L A N D T I T L E S M I D T E R M S ( 2 0 17 )
A t t y. G i m a r i n o
Land Titles Midterms Reviewer
SY 2017 — Atty. Gimarino
By: SUAN, Christia Sandee
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ii. Involuntary Transactions — refer to those executed against
Registration of Land Titles and Deeds
Registration under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem. 2
RTC has plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over land registration cases 2
Concept: Regalian Doctrine
The Regalian doctrine declares that all lands and all other natural resources
are owned by the State. 2
Section 2 of Article XII on “National Economy and Patrimony” 2
Purpose and Meaning of the Torrens System of Registration
Land Registration Commission and its Registries of Deeds
1. The Land Registration Authority 5
2. Office of the Register of Deeds; General Functions 5
Original Registration
1. Application 7
2. Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles 7
3. Registration under the Indigenous People’s Rights Act 12
4. Forms and Contents (Section 15-19) 13
5. Publication, Opposition of and Default (Sec. 23) 14
6. Classification of Public Lands 17
7. Non-Registrable Properties 19
8. Remedies 20
Remedies under the Property Registration Decree, 

in cases of fraudulent registration 21
Key Concepts of the Torrens System
Decree Binds The Land (Sec. 31, PD 1529) 29
Owner’s Duplicate Certification (Sec. 41) 29
Statement of Personal Circumstance (Sec. 45) 31
Registered Land Not Subject to Prescription (Sec. 47) 32
Certificate of Title Not Subject to Collateral Attack (Sec. 48) 32
DEFINITION OF TERMS
has acquired certain rights or interests in the property
⁍ Land Registration — is a judicial or administrative proceeding
whereby a person’s claim of ownership over a particular land is
determined and confirmed or recognized so that such land and the
ownership thereof may be recorded in a public registry.
Note: Registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of
such title over a particular property.
⁍ Registration of Title or Original Registration — takes place when
the title to land is made of public record for the first time in the
name of its lawful owner. It refers to the registration procedure from
the filing of the application to the issuance of the original certificate
of title based on the decree of registration, patent, award or grant.
• As to it its nature, original registration is further classified into:
i. Judicial, which may either be voluntary (ordinary) or
compulsory (cadastral)
ii. Administrative
⁍ Registration of Deeds and Other Instruments or Subsequent
Registration — takes place when a deed or instrument affecting
land is made of public record after the date of its original
registration. Thus, the registration of sale, mortgage, lease,
attachment, notice of levy or other encumbrances falls within the
purview of subsequent registration.
• The dealings pertaining to lands may refer to either voluntary or
involuntary instruments.
i. Voluntary transactions — are the contracts or agreements
willfully executed by the landowner or his duly authorized
representatives such as sales, leases, mortgages, donations,
exchanges, trusts, or variations thereof affecting real estate.
(SandeeSuan)
the will or without the consent of the landowner contrary to his
interest or will affect him adversely such as attachment, levy
on execution, adverse claim, lis pendens and other liens.
⁍ Land Titles — is the evidence of the owner’s right or extent of
interest, by which he can maintain control and as a rule assert right
to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of property
⁍ Deed — is the instrument in writing by which any real estate or
interest therein is created, alienated, mortgaged, or assigned, or by
which title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity.
⁍ Torrens System — is a system for registration of land under which,
upon the landowner’s application, the court may, after appropriate
proceedings, direct the issuance of a certificate of title.
⁍ Torrens Title — is a certificate issued under the Torrens System,
through the Register of Deeds, naming and declaring the owner of
the real property describe therein, free from all lends and
encumbrances except such as may be expressly noted there or
otherwise reserved by law.
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND
DEEDS
FUNCTIONS OF REGISTRATION
Three major functions of registration are:
1. Publicity — serves to give notice to all persons from time to time
of such registering, filing and entering that certain party has or
2. Priority — serves to fix and determine the relative rights of parties
whether superior or subordinate, in relation to time, following the
maxim “priore tempore, priore jure” (first in time, first in law).
Article 709 of the New Civil Code provides that the titles of
ownership or other rights over immovable property which are not
duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not
prejudice third persons.
3. Security — serves to provide registrants an archive for
muniments of title, rights and interests in land recorded in the
registry where the property is located.
MODES OF REGISTRATION
Registration may be by:
1. Transcriptions — is the entering in the registration book by the
register of deeds of the original certificate of title duly numbered,
dated, signed and sealed issued pursuant to a decree of
registration, patent, award or grant.
2. Inscription — is the recording on the certificate of title a
memorandum or an abstract of the instrument sought to be
registered
GOVERNING LAWS
P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), approved on June 11,
1978, codified and incorporated the following laws related to
property registration:
1. Act 496, The Land Registration Act (Feb. 1, 1903)
2. C.A. 14, The Public Land Act (Nov. 7, 1936)
3. Act 2259, The Cadastral Act (Feb. 11, 1913)
4. Act 3344, System of Registration for Unregistered Lands (Dec. 8,
1926)
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5. Act 1508 as amended, The Chattel Mortgage Law (July 2, 1906)
6. R.A. No. 26, Reconstitution of Original Certificates of Title (Sept.
25, 1946) (Amended by RA 6732, July 17, 1989)
7. P.D. No. 27, Emancipation Patents, Land Reform Law (Oct. 21,
1972)
8. P.D. 957, Subdivision and Condominium Protective Buyers’
Decree (July 12, 1976)
9. R.A. No. 4726, Condominium Act (June 18, 1966)
Legal Basis and Nature of Land Registrations
C H A P T E R 1 ( S E C . 2 , P. D . 1 5 2 9 )
Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.
Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall
be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests
therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The
court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission
with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or
issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of
stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
Registration under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem.
A proceeding is in rem when the object of the action is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world
has a right to be heard on the strength of alleging facts, which if true,
show an inconsistent interest.
A land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem
cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land
through publication and service of notice. However, personal notice
to all claimants of the res is not necessary to give the court
jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res, and neither may lack
of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued
in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land
situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a
proceeding in rem or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which
shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown.
RTC has plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over land registration cases
Under Section 2, RTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction over:
a. All applications for original registration of titles to lands,
including improvements and interest therein and;
b. All petitions filed after original registration of title.
RTC also has the power to hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications and petitions.
CONCEPT: REGALIAN DOCTRINE
⁍ Regalian Doctrine — A time‐honored constitutional precept that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership in land, and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony.
⁍ Jura Regalia — private title to land must be traced to some grant,
express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Incontrovertible
evidence must be shown that the land is alienable or disposable in
order to overcome such presumption.
(SandeeSuan)
The Regalian doctrine declares that all lands and all other
natural resources are owned by the State.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever classification and
other natural resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership belong to the State, being the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
Hence, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released
as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the
State remain part of the alienable public domain.
Section 2 of Article XII on “National Economy and Patrimony”
SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The present Constitution provides that, except for agricultural lands of
the public domain which alone may be alienated, forest or timber,
and mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources must remain
with the State, the exploration, development and utilization of which
shall be subject to its full control and supervision albeit allowing it to
enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization.
Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR
GR No. 135385. Dec. 6, 2000
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), on the
ground that it amounts to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural re-
sources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous
Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the basis of native title. After
due deliberation on the petition, the Supreme Court voted as follows:
seven (7) Justices voted to dismiss the petition while seven (7) others
voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7)
and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained
the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of
Court, the petition was dismissed, and the validity of the law, deemed
upheld.
Justice Panganiban’s Dissenting Opinion: he stated that all Filipinos,
whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution, and that no
one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions.
Contentions of RA 8371’s unconstitutionality:
1. It violates the inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public
Domains. That this is in contravention to Section 2, Art. 12 of the
Constitution that only agricultural lands of the public domain can
be considered as alienable and disposable lands.
2. No land area limits are specified - That 4/5 of the country’s natural
resources and 1/3 of the country’s land will be concentrated to 12
Million IPs, and while 60 million other Filipinos will share the
remaining. These figures violates the constitutional principle of a
“more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth”
among Filipinos.
3. It abdicates the State Duty to take Full Control and Supervision of
Natural Resources
4. Public Domains and Natural Resources are owned by the State and
Cannot be Alienated or Ceded
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Doctrine: The Regalian doctrine does not negate native title. Native
title to land, or private ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial, and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown – “It might, perhaps,
be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same
way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land.”
The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by
native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held
under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never
been public lands and are private. The concept of native title in the IPRA
was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular Government, which
firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective
of any royal grant from the State.
What is a Native Title?
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part
- It refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far
as memory, reaches have been held under a claim of private
ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public land and are
thus indisputable presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish conquest.
What is a time immemorial?
❖ General Rule: All lands are owned by the state
- refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go,
certain Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous People
(ICCs/IPs) are known to have occupied, possessed in the
concept of owner, and utilized a define territory devolved to them
by operation of customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in
accordance with their customs and traditions
Native Title is an EXCEPTION to the Regalian doctrine
as alienable and disposable
- The recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership
of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of
ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant
from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory if jura
regalia.
May an ancestral land be titled? How?
- Yes. Under the IPRA law, the ancestral may be titled. The two
methods of obtaining a certificate of title may be made under
Public Land Act or ordinary registration proceedings under Sec.
14 of PD 1529.
Secretary of DENR vs Yap
GR No. 167707. Oct. 8, 2008
Facts: On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve.
Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application
for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief
with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed
the petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of
the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as
“public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to
section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
Issue: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically
deemed agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable
Ruling: No.  To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
(SandeeSuan)
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.  Necessarily, it is
up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be
disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the
state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as
under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would
be ordinary acts of ownership.
Doctrine: There must be a positive act from the government
classifying lands as alienable and disposable before registration.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, lands of the public domain belong to the
State. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership and all lands that have not been acquired from the
of the inalienable public domain; and before these inalienable lands of
public domain becomes alienable and disposable, there must be a
positive act from the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes.
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
Proof of Private Ownership (2 requisites)
1. Applicant is in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession (OCENP) over the land within a time prescribed by
law or since June 12, 1945 or earlier
2. There must be a POSITIVE ACT of government declaring the land
What are positive acts of government?
- Presidential Proclamations
- Executive orders
- Administrative acts
- Investigative reports of Bureau of Lands
- Certification from the DENR
- Legislative acts
What does PD 705 say in so far as land classification is concerned?
- PD 705 Sec. 3 categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest hence it was not available for disposition.
Republic vs CA, et. al (Spouses Carag)
GR No. 155450. Aug. 6, 2008
This was the first time that land classification was made as a requirement
prior to disposition, This is under Act 2874 approved as law in year
1919. Prior to that, the law in effect was Act 126, the presumption is
that it is agricultural lands unless it is shown as timber or mineral.
In 1919 it is already a requirement that the land should be classified as
agricultural first. The law in effect when the decree was issued is already
Act 2874. But the law provides for an exception Sec. 8 of Act 2874
provides that where the land is already a private land under existing law,
then it is excepted from the classification requirement.
Hence, it need not be classified as agricultural land for it to be registered if
the subject property is already considered as private land under existing
law.
Act 2874, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands,
as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law,
are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for
purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that
during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless
falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some
public purpose in accordance with law.
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PURPOSE AND MEANING OF THE
TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION
What is Torrens Title?
into the Torrens system.
Those systems of registration of transaction with interest in land whose
declared object is, under governmental authority;
- To establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and
indefeasible title to realty
- To simplify its transfer
Torrens System upholds indefeasible and imprescriptible title.
- The land registration proceeding binds the whole world when it
The Torrens system requires that the government shall issue an official
certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the
owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves. The
certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to
the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This
system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.
It is a conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein, and other matters which can be litigated and
decided in land registration proceedings.
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
registered under Torrens System; alleged long and continuous
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not
create or vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is
merely a procedure to establish evidence of title over realty. It is a
means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world
at large. A certificate of title is not a source of right. It merely confirms
or records a title already existing and vested.
Real Purpose of the Torrens System of registration
public domain and became his private property.
The real purpose is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title,
— EXCEPT: claims which were noted at the time of registration,
in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.
• That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner
may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. While the proceeding is judicial, it
involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action.
• All the world are parties, including the government. After the
registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there
are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights
of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration.
• The certificate of registration accumulates in one document a
precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by
its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of
title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.
• The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or
diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
Legarda vs Saleeby
GR No. 8936. Oct. 8, 2008
Facts: A stonewall stands between the adjoining lots of Legarda and
Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered
in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years
after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legards, Saleeby
applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and
the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the
strip of land where it stands.
Doctrine: Where two certificates purport to include the same
registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold
title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to
land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
(SandeeSuan)
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the ‘mirador de su casa,’ to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered
A land already registered to a person under the Torrens System cannot
anymore be subsequently registered by another person even if the prior
registrant did not present an opposition thereto.
How do you understand in rem?
becomes final, without contest, except for cases of fraud, it
becomes final and executor. All the rights of everyone is
foreclosed by the act of registration.
Bishop vs CA & Salang
Facts: Certain parcels of land in Subic was in the possession of the
Petitions (Bishop, et al). Entire parcel of land is registered to
respondents Salang.
In 1985, Salang sued petitioners for Recover of Possession and invoked
their right as registered owners of the land.
Petitioners claimed: lots were part of public domain and could not be
possession; produced tax declarations; acquired lots by sale and
inheritance.
RTC — favored Salang. Invoked Art. 428. Right to enjoy, dispose, etc.
Plaintiffs, registered owner, has the right to the recovery and possession
of the land. Defendants had no right even if they are in physical
occupancy of the land. The certification from the Bureau of Forestry are
without basis.
The moment land was titled in the name of Salang, it is no longer part of
Tax declarations are NOT evidence of title, which is already in the name of
the plaintiff.
Prescription will NOT ripen into ownership because the land is covered by
a Torrens title. Acquisitive prescription will not be available to land under
Art. 496.
Issues: (1) Land is part of public domain; (2) Acquired the title by laches;
(3) builders in good faith
Ruling:
(1) Respondent’s title is traceable to an OCT issued in 1910. Certification
is now inconvertible and conclusive against the world. Land was
private in nature and registrable under Torrens.
To annul torrens certificate, it must show that:
a. registration court had not acquired jurisdiction, and
b. there was actual fraud in securing title
Petitioners were not able to establish such requirement. No government
opposed the registration. To indicate certificate of title prescribes after 1
year from decree of registration. Non-presentation of Tax Dec is no
indication that they never acquired ownership of the land.
(2) As registered owners, respondents has the right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible and
never barred by laches.
Even if they were aware of the occupation and merely tolerated such
occupation, they still have right to demand the return of their property.
The owner of a land registered under the torrens system cannot lose it
by prescription.
(3) A builder in good faith — unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at
the time he builds on it. This cannot apply because they knew they
had no right to occupy the subject lands. Petitioners did not check
the registration of lands. No right to occupy the land and build on it,
They are called “squatters” for entered without permission on the
land that did not belong to them.
NGA vs IAC & Magcamit
Facts: In 1971, Supposes Vivas and Lizardo sold a parcel of land to
Respondent Magcamit, evidenced by sale with right to repurchase for
Php 30k and was registered in the office of Register of Deeds. Sale was
then made absolute for Php 90k. Respondents remained in possession.
In 1974, OCT was issued to Spouses without knowledge to respondent
and mortgaged the property to NGA.
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NGA foreclosed the mortgage for unpaid indebtedness and was able to
purchase it on public auction. In July 1974, respondents found out the
property has been mortgaged and offered to pay balance which the
petitioners denied.
Respondents made a formal demand to the spouses to comply with their
obligation. NGA said they are the owners of the land and no plans of
disposing it and invoked they were purchasers in good faith and action
has already prescribed.
TC — favored NGA
IAC — favored Magcamit
Issue: WON violation of terms of Vivas and Lizardo with respondent
would constitute breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title of NGA
Ruling: Sec. 194 of Admin Code — while the registration of the
conditional sale with right to repurchase be binding upon third persons,
it is by provision “understood to be without prejudice to third party who
has better right” NGA, registered owner under Torrens, has the better
right.
Proceeding for the registration of title to land under Torrens System is
action in rem, binding to all persons.
Respondents right over property was barred by res judicator when the
decree of registration was issued — does not matter of they had some
right of ownership before the grant of the Torrens title.
Sec. 44 of PD 1529 — every registered owner receiving a certificate of
title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted on the certificate. Claims of liens of
whatever character, PRIOER to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut
off by such certification if not noted.
Respondents claim does not fall under any of the exception. The only
exception is guilty of fraud.
Rule — all persons dealing with the property covered under the Torrens
Certificate of the Title are NOT required to go beyond what appears on
the face of the title.
C H A P T E R 2 ( S E C . 4 T O 1 3 , P. D . 1 5 2 9 )
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND
ITS REGISTRIES OF DEEDS
1. The Land Registration Authority
Section 4. Land Registration Commission — In order to have a more efficient
execution of the laws relative to the registration of lands, geared to the massive
and accelerated land reform and social justice program of the government, there is
created a commission to be known as the Land Registration Commission under
the executive supervision of the Department of Justice.
Section 5: Officials and employees of the Commission - The Land
Registration Commission shall have a chief and an assistant chief to be known,
respectively, as the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall be appointed by the President. The Commissioner shall be
duly qualified member of the Philippine Bar with at least ten years of practice in
the legal profession, and shall have the same rank, compensation and privileges
as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. The Deputy Commissioner, who
shall possess the same qualifications as those required of the Commissioner, shall
receive compensation which shall be three thousand pesos per annum less than
that of the Commissioner. He shall act as Commissioner of Land Registration
during the absence or disability of the Commissioner and when there is a vacancy
in the position until another person shall have been designated or appointed in
accordance with law. The Deputy Commissioner shall also perform such other
functions as the Commissioner may assign to him.
They shall be assisted by such number of division chiefs as may be necessary in the
interest of the functioning of the Commission, by a Special Assistant to the
Commissioner, and by a Chief Geodetic Engineer who shall each receive
compensation at the rate of three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less
than that of the Deputy Commissioner. All other officials and employees of the
Land Registration Commission including those of the Registries of Deeds whose
salaries are not herein provided, shall receive salaries corresponding to the
minimum of their respective upgraded ranges as provided under paragraph 3.1 of
Budget Circular No. 273, plus sixty per centum thereof across the board,
notwithstanding the maximum salary allowed for their respective civil service
eligibilities
The salaries of officials and employees provided in this Decree shall be without
prejudice to such benefits and adjustments as may from time to time be granted
by the President or by the legislature to government employees.
(SandeeSuan)
All officials and employees of the Commission except Registers of Deeds shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon recommendation of the Commissioner
of Land Registration.
• To have a more efficient execution of the laws relative to the
registration of lands, geared to the massive and accelerated land
reform and social justice program of the government
• Headed by an Administrator, who shall be assisted by 2 Deputy
Administrators
• All of whom shall be appointed by the President through the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
• All other officials except the Register of Deeds shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice upon recommendation of the Administrator
2. Office of the Register of Deeds; General Functions
SEC. 6. General Functions. —
(1) The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the ff functions:
(a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in
land registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registers of
Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;
(b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other
personnel of the Commission;
(c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of,
Registers of Deeds;
(d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the
Courts of First Instance throughout the Philippines with respect to the
discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the registration of
lands;
(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the
registration of lands and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefor;
(f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-
subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496 except
those covered by P.D. No. 957.
(2) The Land Registration Commission shall have the following functions:
(a) Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department of Agrarian
Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in the implementation of the
land reform program of the government;
(b) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings;
(c) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands
titled under the Torrens system, including subdivision and consolidation
plans of titled lands.
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. —
The office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of
instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in
the province or city wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument
presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies
with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears
the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly
canceled. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or
reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree.
FUNCTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
(a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in
land registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registers of
Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;
Once you file a petition in court for ordinary registration proceedings or
judicial confirmation of title under the Public Land Act, once the
decision becomes final, the land registration court issues an Order
of Issuance of a Decree. Once the decision becomes final, the land
registration court (RTC), will issue an order directing the administrator
to issue a Decree of Registration. A decree of registration is exactly
the same as the original certificate of title. The decision itself that has
become final will become the basis in the preparation of the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT). In the OCT, which is exactly the same as
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the Decree of Registration, the name of the Administrator is indicated
there. This is important because on the date that he approves the
land registration, 1 year thereafter, the title becomes incontrovertible.
The administrator in turn will transmit this OCT to the office of the
Register of Deeds(RD) for transcription. That is the time that the title
will take effect, it is the date of transcription by the Register of Deeds.
(b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other
personnel of the Commission;
(c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of,
Registers of Deeds;
Consulta happens in two ways: (1) When the RD is in doubt of a
particular transaction (complicated, too many issues and he is in
doubt as to how to go about it), the remedy is to elevate the matter
en consulta to the administrator. He elevates it for guidance on how
to go about the transaction. Once the administrator issues his ruling,
the decision is binding to the RD. The RD has no right to appeal. The
decision of the Administrator is binding to all RD’s.
On the other hand, if a registrant will go to the office of the RD and
presents an instrument and the RD finds it not to be registrable, he
can deny registration. Now the registrant may now appeal by way of
consulta.
(d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the
Courts of First Instance throughout the Philippines with respect to the
discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the registration of lands;
The Administrator can issue Circulars and other Issuances directed to
the Clerk of Courts to have a uniform procedure.
(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the
registration of lands and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefor;
(f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-
subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496 except those
covered by P.D. No. 957.
Before the LRA and DENR through the Bureau of Lands had a
concurrent authority to approve original survey plans but due to the
case of Noblejas v. Teehankee, the authority given to the
Administrator was abused by Noblejas during his time. President
Marcos withdrew the authority to approve original survey plans. The
Administrator can now only approve subdivision plans. He has
concurrent authority with DENR.
Now the authority of the Administrator is only limited to a subdivision
that does not involve a subdivision project as defined under PD 957.
Only the DENR can approve a subdivision project as defined as
“lands that are subdivided for residential, industrial and commercial
purposes”. LRA is only limited to simple subdivision for example you
have a land and you want to subdivide it for future heirs.
Duty of the Register of Deeds to Register is Ministerial.
Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract or
instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the office of the
Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of the
title covering the land subject of the deed, contract or instrument.
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is
not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but is for a court of
competent jurisdiction to determine.
Instances where Register of Deeds may deny or refuse
registration
a. Where there are several copies of the title (co-owner’s duplicate) but
only one is presented with the instrument to be registered.
b. Where the property is presumed to be conjugal but the instrument
of conveyance bears the signature of only one spouse.
c. Where there is a pending case in court where the character of the
land and validity of the conveyance are in issue.
d. Where required certificates or documents are not submitted
(SandeeSuan)
Baranda vs Gustilo
A notice of lis pendens, when the title is involved in a civil case, the
plaintiff will file the notice of lis pendens to the RD and this is usually
annotated on the title. The effect of the notice of lis pendens is that it is
a notice to everyone, that when you buy a property with this notice, you
take the risk to the result of the case. You are bound by the outcome of
the case such that when the outcome of the case is against the seller,
then you are bound by it.
A parcel of lot was sought to be registered before the Register of Deeds.
The latter denied registration on the ground of lis pendens annotation at
the back of the title. Subsequently, RTC issued an order directing him to
cancel the lis pendens annotation. RD did not yield to such order and
filed a motion for renconsideration before the court
Doctrine: The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to
the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the
like is ministerial in nature. In case of doubt with the proper step
to be taken, he shall elevate the matter en consulta to the LRA
for resolution. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have
any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent
Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject
parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in
pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he
should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land
Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and
Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. (Section 10 & Section 117 of PD1529)
Balbin vs Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
Under Section 41 of PD 429, when there are several owners with a parcel
of land, the owners may request for 1 title for all of them. But the co-
owners may also request for a co-owners title but whenever there is a
voluntary transaction, all titles should be surrendered, otherwise the RD
can deny.
Petitioner sought for the annotation of a deed of donation in his favor at
the back of the OCT which he brought before the Register of Deeds. It
turned out that at the back of the OCT, there is an annotation that the
property is co-owned and that there are other 3 co-owners’ copies
existing which were apparently not presented by petitioner. RD denied
the annotation of the deed of donation.
Doctrine: Where several co-owner’s duplicate of certificates of titles are
issued, a voluntary instrument cannot be registered without
surrendering all the copies to the Register of Deeds so that every copy
of thereof would contain identical entries of the transactions affecting
the land covered. While a Register of Deeds has a ministerial function,
he may refuse registration if the OCT bears on its face an infirmity.
The register of deeds may deny the annotation of a deed of donation of a
portion of a co-owned property when the applicant fails to present all of
the copies of the title from the co-owners. In justifying such denial, the
Court said that there being several copies of the same title in existence,
it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an
encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy
and not on the others
Almirol vs Register of Deeds of Agusan
Doctrine: Where several co-owner’s duplicate of certificates of titles
are issued, a voluntary instrument cannot be registered without
surrendering all the copies to the Register of Deeds so that every
copy of thereof would contain identical entries of the transactions
affecting the land covered. While a Register of Deeds has a ministerial
function, he may refuse registration if the OCT bears on its face an
infirmity.
C H A P T E R 3 ( S E C . 1 4 T O 3 8 , P. D . 1 5 2 9 )
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
LEGAL BASIS: Section 14(1) of PD1529 and Section 48(b) of CA141
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1. Application
WHO MAY APPLY: Section 14 of P.D. 1529 (OPRA)
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for
by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application
jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an
application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should
the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration
proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the
latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land
held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.
On the basis of their capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain, who may acquire private lands?
1. Filipino citizens
2. Filipino corporations and associations as defined in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution; and by exception:
3. Aliens, but only by hereditary succession; and
4. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
citizenship under the terms of Section 8.
BONAFIDE OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR EARLIER
claimed actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the
Section 14. (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation (OCENPO) of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Requirements for Registration under Section 14(1) – Original
Registration Proceedings
a. The land applied for is an agricultural public land already classified
as alienable and disposable land at the times of the filing of the
application for registration.
b. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land, under a bona fide claim of ownership.
c. Such possession and occupation must have commenced since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ong vs Republic
Possession & Occupation
Petitioners filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land. The
petitioners, however, admitted that upon buying the lot from their
predecessors- in-interest, they left abroad and have not been actually
occupying the land. Te petitioners paid for the realty taxes though.
Doctrine: Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to
alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires
possession and occupation. The law speaks of possession and
occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for
an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
(SandeeSuan)
over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.
The presentation of a tax declaration issued in 1971 falls short of the
required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier. Moreover,
possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the
public domain because the law requires possession and occupation.
Cañete vs Genuine Ice Company
Inapplicability of Sec. 14(1) to Friar Lands
Petitioners sought to cancel respondent’s OCT to a parcel of land.
Respondent said they were in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of land so were their predecessors-in-interest.
Petitioners respond that their title was spurious, fictitious and issued
under mysterious circumstances and that even assuming possession
and occupation, their title is inconsistent with the intent of the Friar
Lands Act.
Doctrine: Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual settlers and
occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the
Government" were given preference to lease, purchase, or
acquire their holdings, in disregard of the settlement and
occupation of persons before the government acquired the
lands. One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his
successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase
by reason of occupation from time immemorial, as this contravenes the
historical fact that friar lands were bought by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States,
approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from certain
companies, a society and a religious order.
Unlike alienable lands of the public domain, a friar land is patrimonial
property of the State. It does not follow rules on open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession, as what you find in Section 14(1)
because these are already private lands.
OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name of the
Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496. The
Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land
registration, which means that all lots therein are titled. The petitioners’
subject property is really of no moment unless it is shown that their
predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and occupants at the time
said lands were acquired by the Government, and whose rights were
not disregarded even though they were in occupation of the same
before the government acquired the land; yet, no period of time in
relation to adverse possession is alleged.
2. Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles
SEC. 48 (B) OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, CA 141
SECTION 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
History of CA 141 Section 48(b) as to Period of Possession
Requirement
1. Act 926 — open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands for a
period of 10 years next preceding the effectivity of this Act.
(Effective on October 7, 1903)
2. Act 2874 — open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain since July 26, 1894 for Filipino and American citizens.
(Effective on November 29, 1919)
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3. CA 141 (unamended) — possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain since July 26, 1894 but only to Filipinos.
(Effective on November 7, 1936)
4. RA 1942 — possession and occupation for at least 30 years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title. (Effective on June 22, 1957)
5. PD 1073 — open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain since June 12, 1945. (Effective on January
25, 1977)
If given a problem, check the date of the filing of application for
registration and apply the existing law at that time.
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
Act 926 and occupation of agricultural public lands for a
period of 10 years next preceding the effectivity of Oct 7, 1903
(1st PLA)
this Act
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
Act
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
2874 Nov 29, 1919
domain since July 26, 1894 for Filipino and
(2nd PLA)
American citizens
possession and occupation of lands of the public
CA 141 domain since July 26, 1894 but only to Filipinos Nov 7, 1936
possession and occupation for at least 30 years
RA 1942 immediately preceding the filing of the application Jun 22, 1957
for confirmation of title
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
PD 1073 and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of Jan 25, 1977
the public domain since June 12, 1945
Did PD 1529 and PD 1073 (which removed the 30 yr requirement
for OCENPO) preclude application for registration of alienable
lands of public domain commenced only after June 12, 1945?
No, considering Section 14(2) still allows acquisition of alienable lands
of public domain through prescription. In civil law, prescription is one
of the wars of acquiring public land. So even if the possession was
commenced later than June 12, 1945, you may still qualify under
Section 14(2).
Republic vs CA & Naguit
Doctrine: Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. The more reasonable interpretation of
Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case,
then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
The requirement that the property sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable means that it is so at the time when the application for
registration of title is filed and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
What does it mean when the land is alienable and disposable?
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
The moment the land is classified as A&D, it is equivalent to an
application of the state’s intention to use the land using its
prerogative, SC said as long as AT THE TIME OF THE APPLICATION,
the land was already alienable and disposable.
(SandeeSuan)
What did the SC say about the rule on prescription?
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. There is a rule that properties classified as alienable public
land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.
Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on
a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been
open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor can invoke
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
In 2005, the principle then or the leading case was Republic v Doldol,
in that case, the SC made it clear that the land must also be declared
A&D since June 12, 1945, so when the Naguit case was ruled after, it
was very enlightening. Unfortunately, 4 months later, the case of
Republic v Herbieto was also decided by the SC.
Republic vs Herbieto
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, now requires adverse
possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present
petition, the subject lots became alienable and disposable only on 25
June 1963. So the SC said that whatever period of possession before
the land was classified was A&D was inconsequential.
Doctrine: Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires possession
and occupation since June 12, 1945. Applicants could not acquire
land through adverse possession since the land was only classified as
alienable in 1963 and their possession only started in 1950.
(Also, Under the PRD, there already exists a title which is confirmed by
the Court; while under the PLA, the presumption always is that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and
possessors only a claim an interest in the same by virtue of their
imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession [since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.)
The requirement that the property sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable means that it is so on June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is a
wrong decision. The decision in Republic v. CA and Naguit is
controlling.
Regarding publication, what did the SC say?
Sec. 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be
given Notice of Initial Hearing for land registration by means of (1)
publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting. The respondents in this case
failed to comply with the publication requirement which did not
confer jurisdiction to the MTC. So, it is as if there was no publication
at all,
What did the SC say about the rule on prescription in this case?
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession
of the subject lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title. The said lots are public lands classified
as alienable and disposable only on June 25, 1963 and the
respondents were seeking for a confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title through judicial legalization. Under Sec.48 of the
Public Land Act, which is the ruling law in this case, respondents
were not able to prove their continuous ownership of the land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, because said lands were only classified as
alienable and disposable only on June 25, 1963.
There seem to be an apparent conflict between the case of Naguit and
Herbieto cases in the sense that in the Naguit case, it states that it is
enough that at the time of the filing, the land must already be A&D. In
Herbieto, it negates the ruling that it should start from June 12, 1945.
ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE LANDS BY
PRESCRIPTION
Section 14. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
This does not including alienable and disposable lands. Must be
PATRIMONIAL or PRIVATE LANDS.
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Because of Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529, those who are in possession of
alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been
characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or
more, may have the right to register their title to such land despite the
fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June
1945.
NOTE: Sec. 14(2) speaks of PRIVATE LANDS
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial for the
For one to invoke the provisions of Sec. 14(2) and set up acquisitive
prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the
property as patrimonial be fist established (either enactment of law
by Congress or proclamation by the President declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for the development of
national wealth). But the period of possession preceding the
classification as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the
completion of the prescriptive period.
Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic
Doctrine: Applicants under 14(1) of PD 1529 in relation to sec 48(b) of
CA 141 acquire ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based
on the length and quality of their possession. It is sufficient that the land
be declared alienable and disposable at the time of the filing for the
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title and the land need
not be alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession.
Facts: In 1998, Mario Malabanan led an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land located in Silang Cavity. Malabanan claimed
that he purchased the land from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in OCENPO of the land for more
than 30 years.
Aristedes Velazco, Malabanan’s witness, testified before the court that
the property originally belonged to a 22-hectare property owned by
Lino Velazco, her great-grandfather. Lino had 4 sons – Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban. Esteban is Aristedes’ grandfather. The
property was divided among the 4 of them.
In 1996, Magdalena, Esteban’s wife, became the administrator of all the
properties of the Velazco sons. After Esteban and Magdalena died, their
son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including
the subject land, which is owned by his uncle, Eduardo Velazco.
Eduardo sold this to Malabanan.
Also, a certificate issued by CENRO, DENR dated JUNE 1, 2001 was
presented verifying the said land as A and D. RTC ruled in favor of
Malabanan. Republic appealed, now represented by the OSG, CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND, IN ORDER
TO BE REGISTRABLE UNDER SECTION 14 (1) OF PD 1529,
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AS A&D AS OF JUNE 12,
1945.
Ruling: The OSG contends that all lands certified as A&D after June 12,
1945 cannot be registered either under Sec. 14 (1) of PD 1529 sec. 48
(b) of Public Land Act.
The SC said such interpretation renders the mentioned provision virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government form giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as A&D. Such
unreasonableness is aggravated of the fact the before June 12, 1945,
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. The SC
cited the case of Naguit. Such decision provides that the Sec. 14 (1) of
PD 1529 only requires the property sought to be registered as
already A&D at the time the application for registration of title is
led.
If the State has not yet released the land as A&D at the time of the
application, it is presumed that the State is still reserving its right to
utilize the property. But in this case, the property was already classi ed
as A&D, this shows an intention of the State to abdicate its authority
over the land.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT A LAND CLASSIFIED
AS A&D BE DEEMED PRIVATE LAND AND THEREFORE
SUSCEPTIBLE TO ACQUISITION BY PRESCRIPTION.
In this case, the petitioners primarily based their registration bid on Sec.
14 (2) of PD 1529 or prescription.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that “All things which are within the
commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription.”
(SandeeSuan)
SC said, unlike Sec 14(1), Sec 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. The SC also said that the rules on
prescription under the Civil Code is applicable in Sec 14 (2). Article
1113 of the Civil Code says that only the patrimonial property of the
state can be subject to prescription. Also it is clear that land which is
part of public dominion cannot be alienated even if it is declared A&D.
There must be a declaration of the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for the development of the national
period of prescription to run. Without these, the property remains to be
of public dominion.
Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of possession while
Sec. 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription.
Registration under Section 14 (1) is extended under the aegis of the
Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act, while registration
under Section 14 (2) is made available both by the Property Registration
Decree and the Civil Code.
Also, Registration under Sec. 48 (b) of Public Land Act is based on
possession,
Sec. 14 (2) of PD 1529 is founded on extraordinary prescription under
the Civil Code. The rules on prescription under the Civil Code do not
apply to Sec 14 (1) since there is no such intent manifested by the
legislature and that PD 1529 is neither superior nor inferior than Civil
Code, legislature is not bound to adhere on Civil Code framework.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT MALABANAN IS
ENTITLED TO REGISTER THE PROPERTY BASED ON SECTION
14 (1) OR SECTION 14(2) OF PD 1529 OR BOTH.
The SC said that the evidence presented is insu cient to establish that
Malabanan thas acquired ownership over the subject property under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence
to establish that Malabanan or his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since June, 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest
that petitioners can date back their possession, as evidenced a tax
declaration, is to the year 1848. Therefore, they cannot register the land
under Sec. 14 (1). Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2)
as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared A&D in
1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for
public use, public service, or for the development of the national wealth.
The classi cation of the subject property as A&D land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription
To acquire a land through acquisitive prescription, the land must first be
classified as alienable and disposable before the period required will be
counted. Otherwise, the applicant’s possession cannot be tacked or
counted.
NOTE: It is required that the land be patrimonial or private in order for
prescription to run not merely alienable and disposable. See Dream
Village v. BCDA
How did the SC resolve these issues?
Naguit is still the controlling doctrine because it is mentioned in the
Herbieto case that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction because of
lack of publication.
How about the issue on prescription in this case? Most imp’t part
The land in question was already declared patrimonial on March 15,
1982 which was only a few years from the Malabanan’s date of
application for registration so that would mean that, by virtue of
prescription, he cannot qualify to acquire as owner.
Why? What are the rules on prescription with respect to
patrimonial property of the state?
If it is patrimonial property, there must be an express declaration or a
positive act (Act of Congress or Presidential Declaration) that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public
service or the development of national wealth.
What is the distinction between Sec. 14(1) in so far as the length
or duration is concerned and the prescription under Sec. 14(2)?
Sec. 14(1) — is settled under the ruling in Naguit wherein, AT THE
TIME OF FILING, the land must be alienable and disposable
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Sec. 14(2) — it is not enough that the land is alienable and disposable
but there must be a positive act by the government or express
declaration that the land in question is already patrimonial property
and not needed for public use, public service, etc.
It is stated in the Naguit that if you cannot prove possession prior to
June 12, 1945, then you can invoke Sec. 14(2).
Sec. 14 (1) Sec. 14 (2)
settled under the ruling in Naguit not only alienable and disposable but
wherein, AT THE TIME OF FILING, the there must be a positive act by the
land must be alienable and disposable government or express declaration that
the land in question is already
patrimonial property and not needed
for public use, public service, etc
registration on the basis of possession registration on the basis of prescription
2 types of prescription:
thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new
1. Ordinary prescription – 10 years (good faith)
2. Extraordinary prescription – 30 years (bad faith)
Where property is A&D and you assumed possession since June 12,
1945, you can invoke Sec. 14(2) but it is qualified that it is not enough
that it is A&D, there should be an express declaration that the land is
already patrimonial property of the State.
Once there is an express declaration that the land is a patrimonial
property, that’s the time the rules of prescription run. It does not
necessarily follow that once the land is declared as A&D, that the
government loses its control over it.
Until such time that it is given, awarded or granted to an individual,
State still retains ownership over the land that is declared as A&D as
part of the public domain.
Bar Question: (Prescription)
Anthony bought a piece of untitled agricultural land from Bert. Bert, in
turn, acquired the property by forging Carlo’s signature in a deed of sale
over the property. Carlo had been in possession of the property for 8
years, declared it for tax purposes, and religiously paid all taxes due on
the property. Anthony is not aware of the defect in Bert’s title, but has
not been in actual physical possession of the property from the time he
bought it from Bert, who had never been in possession. Anthony has
since then been in possession of the property for one year.
Can Anthony acquire ownership of the property by acquisitive
prescription? How many more years does he have to possess it to acquire
ownership?
Yes, Anthony can acquire ownership of the property thru acquisitive
prescription. In the present case, Anthony is a buyer/possessor in good faith
because he was not aware of the defect on Bert’s title. As such, Anthony can
acquire ownership and other real rights over immovable property through
open, continuous possession of ten years. Anthony needs nine years of
possession in addition to his one year of possession in good faith.
OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE LANDS BY RIGHT OF ACCESSION
Torrens System.
Section 14. (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing
laws.
ACCESSION
2. Filing of application for registration;
⁍ Accession — refers to the right of an owner of a thing to its products
as well as whatever is inseparably attached thereto as an
accessory. The accessory follows the principal
Basis in the Civil Code — Art. 440, NCC
6. Service of notice upon owners, occupants and those known to
Art 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything
which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either
naturally or artificially.
(SandeeSuan)
Requisites of Accession (applies to lakes, creeks, and streams):
1. That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of the river.
ACCRETION & ALLUVION
⁍ Accretion — defined as the addition of portions of soil, by gradual
deposition through the operation of natural causes, to that already
in the possession of the owner. (Black’s Law)
⁍ Alluvion — It refers to the accretion made by ow of rivers. A form of
accession natura, which is provided for in Articles 457 and 461.
Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by
the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands
adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value
bed.
Requisites of Accretion or Alluvion:
1. The change must be sudden;
2. The changing of the course must be more or less permanent, and
not temporary over flooding of another’s land;
3. The change of the river must be a natural one, not by artificial
means;
4. There must be definite abandonment by the government;
5. The river must continue to exist, that is, it must not completely dry
up or disappear.
Rationale of the law on accretion:
It is primarily anchored on the principle or right of accession in Art.
457. Also, to compensate the owner for the danger of loss that he
suffers because of the location of his lands.
Republic vs. Abrille
The trial court rendered judgment cancelling TCTs and directing the
Register of Deeds to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the
portions consisting of 82,127 square meters, the land involved, shall
have been segregated therefrom in accordance with law. On appeal, CA
certified the case to the SC.
Lower Court is upheld. The step taken by defendant-appellant in
petitioning the court for the approval of their Subdivision Plan with the
increased area is unwarranted and irregular.
The land in question is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in
area. Proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed
instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
The recourse under Section 44 of Act 496 is good only insofar as it
covers previously registered lands. In the instant case, the area of
82,127 sq.m, has not yet been brought under the operation of the
Worse, the approval of Subdivision Plans was without notice, more
particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect
or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under
Act 496, the following requisites should all be satisfied:
1. Survey by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;
3. Setting of the date for initial hearing of the application by the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application with all the documents attached
thereto by the Clerk of Court to the LRC;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and
place of the hearing in the Official Gazette;
have interests in the property by the sheriff;
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Judgment by the Court;
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10. Declaration by the Court and instruct- ing the LRC to issue a
decree of confirmation and registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
Commission;
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding
Register of Deeds, and
13. Transcription of the decree in the registration book and the issuance
of the owner's duplicate OCT to the applicant by the Register of
Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees. 
Bar Question: (Accretion)
The properties of Jessica and Jenny, who are neighbors, lie along the banks
of Marikina River. At certain times of the year, the river would swell and
as the water recedes, soil, rocks and other materials are deposited on
Jessica’s and Jenny’s properties. This pattern of the river swelling,
receding and depositing soil and other materials being deposited on the
neighbor’s properties have gone on for many years. Knowing this
pattern, Jessica constructed a concrete barrier about 2 meters from her
property line and extending towards the river, so that when the water
recedes, soil and other materials are trapped within this barrier. After
several years, the area between Jessica’s property line to the concrete
barrier was completely filled with soil, effectively increasing Jessica’s
property by 2 meters. Jenny’s property, where no barrier was
constructed, also increased by one meter along the side of the river.
If Jessica’s and Jenny’s properties are registered, will the benefit of such
registration extend to the increased of their properties?
If the properties of Jessica and Jenny are registered, the benefit of such
registration does not extend to the increased area of their properties.
Accretion does not automatically become registered land because there is a
specific technical description of the lot in its Torrens title. There must be a
separate application for registration of the alluvial deposits under the
Torrens system. (Grande vs. CA, G.R. L-17652)
Section 14. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
i. By law (Art. 712 NCC)
ii. Titles by escheat under Rule 91, Rules of Court
iii. Donation
iv. Succession
v. Voluntary Alienation
P.D. 1529 C.A. 141
deals with registered lands deals with unregistered lands
there already exists a title which the the presumption is that the land applied for
court need only confirm still pertains to the State, and the occupants
and possessors merely claim an interest in
the land by virtue of their imperfect title or
open, continuous, and notorious possession
SEC. 48 (B) OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, CA 141
came into their possession. Acme contended in its application that their
SECTION 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act ,
to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Susi vs Razon
Compliance with requirements for government grant
Where there is compliance with all the requirements, i.e., possession in
the manner and for the period required by law, for a government grant,
(SandeeSuan)
the land ipso jure ceases to be public land and becomes private
property
Doctrine: Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates
the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
land. When Razon applied for the purchase of the land, Susi had
already been in possession thereof personally for more than 30 years.
Given that, Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor being sufficient.
The moment all the requisites for the acquisition of land based on any
grounds under Sec. 14 of PD 1529 are existing, the land will
automatically become a private property of such grantee by operation of
law despite the fact that an OCT is not yet issued to the grantee.
In such a case, the Republic cannot anymore sell the land to another
person because the land is already private.
NOTE: Act 2874
In favor of Susi was the presumption juris et de jure established in Sec.
45(b) of Act. No. 2874. Under the law then in effect, actual and
physical possession of agricultural land of the public domain since
July 26, 1894 entitles one to a right to a certificate of title of said land.
Compliance with the possession for the nature and length of time
required gives rise to not just an entitlement to a grant, but a grant
from the Government without the necessity of the issuance of a title.
NOTE: Authority of Director of Lands
Once the land has ceased to form part of the public domain, and has
become private property, the Director of Lands no longer has
authority to sell such parcel of land. The sale of such parcel of land is
null and void.
SEC. 48 (C) OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, CA 141
SECTION 48. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted
in sub-section (b) hereof.
Republic vs IAC & ACME Plywood and Veneer Co
Application for registration by private corporation
Facts: In 1981, Acme Plywood and Veneers Co. Inc. applied for a land
registration of 5 parcels (481, 390 sqm) of land it allegedly acquired from
Mariano and Acer In el, both member of the Dumagat tribe. The Infiels
substantiates their ownership saying that their ancestors have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until it
adverse and continuous possession since 1962 and by tacking their
possession to that of the possession of the In els, they have already
acquired title over it; that the ownership of lands by corporations is
governed by the 1935 Constitution. Acme further proves that the
subject land is a private land after it ownership was given to the non-
Christian tribes pursuant to RA 3872. That also, they have
introduced more than 45 million pesos worth of improvements on the
land. Also that their ownership is recognized by Municipality of Isabela
through the donation it made which was accepted by the former.
The Director of Lands opposed to nothing of the allegations except the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution. DL contends that the registration
was commenced only in 1981 which was long after the 1973
Constitution took effect.
Article 14 Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. This
proscription is not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force the
time Acme bought the land in question. Hence, it cannot be registered
under Sec. 48 of CA 141. RTC and CA ruled in favor of the Director of
Lands.
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Issue: WON the title Infiels transferred to Acme in 1962 could be
confirmed in favor of Acme? And WON 1973 Constitution should
apply?
Ruling: The land was already private land to which the In els had a legally
sufficient transferable title in 1962 when Acme purchased it. Acme also
had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the
1935 constitution prohibiting Corporations from acquiring and owning
private lands. Even if the land remained technically “public” land despite
immemorial possession of the In els and their ancestors, until title in their
favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the
Public Land Act, there can be no question to Acme’s right to acquire the
same since there is no prohibition for corporation to acquire
incomplete or imperfect title. The only limitation was that
corporations could not hold or lease public agricultural lands in
excess of 1,024. 1973 Constitution also cannot defeat a right
already vested before the law came into effect, or invalidate
transaction then perfectly valid and proper.
Doctrine: Where at the time the corporation acquired the land, its
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession and occupation
thereof in the manner and for the period prescribed by law as to
entitle him to registration in his name, then the proscription against
corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain
except through lease does not apply for the land was no longer
public land but private property.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors in interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years) is converted to private property
by mere lapse or completion of said period.
Following that rule, the subject land was already private property at the
time it was acquired from the Infiels. Acme thereby acquired a
registerable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation’s holding or owning private land. (Comment: RA 1942 was
the law existing at this time)
The moment all the requisites for the acquisition of land based on any
grounds under Sec. 14 of PD 1529 are existing, the land will
automatically become a private property of such grantee by operation of
law despite the fact that an OCT is not yet issued to the grantee.
Thus, a private corporation which bought a land from the grantee is not
covered by the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution that private
corporations or associations cannot hold alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares because the
land was already private in character.
NOTE: ACME as prevailing jurisprudence
public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these
ACME has evolved what is now the prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter. ACME, although a private corporation, was qualified to apply
for the judicial confirmation of its title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, since the property at the time it was
purchased by it on 29 October 1962 was already a private land to
which they had a legally sufficient and transferrable title.
Ownership by Corporations — History
3. Registration under the Indigenous People’s Rights Act
1935 It allowed private juridical entities to acquire alienable lands of public
domain, which shall only be less than 1,024 hectares.
1973 Section 11, Article 14 of the said constitution stated that no private
corporation xxx may hold alienable lands except by lease not to
exceed 1000 hectares in area.
1987 Section 3, Article 12 retained the 1973 Constitution’s limitations, but
added lease period not exceeding 25 years and renewable for
not more than 25 years.
General Rule: Corporations are disqualified from owning alienable lands of public
domain except through lease.
— Exception: Where at the time the Corporation acquired the land, its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with OCENPO as to entitle him
registration in his name. The Constitutional prohibition will no longer apply
as the land, by virtue of prescription has become private. (Suzi vs. Razon)
(SandeeSuan)
Diaz vs Republic
The ruling in the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes is applicable in this
case and thus constitutes res judicata. The Supreme Court ruled that in
registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for
the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title an order
dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part
of the public domain constitutes res judicata not only against the
adverse claimant but also against all persons.
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession for it is shown by the evidence that the
land involved is largely mountainous and forested. It is well-settled that
forest land is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title whether
such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the
present Torrens system of registration nullifies the title. However, it is true
that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as
alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the
recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority
to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable,
timber and mineral lands) coupled with possession by the claimant as
well as that of her predecessors-in-interest.
In registration cases for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and
imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and
declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata,
not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.
Sps. Fortuna vs Republic
Even if they possessed the land within the 30 year period, just the same
they are not entitled to the registration of the land.
The alienable status of the land was not established by the Spouses
Fortuna. You must present an original certification of classification.
Period of possession: Sps. Fortuna were unable to prove possession
since May 8, 1947 because according to the SC, even assuming that
the lot is alienable and disposable, the fact remains that possession was
insufficient.
Doctrine: Land, being alienable and disposable, needs an
incontrovertible evidence. A mere certification of DENR is not
sufficient government act to classify lands as alienable and
disposable. The surveyor’s notation is insufficient to prove conversion
of land into A&D. In reality, the survey plan is done by the Bureau of
Lands. DENR will go over the cadastral map and if it sees that the land
is already A&D, it will approve the survey plan.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the
President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the
documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the
issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public
land as alienable and disposable.
NOTE: See Republic v. T.A.N. Properties for the documents considered
as proof that the land is alienable and disposable.
Read discussion in Cruz vs Sec. of DENR part.
a. R.A. No. 8371
b. Constitutionality
c. Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
d. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands
e. National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
Native Title
It refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far
back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private
ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the
Spanish Conquest.
Ancestral Domain
NCIP (National Commission for Indigenous People) may alienate and
identify land to be known now to be issued Certificate of Ancestral
Title simply to identify, to apprised the public that this land has been
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identified as an ancestral domain and ancestral land. No Torrens title
would be issued.
An ancestral domain may not be titled. This is a communally owned
land of the indigenous people. On the other hand, an ancestral land
has to be titled. For this purpose, it has to be declared to be
agricultural but it does not have to be declared as alienable and
disposable. Neither is this covered under PD 705(the Forestry Code).
As presented by Agcaoili, 18% slope for the land this is not
considered as registrable but for ancestral lands, this does not apply
to the latter.
4. Forms and Contents (Section 15-19)
Section 15. Form and contents. The application for land registration shall be in
writing, signed by the application or the person duly authorized in his behalf, and
sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oaths for the province or city
where the application was actually signed. If there is more than one applicant, the
application shall be signed and sworn to by and in behalf of each. The application
shall contain a description of the land and shall state the citizenship and civil
status of the applicant, whether single or married, and, if married, the name of the
wife or husband, and, if the marriage has been legally dissolved, when and how
the marriage relation terminated. It shall also state the full names and addresses
of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners, if known, and, if
not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to find them.
Section 17. What and where to file. The application for land registration shall be
filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is
situated. The applicant shall file together with the application all original
muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by
the Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the
applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all
annexes.
A. WHAT TO FILE
addressed to the administrator.
• Application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and
a survey plan of the land approved by the Bureau of Lands
B. WHERE TO FILE
13. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the
• Filed with the Court of First Instance (Regional Trial Court) of
province or city where land is situated
C. STEPS IN BRINGING A LAND UNDER TORRENS SYSTEM
upon payment of the prescribed fees.
In order that land may be brought under the operation of the Torrens
system, the following steps should be observed:
1. Survey of land by the Lands Management Bureau or a duly
licensed private surveyor.
- The purpose of this is to identify precisely the land which is the
subject matter of the registration. It is only the DENR through
the Regional Director who can approve the original survey
plans (PD 239)
- This used to be covered by a tracing cloth plan. The submission
of the original tracing cloth plan is a jurisdictional requirement
which is mandatory in character. Failure to submit this is a
ground for denial of application. Lately, they used another kind
of material(diastole polyester film idk). Either are acceptable.
The original of this normally would be submitted to the LRA
since they are the official repository of all documents and
monuments of title pertaining to original registration. Although
in a Circular way back in 2000, the LRA issued that a blueprint/
whiteprint may be submitted since the original would be
submitted to court.
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant
- To the RTC or lower courts
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by
the court
- The courts within 5 days of the receipt of application, they will set
the case for initial hearing which would not be earlier than 45
days or later than 90 days from the date of the order setting the
case for initial hearing.
(SandeeSuan)
- Applicant will now have to comply with the jurisdictional
requirement (posting, mailing and notices etc) ! During the
Initial Hearing
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing
together with all the documents or other evidence attached
thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration
Authority.
5. Publication of the notice of the filing of the application and
date and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation.
6. Service by mailing of notice upon contiguous owners,
occupants and those known to have interests in the property.
7. Posting by the sherriff of the notice in a conspicuous place on
the land and in the bulletin board of the municipal building or
city where the land is situated.
8. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether
named in the notice or not.
- Then if the Solicitor General would oppose, then the filing of the
answer. During the hearing, the OSG does not appear or
actively take part in the proceeding. They are relying on the
fact that the RP has this inherent power that the applicant has
to prove incontrovertibly that they are owners of the land. This
is done usually on appeal, the SC will have to decide if the
applicant has satisfied the requirements.
9. Hearing of the case by the court.
10. Promulgation of judgment by the court.
11. Issuance of an order for the issuance of a decree declaring the
decision final and instructing the Land Registration Authority
to issue the decree of confirmation and registration.
- When this becomes final, the Court issues a decree which is
12. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
Authority
corresponding Register of Deeds.
14. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration
book and the issuance of the owner’s duplicate original
certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds,
- Which is an exact copy or the OCT itself will now be transmitted
to the office of the Register of Deeds whom transcribes it in his
book of transcription. Then the title takes effect.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements will justify the court
to deny the application for registration.
D. AMENDMENTS OF BOUNDARIES OR AREA
Section 19, P.D. 1529
Section 19. Amendments. Amendments to the application including joinder,
substitution, or discontinuance as to parties may be allowed by the court at any
stage of the proceedings upon just and reasonable terms.
Amendments which shall consist in a substantial change in the boundaries or an
increase in area of the land applied for or which involve the inclusion of an
additional land shall be subject to the same requirements of publication and
notice as in an original application.
Benin vs Tuazon
Doctrine: Once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a
certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue
of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land
or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown
that the decree of registration had included land or lands not included in
the original application as published, then the registration proceedings
and the decree of registration must be declared null and void insofar –
but only insofar – as the land not included in the publication is
concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the land not included in the publication the publication being the
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basis of the jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the
decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included in the
publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had
been issued covering lands where the registration court had no
jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns
the land or lands over which the registration court had not acquired
jurisdiction.
There was an excess land of 27 sq. meters.
It was already res judicata.
LESSON: Even if there is an excess area, it will not affect the decree of
registration over the entire area. It will only be invalid regarding the excess
area for there is no jurisdiction acquired.
Dream Village vs Bases Development Authority
Even if the land is considered as alienable and disposable, there has to be
an expressed proclamation by the government (Executive department)
stating that the land is not intended for public use.
Even if the land was considered A and D and even considered as
patrimonial property of the state, just the same it is part of the Public
Domain since it was intended to the service of the development of the
national wealth.
Under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become
patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable
or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property
has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2)
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before
acquisitive prescription can commence, the property sought to be
registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable, it
must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth, or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Absent such an
express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of
public dominion.
Purpose of the BCDA — to sell military camps to defray the expenses;
proceeds of the sale will be used as capital
Property owned by BCDA is patrimonial but it is still part of public domain.
E. SURVEY OF THE LAND
land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the
Republic vs Sarmiento
The Survey plan was not approved by the Director of Lands. The SC has
ruled that for the survey plan to be admissible for the registration, it isn’t
enough to have the land classified as A and D but there must be a
positive act from the government.
Notwithstanding the weakness of the oppositor, the applicant has the
burden of proof to show that the land is A and D and the possession
has satisfied the number of years.
Sarmiento filed for an application for registration of land. To support his
claim, he presented the notation of surveyor-geodetic engineer which
states that “this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area” to
prove that the lot is alienable. The Court ruled that the reliance on such
notation of surveyor-geodetic engineer is insufficient and does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Doctrine: It is required that the application for registration must be
accompanied by a survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director
of Lands, together with the claimant’s muniments of title to prove
ownership. No plan or survey may be admitted in the land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands.
Petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land.
Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere
surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.
(SandeeSuan)
Carpo vs Ayala Land
Carpo filed a complaint for the quieting of title against Ayala Land
Incorporated. Ayala pointed out that it traces back its original title in
OCT No.242 issued in 1950 while Carpo's title was derived from OCT
No. 8575 issued only in 1970.CA ruled that Carpo's cause of action has
been barred by prescription and laches. But the latter alleged that
Ayala's title is void for want of duly approved survey plan, thus their
cause of action did not prescribe.
Doctrine: The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of
mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the Director of Lands the same
are not of much value. It is admitted that a survey plan is one of the
requirements for the issuance of decrees of registration; it can most
certainly be assumed that said requirement was complied with by
Ayala's original predecessors-in-interest- at the time the latter sought
original registration of the subject property.
In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application
should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for
registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A
survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands
has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore
worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by
the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to
have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of the
Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a
survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands
is tainted with irregularity and therefore void.
A survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of
registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it can most certainly
be assumed that said requirement was complied with by ALI's original
predecessor-in-interest at the time the latter sought original registration
of the subject property. Moreover, the land registration court must be
assumed to have carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree
in favor of ALI's predecessor-in- interest, under the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers. The
court upon which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have
all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have
exercised it effectively. This is as it should be, because once a decree of
registration is made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed
within which that decree may be questioned the title is perfect and
cannot later on be questioned.
In the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land,
the earlier in date prevails. In successive registrations, where more than
one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or
indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof.
SC: In all, we find that the CA committed no reversible error when it
applied the principle "Primus Tempore, Portior Jure" (First in Time,
Stronger in Right) in this case and found that ALI's title was the valid title
having been derived from the earlier OCT.
5. Publication, Opposition of and Default (Sec. 23)
Section 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five
days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety
days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
3 Modes of Giving Notice, Necessary.
Section 23 directs that the court, within 5 days from the filing of the
application, shall issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days
from the date of the order. The public shall be given notice of the
initial hearing by means of: (a) publication, (b) mailing, and (c)
posting. This requirement of giving notice by all 3 modes is
mandatory.
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A. NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING
Republic vs dela Paz
(1) Publication
One must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the
The publicity which permeates the whole system established for the
registration of real property requires that the application for
registration be accompanied by a plan of the land, together with its
description, and that all the owners of the adjacent properties and
all other persons who may have an interest in the realty shall be
notified, which notification with a description of the property
concerned in the application, shall be published in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation.
Publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon
the land registration court. However, absent any publication of the
notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, the
land registration court cannot validly confirm and register the title of
the applicants. The rationale behind the newspaper publication is
due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely
read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its
circulation.
(2) Mailing
merely an indicia of ownership.
In addition to publication, mailing is also an indispensable and
mandatory requirement for notice of initial hearing.
Within 7 days from publication in the Official Gazette, LRA
Administrator shall cause a copy of the notice to be mailed to every
person named in the notice whose address is known.
(3) Posting
The moment you want to avail B.P 185, you should be able to show that
The third mode of giving notice of the initial hearing is by posting.
Within 14 days before the initial hearing, the LRA Administrator
shall cause a duly attested copy of the notice to be posted by the
sheriff in a conspicuous place on the land applied for and also in
a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the municipality
or city in which the land is situated. This requirement is also
mandatory.
Director of Lands vs CA & Abistado
Petitioner: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to confer
jurisdiction upon the trial court and in a newspaper of general circulation
to comply with the notice requirement of due process.
Abistado: Failure to comply with publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is a mere "procedural defect". The publication in the OG is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
SC: The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for
land registration by means of; (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting.
A land registration is a proceeding in rem so the process must be strictly
complied with. Why is there a need to publish in a newspaper of general
circulation when there is publication in OG, mailing and posting already?
For due process, and because of the reality that the OG is not as widely
read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its
circulation, such that notices may not reach interested parties on time, if
at all. Application for land registration is hereby dismissed, without
prejudice to reapplication in the future.
Doctrine: Publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
mandatory. There are several issues with the Official Gazette which
might not meet the purpose of publication such as not too many read
them, late publications and the like. Given this, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is more In keeping with an in rem
proceeding and affords due process to anyone who may have an
adverse claim over the subject property.
B. PROOF REQUIRED IN REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
CFI of Negros Oriental. The CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated
Applicant must show, even in the absence of opposition, that he is
the absolute owner, in fee simple, of such land.
The burden is on applicant to prove his positive averments and not for
the government or the private oppositors to establish a negative
proposition. He must submit convincing proof of his and his
predecessors-in-interest’s actual, peaceful and adverse possession
in the concept of owner of the lots during the period required by law.
(SandeeSuan)
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the
DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable,
and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by
the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts
must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable. The annotation of the Geodetic Engineer on the survey
plan is insufficient.
Doctrine: The presumption is all lands belong to the State. To overcome
such presumption, an incontrovertible evidence must be established
that the land of application is alienable or disposable. There has to be
certification from the proper government agency to establish that land is
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Moreover, aside
from proving that land is alienable and disposable, it must be proved as
well that land has been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive
possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Tax declaration of 1949 is
Republic vs CA & Lapina
A foreign national may validly apply for registration of title over a parcel of
land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines
from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration
under the Public Land Act.
you have the intention to reside in the country permanently. RA 7042
amended RA 8179 which is called National Incentive Law which allows
a former Filipino who became a citizen of another country, this time to
acquire a private land after a maximum of an area of 5,000 sq meters of
urban land and 3 hectares for rural lands for use for business or other
purposes.
Doctrine: Regardless of your citizenship upon registration, what is
only necessary is that you are a Filipino when you acquired the
land as the owner. Under Sec 48 of CA 141, the law tacks possession
over the property from predecessor-in- interest. It does not matter
whether the applicant has been in possession of the subject property
for only a day, so long as the period and or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessors-in-
interest. Since the Lapina’s predecessors-in-interest have been shown
to have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation over the land since 1937. The land, therefore, became
private land and therefore registrable.
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership, but merely a formality
aimed to confirm a title which one already has. The Lapinas, therefore,
had no legal impediments to register the land which they validly and
legally acquired while they were Filipinos.
Former filipinos may acquire private lands. Submit a sworn statement
stating that he has the intention of staying permanently in the Philippines
EXCEPTION for Section 7, Art. 12 of the Constitution
(1) RA 8179 — Foreign Investments Act
(2) RA 9225 — Citizenship Retention and
C. ISSUANCE OF DEGREE
Republic vs Nillas
No time limit for issuance of decree
In 1997, the respondent seeks for the revival of the 1941 decision of the
several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named
oppositors who had established their title to their respective lots and
their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the
decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration. The
petitioner contends that the petition of the respondent is barred by
prescription or laches due to the lapse of time from 1941 up to 1997.
Doctrine: Prescription or laches is not a bar to the petition for
revival instituted by the respondent. If it is sufficiently
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established before that body that there is an authentic standing
judgment or order from a land registration court that remains
unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the
issuance of the decree of registration. The SC held it in a negative.
The SC reiterated the process in issuing of decree as contemplated in
Sec. 39 P.D. 1529 to support the conclusion that in this procedure, the
failure of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of
the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from
ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up
with said authorities can. The SC also emphasized the ultimate goal of
our land registration system and such imposition of an additional burden
to the owner after judgment in the land registration case had attained
finality would simply frustrate such goal.
A decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title
becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that
the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of
title. But there is no time limit within which the court may order the
issuance of the decree.
In a land registration proceeding, a special proceeding, the purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; it is the ownership by a person of a
parcel of land that is sought to be established. After ownership has
been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce judgment is necessary, except when the adverse
or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party
desires to oust him therefrom.
Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no
further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty
exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the
issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in
the issuance of the decree cannot oust the prevailing party from
ownership of the land. The primary recourse need not be with the
courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of
registration remains. There is no need for a revival of judgment.
When the decision becomes final, you only have 5 years to question
the judgement.
Ting vs Heirs of Lirio
When decision becomes final
Sec. 30 of the Property Registration Decree provides: “x x x The
judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final
upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the date of
receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the
judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases. x x x”
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party
is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period or perfecting an appeal.
In 1976, CFI granted the application filed by the Spouses Lirio for
registration of title to the subject lot. The decision later became final and
executory in 1977. The judge then issued an order directing the LRC to
issue the corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title
in favor of the spouses.
In 1997, Rolando Ting filed with RTC an application for registration of the
title to the same lot. The respondents then filed an answer to petitioner,
calling attention to the decision of CFI which had become final and
executory, and that Ting is barred in filing the application on the ground
of res judicata.
The RTC dismissed Ting’s application on the ground of res judicata.
Doctrine: In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a
private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court
confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be,
and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res
judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when no appeal
within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation
and registration.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to
Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,
except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a
writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
further action, upon the expiration of the period
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree provides that after judgment has become final and executory, it
shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance
with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of
(SandeeSuan)
the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in
favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration
court’s approval of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s application
for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the
whole world including petitioner.
NOTE: Approval of resurvey plan by DENR
The LRA is supposed to submit a report in the land registration court
regarding certain discrepancies and deficiencies in the survey plan.
But, in this case of the Tings, this the LRA failed to do. According to
the Supreme Court, there is nothing wrong about the requirement that
the resurvey plan should first be approved by the DENR.
D. WHEN OCT TAKES EFFECT
When an Original Certificate of Title takes effect
The original certificate of title is issued on the date the decree of
registration is transcribed. What stands as the certificate of title is the
transcript of the decree or registration made by the registrar of deeds
in the registry.
Manotok Realty vs CLT Realty
Transcription of Decree
Both petitioners and respondent claim ownership over a parcel of land.
Claim of ownership sprung from OCT 994. The confusion arises
because of the fact that the petitioner’s OCT 994 was registered on May
3, 1917 while respondent’s OCT 994 was registered on April 19, 1917.
Record shows that OCT 994 was received by the Register of Deeds for
Transcription of May 3, 1917.
The land becomes a registered land only upon the transcription of the
decree in the original registration book by the Register of Deeds, and
not the date of issuance of the decree. The certificate of title is a true
copy of the decree of registration. The original certificate of title contains
the full transcription of the decree of registration.
Any defect in the manner of transcribing the technical description should
be considered as a formal, and not a substantial, defect.
NOTE: Primary entry book
The original registration book mentioned here is actually the primary entry
book. The Registry of Deeds does not maintain a separate registration
book for OCTs only.
NOTE: Process of entry of decree
Entry of the Decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and
the entry of the certificate of title is made by the register of deeds. A
certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration.
What is actually issued by the Register of Deeds is the certificate of title
itself, not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the recipient from
the land registration office of the decree for transcription to the
certificate as well as the transcriber no less.
Doctrine: OCT takes effect and land becomes registered land only
upon transcription of the decree. The land becomes a registered
land only upon the transcription of the decree in the original registration
book by the Register of Deeds, and not on the date of issuance of the
decree. Otherwise stated, as soon as the decree has been registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds, the property described therein shall
become registered land, and the certificate shall take effect upon
transcription of the decree.
A decree of registration is an order issued under the signature of the
Commissioner of Land Registration (formerly Chief, G.L.R.O.) in the
name of the Judge to the fact that the land described therein is
registered in the name of the applicant or oppositor or claimant as the
case maybe. When this is transcribed or spread in toto in the
registration book and signed by the register of deeds, the page on
which the transcription is made become the original certificate of title,
more commonly called the Torrens title. It is only after the transcription
of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of title is to
take effect.
Thus, when there are two similar OCTs, the OCT which was issued before
the time such is transcribed in the registration book and signed by the
register of deeds
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Angeles vs Secretary of Justice
Re: writ of mandamus against LRA officials
Two OCTs were issued, one in April 1917, another in May 1917.
Transcription was on May 1917.
A TCT anchored on a void OCT for it was issued before such date when
it took effect.
Doctrine: OCT takes effect and land becomes registered land only
upon transcription of the decree. A certificate of title takes effect
upon the transcription by the Register of Deeds in its registration book,
and not on the date of registration. The date April 1917 was the date of
the issuance of the title, but it was only on May 1917 that the title was
transcribed.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary
duty. The issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not
a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result
to the double titling of the same parcel of land.
NOTE: Effect of probable duplication of titles
The very basis of petitioners’ claim is the earlier registered OCT No. 994,
which was declared as null and void in the 2007 Manotok case. If the
LRA officials and the Register of Deeds were to issue the title, it would
result to the overlapping of titles.
Such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
Q: What would happen to a buyer of any property that is related to the
said null and void OCT 994, considering he is a buyer in good faith?
A: Even if the buyer claims that he is a purchaser in good faith, the title
would still remain null and void. The spring cannot rise higher than its
source.
Q: Is there a remedy available to the purchaser in good faith?
A: Yes, damages.
6. Classification of Public Lands
Classification of Public Lands under the 1987 Constitution
and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
1. Agricultural
2. Forest of Timber
3. Mineral
4. National Parks
Classification of public land is an executive prerogative  CA No. 141
(Public Land Act), as amended, remains to this day the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of
the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands.  The
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
executive department of the government and not of the courts.
Who may classify lands of the public domain?
CA 141, until now, governs the classification and disposition of lands
of the public domain. Under CA 141, the President, through a
presidential proclamation or executive order, is authorized, from time
to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands. The Secretary of DENR is the
only other public official empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.
System of classification
disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the
a. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands
of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or
mineral lands.
b. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further
classified according to their uses into:
i. Agricultural
(SandeeSuan)
ii. Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
iii. Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or
iv. Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-
public uses.
c. The Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), is the only other public official empowered by law to
approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable
and disposable.
Requirements to establish classification
1. Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO) to certify that land is alienable and disposable (A and
D);
2. Applicant must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as
A and D land;
3. That the land falls within the land classification map as verified
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO;
4. The applicant must present a certified copy of the DENR
Secretary’s declaration or the President’s proclamation
classifying the land as alienable and disposable.
Only A and D lands may be the subject of disposition
Before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public
domain, the President must first officially classify these lands as
alienable and disposable, and then declare them open to disposition
or cession.
Director of Lands vs CA & Bisnar
Re: Forest or Timber Lands
Adherence to the Regalian doctrine subject all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may
be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable and
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
positive act from government.
Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles does not apply unless
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of public domain.
The petitioner through the OSG seeks to review the findings of the CA
regarding the decision of the latter which affirmed the decision of the
RTC which granted the private respondents application for confirmation
and registration of their title to two parcels of land. The petitioners
contended that the two parcels of land are classified by the director of
forestry as timberland and therefore the private respondents could not
have private ownership notwithstanding the fact that the latter was in
possession of the land for over 80 years. On appeal, the Appellate
Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of
the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the
absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest
land than as agricultural land.
Doctrine: Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership so long as there is no classification of the
land as alienable and disposable by the Executive Department.
The classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable is no longer a prerogative of the court. There should be no
more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the
classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the Office
of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion
for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the
then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.
Positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. Unless and until the land classified as
forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
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L A N D T I T L E S M I D T E R M S ( 2 0 17 ) A t t y. G i m a r i n o
As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was
lifted from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative
of the Executive Department of the government and not the courts.
With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not
the court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of
the government, through the Office of the President.
Republic vs CA (discussed above)
In 1930, the Trial Court of Cagayan issued a Decree No. 381928 giving
the Spouses Carag’s predecessors an OCT for a parcel of land. The
government was a party to this case. 68 years later the Reg. Executive
Director of DENR filed an action to annul the said decree on the ground
that the trial court had no jurisdiction of the case. He said that at the
time of the issuance of the decree the land was still timber and thus not
alienable and disposable. He said during 1930 it was the Exec Branch
of the Government that had power to classify lands of the public
domain. Thus, the trial court having no jurisdiction the title given to the
Spouses were null and void.
The law prevailing the time of the issuance of the decree was Act 2874.
Sec.6 of the act said that the Gov. Gen shall classify the lands.
However, in the case at bar the petitioner did not allege that the Gov
Gen declared the subject land as mineral, timber or reserved for public
purpose. Also, sec 8 of the same act states that land that were
classified as A&D as well as those private land can be disposed by the
government. But as to the lands excluded from the classification
requirement, the trial court has jurisdiction to adjudicate them to private
parties.
The SC said that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the
property was agricultural, timber or mineral land. Since the TC
determined the land as agricultural the Spouses Carag were entitled to
the decree and the certificate of title. Also, the government was a party
to that issuance of decree in 1930, however they did not appeal the
decision, thus the judgement of the court was final and beyond review.
Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing
of the action. Under the applicable law at the time of the
issuance of the decree, all lands owned by the State are
alienable lands unless declared as mineral or forest zone, or
reserved by the State for public purpose. While it is true that under
the prevailing law at that time (Act No. 2874), the disposition of lands is
confined to those which have been declared alienable or disposable,
this provides for an exception such as those lands that were already
private lands. Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the
classification requirement in, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate
these lands to private parties.
Act 2874, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands,
as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law,
are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for
purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that
during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless
falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some
public purpose in accordance with law.
Leonardo de Castro vs Mayor Yap (discussed above)
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up
to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed
of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine
who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under
what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would
be ordinary acts of ownership.
Classification of Boracay Island
a. President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay
Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
b. Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Under PD No. 705, or Revised Forestry Code, all unclassified
lands are considered public forest.
(SandeeSuan)
Republic vs T.A.N. Properties
Re: Approval by DENR Secretary
FACTS: TAN Properties applied for registration over a parcel of land. It
presented a certification from CENRO that the property falls within the
“alienable and disposable” area.
Doctrine: CENRO certification is not sufficient proof that the land
has been classified A&D. There must be a certification from the
Secretary of the DENR attesting that the land had indeed been
classified as A&D.
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
20, dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the
offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the
CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below
50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering
over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No.
20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of
the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas
below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50
hectares. In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-
B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007
square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705
with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38,
series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as
alienable and disposable.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and
that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO.
In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must
be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
NOTE: CENRO and PENRO issuances
CENROs may issue certificates of land classification status for areas
below 50 hectares, while those falling above 50 hectares is within the
function of the PENROs
NOTE: Need for classification as A and D
Even though it is a government agency, you have to classify the land as A
and D. (CMU v. Republic)
NOTE: Registration not always available
In so far as registration is concerned, what might be legal might not be
registrable. Because there are certain rules in registration. In other
words, although one may have a right over a property by virtue of a
proclamation in their favor, whether or not the land may be registered
under their name is an entirely different story.
Republic vs Santos
GR no. 160453
By law, accretion — the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through
the effects of the current of the water-belongs to the owner of the land
adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river
is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as
property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law
vests the ownership in some other person.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of
proof to establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of
evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or
more
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L A N D T I T L E S M I D T E R M S ( 2 0 17 ) A t t y. G i m a r i n o
QUESTION No.1: Angel filed a petition for registration of a parcel of land
on June 22, 1994 claiming that he has been in actual, open, continuous
and notorious possession, in the concept of an owner over the same. It
appears that he likewise filed a foreshore lease application over the same
land in 1977. During the trial, the court ordered the LRA and the
CENRO to file with it a report on the status of the subject land. The court
thereafter rendered a decision on May 3 1995 granting the petition. The
said decision became final and executory. The Office of the Solicitor
general subsequently filed a petition for annulment of the above
judgment on the ground that based on the report of the LRA which was
received by it on June 22, 1995, the land applied for is foreshore land.
a) What is the nature and classification of foreshore land?
b) Will the action of the Republic through the OSG prosper?
ANSWERS:
a) NO. Foreshore land is that strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and is alternatively wet and dry to the flow of the tide. It is
that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which is alternatively covered
and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of the alienable land of
the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not
otherwise. Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is
outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of private appropriation.
b) YES. Even if the decision of the RTC has become final and executory, the
action for annulment of judgment should be sustained since it is
impressed with public interest. The State has to protect its interests and
cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of
its officials or agents, mush more, non-suited as a result thereof.
Furthermore, Angel had in fact filed a foreshore lease application in 1977
and paid the corresponding fees thereon. There is therefore doubt to
Angel’s claim that he had been in actual, open, notorious, and
continuous possession in the concept of an owner.
QUESTION No.2: On December 27, 1976, Francisco filed a petition for
registration of the three parcels of land. He alleged therein that there
were hardly any big trees in the subject property and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest even planted bananas, cassava, coconut trees
and camotes on the same. He further alleged that he had been in actual,
open, notorious and continuous possession of the property in the
concept of owner. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands
on the ground that the subject property was forest land and was only
reclassified as alienable and disposable only on April 16, 1973.
a) Should the petition for registration be granted?
b) Is the absence of big trees conclusive as regards to the classification of a
parcel of land as not belonging to forest land?
ANSWERS:
a) NO. Under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No.141, the classification
and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. The rule on
the confirmation of imperfect title does not apply unless and until the
land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain. Francisco failed to adduce in evidence any certification
from the Bureau of Lands or the Bureau of Forestry to the effect that the
property is alienable or disposable. Furthermore, since the property was
reclassified as alienable and disposable only on April 16, 1973 and
Francisco filed his application only on December 27, 1976, he
irrefragably failed to prove his possession of the property for the
requisite thirty (30)-year period.
b) NO. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by Kaingin cultivators
or other farmers. “Forest Lands” do not have to be in the mountains or in
out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like.
7. Non-Registrable Properties
What properties are not registrable?
part of the public forest, then any possession thereof, however how
With respect to land banking program of Bedrock, the following
properties may not be registered under the Torrens System with any
Register of Deeds:
(a) inalienable lands of the public domain; and
(b) those prohibited under the Constitution (such as national
parks, mineral lands, forest or timber lands and agricultural
lands not classified as alienable and disposable)
(SandeeSuan)
Santulan vs. Executive Secretary
Re: Preferential Right to Lease Foreshore Lands
Petitioner Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin who have been succeeded
by their heirs were rival claimants with respect to the lease of a parcel of
foreshore land of public domain in Cavite. The Petitioner applied for
revocable permit for planting then fishpond of Bakawan. He also
acquired OCT over the land. On the other hand, private respondent
Lusin was reported that he illegally entered the area covered by the
petitioners fishpond permit. However, private respondent Lusin filed
applications for a revocable-permit and a lease of a foreshore. He also
contends that he had been in continuous and exclusive possession of
the land and had improvements including water breakers. The 1942
foreshore lease applications of Petitioner Santulan and private
respondent Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands conflict.
Doctrine: Disputed land was subject to “riparian rights” of Julian
Santulan as owner of the upland of the foreshore. The foreshore land
that accumulated on land covered by OCT subjected the land to the
preferential right to lease the land and cannot be nullified by allegations
of possession and improvements of the land. The owner of the OCT
has the preferential right to lease the land.
Paragraph 32 of Land Administrative Order No. 7-1, promulgated for the
disposition of alienable lands of the public domain, provides: “x x x The
owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands
covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable rivers,
shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his
property as may not be needed for public service, subject to the
laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he
applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a
communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his
preferential right.”
In sum, the riparian owner of the registered land abutting upon the
foreshore land has the preferential right to lease foreshore land.
NOTE: Riparian owner
The term “riparian owner” embraces not only the owners of lands on the
banks of rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters.
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits when they
are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary
for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coast guard service, may be declared by the
Government as its patrimonial property and may be leased to the
riparian owner as having a preferential right.
Republic vs CA & Lastimado
Lastimado filed a petition for the reopening of cadastral proceedings over
a portion of the Mariveles Cadastre. There was no opposition from the
Government or other private individuals. The court adjudicated the land,
after an ex-parte proceeding and ordered an issuance of a decree of
registration. A decree, and then an OCT was issued in Lastimado’s
name. She then caused the lot to be subdivided into 10 lots, and thus
corresponding TCTs were issued.
A year after the entry of the decree of registration, the Republic filed a
Petition for Review alleging fraud during the alleged adverse possession
since the lot was part of the US Military Reservation and was inside the
public forest. According to the Republic, the land was not subject to
disposition or acquisition under the Public Land Act.
Doctrine: The Government is not estopped from questioning the
decision. The State cannot be bound by the mistakes of its agents or
officials. Since the subject property was inside the military reservation, it
cannot be the object of cadastral proceedings; and since it also forms
long can never convert it to private property.
If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the
military reservation at the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be
the object of any cadastral nor can it be the object of reopening under
Republic Act No. 931. Similarly, if the land in question, indeed forms
part of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
Cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System.
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Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for inaction
and neglect (although the Solicitor General claims that it received no
notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by the State as it
cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials
Chavez vs Public Estates Authority (PEA)
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being
reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority. The
Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency
tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about
to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with
AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement
between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands (77.34 hecatares) and several portions
of submerged areas of Manila Bay( 290.156 hectares) were going to be
transferred to AMARI .
Doctrine: Alienable lands of the public domain cannot be sold to
private corporations. It can only be leased to the latter.
Ownership of alienable lands of the public domain can only be
vested upon individuals.
The transfer of PEA to AMARI was not valid. To allow vast areas of
reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to AMARI as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain (Sec. 3). Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as
amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease. Also Sec. 2 of the Constitution prohibits
the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain.
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to
private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution
and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections
2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or
whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and
void from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend
and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA
null and void ab initio.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with
Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands
of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands
of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or
to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these
lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the
constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the
public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a
government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.
Chavez vs NHA & Romero
In the case of NHA, how come property can be transferred?
The PEA corpo is more or less the administrator of land agencies of
government who are already end-users, thats why it can validly transfer
the lands involved herein. It is already a patrimonial property of the State
and when it was alienated they have a special pass to manage,
administer as his own of the land. In the hands of an end user, such as
NHA the land is already considered as a private land
Despite not having a congressional approval or explicit declaration, the
lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use thru the
proclamation no. 39 which states “disposed to qualified beneficiaries” it
served as an implied evidence that the lands were already alienable and
disposable.
When the titles to the reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA, said
alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically
classified as lands of the patrimonial properties of the State because the
NHA is an agency NOT tasked to dispose of alienable or disposable
lands of public domain unlike in PEA in the previous case. The only way
(SandeeSuan)
it can transfer to the reclaimed land in conjunction with its housing
projects and to attain its goals is when it is automatically converted to
patrimonial properties of the State.
Angel filed a petition for registration of a parcel of land on June 22, 1994
claiming that he has been in actual, open, continuous and notorious
possession, in the concept of an owner over the same. It appears that he
likewise filed a foreshore lease application over the same land in 1977.
During the trial, the court ordered the LRA and the CENRO to file with
it a report on the status of the subject land. The court thereafter rendered
a decision on May 3 1995 granting the petition. The said decision became
final and executory. The Office of the Solicitor general subsequently filed
a petition for annulment of the above judgment on the ground that
based on the report of the LRA which was received by it on June 22,
1995, the land applied for is foreshore land.
a) What is the nature and classification of foreshore land?
b) Will the action of the Republic through the OSG prosper?
Answer:
A. NO. Foreshore land is that strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and is alternatively wet and dry to the flow of the tide. It is
that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which is alternatively covered
and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of the alienable land of
the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not
otherwise. Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is
outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of private appropriation.
B. YES. Even if the decision of the RTC has become final and executory, the
action for annulment of judgment should be sustained since it is
impressed with public interest. The State has to protect its interests and
cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of
its officials or agents, mush more, non-suited as a result thereof.
Furthermore, Angel had in fact filed a foreshore lease application in 1977
and paid the corresponding fees thereon. There is therefore doubt to
Angel’s claim that he had been in actual, open, notorious, and
continuous possession in the concept of an owner.
8. Remedies
Remedies available to the aggrieved party
(1) Rule 37 of Rules of Court – Remedy of New Trial or
Reconsideration
(2) Rule 38 of Rules of Court – Relief from Judgment
(3) Section 33 of PD 1529 – Appeal
(4) Section 32 of PD 1529 – Review of Decree and Damages
(5) Section 53 and 96 of PD 1529 – Reconveyance
(6) Section 95 of PD 1529 – Claim against Assurance Fund
(7) Section 101 of CA 141 – Reversion
(8) Rule 47 of Rules of Court – Cancellation of Title, Annulment of
Judgment
(9) RPC – Criminal Prosecution
Remedies Available in a Registration Case
a. Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration (Rule 31, RoC)
b. Petition for Relief from Judgement (Rule 38, RoC)
c. Appeal (Sec. 33, PD 1529)
a. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION (RULE 31)
Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move
the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a
new trial for one or more of the causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of said party.
- If motion for new trial is granted — the judgment is set aside;
- If motion for reconsideration is granted — the judgment is merely
amended.
The period for filing either motion is within the period for taking, not
perfecting, an appeal. An appeal may be taken within fifteen (15)
days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days after notice of the judgment or final order.
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L A N D T I T L E S M I D T E R M S ( 2 0 17 ) A t t y. G i m a r i n o

GROUNDS:
exclusive of each other. He should appeal from the judgment and
(1) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which question such denial.
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by
reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been
impaired in his rights;
c. APPEAL (SEC. 33, PD 1529)

Sec 33. Appeal from judgment, etc. The judgment and orders of the court hearing
(2) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable the land registration case are appealable to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme
diligence, have discovered, and produced at the trial, and Court in the same manner as in ordinary actions.
which if presented would probably alter the result.
— Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
for reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared
awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to
by the Rules of Court to be appealable.
justify the decision or final order or that decision or final order
is contrary to law.
• It must be filed within 15 days from receipt of the judgment or final
order appealed from
Only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a
ground for annulling a judgment. • Under PD 1529, judgments and orders in land registration cases
are  appealable to the CA or to the SC  in the same manner as
❖ Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party
ordinary actions.
in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case against
the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby
said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his Who may file an appeal in land registration cases?

side of the case.
❖ Intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in litigation during the trial,
such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which
did not
Only those who participated in the proceedings can interpose an
appeal.
In land registration cases, may a party validly move for execution
pending appeal?

Petition for relief and motion for new trial/reconsideration are No. A motion for execution pending appeal is not applicable to land
exclusive of each other
registration proceedings. The reason is to protect innocent
A party who has filed a timely motion for new trial cannot file a petition purchasers.
for relief after his motion has been denied. These two remedies are
exclusive of each other. He should appeal from the judgment and
question such denial. No appeal may be taken from:

1) Order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration

Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the
effects of a judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to 2) Order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking 

his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure. relief from judgment
3) Interlocutory order
b. PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGEMENT (RULE 38)
4) Order disallowing or dismissing an appeal
5) Order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consider,
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any proceedings is
confession, or compromise on the ground of F/M/D or any ground
thereafter taken against a party in any court through, accident,
vitiating consent
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or 6) Order of execution
proceeding be set aside 7) Judgment or final order for or against parties in separate claims,
When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and counter-claims, crossclaims, and 3rd party complaints — main
a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable case is pending
negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a 8) Order dismissing an action without prejudice
petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal
be given due course.
A “final” judgment or order (as distinguished from one which has Remedies under the Property Registration Decree, 

“become final” or “executory” as of right [final and executory]), is one in cases of fraudulent registration
that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by a. Petition for Review of Decree (Sec. 32)
the court in respect thereto. Conversely, an order that does not finally b. Action for Reconveyance (Sec. 53 and 96)
dispose of the case, and does not end the court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contention and determining their rights and c. Action for Damages (Sec. 32)
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other d. Recovery from the Assurance Fund (Sec. 95)
things remain to be done by the court, is “interlocutory.”
PETITION OF ORDINARY APPEAL

Time for filing petition

• Within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from
A petition for relief from judgment or from denial of appeal under • When a record of appeal is required, within 30 days from notice of
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 38, must be verified, filed within sixty (60) judgment or final order
days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other • Period of appeal shall be interrupted by a firmly motion for new trial
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after or reconsideration
such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was
taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, • In the above case, there would be a “fresh 15 days”
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the
facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of a. PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECREE (SEC. 32)

action or defense, as the case may be. SEC. 32. Review of Decree of Registration; Innocent Purchaser for Value — …a
registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such
Petition for relief and motion for new trial or reconsideration are decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the
exclusive of each other
court where the innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
therein, who rights may be prejudiced.
A party who has filed a timely motion for new trial cannot file a petition
for relief after his motion has been denied. These two remedies are

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Requisites for Petition for Review of Decree
IN CASE OF PUBLIC LANDS, HOW SHOULD THE PERIOD BE
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of
registration
(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the
decree by the Land registration Authority
(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value
(If it has already passed to an innocent purchaser for value, the
party filing the petition for review can only get damages)
In land registration cases, when may a petition for review may be
filed?
intrinsic, and has been controverted and decided
Any person may file a petition for review to set aside the decree of
registration on the ground that he was deprived of their opportunity to
be heard in the original registration case  not later than 1 year after
the entry of the decree.
Grounds for filing a petition for review:
Innocent Purchaser for Value in Good Faith
1. That a land belonging to a person has been registered in the name
of another or that an interest has been omitted in the application;
2. Registration has been procured thru actual fraud;
3. Petitioner is the owner of the said property or interest therein;
4. Property has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for
value;
5. Action is filed within one year from the issuance ad entry of the
decree of registration; or
6. Actual fraud must be utilized in the procurement of the decree and
not thereafter.
Note: What is contemplated by law is extrinsic fraud.
Fraud must be extrinsic fraud.
Only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a
ground for annulling a judgment. Extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation which is
committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or
his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. On the
other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in litigation during
the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony,
which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a
fair and just determination of the case.
The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive the parties of their day
in court and thus prevent them from asserting their right to the
property registered in the name of the applicant.
Specific instances of actual or extrinsic fraud
proceedings, by the addition of land not previously included, should
(1) Deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when
in fact they are;
(2) Applying for and obtaining adjudication and registration in the
name of a co-owner of land which he knows had not been
allotted to him in the partition;
(3) Intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the land
inspector to include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable
stream;
(4) Willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims;
(5) Deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice;
(6) Inducing a claimant not to oppose the application for registration;
(7) Misrepresentation as to the identity of the lot to the true owner
(8) Failure of the applicant to disclose vital facts
(9) Deliberate falsehood
PETITION MUST BE FILED WITHIN 1 YEAR FROM DATE OF ENTRY
OF THE DECREE — this decree pertains to the decree prepared and
issued by the LRA
(SandeeSuan)
COMPUTED?
• Date of issuance of the patent corresponds to the date of the decree
in ordinary registration cases
• Decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party
entitled to it and the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally
and finally grants, awards, and conveys the lands applied for to the
applicant
When relief may not be granted?
1. When the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is
2. Where it appears that the fraud consisted in the presentation at
the trial of a supposed forged document, or of a false or
perjured testimony, or in basing a judgment on a fraudulent CA,
or in the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of the accused.
• One who buys property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full
and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or Before
he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property
• Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another
• The decree guarantees to every purchaser of registered land in
good faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and
all prior claims, liens and encumbrances except those set forth in
the certificate of title
• Good faith requires a well-founded belief that the person from whom
the title was received was himself the owner of the land, with the
right to convey it
Republic vs CA & Ribaya
GR 113549
1 year period provided in Section 38 of Act 496 merely refers to a petition
for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree.
There are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said
one-year period: Reconveyance, Damages, Assurance Fraud.
PRESCRIPTION NEVER LIES AGAINST THE STATE for the reversion of
property which is part of the public forest/forest reservation which was
registered in favour of any party.
It was part of the public forest released only in 1930, no
jurisdiction of land reg court because not yet A & D. Hence, state
action to annul the certificates of title and for the reversion of the land is
not barred by prescription.
Only where the original survey plan is amended during the registration
publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction of the court to order
the registration of the area. If reduction, no need for publication.
Amendment was made after the land registration court rendered its
decision. So it follows that reopening of the case was indispensable.
But no re-opening happened.
Eland Philippines, Inc vs Garcia
On 1998, the heirs of Malabanan filed for Quieting of Title against Eland.
They claimed that they’ve been in open, continuous, actual possession
of land for 30 years, and that there was never a claim on said land until
they found out that on August 1997, the land was awarded to Eland in
a Land registration proceeding.
Ruling: the proper remedy for the heirs of malabanan is not one for
quieting of title, but review of decree of registration.
Doctrine: When the requisites for petition for review are all present,
petition for review is the more appropriate action and not quieting of
title. Anyone affected by a decree of registration issued by the court
may ask for a review of decree of registration, as long as it was filed
within 1 year from the issuance of decree. The following requisites must
be present:
a. Petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land
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b. There was actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of
registration
c. Must be filed w/in 1 year from issuance of decree by LRA
d. Property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser
Doctrine: “1 year from issuance of decree” means any time after the
rendition of the court’s decision BEFORE the expiration of 1 year from
entry of final decree of registration.
Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or
decree when an application for review is filed by the party aggrieved
within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. However,
the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored solely on actual
fraud.
Requisites for review:
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of
registration
(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the
decree by the Land registration Authority
(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value
✦ Q: Remedy should have been a petition for review instead of
quieting of title?
➡ A: Because it is still well within the 1 year period provided by law.
1 year from the time the title was issued and from the time they
alleged there was fraud
✦ Q: A petition for review may be filed even before a decree of
registration?
➡ A: Yes. Even if no decree of registration has yet been issued, a
petition for review under sec 32 is available for remedy.
Serna vs CA
Petitioners spouses Serna claim ownership of the land based on the
deed of sale executed by Turner Land Surveying Co. in favor of Alberto
Rasca, which, however, they failed to present in court. The truth or
falsity of this claim is a question of fact, which, as aforesaid, is not
reviewable in this appeal. On the other hand, respondents proved that
they were enjoying open, continuous and adverse possession of the
property for more than (60) years.
As early as 1921, Dionisio Fontanilla was in adverse possession and
paying taxes over the land. Rosa in turn, paid taxes for the first time in
1939, while respondents began paying taxes in 1967. They had their
residential house built in 1955, which was completed in 1957. In 1980,
Santiago executed a tenancy agreement with a certain Sixto Fontanilla.
Until 1984, Santiago paid the taxes together with his tenant Sixto.
Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property
of the declarant, tax declarations and receipts can be strong evidence
of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a
period sufficient for prescription.
Respondents came to know of the fraud in securing title to the land
sometime after its registration, however, an innocent purchaser for
value had not acquired the property. Extrinsic fraud attended the
application for the land registration. It was filed when respondents were
out of the country and they had no way of finding out that petitioners
applied for a title under their name.
“An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10)
years. This means that petitioners should have enforced the trust within
ten (10) years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent
registration of the property.”
Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the
issuance of the certificate of title because registration of real
property is considered a “constructive notice to all persons” and it shall
be counted “from the time of such registering, filing or entering.”
Fortunately, respondents’ action for reconveyance was timely, as it
was filed within ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over
the property.
RULE ON DOUBLE SALE OF PROPERTY
1. The first registrant in good faith
(SandeeSuan)
2. The first possessor in good faith
3. The buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title
RULE OF “PRIOR EST TEMPORAE, PRIOR EST IN JURA”
• He who first in time is first in right
• The rule that where 2 certificates purport to include the same land,
the earlier in date prevails, is valid only absent any anomaly or
irregularity tainting the registration process
• Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot
defeat the first buyer’s right except only as provided for in the CC
and that’s where the second buyer first registers in good faith the
second sale ahead of the first
RULES OF PREFERENCE
1. The first registrant in good faith
2. The first in possession in good faith
3. The buyer who presents the olders title in good faith
b. ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE (SEC. 53 AND 96)
Section 53. Presentation of owner's duplicate upon entry of new certificate. No
voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the
owner's duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases
expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown.
The production of the owner's duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary
instrument is presented for registration, shall be conclusive authority from the
registered owner to the Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument, and the new
certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon the registered owner and upon
all persons claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser for value and in good
faith.
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his
legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without
prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of
title. After the entry of the decree of registration on the original petition or
application, any subsequent registration procured by the presentation of a forged
duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed or other instrument, shall be null and
void.
Section 96. Against whom action filed. If such action is brought to recover for loss
or damage or for deprivation of land or of any estate or interest therein arising
wholly through fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of the
court personnel, Register of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the
Registry in the performance of their respective duties, the action shall be brought
against the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land is situated and
the National Treasurer as defendants. But if such action is brought to recover for
loss or damage or for deprivation of land or of any interest therein arising
through fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of person other
than court personnel, the Register of Deeds, his deputy or other employees of
the Registry, such action shall be brought against the Register of Deeds, the
National Treasurer and other person or persons, as co-defendants. It shall be the
duty of the Solicitor General in person or by representative to appear and to
defend all such suits with the aid of the fiscal of the province or city where the land
lies: Provided, however, that nothing in this Decree shall be construed to deprive
the plaintiff of any right of action which he may have against any person for such
loss or damage or deprivation without joining the National Treasurer as party
defendant. In every action filed against the Assurance Fund, the court shall
consider the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration.
Reconveyance  is an action seeking to transfer or reconvey the
land from the registered owner to the rightful owner.
Reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
the name of another. It is also available not only to the legal owner of
a property but also to the person with the better right than the person
under whose name said property was erroneously registered.
The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed
after one year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy
of the landowner is to bring an action in court for reconveyance.
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Nature and Purpose of an Action for Reconveyance
GROUNDS
• An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted
to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him.
• Such action, filed after 1 year from the issuance of the decree,
does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding but
only to show that the person who secured the registration
proceeding but only to show that the person who secured the
registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.
• It does not seek to set aside the decree but, respecting it as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or
reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner,
or to the one with a better right.
• When a person is a party to a registration proceeding, or, when
notified, he does not want to participate and only after the property
has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding title has
been issued does he file an action for reconveyance, to give due
course to the action is to nullify registration proceedings and defeat
the purpose of the law.
Requisites for Reconveyance:
complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks relief
(a) the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming
ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name
of the defendant
(b) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was
procured through fraud or other illegal means
(c) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value
(d) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become
final and incontrovertible within 4 years from the discovery of
fraud, or not later that 10 years in the case of an implied trust
DECREE BECOMES INCONTROVERTIBLE AFTER 1 YEAR FROM THE
ISSUANCE OF DECREE
3. Between the first and second causes of action—there is identity of
• Action for reconveyance still available as remedy
• Action in personam that it is always as long as the property has not
passed to an innocent purchaser for value
RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS
possession of the title because he is in effect seeking to quiet title to
1. That the plaintiff is the owner of the land
2. That the defendant has illegally disposed him of the same
Reconveyance is an Action in Personam
What is action for quieting of title?
• Binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or
given an opportunity to be heard
• Directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments
• Court must have jurisdiction over the defendant
THE RTC HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER AN ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE
THE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY OVER WHICH
RECONVEYANCE IS BEING SOUGHT ARE INDISPENSABLE
PARTIES WITHOUT WHOM NO RELIEF IS AVAILABLE
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE MAY BE BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Action for Reconveyance may be barred by prescription
GROUNDS PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
4 years after the discovery of the alleged
Action based on fraud
fraud
Action based on implied or 10 years from the issuance of the OCT or
constructive trust TCT
Action based on express trust Not barred by prescription
Action based on a void contract Imprescriptible
(SandeeSuan)
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
Action based on fraud where a
Imprescriptible
plaintiff is in actual possession
If the ground relied upon for an action for reconveyance is fraud,
what is the period for filing the same?
If ground relied upon is fraud, action may be filed within 4 years from
discovery thereof. Discovery is deemed to have taken place when
said instrument was registered. It is because registration constitutes
constructive notice to the whole world.
STATE IS NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
The State has an imprescriptible right to cause the reversion of a
piece of property belonging to the public domain if title has been
acquired through fraudulent means.
Laches may bar recovery
1. Conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom him
or one under who he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
2. Delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice, or the defendant’s conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit
3. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit
4. Inquiry or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is
afforded the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred
Action may be barred by Res Judicata
1. Final judgment
2. Court has competent jurisdiction
parties, subject matter and causes of action
Action based on implied or constructive trust
It does not apply where the person enforcing the trust is in actual
the same which is imprescriptible.
QUIETING OF TITLE
It is an action that is brought to remove clouds on the tile to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.
Who may file an action to quiet title?
(1) Registered owner;
(2) A person who has an equitable right or interest in the property; or
(3) The State
QUIETING OF TITLE IS PROPER WHEN
There is a cloud on the title — an outstanding claim or encumbrance
which if valid would affect or impair the title of the owner of a
particular estate, on its face has that effect but can be shown by
extrinsic proof to be invalid or inapplicable to the estate in question
Roque vs Aguada
For Reconveyance, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that
he has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered
owner and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value.
Examining its provisions, the Court finds that the stipulation above-
highlighted shows that the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is actually in
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the nature of a contract to sell and not one of sale contrary to Sps.
Roque’s belief and therefore the seller retains ownership before payment
of the entire price. Hence reconveyance is not the remedy.
It is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he has a legal claim
on the property superior to that of the registered owner and that the
property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value.
It was a contract to sell and therefore the seller retains ownership before
payment of the entire price. Hence reconveyance is not the remedy.
Emma Ver Reyes vs Montemayor
A case about double sales, there was an anomaly how the second sale
was registered.
Any subsequent registration procured by the presentation of a forged
duplicate certificate of title, or of a forged deed or other instrument, shall
also be null and void. The third party here cannot be considered to be
innocent purchasers for value, because they acquired it from private
respondent who beforehand already admitted to holding a dubious title
of the subject property.
Reyes filed a complaint of reconveyance against Montemayor claiming
that she bought lot from Marciano. However, she failed to register the
sale and lot because she was suffering from diabetes and rheumatoid
arthritis. Later, she found out that the lot was already registered under
the name of Montemayor, who also claimed to have bought it from
Marciano. When asked, Marciano said he only sold it to Reyes and
never to Montemayor. There were evidences of forged signature of
Montemayor too. Montemayor executed a waiver and quitclaim
admitting that her claim to the property is of dubious origin, which
conveyed the property to Isip.
Doctrine: Reconveyance is the proper remedy for a land owner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s
name. Torrens system should not be a means to perpetrate fraud.
Isip is not a purchaser for value in good faith and cannot be protected
under the law since he knew that Montemayor already admitted his
dubious claim over the property and that should have raised a suspicion
on his part.
It has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's
name is to bring an ordinary action in an ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, for damages. "It is one thing to protect an
innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of
justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to
enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed." Reconveyance is all about the
transfer of the property, in this case the title thereto, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its
rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. Evidently,
petitioners, being the rightful owners of the subject property, are entitled
to the reconveyance of the title over the same.
Gasataya vs Mabasa
SC ruled Gasataya defrauded respondents and thus they can file an
action for reconveyance. Even though they don’t have the titles of the
lots they can file for reconveyance because Gasataya was a purchaser
in bad faith. Reconveyance is also available to the heirs and not just
necessarily to the registered owners
Whenever a title is issued pursuant to a homestead or a free patent,
the person or his heirs have a right to repurchase this property within a
period of 5 years from the date of reconveyance. Pursuant to Sec 119
of Commonwealth act 145.
In the case where it is mortgaged or consolidated, heirs have 5 years to
repurchase said property. Reason: to preserve the homestead in favour
of the grantee. Unlike in a judicial title, that there is no prohibition. Thats
why some are reluctant receive mortgage land that has homestead and
patent titles.
Mabasa mortgaged his lots to DBP. He wasn’t able to pay his loan, so it
was foreclosed and bought by DBP. Later, DBP and Mabasa entered
into an agreement to repurchase. For payment of repurchase price,
Mabasa entered into another agreement with Gasatayas which stated
that Gasatayas will pay for him, so long as he can possess for 20 yrs.
(SandeeSuan)
However, Gasatayas stopped paying DBP, so DBP ordered foreclosure
and Heirs of Gasataya bought the property.
Doctrine: Reconveyance is a remedy available not only to the rightful
owner but also to one who has a better right over the property. Here,
Mabasa had a better right over the property. Had it not been for the
deliberate fraudulent design of Gasataya, the mortgaged would not
have been foreclosed.
Re: 4 year period and 10 year period to file action
Almerol vs Bagumbayan
In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in respondent’s
name by and through his false pretenses. Molok Bagumbaran
fraudulently misrepresented that he was the occupant and actual
possessor of the land in question when he was not because it was
Liwalug Datomanong. An action for reconveyance based on an implied
or constructive trust must perforce prescribed in ten years and not
otherwise. It is abundantly clear from all the foregoing that the action of
petitioner Datomanong for reconveyance, in the nature of a
counterclaim interposed in his Answer, filed on December 4, 1964, to
the complaint for recovery of possession instituted by the respondent,
has not yet prescribed.
Between August 16, 1955, the date of reference, being the date of the
issuance of the Original Certificate of Title in the name of the
respondent, and December 4, 1964, when the period of prescription
was interrupted by the filing of the Answer cum Counterclaim, is less
than ten years.
One parcel of land was issued with two free patents. Amerol (proper
name: Datumanung) has been in possession of the land and he was
also cultivating the land. He did not know that Bagumbayan registered
the land in his name and an OCT has been issued in favor of
Bagumbayan. He sought for reconveyance of the land, only after 9
years from issuance of patent and claimed that the patent was secured
by Bagumbayan through fraud and deceit.
Doctrine: An action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of
the Torrens title over the property.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in
this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to
one with a better right. The registrant, then, is holding the property in
trust for the rightful owner.
It was proven that fraud and misrepresentation was done by
Bagumbayan. The Supreme Court said that the prescriptive period in
this case is 10 years from the issuance of the certificate of title because
an implied trust was created.
Sanjorjo vs Quijano
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the torrens title issued on the
basis of the free patents became as indefeasible as one which was
judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance
of the patent. The order or decision of the DENR granting an application
for a free patent can be reviewed only within one year thereafter, on the
ground of actual fraud via a petition for review in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) provided that no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the
property or any interest thereon. However, an aggrieved party may still
file an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust,
which prescribes in ten years from the date of the issuance of the
Certificate of Title over the property provided that the property has not
been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value.
———
Plaintiffs are owners of a parcel of land. Later, plaintiff filed for a criminal
case against defendant for theft saying that defendant stole coconuts.
The court acquitted the defendant finding that the latter is the owner of
the property. It is only here when they learned that the property was
already titled under defendant’s name. They filed an action for
reconveyance. Defendant said that the action has already prescribed.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise.
It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456,
are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or
in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as
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legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for
reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
Q: Was there res judicata in this case?
A: There was no res judicata in this case because the decision of the
Regional Executive Director was not a decision on the merits of the
complaint. Only the regular courts of justice have jurisdiction on the
matter of cancellation of title.
Q: What about the second issue?
A: Regarding the reconveyance of the lots, the respondents alleged that
the petitioners are barred by Sec. 32 of PD 1529 however the SC ruled
that they agreed with the CA that the torrens title issued became as
indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of
one year from date of issuance of the patent. In the instant case, the
one applied for is an administrative patent so there was no decree. But
same rule applies, still it should be 1 year from the issuance of
the patent. So after the lapse of 1 year, it should not be open for
review.
However an aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust, w/c prescribes 10 years from the
date of issuance of title (in this case the free patent) provided that the
property has not been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value.
In the case, the remedy of action for reconveyance is not available for
the petitioners.
NOTE:
name?
• The Regional Executive Director is not supposed to entertain actions
for reconveyance especially once an OCT is issued pursuant to a
patent.
• Under the Public Land Act (CA 141), the Dir of Lands, this is now
exercised by the Regional Exec Director has this continuing
authority to conduct an investigation. The purpose of this
investigation, once a title has been issued, is really to recommend
to the SolGen to file an action for the person in the cancellation of
the title. In this case, it seems that patents have already been
issued that’s why the Regional Exec Director excluded only the
lands, titles in the name of Alan Quijano and Gwendolyn Enriquez.
The land of Gwendolyn, 3 years has already lapsed but even if it
was still within the 1 year period from the time the patent was
issued, still it does not have jurisdiction to cancel the title. Unlike in
a judicial proceeding, within the period of 1 year, the Court still has
the authority to order the decree be vacated but the Regional Exec
Dir has no authority.
• Once an OCT is issued, his authority is only up to the time the patent
was issued. But once OCT has been issued pursuant to a patent,
he loses jurisdiction over the case.
• If it is a case of reconveyance, it is still not a proper subject matter
for the SolGen to institute an action where it is recommended that it
be instituted by the SolGen, discussed here under Sec. 101. If the
purpose is to revert back the land to the public domain, that’s the
time where the SolGen has right to institute the action but where the
purpose is to reconvey the land in favor of a prevailing party, it is
not proper for the SolGen to assume its jurisdiction to the instituted
action.
TOPIC: PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES (1990, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003)
Louie, before leaving the country to train as a chef in a five- star hotel in
New York, USA, entrusted to his first-degree cousin Dewey an
application for registration, under the Land Registration Act, of a parcel
of land located in Bacolod City. A year later, Louie returned to the
Philippines and discovered that Dewey registered the land and obtained
an Original Certificate of Title over the property in his (Dewey’s) name.
Compounding the matter, Dewey sold the land to Huey, an innocent
purchaser for value. Louie promptly filed an action for reconveyance of
the parcel of land against Huey.
A. Is the action pursued by Louie the proper remedy?
B. B. Assuming that reconveyance is the proper remedy, will the action
prosper if the case was filed beyond one year, but within ten years,
from the entry of the decree of registration?
A. An action for reconveyance against Huey is not the proper remedy,
because Huey is an innocent purchaser for value. The proper recourse is
for Louie to go after Dewey for damages by reason of the fraudulent
registration and subsequent sale of the land. If Dewey is insolvent, Louie
(SandeeSuan)
may file a claim against the Assurance Fund (Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De
Castro 324 SCRA 591 [2000] citing Sps. Eduarte vs. CA, 323 Phil 462).
B. Yes, the remedy will prosper because the action prescribes in ten (10)
years, not within one (1) year when a petition for the reopening of the
registration decree may be filed. The action for reconveyance is distinct
from the petition to reopen the decree of registration (Grey Alba vs. Dela
Cruz). There is no need to reopen the registration proceedings, but the
property should just be reconveyed to the real owner.
The action for reconveyance is based on implied or constructive trust,
which prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of issuance of the
original certificate of title. This rule assumes that the defendant is in
possession of the land. Where it is the plaintiff who is in possession of
the land, the action for reconveyance would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title which action is imprescriptible (David vs. Malay).
The spouses Zulueta obtained from GSIS various loans secured by real
estate mortgages over parcels of land. The spouses Zulueta failed to pay
their loans which prompted GSIS to foreclose the real estate mortgages.
During the auction sale, some of the mortgaged properties were awarded
to GSIS. However, some lots which were covered by the mortgaged titles
were expressly excluded from the auction since those that were sold were
sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts. This notwithstanding, GSIS
included the excluded lots when it executed on November 25, 1975 an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership on the basis of which,
certificates of title over the same were issued in the name of GSIS.
Zulueta thereafter transferred his rights over the excluded lots to
Eduardo in 1989 who consequently demanded from GSIS the return of
the said excluded lots. Eduardo then filed on May 7, 1990 a complaint for
reconveyance of real estate against the GSIS.
a) Can GSIS legally claim ownership over the excluded properties on the
basis of the certificates of title over the same which were issued in its
b) Has the action for reconveyance prescribed?
ANSWERS:
a) NO. Even if titles over the lots had been issued in the name of the GSIS,
still it could not legally claim ownership and absolute dominion over
them because indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system does not
attach to titles secured by fraud or misrepresentation. The fraud
committed by GSIS in the form of concealment of the existence of said
lots and failure to return the same to the real owners after their exclusion
from the foreclosure sale made GSIS holders in bad faith. It is well settled
that a holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the
protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.
b) NO. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides: If the property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes. An action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent
registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
The general rule that the discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken
place upon the registration of real property because it is “considered a
constructive notice to all persons” does not apply in this case. The case in
point is Samonte vs Court of Appeals where the Supreme Court
reckoned the prescriptive period for the filing of the action based on
implied trust from the actual discovery of the fraud. Santiago came know
of GSIS’ fraudulent acts only in 1989 and the complaint was filed in 1990.
Following the Court’s pronouncement in Samonte, the institution of the
action for reconveyance was thus well within the prescriptive period.
In August 1950, the Republic of the Philippines filed an application with
the cadastral court claiming ownership over certain properties which
covered Lot 4329. Guillermo filed an answer claiming therein a right
over Lot 4329. Guillermo died during the pendency of the case.
Gregorio, who claimed to be the only son of Guillermo, substituted the
latter, and to him, Lot 4329 was adjudicated by the court. The decision
became final and executory. On July 8, 1985, OCT No. 0-6,151 was issued
in the name of Gregorio. Sometime thereafter, the brothers and sisters of
Guillermo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages
against Gregorio, alleging that Guillermo died single and without issue
and that Gregorio obtained title to the property through fraud deceit
and gross misrepresentation. They prayed that Gregorio’s title be
cancelled and the property be reconveyed to them. After the trial, the
court declared that Gregorio has not sufficiently proved that he is the
son of Guillermo but ruled that he has the right of possession of the
disputed property. Is Gregorio entitled to the possession of the disputed
property?
ANSWER: YES. Gregorio was able to obtain a title in his name over the
questioned property after the cadastral proceedings instituted by the
Republic. This Torrens title is now a conclusive evidence of his ownership of
the subject land. After the expiration of the one-year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration, the said certificate of title became
incontrovertible. In fine, whether or not his title was obtained fraudulently
is beyond the competence of the Supreme Court to determine. The issue
should have been raised during the proceeding before the cadastral court. A
Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, the issue on the validity of title,
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i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently issued can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose. The prayer for the cancellation of
Gregorio’s title and the reconveyance of the same to brothers and sisters of
Guillermo is legally impossible. To sustain the said action would be
inconsistent with the rule that the act of registration is the operative act that
conveys a parcel of land to its registered owner under the Torrens system.
What we are emphasizing is that, although Gregorio has not sufficiently
proved his filiation to the late Guillermo, the fact that he has a legal title
over the subject land entitles him to possession thereof, pending the final
determination of the validity
c. ACTION FOR DAMAGES (SEC. 32)
In the suit before the lower court, the Director of Lands and the National
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.
The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence,
minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of
any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land
or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
than one (1) year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where
an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for
value or any equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include
an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration
in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against
the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.
• Prescription: An action for damages should be brought within 10
years from the date of the issuance of the questioned certificate
of title pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
⁍ Is available when the remedy of an action for reconveyance may no
longer be availed of or when the land has passed already to the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
d. RECOVERY FROM THE ASSURANCE FUND (SEC. 95)
Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who, without negligence
on his part, sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest
therein in consequence of the bringing of the land under the operation of the
Torrens system of arising after original registration of land, through fraud or in
consequence of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in any certificate of
title or in any entry or memorandum in the registration book, and who by the
provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of
any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or
interest therein, may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the
recovery of damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund.
Public policy admits of affording remedies to those unjustly deprived of
their rights over real property by reason of the operation of our
registration laws.
Sc 95 of Property Registration Decree provides that a person who,
without negligence on his part sustain loss or damage or is deprived
of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence of the
bringing of the land under the operation of Torrens System or arising
after the original registration of the land, through fraud or in
consequence of any error, may bring an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages paid out of the
Assurance Fund within 6 years from the time the right to bring such
action accrues.
The assurance fund is intended to relive innocent persons from the
harshness of the doctrine that a certificate of title is conclusive
evidence of indefeasible title to the land.
Requisites for Recovery from the Assurance Fund
c. Criminal Action for Perjury
a. A person sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of any estate of
interest in land,
(SandeeSuan)
b. On account of the bringing of land under the operation of the
Torrens system arising after original registration
c. Through fraud, error, omission, mistake or misdescription in a
certificate of title or entry or memorandum in the registration book
d. Without negligence on his part and
e. Is barred or precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of
such land or estate or interest therein.
Development Bank of the Philippines vs Bautista
Treasurer of the Philippines were likewise made defendants by appellant
bank because of its belief that if no right existed as against appellee
Bautista, recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund. Such a belief
finds no support in the applicable law, which allows recovery only upon
a showing that there be no negligence on the part of the party
sustaining any loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest
therein by the operation of the Land Registration Act. This certainly is
not the case here, plaintiff-appellant being solely responsible for the
plight in which it now finds itself. Accordingly, the Director of Lands and
the National Treasurer of the Philippines are likewise exempt from any
liability.
After appellant bank had acquired her title by such extrajudicial
foreclosure sale and thus, through its own act, seen to it that her
obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to revive the
same on the allegation that the title in question was subsequently
annulled, considering that she was not made a party on the occasion of
such nullification. Recovery can be effected from the Assurance Fund
only upon a showing that there be no negligence on the part of the
party sustaining any loss or damage or being deprived of any land or
interest therein by the operation of the Land Registration Act. DBP was
not able to claim from the Assurance Fund because it was declared
negligent.
Bautista loaned from RFC, predecessor-in-interest of DBP. As a security,
she offered a parcel of land as a mortgage. She failed to pay so the
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. Subsequently, Ramoses came
in claiming ownership over the land. In a judicial proceeding between
DBP and the Ramoses, wherein Bautista was not made a party to and
was not summoned in the suit, the title was adjudicated to the
Ramoses. Consequently, title of RFC from Bautista was set aside. RFC
sought to recover from the assurance fund but he cannot do so. A bank
is required to exercise extraordinary diligence which RFC failed to do so.
Doctrine: Recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund only upon a
showing that there be no negligence on the part of the party sustaining
any loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest therein by
the operation of the Land Registration Act.
• The fees for claim in the assurance fund is increased to 2% of the
assessed value but under the law, it’s 1⁄4 of 1% of the assessed
value. If there is no assessed value or it is not stated, the fees will
be computed through the SWORN DECLARATION of 2
disinterested persons on the value of the land is required.
• Assurance Fund — a special fund which is created under the
Torrens System for the compensation of certain persons for losses
sustained by operations under the system.
✦ Q: If you recover from the assurance fraud, who will you sue?
➡ A: Register of Deeds or National Treasurer
✦ Q: If you are able to recover damages from the person who was
responsible for the fraud, can you still recover from the assurance
fraud?
➡ A: Not anymore. Barred from double recovery.
Other Remedies Available
a. Action for Cancellation or Reversion (Sec. 101 of the Public Land
Act)
b. Annulment of Judgements, Final Orders or Resolutions (Rule 47,
Rules of Court)
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a. ACTION FOR CANCELLATION OR REVERSION (SEC.
101, CA 141)
the sales patent application. Any subsequent action questioning the
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or
the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.
What is cancellation suit?
It is an action for cancellation of title brought by a private individual,
alleging ownership as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake, as the
case may be, in successfully obtaining title over a disputed land
claimed by the plaintiff.
• If public land, the Solicitor General will represent the government—
will revert to the public domain
• Violations of Sections 118, 120, 121, 123, and 124 of CA 141
• State is not barred by res judicata or estoppel
• If regarding private property, the action would be an ACTION FOR
CANCELLATION, which is another remedy
• Section 101 of Public Land Act provides for a remedy whereby lands
of the public domain fraudulently awarded to the applicant may be
recovered or reverted back to its original owner, the government
• Lands of public domain wrongfully registered in another person’s
name is imprescriptible because the person never owned the land
in the first place. It belongs to the public domain.
• It is improper for the government to file an action for reversion of land
titled to defendant pursuant to a free patent where the alleged
fraud consists in the fact that said land, at the time of issuance of
the free patent was no longer a part of the public domain, having
been adjudicated as private property of another person in a
previous registration case
• An action for reversion on the ground that defendant obtained patent
through fraud would also fail where the land had successively been
sold by the heirs of the patentee to third parties who are holding
Torrens titles and enjoying the presumption of good faith
• Private parties cannot challenge the validity of the patent and title
when they are not registered owners thereof nor had they been
declared the owners as owners in the cadastral proceedings—
whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question
which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the
government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The
legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the
government.
PRIVATE PARTY CANNOT BRING ACTION FOR REVERSION
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The proper court is the CA which is the
• If there has been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title,
an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be
the proper remedy
ACTION FOR REVERSION NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
cause constrain us to rule for petitioners. While it may be true that
• Statute of limitations doesn’t run against the State
ACTION FOR CANCELLATION OF TITLE
for value who relied on the clean certificates of the title was sought to be
• Proper when a private party claims ownership of the land as private
property by virtue of a long period of possession and hence, no
longer deemed a part of the public domain which could be
disposed of under the provisions of the Public Land Act, or when
the land is already covered by a previously issued certificate of title
Cawis vs Cerilles
The petitioners’ complaint questioning the validity of the sales patent and
the original certificate of title over Lot No. 47 is, in reality, a reversion suit.
The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation
of the certificate of title and the resulting reversion of the land covered
by the title to the State. This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes
designated as an annulment suit or a cancellation suit.
(SandeeSuan)
In this case, it is clear that Lot No. 47 was public land when Andrada filed
validity of the award of sales patent on the ground of fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation should thus be initiated by the State. The State has
not done so and thus, we have to uphold the validity and regularity of
the sales patent as well as the corresponding original certificate of title
issued based on the patent. The prescription issue pertaining to the
action is now moot.
Republic vs CA & Alpuerto
The land in question is not within the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands
but of the Director of Forestry. Although the Public Land Act vests upon
the Director of Lands, subject to the immediate control of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, direct executive control of the survey,
classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition
and management of the lands of the public domain (Sec. 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 141), the same law explicitly states that timber
and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws. And the Forestry
Law (Secs. 1814-1842, Revised Administrative Code, as amended)
now vests in the Director of Forestry (now Director of Forest
Development under P.D. No. 705) the jurisdiction and authority over
forest or timberland. Therefore the title is deemed void.
An action to recover lands of the public domain is imprescriptible. Such
right however can be barred by laches/estoppel under Sec. 32 of P.D.
1529 which recognizes the rights of innocent purchasers for value
above the interests of the government.
d. ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENTS, FINAL ORDERS OR
RESOLUTIONS (RULE 47, RULES OF COURT)
Yujuico vs Republic
Effective 1 July 1997, any action for reversion of public land instituted by
the Government was already covered by Rule 47 and the same should
be filed with the Court of Appeals, not the Regional Trial Court. The
Republic misfiled the reversion suit with the Paranaque RTC. It should
have been filed in the CA. Evidently, the Paranaque RTC had no
jurisdiction over the instant reversion case.
When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on July 1,
1997, it incorporated Rule 47 on annulment of judgments or final orders
and resolutions of the RTCs. The two grounds for annulment under
Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on
extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years from its
discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by
laches or estoppel as provided by Section 3, Rule 47. Thus, effective
July 1, 1997, any action for reversion of public land instituted by the
Government was already covered by Rule 47.
The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and cancellation of
Decree No. N-150912 and its derivative titles was filed on June 8, 2001
with the Parañaque City RTC. It is clear therefore that the reversion suit
was erroneously instituted in the Parañaque RTC and should have been
body mandated by BP Blg. 129 and prescribed by Rule 47 to handle
annulment of judgments of RTCs.
Assuming that the Parañaque RTC has jurisdiction over the reversion
case, still the lapse of almost three decades in filing the instant case, the
inexplicable lack of action of the Republic and the injury this would
estoppel does not operate against the state or its agents, deviations
have been allowed.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent purchaser
cancelled and the excess land to be reverted to the Government, we
ruled that "[i]t is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle
of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to
innocent purchasers for value.
e. CRIMINAL ACTION FOR PERJURY
• The state may criminally prosecute for perjury the party who obtains
registration through fraud, such as by stating false assertions in the
application for registration, sworn answer required of applicants in
cadastral proceedings or application of public land patent.
• On the matter of disposition of public lands, Sec 91 of Public Land
Act provides that “the statements made in the application shall be
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considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession,
title, permit issued on the basis of such application and any false
omission of facts altering, changing, modifying the consideration of
the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in
the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession, title or permit granted.
Louie, before leaving the country to train as a chef in a five-star hotel in
New York, USA, entrusted to his first—degree cousin Dewey an
application for registration, under the Land Registration Act, of a parcel
of land located in Bacolod City. A year later, Louie returned to the
Philippines and discovered that Dewey registered the land and obtained
an Original Certificate of Title over the property in his Dewey’s name.
Compounding the matter, Dewey sold the land to Huey, an innocent
purchaser for value. Louie promptly filed an action for reconveyance of
the parcel of land against Huey. Is the action pursued by Louie the
proper remedy?
An action for reconveyance against Huey is not the proper remedy, because
Huey is an innocent purchaser for value. The proper recourse is for Louie to
go after Dewey for damages by reason of the fraudulent registration and
subsequent sale of the land. If Dewey is insolvent, Louie may file a claim
against the Assurance Fund. (Heirs of Lopez vs. De Castro 324 SCRA 591)
CHAPTER 4 (SEC. 39 TO 50, PD 1529)
KEY CONCEPTS OF THE TORRENS
SYSTEM
Decree Binds The Land (Sec. 31, PD 1529)
Section 31. Decree of registration. Every decree of registration issued by the
Commissioner shall bear the date, hour and minute of its entry, and shall be
signed by him. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if
married, the name of the husband or wife: Provided, however, that if the land
adjudicated by the court is conjugal property, the decree shall be issued in the
name of both spouses. If the owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of
disability, and if a minor, his age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally
determined by the court, and shall set forth the estate of the owner, and also, in
such manner as to show their relative priorities, all particular estates, mortgages,
easements, liens, attachments, and other encumbrances, including rights of
tenant-farmers, if any, to which the land or owner's estate is subject, as well as any
other matters properly to be determined in pursuance of this Decree.
The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to
such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being
included in the general description "To all whom it may concern".
ISSUANCE OF DECREE OF REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
The court shall issue within 15 days from the entry thereof, an order
directing the LRA administrator to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and certificate of title
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
1. The OCT shall be the true copy of the decree of registration
2. Transcript of the decree
3. Accumulates in one decree a precise and correct statement of
the exact status of the fee simple title which an owner possesses
4. Evidence of the title which the owner has
5. What appears on the face of the title is controlling on questions of
ownership since the certificate of title is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the
DECREE BINDS THE LAND AND IS CONCLUSIVE AGAINST THE
WHOLE WORLD
• As soon as the decree of title has been registered in the office of the
RD, the property included therein becomes registered land
• Certificate of title shall take effect upon the transcription of the
decree
REGISTRATION DOESN'T GIVE ANY PERSON A BETTER TITLE
THAN WHAT HE REALLY HAS
(SandeeSuan)
PROBATIVE VALUE OF A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
• Serves as an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein and is conclusive as to the identity of
the land and its location
• The title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its
final decree
• The notations or memoranda at the back of the certificate aren’t
admissible as proof of the contracts or documents to which they
pertain
• Validity and correctness of the title is presumed
WHERE TWO OR MORE CERTIFICATES COVER THE SAME LAND, THE
EARLIER IN DATE PREVAILS
ENTRY OF Original Certificate Of Title
• The OCT is issued for the first time after initial registration
proceedings
• OCT shall be the true coy of the decree of registration
• Upon receipt of the RD of the original and duplicate copy of the
certificate of title, he shall enter the same in the record book and
shall be numbered, dated and signed and sealed with the seal of
his office
Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City
The dela Cruz case was already final when it was decided upon by the
Supreme Court on July 25, 1984. That issue of ownership in that case
has been resolved already and the principle of res judicata should be
applied.
Even if the parties were not the parties in such case, they cannot claim
that they were never notified of that the case was pending. Amando
Clemente was never a registered owner of the land because his
predecessors-in-interest have lost their rights over that land when the
lot was sold to Lucia dela Cruz in 1943.
The sale to Lucia dela Cruz was valid and the registration the lot under
her name in the Primary Book of the Registry of Deeds was a
constructive notice to the whole world. And even if they claim that
Clemente, their predecessor, has a title, the same cannot be preferred
over Lucia’s since Clemente’s title was issued in 1951.
Instant case applying the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment. The less familiar concept or less
terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of
judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined
therein or which were necessarily included therein (De la Cruz v. Court of
Appeals)
To reopen or to question the legality of INK's title would defeat the
purpose of our Torrens system which seeks to insure stability by
quieting titled lands and putting to a stop forever any question of the
legality of the registration in the certificate or questions which may arise
therefrom.
INK was issued a Torrens Title over the lot as a result of the sale in 1975.
The actions instituted by the petitioners took place in 1986.
Under the Torrens System of registration, the Torrens Title became
indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree of
registration.
A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the
land referred to therein. It is, therefore, too late in the day for the
petitioners to reopen or question the legality of INK's title over Lot 671
at this time.
DepEd vs Delfina Casibang
Owner’s Duplicate Certification (Sec. 41)
Section 41. Owner's duplicate certificate of title. The owner's duplicate certificate
of title shall be delivered to the registered owner or to his duly authorized
representative. If two or more persons are registered owners, one owner's
duplicate certificate may be issued for the whole land, or if the co-owners so
desire, a separate duplicate may be issued to each of them in like form, but all
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outstanding certificates of title so issued shall be surrendered whenever the
Register of Deeds shall register any subsequent voluntary transaction affecting the
whole land or part thereof or any interest therein. The Register of Deeds shall note
on each certificate of title a statement as to whom a copy thereof was issued.
ISSUANCE OF THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
Court, for the purpose of recording the fact that the lots covered by the
• Shall be delivered to the registered owner or his duly authorized
representative
• If 2 or more persons are registered owners, one owner’s duplicate
may be issued for the whole land
• If the 2 co-owners desire, a separate duplicate may be issued to
each of them in like form but all outstanding certificates so issued
shall be surrendered whenever the RD shall register any
subsequent voluntary transaction affecting the whole land or part
thereof or any interest therein
THE ISSUANCE OF MORTGAGEE’S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE IS
DISCONTINUED
CO-OWNER MAY ONLY DISPOSE OF HIS ALIQUOT SHARE IN THE
PROPERTY HELD IN COMMON
REGISTERED OWNER ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OF THE OWNER’S
DUPLICATE
Registered owner has preferential right to the possession of the
owner’s duplicate as against one whose name doesn't appear in the
certificate but who may have right or claim to the possession of the
land
DECREE AND TITLE BECOME INCONTROVERTIBLE AFTER ONE YEAR
UPON ITS ISSUANCE. THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS THOUGH—
second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first,
1. Laches
2. If there is fraud and misrepresentation on the title over public land
3. Buyer in bad faith
4. When the title over the land which you acquire is already privately
owned
3 PRINCIPLES UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM:
Republic vs. Mendoza
1. “Curtain Principle” — In Land Registration proceedings, once
the 1 year period from the time the decree or registration was
issued, the title now becomes indefeasible and registration
binds the land and quiets title thereto.
2. “Mirror Principle” — you are not supposed to go beyond the
face of the title, one should rely on what appears on the
certificate
3. “Insurance Principle” — When everything else fails, the person
aggrieved in the land registration proceedings (after filing
petition, action for reconveyance, etc.) should go after the
Assurance Fund as a remedy to claim for damages.
Reyes vs. Rayal-Reyes
The one who should be in custody or who should possess the owner’s
duplicate of title is the registered owner. Raval-Reyes’ interests are
already protected and so he should surrender it back to the Reyeses.
We see no valid and plausible reason to justify, on this ground, the
withholding from the registered owners, such as the petitioners-
appellants herein, the custody and possession of the owners'
duplicates of certificates of title. In a decided case, this Court has
already held that: the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose
name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a
more preferential right to the possession of the owner's duplicate than
one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to
establish his right to the possession thereof.
This Court has already held that: the owner of the land in whose favor and
in whose name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of
title has a more preferential right to the possession of the owner's
duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and
has yet to establish his right to the possession thereof.
(SandeeSuan)
Undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independent civil
action to recover his alleged co-owner's share in the disputed lots by
filing a counterclaim for partition in said Civil Case No. 3659, his rights
appear to be amply protected, and considering that he may also avail
of, to better protect his rights thereto.
Notice of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of
titles in question are litigated in said Civil Case No. 3659, we again see
no justifiable reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners'
duplicates of certificates of title.
Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes is hereby ordered to deliver to petitioners
the owners' duplicate of Original Certificates of Title No. 22161 and
8066. With costs against respondent appellee, Mateo Raval Reyes.
Abrigo vs. De Vera
Registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land.
✦ Q: Will the rules on double sale of the CC apply in this case?
➡ A: No, in the case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent
registered the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor
their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the
property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their
respective sales under Act 3344.
➡ For her part, respondent registered the transaction under the
Torrens system because, during the sale, Villafania had presented
the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.
✦ Q: What is wrong with registering it under Act 3344?
➡ A: Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting
unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a
better right.
On the issue of good faith, knowledge gained by the first buyer of the
second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except where the
as provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does
not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to
register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso,
knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his
rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such
knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.
From the facts of the case, it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry
released Silot Bay as alienable and disposable by virtue of the
Memorandum issued by then President Marcos on 16 January 1967
which clearly empowered said bureau to identify and locate the 700,000
hectares of fishpond areas and to release said areas as alienable and
disposable. Hence, the courts, in view of the clear legal directive by
which said area was released as alienable and disposable, will refrain
from questioning the wisdom of such classification or declaration.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the contested areas and titles
thereto had already passed on to third parties who acquired the same
from the Mendozas in good faith and for value. The Mendozas'
certificates of title were clean and, thus, MENCA Corporation, Jacinto
Velez, Jr. and Carmen Velez-Ting were induced to acquire the same
from the Mendozas. That they did so in good faith and for value was not
even questioned herein. Their titles, rights, and interests to the fishpond
area must be respected and protected.
A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the
Government of the Republic and all its branches, whether or not
mentioned by name in the application for registration or its notice. Here,
the existence and genuineness of the Mendoza’s title over the property
has not been disputed. While the consolidation and subdivision plan of
Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149 square meter lot had been
designated to the City Government, the Republic itself admits that no
new title was issued to it or to any of its subdivisions for the portion that
PPS had been occupying since 1957.
✦ Q: Can Court grant just compensation in the absence proceeding?
➡ A: Yes.
✦ Q: How is the value determined?
➡ A:It should be determined from the time of the taking.
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Statement of Personal Circumstance (Sec. 45)
Section 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. Every certificate
of title shall set forth the full names of all persons whose interests make up the full
ownership in the whole land, including their civil status, and the names of their
respective spouses, if married, as well as their citizenship, residence and postal
address. If the property covered belongs to the conjugal partnership, it shall be
issued in the names of both spouses.
Litam vs. Espiritu
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal
properties of Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens Titles covering said
properties. All the said properties are registered in the name of 'Marcosa
Rivera, married to Rafael Litam.' This circumstance indicates that the
properties in question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera,
as her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles
covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael
Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words 'married to Rafael Litam' written
after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned titles
are merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the
registered owner of the properties covered by said titles.
1st marriage was not acknowledged by the SC.
Property regime — absolute separation of properties
Presumption is whenever properties acquired in marriage, it is conjugal.
There is exception. When the parties stipulated another property regime.
Property of Marcosa was paraphernal. Not conjugal.
The words “married to Rafael Litam” is merely descriptive.
Most of the properties of Marcosa were acquired prior to the constitution.
Another reason — declaration of heirs is not in the civil case but in another
special proceeding.
Every time an heir or a successor claims, there should be declaration
first of who the heirs are. You do not file claim that you are an heir if
you there is no declaration.
Yaptinchay vs Del Rosario
GR 124320, March 2, 1999
Petitioners are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the
owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.  of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the
Petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid
properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and
Development Corporation (Golden Bay) under Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 225254 and  225255.    They filed a complaint for annulment
and/or declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. 493363-67 and its derivatives
and as alternative reconveyance of realty with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order with damages with the
Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.  Private respondents presented a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action and that petitioners did not have a right of action, that
they have not established their status as heirs and that the land being
claimed is different from that of the private respondents.  The said
motion to dismiss was granted by the respondent court holding that
petitioners have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except
the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the deceased couple.  The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone.
Petitioners interposed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.  The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil
Hence, the present petition.  Petitioners contended that the respondent
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the issue of
heirship should first be determined before the trial of the case could
proceed.  It is petitioners submission that the respondent court should
have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of
heirship in the same case.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding.  Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or particular fact. The Court held that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners in the case at bar are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
(SandeeSuan)
Parulan vs Garcia
Principle: It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only
at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that
"[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we
proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is
basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus,
the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died
(Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art.
908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771).
Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the
amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and
the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee
(Art. 948).
Borromeo vs Descallar
The mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in
her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her
the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to
respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is
perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good
faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable
consideration. This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did
not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She
had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings.
She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it
was Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
properties in dispute. The rule of co-ownership applies to a man and a
woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other
does not apply. In the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to
another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution
to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion
of it.
It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is
only a means of confirming the existence with notice to the world at
large. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner
disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner.
Ventura vs Abuda
Civil Law — in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the properties
acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on
the actual contribution of the parties.
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim
to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.
status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property.The
evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over
the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate
of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration
under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the
Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered
some of the amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and
Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.
Civil Law - Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not
intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation,
which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case
valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the
parties intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and
registered under the name of Esteban.
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Registered Land Not Subject to Prescription (Sec. 47)
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land
in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.
Supapo vs De Jesus
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery
of possession of the subject lot but they based their better right of
possession on a claim of ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana
is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the
parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the
issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess
the property.
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is
only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to
an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The
adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo’s claim of ownership
over the subject property, we will only do so to determine if they or the
respondents should have the right of possession. Having thus
determined that the dispute involves possession over a real property, we
now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value
of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven
by the tax declaration  issued by the Office of the City Assessor of
Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and
authenticity of this tax declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional
requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana. The cause of action
has not prescribed
RA 7691 — MTC - 20k outside metro manila, 50k metro manila
Right of possession is a logical consequence of your right to ownership
under the Torres System.
Barred by Statute of Limitation
— Accion Publiciana - 10 year prescription
Supapo admit they filed beyond 10 years but the right is imprescriptible for
the land is covered by Torrens title.
- TCT lands cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession
regardless of length
Cabrera vs CA
The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to the
Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property, and,
therefore, void, is untenable.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code:
“Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and even he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.   But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.”
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the
subject property to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad
Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to her.   There has,
therefore, been a partial partition, where the transferees of an undivided
portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a
definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for a period too
long to be ignored--the possessor is in a better condition or right.
(SandeeSuan)
Tiongco vs Tiongco
The Court agrees with the CA’s disquisition that an action for
reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. In a long line of
cases decided by this Court, we ruled that an action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten
(10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
However, there is an exception to this rule. There is but one instance
when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that
is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. The
exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could
not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the
expense of another.
Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the
disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an
action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. The
Court held that where the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains
in possession of the subject land, the action for reconveyance becomes
in effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to
prescription.
In this case, petitioner’s possession was disturbed in 1983 when
respondent Jose filed a case for recovery of possession. The RTC of
Iloilo City ruled in respondent Jose’s favor but the CA on November 28,
1991, during the pendency of the present controversy with the court a
quo, ruled in favor of petitioner. Petitioner never lost possession of the
said properties, and as such, she is in a position to file the complaint
with the court a quo to protect her rights and clear whatever doubts has
been cast on her title by the issuance of TCTs in respondent Jose’s
name.
A Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible. The power to pass upon the
validity of such certificate of title at first instance belongs to the Regional
Trial Court in a direct proceeding for the cancellation of title. The alleged
invalidity of a Torrens certificate of title may not be raised by way of a
defense in an ejectment case where the question of ownership may be
provisionally ruled upon only for the sole purpose of determining who is
entitled to possession de facto.
Certificate of Title Not Subject to Collateral Attack (Sec. 48)
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
A decree of registration and registered title cannot be impugned,
enlarged, altered, modified, or diminished either in collateral or direct
proceeding, after the lapse of one year from the date of its entry.
If an attack is made thru a counterclaim, should it be disregarded
for being a collateral attack?
No. A counterclaim is also considered an original complaint, and as
such, the attack on the title is direct and not collateral.
It  is well settled that the Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked;
the issue on the validity of  title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently
issued can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the
purpose. It has been invariably stated that the real purpose of the
Torrens System is to quiet title to land to stop forever any question as
to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the “mirador a su casa” to avoid the possibility of losing his hand.”
“Respondents’ application for registration of a parcel of  land already
covered by a Torrens title is actually a collateral attack against
petitioners’ title, not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of
a Torrens title.”
“A decree of registration that has  become final shall be deemed
conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and
determined, but also upon matters that might be litigated or decided
in the land registration proceedings. Thus, it  is too late for  the
respondents to question petitioners’ titles considering that
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the  certificates of title issued to the  latter have become
incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from the date of  of possession.
registration.”
Taparuc vs Vda de Mende
It appears undisputed that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public
document, having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap
who, unfortunately, had already passed away. Being a notarial
instrument, the deed in question is a public document and as such
enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution. To overthrow that
presumption, sufficient, clear and convincing evidence is required,
otherwise the document should be upheld.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not
evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it. Here, the
petitioners failed to discharge their burden.
With the Mendes’ possession in this case having been in the concept of
an owner and the land itself registered in their names for more than
thirty (30) years now, their title thereto had become indefeasible and
their possession could no longer be disturbed. The petitioners’ failure to
take the necessary steps to assert their alleged right for at least twenty-
nine (29) years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of
action on the ground of laches.
A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question on the validity
of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be raised only
in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The title represented
by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged,
diminished, or cancelled in a collateral proceeding. The action for the
declaration of nullity of deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in
the RTC is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens
certificate of title.
First issue: Forgery — is a question of fact. Petition for review in the SC is
only about question of law.
Second issue: it is readily apparent that the forgery, they were not able to
show; Petitioners has the absolute control the evidence since the case is
a civil case and not a criminal case. But they did not show any evidence.
A torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. It was not considered as a
direct attack because the action filed was for Declaration of Nullity of Deed
of Sale and Cancellation of subsequent documents.
Rodriguez vs Rodriguez
We agree with the RTC that a certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of
ownership of the land described therein; the validity of which shall not
be subject to a collateral attack, especially in an answer in an ejectment
case which is summary in nature.
———
Being a summary proceeding intended to provide an expeditious means
of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property, the
question of title is not involved and should be raised by the affected
party in an appropriate action in the proper court.
However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is not ousted of
its jurisdiction. Section 16 of Rule 70.(ROC) All that the trial court can do
is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so
that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other
evidence to resolve ownership. But this adjudication is only provisional
and does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property.
Wills - The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence
in arriving attheir respective decisions: 1) HulingHabilin at Testamento 2)
Deed of Sale 3) TCT No. in the name of the petitioner; and 4) Partition
Agreement executed by both the respondents and the petitioner.
Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is
preponderance of evidence in favor of the petitioner’s claim.
Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling
Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal effect
since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or
validity itmust be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a
matter of public policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.” As the will was not
probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant
thereto cannot be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party
(SandeeSuan)
to said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue
Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the
petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since
ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as
owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it during
his lifetime.
Corpuz vs Agustin
Facts: Ruben C. Corpuz filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses
Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered
owner of two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 12980.
Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Francisco D. Corpuz,
father of Ruben C. Corpuz.
The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties,
the latter being relatives. Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins
refused to leave the premises.
Ruben alleged that he has the better right to possess subject property
having acquired the same from his father who executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in his favor. Spouses Agustin interposed the defense that
Francisco Corpuz disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of
Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration.
Issue: Whether or not Corpuz has the right to possession of the disputed
properties being the registered owner of the same?
Held: Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject
properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof.
However, the lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that
possession of the disputed properties by respondents was in the nature
of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz.
In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of
the property for more than 30 years up to this day.
Petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents where the
only question that the courts will resolve is: who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto
and not to the possession de jure. 
For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor
of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property.
Petitioner has not proven that respondents' continued possession of the
subject properties was by mere tolerance of his father nor the
possession of the properties became unlawful - a requisite for a valid
cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.
Tuazon vs Isagon
An action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature and cannot be
delayed by a mere assertion of ownership as a defense. When the
parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the court may
pass upon that issue only if needed to determine who between the
parties has a better right to possess the property. Furthermore, the
adjudication on the issue of ownership is only provisional, and subject to
a separate proceeding that the parties may initiate to settle the issue of
ownership.
A person who possesses a title issued under the Torrens system is
entitled to all the attributes of ownership including possession.
A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack in an action for
unlawful detainer. A collateral attack is made when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, the validity of a certificate of title is questioned.
It as an ejectment case, but the defendant set the defense that the title
of the plaintiff was illegally obtained. SC said it was considered as a
collateral attack to the certificate of title.
Issue of Unlawful detainer case is about possession and not
ownership. So the SC considered it as a collateral attack.
Romero vs Singson
The procedural issue of lack of attempts at compromise should be
resolved in respondent’s favor. True, no suit between members of the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made. However, the failure of a party to comply with this condition
precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. If the opposing party fails to raise
such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.
In arriving at its pronouncement, the CA passed upon the issue or claim
of ownership, which both parties raised. While the procedure taken is
allowed — under Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
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L A N D T I T L E S M I D T E R M S ( 2 0 17 ) A t t y. G i m a r i n o

Procedure, the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine

the issue of possession — the CA nonetheless committed serious and
patent error in concluding that based solely on respondent’s TCT 12575
issued in her name, she must be considered the singular owner of the
subject property and thus entitled to possession thereof — pursuant to
the principle that “the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is
entitled to possession thereof.” Such provisional determination of
ownership should have been resolved in petitioners’ favor.
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned,
the registration of the property in said person’s name would not be
sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property. A certificate of title
merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to
perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith
must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be
an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive
notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if
the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the
land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same
remained in the name of the original registered owners, Macario and
Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and respondent thus
became, and remain co-owners — by succession — of the subject
property. As such, petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership
over the same, including possession — whether de facto or de jure;
respondent thus has no right to exclude them from this right through an
action for ejectment.
With the Court’s determination that respondent’s title is null and void, the
matter of direct or collateral attack is a foregone conclusion as well. “An
action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is
susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack;” petitioners were
not precluded from questioning the validity of respondent’s title in the
ejectment case.

(SandeeSuan) Page 34 of 34