MODULE 5 CASES

1. Apostol vs Court of Appeals

Respondents Spouses Emmanuel and Edna Chua filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer against the petitioners, Spouses Apostol.
Respondents alleged that they had contracted with the Spouses
Pascia for the purchase of a parcel of land. Petitioners, who were
present during the negotiations, verbally assured the respondents
that they would vacate the properties within ten (10) days from the
execution of sales. Petitioners then acknowledge that their stay in the
property was only upon the tolerance of its former owners. Spouses
Pascua executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the
improvements thereon in favor of the respondents for 1,000,000.00.
on the basis of the said deed, the respondents were issued the
Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT) over the property. Despite
demands, however, the petitioners refused to vacate the property.

Petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents, the Spouses

Chua, the Spouses Pascua, and the Register of Deeds in the RTC of
Quezon City for the annulment of deed of sale and for reconveyance
with damages. Petitioners alleged that they had been in possession of
the property. Luz Pascua died but Paulo Pascua did not inherit the
property from because the same had already been sold to the
respondents; Paulo Pascua executed a falsified affidavit for self-
adjudication over the property on the basis of which he was able to
secure.

MeTC rendered judgement in favor of the respondents. RTC reversed

the decision of the MeTC and ordering the dismissal of the
complaint. CA held the decision of the MeTC.

The Supreme Court ruled that it is an accepted rule that a person

who has a torrens title over the property, such as the respondents, is
entitled to the possession thereof. The registered owners are entitled
to the possession of the property covered by the said title from the
time such title was issued in their favor. The fact that the repondents
were never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no
moment, as prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible
 entry cases. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents
can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.

2. Sarmiento vs Lasaca
Petitioner Sarmiento was the owner of three (3) parcels of land and
has been in possession of the aforesaid properties being the owner
thereof. Petitioner managed said properties to the Philippine
National Bank (Bank). These were subsequently foreclosed by the
Bank. After failing to redeem within the prescribed period,
petitioners TCTs were cancelled and new ones were issued in the
name of the Bank. The bank sold the property to the respondent.
Petitioner then filed a complaint before the RTC for the annulment of
TCT No 466519-R and the deed of sale between the Bank and the
respondent as well as for reconveyance and damages. With said Civil
Case still pending, respondents sent demand letters demanding
petitioner to vacate the premises.

Respondent filed a complaint with the MTC for ejectment of

damages. MTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent ordering
the petitioners to vacate the subject property. RTC rendered a
decision affirming with modification the MTC’s decision. Respondent
then filed a Motion with the RTC for issuance of writ of execution
pending appeal. CA held that the continued possession of the
property by petitioner had merely been tolerated by respondent.

The SC ruled that the trial bought to light the true nature of the right
of possession of respondent over the property, and the cicrumstances
surrounding her dispossession. The facts, as culled from the evidence
presented by both parties, unequivocally show that the instant case is
one for unlawful detainer. Respondent was able to present evidence
showing that after the foreclosure of the property, petitioner failed to
redeem it within the redemption period. Thus, the later was divested
of her ownership and right to retain possession thereof. Respondent
acquired a better right to possess the property after acquiring title to
it through a sale between her and the mortgage bank.
3. Dumo vs Espinas
The present case arose from a complaint for forcible entry with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction filed by spouses Danilo and Suprema Dumo
(petitioners) against Erlinda Espinas, Jhean Pacio, Phol Pacio, Manny
Jubinal, Carlito Campos and Severa Espinas (respondents).

MTC rendered judgment holding that petitioners were able to prove

their right of possession over the subject property. RTC reversed and
set aside the decision of MTC and dismissed the case filed by the
petitioners. CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision setting
aside the judgment of the RTC and reinstating with modification the
decision of the MTC, by deleting the awards for actual, moral and
exemplary damages.

The SC ruled that considering that the only issue raised in ejectment
is that of rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are
those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or
those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property,
and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no
direct relation to his loss of material possession. Although the MTC's
order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their alleged lost
earnings over the subject premises, which is a beach resort, could
have been considered as compensation for their loss of the use and
occupation of the property while it was in the possession of the
respondents, records do not show any evidence to sustain the same.

4. Corporation vs Treyes
CGE Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto
(petitioners) claimed to have occupied a public land. Ernesto L.
Treyes, Jr (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the
leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the
fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to the
petitioners’ fishponds and harvested several tons of fishes owned by
the petitioners.
 Petitioners promptly filed with the MTC separate complaints for
Forcible Entry with Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction and Damages.

In a separate move, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against

respondent alleging that the unlawful, forcible and illegal
intrusion/destruction of defendant Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men
on the fishpond leased an possessed by the plaintiffs is without any
authority of the law and in violation of Art 539 of the Civil Code.

RTC dimissed petitioner’s complaint on the ground of prematurity

and that holding a complaint for damages may only be maintained
after a final determination on the forcible entry cases has been made.

SC ruled that the petitioners claim for damages have no direct

relation to their loss of possession of the premises. Surely, litis
pendentia is not present and it may not be invoked to dismiss
petitioners’ complaint for damages. Res judicata may not apply
because the court in a forcible entry has no jurisdiction over claims
for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and
attorney’s fees. Neither may forum shopping justify a dismissal of the
complaint for damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being
present or where a final jdgement in the forcible entry case will not
amount to res judicata in the former. Petitioners filing an
independent action for damages other than those sustained as a
result og their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use
and occupation of their properties could not thus be considering as
splitting of a cause of action.

5. Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. vs Court of Appeals

Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation , Iloilo Multi Parts Supply
Corporation, Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern Sales Corporation,
and Chang Liang, Jr. were lessees of a commercial building and
bodegas standing on a registered land in Iloilo City owned in
common by Lucy, Fr.Jerry, Lourdes, Manuel Locsin and Ester
Jarantilla. The leases were embodied and in uniformly worded deeds
 executed by the individual petitioners, as lessees, and Lourdes C.
Locsin, representing the lessors-co-owners.

After the expiration of the period fixed in the lease agreements, the
lessors executed a public instrument entitled “Deed of Absolute Sale”
in virtue of which they sold the leased property to Star Group
Resources and Development Inc. the deed provided that the “vendee
shall henceforth deal with the lessees and occupants of the properties
herein sold without any further warranty or obligation on the part of
the vendors”.

The buyer, Star Group, brought separate actions of unlawful detainer

in the MTC in Iloilo City against the lessees.

Supreme Court ruled that the underlying reasonse for the above
rulings were that the actions in RTC did not involve physical or de
facto possession and on not a few occasions, that the case in RTC was
merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or
that the issues presented in the former could quite easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. This is specially
true in the cases at bar, where the petitioner-lesees claim – that the
lessors (and the buyer of the leased premises) had violated their
leasehold rights because (a) they were not accorded the right of pre
emption, (b) the buyer was not required to respect their leases, and
(c) the lessees were denied the option to renew their leases upon the
expiration thereof – constituted their causes of action in the suits
commenced by them in the RTC. It may well be stressed in closing
that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, "the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership," the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of
ownership . . . only to determine the issue of possession."

6. De Luna vs Court of Appeals

Petitioner alleged that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel land.
Defendants Octavio Daclison, Oscar Crispin, and private respondents
Juan Dimaano, Jr. and Gerino Doble entered the land and began
plowing it; and that said defendants fenced the land with barbed
wire and began planting sugar cane, despite his objections. Petitioner
prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay
him the amount of P45.00 monthly per hectare until possession
thereof would be transferred to him, with litigation expenses and
costs.
Defendant Dimaano, Jr. raised as his special and affirmative defense
that petitioner was not the owner of the property, alleging instead
that the owner thereof was Agustin Dequiña, Jr., Upon the death of
Agustin Dequiña, Sr. in 1945, he was succeeded by his son Agustin
Dequiña, Jr., who possessed the property from 1945 up to February
1972, when the same was leased to defendant Dimaano, Jr. Agustin
Dequiña, Sr. happens to be the uncle of petitioner, the former being
the elder brother of the latter's mother, Apolonia Dequiña.
RTC judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner, with the trial
court ordering the defendants or persons acting for and in their
behalf to restore to petitioner possession of the property. CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only issue to be
resolved therein is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the premises, or possession de facto, independent of
any claim of ownership that either party may set forth in their
pleadings. If petitioner can prove prior possession in himself, he may
recover such possession from even the owner himself. Whatever may
be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority
time, he has the security that entitles him to stay on the property until
he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either
accion publiciana or accion reindivicatoria.

However, where the question of possession can not be resolved

without deciding the question of ownership, an inferior court has the
power to resolve the question of ownership but only insofar as to
determine the issue of possession.
 In the case at bar, the inferior court acted correctly in receiving
evidence regarding the ownership of the disputed property,
inasmuch as respondent Dimaano, Jr. claimed to possess the property
by virtue of a lease agreement with the alleged owner thereof,
Agustin Dequiña, Jr .

Petitioner has shown that he had prior possession of the property.

The prior possession of petitioner was established by the testimony of
his witnesses, notably that of his tenant Epigenio Dilag and Victor
dela Cruz. While petitioner admitted that he declared the property
for taxation purposes only in 1957, he had possessed the property
beginning 1953 at the very latest, when he leased the same to
Epigenio Dilag, who in turn possessed the same until respondent
Dimaano, Jr. entered upon the property in 1972. The possession of the
property by Dilag since 1953 redounds to the benefit of petitioner,
since possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of
another.

7. Semira vs Court of Appeals

Juana Gutierrez owned a parcel of land, which she sold to private

respondent Buenaventura An by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
Thereafter, private respondent entered the premises observing thereby the
boundaries of the property and not the area given. Private respondent sold
Lot 4221 to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, and spouse by means of
another "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" where the lot was described with
the same area and boundaries with the exception of the boundary on the
east; which was changed from "Juana Gutierrez" to "Buenaventura An"

Cipriano Ramirez occupied the lot by observing the boundaries stated in

the document of sale. Subsequently, he applied for a new tax declaration
to replace the one in the name of his uncle but was denied in view of an
existing mortgage executed by Buenaventura An. Cipriano Ramirez sold
the lot to petitioner Miguel Semira. However, the area stated in the
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" 4 was 2,200 square meters and not 822.5
appearing in the previous document. As delimited by its boundaries, the lot
is actually much bigger than 822.5 square meters.
Miguel Semira entered the very same premises previously occupied by
Ramirez and began the construction of a new rice-mill. A complaint for
forcible entry was filed against him by private respondent. The latter
claimed that the area of Lot 4221 was 822.5 square meters only and that
the excess of 1,377 square meters forcibly occupied by petitioner formed
part of Lot 4215 which he acquired from the Hornillas in 1964.

Private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court which reversed the
Municipal Circuit Trial court,

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but without success.

SC agree with the position of petitioner and sustain the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court in holding that in the case at bench the issue of possession
cannot be decide independently of the question of ownership.

We have repeatedly ruled that where land is sold for a lump sum and not
so much per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of the land stated
in the contract determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the area
thereof. 15 Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the land included
within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be
greater or smaller than that recited in the deed

Hence, when private respondent Buenaventura An sold Lot 4221 to his

nephew Cipriano Ramirez by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
which incorporated both the area and the definite boundaries of the lot, the
former transferred not merely the 822.5 square meters stated in their
document of sale but the entire area circumscribed within its boundaries.

The fact that the area turned out to be 2,200 square meters; instead of only
822.5 square meters, is of no moment and does not entitle private
respondent to the difference because the defnite object sold was Lot 4221
in its entirety and not just any unit of measure or number. The case before
us is merely an action of forcible entry and that the issue of ownership was
decided for the sole purpose of resolving priority of possession. Hence,
any pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to
be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the land