Marcos burial: Ocampo vs.
Enriquez (majority opinion digest) regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment
Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. No.
225973; Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, G.R.
No. 226097, November 8, 2016  4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains
 
Facts:
 
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate
Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB").
On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a
Memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding
the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga
Bayani. Duterte won the May 9, 2016 election and formally assumed his office at
the Rizal Hall in the Malacanan Palace.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernest C. Enriquez issued a directive to the
Philippine Army regarding the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.
 
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.
 
ISSUES
 
1) Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the
verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to
have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?
 
2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and
directive violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws?
 3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the
Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos
at the LNMB?
 
of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and
procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the
Philippines?
 
RULING
The petitions must be dismissed.
 
Procedural issues
 
Political question
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a
justiciable controversy. In the excercise of his powers under the Constitution and
the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB,
which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and
military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on
his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no
taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President
Duterte's decision on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.
 Locus standi
 
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct
and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
 
Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal disbursement of
public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the
LNMB by either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or
jurisprudence.
 
Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to disclose the direct or
potential injury which they may suffer as a result of the act complained of. Their
interest in this case is too general and shared by other groups, such that their duty
to uphold the rule of law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite
legal standing.
 
Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of transcendental importance. At this
point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a
national military cemetery and declared a national shrine would have no profound
effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering
that more than twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after
his ouster have already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a
clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights. 
 
As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman Lagman, they failed to show
that the burial of Marcos encroaches on their prerogatives as legislators.
 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
 
Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Contrary to their
claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed
memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National Defense. The
Secretary of National Defense should be given opportunity to correct himself, if
warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order.
Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise
of sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of his office to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If
petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, they could
elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control and
supervision over the Department of National Defense (DND).
 
Hierarchy of Courts
 
While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which
are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve
questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue
restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
 
Substantive issues
 
I. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law of jurisprudence
 
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety
should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything
remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at
the LNMB.
 
Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision
considering that a law should be passed by the Congress to clearly define and
effectuate the principle embodied therein. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted the
Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, Plunder Act, and Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. To
complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued various orders,
memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of
conduct/ethical standards of officials and employees; workflow charts/public
transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and reporting;
and client feedback program
 
Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constituti
on is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of
educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and
respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on
sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten
wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect
prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.
 
The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not violated by public
respondents. Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his or her department.  Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the
power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The
mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is
intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best construed as an
imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision simply
underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President
is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.
 
There is no violation of RA 289
 
Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their
supposition that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This is
not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial
place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President
Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by President
Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered by Marcos'
Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date,
the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction
or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the
legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a singular
interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national
heroes, and patriots.
 
Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent
and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into
question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains resting therein,
and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots
at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws
and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed
interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act
in itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is
actually a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical
perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of
"hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero."
Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors,"
without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to
the remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment have been
finalized by public respondents.
 
RA 10639 is not violated
 
The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A.
No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the
LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates.
With its victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a
provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation"
for the Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs). The law is silent and should
remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there. It is
irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying
material details into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
 
The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be
impaired by the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the
assailed act has no causal connection and legal relation to the law. The subject
memorandum and directive of public respondents do not and cannot interfere with
the statutory powers and functions of the Board and the Commission. More
importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368
and other domestic laws are not curtailed. R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or
repeal, whether express or implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or
AFP Regulations G 161-375.
 
There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws
 
The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President
Duterte, acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB.
Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already
engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present
generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and
popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is
a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
 
Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights
Victims' Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization
of HRVV s, the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly
known as the National Historical Institute (NHJ), is mandated to act as the primary
government agency responsible for history and is authorized to determine all
factual matters relating to official Philippine history.
 
II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias
 The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD
105
 
P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208
predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines
enumerated in the latter. The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the
catchall phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in the future as National
Shrines" is erroneous because: (1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to
P.D. No. 105; (2) Following the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or
death of great and eminent leaders of the nation,"; and (3) Since its establishment,
the LNMB has been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO.
 
Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and
hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains
interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said
cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed
individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried
therein. The "nation's esteem and reverence for her war dead, " as originally
contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands
unaffected. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not
constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB
as a national military shrine.
 
The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO,
which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under
the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under the Office of the
President.
 
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a
self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992
Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is
free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his
predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed
judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
 
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve
for public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain
and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose
indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.  At present, there is no
law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is
located from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The
allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and
Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military
personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his
contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The
disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is
granted to compensate him for valuable public services rendered. 
 
Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at
the LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over
petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a
presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob
(debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is
not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis
of their claim. They failed. Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual
issues since We are not a trier of facts.
 
AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained
 
Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the
LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP;
( c) Secretaries of National Defense; ( d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag
Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include
active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU
Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities;
(g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the
PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized
guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other
deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and G) Former
Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows
of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.
 
Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred
in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged
from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final
judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.
 
In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations
G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and
disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered
to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III,
who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by
expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP
Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for having been issued by the
AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense,
who is the alter ego of the President.
 
AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and
unmistakable showing that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires
for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards for
qualification for burial at the LNMB.
 
It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to
argue that the word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a
symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for military
memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as a military
cemetery and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the
purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives, has neither
been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only
those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." 
 
In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the
years. Since 1986, the list of eligible includes not only those who rendered active
military service or military-related activities but also non-military personnel who
were recognized for their significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as
government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons
whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief,
Congress or Secretary of National Defense). In 1998, the widows of former
Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the list.
Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and
should be restricted in order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB
is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos
had rendered significant active military service and military-related activities.
 
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-
Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran,
and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt
practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but
we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he
held or the awards he received. In this sense, We agree with the proposition that
Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all
good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.
 
Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by
final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.  rendered by a military person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of
 
The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense
involving moral turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a
person shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.
 
Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property
right to safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact
would only give him or her the privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a
favorable recommendation from the Commander- in-Chief, the Congress or the
Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then, such
inchoate right is not legally demandable and enforceable.
 
Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection
clause are not met. 181 In this case, there is a real and substantial distinction
between a military personnel and a former President. The conditions of
dishonorable discharge under the Articles of War attach only to the members of the
military. There is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three
Philippine Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and
Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In
addition, the classification between a military personnel and a former President is
germane to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the
LNMB is a national shrine for military memorials, it is also an active military
cemetery that recognizes the status or position held by the persons interred
therein.
 
Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly
recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended.
Petitioners have not shown that he was dishonorably discharged from military
service under APP Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to
Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles
of War. The NHCP study is incomplete with respect to his entire military career as it
failed to cite and include the official records of the AFP.
 
The word "service" in AFP Regulations G 161-375 should be construed as that
his/her commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the date of
his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable
separation and retirement from the AFP is outside the context of "service" under
AFP Regulations G 161-375.
 
Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency
during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion
or discharge from the military service. The fact that the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the
principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military
person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly
be deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as
contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a
successful revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act of the
people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative
regulation.
 
IIt is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the
people through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people
should not be automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious
consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the
Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from
multifarious inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the people. It is
not the function of the Court, for instance, to divine the exact implications or
significance of the number of votes obtained in elections, or the message from the
number of participants in public assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the pitfalls
of getting embroiled in political and oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious,
debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its recognized guiding stars - clear
constitutional and legal rules - not by the uncertain, ambiguous and confusing
messages from the actions of the people.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL
NORTE
vs. HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG ET. AL.
G.R. No. 193340, January 11, 2017
Jardeleza, J:
FACTS
The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo led a Complaint against
the petitioner Municipality of Tangkal (Municipality) before the with the Shari'a
District Court of Marawi City for the recovery of possession and ownership of a 25-
hectare parcel of land located at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte.
They alleged that in 1962, Macalabo Alompo entered into an agreement with the
Municipality allowing the latter to “borrow” the land to pave the way for the
construction of the municipal hall and a health center building, on the condition that
the Municipality will pay the value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997;
otherwise, ownership of the land would revert to Macalabo. Private respondents
claimed that the Municipality neither paid the value nor returned the land to its
owner.
The Municipality led an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue
and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and
represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery of land
is a real action, it should have been led in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lanao del Norte.
In its Order dated March 9, 2010, the Shari'a District Court denied the Municipality’s
motion to dismiss and held that since the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M.
Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case “is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court
has original jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil courts.” It added that
venue was properly laid because the Shari'a District Court has territorial jurisdiction
over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte. In response to an Order by
Shari'a District Court to file an answer within 10 days, the Municipality, in its
answer, raised as an affirmative defense the court's lack of jurisdiction.
Within the 60-day reglementary period, the Municipality elevated the case to the
Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and reiterated the Shari'a District Court’s lack
of jurisdiction. In their Comment, the heirs of Alompo echo the reasoning of the
Shari'a District Court that since both the plaintiffs below and the mayor of defendant
municipality are Muslims, the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Code of Muslim Personal Laws vests the Shari'a District Court
jurisdiction over the Municipality of Tangkal.
RULING
No, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws does not vests the Shari'a District Court
jurisdiction over the Municipality of Tangkal.
Article 143 (2) (b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws qualifies the conferment of
jurisdiction to actions “wherein the parties involved are Muslims,” the word
“parties” necessarily refers to the real parties in interest. “Muslim” is “a person who
testifies to the oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and professes
Islam." The ability to testify to the “oneness of God and the Prophethood of
Muhammad” and to profess Islam is restricted to natural persons. In contrast,
juridical persons are artificial beings considered as persons only by virtue of legal
action. The Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category. Under the Local
Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate that exercises
powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory.
Another manifested error on the part of Shari’a District Court is the attribution of the
religious affliation of the mayor to the Municipality. It is an elementary principle that
a municipality has a personality that is separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-
mayor, sanggunian, and other offers composing it. And under no circumstances can
this corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations — as the Shari'a
District Court has done — without running afoul the inviolability of the separation of
Church and State enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, the Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law
to decide private respondents’ complaint because not all of the parties involved in the
action are Muslims.
Firestone Ceramics vs CA / Republic vs CA
FACTS:
This case involves a 99-hectare land presumptively belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court
alleged to be without jurisdiction.
The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in question,
when the herein private respondents obtained their decree of registration
thereover.
Since the validity of the said decision and the original certificate of title as well as
transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of
subject area at the time it was so adjudicated, determination of the validity of the
disposition thereof is in order.
Petitioner filed Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases
ISSUE:
WON the SC should hear the case en banc
HELD:
YES. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, as amended by the Resolution of
November 18, 1993: the following are considered en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit;
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or
employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any
of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or
both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members
thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of
the actual membership of the court en banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may
deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.
In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court conceded that it is not
infallible. Should any error of judgment be perceived, it does not blindly adhere to
such error, and the parties adversely affected thereby are not precluded from
seeking relief therefrom, by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this jurisdiction,
rectification of an error, more than anything else, is of paramount importance.
On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners' motion to
transfer these cases to the Banc. Thus, on March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on
the consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the Banc to pass upon
in view of the finding that the cases above entitled are of sufficient importance to
merit its attention. Evidently, the action of the Court under the premises is a
legitimate and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER within the contemplation of
paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads: "All
other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem
of sufficient importance to merit its attention."
Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief Justice and the
eight (8) Associate Justices who voted to treat these consolidated cases as En
Banc cases, have not given any cogent or compelling reason for such action.
Considering that paragraph 9 of the Resolution of this Court dated November 18,
1993, has been cited to support the majority opinion, it is decisively clear that these
consolidated cases have been found to be of sufficient importance to merit the
attention and disposition of the entire Court en banc and therefore, the prayer of
the Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for the Court en banc to
hear and resolve their pending motions for reconsideration, is meritorious. The
aforesaid finding by the Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling enough
to warrant the majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act upon and decide
petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc entertains a
case for its resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division
of origin is incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court
simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and
consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue
advantage of sheer voting strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding
and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership — that, indeed,
subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of the
whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court
of the land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in interpreting and
applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the
Court — to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be
observed.
In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the Motions for
Reconsideration of the petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone
Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending and unresolved.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let alone
the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is claimed as government
property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that their pending motions for
reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.
WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated as en banc cases
LU v. LU YM
G.R. No. 153690 / AUG 4, 2009 / NACHURA, J. / CIVPRO-JURISDICTION OF RTC / RPNICOLAS
NATURE: Motion for Reconsideration
PETITIONERS: David Lu
RESPONDENTS: Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. et al.
SUMMARY. In this case, the Lu Ym father and sons moved to reconsider the decision of the
Court in 2008 that the complaint filed by David et al. was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The father and sons point out that the case filed by David et al. allege the real value of the
shares, based on underlying real estate values worth P1,087,055,105. The Court resolved that
it was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation and that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case filed by David et al. since they did not pay the correct docket fees.
DOCTRINE. A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the
prescribed fees. Hence, without payment of the correct docket fees, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the action filed by David, et al.
FACTS.
 On August 14, 2000, David Lu, Rosa Go, Silvano Ludo and CL Corporation filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr.,
Paterno Lu Ym, Jr., Victor Lu Ym, John Lu Ym, Kelly Lu Ym, and Ludo & Luym
Development Corporation (LLDC) for Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue,
Receivership and Dissolution.
 The plaintiffs, shareholders of LLDC, claimed that the Lu Ym father and sons, as
members of the Board of Directors, caused the issuance to the latter of 600,000 of the
corporation’s unsubscribed and unissued shares for less than their actual value. They then
prayed for the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of a receiver during the
pendency of the action.
 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint but were denied and placed LLDC under
receivership.
 Defendants Lu Ym father and sons elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a
petition for certiorari but was still denied. They re-filed the petition and was granted.
 The Lu Ym father and sons then filed with the trial court a motion to lift the order of
receivership over LLDC. Before the matter could be heard, David instituted a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the CA on the issue of the motion to lift order of
receivership.
 On February 27, 2003, the CA granted the petition and ruled that the proceedings on the
receivership could not proceed without the parties amending their pleadings. The Lu Ym
father and sons thus filed a petition for review with this Court.
 On March 31, 2003, the plaintiffs therein filed a Motion to Admit Complaint to Conform
to the Interim Rules Governing IntraCorporate Controversies, which was admitted by the
trial court.
 On January 23, 2004, the Lu Ym father and sons inquired from the Clerk of Court as to
the amount of docket fees paid by David, et al. John Lu Ym further inquired from the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the correctness of the amount paid by David,
et al. The OCA informed John Lu Ym that a query on the matter of docket fees should be
addressed to the trial court and not to the OCA.
 On March 1, 2004, the RTC decided the case on the merits. It annulled the issuance of
LLDC’s 600,000 shares of stock to the Lu Ym father and sons. It also ordered the
dissolution of LLDC and the liquidation of its assets, and created a management
committee to take over LLDC. The Lu Ym father and sons appealed to the CA.
 In our August 26, 2008 Decision, we declared that the subject matter of the complaint
filed by David, et al., was one incapable of pecuniary estimation. Movants beg us to
reconsider this position, pointing out that the case filed below by David, et al., had for its
objective the nullification of the issuance of 600,000 shares of stock of LLDC. The
complaint itself contained the allegation that the “real value of these shares, based on
underlying real estate values, was One Billion Eighty Seven Million Fifty Five Thousand
One Hundred Five Pesos (P1,087,055,105).”
 Upon deeper reflection, we find that the movants’ claim has merit. The 600,000 shares of
stock were, indeed, properties in litigation. They were the subject matter of the
complaint, and the relief prayed for entailed the nullification of the transfer thereof and
their return to LLDC.
 Thus, to the extent of the damage or injury they allegedly have suffered from this sale of
the shares of stock, the action they filed can be characterized as one capable of pecuniary
estimation. The shares of stock have a definite value, which was declared by plaintiffs
themselves in their complaint. Accordingly, the docket fees should have been computed
based on this amount. This is clear from the following version of Rule 141, Section 7,
which was in effect at the time the complaint was filed.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action filed by David– NO.
We have earlier held that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed fees. Hence, without payment of the correct docket fees, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action filed by David, et al. We also
stated in our Decision that the earlier rule in Manchester Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals has been relaxed. Subsequent decisions now uniformly hold that when
insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the plaintiffs and there is no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
DECISION.
The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action filed by David. Consequently, all
interlocutory matters pending before this Court, specifically the incidents subject of these
three consolidated petitions, must be denied for being moot and academic.
YARED V. ILARDE
FACTS: Estrella Yared, substituted by Carmen Tiongco because the former is now
dead, and Jose Tiongco were opposing parties to a property in litigation. Carmen
directly filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Supreme Court because Judge
Ilarde of the RTC ordered the cancellation of annotation of notices of lis pendens.
The Supreme Court noticed and commented that Carmen has failed to comply with
the principle of judicial hierarchy and that she should have filed the petition in the
CA first. However, the Supreme Court also noticed the improper and unethical
language employed by Jose Tiangco, who was also a counsel for the private
respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both in SC and lower court. He
described the counsel of the petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, ―a rambunctious
wreastler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not red, and who
stampedes into the court room like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to
conceal her faulty grammar.‖ Jose Tiongco alleged that Atty. Deguma does that ―to
please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily available
Carmelo Tiongco, an unmarried mestizo who lives with Carmen.‖ He further
described Atty. Deguma as ―an unmarried maiden of certain age‖ and a ―love-
crazed female Apache who is ready to skin the defendant alive for not being a
bastard‖ and a ―horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of an
Amazon.‖ He also stated that Atty. Deguma is using PAO as a ―marriage bureau for
her own benefit.‖
ISSUE/S: W/N Jose Tiongco, being also one of the counsels of the defendants,
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: Yes. With the language that he employed, he obviously violated Canon 8-A
Rule 8.01 which states that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
languages which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper. He also violated Rule
11.03 which says that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or
menacing language before the courts. The SC also cited Romero vs Valle, ―although
allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in furtherance of the cause he
upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentleman to another.‖ Jose Tiongco was merely warned. Note: In the first part of
the case, even the title of the case, it was not mentioned whether Jose Tiongco is a
lawyer or not. Then, there‘s one sentence which addressed him ―Atty. Jose
Tiongco.‖
SJS v. Lim
G.R. No. 187836
November 23, 2014
Facts:
On 20 November 2001, during the incumbency of former Mayor Atienza, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the use of the
land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial
I. The owners and operators of the businesses thus affected by the reclassification
were given six months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to
stop the operation of their businesses. Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in favor of the oil depot
operators.
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Lim, who succeeded Mayor
Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The new
Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No.
8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions
inconsistent therewith thereby allowing, once again, the operation oil depots.
Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Is amendatory Manila Ordinance No. 8187, which would allow the continued stay of
oil deposits in Pandancan, valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
The same best interest of the public elaborated in G.R. No. 156052 1 guided the
Court in resolving this issue. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even
if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to
persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are
no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No.
8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
1 hierarchy of courts, resulting in a lack of cause of action that justifies the dismissal
G.R.No. 198756. January 13, 2015
Banco de Oro v Republic
Petitioners: BANCO DE ORO, BANK OF COMMERCE, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION, METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK AND
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
Respondents: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL TREASURER AND BUREAU OF TREASURY
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus filed by petitioners
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The case involves the proper tax treatment of the discount or interest income
arising from the P35 billion worth of 10-year zero-coupon treasury bonds issued by
the Bureau of Treasury. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued BIR Ruling
No. 370-2011  (2011 BIR Ruling), declaring that the PEACe Bonds being deposit
substitutes are subject to the 20% final withholding tax. Pursuant to this ruling, the
Secretary of Finance directed the Bureau of Treasury to withhold a 20% final tax
from the face value of the PEACe Bonds upon their payment at maturity on October
18, 2011.
Petitioners contend that the retroactive application of the 2011 BIR Ruling without
prior notice to them was in violation of their property rights, right to due process, as
well as Sec 246 of the 197 NIRC. And that Commissioner of Internal Revenue gravely
and seriously abused her discretion in the exercise of her rule making power.
Respondents argue that petitioners' direct resort to this court to challenge the 2011
BIR Ruling violates the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
of the petition.|||
Issue: Whether or not doctrine of hierarchy of courts was violated by the BIR and
acted outside its jurisdiction in connection with the 2011 BIR Ruling.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court agreed with the respondents that the jurisdiction to review the
rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue pertains to the Court of Tax
Appeals.||| In exceptional cases, however, this court entertained direct recourse to
it when "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy."  venture satisfied the requirements in the published Invitation to Bid, Smartmatic JV,
Non-compliance with the rules on exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts had been rendered moot by this court's issuance of the
temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the 2011 BIR Ruling.
The temporary restraining order effectively recognized the urgency and necessity of
direct resort to this court.
Leo Y. Querobin et al vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015
Ponente: Velasco
Facts:
On October 27, 2014, the COMELEC en banc, through its Resolution No. 14-
0715, released the bidding documents for the "Two-Stage Competitive Bidding for
the Lease of Election Management System (EMS) and Precinct-Based Optical Mark
Reader (OMR) or Optical Scan (OP-SCAN) System to be used in the 2016 National
and Local Elections. The COMELEC Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) set the
deadline for the submission by interested parties of their eligibility requirements
and initial technical proposal on December 4, 2014.
The joint venture of Smartmatic-TIM Corporation (SMTC), Smartmatic
International Holding B.V., and Jarltech International Corporation (collectively
referred to as "Smartmatic JV") responded to the call and submitted bid for the
project on the scheduled date. Indra Sistemas, S.A. (Indra) and MIRU Systems Co.
Ltd. likewise signified their interest in the project, but only Indra, aside from
Smartmatic JV, submitted its bid.
During the opening of the bids, Smartmatic JV, in a sworn certification,
informed the BAC that one of its partner corporations, SMTC, has a pending
application with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to amend its Articles
of Incorporation (AOI), attaching therein all pending documents. The amendments
adopted as early as November 12, 2014 were approved by the SEC on December 10,
2014. On even date, Smartmatic JV and Indra participated in the end-to-end testing
of their initial technical proposals for the procurement project before the BAC.
Upon evaluation of the submittals, the BAC, through its Resolution No. 1
dated December 15, 2014, declared Smartmatic JV and Indra eligible to participate
in the second stage of the bidding process. The BAC then issued a Notice requiring
them to submit their Final Revised Technical Tenders and Price proposals on
February 25, 2015, to which the eligible participants complied. Finding that the joint
on March 26, 2015, was declared to have tendered a complete and responsive
Overall Summary of the Financial Proposal. Meanwhile, Indra was disqualified for
submitting a non-responsive bid. Subsequently, for purposes of post-qualification
evaluation, the BAC required Smartmatic JV to submit additional documents and a
prototype sample of its OMR. The prototype was subjected to testing to gauge its
compliance with the requirements outlined in the project's Terms of Reference
(TOR).
After the conduct of post-qualification, the BAC, through Resolution No. 9
dated May 5, 2015, disqualified Smartmatic JV on two grounds, viz.:
1. Failure to submit valid AOI; and
2. The demo unit failed to meet the technical requirement that the system
shall be capable of writing all data/files, auditlog, statistics and ballot
images simultaneously in at least two (2) data storages.
The ruling prompted Smartmatic JV to move for reconsideration. In denying the
motion, the BAC, through Resolution No. 10 dated May 15, 2015, declared that
Smartmatic JV complied with the requirements of Sec. 23.1 (b) of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184 (GPRA IRR), including the
submission of a valid AOI, but was nevertheless disqualified as it still failed to
comply with the technical requirements of the project.
Aggrieved, Smartmatic JV filed a Protest to the COMELEC seeking permission to
conduct another technical demonstration. Accordingly, on June 19, 2015,
Smartmatic JV was allowed to prove compliance with the technical specifications
for the second time, but this time before the electoral tribunal's Technical
Evaluation Committee (TEC). This was followed, on June 23, 2015, by another
technical demonstration before the Commission en banc at the Advanced Science
and Technology Institute (ASTI) at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon
City.
COMELEC en banc then ruled that the instant Protest is hereby GRANTED and
to RETURN to prospective bidders their respective payments made for the purchase
of Bidding Documents pertaining to the Second Round of Bidding.
Petitioners contend that SMTC misrepresented itself by leading the BAC to
believe that it may carry out the project despite its limited corporate purpose, and
by claiming that it is a Philippine corporation when it is, allegedly, 100% foreign
owned. They add that misrepresentation is a ground for the procuring agency to
consider a bidder ineligible and disqualify it from obtaining an award or contract.
They further contend that SMTC is the biggest shareholder in the bidding joint
venture at 46.5%, making the joint venture less than 60% Filipino-owned.
Issue:
Whether Smartmatic JV misrepresented itself by leading the BAC to believe
that it is a Philippine corporation when it is 100% foreign owned.
Ruling:
No. The Argument is specious.
Clause 5 of the Instruction to Bidders provides that the following may
participate in the bidding process:
5.1. Unless otherwise provided in the BDS, the following persons shall be
eligible to participate in the bidding:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Unless otherwise provided in the BDS, persons/entities forming
themselves into a JV, i.e., group of two (2) or more persons/entities that
intend to be jointly and severally responsible or liable for a peculiar
contract: Provided, however, that Filipino ownership or interest of the joint
venture concerned shall be at least sixty percent (60%).
While petitioners are correct in asserting that Smartmatic JV ought to be at
least 60% Filipino-owned to qualify, they did not adduce sufficient evidence to
prove that the joint venture did not meet the requirement. Petitioners, having
alleged noncompliance, have the correlative burden of proving that Smartmatic JV
did not meet the requirement, but aside from their bare allegation that SMTC is
100% foreign-owned, they did not offer any relevant evidence to substantiate their
claim. Aside from the sheer weakness of petitioners' claim, SMTC satisfactorily
refuted the challenge to its nationality and established that it is, indeed, a Filipino
corporation as defined under our laws. As provided in Republic Act No. 7042 (RA
7042), otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act, a Philippine corporation is
defined in the following wise:
Section 3. Definitions. — As used in this Act:
a) The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a
domestic partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of
which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee
of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits,
where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty (60%) of the
fund will accrue to the benefit of the Philippine nationals: Provided, That
where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least
sixty percent (60%) of the capital stocks outstanding and entitled to vote of
both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines
and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors
of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the
corporations shall be considered a Philippine national.
Perusing SMTC's GIS proves useful in applying the control test. Upon
examination, SMTC's GIS reveals that it has an authorized capital stock of
P226,000,000.00, comprised of 226,000,000 common stocks 116 at P1.00 par value,
of which 100% is subscribed and paid. Applying the control test, 60% of SMTC's
226,000,000 shares, that is 135,600,000 shares, must be Filipino-owned. Based on
the GIS, it is clear that SMTC reached this threshold amount to qualify as a Filipino-
owned corporation.
Indeed, the application of the control test would yield the result that SMTC
is a Filipino corporation. There is then no truth to petitioners' claim that SMTC is
100% foreign-owned. Consequently, it becomes unnecessary to confirm this finding
through the grandfather rule since the test is only employed when the 60% Filipino
ownership in the corporation is in doubt. Anent the nationality of the other joint
venture partners, the Court defers to the findings of the COMELEC and the BAC, and
finds sufficient their declaration that Smartmatic JV is, indeed, eligible to participate
in the bidding process, and is in fact the bidder with the lowest calculated
responsive bid. Hence, there is no other alternative for this Court other than to
adopt the findings of the COMELEC and the BAC upholding Smartmatic JV's
eligibility to participate in the bidding process, subsumed in which is the joint
venture and its individual partners' compliance with the nationality requirement.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc is hereby AFFIRMED.
JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA
G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
FACTS: A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police-Olongapo
City Police Office and private respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude)
against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton.
During the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City found
probable cause against Pemberton for the crime of murder and filed for an
Information. Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice. Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton's Petition for Review and stated that
based on the evidence on record, there was "no reason to alter, modify, or reverse
the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City. Pemberton filed this Petition
for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Pemberton argues that in sustaining a finding of probable cause, Secretary De Lima
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or absence of jurisdiction
based on the following grounds: (a) Secretary De Lima took into account additional
evidence which the City Prosecutor allegedly had no authority to receive and which
Pemberton had no opportunity to address and rebut, thereby denying him due
process of law;(b) Secretary De Lima found probable cause to charge Pemberton
with the crime of murder when "the evidence on record does not support the
existence of probable cause to indict [him] . . . with either homicide or murder[;]"
and (c) Secretary De Lima found that "the killing was attended with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength[,] and cruelty despite
prevailing jurisprudence dictating that the elements of these qualifying
circumstances . . . be established by direct evidence.”
Secretary De Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General, points out that this
Petition is procedurally infirm. The Petition assails the appreciation of evidence and
law by Secretary De Lima, which are "errors of judgment . . . [that] cannot be
remedied by a writ of certiorari." Further, by filing this Petition before this court and
not the Court of Appeals, Pemberton violated the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Moreover, the case is moot and academic, considering that the Regional Trial Court
has convicted Pemberton for the crime charged
ISSUES:
(1) WON respondent Secretary Leila M. De Lima committed grave abuse of
discretion in sustaining the finding of probable cause against petitioner Joseph
Scott Pemberton, thereby denying petitioner due process of law?
(2) WON petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his
Petition before this Court instead of the Court of Appeals?
(3) WON this case has been rendered moot and academic?
HELD:
(1) Respondent De Lima's finding of probable cause against petitioner was not
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Rather, her determination was based
on a careful evaluation of evidence presented. Moreover, petitioner was fully
accorded due process in the preliminary investigation proceedings. Petitioner
had multiple opportunities to controvert the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation. He was directed to file a counter-affidavit, which
was an opportunity to refute the allegations against him. Petitioner was also
given the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the initial finding of probable
cause.
(2) Respondents contend that petitioners' failure to file the proper suit with a
lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient ground for the dismissal of
their petition. They add that observation of the hierarchy of courts is
compulsory. While respondents claim that while there are exceptions to the
general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present in this case. On
the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona on this court's discretionary
power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if warranted by
"compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and importance of the issues
raised . . . ." Petitioners submit that there are "exceptional and compelling
reasons to justify a direct resort [with] this Court."
 (3) YES. Petition for Certiorari is denied for lack of merit and for being moot and
academic
LIZA L. MAZA v. EVELYN A. TURLA, GR No. 187094, 2017-02-15
Facts:
Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casiño, and Rafael V.
Mariano (petitioners) are former members of the House of Representatives. Liza
represented Gabriela Women's Party (Gabriela), Saturnino and Teodoro
represented Bayan Muna Party-List (Bayan Muna), while Rafael represented
Anakpawis Party-List (Anakpawis).
Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly
responsible for the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe.[8]
His findings show that the named individuals conspired, planned, and implemented
the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List (AKBAYAN), a rival of Bayan
Muna and Gabriela.[9] Carlito Bayudang and Danilo Felipe were AKBAYAN
community organizers,[10] whereas Jimmy Peralta was mistaken for a certain
Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter.
Inspector Palomo recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted and
that an Information for each count of murder be filed against the 19 individuals.
The panel of prosecutors issued on April 11, 2008 a Joint Resolution, reviewed and
approved by Officer-in-charge Provincial Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo (Prosecutor
Florendo). The panel found probable cause for murder in the killing of Carlito
Bayudang and Jimmy Peralta, and for kidnapping with murder in the killing of Danilo
Felipe, against the nineteen 19 suspects. However, the panel considered one of the
suspects, Julie Flores Sinohin, as a state witness. The panel recommended that the
corresponding Informations be filed against the remaining suspects. On the same
day, two (2) Informations for murder were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Palayan City, Branch 40 in Nueva Ecija, (Palayan cases) and an Information for
kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba case).
Judge Turla REMANDED the case to the prosecutor.
On July 18, 2008, Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turla (Judge Turla) issued an
Order on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla held that "the proper procedure in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed in [the Palayan] cases"
There is no dispute that the two (2) Informations for murder were filed without first
affording the movants their right to file a motion for reconsideration. The denial
thereof is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
This fact alone already renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case
incomplete. The inevitable conclusion is that the movants were not only effectively
denied the opportunity to file a "Motion for Reconsideration" of the "Joint
Resolution" dated April 11, 2008 issued by the panel of prosecutors assigned in
these cases, but were also deprived of their right to a full preliminary investigation
preparatory to the filing of the Information against them.
Judge Turla added that her order of remanding the Palayan cases back to the
provincial prosecutors "for a complete preliminary investigation is not a
manifestation of ignorance of law or a willful abdication of a duty imposed by law ...
but due, to the peculiar circumstances obtaining in [the cases] and not just 'passing
the buck' to the panel of prosecutors ORDER the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Nueva Ecija to conduct the preliminary investigation on the incidents subject
matter hereof in accordance with the mandates of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner to Supreme Court:
Petitioners pray that the July 18, 2008 and December 2, 2008 Orders of Judge Turla
be set aside and annulled and that the murder cases against them be dismissed for
failure to show probable cause. They also ask for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Turla from
remanding the cases to the provincial prosecutors, and "the respondent
prosecutors from conducting further preliminary investigation [on] these cases."
Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the
prosecutors had no basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had already
evaluated the evidence submitted by the prosecutors along with the Informations,
she should have determined the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants or the dismissal of the Palayan cases.
Respondent's assignment of errors
Respondents claim that the petition before this Court violates the principle of
hierarchy of courts.
Respondents also allege that respondent Secretary Gonzalez was wrongly
impleaded.
On the allegation that Judge Turla reneged on her constitutional duty to determine
robable cause, respondents counter that she did not abandon her mandate.
Furthermore, respondent prosecutors' finding of probable cause is correct since
evidence against petitioners show that more likely than not, they participated in the
murder of the alleged victims.
Petitioners' Reply
Aside from reiterating their allegations and arguments in the petition, they added
that direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction was allowed as their
petition involved legal questions.
Issues:
Whether respondent Judge Turla gravely abused her discretion when she remanded
the Palayan cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of preliminary
investigation
Ruling:
The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of
another preliminary investigation is improper
Petitioners assert that the documents submitted along with the Information are
sufficient for Judge Turla to rule on the existence of probable cause. If she finds the
evidence inadequate, she may order the prosecutors to present additional
evidence. Thus, according to petitioners, Judge Turla's action in remanding the case
to the prosecutors for further preliminary investigation lacks legal basis.
Petitioners' contention has merit.
A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial
court judge has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a
commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable cause.
The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on her or his
personal evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The
determination of probable cause by the trial court judge is a judicial function,
whereas the determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is an executive
function.
Regardless of Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, it was incumbent upon her to determine the existence of probable
cause against the accused after a personal evaluation of the prosecutors' report and
the supporting documents. She could even disregard the report if she found it
unsatisfactory, and/or require the prosecutors to submit additional evidence. There
was no option for her to remand the case back to the panel of prosecutors for
another preliminary investigation. In doing so, she acted without any legal basis.
Principles:
Upon filing of an information in court, trial court judges must determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation of
the prosecutor's report and its supporting documents. They may dismiss the case,
issue an arrest warrant, or require the submission of additional evidence. However,
they cannot remand the case for another conduct of preliminary investigation on
the ground that the earlier preliminary investigation was improperly conducted.
No less than the Constitution commands that "no ... warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce[.]" This requirement of personal evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed
in Rule 112, Section 5 (a) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an information in court
and that for issuance of an arrest warrant are different. Once the information is
filed in court, the trial court acquires jurisdiction and "any disposition of the case as
to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court.
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL COURTESY
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 166859, G.R. No. 169203, G.R. No. 180702, April 12, 2011
FACTS:
The Republic commenced Civil Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan by complaint,
impleading as defendants respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) and
59 individual defendants.
Cojuangco allegedly purchased a block of 33,000,000 shares of SMC stock through
the 14 holding companies owned by the CIIF Oil Mills. For this reason, the block of
33,133,266 shares of SMC stock shall be referred to as the CIIF block of shares.
Contention of the Republic of the Philippines:
That Cojuangco is the undisputed "coconut king" with unlimited powers to deal
with the coconut levy funds, who took undue advantage of his association,
influence and connection, acting in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos, misused coconut levy funds to buy out majority of the outstanding shares
of stock of San Miguel Corporation.
Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and ACCRA law offices plotted, devised,
schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the
use of coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures
that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK. CIC, and
more than twenty other coconut levy-funded corporations, including the acquisition
of San Miguel Corporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential
directives of the coconut monopoly.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan:
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033-F was dismissed for failure of plaintiff to
prove by preponderance of evidence its causes of action against defendants with
respect to the twenty percent (20%) outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel
Corporation registered in defendants’ names
Republic of the Philippines appealed the case to the Supreme Court invoking that
coconut levy funds are public funds. The SMC shares, which were acquired by
respondents Cojuangco, Jr. and the Cojuangco companies with the use of coconut
levy funds – in violation of respondent Cojuangco, Jr.’s fiduciary obligation – are,
necessarily, public in character and should be reconveyed to the government.
ISSUE:
Whether Respondent Cojuangco Jr. used the coconut levy funds to acquire SMC
shares in violation of the his fiduciary obligation as a public officer.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
Cojuangco violated no fiduciary duties
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a
government official or employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos.
There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated
wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or
his wife.
Republic’s burden to establish by preponderance of evidence that
respondents’ SMC shares had been illegally acquired with coconut-levy funds was
not discharged.
The conditions for the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Civil
Code (like the trustee using trust funds to purchase, or a person acquiring property
through mistake or fraud), and Section 31 of the Corporation Code (like a director
or trustee willfully and knowingly voting for or assenting to patently unlawful acts
of the corporation, among others) require factual foundations to be first laid out in
appropriate judicial proceedings. Hence, concluding that Cojuangco breached
fiduciary duties as an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB
without competent evidence thereon would be unwarranted and unreasonable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan could not fairly find that Cojuangco had
committed breach of any fiduciary duties as an officer and member of the Board of
Directors of the UCPB. For one, the Amended Complaint contained no clear factual
allegation on which to predicate the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the
Civil Code, and Section 31 of the Corporation Code. Although the trust relationship
supposedly arose from Cojuangco’s being an officer and member of the Board of
Directors of the UCPB, the link between this alleged fact and the borrowings or
advances was not established. Nor was there evidence on the loans or borrowings,
their amounts, the approving authority, etc. As trial court, the Sandiganbayan could
not presume his breach of fiduciary duties without evidence showing so, for fraud
or breach of trust is never presumed, but must be alleged and proved.
The thrust of the Republic that the funds were borrowed or lent might
even preclude any consequent trust implication but is more inclined to be a
contract of loan. To say that a relationship is fiduciary when existing laws do not
provide for such requires evidence that confidence is reposed by one party in
another who exercises dominion and influence. Absent any special facts and
circumstances proving a higher degree of responsibility, any dealings between a
lender and borrower are not fiduciary in nature.
DISPOSITION:
The Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari and, AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated by the Sandiganbayan on November 28, 2007 in Civil Case No. 0033-F.
The Court declares that the block of shares in San Miguel Corporation in
the names of respondents Cojuangco, et al. subject of Civil Case No. 0033-F is the
exclusive property of Cojuangco, et al. as registered owners.
ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) V. EIJI* YANAGISAWA  Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on TCT No. 99791. Deeming the
G.R. No. 175303,  [April 11, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
An undertaking not to dispose of a property pending litigation, made in open court
and embodied in a court order, and duly annotated on the title of the said property,
creates a right in favor of the person relying thereon. The latter may seek the
annulment of actions that are done in violation of such undertaking.
FACTS:
Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanesenational, and Evelyn F. Castañeda
(Evelyn), a Filipina, contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of Manila.
On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit located
at Bo. Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Parañaque townhouse unit). The
Registry of Deeds for Parañaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791
to “Evelyn P. Castañeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen[,]
both of legal age.”
In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Evelyn on the ground of bigamy (nullity of marriage case). During the pendency of
the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn
and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be
enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her
name. At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily
undertook not to dispose of the properties registered in her name during the
pendency of the case, thus rendering Eiji’s application and motion moot. Said
undertaking was annotated on the title of the Parañaque townhouse unit or TCT
No. 99791.
Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from petitioner
Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN). To secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real estate
mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Parañaque townhouse unit covered by
TCT No. 99791. The instrument was submitted to the Register of Deeds of
Parañaque City for annotation on the same date.
At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of marriage case was
pending before the CA. The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage,
and had ordered the liquidation of their registered properties, including the
Parañaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided between the parties.
The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its Order on Evelyn’s
commitment not to dispose of or encumber the properties registered in her name.
mortgage as a violation of the Makati RTC’s Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the
annulment of REM (annulment of mortgage case) against Evelyn and PAFIN.
For its defense, PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order against
Evelyn. It admitted, however, that it did not conduct any verification of the title
with the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City “because x x x Evelyn was a good,
friendly and trusted neighbor.” PAFIN maintained that Eiji has no personality to
seek the annulment of the REM because a foreign national cannot own real
properties located within the Philippines.
Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order. Evelyn asserted
that she paid for the property with her own funds and that she has exclusive
ownership thereof.
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the CA Decision, which allegedly affirmed the Makati
RTC ruling that Eiji is a co-owner of the mortgaged property. PAFIN insists that the
CA sustained a violation of the constitution with its declaration that an alien can
have an interest in real property located in the Philippines.
ISSUE/S:
 1. Whether a real property in the Philippines can be part of the community
property of a Filipina and her foreigner spouse;
 2. Whether a real property registered solely in the name of the Filipina wife is
paraphernal or conjugal;
 3. Who is entitled to the real property mentioned above when the marriage is
declared void?
 4. Whether the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the
same issue was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the
CA.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
RATIO:
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who
between Eiji and Evelyn owns the Parañaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that
the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not
have been interfered with by the Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was
improper for the Parañaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.
Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the Parañaque RTC to rule on the
ownership issue because it was essential for the determination of the validity of the
REM.
The Court disagrees. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim
ownership of the Parañaque townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as
his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his right to rely on Evelyn’s
commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed in the
October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC), and the annotation of the said
commitment on TCT No. 99791.
It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eiji’s incapacity to own real property as their
defense to the suit. They maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to own real
estate in the Philippines, need not consent to the REM contract for its validity. But
this argument is beside the point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted
by Eiji. This defense does not negate Eiji’s right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order
of the Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal with the registered property,
to the annotations entered on the title. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the
complaint based on this defense.
Petitioner did not question the rest of the appellate court’s ruling, which held that
Evelyn and PAFIN executed the REM in complete disregard and violation of the
October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and the annotation on TCT No. 99791. It
did not dispute the legal effect of the October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyn’s capacity to
encumber the Parañaque townhouse unit nor the CA’s finding that petitioner is a
mortgagee in bad faith.
The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or
encumber the property, is akin to an injunction order against the disposition or
encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of
a standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties
who are not in good faith. The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a
cause of action to seek the annulment of the offending actions.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no need to discuss the other issues
raised by the petitioner.
CONRADO B. NICART v. MA. JOSEFINA C. TITONG, GR No. 207682, 2014-12-10
Facts:
A few days prior to the end of his term, then Governor of Eastern Samar Ben P. Evardone
(Evardone) issued ninety-three (93) appointments between May 11, 2010 and June 29, 2010,
including that of herein respondents Ma. Josefina Titong (Titong) and JoselitoAbrugar, Sr.
(Abrugar),... which appointments were later confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Consequently, the appointees immediately assumed their respective positions.
Upon submission, however,of the appointments to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Regional Office (CSCRO) No. VIII, all 93 appointments were disapproved for having been
made in violation of Section 2.1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16, series of 2007
Evardone appealed the disapproval but it was dismissed for non-payment of the requisite
filing fee and the appointments having been issued in violation of said circular. Respondents,
for their part, individually moved for reconsideration of the disapproval of their respective...
appointments but later withdrew their motions via an Omnibus Joint Motion and separately
converted the same to an Appeal by means of a petition for review with the CSC proper.
Titong and Abrugar requested the assistance of the CSC with their claim for payment of their
first salary which was denied by the Commission on Audit (COA) Provincial Office and by
petitioner, who at that time was already the incumbent
Governor.
petitioner, in the main, argues that the appointments were in violation ofsaid Section 21 of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16, s. 2007 and that the exemptions laid down in Nazareno v
City of Dumaguete[4] were not met for the following reasons:
(a) there was no need to fill up the vacancies immediately; and (b) the appointments were
made en masse.
In view of petitioner's continued refusal to pay their salaries, among others, despite the
service of the writ of execution upon him and with CA-G.R. SP No. 119975 still pending
resolution, respondents filed before the RTC a Petition for Mandamus with Unspecified
Damages against... herein petitioner, the Vice Governor, and the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, docketed as in Civil Case No. 4236.[5] In it, they prayed that
therein respondents be directed to: (a) pay Titong and Abrugar their salaries and other
emoluments or... benefits due them from their assumption of office on June 21, 2010 up to
the present; (b) incorporate their salaries in the annual budget of the Province; (c) pay herein
respondents damages and attorney's fees; and (d) recognize their appointments as valid,
among... others.
On July 3, 2012, with Civil Case No. 4236 still pending, the CA rendered a Decision[8] in CA-
G.R. SP No. 119975 granting the petition and ruling that respondents' appointments are not
valid for having been issued in violation of CSC Rules and for failure to... comply with the
requisites set forth by jurisprudence.[9] Consequently, the CA held, respondents can no
longer claim entitlement to the payment of their salaries from the government and that it is
the appointing authority who shall be personally liable for... their salaries, as directed by
Section 4, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel
Actions
RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4236
Pending this Court's action on respondents' motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 203835,
the RTC, on April 11, 2013, rendered the assailed Decision in Civil Case No. 4236 in favor of
Titong and Abrugar, disposing of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the herein Petition for Mandamus is
hereby GRANTED. The prayer of respondents in their Comment asking for the dismissal of
this petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
According to the RTC, the non-issuance by the CA of a restraining order or injunction
restraining it from proceeding with Civil Case No. 4236, coupled with respondents' filing of a
Rule 45 petition before this Court (G.R. No. 203835) thereby staying the Decision of the CA
which... reversed the ruling of the CSC and declared respondents' appointment as invalid,
results in the continued effectivity of the CSC Decision in respondents' favor.
Issues:
whether or not the enforcement of the Decision of the CSC upholding the legality of
respondents' appointment remains to be proper considering Our affirmation of the invalidity
thereof in Our Resolutions of February 27, 2013 and
February 10, 2014.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
The central foundation for the RTC's continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 4236
and the rendering of the assailed Decision, among others, is Section 82 of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 19, s. 1999.[18] Said provision states that the filing and... pendency of a petition
for review with the [CA] or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of
the final decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining order or an
injunction. This, coupled with the non-issuance by the CA of an injunction... or restraining
order upon CSC Resolution No. 1100653, and its opinion that the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 119975 will not constitute res judicata or in any way affect the petition for mandamus
considering that the reliefs sought were allegedly not founded on the same facts,...
convinced the trial court that there is sufficient basis to grant the petition and issue a writ of
mandamus compelling petitioner, among others, to acknowledge respondents' appointment
and to pay the salaries and emoluments due them.
Ordinarily, the non-issuance by the CA of an injunction or restraining order would make the
CSC Resolution executory pending appeal per Section 82 of CSC Memorandum Circular No.
19, s. 1999, making it a proper subject of a petition for mandamus. However, what the RTC
failed to... take into account is the fact that the propriety of the very directives under the writ
of mandamus sought is wholly reliant on the CA's resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 119975 and
that judicial courtesy dictates that it suspend its proceedings and await the CA's resolution of
the... petition for review.
When the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, it was well aware of the pendency of CA-G.R.
SP No. 119975 the subject of which is the reversal and setting aside of the CSC's affirmation
of respondents' appointments, embodied in the very Resolution which respondents seek to
be... enforced in the petition for mandamus. Nevertheless, the trial court, implying that the
petition for review pending before the CA will not, in any way, affect or be affected by the
petition for mandamus, held that "such review of the [CA] deals primarily with the validity
or... invalidity of the alleged midnight appointments xxx,"[19] as opposed to the petition
before it which only seeks the enforcement of the CSC's Resolution.It then went on to state
that "the ground relied upon by [petitioner] is the mere fact that
[respondents'] appointments were allegedly a 'midnight appointments' (sic) which the [CSC],
however, ruled out to be devoid with (sic) merit. The prohibition under Article VII, Section 15
of the Constitution, it must be noted, applies only to presidential appointments, but not... to
local appointments, like in this case. This is true even if the grounds relied [upon] by
[petitioner] are with respect to CSC Circulars and/or Memorandum, Resolutions, Laws, Rules,
and Regulations relative to the civil service."[20]
Furthermore, the trial court held that it is an accepted principle that "quasi-judicial bodies
like the Civil Service Commission are better-equipped in handling cases involving the
employment status of employees as those in the Civil Service since it is within the field of
their... expertise"[21] and that "the appointments of [respondents] having been accepted by
them and in fact assumed office[,] shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the
[CSC], the only office who has the authority to recall such appointments by
[respondents]."
To cap it all off, the trial court issued the writ of mandamus and directed petitioner, among
others, to immediately pay respondents' salaries, emoluments, and other benefits due them
by virtue of the positions to which they were appointed to, and to recognize the... validity of
their appointments, among others.
In this regard, the Court has, in several cases, held that there are instances where, even if
there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher
court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings... on
the precept of judicial courtesy. Unfortunately, the RTC did not find the said principle
applicable in Civil Case No. 4236 as it disregarded the fact that there is an intimate
correlation between the two proceedings though technically no... prejudicial question exists
as it properly pertains to civil and criminal cases.
To Our mind, considering that the mandamus petition heavily relies on the validity or
invalidity of the appointments which issue is to be resolved by the CA, the court a quo
incorrectly concluded that it may take cognizance of the petition without erroneously
disregarding the... principle of judicial courtesy. What is more, the RTC went beyond the
issues of the case when it affirmed the validity of respondents' appointments, considering
that the only issue presented before it is the propriety of executing CSC Resolution No.
1100653 through a writ of... mandamus despite the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 119975.[25]
By making said findings, conclusions, and directives, the RTC, in effect, affirmed the CSC's
finding that the disputed appointments were valid, pre-empted the CA's Resolution of the
appeal, and... made its own determination thereon, despite the non-presentation of said
question before it and the pendency thereof before the CA. And all of this was made under
the pretext of enforcing CSC Resolution No. 1100653 via a writ of mandamus.
Nevertheless, enforcementof the disputed CSC Resolution is no longer proper and necessary
in light of Our Resolutions dated February 27, 2013 and February 10, 2014, affirming the CA's
ruling that respondents' appointments were not valid, making the issue on the propriety of...
enforcing the CSC Resolution pending appeal, moot and academic.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.[26] Whatever
judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature
of things, can no longer be enforced.[27]
Here, the supervening event contemplated is Our issuance of two minute resolutions one
denying the petition, and the second denying reconsideration thereof thereby affirming CA's
finding against the validity of respondents appointments and effectively reversing the RTC's...
affirmation of the CSC's findings. It is well to note that although contained in a minute
resolution, Our dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 203835 was definitely a disposition of the
merits of the case and constituted a bar to a relitigation of the issues raised there under...
the doctrine of res judicata. When we dismissed the petition and denied reconsideration
thereof, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned.
Having written finis to the issue of whether respondents' were validly appointed or not, the
mandamus now has no basis upon which its issuance can be anchored under the principle of
res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 180147. January 14, 2015.]
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. EMILINDA D.
MACATLANG, ET AL., 1 respondents.
FACTS:
Aris Philippines permanently ceased operations on 9 October 1995
displacing 5,984 rank-and-file employees. On 26 October 1995, FAPI was
incorporated prompting former Aris employees to file a case for illegal dismissal on
the allegations that FAPI was a continuing business of Aris. Sarah Lee Corporation
(SLC), Sarah Lee Philippines (SLP) and Cesar Cruz were impleaded as defendants
being major stockholders of FAPI and officers of Aris, respectively.
On 30 October 2004, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of 5,984 Aris
employees illegal and awarded them monetary benefits amounting to
P3,453,664,710.86. The judgment award is composed of separation pay of one
month for every year of service, back wages, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal
Bond. They posted a P4.5 Million bond. The NLRC granted the reduction of the
appeal bond and ordered the Corporations to post an additional P4.5 Million bond.
The 5,984 former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang (Macatlang
petition), filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals insisting that the
appeal was not perfected due to failure of the Corporations to post the correct
amount of the bond which is equivalent to the judgment award.
 While the case was pending before the appellate court, the NLRC
prematurely issued an order setting aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter for
being procedurally infirmed.
The Court of Appeals, on 26 March 2007, ordered the Corporations to post
an additional appeal bond of P1 Billion
PETITIONERS' CONTENTION: That by the filing of the motion to reduce the bond and
the positing of the bond of Php 4.5m, roughly equivalent to the 10% of the original
judgment award is enough to perfect an appeal.
That the Confession of Judgement submitted by the Petitioners
that is only signed by some of the aggrieved workers instead of the 5,984 illegally
dismissed employees and only an amount of P342,284,800.00 is enough as a
substitute for a valid compromise agreement that will dismiss the cases in dispute.
RESPONDENTS' CONTENTIONS: That the appeal bond made by Petitioners are not
enough to perfect an appeal due to its amount being below the directed amount
given by the Courts
That the Confession of Judgement submitted by Petitions are not
enough to satisfy the claims of Respondents for being grossly inadequate to satisfy
their claims and that they lack all of the signatures and/or consent of all the 5,984
illegally dismissed employees running counter to the nature of a compromise
agreement.
ISSUE: 1) WON the appeal bond of roughly Php 4.5M is enough to perfect an
appeal.
2) WON the Confession of Judgement can be accepted as a valid compromise
agreement between the parties.
HELD: 1) NO. The Corporations should have followed the direction of the Court and
filed the additional amount requested by the Courts for the perfection of the appeal
so that the NLRC may proceed to try the merits of the case for illegal dismissal. The
10% requirement pertains to the reasonable amount which the NLRC would accept
as the minimum of the bond that should accompany the motion to reduce bond in
order to suspend the period to perfect an appeal under the NLRC rules. The 10% is
based on the judgment award and should in no case be construed as the minimum
amount of bond to be posted in order to perfect appeal.
Should the NLRC, after considering the merit of the Motion to
Reduce Appeal Bond determines that a greater amount or the full amount of the
bond needs to be posted by the appellant, then the party shall comply accordingly.
The appellant shall be given a period of 10 days from notice of the NLRC order
within which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.
The Petitioners are then directed to post the amount of PHP
725M in cash or surety bond within 10 days of the decision to continue with the
determination of the merits of the alleged illegally dismissed Respondents through
the NLRC.
2) NO. The Confession of Judgement cannot be accepted as a valid compromise
agreement. A confession of judgment is an acknowledgment that a debt is justly
due and cuts off all defenses and right of appeal. It is used as a shortcut to a
judgment in a case where the defendant concedes liability. It is seen as the written
authority of the debtor and a direction for entry of judgment against the debtor.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is an
agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to
a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree
on, and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the
danger of losing. A compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs
and public policy; and must have been freely and intelligently executed by and
between the parties.
Article 273 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes compromise agreements
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, in conformity with the basic policy of the
State "to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and
negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes
of settling labor or industrial disputes.” A compromise agreement is valid as long as
the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily,
with a full understanding of what he was entering into.
A review of the compromise agreement shows a gross disparity between the
amounts offered by the Corporations compared to the judgment award. The
judgment award is P3,453,664,710.86 or each employee is slated to receive
P577,149.85. On the other hand, the P342,284,800.00 compromise is to be
distributed among 5,984 employees which would translate to only P57,200.00 per
employee. From this amount, P8,580.00 as attorney's fees will be deducted, leaving
each employee with a measly P48,620.00. In fact, the compromised amount roughly
comprises only 10% of the judgment award.
Batch 2 cases
LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal,
and means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as
the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court.40
The concept of law of the case is well explained in Mangold v. Bacon,41 an
American case, thusly:
The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced
on a first appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the
concrete facts, not only prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court
to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the
law of the case in all other steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The
rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and reason. Without the rule
there would be no end to criticism, reagitation, reexamination, and
reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation. It would be
intolerable if parties litigants were allowed to speculate on changes in the
personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions once
gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given
case. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result in
the foolishness of the inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it
grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to act like ordinary sensible
persons. The administration of justice is a practical affair. The rule is a practical
and a good one of frequent and beneficial use.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an
appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its declaration
continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal,
notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other
cases.42 For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has
issued a pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full
opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, the
pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should
not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case,
like damages.43 But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only
legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
HEIRS OF FELINO M. TIMBOL, JR., NAMELY, MICHAEL JOHN JORGE
TIMBOL, FELINO JAMES JORGE TIMBOL, AND MARILOU
TIMBOL, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review1 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated 26 September 2012 and
Resolution3 dated 31 May 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84649. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the 5 January 2005
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150, in Civil
Case No. 00-946.
The Facts
Civil Case No. 00-946 stems from a Complaint5 for annulment of real estate
mortgage, foreclosure of mortgage, and auction sale; accounting and
damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunction filed by
Felino M. Timbol, Jr. and his wife Emmanuela R. Laguardia (Spouses Timbol)
against the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Atty. Ricardo M. Espina, in his
capacity as notary public of Makati, and the Register of Deeds of Makati.
The facts of the case are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sometime in December 1996, Karrich Holdings Ltd. ["KHL"], based in Hong
Kong and owned by Felino M. Timbol, Jr. ["Timbol"] applied with Philippine
National Bank ["PNB"]'s wholly-owned Hong Kong-based subsidiary, PNB
International Finance Limited ["PNB-IFL"] for credit facilities. Karrich Auto
Exchange ["KAE"], then named Superkinis Auto Sales, a sole proprietorship
based in the Philippines and also owned by Timbol, acted as co-borrower. The
credit facilities were granted in the total amount of USD 850,000.00, or PhP
22,796,200.00.
As security, Timbol executed real estate mortgages on his behalf and on behalf
of Emmanuela Laguardia ["Laguardia"], over nine (9) different parcels of real
estate registered in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Felino M. Timbol, Jr. Timbol was
supposedly made to sign the real estate mortgage forms and Promissory Note
forms in blank, among other documents, and thereafter returned the same to
PNB. Timbol was allegedly never furnished with copies of the finished forms, a
statement PNB would later categorically deny.
The first Real Estate Mortgage was in consideration of credit accommodations
in the amount of Thirteen Million Fifty Three Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (Php
13,053,600.00, Philippine currency) and further read pertinently as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of credit accommodations obtained
from the Mortgagee and to secure the payment of the same x x x the
Mortgagors hereby transfer and convey by way of mortgage unto the
Mortgagee its successors or assigns, the following:
Seven (7) real estate properties covered by TCT Nos. 196111, 196112,
196113, 196114, 196115, 196116 and 196117 with their technical descriptions
detailed in the attached Annex A.
xxx
The consideration for the second Real Estate Mortgage amounted to Seven
Million Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Pesos and
0/100 (PhP 7,598,850.00, Philippine currency). The mortgage was constituted
over a 293-sq.m. parcel of land covered by TCT No. 177564. The third Real
Estate Mortgage secured an obligation amounting to Two Million One Hundred
Forty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Pesos and 0/100 (Php
2,143,750.00, Philippine currency) and covered an 87.5 sq.m. parcel of land
under TCT No. 207636.
The real estate mortgages were annotated on the aforementioned transfer
certificates of title. On later perusal of the transfer certificates of title, however,
Timbol supposedly discovered that the amounts annotated as mortgaged
added up to One Hundred One Million One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Eight
Hundred Pesos and 0/100 (PhP 101,117,800.00). Over time, Timbol signed
several Promissory Notes, attesting to availments under the credit line
amounting to Eight Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Five US
Dollars and 7/100 (USD 849,595.07). On April 1, 1998, the credit facilities
were reduced to Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Three Hundred US
Dollars and 0/100 (USD 848,300.00), pursuant to the letter sent by PNB-IFL to
KAE/ KHL.
When Timbol, KAE, and KHL defaulted on the payment 6f their loan obligation,
PNB, on behalf of PNB-IFL, sent a demand letter dated September 2, 1999,
advising them that their total outstanding obligation stood at Thirty-Eight
Million, Eighty-Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos and 59/100
(PhP 38,088,173.59), inclusive of penalties and interests. In a response
apparently dated October 19, 1999, Timbol, signing in representation of KHL,
manifested that he was "well aware" of the "P33 Million" outstanding obligation
and that he was awaiting the outcome of a pending application for another
loan. Timbol thus requested for additional time to settle the obligation with
PNB-IFL and for the conversion of the same to Philippine currency.
On November 15, 1999, PNB caused the foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties, claiming that Timbol/KAE/KHL had violated the terms of the real
estate mortgage by defaulting on the payment of the loan obligation despite
demands. As of the date of the foreclosure, the outstanding obligation already
amounted to One Million Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-Three US
Dollars and 40/100 (USD 1,021,743.40) or Forty-Two Million Three Hundred
Twenty Thousand Six Hundred Eleven Pesos and 62/100 (PhP 42,320,611.62).
Atty. Ricardo M. Espina ["Espina"] notarized the Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale.
PNB was allegedly the highest bidder at the public auction sale with a bid price
of Thirty-Five Million Six Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand Pesos and 0/100 (PhP
35,669,000.00). Espina issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale dated
December 10, 1999.
On August 4, 2000, Timbol and Laguardia filed suit against PNB, Espina, and
the Register of Deeds of Makati City for annulment of the real estate mortgage,
of the foreclosure and auction sale, for accounting and damages, and for a
temporary restraining order and/or injunction. They accused PNB of
deliberately "bloating" the amount of the obligation. They furthermore assailed
the foreclosure proceedings as highly irregular, invalid, and illegal, because the
petition for the extra-judicial foreclosure had not been filed in accordance with
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3; the Notice of Notary Public's Sale
did not specify the newspaper in which the Notice of Sale would be published,
and was neither raffled for this purpose nor properly posted; and the Notary
did not conduct an actual public bidding. They moreover faulted Defendant
Espina for refusing to furnish Timbol with copies of documents relative to the
supposed auction sale. Meanwhile, the Makati City Register of Deeds gave
plaintiff Timbol a Certification that no December 11, 1996 Deed of Mortgage in
favor of PNB-IFL covering the transfer certificates of title in question was
located in the records. Nor had any certificate of sale been registered on the
titles. Plaintiffs thus prayed that the mortgage and Promissory Notes, and the
extra-judicial foreclosure, the foreclosure sale, and any subsequent Certificate
of Sale, be declared null and void; that the mortgage liens annotated on the
transfer certificates of title be cancelled; that PNB be directed to render an
accounting of plaintiffs' true and actual obligation; and that damages and
attorney's fees be awarded. Plaintiffs also prayed for preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief to restrain PNB from consolidating its title to and
ownership over the real properties, and to restrain the Makati City Registry of
Deeds from canceling plaintiffs' titles and issuing new ones in lieu thereof.
During the hearings on his prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, Timbol affirmed the Affidavit he executed for that
purpose.
By Order dated September 8, 2000, the RTC granted the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for. The RTC denied PNB's Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, while granting
the plaintiffs' Motion to Reduce Bond. PNB elevated the RTC's Order all the way
to the Supreme Court which would ultimately nullify and set aside the same in
its February 11, 2005 Decision in G.R. No. 157535.
Meanwhile, in his Answer, Espina defended the validity of the foreclosure sale
proceedings and explained that it was PNB's Atty; Geromo who rejected
Plaintiff Timbol's request for copies of the mortgage documents and promissory
notes. Espina pointed out that the1 alleged Special Power of Attorney
supposedly authorizing plaintiff Timbol to represent Laguardia had already
been revoked by a July 20, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Para
DBP vs. GUARIÑA CORPORATION
G.R. No. 160758
15 January 2014
Petition for review on certiorari
J. Bersamin
FACTS: Respondent Guariña Corporation applied for a loan (P3,387,000.00) from petitioner
DBP for the construction of a resort complex in Iloilo. Prior to the release of the loan,
petitioner required respondent to put up a cash equity of P1,470,951.00 for the construction
of the buildings and other improvements on the resort complex. The loan was released in
several installments, which respondent used to cover the additional improvements. In all, the
amount released totaled P3,003,617.49, from which petitioner withheld P148,102.98 as
interest.
Upon inspection, petitioner found that Guariña had not completed the construction works
and demanded in a letter that respondent expedite the completion and warned that it would
initiate foreclosure proceedings should they not comply. The non-action and objection of
respondent led DBP to initiate extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, which gave its clients
and patrons the impression that business operation had slowed down and the that the resort
had closed.
Respondent filed a complaint to the RTC to seek the nullification of the foreclosure
proceedings and cancellation of certificate of sale, which ruled in their favor –rendered the
extrajudicial sale as null and void, ordered petitioner to give back the properties foreclosed
and for respondent to pay back the loan. On appeal, the CA sustained the trial court’s
decision with the modification deleting the award of attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is in default when it failed to perform the terms of the
mortgage contract securing the promissory note.
HELD: No. Petition denied. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
RATIO: The Court held that the agreement between petitioner and respondent was a loan,
which requires the delivery of money or any other consumable object by one party to
another on the condition that the same amount or quality shall be paid. Loan is a reciprocal
obligation, as it arises from the same cause where one party is the creditor, and the other the
debtor – which means that the creditor should release the full loan amount and the debtor
repays it when it becomes due and demandable.
The failure of petitioner to release the proceeds of the loan in its entirety, gave them no right
to demand from respondent to comply with their obligations. Indeed, if a party in a
reciprocal contract like a loan does not perform its obligation, the other party cannot be
obliged to perform what is expected of it while the other’s obligation remains unfulfilled. In
other words, the latter party does not incur delay.
G.R. No. 179287. February 1, 2016
PCI JIMMY M. FORTALEZA and SPO2 FREDDIE A. NATIVIDAD, petitioners, vs. HON. RAUL M.
GONZALEZ in his capacity as the Secretary of Justice and ELIZABETH N. OROLA VDA. DE
SALABAS, respondents.
Facts:
This is a case about kidnapping with murder and filed against the petitioners. The case were
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Department of Justice sent a letter directing the
Negros Oriental Provincial Prosecution Office to forward the records for automatic review.
Negros Provincial Prosecution Office without conducting reinvestigation, issued a Resolution
affirming in toto. Petitioners filed Petition for Certiorari but CA dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. The appellate court held that the Secretary of Justice has the power of supervision
and control over prosecutors and therefore can motu proprio take cognizance of a case
pending before or resolved by the Provincial Prosecution Office. Petitioners filed with this
court petition for Review but the court denied the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not judgment of CA on the validity of Secretary of Justice Resolution should be
considered the law of the case pursuant to the law of the case doctrine.
Ruling:
No.
The doctrine of the law of the case applies even if the prior resort to the appellate court is in
a certiorari proceeding, as in the case at bar. If this doctrine were to be applied, the previous
opinion by the Court of Appeals — that the October 2, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice was valid should govern on subsequent appeal. However, the doctrine of the law of
the case requires that the appeal be that of the same parties, and that the pronouncement
by the appellate court be with full opportunity to be heard accorded to said parties.
petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial
court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the
conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr.
Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact, contrary to the guidelines set
forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
Carmen filed a MR, it was denied then she filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, SC directed CA to
decide on Carmen’s case. On review, CA reversed it’s earlier ruling.

G.R. No. 179287 and G.R. No. 182090 do not, however, involve the same parties. The ISSUE:
doctrine of the law of the case does not, therefore, apply in the case at bar.     Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth
under the Santos and Molina cases.
PRECEDENT
HELD:
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
FACTS:
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were
 
classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later
respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the
 On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest
historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on
child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
Elections is enlightening:
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin
 
suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which,
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not disturb the
however, only became manifest thereafter.
calm.” The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the
18th century, “it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used
in litigation.” As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be
to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. But after they were married, petitioner continued to
followed if it were “plainly unreasonable”; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting
drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning
decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the “actual principle or principles necessary for
drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have
the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.”
sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house.
 
Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.
had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists.
According to Hamilton, “strict rules and precedents” are necessary to prevent “arbitrary discretion in the
Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be
courts.” Madison agreed but stressed that “x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering
unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking problem, but Benjamin
or repealing the law, it should be rejected.” Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison
refused to acknowledge the same.
“disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a
precedent.” He added that their ideas “reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a
required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that
respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic
the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.”
clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent
 
person, except when provoked by circumstances.
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by
scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the
Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply
decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare
with the essential obligations of marriage.
decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as
a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone
in our Constitution.
 
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis
and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important
for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In
soothing prose, Brandeis stated: “Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of
stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within
the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided.” In the same
vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.” In contrast, the application of stare decisis on
judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: “after a statute has been
construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and
agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the
Congress itself.” This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts'
limited resources.
 
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts
refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it
leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist
judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.
 
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed
its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which
junked Plessy v. Ferguson's “separate but equal doctrine.” Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law
requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court,
unanimously held that “separate . . . is inherently unequal.” Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of
stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the
Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to
promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original
ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private
respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.
 
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the
factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the
following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
 
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2)
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned
doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
 
To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos
and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no
longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in
Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.
  Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.  
We have not. By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable,
are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts
must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given
case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.
Respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s “defects” were present at the time of the celebration of
their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would
occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any
pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove
such “defects” to be incurable.
*** The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of
the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether
to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that
the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity.
The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that
petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder, while Dr. Obra maintained that
there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr.
Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr.
Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by
another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s)
personal interview with Benjamin’s brothers.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529
Ponente: Justice Brion
Facts:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for
reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated
October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009.
These resolutions delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act,
COMELEC, upon verified complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition if: (1) it fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several
party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions.
Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get
2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a
party-list organization. One of the arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 177548 – MINERO (Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC
cannot apply in the instant controversy.
One of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's.
Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 179271 - BANAT (Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency) vs
COMELEC.
COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely
in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the
2004 elections.
Issue:
Whether the MINERO ruling can be used as a legal basis in delisting PGBI.
Held:
According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA
7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional
or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
First the law is clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain,
clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two separate reasons for delisting.
Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941
and therefore, simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-
participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2%
threshold party-list vote.
What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an
election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a
confused interpretation of the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the
legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or
fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained
application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the
contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the
law.

Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs COMELEC where the 2%
party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 is partly invalidated.
The Court rules that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation
of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and the disqualification for
failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in
light of the BANAT ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941
should be understood and applied under the authority of the Supreme Court to state what
the law is and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established).
The most compelling reason to abandon MINERO and strike it out from ruling case law is that
it was clearly an erroneous application of the law - an application that the principle of
stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence
to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature and to the rule of law in general.
Therefore, the Supreme Court grants PGBI’s petition and accordingly, annul COMELEC
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and
the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration.
PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the May 2010
elections.
Lazatin vs. Desierto  dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman : The Court held that giving
FACTS:
The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-
Affidavit charging petitioners (Lazatin) with Illegal Use of Public Funds.         
 A preliminary investigation was conducted and it was recommened that 14 counts each of
Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be filed
against the petitioners.  Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, 28
Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
 Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners. 
The Office of the Special Prosecutor(OSP) submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution which
recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of
evidence. 
The Ombudsman ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution.  
In a Memorandum, the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the
OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners.  The Ombudsman
adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution and ordering the
prosecution of the subject cases.  The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for
continuation of criminal proceedings.
Petitioners filed the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution
dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and
recommend the filing of proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the
power to prosecute.  They point out that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute
belongs to the OSP, which was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct entity
from the Office of the Ombudsman.   Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the
Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no
power and authority over the OSP.  Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component of the Office of the
Ombudsman, should be struck down for being unconstitutional. 
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
         Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale.   It has long
been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman
prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity.  
The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully
prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph
8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall “exercise such other functions or
duties as may be provided by law.”   
         The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP   under the
Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop.  It was explained, thus:
         x  x  x  Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be
henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, “shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on
the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.”  The underscored phrase
evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under  P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent
amendatory legislation.  It follows then that Congress may remove any of the
Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers,
except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
             Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate
of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may “exercise such
other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law,” it is indubitable
then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the
Office of the Ombudsman.  In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers
granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant
the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as Congress
may deem fit and wise.  This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.  Corporation, the Court expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:
          The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.  More
recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its
ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is “merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of
the Ombudsman” and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is
lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.  The Court's ruling in Acop that
the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the
Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,
where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the
filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP.   It is, therefore,
beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the
grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the
Ombudsman.  parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court,
ISSUE:        
        W/n the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should
be revisited and the principle of stare decisis be set aside.          “[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise,
RULING:
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines. 
It was further explained in Fermin v. People as follows:
          The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents.  It requires
courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. 
That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts
in the land.  The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law
has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. 
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel
         The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice
that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially
the same.   Stare decisis et non quieta movere.  Stand by the decisions and disturb not what
is settled.  Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in
one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different.   It proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.  
Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.  
         The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be
immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn
pronouncements diminished.” Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of
stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.
         In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the
Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case.  They have not
successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the
Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of control and
supervision over the OSP,  to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.  RULING:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.  Partially granted. Deviating from its earlier rule that an ISR activities do not constitute a crime
PLDT vs Alvarez
G.R. No. 179408, March 05, 2014
FACTS:
Philippine Long Distance Company’s ACP Detection Division regularly visits foreign countries
to conduct market research on various prepaid phone cards offered abroad that allow their
users to make overseas calls to PLDT subscribers in the Philippines at a cheaper rate, so as to
prevent or stop network fraud. While in UK, they bought a prepaid card – The Number One
prepaid card – to make test calls, and discovered that During a test call placed at the PLDT–
ACPDD office, the receiving phone reflected a PLDT telephone number (2–8243285) as the
calling number used, as if the call was originating from a local telephone in Metro Manila.
Upon verification with the PLDT’s Integrated Customer Management (billing) System, the
ACPDD learned that the subscriber of the reflected telephone number is Abigail R. Razon
Alvarez, with address at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound, Barangay Don Bosco,
Parañaque City. It further learned that several lines are installed at this address with Abigail
and Vernon R. Razon. Local call tests were conducted then in the country. Moreso, they test
other call cards as well, Unity Card and IDT Supercalling Card, which yield to the same results.
All foreign calls are directed to same local PLDT number belonging to Experto Enterprises,
which when traced, the occupant is still Abigail n that same address in Paranaque.
According to PLDT, the respondents are engaged in a form of network fraud known as
International Simple Resale (ISR) which amounts to theft under the RPC. ISR is a method of
routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae and/or
wave frequencies which are connected directly to the domestic exchange facilities of the
country where the call is destined (terminating country); and, in the process, bypassing the
IGF at the terminating country.
Several Search warrants were then filed for violating PD 401.
Respondent filed a motion to quash but was denied by the RTC. Respondent then filed a
petition for Certiorari and was granted. PLDT filed for a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence this case.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Alvarez is liable for theft.
under Philippine law; the court held that even prior to the passage of the RPC, jurisprudence
is settled that “any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal,
capable of appropriation can be the object of theft.” 40 This jurisprudence, in turn, applied
the prevailing legal meaning of the term “personal property” under the old Civil Code as
“anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real
property).” 41 PLDT’s telephone service or its business of providing this was appropriable
personal property and was, in fact, the subject of appropriation in an ISR operation,
facilitated by means of the unlawful use of PLDT’s facilities.
. It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes
the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR
is an act of “subtraction” penalized under said article.
However, on the Court ruled that Paragraphs 7 to 8 of SW B–l and SW B–2 read as follows:
7. COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any similar equipment or device used for copying
and/or printing data and/or information;
8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar equipment or device used for recording or
storing information; and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment[.]74
The fact that the printers and scanners are or may be connected to the other illegal
connections to the PLDT telephone lines does not make them the subject of the offense or
fruits of the offense, much less could they become a means of committing an offense. What
PD No. 401 punishes is the unauthorized installation of telephone connection without the
previous consent of PLDT. In the present case, PLDT has not shown that connecting printers,
scanners, diskettes or tapes to a computer, even if connected to a PLDT telephone line,
would or should require its prior authorization.
Light Rail Transit Authority vs Noel Pili, et al.
G.R. No. 202047, June 08, 2016
Facts:
LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Executive Order No.
603. It entered into a ten-year operations and management agreement with Meralco Transit
Organization, Inc., a corporation organized under the Corporation Code.
However the Commission on Audit declared the Agreement between LRTA and MTOI void. As
a result LRTA purchased all the shares of stock of MTOI and renamed MTOI to Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. and formally declared Metro as its wholly-owned subsidiary.  FACTS:
Respondents were employees of Metro who have been terminated upon the expiration of
the Agreement. While the rest of the respondents filed cases involving purely monetary
claims in the form of separation pays, balances of separation pays, and other unpaid claims,
respondent Noel B. Pili, in addition to his monetary claims, alleged that he was illegally
dismissed.
Issues:
- Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the money claims of respondents
herein against LRTA;
- Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal claim of
respondent Pili against the LRTA and/or Metro;
- Whether or not the LRTA is liable to the monetary claims of the employees herein.
Held:
The petition has no merit.
1. Yes. The NLRC acquired jurisdiction over LRTA not because of the employer-
employee relationship of the respondents and LRTA (because there is none) but rather
because LRTA expressly assumed the monetary obligations of Metro to its employees.
2. No. The NLRC and Labor Arbiter erred when it took cognizance of such matter.
Petitioners themselves admitted in their complaint that LRTA "is a government
agency organized and existing pursuant to an original charter (Executive Order No. 603)" and
that they are employees of Metro. Pili cannot claim to be employed by LRTA merely on the
bare allegation that the corporate veil must be pierced based on LRTA's ownership of the
shares of stock of Metro.
3. Yes. The application of the doctrine of stare decisis is in order. The basic facts in
this petition are the same as those in the case of LRTA v. Mendoza. Thus, we find
that LRTA is solidarily liable for the monetary claims of respondents, in light of this
Court's findings in said case.
QUINTANAR vs. COCA-COLA
G.R. No. 210565
28 JUNE 2016
Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision & resolution
Justice Mendoza
Petitioners were directly-hired employees of respondent as Route Helpers. After working for
quite some time, they were allegedly transferred as agency workers to several manpower
agencies.
When DOLE conducted an inspection to determine if labor standards were being complied
with, petitioners were declared to be regular employees and that respondent is liable to pay.
Petitioners were thereafter dismissed on various dates, and their claims settled later.
However, the settlement did not include the issues on reinstatement and payment of CBA
benefits. Hence, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Respondent alleged that
there was no ER-EE relationship between them.
LA declared that petitioners were illegally dismissed, and ordered respondent to reinstate
them and to pay full backwages. NLRC affirmed the LA decision.
CA reversed & set aside NLRC decision. The appellate court held that the manpower agency is
an independent contractor that exercises control over the petitioners.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not an ER-EE relationship exists between the petitioners and respondent.
(2) Whether the manpower agencies are labor-only contractors.
RULING:
The Court held that petitioners still enjoyed an ER-EE relationship with respondent since
becoming employees of manpower agencies. To determine whether an employment should
be considered regular or casual, the applicable test is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of
the employer.
It has been established in jurisprudence that Route Helpers are regular employees of
respondent. The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for their
services clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct
of the business or trade of petitioner company.
Furthermore, it has already been established in jurisprudence that the manpower services
were a labor-only contractor since the work performed by the “supplied” employees were
indispensable to the principal business of respondent. In fact, the manpower agencies were
found to not have substantial capital or investment or tool to engage in job contracting.
Finally, the Court determined the existence of an ER-EE relationship between the parties
since the contract of service between the respondent and the manpower services showed
that the former indeed exercised the power of control over the complainants therein.
RES JUDICATA
G.R. No. 150470, August 6, 2008
FELIPE AND VICTORIA LAYOS VS FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND
DEVELOPMENT, INC.
FACTS: In a previous case, Fil-Estate Golf (FEGDI) was the developer of a
golf course in Laguna along with La Paz who provided the properties
registered in its name. Thereafter, Layos filed for injunction against FEGDI
and alleged that he is the legal owner of the lands in question, and further
alleged an intrusion on the part of FEGDI and La Paz. Layos filed two
different cases in two separate courts, praying for the same thing. Complaint
was dismissed for forum-shopping.
Only months after instituting the injunction cases, Layos filed a
complaint for quieting of title against La Paz. Layos alleges that La Paz
“grabbed” his land and entered it without his consent. His main proof was the
Original Certificate Title No. 239, issued in his name. La Paz argues that
Layos never owned or possessed the land in question an in fact, it got the
lands from the government and it was issued the assailed Transfer
Certificate of Titles. The court ruled in favor of La Paz and declared their
titles to be indefeasible and found the OCT of Layos to be spurious.
Layos filed an action to reconstitute his title and many others
opposed. The court again denied this, reiterating that OCT 239 of Layos is
forged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Layos is entitled to reconstitution.
HELD:No. Layos did not have a valid title to the said property because the
RTC ruled that it was forged.
Reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and
within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the
instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. For an order of reconstitution to issue, the following
elements must be present:
1) the certificate of title has been lost or destroyed;
2) the petitioner is the registered owner or has an interest
therein; and
3) the certificate of title is in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed.
Courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly
issued subsisting titles in the name of their duly registered owners.
When the court relied on the previous judgment in the injunction
cases that the OCT of Layos was forged, it did NOT entertain a collateral
attack when it dismissed the reconstitution case.
G.R. No. 173590 : December 9, 2013
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and CRISANTO
G. DE GUZMAN,Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
De Guzman was charged for dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest as Postal Inspector at the Postal Services Office and eventually was relieved
from his post
Since the Postal Services Office was then a line-agency of the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC), the charge against De Guzman was
forwarded to the Investigation Security and Law Enforcement Staff (ISLES).
However, the ISLES, through a Memorandum, Director Reyes recommended that De
Guzman be exonerated from the charges against him due to lack of merit. The said
recommendation was later approved by DOTC Asst. Secretary Jardiniano.
RA 7354 orthe Postal Service Act of 1992, was passed. Pursuant thereto, the Postal
Services Office under the DOTC was abolished, and all its powers, duties, and rights
were transferred to the PPC.Likewise, officials and employees of the Postal Services
Office were absorbed by the PPC.
Subsequently, De Guzman, who had by then become Chief Postal Service Officer,
was formally charged and later on found guilty byPPC, for the same acts of
dishonesty, gross violation of regulations, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and the Anti-graft law thereby dismissing him from
service.
He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. A second MR was filed which
was resolved in his favour although he was found guilty of the charges, since the
complainant was the PPC, which had its own charter and was no longer under the
DOTC. Thus, the ISLES Memorandum which endorsed his exoneration and dismissal
of the complaints against him was merely recommendatory. As such, the filing of
the formal charge was an obvious rejection of said recommendation.
De Guzmans motion for reconsideration was denied initially but the motion was, at
the same time, considered as an appeal to the PPC Board of Directors. Thus, in a
Resolution dated May 10, 2005, PG Rama pointed out that, being the third MR filed
by De Guzman, the same was in gross violation of the rules of procedure recognized
by the PPC, as well as of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which both allowed
only one (1) such motion to be entertained. It was further held that res judicata was
unavailing as the decision exonerating De Guzman was ―only a ruling after a fact-
finding investigation. Hence, the same could not be considered as a dismissal on the
merits but rather, a dismissal made by an investigative body which was not clothed
with judicial or quasi-judicial power.
Meanwhile, before the issuance of the Resolution dated May 10, 2005, De Guzman
elevated his case on March 12, 2005 to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari
and mandamus.
OnJune 10, 2005, De Guzman appealed the Resolution dated May 10, 2005 before
the PPC Board. Almost a year later, the Board issued a Resolution denying the
appeal and affirming with finality his dismissal from service. The motion for
reconsideration subsequently filed was likewise denied.
OnApril 4, 2006, the CA reversed the PPC Resolutions. It held that the revival of the
case against De Guzman constituted grave abuse of discretion considering the clear
and unequivocal content of the Memorandum duly signed by Asec. Jardiniano that
the complaint against De Guzman was already dismissed.
Aggrieved, PPC moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied hence, the
instant petition.
Meanwhile, on July 26, 2006, De Guzman filed an appeal of the PPC Boards
Resolutions with the CSCwhich was, however, dismissed.
ISSUES:
Whether De Guzman unjustifiably failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to him;
Whether De Guzman engaged in forum-shopping; and
Whether the investigation conducted by the DOTC, through the ISLES, bars the filing
of the subsequent charges by PPC.
HELD: The Petition is meritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW - Res judicata
The investigation conducted by the ISLES, which "provides, performs, and
coordinates security, intelligence, fact-finding, and investigatory functions for the
Secretary, the Department, and Department-wide official undertakings,"was
intended precisely for the purpose of determining whether or not aprima faciecase
against De Guzman existed. Due to insufficiency of evidence, however, no formal
charge was filed against De Guzman and the complaint against him was dismissed
by Asst. Secretary Jardiniano.
In order thatres judicatamay bar the institution of a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the
first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and
(iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits when it determines
the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of
formal, technical or dilatory objections; or when the judgment is rendered after a
determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,
G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013.
In this case, there was no judgment on the merits, the dismissal of the complaint
against De Guzman in the Memorandum of Asec. Jardiniano wasa result of a fact-
finding investigation only for purposes of determining whether aprima faciecase
exists and a formal charge for administrative offenses should be filed. This being the
case, no rights and liabilities of the parties were determined therein with finality.
Hence, the Court holds that PPC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it revived
the case against De Guzman despite the previous dismissal thereof by Asec.
Jardiniano. Since said dismissal was not a judgment on the merits, the doctrine
ofres judicatadoes not apply.
In fine, due to the errors of the CA as herein detailed, the Court hereby grants the
present petition and accordingly reverses and sets aside the farmer's dispositions.
The Resolutions dated November 23, 2004 and January 6, 2005 of the PPC ordering
De Guzman's dismissal from the service are thus reinstated.
The petition is granted.
RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD VIRAY, Petitioners, -
versus - SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA USI, Respondents.
G.R. No. 192486               November 21, 2012
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The case involves a piece of land, lot no. 733, registered under the name of
Ellen and Moses Mendoza. The said lot was subdivided to 6 parts by Engr.Fajardo but
was not officially approved by the LMB. On, April 29, 1986, Mendoza executed two
separate deeds of absolute sale, the first, transferring Lot 733-F to Jesus Carlo Gerard
Viray (Jesus Viray), and the second deed conveying Lot 733-A to spouses AvelinoViray
and Margarita Masangcay (Sps. Viray).
The aforementioned conveyances notwithstanding, Mendoza, Emerenciana
M. Vda.deMallari (Vda. de Mallari) and respondent spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi
(Sps. Usi or the Usis), as purported co-owners of Lot 733, executed on August 20,
1990 a Subdivision Agreement, or the 1st subdivision agreement (1st SA) where lot
no. 733 was divided to 3 lots: Lot 733-A, Lot 733-B and Lot 733-C. Lot 733-C was
further subdivided to 13 lots under a 2 nd subdivision agreement (2nd SA) where herein
respondents appeared as owners of some the further subdivided lots covering a part
of the lot sold to herein petitioners.
As to be expected, the foregoing overlapping transactions involving the
same property or portions thereof spawned several suits and countersuits between
petitioner and respondents herein.
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the petition of the Sps. Usi but was
reversed by the CA on appeal, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the two (2) subdivision agreements dated August 20, 1990 and April
5, 1991, respectively, partake of a bona fide and legally binding partition contracts or
arrangements among co-owners that validly effectuated the transfer of the subject
lots to respondent spouses Usi?
HELD: NO.
The earlier sale of Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) on April 29, 1986 was valid
and effective conveyances of said portions of Lot Decision G.R. No. 192486 15 733.
The subsequent transfers to the Sps. Usi of substantially the same portions of Lot 733
accomplished through the subdivision agreements constitute in effect double sales of
those portions.
Partition, in general, is the separation, division, and assignment of a thing held in
common by those to whom it may belong. Contrary to the finding of the CA, the
subdivision agreements forged by Mendoza and her alleged co-owners were not for
the partition of pro-indiviso shares of co-owners of Lot 733 but were actually 35 Heirs
of Cesar Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 15678, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 409, 445;
citing Noceda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999, 313 SCRA 504,
517 and Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122904, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 165, 171.
Decision G.R. No. 192486 16 conveyances, disguised as partitions, of portions of Lot
733 specifically Lots 733-A and 733-B, and portions of the subsequent subdivision of
Lot 733-C.
There is simply nothing in the records to demonstrate how the Sps. Usi became co-
owners of Lot 733 before or after the death of Moses Mendoza. Elsewise put, no
evidence had been adduced to show how the alleged interest of the Sps. Usi, as co-
owner, came about, except for the bare assertions in the 1st and 2nd SAs that they
co-owned Lot 733 and Lot 733-C.
In light of the convergence of the foregoing disposed-of cases, there can be no
question as to the ownership of the Sps. Viray and Vda. deViray (vice Jesus Viray) over
the specified and delineated portions of Lot 733 which they purchased for value from
Mendoza. And Mendoza, as vendor, was bound to transfer the ownership of and
deliver, as well as warrant, the thing which is the object of the sale.
From the facts, there is no valid sale from Mendoza to respondents Usi. The parties
did not execute a valid deed of sale conveying and transferring the lots in question to
respondents. What they rely on are two subdivision agreements which do not
explicitly chronicle the transfer of said lots to them. Under the 1st SA, all that can be
read is the declaration that respondents, together with others, are the “sole and
exclusive owners” of the lots subject of said agreement. Per the 2nd SA, it simply
replicates the statement in the 1st SA that respondents are “sole and exclusive
undivided co-owners” with the other parties. While respondents may claim that the
SAs of 1990 and 1991 are convenient conveying vehicles Mendoza resorted to in
disposing portions of Lot 733 under the Galang Plan, the Court finds that said SAs are
not valid legal conveyances of the subject lots due to nonexistent prestations
pursuant to Article 1305 which prescribes “a meeting of minds between two persons
whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render
some service.”
Given the above perspective, the Sps. Viray and Vda.deViray (vice Jesus Viray) have, as
against the Sps. Usi, superior rights over Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F or portions thereof.
G.R. No. 146980             September 2, 2003
LUZ E. TAGANAS and VALENTIN G. TABBAL, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. MELITON G. EMUSLAN AND STANDARD INSURANCE CO.,
INC., respondents.
CORONA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners assailing the
September 12, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals upholding the twin
orders2 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 47.
The first order denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss, while the second denied their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents follow.
On July 11, 1997, a road accident involving four vehicles occurred along the national
highway in Barangay San Jose, San Joaquin Sur, Agoo, La Union.
The vehicles involved were a "Jack and Yolly" minibus, an Izusu Elf van owned by
Josalde and Zenaida Junto, a Petron tanker truck owned and operated by petitioner
Luz Taganas and a Shell tanker truck.
According to the records, the minibus, the Juntos’ Isuzu Elf van and the petitioner’s
Petron tanker truck were traveling in that order on one side of the road. Going the
opposite direction on the other side of the road was the Shell tanker truck. The Isuzu
Elf tried to overtake the minibus but collided head-on instead with the Shell tanker
truck, after which it swerved back to its lane, this time bumping the rear of the
minibus. The Petron tanker truck at the end of the column was not able to stop and in
turn rammed the rear of the Isuzu Elf van.
The owners of the Elf van, the Juntos, filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Luz Taganas and Valentin Tabbal, the owner and driver respectively of the
Petron tanker truck. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-02055-D.
On the other hand, private respondent, Standard Insurance Co., Inc, insurer of the
Shell tanker truck, filed a separate complaint for damages against both the Juntos
and petitioners Taganas and Tabbal, docketed as Civil Case No. 6754.
On March 10, 1999, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 6754 on the
grounds of prematurity of action and multiplicity of suits.
On April 5, 1999, Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was decided holding the owners of the
Izusu Elf van (the Juntos) liable for the damage sustained by petitioner Taganas’
Petron tanker truck.
On April 26 1999, the trial court, in Civil Case No. 6754, denied petitioners’ motion to
dismiss.
On May 10, 1999 petitioners filed a "Second Motion to Dismiss," this time invoking res
judicata. In addition to said motion, petitioners likewise moved for the dismissal of the
Juntos’ cross-claim against them.
On August 5, 1999, the trial court, in its first assailed order, granted the motion to
dismiss the cross-claim but denied the second motion to dismiss. The pertinent
portion read:
x x x . A perusal of the Decision rendered by the RTC in Dagupan City would
disclose that all the first three requisites or conditions of res judicata are
present. It is the final condition requiring identity of parties, of subject matter
and causes of action that there is no coincidence.
Plaintiff insurance company was never a party in the case before the RTC of
Dagupan City. Its cause of action is legal subrogation to the rights of the insured,
whose vehicle was damaged in the vehicular accident involving the vehicles of the
defendants. Neither was the insured involved in the litigation before the Dagupan City
RTC so as to bar the plaintiff insurer, who merely stepped into the shoes of the
insured party, so to speak.
On the basis also of the principle of res inter alios acta, the proceedings before the
RTC of Dagupan City cannot affect the rights of those not parties thereto.
The Court, however, finds justification and merit in movants’ MOTION TO DISMISS
CROSS CLAIM. It is in respect to the cross-claim of defendants ZENAIDA JUNTO
and JOSALDE JUNTO against the other defendants TAGANAS and TABBAL that the
doctrine of res judicata perfectly applies to bar their cross-claim. To allow the cross-
claim to prosper would relitigate the same issue that has already been finally decided.
It would not put to an end the litigation of the same parties before the Dagupan City
RTC. The doctrine of res judicata, in fact is founded on the public policy that it is the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and that a party should
not be vexed twice for the same cause (LINZAG vs. CA, Ibid).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court rules:
1. The SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS filed by defendants LUZ TAGANAS
and VALENTIN TABBAL is DENIED for lack of merit.
2. The MOTION TO DISMISS the CROSS-CLAIM of defendants JUNTO is
GRANTED on the ground of res judicata.3
On August 30, 1999, petitioners filed a partial motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied in the second assailed order dated September 13, 1999.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari but
it too was dismissed:
Consequently, the principle of res judicata that would operate as an absolute
bar to a subsequent action does not apply to the case at bench. The
decision rendered by the regional trial court of Dagupan City is conclusive
only as between petitioners and the Juntos but not to herein private
respondent who has a different cause of action.
The decision rendered by the regional trial court of Dagupan City in Civil
Case No. 97-02055-D is, therefore, not a bar to the complaint filed by private
respondent before the regional trial court of Urdaneta City.
Concluding, we hold that respondent judge did not commit any reversible
error nor grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.4
Hence, the instant petition wherein petitioners assign the following errors:
I
IN NOT DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS ON
THE BASIS OF THE CONCLUSIVE FACT THAT THE JUNTOS AS THE
OTHER DEFENDANTS IN THIS INSTANT CASE WERE ADJDUGED IN A
PREVIOUS CASE AS THE WRONGDOER OR WHOSE FAULT AND
NEGLIGENCE CAUSED THE VEHICULAR MISHAPS SIMILARLY
INVOLVED IN SUCH PREVIOUS CASE AND IN THIS SUBSEQUENT
CASE, PURSUANT TO THE LAW ON SUBROGATION (ART. 2207 OF THE
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)
II
IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA IN THIS
INSTANT CASE IN THE LIGHT OF THE STATE OF FACTS ALREADY
ADJUDGED WITH CERTAINTY AND FINALITY BY THE COURT, IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE RULINGS OR LEGAL PRECEPTS ON
THE MATTER.
Stated otherwise, petitioners, invoking the doctrine of res judicata, contend that since
the RTC in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D already decided with finality that they were not
liable for the vehicular accident, private respondent no longer had any cause of action
against them.
It is true that the two cases could have been properly consolidated. But since Civil
Case No. 97-02055-D was already near its conclusion when Civil Case No. 6754 was
filed, consolidation was no longer possible through no fault of the parties.
The Court, however, finds petitioner’s argument specious.
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.5
The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be
final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there must
be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and
cause of action.6
For res judicata to apply, all the above essential requisites must exist.
Since, the decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D (declaring the
Juntos liable for the damage sustained by petitioners) had become final, there existed
a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioners rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. But this was only insofar as Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was
concerned.
Civil Case No. 6754 was an entirely different story. The Court agrees with both the
trial court (in Civil Case No. 6754) and the appellate court that there was neither
identity of parties nor identity of subject matter, much less identity of cause of action
between Civil Case No. 97-02055-D and Civil Case No. 6754.
There is identity of parties where the parties in both actions are the same or there is
privity between them or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity.7
Clearly, there was, in the two cases, no identity of parties. The owner of the Shell
tanker truck was never a party in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D. Neither was the private
respondent insurance company a party therein. Since private respondent insurance
company, whose cause of action was legal subrogation to the rights of the owner of
the Shell tanker, was not a party in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D, it was not barred from
filing Civil Case No. 6754. Res judicata clearly did not apply to it.
On the issue of identity of subject matter, the subject of an action is defined as the
matter or thing with respect to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which a
wrong has been done.8
In Civil Case No. 97-02055-D, the subject matter was the collision between the Isuzu
Elf van owned by the Juntos and the Petron tanker truck owned and operated by
petitioner Luz Taganas. However, in Civil Case No. 6754, the subject matter was the
collision between the Shell tanker truck insured by private respondent insurance
company and the Isuzu Elf van of the Juntos which was rear-ended by the Petron
tanker truck of petitioner.
Finally, the Rules of Court defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another.9 Records reveal that Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was
filed by the Juntos against petitioners for the damage caused by petitioners’ Petron
tanker truck to the Juntos’ Isuzu Elf van. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 6754 was
filed by private respondent insurance company against both petitioners and the
Juntos arising from the damage suffered by the Shell tanker truck insured by it.
The Court therefore finds no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. The
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was conclusive only as
between the petitioners and the Juntos, and not as to private respondent.
Consequently, the principle of res judicata did not apply.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
C-A G.R. SP No. 55500 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan(2015); Brion, C.J.
G.R. No. 173148
Brief Facts: Degayo and Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. were contesting the ownership of a
disputed area adjoining the Jalaud River: Degayo was claiming ownership on the theory that
the disputed area was an accretion to her own property; on the other hand, Magbanua-
Dinglasan, et al. were claiming ownership on the theory that the disputed area was an
abandoned riverbed which accrued to them, as the owners of the land where the new riverbed
ran through. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. filed a complaint for ownership against Degayo’s
tenants (CIVIL CASE NO. 1). After denying Degayo’s motion to intervene, the RTC
eventually decided in favor of Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. – which decision attained finality.
Meanwhile, Degayo filed a separate case for ownership with damages against Magbanua-
Dinglasan, et al. (CIVIL CASE NO. 2). Although the RTC decided in favor of Degayo, the
CA – on appeal – reversed, on the ground that Civil Case No. 1 constituted res judicata, and
after taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 1. The Supreme Court DENIED the petition
for review on certiorari filed by Degayo.
Doctrine: The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it
fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent
to proof.
General Rule (contents of records of other cases): courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice – even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge.
 Exceptions:
o Close connection with the matter in controversy.
o To determine whether or not the pending case is moot.
FACTS:
Antecedents
1. Controversy between riparian owners (Jalaud River):
1.1. Degayo’s lot: used to be bounded on the southwest by the Jalaud River
1.2. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.’s lot: opposite side of the Jalaud River
2. In the 1970s, the Jalaud River steadily changed its course and moved southwards.
2.1. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.’s lot decresed in size while the banks adjacent to
Degayo’s lot gradually increased in land area.
2.1.1. Half of the disputed area, 52,528 sq.m. big, was made up of the original
abandoned river bed, while the other half was made up of the resurfaced area
of Magbanua-Dinglasan et al.’s lot.
2.2. Degayo and her tenants: believed that the disputed area was an ACCRETION to
Degayo’s lot – the tenants began cultivating and tilling the area with corn and
tobacco.
2.3. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.: believed that the disputed area was an
ABANDONED RIVERBED – thus, rightfully belongs to them, to compensate for
the portion of their lot over which the Jalaud River presently ran.
The Case
3. (CIVIL CASE NO. 1)
3.1. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. filed a complaint for ownership and damages
against Degayo’s tenants (RTC of Iloilo).
3.1.1. Degayo sought to intervene – her motion was denied.
3.1.1.1. NOTE: Degayo never filed anything to question the interlocutory
order denying her motion to intervene.
3.2. Notwithstanding the denial of her motion to intervene (and as Civil Case No. 2 was
pending), Degayo participated in the proceedings as a witness for the defense
(her tenants).
3.2.1. During her direct examination, she testified on the same matters and raised
the same arguments she alleged in her complaint in Civil Case No. 2.
3.3. RTC: rendered a decision in favor of Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.
3.3.1. Although Degayo’s tenants filed an appeal, they failed to file an appeal brief
– causing the dismissal of their appeal.
3.3.2. The decision became final and executory on 6 August 1999.
4. (CIVIL CASE NO. 2)
4.1. Degayo filed a complaint for declaration of ownership with damages (RTC of
Iloilo).
4.1.1. Degayo stressed that the disputed area was an accretion to her lot.
4.2. RTC: found in favor of Degayo – declared the disputed area as an accretion of
Degay’s lot.
4.2.1. After the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration, Magbanua-
Dinglasan, et al. filed an appeal w/ the CA
4.3. CA: granted the appeal and reversed and set aside the RTC.
4.3.1. The CA noted that the disputed area was an abandoned riverbed that
rightfully belonged to Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.
4.3.2. ***The CA also noted that the decision in Civil Case No. 1 was
CONCLUSIVE to the title of the thing (Conclusiveness of Judgment).
4.4. After the CA denied her motion for reconsideration, Degayo filed a petition for
Review on Certiorari (R45) with the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Does the Decision in Civil Case No. 1 constitute res judicata? (YES.)
2. ***Was the CA correct in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 1? (YES.)***
RATIO:
1. The Decision in Civil Case No. 1 constituted res judicata.
Res judicata: “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment.”
 Final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of
the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points on matters
determined in the former suit.”
 Parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. (There
should be an end to litigation.)
o Practical concern: overflowing dockets, scarce judicial resources,
efficiency. (Salud v. CA)
o Rights and liabilities once established should remain fixed.
 Most important purpose of res judicata: provide repose for
both the party litigatnts and the public.
  Res judicata thus encourages reliance on judicial decision, bars
vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other
disputes.
Case at bar:
 Civil Case No. 1: adjudicated on the merits, attained finality, decided by competent
court.
 Identity of parties in both actions – absolute identity of parties is NOT required,
shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of res judicata.
SC: agreed with the uniform view of the CA, on the application of conclusiveness of judgment
to the present case.
2. ***The CA may take judicial notice of Civil Case No. 1.***
The SC stated that “[t]he taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience
for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is
equivalent to proof.” (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal)
General Rule (contents of records of other cases): courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice – even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before
the same judge.
 Exceptions:
o Close connection with the matter in controversy.
o To determine whether or not the pending case is moot.
Moreover, Degayo’s objection to the action of the CA is merely technical:
 Degayo herself repeatedly referred to Civil Case No. 1 in her pleadings, her
appellee’s brief before the CA, and her petition for review before the SC.
o Complaint: “motion to intervene in [Civil Case No. 1], which was denied
by the Court…”
o Appellee’s brief: “[Civil Case No. 1] was for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages…”
 Existence of Civil Case No. 1 was jointly stipulated by the parties and
mentioned by the court a quo in its decision.
SC: “Under the circumstances, the CA could certainly take judicial notice of the finality of a
judgment in Civil Case No. 16047. There was no sense in relitigating issues that have already
been passed upon in a previous civil case. That was all that was done by the CA in decreeing
the dismissal.”
Justice Paras on Judicial Notice (Republic v. CA):
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of
another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and
of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the
record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or
involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case between
different parties in the same court.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioner
ESPERANZA SUPAPO et al vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS et al.
G.R. No. 198356 April 20,2015
FACTS:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and
Susan de Jesus with the MeTC of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel the
respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, and
registered under petitioners’ name. The land has an assessed value of
Php39,980.00. Petitioners did not reside on the lot but made sure to visit at least
twice a year.
During one of their visits, they saw two houses built on the lot without their
knowledge and permission. They learned that respondents occupied both houses.
They demanded the surrender of the lot by bringing the dispute before the
appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a certificate to file action for
failure of the parties to settle amicably.
The Spouses Supapo filed a criminal case against the respondents for violating PD
No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law). The trial court convicted the respondents. On appeal,
the CA dismissed the case because Congress enacted R.A. No. 8368 repealing the
Anti-Squatting Law. Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for
the execution of the respondents’ civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the
subject lot. The RTC granted the motion and issued the writ of execution.
Respondents moved to quash it but the RTC denied their motion. They filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA granted it and ruled that with the repeal of
the Anti-Squatting Law, the criminal and civil liabilities of respondents were
extinguished, but it also said that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper
action for recovery of possession. Thus, the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for
accion publiciana.
After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses
for preliminary hearing and argued that there is another action pending between
the same parties, the complaint is barred by statute of limitations, and the
petitioners’ cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary
hearing. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari of respondents because the
action has prescribed and accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTC. It likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision; hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed.
3. Whether or not the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
HELD:
1. YES. Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is plenary. However, R.A. No. 7691 granted the MeTC,
MTC, and MCTC the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear actions where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed Php20,000 ot Php50,000 if the
property is located in Metro Manila. Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value. It is its fair
market value multiplied by the assessment level.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the
subject lot located in Metro Manila is Php39,980. Thus, the MeTC properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
2. NO. Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Even it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of
the other persons’ occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property
at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated.
3. NO. Res judicata is not present in the case because:
a. First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint was prosecuted in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The accion publiciana was filed in the name
of the Spouses Supapo.
b. There is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution
of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to
recover possession of the subject property.
c. There is no identity of causes of action. The People of the Philippines filed the
case to protect governmental interests, while the spouses filed the accion
publiciana to protect their proprietary interests.
PETITION GRANTED.
DELA ROSA LINER VS. BORELA
GR NO: 207286
DATE: July 29, 2015
Facts: On September 23, 2011, respondents Calixto Borela, bus driver, and Estelo
Amarille, conductor, filed separate complaints (later consolidated) against
petitioners Dela Rosa Liner, Inc., a public transport company for
underpayment/non- payment of salaries and other benefits, and violation of Wage
Order Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16.
In a motion dated October 26, 2011, the petitioners asked the labor arbiter
to dismiss the case for forum shopping. They alleged that on September 28, 2011,
the CA 13th Division disposed of a similar case between the parties after they
entered into a compromise agreement which covered all claims and causes of
action they had against each other in relation to the respondents' employment. The
respondents opposed the motion, contending that the causes of action in the
present case are different from the causes of action settled in the case the
petitioners cited
LA: upheld the petitioners' position and dismissed the complaint on grounds of
forum shopping.
NLRC: held that the respondents could not have committed forum shopping as
there was no identity of causes of action between the two cases.
CA: found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC ruling that the respondents did
not commit forum shopping when they filed their second complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second complaint is barred by the rule on forum
shopping or by the principle of res judicata.
HELD: NO. Contrary to the petitioners' submission, respondents' second complaint,
a money claim, is not a "similar case" to the first complaint. Thus, the filing of the
second complaint did not constitute forum shopping and the judgment in the first
case is not a res judicata ruling that bars the second complaint
The first complaint charged the petitioners with illegal dismissal and unfair
labor practice; while the second complaint was based on the petitioners' alleged
nonpayment/underpayment of their salaries and monetary benefits, and violation
of several wage orders. As the CA aptly cited, the elements of forum shopping are:
(1) identity of parties; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. We concur
with the CA that forum shopping and res judicata are not applicable in the present
case. There is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and the judgment
rendered in the previous action will not amount to res judicata in the action now
under consideration. There is also no identity of causes of action in the first
complaint and in the second complaint because the same facts or evidence would
not support both actions.
We likewise cannot accept the compromise agreement's application "to all
claims and damages or losses either party may have against each other whether
those damages or losses are known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen." This
coverage is too sweeping and effectively excludes any claims by the respondents
against the petitioners, including those that by law and jurisprudence cannot be
waived without appropriate consideration such as nonpayment or underpayment of
overtime pay and wages.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 
vs.
BENJAMIN GUERRERO,  decision dated February 12, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court,
G.R. No. 133168
FACTS: Sometime in December 1964, respondent filed with the
Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous
Sales Application which was later on approved. On 1983, one
Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming
that respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud, false
statement of facts and/or omission of material facts considering that
the awarded land is where her house is situated and where she has
been residing since 1961. An investigation was conducted by the
BOL., after which the the said office ordered for the dismissal of the
said protest. On MR, the President, …, ordered that the case be
remanded to the DENR. DENR then found out that the land in
question is under ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION of Marcelo
Bustamante (husband of Angelina Bustamante).
Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of
Lands [on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines] instituted the
instant action [Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical
Description of OCT No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero] on
November 7, 1989.
On April 6, 1990, the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition
alleging among other things, that the RTC of Quezon City was without
jurisdiction over the Director of Lands’ petition and that the said
petition was defective in form and substance. However, said motion
was dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 13, 1995, the RTC, on the postulate that petitioner Republic
failed to prove its allegation that respondent obtained the sales patent
and the certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation,
rendered judgment finding for the latter. The trial court likewise ruled
that the original certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) in the name of
respondent acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after the
expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of registration.
Consequently, petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which, in a
rationalizing as follows:
It is a settled rule that a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant
or patent involving public lands is as conclusive and indefeasible as
any other certificate of title issued upon private lands in ordinary or
cadastral registration proceedings. The effect of registration of a
homestead or any other similar patent and the issuance of a
certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title
to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had been determined
by final decree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutely
conclusive and indisputable.
In the same way, therefore, that a decree of registration may be
reviewed or reopened within one year after the entry thereof, upon a
charge of actual fraud, a patent awarded in accordance with the
Public Land Law may be reviewed within one year from the date of
the order for the issuance of the patent also on the ground of actual
fraud.
xxx xxx
x Petitioner argues in esse that respondent procured his sales patent
xxx there is no showing … that at the time the [respondent] applied for
his miscellaneous sales patent, there were third persons who had
been in occupation of the land applied for. While subsequent survey
documents, prepared as a consequence of the protest filed by the
Bustamentes, report the possession of the Bustamantes of a portion
of the land, and the erection of their house thereon, these reports do
not indicate if such structures were existing at the time the application
of the [respondent] was filed in 1964.
There is no support, therefore, to the submission that the [respondent]
was guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales
patent, and subsequently, OCT No. 0-28.4 (Words in bracket added)
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but
the same was denied by the appellate court in its resolution of March
23, 1998.5
Hence, this recourse, petitioner Republic contending that the
appellate court erred in holding -
I. That a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or
patent involving public lands is conclusive and indefeasible
despite the fact that respondent’s title was procured through
fraud and misrepresentation.
II. That there is no basis for the submission that respondent
was guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition of his
miscellaneous sales patent despite the final ruling of the Office
of the President from which ruling respondent did not appeal.
III. That the Director of Lands cannot raise the issue of
possession of a third person of the land, or a portion thereof,
after the award and issuance of the patent to the applicant
despite the obvious fact that the protest was filed within one
year from the issuance of patent.6
and certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation. To support
its basic posture, petitioner points to the verification survey conducted
by Engr. Ernesto Erive of the DENR, which, to petitioner, argues for
the proposition that respondent’s entitlement to a public land award
should have been limited to a 91-square meter area instead of the
174 square meters eventually granted.
On the other hand, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which
he secured pursuant to a sales patent is conclusive and indefeasible
under the Torrens system of registration. As such, his title can no
longer be altered, impugned or cancelled.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the essential issue raised in
this Petition ― the presence of fraud ― is factual. As a general rule,
this Court does not review factual matters, as only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court.
And as the Court has consistently held, factual findings of trial courts,
when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on
this Court,7 save when the judgment of the appellate court is based on
a misapprehension of facts or factual inferences manifestly incorrect
or when that court overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 8Obviously, petitioner
is invoking these exceptions toward having the Court review the
factual determinations of the CA.
The basic issue in this case turns on whether or not petitioner has
proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent procured
Miscellaneous Sales Patent (MSP) No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28
through fraud and misrepresentation.
It bears to stress that the property in question, while once part of the
lands of the public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales
arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public
land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act
No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens
system of registration, the government is required to issue an official
certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the
owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or
reserves.9 As it were, the Torrens system aims to obviate possible
conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of
the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of
inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner, the system gives
him complete peace of mind that he would be secured in his
ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over
the covered land.10
Section 122 of Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands … belonging to the Government of
the [Republic of the Philippines] are alienated, granted, or conveyed
to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become
registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the
instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the
Government to cause such instrument before its delivery to the
grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where
the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and
conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other
cases of registered land, and an owner’s duplicate certificate issued to
the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from the
Government shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land,
but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the
grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds
to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act
to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act
registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the
province where the land lies. xxx. (Words in bracket added)
Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496
and becomes registered land. Time and again, we have said that a
Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in
favor of the person whose name appears thereon.11
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person
deprived of land to institute an action to reopen or revise a decree of
registration obtained by actual fraud. Section 38 of Act No. 496 says
so:
SEC. 38. ― xxx. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and
quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following
section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including
the [Republic of the Philippines] and all the branches thereof, …. Such
decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, minority, or
other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding
in any court for reversing judgments or decrees, subject, however, to
the right of any person deprived of the land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by actual fraud, to file in the
proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] a petition for
review of the decree of registration within one year after entry of the
decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or
certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be
incontrovertible. xxx. (Emphasis and words in bracket supplied)
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud
proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive
fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon
public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act
is not done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury
upon other persons.12
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as
intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the
original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to
deprive parties of their day in court and thus prevent them from
asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the
applicant.13
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and
extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is contemplated by the law as
a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is
granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud
consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not
contested when in fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that
there are no other claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party
entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an application; or in
misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the
applicant causing the former to withdraw his application. In all these
examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme
of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court
or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects
and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.14
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be
granted where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is
intrinsic and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided.
Thus, we have underscored the denial of relief where it appears that
the fraud consisted in the presentation at the trial of a supposed
forged document, or a false and perjured testimony, or in basing the
judgment on a fraudulent compromise agreement, or in the alleged
fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel which prevented the
petitioner from properly presenting the case.15
Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to
justify a review of the decree constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. It
has not adduced adequate evidence that would show that respondent
employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the
corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove
that it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question
and from properly presenting its case by reason of such fraud. In fact,
other than its peremptory statement in its petition filed before the trial
court that "the patentee, Benjamin Guerrero, obtained the above
indicated sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or
omission of material facts,"16 petitioner did not specifically allege how
fraud was perpetrated by respondent in procuring the sales patent
and the certificate of title. Nor was any evidence proffered to
substantiate the allegation. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure
of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a
transaction bears the burden of proof.17 The circumstances evidencing
fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It
may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as
many different ways.18 Thus, the law requires that fraud be
established, not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and
convincing evidence.19
Petitioner relies heavily on the verification survey report 20 which stated
that respondent Guerrero was entitled to only 91 square meters of the
subject lot instead of 174 square meters which was awarded to him.
There is, however, no proof that the area eventually awarded to
respondent was intentionally and fraudulently increased. It was never
proven that respondent was a party to any fraud that led to the award
of a bigger area of 174 square meters instead of 91 square meters.
Petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error which may
have been committed by its agents who had surveyed the subject
property nor had petitioner offered a sensible explanation as to the
reason for such discrepancy. Thus, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions must be respected.
This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales patent
over the subject lot was made in accordance with the procedure laid
down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act.21 Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation
should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the veracity of
the material facts set out in the application. 22 The law also requires
sufficient notice to the municipality and barrio where the land is
located in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present
their claims.23
In the instant case, records reveal that on December 22, 1964, a day
after respondent filed his miscellaneous sales application, an actual
investigation and site verification of the parcel of land was conducted
by Land Investigator Alfonso Tumbocon who reported that the land
was free from claims and conflicts.24 Likewise, the notice of sale of the
lot in question was posted at the District Land Office in San Miguel,
Manila, at the Quezon City Hall, and at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City for
30 consecutive days from February 17, 1965 to March 17, 1965 which
was the date scheduled for the sale of the lot. The said notice was
worded as follows:
If there is any adverse claim to the land, such claim must be filed at
the Bureau of Lands, Manila on or before the date of the sale;
otherwise such claim shall forever be barred.25
Further, the "Order of Award" 26 dated May 20, 1971, as well as the
"Issuance of Patent"27 dated June 28, 1982 were both duly signed by
the Director of Lands. The "Order of Award" even declared that
Guerrero has in good faith established his residence on the land in
question. On the other hand, the "Issuance of Patent" stated that the
land consisting of 174 square meters is free from any adverse claim
and that Guerrero has fully paid the purchase price of the lot. Having
complied with all the requirements of the law preliminary to the
issuance of the patent, respondent was thus issued MSP No. 8991
dated August 16, 1982. Thereafter, the corresponding OCT No. 0-28
was issued on August 27, 1982 in the name of respondent Guerrero.
At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed to have
regularly performed their official duties. Thus, the proceedings for land
registration that led to the issuance of MSP No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-
28 in respondent’s name are presumptively regular and proper. To
overturn this legal presumption will not only endanger judicial stability,
but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed,
to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens
titles to meaningless verbiage.28 Besides, this presumption of
regularity has not been overcome by the evidence presented by
petitioner. We, therefore, cannot sustain petitioner’s contention that
fraud tainted the sales patent granted to respondent Guerrero, as well
as the certificate of title issued in consequence thereof.
Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner
failed to avail itself of the remedy within the prescribed period. Under
Section 38 of Act No. 496, a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration must be filed within one year from the date of
entry of said decree.
In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period
commences from the issuance of the patent by the government.29
In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on
August 16, 1982, while petitioner instituted an action to amend
respondent’s certificate of title on November 7, 1989 or after the lapse
of more than seven (7) years from the issuance of the patent. Clearly,
petitioner failed to timely avail of the remedy to contest Guerrero’s
title.
Petitioner argues that the right of the State for the reversion of
unlawfully acquired property is not barred by prescription. Thus, it can
still recover the land granted to respondent.
True, prescription, basically, does not run against the State and the
latter may still bring an action, even after the lapse of one year, for the
reversion to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently
granted to private individuals.30 However, this remedy of reversion can
only be availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the
land in patents or certificates of title. In the present case, petitioner
cannot successfully invoke this defense for, as discussed earlier, it
was never proven that respondent’s patent and title were obtained
through actual fraud or other illegal means.
Lest it be overlooked, a piece of land covered by a registered patent
and the corresponding certificate of title ceases to be part of the public
domain. As such, it is considered a private property over which the
Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.31
Petitioner likewise insists that respondent’s title had yet to attain the
status of indefeasibility. As argued, Angelina Bustamante was able to
timely file a protest on July 29, 1983, which was well within the one-
year prescriptive period.
We do not agree.
While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales
patent in favor of respondent, the protest was, however, filed with the
Bureau of Lands instead of with the regional trial court as mandated
by the aforequoted provision of Section 38 of Act No. 496. Said
provision expressly states that a petition for review of a decree of
registration shall be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance" (now
Regional Trial Court). The law did not say that such petition may be
filed with an administrative agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be
sure, what the law contemplates in allowing a review of the decree of
registration is a full-blown trial before a regular court where each party
could be afforded full opportunity to present his/its case and where
each of them must establish his case by preponderance of evidence
and not by mere substantial evidence, the usual quantum of proof
required in administrative proceedings. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to
it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.32On the other hand,
substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.33
As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack on the
very integrity of land titles and the Torrens system, a full-blown trial on
the merits before a regular court is necessary for the purpose of
achieving a more in-depth and thorough determination of all issues
involved.
Hence, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the protest filed by
Bustamante with the Bureau of Lands cannot be considered in the
context of a petition to review the decree of registration issued to
respondent. It was only on November 7, 1989 that such petition was
filed by the Director of Lands with the RTC and obviously, it was way
beyond the one-year period prescribed by law.
It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in this
country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a
person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s
title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair
to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence
in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to
be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would
be that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent.
The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens
system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued
thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.34
No Torrens title holder shall be at peace with the ownership and
possession of his land, for land registration officers can question his
title any time they make a finding unfavorable to said title holder. This
is all the more frustrating for respondent Guerrero considering that he
had bought the subject lot from the government itself, the very same
party who is now impugning his title.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but
merely a system of registration of titles to lands, 35 justice and equity
demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents,
in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest
damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to
quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the
legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at
the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto.36 Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever
be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed
their duties.37
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
RATIO DECIDENDI

OBITER DICTUM
G.R. No. 121075 July 24, 1997
DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROBERTO M. LAGMAN, and STATE
INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS
- Private Respondent State Investment House, INc. filed action against
DELTA for a sum of money at the RTC of Manila, Branch VI.
DELTA was required to pay P20M to the private respondent.
- The above decision could not be served by DELTA due to its
dissolution. It had been taken over by Philippine National Bank (PNB)
in the meantime.
- Dec. 1986: SIHI moved forservice of the decision by way of
publication. It was published in the Thunderer, a weekly Manila
newspaper. Afterwards, SIHI moved for the execution, which the RTC
granted on March 1987. Pursuant to the writ of execution, properties of
DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod City were levied upon and sold.
- DELTA commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the CA,
alleging that a) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over DELTA since
there was no valid/proper service of summons rendering the decision
void, and b) the decision never became final and executory
- The CA ruled that against DELTA on the first ground, but ruled that
the decision never became executory because records show that the
assailed judgment had never been properly served against on PNB
(which assumed DELTA’s operation upon its dissolution). The CA also
stated that the publication was not a cure for such a fatal defect.
- Therefore, the CA decreed that since the decision had not yet attained
finality pending a service of a copy on DELTA, who may appeal within
the reglementory period.
- DELTA filed an MR, insisting there could be no valid service of
summons since the RTC decision was not in accordance with the Rules
and hence void. Dismissed by CA
- DELTA filed a ppetition with the SC for review on certiorari. Denied.
- DELTA filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC, indicating that it was
appealing from the earlier decision and prayed that records be elevated
to the CA
- SIHI filed a motion to dismiss DELTA’s appeal on the grounds that it
was filed out of time (beyond 15 days period after obtaining the copy of
the decision). DELTA’s appeal was dismissed.
- DELTA filed an Omnibus motion with the CA to declare all acts and
proceedings relating to the earlier decision as void. The CA issued a
reolustion on Jan. 5 1995
- SIHI filed a motion for clarification, asking for a deletion of a portion
of the resolutio for it being mere obiter dictum (“While it is true that as
a necessary consequence the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 22, 1991 ruling that the decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019
"has not attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner
Delta, which may appeal therefrom within the reglementary period", all
proceedings and/or orders arising from the trial court's decision in Civil
Case No. 84-23019 are null and void x x x .”) SIHI claimed that the
statement was “not necessary for the case before it” (the denial of the
Omnibus motion” and therefore “could not be held binding for
establishing a precedent”).
- CA decreed to amend its resolution and delete the assailed paragraph
ISSUES/HELD
- WON the CA erred in denying the petitioner’s Omnibus motion?
a.) No, the CA was correct is denying the Omnibus motion
Sec. 7 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court on the Procedure in the
CA:
“Questions that may be decided – No error which does not affect
the jursidiction over the subject matter will be considered unless
stated in the asdsignment of errors properly argued in the brief,
save as the court, at its option, may notice plain errors not
specified, and also clerical errors.”
b.) The CA could only consider errors raised by the petitioner, which
were only limited to the RTC’s orders and not on the CA’s previous
decisions.
Even so, to allow DELTA’s Omnibus motion which it filed more
than eight months after the promulgation of the decision and long
after its finality would result in the abandonment of sound judicial
process.
- WON the assailed paragraph in the CA’s resolution was obiter
dictum?
a.) Yes, the assailed paragraph is considered obiter dictum.
 1.) Obiter dictum – opinion expressed by a court upon some
question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case
before it; “by the way”. It is not binding as precedent (Cannot be
basis for stare decisis)
2.) The phrase was not raised by the petitioner expressly in its
petition assailing the dismisssal of its notice of appeal. Hence, it
could not be considered a prerequisite in disposing of the issues
USE OF FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE
EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGAY" S. SAN LUIS
FACTS:
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for
disqualification was filed by Edgar “Egay” San Luis before the COMELEC
against Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial
candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of
Laguna.
Petition alleged Ejercito distributed orange card to influence
voters in his favor; and Ejercito exceeds the amount of expenditures
necessary.
Ejercito proclaimed Governor.
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of
Conference. Ejercito prayed for the dismissal of the petition which was
improperly filed because it is in reality a complaint for election offenses, thus,
the case should have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department, and if
with probable cause, file with proper court.
The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of
Ejercito. The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division
that San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito.
Ejercito filed before the Court GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
against COMELEC and contends It violated the right of petitioner due
process when it ruled for disqualification of petitioner even it was not
prayed for disqualification. Worse, there is yet no finding of guilt by
competent court that he committed election offense.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD:
NO. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, is an independent action that is available only if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.44 It is a legal remedy that is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional
issues and is not meant to correct simple errors of judgment. 45 More
importantly, it will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is
actually proved to exist.46
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. It means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would amount to lack of
jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law. x x x. 47
Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed
Resolution with grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled
that the petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution
of election offense but for disqualification as well. Ejercito cannot feign
ignorance of the true nature and intent of San Luis’ petition. The title of San
Luis’ petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the specific rule governing the
disqualification of candidates. Moreover, the averments of San Luis’ petition
rely on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC as grounds for its causes of action.
Section 68 of the OEC precisely enumerates the grounds for the
disqualification of a candidate for elective position and provides, as penalty,
that the candidate shall be disqualified from continuing as such, or if he or
she has been elected, from holding the office. A similar tenor was expressed
in the prayer in the petition filed by San Luis.
An election offense has both criminal and electoral aspects. The
electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-
versa. The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether
there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The
prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines
whether probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC,
through its Law Department, files the criminal information before the proper
court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and
require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall
result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include
disqualification from holding a future public office. The conduct of
preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral
aspect of a disqualification case.
The “exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary
investigation of all casesinvolving criminal infractions of the election laws”
stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal
aspect of a disqualification case. Hence, an erring candidate may be
disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a
preliminary investigation
REPUBLIC VS. MERALCO
GR 141314
FACTS:
On 23 December 1993, Meralco filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
an application for the revision of its rate schedules. On 28 January 1994, the
ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P0.184/kwh subject to the
condition that in event that the board finds that Meralco is entitled to a lesser
increase in rates, all excess amounts collected shall be refunded or credited to its
customers. Subsequently, ERB rendered its decision adopting the audit of the
Commission on Audit (COA) and authorized Meralco to implement a rate
adjustment of P0.017/kwh, but ordered the refund of the excess amount of
P0.167/kwh collected from the billing cycles of February 1994 to February 1997,
holding that income tax should not be treated as operating expense, and applying
the net average investment method in the computation of the rate base. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the
reduction of the rates by P0.167/kwh and the refund to Meralco’s customers.
Motions for reconsideration were denied. Hence, the petition before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the net average investment method or the trending method should be
used in determining the tax base?
HELD:
The administrative agency is not bound to apply any one particular formula or
method simply because the same method has been previously used and applied.
What constitutes a reasonable return for the public utility is necessarily
determined and controlled by its peculiar environmental milieu. The
reasonableness of the net average investment method is borne by the records of
the case. By using the said method, the ERB and COA considered for
determination of the rate base the value of the properties and equipment used by
Meralco in proportion to the period that the same were actually used during the
period in question. If the “trending method” is to be applied, the public utility
may easily manipulate the valuation of its property entitled to a return (tax base)
by simply including a highly capitalized asset in the computation of the rate base
even if the same was used for a limited period if time during the test year.
G.R. No. 148208             December 15, 2004
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, 
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.
Puno. J.,
Facts:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It
abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653,
petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a
petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office
of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso  in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it
is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the
Monetary Board shall:
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the
selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such
system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of
the  Bangko Sentral  in accordance with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of
the  Bangko Sentral's  human resource development program: Provided, That the
Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the
principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization
Act].Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees
whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance
with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz:
(1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary
Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the
SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic
case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's
position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to
establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.  pass muster.
Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and
violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to
some 2994 rank- and –file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand
contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause,
provided that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law
such as the “fiscal and administrative autonomy” of the Bangko Sentral and
the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor General, as counsel of the
Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of
employees is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the
policy of RA 7653 to “establish professionalism and excellence within the
BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.”
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal
protection of laws, hence unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the
officer employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status
with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law
than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the
BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the
former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by the
proviso.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary
grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic
class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically
withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the
poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the
SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are
paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank -
possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career
advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to
stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist
of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real
economic and financial need  for the adjustment This is in accord with the
policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate
social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the
quality of life for all."108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this
Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government
employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right
to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and
conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair
labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy
to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them
from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file
employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be
compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous
treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act.
They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given
any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a
mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless
discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and
implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
No. 7653 is unconstitutional.