 .93
CFI .87 .93 .94
Dw2 (Ddf ) F 469.46 (1) 77.35 (1)
Note. NFI 5 Bentler–Bonnet normed fit index; CFI 5 comparative fit index.
Independence model w2(120) 5 7731.98.
p o .05. p o .01. p o .001.
1694 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

on the other hand) produced a good fit of the model in every case. A number
of conclusions can be drawn from this series of studies.
First, in all three studies perceived value similarity explained most of the
variance in general trust and skepticism, while the latter two factors were
mutually unrelated. Although an earlier analysis of the data from Study 1
suggested that value similarity has only a limited value in explaining trust in
risk regulation (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003a), the current research suggests
that the precise relationship between value similarity, the conventional as-
pects of trust, and trust in risk regulation is more complex.
Rather than being an additional dimension or attribute of trust, the
model suggests that value similarity precedes other important trust judg-
ments. This supports the assertion of Siegrist et al. (2000) that instead of
being a substitute, SVS could be seen as a general factor that allows for the
operation of multiple trust influences, including the usual factors of com-
petence or fiduciary responsibilities.
The second conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that
various trust judgments, and value similarity in particular, are related to
people’s prior attitudes toward GM food. Although affect, as a measure of
people’s overall attitudes toward GM food, explained a significant but
modest part of value similarity, Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that a com-
bination of people’s prior attitudes and the perceived government position
on GM food could explain most of the variation in value similarity. These
results clearly indicate that the extent to which an organization (in this case,
the government) is seen as having similar values is influenced by perceived
attitudinal distance; that is, the difference between one’s own and the other
person’s attitudes.
The third conclusion from this research has to do with the question of
whether trust in risk regulation is an important factor in people’s responses
to GM food. All three studies found that adding two extra paths to the
model (i.e., between affect on the one hand, and trust and risk regulation
and acceptability or behavioral intentions on the other hand) substantially
reduced the initial strong relationship between trust in the regulation of GM
food, and the acceptability of or intention to eat GM food. These findings
clearly indicate that the relationship between these variables is a result of
differences in people’s general affective evaluation of GM food.
In line with Eiser et al. (2002) and Poortinga and Pidgeon (2005), the
results suggest that expressed behavioral intentions, acceptability, and trust
in risk regulation are all indicators of a more general attitude toward GM
food. At a more general level, they provide further evidence for the view
proposed by Slovic et al. (2002) that affect is a critical variable for risk
judgments. This also would suggest that trust in risk regulation is not as
important for the way people behave in complex controversial social issues,
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1695

as is commonly assumed. Rather, trust seems to be an expression of overall

agreement or approval with the risk issue at hand.
As suggested by Poortinga and Pidgeon (2005), these findings may have
important implications for risk communication and policy. Although for
many government organizations the reclamation of trust has become an
explicit objective, these studies suggests that risk-communication efforts that
are aimed at increasing trust directly may not be universally effective in
solving risk controversies (cf. Fischhoff, 1995). So, rather than simply pro-
viding information about GM food, it probably would be more worthwhile
to try to understand (and address) why people support or oppose devel-
opments in biotechnology in the first place. Some research even suggests
that providing persuasive information in situations of distrust decreases,
rather than increases, trust (e.g., Frewer, Scholderer, & Bredahl, 2003; Lord,
Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Wilson, Evans, Leppard, & Syrette, 2004).
Another consistent finding across this series of studies is that skepticism
about government policies does not seem to affect trust in the regulation of
GM food. These results provide some support for the typology of trust
proposed by Walls et al. (2004), and Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003a). Based
on the two independent evaluative components of general trust and skep-
ticism, Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003a) argued that the importance of full
trust tends to be exaggerated. In many cases, even where expressed trust in
an institution appears to be high, critical sentiments almost always coexist
regarding such things as organizational motives, effectiveness, independ-
ence, or available resources. Distrust in this sense, which has been termed
critical trust (see Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003a; Walls et al., 2004), is not
destructive, but can be seen as an essential component of political account-
ability in a participatory democracy. The argument that a critical attitude is
not necessarily destructive (criticizing government policy or communication
does not automatically mean that you do not trust them) is supported by the
finding that skepticism about government GM food policies does not affect
trust in risk in the regulation of GM food. This shows that the question of
what constitutes and contributes to trust, as well as the consequences of (the
absence of) trust, is a complex one and raises the challenge for policymakers
and researchers to distinguish between constructive criticism and genuine
distrust.
As a note of caution, because Study 1 and Study 3 were not designed
specifically for the purpose of testing the model with SEM, only a limited
number of indicator variables were available. While it is good practice to use
multiple indicator variables, some model constructs were measured with
only a few items. However, the findings were surprisingly consistent across
the three studies. The results were replicated in three separate studies with
members of the general public and relatively large sample sizes.
1696 POORTINGA AND PIDGEON

Overall, the results demonstrate that the three distinct approaches to

trust can be integrated successfully into one causal model. These findings
were strengthened by the fact that comparable results were found using
slightly different measures for the various model constructs. However, the
model was tested in the specific context of GM food in the United Kingdom.
Further research will have to determine if the model can be applied to other
controversial risk cases.
It is also important to recognize that SEM is a confirmatory statistical
technique that shows whether a model fits a particular dataset. This means
that other models may fit the data equally well. Moreover, SEM does not
test the causality of the relationships. While the results suggest that the
proposed model is a plausible one, more systematic (experimental) research
is needed to clarify the direction of the relationships. For example, a part of
the model that needs further attention is the role of affect in people’s re-
sponse to risks. Based on the findings of Eiser et al. (2002) and Poortinga
and Pidgeon (2005), we have taken the position that affect comes prior to
various trust judgments. However, this does not mean that people’s affect is
a given and cannot be changed. Rather, the model should be seen as dy-
namic and iterative. People are likely to change their (affective and cogni-
tive) attitudes based on new information and experiences. Having said that,
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2004b) showed that trust–relevant information is
largely interpreted in line with people’s existing attitudinal position, sug-
gesting that people may not change their views easily.
Finally, this research found that relationships between the different
model factors are generally strong. For example, the association between
value similarity, general trust, and skepticism was surprisingly high in all
three studies. Likewise, if somewhat lower in the first study, the relationship
between general trust in government and trust in the regulation of GM food
was nearly perfect in Studies 2 and 3. The strong relationships show that it is
difficult to distinguish between the different aspects of trust. It seems that
the items that were used as indicators for the different trust aspects of value
similarity, general trust in government, skepticism, and trust in the regu-
lation GM food may be measuring very similar things. Although this could
mean that the measures are not sensitive enough to discern between the
different aspects of trust, it also could mean that the people themselves may
find it difficult to differentiate between them. That is, there are often only
subtle differences between the different aspects of trust. It could be that
people’s knowledge and views of the government and its policies on GM
food are not very specific. It is possible that in such situations, people base
specific trust judgments on more general evaluative judgments (cf. Eiser
et al., 2002; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005; Slovic et al., 2002). This questions
the usefulness of detailed modeling of the different trust aspects, which often
 PRIOR ATTITUDES, VALUE SIMILARITY, AND DIMENSIONALITY 1697

are used in risk research. Future empirical research should assess whether
or not the various judgments are indeed empirically and psychologically
discernible aspects of trust, and how they interact with other evaluations of
risk-regulatory institutions.

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