SURVEY OF RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON POLITICAL LAW

Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria

October 8, 2018

Article I, National Territory

The most important would be two things: Magallona v. Executive Secretary and the PCA Judgment. So, I'll give you a
summary of the PCA judgment, procedural and the merits. Magallona is the only case law that you will find regarding
baselines. That there are no salient points. If you will recall, during my pre-bar lecture here that we drew our baselines
in accordance with the UNCLOS. And the baselines were challenged as perhaps going to reduce over the seas. Justice
Carpio, in the majority opinion, said no, we are not. We are actually gaining. We actually gained more, not loss. Our
seas, under the old treaty of Paris, limits on the basis of which we drew our old baselines.

What do you need to remember in Magallona? Number one, we can only use right now the straight base-line method,
under the UNCLOS we have a maximum of about up to 125 nautical miles to draw the baselines. If you have an
island group like Kalayaan Island Group, that is a little far from the main coast, it cannot be connected by a straight
baseline. Instead it will be under the UNCLOS, what we call regime of islands. It’s recognized. It will have its own
maritime areas for that matter. When we drew our baselines naturally we enclose certain bodies of water which might
have been internal waters in accordance with our old baseline limits but because of the straight baselines that we use
under the new baselines law, we enclose it then became archipelagic waters. If you have archipelagic waters, you have
an obligation to allow other states traditionally dependent upon those waters to navigate. We are obliged under the
UNCLOS to develop navigational lanes and to allow other fisherfolk fishermen to actually navigate the area.

There is a concept called innocent passage, while traditionally applied to territorial sea, may also be applied in the
context of archipelagic waters. What is innocent passage? It is entry that is not intrusive and not threatening to the
security of the state.

Those are the major points to consider and now, we have updates on the PCA judgment, Permanent Court of
Arbitration.

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION (THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Permanent Court of Arbitration (Press Release) | 12 July 2016

Permanent Court of Arbitration involved China and the Philippines particularly, we had 15 claims. The procedural
aspect was easily handled by the tribunal, China was contesting jurisdiction of the tribunal on the basis of at least three
major points. It objected to the acquisition of jurisdiction by the tribunal because it was going to be a limitation on
territorial sovereignty. The tribunal said, it’s not. It’s all not about territorial sovereignty. China cited bilateral
instruments between the Philippines and China and that under those bilateral instruments they should be negotiating
rather than going through arbitration. The tribunal said, it does not prevent the Philippines from resorting to
arbitration. That’s not an exclusive remedy. Number three, again, still on the procedural plane, assuming that the
subject matter, that the arbitration had something to do with the application of the convention or interpretation of the
convention, China cited it’s own declaration where it made some form of preservation by excluding disputes
concerning maritime delimitation for the purpose of compulsory arbitration. Again, the tribunal said this is not all
about maritime delimitation, and that the tribunal will proceed even in the absence of the Chinese before the
proceedings. So on all scores there we won and proceeded to the merits. The merits are really what are significant for
our purpose. China you may have seen during my presentation in PIL, my powerpoint on the 9-dash lines. What is the
nine-dash line, this is a way by which China drew certain points around the South China Sea and practically said that
anything that falls within the nine-dash lines would be Chinese waters because of historic rights. The tribunal said, the
claim for historic rights were not proven, in fact China belatedly passed a law in 1998 that identified its EEZ but that
was a belated act. China has never shown any evidence that they were historically and exclusively using the South
China Sea. That was not proven. The most telling in terms of the tribunal’s decision was the fact that China admitted
having embraced the UNCLOS. If you embrace the UNCLOS, you practically give up all historic claims because now
you cannot use the 9-dash line independent of what the UNCLOS allows you to do in having to determine your
maritime zones. You have to abide by the structure of the UNCLOS that allows you a baseline and from the baseline
you draw your 12 nautical miles, 24 nautical miles, 200 nautical miles. 12 territorial sea, 24 contiguous zone, 200
nautical mile exclusive economic zone. That’s the structure. And you reckon it from the main coast. So the 9-dash line
that China did around the South China Sea dispute started from any form of maritime delimitation structure of the
UNCLOS. So it cannot be recognized. The PCA arbitration also ruled on the geologic features. What are geologic
features in the South China Sea that they are contesting? They are islands, rock formations, shoals and it’s important
to know what these geologic features are because if you know the geologic feature, and the characteristic of the
geologic feature then you’re able to distinguish the rights of a state that has a claim over that geologic feature. So the
tribunal said that the Spratly’s, which is the contested area where many of the islands and rocks are located are actually
not capable of human habitation. They are not your typical island where there is vegetation, and people can rely for
purposes of livelihood, those are not the kind of geologic features that you can find. If that were the case, those
islands and rocks within the Spratly’s that do not have capability of human habitation would not have 200 nautical
mile exclusive economic zone. Pushing the ruling further, if there could not be any EEZ around the Spratly’s, there
could not be any overlapping of EEZs. And there could not be any overlapping of EEZs there, our reckoning of the
EEZ from Palawan, let’s say the western side, up to 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone will not have any
overlap with any other state in the area. So, the Spratlys cannot be taken as a single unit to determine capability to
sustain human habitation or economic life.

There is one that we have always claimed, that’s Itu Aba. What is Itu Aba? It is a geologic feature entitled to 12
nautical mile territorial sea. Now, when is a geologic feature entitled to a territorial sea? That is when the ruling moved
towards what China had been occupying illegally in the Spratlys. So, the ruling distinguished between high tide
elevation reefs. It identified those reefs. If you are a high tide elevation reef, which means that you are still visible and
protruding even during high tide, then you are entitled to your 12-nautical mile territorial sea. And if you are a low tide
reef, which means that during high tide, you cannot be seen, you do not have any territorial sea. But can you be part of
an EEZ? Yes, if you are submerged. That is what happened in Mischief Reef which we claimed. It does not have a
territorial sea but it is within the Philippine EEZ. It’s only part of your continental shelf. As far as the tribunal is
concerned, only the Philippines may be able to establish structures within Mischief and Subi and China’s structures are
illegal.

We have a claim over Reed Bank. It’s part of our EEZ. Ayungin Shoal also is a low tide elevation within the
Philippine EZ. What about the famous Scarborough Shoal near Zambales? It’s a high tide elevation reef and it’s
entitled to a 12-nautical mile territorial sea only and it’s a traditional fishing ground for fishermen in the region and
China cannot prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing and the reverse is true. So that’s an open area for purposes of
fishing.

Finally, on the harm to the environment, the tribunal found China in violation of international environmental laws,
including UNCLOS because it collected turtles, damaged the reefs, and collected giant clams. These are outright
violations of existing UNCLOS and international environmental law rules, for which China should be made to pay.
So, on all scores, we won. China lost on all this.

What do you do with the judgment that you cannot enforce? That’s political. That’s not legal. But what can you do
legally? Then you have to navigate because legally, you are entitled to navigate the area. So conduct naval and aerial
patrols in the EEZ. Start exploiting your resources to manifest acts of jurisdiction over the area. Overflight is allowed
in the high seas and also in the EEZs.

ARTICLE II
The key in Article II is that so many decisions in the SC have started citing provisions of Article II. In Ocampo v.
Enriquez, November 8, 2016, G.R. No. 225973, J. Peralta, it listed also a number of provisions that the petitioner
cited in support of their arguments but many of the provisions in the Declaration of State Principles and Policies are
generally non-self executing. You can count a few but in general, they are not. So, how do you determine? Then you
just have to know the case that declared certain provisions self-executing and not self-executing. The most glaring
example of self-executing is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Article II, Sec. 16). So I make cross
references to other related provisions of the Constitution.

Cudia v. Superintendent of the PMA, February 24, 2015, G.R. No. 211362, J. Peralta
Does the Philippine Military Academy have the same status as any other schools that can also exercise administrative
due process in disciplinary proceedings? Yes. So Cudia here was found to have lied about the cause of his tardiness
during a lesson or examination. The SC here said that the power of an academic institution is actually part of the vital
operation of the institution and it upheld what is traditionally known as administrative due process in disciplinary
proceedings. The method of disciplining is based on its Honor Code, which is part of the mission and vision of the
academy. Just like any other administrative proceeding also, it is not cloaked with judicial characteristics so there could
not be undue judicialization of administrative hearing in the academy.

VAWC
You know that the Anti-VAWC was the subject of the issuance of certain Barangay Protection Orders. This was on
the basis of what we call as affirmative action. The basis for this is the historical injustice that has been caused or
suffered by many battered women. So it’s an attempt to put the women at the level of men for purposes of remedial
measures. So there is no unconstitutionality there. I am more interested in the reverse. What if a law, hypothetically,
were to be passed that now adopts anti violence against men and their children? Would that be constitutional or
unconstitutional? Because this one is with historical context. This is a context legislation. Would the context be the
same? But would you say that there are no battered men and are they not also entitled to such remedies? Hypothetical.

Imbong v. Ochoa, April 8, 2014, G.R. No. 204819, J. Mendoza

This one is big. This has not been asked. It’s very long but I listed all the issues here and I will cluster and I think
that’s important. The main issues really revolved around the right to the lift of the unborn from the point of
conception. That provision was definitely a statement so that would not apply here or you can terminate the life of the
fetus until the second trimester. That cannot apply yet. The HR law is also anti-abortion but it allows the usage of
contraceptives and intrauterine devices that the petitioners were saying would have the effect of abortifacients or abort
pills. That’s the premise. The policy is very clear. We do not allow abortion in this country. But the use of devices that
may induce or lead towards abortion is what is questioned.

There are three clusters of issues that will often reverberate in all of this very long set of facts. One, on the matter of
religions belief. Anything that has something to do with you being compelled to do something without regard to your
religions belief whether you are in the private or public sector as a provider is unconstitutional. The rest are
constitutional, except those of provisions.

Two, a matter of consent. Anything that will pertain to the rights of minor or parent. Or a miner was pregnant and
would have to deliberate on whether to avail on certain contraceptives or devices. Anything that will violate the
consent rule with regard to the parents will be unconstitutional because that is the child. The provisions on the
constitution say while the state may be able to supplement the power and authority of the parents in the rearing of the
child, it is still the primary right and duty of parents to rear their children. So consent was an issue in an umber of
provisions. Third, spousal consent.

If there is a problem, it is focused on these three. That is what the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional.
Fourth, the natural law. The couple here were saying that the right of the unborn is based on natural law. The SC said,
unless the natural law is codified or put into legislation, the courts will not readily resort to natural law. That’s
interesting because in the case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan several years back

Republic v. Sandiganbayan. July 21, 2003, G.R. No. 104768, J. Carpio

On the applicability of natural law as distinguished from positive law, they applied that in the positive law concept.
That was the context of the illegal search that happened when there was no Constitution in place after the revolution.
Do people have rights in that context? One view is positivist which is majority opinion of Justice Carpio. SC said that
State continues to be bound by international instruments. Therefore, in the absence of a Constitution or a
revolutionary government has actually disregarded or did not recognize the previous constitution then people still
have rights because of international human right norms.

That natural law approach was an opinion by Chief Justice Puno who said that people, even in the absence of
fundamental law have natural rights. In the natural law theory, rights precede the State. That’s the Lachean concept.
That's why the bill of rights is a limitation on the use of governmental power. The Bill of Rights is a source, it’s a
listing of what human being actually possess by virtue of natural persons. SC said, natural law has no basis for
application in this case. So these are the rulings.

Religious groups that have hospitals are compelled to refer regardless of religions beliefs. Persons who might need
that kind of advice of might want to undergo certain procedure but under this, in a non-emergency situation, that
would be a violation of religious belief. So it makes the distinction also with regard to emergency cases. In emergency
cases, you might be given that margin of appreciation. But not when it is not an emergency situation. That becomes a
compulsion on the part of religious groups. That also goes for public officials or public service provides who might
just have specific religious beliefs and they themselves are compelled to do certain acts such as that.

Consent. Allowing minor parents who have suffered miscarriage to modern methods without written consent of their
parents or guardians. That’s an example. It cuts through this different rulings.

Environmental Law Case

Paje v. Casino, February 3, 2015, G.R. No. 207257, J. Del Castillo
This is one of the cases wherein the SC has entertained it but not readily granted the writ of kalikasan. In the case of
Paje, this is, for me, not a significant source of question. But it’s a very long ase because of the issues concerning the
powerplant. But I would think that you can go to the decision. No writ of kalikasan was actually issued here. The
other was west tower. What Paje narrated would be the rules on environmental law where they narrated the standards
by which the rules are applied. That’s straightforward memory. The west tower is leak of a gas pipeline that is
connected from Manila to Batangas. This happened here at South super highway and a condominium was at the
receiving end of the leak which filled part of the basement. So they applied for a writ of kalikasan. The SC made a
sharp distinction. What was the petition all about? They were petitioning to check the structural integrity of the
pipelines with regard to an open trust fund to answer for contingencies. The SC said that the Precautionary Principle
does not apply here. What is this principle? It is a guide for decision makes whether administrative, or judicial maker
and for purposes of deciding a case. It says that decision maker does not need absolute scientific certainty for the
purpose of deciding whether to issue an injunction or order for the purpose of promoting a balanced and healthful
ecology. The SC said it did not apply here because detecting the issue of a leak in a pipeline is different from
determining whether the spillage of hazardous materials will cause environmental damage.

The other point is the trust fund, whether it can be raised in light of the environmental rules. The SC cited the rules of
procedure for environmental cases which prohibit the grant of damages.

This is a case of first impression

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., et.al. v. Greenpeace Southeast
Asia (Philippines), et.al. (G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301 and 209430, 8 December 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
International Service. This is about the BE Talong.That the talong youre eating may be carcinogenic. So this was a
petition for writ of kalikasan to stop field trials of the pest resistant crop described as bio engineered eggplant. The SC
said ok, precautionary principle applies. In the second decision, the SC now looks at the development between the
first judgement and the time the second petition was filed. This time the SC said on MR that there is no longer cause
for alarm because they have adjusted field trials, enhanced, and adopted set of more progressive regulations. All told,
it became moot.
Art II, Sec 16 in relation to immunity from suit.

Arigo v Swift, G.R. No. 206510, 16 SEPTEMBER 2014, Villarama, Jr., J

It is good for immunity from suit, it is good for environmental law. It was Tubbataha reef that was damaged as a result
of US naval vessel. It was established there was permit given by PH authorities for the naval vessel to navigate within
the territorial waters. When we sued the naval officers, the SC said this cannot be done. This is an official act even
permitted by PH authorities. So if you sue the naval officers, it will reach the level of the state and head of state and
therefore must be immune from suit. Remember that immunity from suit does not mean automatically immune from
liability. From the cases we've learned that the State cannot be sued without its consent. The standard rule is that
immunity does not result to automatic freedom from liability. But liability also on the other hand does not
automatically result into immediate execution. Now there are forms of having to proceed against State authorities.
That might have violated the host state's law. Like in this case, you may use diplomatic channels. It may come by way
of a state claim. Depending on who has actually been damaged. This is a direct damage on the territorial domain of
the state so this is direct responsibility. The person who penned the decision also cited that US is also not free
pursuant to its responsibility under international law. Mainly the UNCLOS and it cited that under Art. 31, the flag's
state shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal state. While the State may not
necessarily be sued, there are also other remedies that may be applied as we said, diplomatic channels may be done.
The Supreme Court said that the matter of having to course these through diplomatic channels is a political question.
We'll leave it up to the executive branch to pursue but the SC will not second-guess what the executive could do the
moment it pursues diplomatic channels.

Belgica v. Ochoa | G.R. No. 208566 | November 19, 2013 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Article 2, Section 25 in relation to so many other provisions, mainly the pork barrel. This is good for many provisions
under Article 6. What do you have to remember about the pork barrel? It's called the PDAF, by definition, it is an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured safely or primarily to bring money to
representative districts. In the Philippines, it's a lump sum, discretionary fund of members of the legislative and
executive branch. So there are two types of porks: the legislative and the executive pork. So I go straight to the main
decision, as far as the legislative pork is concerned. I always put this in a little matrix, what you have to imagine is how
the budget operates. So if you know how the budget operates, you know where the violation is, based on the SC
decision. Executive proposes a budget --> Legislative body passes it --> The moment it's passed, it's enforced by the
executive, which implements the budget.

After enactment, what can the legislative body do? Oversight function under Article 6, Sec. 22. Remember? The
reason why the legislative body can call on the different cabinet members there for almost like a question hour? It's
because they can exercise oversight function. The PDAF is a post-enactment measure that cannot be done by a
legislative body or any of its members. The moment the legislative member is able to point to a project and direct it to
a particular purpose and even suggest an NGO run by Janet Lim Napoles, to receive the money as a commission, so
they're all commissioners they split from legislature they act as commissioners. They split the money. That's a control
outside of the appropriation law. Because all that the Congress should do is pass it, and leave everything for the
Executive to undertake. That was what was violated. Giving a free hand to the legislative members to direct how the
project will be actually funded, and even having the liberty to choose partners on the ground. The key is giving
discretion, discretion to use certain funds. So when you shift to the executive pork, it's very similar. Where the
President determines the project, the fund released, even the alignment for that purpose. So look at the two
objectionable provisions in the Malampaya fund and the other one in the President Social Fund. This is what you'll eye
for in a problem. The moment you see this discretion given to the President, and for such other purpose as may
hereafter be directed by the President, it is just like the legislative pork. In the President's social fund, there's a similar
provision. To finance the priority infrastructure development projects as may be directed and authorized by the Office
of the President, so it's no different from the legislative pork. There is one provision though, in the President Social
Fund that was upheld as constitutional. And this is the phrase: to finance the restoration of damaged facilities due to
calamities. That one is specific enough, and there is not much discretion on the part of the President to direct the fund
other than to that type of condition of the property. So this one is not unconstitutional. So all you have to do, is to
find out: is there such discretion given? So if you have a problem of this nature, just go for that.
Full public disclosure
Many of these full public disclosure issues came about from the CJ Corona impeachment. So what happened here?
The SC was being asked, through the Clerk of Court, to produce certain documents in relation to certain cases. What
are these cases? Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), it's about the participation
allegedly of a very famous litigator, Estelito Mendoza, who was PAL Legal Counsel, and they were wondering how
come there were some kind of privileges or favors given because of the presence of Estelito Mendoza, he was writing
letters, and they said we might as well get the deliberations of the Court concerning the FASAP. Now, deliberations of
the Court are similar to cabinet hearings. It is similar to the Senate or the House meeting in chambers. They are all
privileged. You cannot ask for anything concerning the deliberations inside these chambers. That's a no no. They
wanted to ask for the rollos as well, of other decisions where the SC allegedly flip-flopped:
1. Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2007, where they changed decision twice
2. League of Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, Nov. 18, 2008, where it was apparently five times that they
changed decisions

and the SC said Rollo can not be accessed by non-parties. If you want, you may get from the parties of the case, but
not from the Supreme Court.

What about judgments? Can judgments of the court be accessed?

Obviously, yes. Because judgments are in a way public knowledge. Orders, resolutions - fine, but not the rollos.

Three points:
1. Internal deliberations - no
2. Rollos - no
3. Decisions, orders - yes

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK VS. SENATE IMPEACHMENT COURT | GR No. 200238 | February 09,
2012 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.
This is the foreign currency deposit units of CJ Corona and the PS Bank officials were asked to produce information
concerning currency deposits. No, you cannot produce that. That's covered by the Foreign Currency Deposit Act.
Confidentiality applies.

Art 3 - Bill of Rights

In the Bill of Rights, what is popular would be the writs, particularly under Sec 1 - right to life, liberty, and security. Of
course, this is the language of the writ but Sec 1 of Art 3 of the Bill of Rights - life, liberty, and property. When they
wrote the writs particularly amaro including habeas data, they really focused on the right to life, liberty, and security.
So what you have to know are the characteristics of a writ of amparo and habeas data. In particular, amparo is not a
search and seizure instrument.

For purposes of immunity, a number of cases in the past had always impleaded the President - immune from suit. If
you want to sue the President for extrajudicial killings, remove the President under Art 11 and then file a criminal case
concerning EJK. But while sitting, immune from suit.

Command responsibility
There is a principle that says command responsibility is customary law that applies to the doctrine of incorporation in
this jurisdiction but when we passed RA 9851, there is no longer any issue about codification of command
responsibility. Under command responsibility, that is already listed as part of RA 9851 - that is codified. Before they
were arguing whether command responsibility applied in the amparo cases, now, you can no longer dispute that. What
you have to remember are the elements of command responsibility.

MISON VS. HON. GALLEGOS | GR No. 210759 | June 23, 2015 | Perez, J.
Attempted to apply amparo to a situation of a Korean who was a subject of summary deportation order. The SC said
it does not apply to summary deportation order. The amparo does not cover that. Besides, there is no threat to life or
security on the part of the Korean. That was disregarded.

HON. ZARATE ET AL VS. H.E. AQUINO III | GR No. 220028 | November 10, 2015 | EN BANC
RESOLUTION
List of militant Congressman and other personalities who have always opposed, on the point of view, of the
communist perspective. They have always been identified with the left and some are even in the order of battle. In one
case, concerning the Manobos tribe, which apparently involved the CPPNPA in influencing a group of Manobos who
were in the United Church of Christ in Davao City. When the military went after the militants here, the military started
asking for names and the complainants there were shown a list of persons - very very high profile persons, some are
Congressman like Zarate, identified with the left, Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis, they were all listed and when these
personalities and legislator found out about this, they sought a writ of amparo and habeas data because they are
threatened. SC said, no you're publicly known anyway to be affiliated with this, you never denied that you were from
Bayan Muna or you're from Anak Pawis, so why are you now complaining when this list was produced that showed
your names. So the SC said mere membership of petitioners in organization such as Bayan Muna, Party List, Gabriella,
do not suffice an actual threat that entitles one to amparo. There is no violation of the right to privacy when their
names were collected and listed. These are all public knowledge anyway.

LEGASPI VS. CITY OF CEBU | GR No. 159110 | December 10, 2013 | Bersamin, J.
Substantive due process. Clamping of vehicles in Cebu City through an ordinance. Is that valid? Yes. So the test of an
ordinance, I think it's easy. It's justified by traffic congestions. What is good for Cebu is also good for Manila and for
other cities.

REMMAN ENTERPRISES INC VS. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE

SERVICE | GR No. 197676 | February 04, 2014 | Villarama, Jr., J.
That anyone who engages in real estate, brokerage, business, must actually go through a process of licensing. So you
have to study and get a license. The exemption is what was challenged. The law exempted any person, natural or
juridical, who shall directly performed by himself/herself, the acts mentioned in the law with reference to his/her own
or its own property, except real estate developers. Real estate developers said, we're also property owners, how come?
So the SC said, there is no violation of equal protection. It makes sense if you're a property owner yourself and then
you sell it - you're not into the business. If you're a real estate developer, you're into the business. They profit too
much.

VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL | GR No. 211833 | April 07, 2015 | Reyes, J.
Equal Protection. The requirement that for you to go up to second level court, you have to have at least five years. Is
there a violation? No. That is valid and the function of the JBC is to select nominees. There is basis for qualification
of at least 5 years. If you go to higher posting. If you want to enter the judiciary now, it is very easy. You're very
young.

FERRER VS. BAUTISTA | JUNE 30, 2015 | G.R. No. 210551 | J. PERALTA
Socialized Tax Ordinances
So this is good for LGUs or even public corporations
Quezon City passed the Socialized Housing Tax, a special assessment equivalent to .5% on the assessed value of plant
in excess of 100,000 for the purpose of socialized housing programs of the city government. Valid? Yes.
But there was a garbage fee. This time the garbage fee distinguished the rates imposable depending on the land or
floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium or socialized housing apartment or project.
Supreme Court said the garbage fee is violative of equal protection.

1-UTAK VS. COMELEC | APRIL 14, 2015 | G.R. NO. 206020 | J. REYES
This also relates to Adiong vs. Comelec. So COMELEC Resolution prohibited forms of election propaganda
displaying in public utility vehicles and within public transport terminals. Question was does this also apply to
privately owned utility vehicles and private transport terminals? Supreme Court said it is violative of Sections 1 and 4
of Article 3. We go back to ADIONG VS. COMELEC | MARCH 31, 1992 | G.R. NO. 103956 | J.
GUTIERREZ, JR.
Struck down the prohibition of COMELEC in posting of decals on mobile places such as private vehicles. This is
private property so cannot. While COMELEC may also regulate franchise or permits to operate, it cannot per se
regulate ownership of private utility vehicles and transport terminals. Sure they register and they are actually franchises
that may be subject of COMELEC regulations in times of elections. Supreme Court said, however, this will go into
the question of ownership similar to Adiong that they have strucked down before.

Prohibition on posting of commercial advertisements on windows of buses because it hinders police authorities
from seeing passengers inside are safe is a regulation on the franchise. That may be done cause it has been used in fact
for very illegal purposes.

DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE | FEBRUARY 11, 2014| G.R. NO 203335 | J. ABAD
The rest are constitutional. There were 3 or 4 points that are declared unconstitutional. That is the cybercrime law.
Spam is allowable. Cyber liber is valid.
(1) Aiding or abetting and attempt in commission of cyber crimes
Supreme Court said is liking, commenting or sharing is too much an overbreadth. In fact in the practice of social
media, that is almost automatic. Some people doesn't really have the criminal intent to do that but automatically just
likes so they said this is too much. It's overbreadth when you penalize on the basis of abetting or aiding.
(2) Restricting or blocking access to computer data
So this one is considered by the SolGen. It empower the DOJ to restrict or block access of computer data on the
basis of a violation of any of the provisions of this Act. The Supreme Court said this is akin to a warrantless search so
you have to get actual, judicial permission.
Those are the major points in cyber crime. All the rest were held valid.

AMPATUAN VS. PUNO | JUNE 7, 2011 | G.R. NO. 190259 | J. ABAD

Due process. Maguindanao massacre and because of the celebrated case, there was need to publicize proceedings.
What you just have to remember here is the set of guidelines. There is an Ampatuan coverage. There was also another
one with Jinggoy Estrada. But this was the set of guidelines for purposes of observing the proceeding. So it's all led by
the SC, audio-visual recording, even the matter to install a computer, distributing the information, it must be well
within the court's jurisdiction. That is also placed in a repository. That is deposited in the National Museum. It's just
the guidelines. What's important to remember here is what we have to observe when there will be coverage of such
highly celebrated cases.

Search and seizure also right to privacy

POLLO V. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID | OCT 18, 2011 | G.R. NO. 181881 | J.
VILLARAMA, JR.
This one is also interesting. A computer was a subject of a search by the civil service authorities. That computer is
within the office, in a government office. What was the problem? The employee was using the computer for purposes
of moonlighting. So he was lawyering for one of the civil service employees who had administrative cases. So he was
using the government issued computer and he said that he had the right to expectation of privacy. Supreme Court said
this is a valid search. There is no right to expectation of privacy on the basis of a government issued computer
because the civil service also has a memo that in fact authorizes the search of the individual computers assigned to
them.

US V. SIGLER | MARCH 8, 2018 | 18-20173

There was an argument made based on this case that if you have a password on your computer and you did not share
this with your officemates and you kept it locked then that is when you have a legitimate expectation of privacy. That
was never in fact manifested by the employee who was subject of the search, never actually produced any of these
evidence with regard to password so that is also struck down as immaterial. Now there is a part here in the decision
that talks about a court employee on the other hand who used his personal computer during working hours to prepare
pleadings for personal cases. This time the Supreme Court said they did not allow the evidence obtained from the
personal computer. So it makes a distinction between personal computer and one that is government issued computer.

Spouses Hing and Tsu'tsey Sr.

This one is about, we do not have a jurisprudence yet I think on Jones in this country but this one is about video
surveillance cameras. So there were two neighbors. One put up surveillance cameras that pointed to the premises of
the neighbor and it was immaterial whether the property was devoted to business or residence. Here it was actually a
business office and the cameras were pointed to that. Supreme Court said this is a violation of the right to privacy
under the civil code and it is prying into the privacy of another's residence. So there is an expectation of privacy on
this point.

VIVARES V. ST. THERESE'S COLLEGE | SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 | G.R. No. 202666 | J. VELASCO JR.
It's about the students who were dressing up and they covered themselves with cameras and these pictures were
uploaded by a friend on Facebook and the children and of course the parents were worried because the children were
not allowed to attend the commencement exercises because of this. So the parents asked for a writ of habeas data
arguing that their children have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court said none in this situation.
Why? I think what is important is to highlight the purpose of habeas data, that it is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty, security has been violated and online social network, the SC said, before one can
have an expectation of privacy, it is first necessary that children would manifest the intention to keep the post private
and there are built-in mechanisms in online social network when you can actually secure it but they never actually avail
of those security mechanisms. So they struck it down as without basis, that there is no expectation of privacy on this
point.

LEE V. ILAGAN | OCTOBER 8, 2014 | GR 203254 | J. PERLAS-BERNABE

This one, you always remember cases because of stories. Here the man was very worried that the video that the
partner actually got from his camera would end up in Quiapo. This is the Quiapo case. What happened here was that
there were common law partners and the petitioner here happens to be a police superintendent. The police visited the
partner, Doctor Lee, and upon arrival petitioner noticed that the digital camera was missing. Inside the digital camera
was a sex video. When the man found out about this he banged the head of the partner and the partner sought
protection under anti VAWC. The police wanted to get protection for himself also so he wanted to apply for the writ
of habeas data fearing that the video will end up in Quiapo. So SC said the writ will not be issued on this point. He
was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy would be violated because of the threatened dissemination
of the sex video.

GMA NETWORK V. COMELEC | SEPTEMBER 2, 2014 | G.R. No. 205357 | J. PERALTA

This is about the aggregate airtime versus per station basis. The COMELEC decided to use aggregate air time
exposure of candidates rather than going on a network basis per station. This of course will reduce the exposure of the
candidates and they were questioning the COMELEC resolution as a violation of their freedom of expression. Was
this in violation of freedom of expression? Supreme Court said it is unreasonable . So the aggregate based airtime is
unreasonable and arbitrary. There was not much substantial distinction and rationale behind that aggregate airtime
limits.

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC | January 21, 2015 | G.R. No. 205728 | Leonen, J.
Diocese of Bacolod. You know about this--buhay, patay. So it's a very famous case and this was all about the
conscience vote. And what the church did in Bacolod was to put up tarpaulins. The first tarpaulin was about "ibasura
RH law". The second was the candidates who were for RH were given a check sign, while those who were against RH
were given an "X" mark. So those were the tarpaulins. COMELEC ordered the tarpaulins removed. On what basis?
It's oversized. So COMELEC was saying this was content-neutral. "We are not about the content of the tarpaulins.
We are about measurements only."
Supreme Court said it violated the freedom of speech. Contrary to the COMELEC's argument that this is content-
neutral, on the face of it, it was really undermining your freedom of expression. So it was really, in the long run,
content-based using, on its face, a standard that sounded so neutral. But in effect, it was all about the content. Besides,
there was lack of clear and reasonable nexus with the size and the objective of the COMELEC in having to remove
the tarpaulin.

DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT V. RODRIGO ARANJUEZ, ET AL. | June 16, 2015 | G.R. No. 194192
| Perez, J.
This one is on civil service. You have Davao City Water District. A set of employees who were going on a fun run
anniversary. Apparently they had gripes against the institution where they were working, which is government. And
therefore, they cannot go on strike. But what they did was to creatively use the fun run--a fun run with inscriptions on
the shirt. The fun run happened during office hours. As government employees, you're not supposed to, in fact, do
certain things during office hours that might be contrary to your rules on civil service, on what we call collective mass
action.

The Supreme Court said the wearing of t-shirts with inscriptions and posting of papers, which wrote the grievances by
the employees, were actually a legitimate expression of their grievances. So when they were administratively made
liable for this, the Supreme Court said it violated their freedom of expression. So the prohibition on concerted mass
action within regular office hours is anchored on the following:
1. Collective activity; and
2. Work stoppage or service disruption

There was none. They were doing it in accordance with a legitimate and sanctioned or allowed activity, a fun run. It's
any sports attire, with inscriptions on it. So it gives you ideas of how to protest within government. Very nice.

SWS, INC. AND PULSE ASIA, INC. V. COMELEC | April 7, 2015 | G.R. No. 208062 | Leonen, J.
Let's go to SWS. This one is a resolution that required SWS and Pulse Asia and other survey firms to submit names of
commissioners and payers of all surveys published.

Was this a violation of freedom of speech and the non-impairment clause?

The Supreme Court said no. This is within the regulatory power of the COMELEC. Besides, election surveys are not
per se election propaganda. However, they can actually shape voters' minds. So this was merely an act of regulation by
COMELEC.

Freedom of Religion

PERFECTO V. ESIDERA | July 22, 2015 | A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 | Leonen, J.

This one is a little complicated. But it's of interest in the are of freedom of religion. It's about a judge who married,
first time, where there was no valid license. The judge married a second time. This time the priest had no authority.
Meanwhile, she gave birth to a daughter under the alleged second marriage. And then subsequently, the first marriage
was declared void. But at the time she registered her daughter, the daughter was registered as legitimate. So she was
being sued for falsification of a public document and for dishonesty for having falsified the daughter's birth certificate.

Judge argued that everything she did was legal and in accordance with her religious beliefs. The court administrator
found her guilty of disgraceful, immoral and dishonest conduct.

May the judge be found guilty of, this time, the Code of Professional Responsibility?
The Supreme Court made distinctions here on the matter of the liability of the judge. The Supreme Court said that she
disobeyed the law against bigamy. Her omission to correct the child's birth certificate is not sufficient to render her
administratively liable. Third, her alleged affair and failure to compose according to Catholic faith is not within the
court's jurisdiction. And on that last point, the Supreme Court said that, "We will not second guess the religious
conviction and belief of the person." Following Estrada v. Escritor, benevolent neutrality was applied by the Supreme
Court there. But the Court actually looked into the Code of Professional Responsibility, at least.

So this last paragraph says the judge knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her first husband knowing the effects
under existing laws. She had sexual relations with her second husband while the first marriage was subsisting. This act
is obviously not in the exercise of religious expression. And her conduct affects credibility of the courts in dispensing
justice. The Court was still quite tolerant in the long run, despite this sort of indiscretion.

Non-delegability of Legislative Power, Freedom of Assembly, etc. in Local Government

SPARK V. QUEZON CITY | G.R. No. 225442 | August 8, 2017 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.

It's all about 3 ordinances. This one is also a bit tricky. 3 ordinances about curfew. This is the famous curfew
ordinances. Quezon City, Manila and Navotas. The 2 ordinances of Manila and Navotas were struck down as
unconstitutional for being overbroad and also for lacking sufficient standards. Well, the most perfect was that of QC.
I'm not sure if it's because Herbert consulted Professor Agra who was the consultant of QC. But look at the
differences, I just wanted you to recognize why QC Ordinance was more exhaustive compared to Manila and
Navotas. On QC, the curfew provided the following exemptions:
1. Those accompanied by parents and guardians;
2. Those on their way to and from a party/graduation/religious mass/extra-curricular activities
3.There was also a need to identify the minors and proper authorities would actually have such power to verify;
4. Emergency situations;
5. Employment -- if you are being employed;
6. Inside a motor vehicle or on travel accompanied by an adult in case of official school, religious, recreational,
educational and other civic related activities sponsored by the school or barangay
7. The minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed quite late that day

So there is a penalty but it is not imposed on the minor. In the case of Manila and Navotas, there were sanctions that
would have a bearing on the minor. And the Juvenile Justice Welfare Law, in fact, would not allow such and I think
that is where the excesses came in. Because Manila Ordinance was rather simple. it looks similar but it was one thing
in terms of the details that QC Ordinance had. So the Ordinance could impose various sanctions such as reprimand,
admission, imprisonment and fine on the offender. So it was too broad. Navotas Ordinance, similar on some points
but it requires the minor along with parents to render social, civic and community service should the guardians fail to
pay the fine. So there is some form of servitude there. So I think that is where the 2 ordinances differed compared to
the QC Ordinance.

So they cited here, RP 9344, that is the Juvenile Justice Welfare Law which prohibits the imposition of penalties on
minors for status offenses such as curfew violation. So curfew violation is a status offense for which you cannot be
penalized. So the 2 ordinances impose penalties unlike the QC's.

MARIO SERENO V. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND RELATED MATTERS (CTRM) OF THE

NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA) | G.R. No. 175210 | February
1, 2016 | Bersamin, J.
Sereno, not the Chief Justice but the husband. This is the right to information. Mr. Serene here belong to the
Petrochemical Manufacturers in the Philippines and he applied for the issuance of writ of Mandamus against the
committee called the Committee on Tariff and Related Matters of the National Economic Development Authority, he
wanted minutes. He wanted minutes, data, concerning deliberations on the executive order that suspended the tariff
reduction on petrochemical resin and plastic products pursuant to our pre-trade commitments. I think they, as
Petrochemical Manufacturers will be affected by that lifting. The SC said they cannot. What he was asking for which
was the deliberations of the Committee was akin to asking for cabinet hearings transcriptions because the committee
is part of NEDA and it was the course of the drafting of the Executive Order so it merely confirms previous SC
decisions on matters that they deem privileged such as Cabinet deliberations. So they enumerated the exemptions
here.
NPC V. MANALASTAS | G.R. No. 196140 | January 27, 2016 | Peralta, J.
One on eminent domain. Very interesting. Very rare that they have new decisions of interest on eminent domain
because they are pretty straightforward decisions except for one about the matter of inflation. In computing just
compensation, would you have to factor in inflationary impact? The SC said they don't. They don't take into account
inflationary impact. But what takes the place of that if the value of the money becomes lower? Interest. Until the
government has paid, interest may actually be adjudged as against the Government but not take into account inflation
so what is used for purposes of somehow compensating for the loss of value of money. So, there was an argument
that estoppel lies against the state because NPC had actually been remiss in trying to raise the issue for a long time. SC
said estoppel does not lie against the state. It can still be raised even at the highest level of adjudication.

BPI FAMILY SAVING BANK V. GOLDEN POWER DIESEL SALES CENTER | G.R. No. 176019 |
January 12, 2011 | Carpio, J.
One on non-impairment might be interesting on real estate mortgage. This also relates to deprivation of certain
remedies. So this is about the redemption of a property and apparently, under the Real Estate Mortgage, there was a
law that could no longer be possible because it barred the redemption. Golden way argued that RA 3135, earlier law,
should apply, which allowed 1 year period. And not the shorter period under RA 8791. And the argument made was
that if you will apply the later law, it would impair the obligation or contract. Supreme Court said there is no
impairment of the obligation of contract. In fact, the remedy is still available. The period is not substantive enough,
that will actually deprive you of your right to contract. It is merely a modification of the time for the exercise of such
right. Reducing the one year period from the original law under Republic Act 3135.

Enrile, do you remember Enrile? Of course. Is he entitled to bail? Yes, he is Enrile, because he is Enrile. He says that
well, probably at this point, he was close to 90 already, with the benefit of stem cell.

Well, Enrile was charged with plunder and he was ordered arrested and he surrendered and was confined at the PNP
General Hospital. He filed a motion to fix bail and on the basis of the fact that the prosecution failed to establish the
evidence of guilt was strong the penalty as to him would be reclusion temporal and he's not a flight risk and his age was
90 at the time and he is actually very weak. He was granted bail. Why? Because of his standing. Enrile's social and
political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities indicate that the risk of flight or escape is
highly unlikely plus his fragile state of health and they presented evidence. That's Enrile. That's because he's Enrile.

So bill for the provisional liberty regardless of the crime charged should be allowed independently of the merits of the
crime charged, especially if it's injurious to his health.

Let's go to citizenship. There's a number of case law here. Citizenship. So watch out for citizenship.

Citizenship

Maquiling. You know you should read always that very short law the retention and reacquisition laws. It's very short,
it's just a back-to-back piece of paper, but it's very tricky when you look at case law. I'm also a little bit struck by some
of the decisions in relation to Bengzon. But let's look at some related case law

Case:
MAQUILING VS COMELEC | April 16, 2013 | G.R. No. 195649 | C.J. Sereno

So here is a natural born citizen who acquired American Citizenship. Later on, he re-acquired. Took an oath of
allegiance and renounced American Citizenship. But he used his passport at least four times. U.S. passport, even after
renouncing U.S. Citizenship. He was contested and was accused of being disqualified even after his term has ended.
Was he disqualified to run for local elective position?

The answer is yes. He was disqualified. The act of using a passport does not divest one of Filipino citizenship, which
he acquired after repatriation. However, representing one's self as a foreign citizen, he voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual. If you are a dual, then that means you have to have that qualified rule that you
have to renounce, right? But because he used his passport, according to the Supreme Court, that actually violated his
commitment to totally renounce American citizenship. So dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only
an oath of allegiance to the Republic, but to personally renounce foreign citizenship. So this one is important to
remember, it's good for the Local Government Code Rules and also Article 4 on Citizenship. I think one of the things
you have to remember is this spin-off from the case that being a non-candidate, so if you have been disqualified, that
means you were not a candidate. So being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted,
so will the succession rule apply? No, it will not apply. So this leaves the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. But the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply. This is, I think, is
something to watch out for, because that is the spin in that particular decision.

Case:
DAVID VS AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | March 18, 2015 | G.R. 199113 | J. Villarama,
Jr.

Agbay vs. People. Here is a natural born citizen who migrated to Canada, acquired a Canadian citizenship by
naturalization. As a Canadian, the petitioner and the wife bought a parcel of land in Mindoro and then, they built a
house. It turned out to be a property that they thought was private, it turned out to be a public land and part of the
salvage zone. What the petitioner here did was to file a Miscellaneous Lease Application over the subject land to
DENR. In that application, what they put was Filipino citizen, and obviously, they are not allowed since they are still
Canadians. What happened was that another person having found out about this complaint against the petitioner for
falsification of public documents. Meanwhile, they re-acquired Filipino Citizenship under Republic Act 9225.

Question: Are they disqualified to own that land?

Supreme Court said, petitioner may be proceeded against for violation of the Revised Penal Code, based on a
misrepresentation that he is a Filipino Citizen qualified to acquire land, because he was still a Canadian as of the time
they actually bought the land. The reason for that is, when they reacquired, the falsification was already consummated.
The reacquisition could not be retroactive to actually exculpate them from criminal liability by that time.

R.A. 9225
This one is what I quoted for purposes of your understanding of 9225. And I want you to pay close attention to this
once you get the digest.

R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of 9225. The first paragraph of Sec. 3 refers to reacquisition while the second paragraph covers retention.
Petitioner belonged to the first category wherein retroactivity of natural born Filipino citizenship cannot be applied.
You remember the case of Bengzon v. Cruz, this was before 9225 because this will have a bearing on another case.
Where if you are Filipino citizen you acquire American citizenship and then later on you revert back to Filipino
citizenship without 9225 yet, you are a natural-born citizen. You are a natural born citizen.

Why was that controversial or first impression case?

Because under Art. 4 Sec. 2, a natural born citizen is one who does not perform any act to perfect one's citizenship.
When you repatriate, there's an act involved there.

CASE:
POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC | MARCH 8, 2016 | G.R. NO. 221697 | J. PEREZ
Justice Perez would answer that in particular with regard to Poe because a foundling according to him is not covered
by that particular provision. Because a foundling does not do an act to perfect one's citizenship compared to this one,
and compared to Bengzon v. Cruz. Very interesting. You should pay close attention to these three cases. So petitioner
belongs to the first category wherein retroactivity of natural born citizenship cannot be applied. So you know Grace
Poe, right? That's a very long set of facts but what's important is that she is a foundling. What you have to remember
in this case is simple.

What's the status of a foundling under domestic law in relation to international law?
You always have to distinguish the effect of international law from municipal law. Poe was found by the Supreme
Court here to have possessed Filipino citizenship and they gave her a natural born citizen status. International law says
a child in a similar case like Poe who is a foundling, is entitled to a nationality. But international law instruments do
not say that municipal law should recognize that child as natural born citizen or naturalized a foundling. So it is left to
domestic law. That's it. But Poe was entitled to a nationality. SC applied a probability test that during the time she was
born, it is almost inconceivable that she could not have been a Filipina because aside from the features, the
circumstantial evidence showed Poe has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond
shaped eyes, and an oval face. Those are circumstantial. Aside from the fact that, of course, they look at the statistical
probability that at that time in that place, in Iloilo, there could not have been the chance of Poe having been born of
foreign parents. They applied statistical probability. You have to take this as is. The first time I bumped into
citizenship by statistical probability. But they went back to the case of the father, because the father, FPJ, was also
pronounced as natural born citizen on the basis of presumption. Also on the basis of presumption. They were trying
to trace the lineage and they said, this grandfather lived during the period of the transition from Spanish to American
sovereignty and they applied the rule that anyone at that time would have been declared if you are uninhabitant as a
citizen of the State that now had jurisdiction over the inhabitants at that time. They could not prove any document to
show that. So they relied on that presumption. So two cases, the same family, on presumptions. So just take that: the
statistical probability.

What's important further is that foundling are a class of natural born citizens as a matter of law. They went back to the
deliberations of the 1935 that there was an intent to in fact confer natural born citizenship on the raffles amendment
that it was never carried into the letter of the Constitution. It was not even reflected in subsequent constitutions. So
domestic law and adoption supports the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. There's a listing of
international law documents, it's all about the right to a nationality but does not say what kind of nationality. So Poe is
a national.

Now, the decision went to Bengzon v. Cruz explained that repatriation results in the recovery of one's original
nationality. In the case of Poe, her repatriation in July 2006 restored her to her natural born citizenship status. She has
always been natural born because the foundling never did any act to perfect one's citizenship. That's how they
reconciled it in Art. 4 Sec. 2.

CASE:
DAVID V. POE-LLAMANZARES | SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 | G.R. NO. 221538 | J. LEONEN
This is a sequel to that. The assumption should be that foundlings are natural born citizens unless there is substantial
evidence to the contrary. So again, presumption. This is where they explain that to determine whether Po is natural
born citizen, one must look whether she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In the ruling, she did not have
to go through naturalization process to become Filipino. So when she repatriated, she was merely going back to her
original natural born citizen status. So all things were covered by this case.

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST VS. COMELEC | December 16, 2015 | G.R. No. 221318 | J. Perlas-Bernabe

Biometrics. Is that Valid? Is this requirement a procedural or a substantive requirement?

It's merely procedural. Your right to vote is still intact.

The state may impose statutory disqualifications provided, it does not amount to literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement.
How come in PCGG, when you read Section 26 of Article 18 of the Constitution. How come there, it refers to ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses and the cronie? Isn't that the violation of the Equal Protection? That's the tenor here. I
always told the tudents, no, it's the constitution. How can the constitution violate itself. The Constitution shouldn't
violate itself. It did not. So this one is the Constitution. It's the sovereign will of the people. No violation.

Undue Delegation

DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH vs.CIR | August 19, 2013 | G.R. No. 188550 | CJ. Sereno

There is a treaty between Germany and the Philiuppines. The treaty provided for a Germean investor in the
Philuppines to avail of certain preferrential tax privilages. What BIR did was to put a regulation. A period within
which you will avail of such privilege under the treaty

SC said that you cannot do that. The spring cannot rise higher than the source. It is a mere regulation. It cannot void
any availment of such privilege under a treaty. The SC said that regulation violates the principle of undue delegation of
legislative authority.

They were trying to apply an earlier case of Mirant but SC said that the Mirant ruling is not a finding president.
Besides, the substance in matter involved in Mirant and in Deutsche Bank are different. So it was reiterated in CBK.

AQUINO vs. COMELEC | April 7, 2010 | G.R. No. 189793 | J. Perez

Very complicated district representatives creation of provinces, legislative districts. Difficult like party-lists. So I'm
trying to give you a little guide after this.

In the case of Aquino, this is Senator Aquino then. There was an act which reapportion the composition of the first
and 2nd legislative districts in CamSur. Creating a new legislative district from such reapportionment. The goal is to
create a new legislative district. At that time, there was 4 legislative districts. This is a province ah. What's the rule? do
you need 250,000? No. You only need that for a city. Focus on that rule.

SamSur, a province but, there are several legislative districts. What they did was to get from 1 & 2. Culled out and
then, a new legislative district. A 2nd one was created.

What is the effect?

The 1st district where they got some population was reduced to 176. Originally, they had more than 250 but because
of this, and what J. Carpio-Morales said was a clear case of Gerrymandering, they pulled out this population from 1 &
2 and in fact, had this effect. The second district now, the new legislative district, had 250,000 but the first lost. The
rest had 250,000, only the first one did not have. Did this comply with the requirements under Article VI,
Section 5 (1,3,4)? Yes. Republic Act 9716 is valid. The 250,000 population requirement does not apply to the creation
of legislative districts in provinces. It only applies to the creation of a legislative district in a city.

Mariano v. COMELEC | March 7, 1995 | G.R. No. 118577 | J. Puno

Let me summarize all the district representative cases starting with the creation of Makati as highly urbanized city. Go
through this so it refreshes your memory under jurisprudence because even with regard to a city, the 250,000 as held
in Mariano v. COMELEC will only apply to the first and not to the subsequent creation.

Bagabuyo v. COMELEC | December 8, 2008 | G.R. No. 176970 | J. Brion

That also happened in the case of Mandaluyong and San Juan. But what is disturbing in those cases is that the earlier
cases applied presumption of validity of the laws even if there had not been any evidence that was presented in
Congress on the 250,000 requirement in the conversion to a highly urbanized city in Makati, Mandaluyong, and San
Juan.
Aldaba v. COMELEC | January 25, 2010 | G.R No. 188078 | J. Carpio
But later on, Justice Carpio would clarify in Aldaba v. COMELEC and became more stricter. He said you have to
produce the information on 250,000 requirement.

Sema v. COMELEC | July 16, 2008 | G.R. No. 177597 | J. Carpio

This case advises you that when it comes to the creation of a province in the ARMM, the SC has ruled that the power
to create a legislative district is legislative in character, and that the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create the
province of Shariff Kabunsuan because the creation of a province would have the effect of creating a legislative
district which is congressional power, not a regional legislative assembly power. That one is interesting to remember.
It's a little different from the string of case law.

Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC | April 2, 2013 | G.R. No. 203766 | J. Carpio

I cannot advise you anything more except to memorize the guidelines. The party-list jurisprudence had been
circulating for a while, but what continues to be good in the party-list is that as far as the 20% of the number of the
district representatives of the total number of congressional members, what is the ruling that is still good? That's a
mere ceiling that continues to be good.

But what is to be remembered as the 6 parameters found in the law. National parties or organizations, regional parties
or organizations, and central parties or organizations all may participate. What has been tricky in the past would be
political parties because some have used means creatively to be able to penetrate the party-list system. So now, that
has been clarified. When at one time political parties at some past jurisprudence had been disallowed, now, they can
participate under Guideline No. 3 provided they register under the party-list system and will not field candidates in the
legislative district. If they intend to field, what they should do is create a central party separate from the political party
per se. But the central party wing of the political party will become a coalition. The idea is a coalition with them. It will
be an independent central party by link to the political party.

The other thing that was finally clarified also was the representation by nominees of marginalized and
underrepresented political constituencies. When we talk about marginalized and underrepresented and you have
nominees, the guidelines now clarifies who may actually be nominees. Do you have to belong to the marginalized
per se? The rule is there are certain nominees that may not necessarily be marginalized by themselves but may
represent because of their consistent advocacy. So Christian Monsod advocates for indigenous people's rights. He's
not indigenous per se in terms of background and ethnicity but he champions the causes of indigenous peoples. Is
that a situation where if Christian Monsod becomes a nominee, he becomes disqualified? Under this rule, it is
clarified. But look at the limitations here. The nominees of central parties or organizations that represent marginalized
or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies either must belong to their respective sectors or
have a track record of advocacy. And the nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona fide
members of such parties. Have these parameters close to your pocket every now and then for easy reference.

Lico v. COMELEC | September 29, 2015 | G.R. No. 205505 | C.J. Sereno
This is about intramurals within the party-list. They had problems of having differences within the party and nominee
gets expelled by the party. Is that within the jurisdiction of COMELEC? Intra-party intramurals? The answer is yes.
COMELEC may actually rule on that and validate that and accept the expulsion from the party. Can COMELEC go a
step further and actually expel that person from the House of Representatives? No. That becomes a congressional
power. It'll be abuse of discretion in the part of COMELEC to much further than that. It will only stop at validating
the expulsion of, in this case, from the partylist, as a result of disloyalty. That's within COMELEC power. They made
that distinction in this case.

Emergency Powers
Let's go to certain emergency powers. There's a whole set of jurisprudence on calling out powers, martial law, habeas
corpus, in relation to Article VI Section 23 par. 2 -- in times of war, or other national emergencies. Who declares the
existence of a state of war? Congress. Who makes war in this country? The executive. You cannot have more than 250
plus 24 making war. They are already at war among themselves. Only one makes war. But, a collectivity declares the
existence of a state of war. What if the missile hits Congress and Senate almost simultaneously and no one will declare
the existence of a state of war? Are we in war? Yes. Can the president act? Obviously. What will apply? 23 par. 2 of
Art. VI, or Art. VII Sec. 18? Both can apply under the circumstances now. It's an emergency, but for purposes of
power, what can the president do? Sec. 23 par. 2 of Art. VI defines the rules. But who is going to delegate under the
circumstances I showed you, when there is no longer a Senate or House? They were all killed in the process. What
happens? Art. VII Sec. 18 may have to apply. During the period of Martial Law, the president may be able to act
accordingly, even pass decrees during that period.

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN v. HON. RONALDO PUNO | June 7, 2011 | G.R. No. 190259 | J. Abad
One case. Ampatuan. GMA declared a state of emergency, directing the AFP to take measures for the purpose of
obtaining order. the AO transferred supervision from office of the President to the DILG, so this was a question of
power of control and supervision over arm. This was eventually amended by an AO delegating supervision of arm to
DILG. Question: can that delegation of supervision of arm be delegated to DILG? That's valid. The president only
has power of supervision over arm, not control, that power is delegated in this regard. The DILG does not exercise
control, per se, but merely supervision.

Calling Out Power

I think this is the start of the series of case law on congressional authority vis-a-vis executive power. When it comes to
calling out power, you don't need congressional authority. I'll attach for your purpose a matrix I have done up to the
point of Lagman, just distinguishing the exercise of executive power under Art. VII Sec. 18 and, to a certain extent,
reflective of Art. VI Sec. 23 par. 2. This case brings to light Lacson v. Perez and Lakas on the superfluity on the
declaration of a state of rebellion, for purposes of calling out the AFP. You don't need to have a declaration of a state
of rebellion, like in the case of Oakwood, the Sanlakas, for the president to be able to quell the rebellion. Under
warrantless arrest, under those circumstances, it's a mere superfluity.

DAVID v. ARROYO | May 3, 2006 | G.R. No. 171396 | J. Sandoval-Gutierrez You remember the case of David
v. Arroyo? In David V. Arroyo, that was PP 1017, a declaration of a state of emergency, pursuant to Art. VI Sec. 23
par. 2. What can the president do under a situation where there is a state of emergency? The Supreme Court struck
down one of the acts of the president there. Actually two, but mainly the other one is lacking in a law where she
ordered during the period of proclamation to go after terrorists. That was the case when Randy David and Risa
Hontiveros were detained during a rally, and GMA was being threatened by leftist groups, including some mainstream
political parties, critical of the president. The president's act of sending the AFP to go after the terrorists at the time
was declared unconstitutional, simply because there was no law on terrorism. The general order addressed to the AFP
would go nowhere, because the AFP would not know who is the terrorist legally, under the law. Later on, we pass a
Human Security Act. That would be an interesting problem, if under there a regime, there is a terrorist in a
proclamation of a state of emergency, can the president now order, going after the AFP? Yes, under the situation.
Now, the characterization of the person as a terrorist under the law is clear. The other one that was struck down as
unconstitutional was in relation to Art. XII Sec. 17, that the state may temporarily take over certain public utilities in a
state of emergency. The Supreme Court said, the president, in trying to close down, ordering police authorities to
close down Olivares' printing and newspaper activity, was in violation of the Constitution, because the words state
refer to the legislature. The president, in a state of emergency, in the absence of a valid delegated authority, pursuant
to Art. VI Sec. 23 par. 2, cannot order the closure of public utilities such as printing press or publications. It
interpreted the word 'state' to mean the legislature.

DAP
DAP is always a good point for questions because of the impact of DAP. Now what you have to remember in so far
as Section 25 (5) of Art. 6 is concerned are the elements.

First, there must be a law. Of course, the rule is that you cannot just realign budgets. The moment a budget GAA is
prepared, you just cannot tinker with it. But the so-called movement of funds in a budget like the General
Appropriations Act has exceptions. That's where the transfer of funds exceptions come in. Art 6, Sec. 25 (5) but the
elements are very clear under the law. You have to have a law that allows it, that's the first element.
Number two, there must be savings. You must point to savings.

Number three, there is an augmentation of another item.

Question:Where is the item?

It must be within the same department. Because those who are authorized to do that are certain heads of specific
branches of the government. So what you have to memorize are who are allowed. So for example Chief Justice,
President, the legislature level also, ConCom. That's an exclusive enumeration as to those who may be allowed to
actually transfer funds, and that transfer must be within.

Question: So what happened in DAP?

Disbursement Allocation Program is an attempt on the government at that time to make use of certain funds from the
following:
1. Unreleased appropriations under personal services
2. Unprogrammed Funds.
Note: Those two were not savings per say according to the Supreme Court. It already violated one
particular element.
3. Carryover appropriations unreleased from previous years
4. Budgets from slow-moving items or projects that had been realized to support faster dispersing
projects.

The government was constrained to spend because during the first few years they did not want to spend. They were
so worried about the risk of having to spend money and be accused perhaps of corrupt practices. In the meantime,
the money is lying there. We had an accumulation of funds and they wanted to finish up. So this is what they did,
identified a set of funds and packaged it as a program.

Question: Did they comply with the elements?

The Supreme Court said the standards were not followed. Why? You have to understand what the DAP is all about.
Is it a law? The Supreme Court said it is not a law.

Question: Why is it important to find out whether that's a law?

Because any transfer of funds must be justified by a law. The DAP is not a law. This had a motion for reconsideration
because the consequences of executing DAP had a personal impact on the implementers. The President, the budget
secretary and all others who relied upon the implementation of DAP. In the MR the matter of, number one, the
responsibility of the implementers had to be clarified. So those are the points I'd like to focus on in Araullo because
they have very serious repercussions personally on the implementers. So DAP was found not to be a fund or an
appropriation but a program of prioritizing spending in pursuit of executive power. For this purpose, there is no need
for a law to validate the program. But the Supreme Court identified unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments as not savings. Therefore, the use of such funds was in violation of Art. 6, Sec. 25 (5) which
required the existence of savings.

There was an attempt to define savings and what the Supreme Court found out was that while it is true, there were
some funds that were classified as savings, the violation of the Constitution was that when that set of funds
considered as savings were transferred outside the specific department or agency, that is what you call a cross-border
transfer. When you look up the case, you will find that there were movements of funds from the Executive to the
Constitutional Bodies like the CHR received some funds, the COA received some funds apparently for purposes of
purchasing certain equipment. And those funds move not within the Department but across departments and that
cannot be done, that again violates the requirement that those savings must be within and augmenting items within the
particular department. So that's another violation.
Doctrine of Operative Fact
The last point here is important because of the several case law that you will find on operative fact. The series of case
law. So watch out for the concept of operative fact. There have been several decisions of the Supreme Court here on
operative fact and the nuances on the application of operative act would depend on the circumstances of the parties.
So here, when they looked at some of the use of the funds, the Supreme Court identified that there were already
certain expenditures that could no longer of course be considered to be invalidated because if you do that, then it will
cause some major repercussions for the implementation of those projects. For purposes of sustaining validity of the
acts there, they applied the operative fact. For those expenditures that received probably in violation of this, you will
have to respect the principle of operative fact.

ARAULLO v. ABAD | 2014 July 1 | G.R. No. 209287 | J. BERSAMIN

The second was on the personal liability of the implementer. This case, the architect and the implementers, the
President and the Secretary of Budget and Management because they can be the subject of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act later on so it mattered in the MR to find out whether there was good faith in the adoption of this
program. Supreme Court said while it is true that operative fact applies only to a law and an executive act and not a
mere administrative practice, they considered the DAP as not just an administrative practice. They said it was covered
by a circular and therefore it produced legal effects. If it produced legal effects, the consequences of the actions
somehow must be respected and if parties acted in good faith, then liability will not actually be imputed on the
architects, proponents, and implementers of the DAP. So that saved the day for them but not in the Pork because in
the Pork they were still sued before the Ombudsman. So the DAP is covered by a Circular and not just a mere
practice. But it's not a law per se but for purposes of application of operative fact, they at least applied that it was a
ruling or regulation. So that's Araullo.

Appointments
GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT | 2015 June 16 | G.R. No. 203372 | J. CARPIO
Let's go to appointments. There was a series of appointments, midnight appointments under Article 7, Sec. 15 by
President GMA - almost 800 appointments, and it turns out that they were not able to produce the appropriate
documents to comply with the valid appointments. It's just about the cutoff, it's probably not as significant but it's just
the number. And what the Supreme Court laid down was a set of requirements for a valid appointment:
a. Authority to appoint and evidence of exercise of such authority
b. Transmittal of appointment papers and evidence of transmittal
c. Existence of vacant position and receipt of the appointment papers
All these were in one way or another not complied with. Having failed, the Supreme Court eventually nullified the
appointments.

KULAYAN v. TAN | 2012 July 3 | G.R. No. 187298 | J. SERENO

Kulayan v. Tan. This is misplaced. It's supposed to be in Sec. 18 but let me go to calling out power. In the case of
Kulayan in relation to the calling out power, the Governor of Sulu here declared a State of Emergency and acted like
the President, felt that he had all the same powers as the President so he invoked the Local Government Code
carrying out emergency measures, ordering law enforcement agencies, and even creating a civilian emergency ports to
set up checkpoints, conduct general searches. Supreme Court said you are not the President. As a governor, you only
have such powers pursuant to Sec. 465 of the Local Government Code and governor does not have the calling out
powers of the President. You do not have the calling out. TB a declaration of a state of calamity but not that
constitutional power that only the President himself or herself may exercise. Besides, there was also a violation of Art.
18, Sec. 24 on the creation of certain groups of persons who are to be vested like a civilian armed groups. That cannot
be done, there is a prescription under the transitory provision on the creation of local civilian groups that might be
similar to the CAFGUS, that's not something that can be done by the Governor.

OCAMPO v. ENRIQUEZ | 2016 November 8 | G.R. No. 225973 | J. PERALTA

Ocampo v. Enriquez. The Marcos burial - there was a listing. This is what I told you. Look at bullet point 2, just mark
the provisions in Art. 2 of the Constitution that were declared as non self executing. So now you already have a guide.
Article 2, Secs. 2, 13, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28 non self executing because the petitioners were using all these provisions to
strike down an implementation by the National Defense of the verbal order of the President making preparations for
the interment of the former President's remains at Libingan ng mga Bayani.

What is of interest here is of course would be the power. Does the President have such powers to actually
order this? First, was the burial violative?
No the intermittent is a political question, that is a matter of policy. There is no specific law that prohibited it, it could
not point to a specific law. They cited provisions, international standards but they could not point to a law that
prevented the intermittent.

What were the significant portions of the decision that I think is important to consider?
Aside from the non self executing character, faithful execution of the laws, that provision is very handy whenever you
speak about the powers of the President. So many significant decisions in Political Law have been supported by this
provision under Section 17 of Article 7: The Faithful Execution of Laws and the President can do this as Chief
Executive. He acted pursuant to EO 292 over a land of public domain devoted for national military cemetery, and
there was no factual basis that the President paid back the Marcoses, that's speculative. The argument that RA 298 on
the National Pantheon intended to provide a burial site for former presidents, etc, national heroes is not the same as
the Libingan ng Mga Bayani. The mere fact that you are in Libingan ng mga Bayani does not confer a title of a hero
on you. So anyone else like Duterte, GMA, Estrada can all be buried there together, Ramos, Cory Aquino but Cory is
buried in a private cemetery, Manila Memorial together with Ninoy.

AFP Regulation allow the internment of Presidents in Libingan ng Mga Bayani. It has never been repealed so they
went through a listing of all this domestic laws, rules and could not find a prohibition.

Was he convicted of final judgment to disqualify him?

Of course Justice Carpio has a different view altogether as a dissenter saying that the mere fact that he was removed
per se would have been sufficient enough to be interpreted as a judgment by the people. But if you look at it from a
very positivist perspective that he is anyway, it would have needed some kind of a judgment by the court if you go by
the strict interpretation of what a conviction is all about.

National Historical Commission has no jurisdiction, Duterte is not bound. This one is interesting. The power of the
President subsequent to an agreement between President Fidel Ramos and the Marcos Family.

Was that binding on them?

That is mere political commitment by a previous administration. It may be couched in a different problem altogether
for you. There is a commitment now by this administration, what are binding legal commitments subsequent or prior
to the assumption into power by let's say a new president,

What can bind subsequent governments in that regard?

Here, they said this is between them. Was there a law about it, was there an executive order about it but even EOs can
be changed right. So it was a mere political commitment at that time and you should not forget this last statement,
"The Court concluded by saying that we agree with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in the
totality of his person while he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly just a human who erred like us."
"Pagkat siya ay tao lamang."

Just like what my good friend from UP, former dean of UP College of Law and became President of the University
when he was seen at a reception inside UP with Imee. Good friend way back during Martial Law, Danny Concepcion.
He was criticized by the progressive groups within UP so in those instances, "Tao lamang po." Those are things you
cannot undo, your past.
Case:
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al v. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY et al | G.R. No. 231658 | July 4, 2017 | Del Castillo, J.

EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, et al v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE et al | G.R. No. 231771|

July 4, 2017 | Del Castillo, J.

NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, et al v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, et. al |

G.R. No.231774 | July 4, 2017 | Del Castillo, J.

It is important to remember Lagman plus the extension for Martial Law, this is an extension case here. You know
what happened, I do not want to repeat the facts. Maute Group while President Duterte was in Russia, penetrated
Marawi, took over public establishments, started a rampage. President declared Martial Law while still in Russia then
immediately went back, suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Before this, there was already a
proclamation, there was a State of National Emergency way back in 2016 and then again this was followed this time by
Martial Law. It is a good set of facts to remember because it combines your Article 6, Section 23 paragraph 2 where
the Article 7, Section 18. In fact, those are 2 separate acts altogether and they may exist independently of the other.
The nullification of Martial Law does not necessarily lead to the nullification of the proclamation of a State of
Emergency, those are 2 separate acts and they are judged on separate standards. Always remember the standards that
apply to specific acts of the President. So really the question was the sufficiency of the factual basis and so many other
powers that needed to be weighed like Congressional Power, Judicial Power in relation to Executive Power. We will
go one by one on this. As a whole, the proclamation 216 is Constitutional.

Proclamation216isconstitutional,whatwerethecontentions?DidtheVoid
ForVaguenessRuleapplytotheproclamation?

The Supreme Court said No, it always applied Void For Vagueness to what? To speech cases, no? That's consistent.
Although there was one case they applied it to non-speech case. But in general the ruling of the Supreme Court has
almost always been consistent that the Void For Vagueness Rule only applies to free speech.

CASE
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-South Network
(SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., VS. ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, | October 5, 2010 |
G.R. No. 178552 | J. Carpio Morales

So in Southern Hemisphere, remember? Human Security Act. They also did not sustain the argument on Void For
Vagueness and Facial Challenge on the Human Security Act which is a criminal statute, because it's only for speech
cases.

Martial Law Standing

Now they further clarified that so far as standing is concerned, even a non-taxpayer may question. That's the
difference between this kind of standing and the ordinary standing that you find under Article VIII Section 1 in
relation to Section 5. So standing here is relaxed even a non-taxpayer.

The process may be triggered by a complaint, again, very very loose, no? And may even be taken as a matter by the
Supreme Court on its own motu proprio.
The Jurisdiction of the Court to Review
It's unique. The power of judicial review within Article VII Section 18 is unique, independent of Article VIII Section 1
second paragraph in declaring the act of any branch of government as in grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack
or an excess of jurisdiction. Different from Article VIII Section 5 on the matter of certiorari. Those are two distinct
remedies. This is a third distinct remedy in terms of review powers. It is sui generis. The usual cop up of the Supreme
Court if they cannot classify it, no? It will say sui generis: a class in itself.

CASES
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG
RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, VS. BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M.
GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary | December 11, 1971 | G.R. No. L-33964 | C.J. Concepcion

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO,

EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., VS. HON. SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN.
EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, | July 4, 2017 | G.R. No. 231658 | J. Del Castillo

Well you know that Lansang v. Garcia has been codified in the Constitution and it is reiterated here in Lagman on the
matter of the extent of the President's acts may be inquired into by the Supreme Court whether it is suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. It is no longer a political question. And the
Constitution extends judicial review to the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

What were the parameters identified by the Court?

1. There must be actual threat of rebellion. Not mere threat but actual rebellion or invasion
2. Public safety requires presidential power
3. Probable cause must exist

Do you need a calibration of the Rules of Evidence?

No. That's not necessary.

TherewasreferencetotheHumanSecurityAct,wasthisterrorism?Couldthe
yhavefiledterrorismhere?Isitrebellion?IsitRepublicAct9851onthelawth
atpunishesgenocide,warcrimes,crimesagainsthumanitybecauseitwasan
on-internationalarmedconflict;wasitanon-internationalarmedconflict?
Andthird,wasitundertheHumanSecurityActortheMautegroupisconsider
edinfluencedbyISIS,knowntobeinternationalterrorists?
Very difficult to be a prosecutor under these circumstances, no? We have been doing training with the judges and
prosecutors and PAU on this. How did they actually apply? They used rebellion because that's the clearest. RA 9851,
yes, I would think it would have been possible but it's really a bit tricky since it's a new law. 9851 has been applied in
the siege of Zamboanga City by MNLF--rouge MNLF group--at the time which declared an independent state. But
this one was easier on the matter of rebellion because the power exercised was pursuant to Article VII Section 18.

Could it have been accommodated under Human Security Act?

The answer is yes, because Human Security Act is defined as a predicate crime coupled with the circumstance to sow
terror and demand government and legal act. But there's a predicate crime of rebellion so the Supreme Court said
rebellion may be a predicate crime under special law but does not automatically result to an automatic absorption of
rebellion in terrorism.
So these are some of the ramifications of this case. The sequence of the 3 commander-in-chief powers is not
exclusive. It's up to the President to pursue it not in the sequence it is to be done. Calling out, suspension of privilege,
or martial law. It doesn't matter. There is no sequence to this.

I already mentioned the nullification of martial law does not lead to the prior calling out of the AFP because... In fact,
in terms of review, the one that had very loose standards would be calling out powers compared to martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It's very interesting to compare. So that's in the next bullet
point.

In the calling out power, the court can examine whether the President acted in permissible constitutional boundaries
and not with grave abuse of jurisdiction, and ordinary police action may be undertaken. The actual use of the AFP is
not within judicial review, so it's loose enough compared to martial law. But in martial law there are so many standards
that you will have to apply constitutionally expressed.

IntermsofsequencingcanreviewbytheSupremeCourtbeundertakenahead
orlaterthancongressionalreview?
It doesn't matter. There's no order to that. But you compare the review power of the Supreme Court together with the
congressional review mechanism. As far as congress is concerned, it tends to be more automatic. Supreme Court tends
to be passive. It must be triggered, right? Where congressional review is more aggressive. Congress can immediately
look into it if it wants. It can revoke the proclamation.

The question is, can that proclamation revocation by congress be reviewed by the Su
preme Court?
My view on this is it's a political question. It's a textually demonstrable commitment to the Congress. It's not
discussed here but by consequence - it is one allotted only to Congress. That's Congressional commitment to revoke.

The other thing was the available information. They were saying the President did not have all the information on his
lap. He did not need absolute certainty about the facts. What is there at the moment is what will convince the
President to make a judgment. It's a judgement call as they call. And it's up to congressional review later on or judicial
review to find out whether there was enough factual basis. But even in that review, you don't need absolute veracity of
all the facts there. Sometimes there might really be some exaggeration but who's going to determine that? If you're a
President sitting at that moment` and you are seeing that citizens are displaced, they are actually taking over structures
of government, will you dilly dally? That gives margin of appreciation to the executive. You do not have time for
deliberation as in the senator or congress like let's have a inquiry in aid of legislation. You don't do that. You have to
act. That's what the case is telling us. Otherwise, it would be too late. The Court will not require absolute correctness
of the facts and this is one where he should act in person. You don't delegate. Again, this is important to remember.
One of those that cannot be delegated.

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO

ESTRADA | January 21, 2015 | G.R. No. 206666 | J. Leonardo-De Castro
Pardon. Estrada's pardon. In the preamble of that pardon given to former President Estrada by President Arroyo -
there was a commitment to the preamble whereas Joseph Ejercito Estrada is publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position. He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights. Was that binding? No. That's the in the
preamble. He lied in the preamble but that's not binding. Reminds me of Miriam one time - I will not run anymore. So
why then did you run? "Hahaha, I lied." She said she lied. You can lie. I think what's important here was the matter of
local government code and the plenary pardon. So a petition for disqualification is filed against President Estrada
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code in relation to Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which disqualified
a candidate unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. So he was given absolute pardon - restored
to all his civil and political rights. According to the Supreme Court the pardoning power of the President cannot be
limited by legislative action. Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be interpreted to mean a diminution
of the President's power. The power of the President remains to be independent of any act.
GRACE SAN DIEGO y TRINIDAD VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | April 8, 2015 | G.R.
No. 176114 | J. Peralta
San Diego. Let's go to a judge who penalized or convicted a person to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for 40
years without pardon. Gigil na gigil. Supreme Court said "how could you do that?" You're not the President. So a
judge cannot impose a penalty without the possibility of clemency. Only the President could exercise that. The portion
without pardon is unconstitutional because he limited the power of the executive. Pardoning power is discretionary on
the President.

Okay, we'll go to a series of international law related cases - very interesting. I think I like this set of cases.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. | July 2, 2014 | G.R. No.
193796 | J. Perlas-Bernabe
Be careful with this case because of the application. There was a loan agreement between the Land Bank of the
Philippines and IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or World Bank). According to
Article 7, Section 20, there is provision - that's about the concurrence of the monetary board. The President may
contract foreign loans. So the President - this is presidential power. President may enter into contractual agreements
pertaining to loan. Land Bank and IBRD entered into a loan agreement which required participation of two local
governments through a subsidiary loan agreement. So there's a mother loan agreement and a subsidiary loan
agreement. Under the provisions of the agreement - there was a referral to exemptions from what we call the regular
bidding process. Atlanta Industries which participated here was disqualified during the rebidding. Atlanta called the
attention of BH and Wards Committee for not having applied a bidding process prescribed under the government
procurement policy board. The bank declared that the bidding was not covered by the regular law 9184. So the
question was: Was that transaction illegal and other participants to the bidding covered by RA 9184? The Supreme
Court looked into the issue of the distinction between Land Bank of the Philippines loan agreement with the
subsidiary loan agreement with Iligan.

CASE: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ATLANTA INDUSTRIES INC | G.R. No. 193796 | July
2, 2014 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.
…subsidiary loan agreement with Iligan. So there were 2 layers — the mother agreement and the other one is an
accessory agreement or contract. It went into characterizing the loan. Is the loan an executive agreement under land
bank and Iligan? If you look at the first agreement, IBRD and land bank, what is that contract? Is it under Art. VII
Sec. 20? If it’s under Art. VII Sec. 20, the wording is the President enters into a contract. Under the Vienna
Convention on the law of treaties, if the President, as head of state, enters into an agreement, regardless of the
characterization, whether it’s political or commercial, for as long as it’s entered into with let’s say another state that
would have the effect of a treaty under the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties because the Vienna Convention
defines a treaty as an international agreement entered into between states and government by international law.

You cannot deny that that agreement between land bank and IBRD would have been governed by international law
because IBRD is authorized under its charter to enter into such a loan agreement but land bank, was land bank
representing the President at that time? It was not the President that entered into it, right? So this was a bit difficult
case. It looks easy but on its face it’s difficult when you look at the characterization of the agreement. The SC said
here Republic 9184 Sec. 4 recognizes the country’s commitment to abide by its obligations under any treaty or
international executive agreement, the terms and conditions of the loan agreement between land bank and IBRD were
incorporated and and made part of the subsidiary loan agreement between land bank and Iligan and therefore would
had been exempt from the regular bidding process. The latter agreement which is the second is a mere accessory
contract and the conditions of the main agreement are actually read into the accessory contract.

What confuses me here was the conclusion on whether we entered into an executive agreement under the 1st which is
IBRD and land bank? But you have to read it as is right now. That if the issue whether the characterization of the
accessory contract and whether that contract would be exempt from bidding the SC was very specific. It will not be
governed by the regular bidding process under RA 9184. It would be exempt because you read the mother agreement
in to the accessory contract. My sense is that you have to understand the scope of Art. VII Sec. 20 in relation to the
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties and as distinguished from Art. VII Sec. 21. But I’m just pointing out when
you read this case you decide on the basis of the facts of Atlanta Industries. I know DFA does not like the
consequence of this type of this decision because it confuses also our foreign affairs persons in looking at agreements
of this nature.

CASE: SAGUISAG VS OCHOA | G.R. No 212426, 212444, | January 12, 2016 | Sereno, J.
Saguisag. Another interesting case. Saguisag is about enhanced cooperation agreement. Saguisag questioned the
EDCA because #1 it abdicates our sovereign rights. What is EDCA all about? The Philippines and the US entered
into an additional agreement to actually identify certain locations in the Philippines where the foreign troops pursuant
to the VFA may actually be present and they can actually construct on these areas. The dissenters here and Saguisag et
al. were complaining that this is going to amount to a basing agreement. If it’s basing then it must go through
concurrence under Art. XVIII Sec. 25.

CASE: BAYAN VS ZAMORA | G.R. No. 138570 | October 10, 2000 | Buena, J.
Let’s go through the history of this. We had the Mutual Defense Treaty after that we abolished the military bases but
the Mutual Defense Treaty remained. Then VFA came, Bayan vs Zamora. That was complied with in Bayan vs
Zamora because the SC interpreted the information we received from Ambassador Hubbard that this is recognized as
treaty by the other party. We got a letter but we don’t know whether it went through the process of 2/3 concurrence
by the Senate but they said don’t worry we’re friends. You trust us. He says the force in effect of a treaty — complied
with. What did VFA allow? Presence of troops but not basing. Can those troops somehow construct or do certain
things? Probably. But EDCA gave it away because now we have agreed locations in different parts of the country and
they can construct.

The SC made a distinction. Did we abdicate sovereign rights by allowing construction in this area? SC said no. We are
not giving away sovereign rights because under the agreement whatever is constructed here and allowed by state
authorities would actually revert back to the pins. So they did not have any control. It is merely use that’s what the SC
identified. It was a mere contract of use and access. Operational control remained in the Philippines, in the Philippine
government. So this is not a basing agreement. While it allowed the building of “permanent facilities” this would later
on be anyway owned by the Philippines. And besides, we authorized it in that regard. So that being the case, it’s not a
basing agreement but a mere implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the VFA. This is a mere executive
agreement and it will not required concurrence by the senate.

What will become basing? Under this, the basing would be having independence from foreign control, the exercise of
Philippine sovereignty in applicable law and respect for national security and territorial integrity. So this is the test of
determining whether it is a basing or not. I find this very interesting the last two bullet points about international
humanitarian law. If certain incidents occur within these areas, will humanitarian law principle of distinction of military
targets exclude agreed locations under EDCA or are they legitimate targets by US enemies state. That's a very
interesting question from IHL perspective. The Supreme Court made its determination and said, it should be
excluded. By that time, you're already hit. You allowed the presence of this. Then it becomes a magnet for attacks,
right? By the time you complain, those targets have been attacked already. But legally, they will say, no, you should
exclude this. Please don't exclude this as targets. So that's the series of case law. And there was none after that.

Case: ISABELITA C. VINUYA et. al. vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO | G.R. No. 162230 | April 28, 2010 | DEL CASTILLO, J.
Article 7, Section 21. On Vinuya v. Romulo, don't remember it for the plagiarism but remember it for the principles.
On Japanese military sexual slavery. What happened here? So just focus on the facts of Vinuya. Well you remember
that MALAYA LOLAS were alleged victims of Japanese military sexual slavery, and we entered into a treaty. After
that there was a treaty of peace between US and Japan, and there was also another document that covered preparation
for all the damages caused by Japan during the Second World War, both public and private. At that time, it was not
very much sensitive to the issue of gender and other women's rights perspectives. The concept of a private act who
would have covered, let's say, sexually related acts by the Japanese soldiers. So they lumped both public and private
acts as having been the subject of preparation when japan paid by way of damages. The MALAYA LOLAS had
actually gone to Japanese Courts, US Courts, and they were frustrated. Because they have always lost on those points,
and they wanted to force the issue on Japan by asking the Philippine Government to take up their claim under
international law on state responsibility, the state may actually proceed to take up on behalf of its nationals whenever
its nationals are injured, because in the long run, what is actually pursued is actually the claim of the state when the
national is hurt. Anyway, the MALAYA LOLAS filed for an injunctive relief, mandamus, to compel the President.
Can you do that? You cannot. As a matter of principle, the Supreme Court will not compel the President to do an act
which is discretionary. While the principle exists, there is the right of an individual or a national of a state to approach
its state to take up the claim that is purely discretionary on the part of the President. The MALAYA LOLAS also
wanted public apology, wanted, if ever, funds to be paid directly by the Japanese Government, and not coursed
through NGOs, because there was an attempt to course money by way of damages in the Asian Women's Fund which
is purely private. They did not want. So just a rundown of the ruling, espouse of claims on behalf on nationals is a
discretionary act, lodged in executive branch. And that the individual's rights are being asserted, but in the long run,
that is really the State's own rights being violated. That's a form of indirect responsibility. I mean, your national is hurt,
then the State is hurt indirectly in that sense.

So, the last point is probably good to remember from the point international law. That there was no showing that the
crimes committed as of the Treaty of Peace constituted jus cogens. Now what is jus cogens, these are actually
standards and norms of international law which cannot be violated through any agreement at all, because any treaty
that violates jus cogens will actually be void. Now, there was no evidence that there was a violation of jus cogens.
Neither is the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes and erga omnes obligation or part of jus cogens.

Case: BAYAN MUNA vs. ALBERTO ROMULO | G.R. No. 159618 | February 1, 2011 | VELASCO, JR., J.
BAYAN MUNA v. Romulo, Executive Secretary Romulo that is on the non-surrender agreement. Non-surrender
agreement was an attempt of the US government to tell its allied parties or allied friends that they should not send US
personnel to international tribunals for purposes of prosecution under the international criminal court. The US did
not want to participate in the adoption on the Rome Statute that created the ICC and so it went around the world
signing this NSA (non-surrender agreement). At that time, we already signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. And as
you know, we have withdrawn, but I will not answer unless the Supreme Court says something about the withdrawal
and the concurrence of the withdrawal. But meanwhile, when this happened, it may not be this, but it can be under a
different context all together, but not on the matter of ICC. But the rule is still important to remember that we have to
reconcile our treaty obligation here, and when we entered into the non-surrender agreement, the argument made was
that we are going to violate our treaty obligation under the Rome Statute if we allow the non-surrender agreement. So
it's BAYAN MUNA that's complaining about this. Supreme Court said that, no, we can reconcile, non-surrender
agreement with our obligations under the Rome Statute. Besides, signing a statute, already puts a state into an
obligation not to frustrate the purpose of the treaty. This is the minimum requirement. If you sign but not ratify, you
already must at least ensure that any act of the government after signing will not lead to a frustration of the agreement
so we must reconcile that duty with the non-surrender agreement.

The other point is it's highly unlikely that the Americans who are probably here subject of let's say possible acquisition
of jurisdiction for crimes committed may not be here but in another jurisdiction - crimes against humanity, war crimes
or crimes of aggression, genocide. Highly unlikely that they will be immediately brought up to the ICC by the
Philippine government because of the principle of complementarity or subsidiarity, that local courts are not deprived
of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of Americans. The risk of them being brought up will take some time. It will
not happen almost automatically. So, that is valid.

Case:
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP) vs HON. CESAR D.
SANTAMARIA, ET AL. | February 7, 2012 | G.R. No. 185572 | J. Sereno
Well, again, another confusing agreement but this is all about the Northrail Project and whether the character of the
memorandum of agreement between China National Machinery and Northrail and also, the MOU between EXIM
bank of China and DOF are considered as executive agreements under Art. 7, Sec. 20. The Supreme Court identified
the types of contracts. One is the contract to construct the Northrail and the other one is the loan agreement that's
between EXIM bank and, of course, Philippine authorities, that's to the Department of Finance. The reason for that is
to determine the responsibility and liability for this purpose. The China National Machinery happens to be an agent of
the Chinese Government and the Northrail Project. These were the issues. Were being argued as executive agreement
and that the transaction was jure imperii, if the transaction is jure imperii, what's the consequence? Immunity from suit.
Right? Sovereign immunity. So, they had to characterize those memoranda of understanding the two types. Supreme
Court said that the China National Machinery is not immune from suits and that the contract agreement is not an
executive agreement. These were purely commercial. So, the Supreme Court went into a discussion of the types of
sovereign immunity, absolute and restrictive. In most countries, as I have pointed out during the international law pre-
bar lecture, restrictive immunity is applicable so that on matters of purely commercial activities. There is no sovereign
immunity. You go down to the level of a private citizen and the construction of a railway is proprietary in character.
So, I think the loan agreement is not an executive agreement. That one is telling because while on its face, the
Department of Finance entered into the loan agreement with EXIM Bank and one might argue that the Department
of Finance represented the President as an alter ego through the Secretary of Finance. The Supreme Court had made it
very clear that the loan agreement is not an executive agreement. Besides, there is a waiver of immunity according to
the Supreme Court. All were purely commercial so there was no immunity here.

Case:
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION v JUAN ANTONIO
MUÑOZ | August 16, 2016 | G.R. No. 207342 | J. Bersamin
One on extradition. This one I think you should consider because it's again another case where under extradition loan
and the practice of entering extradition treaties. We have affirmed the double criminality rule. Not the more modern
practice of what we call penalty-based application of the double criminality rule. It's really more the appellation. It's
the appellation. So what happened here was that there was a person from the treasury department at Central Bank was
tasked to raise some funds for purposes of the buyback of Philippine debts. He transacted with some Hong Kong
based persons in order to pursue this and eventually he was sued because of having entered illegally into certain
transactions without the knowledge of the Central Bank. Muñoz was charged under Hong Kong law. At the time,
there was an extradition treaty between the Philippines and Hong. We were being asked to consider their tradition of
Muñoz here. Muñoz was charged with criminal cases on the following: three counts of accepting an advantage as an
agent, and the other one is seven pounds of conspiracy to defraud. The first one, accepting an agent, accepting
advantage as an agent, did not have an equivalent under our Revised Penal Code or any other anti-corruption laws.
But the other one, conspiracy to defraud had some analogous application to estafa, our Revised Penal Code provisions
on estafa. The Supreme Court applied the strict interpretation of double criminality and said the first one must be
dropped but it does not make Muñoz cut free. He would still be pursued and pursuant to extradition may actually be
proceeded against because of the equivalent provision in the Revised Penal Code but on the first, we apply the very
strict interpretation of double criminality. Don't forget that, in extradition, there is not extradite unless there is a treaty
and there are exceptions, of course, to that. The political complexion rule, the exception to the exception, of course,
would be the attentat clause. But, on the double criminality rule, you follow the rule on existence of a treaty. If the
treaty exists, is the crime listed under both jurisdictions?

Case:
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA) v. PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
(GPH)| November 29, 2016 | G.R. No. 218406 | CARPIO, J.
Article 8, Section 1. Philconsa. My favorite regarding MOAAD. This is the sequel regarding MOAAD. This time,
President Aquino revived the MILF talks and drafting of a new agreement called the Framework agreement on
Bangsamoro and the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro. The agreement was that there will be a law called
the Bangsamoro Basic Law, which now is passed and is called the Bangsamoro Organic Law. The plebiscite will be
conducted very soon on this. At that time, when they did not have the law yet, Philconsa again wanted to go up to
challenge this saying that this is just a revival of the MOAAD, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
which was struck down as unconstitutional in the province of North Cotabato. The Supreme Court said speaking to
Justice Carpio said, “This agreement is different because this agreement specifically says that it will not be effective
until there is a Bangsamoro Law. So you have to have an implementing law, The BBL. Therefore, it postponed its
determination on the allegation of the constitutionality until such time that the Bangsamoro Basic Law would have
been actually drafted cause that is when the actual face of the framework agreement would actually acquire a more
definite figure and configuration. So the Supreme Court said, “This is still premature. Wait for it.” Don’t forget the
series of case though that has been generated along that line where proposed bill cannot be the subject of any
challenge before the Supreme court. Those are purely speculative. This one is not a proposed bill, but it has been
waiting. That framework agreement, while entered into, is yet to acquire a life after the Bangsamoro Basic Law.

Operative fact

Case:
FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COLON HERITAGE
REALTY CORPORATION, OPERATOR OF ORIENTE GROUP THEATERS, REPRESENTED BY
ISIDORO A. CANIZARES | June 16, 2015 | G.R. No. 203754 | VELASCO JR., J.
As I’ve said, Operative fact is a flavor of the month starting with San Roque so let’s be focused on Operative Fact
from time to time. But here was a case about the Cebu City ordinance that required proprietors, SCs, corporators,
theatres cinemas, etc., or other places of amusement to pay an amusement tax equivalent to 30% of gross receipts of
admission. Later on a law was passed that created the film development Council and the film development council
decided to promote the scheme that is an amusement tax reward scheme for all those films. The acquired a grade A or
B rating. And by incentive, all those that will be collected, all those that will be collected from the amusement tax
should actually be directed to the Film Development Council for the purpose of awarding this to the grade A and
Grade B films. This was challenged by the Local Government of Cebu City. The others were complying. There were
collecting and then they were transmitting to the Film Development Council but Cebu said we will not. We will not
transmit because that violates the principle that any of those taxes must accrue to the Local Government so they
challenged that law. And there were millions of pesos being accumulated along this line, so the Supreme Court that
whether that was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court said that, well RTC said, first of all declared Sections 13 and 14
are unconstitutional. The Supreme Court did not overturn that however all remittances of amusement taxes pursuant
to Sections 13 and 14 prior to the finality of the decision shall remain valid. So we apply the operative fact doctrine. It
also infringes on Local Autonomy.

Case:
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, v. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES | August 15, 2017 | G.R.
No. 226679 | PERALTA, J.
This one is a candidate but it’s August it’s interesting. Lobrigo. It’s about the plea bargaining. And it’s past your cut-
off, no? There was an attempt on the part of the accused that was charged in possession of dangerous drugs to enter
plea bargaining. Section 23 of the dangerous drugs act prohibited plea bargaining. He argued that this violated the
Rules on criminal procedure on allowable plea bargaining. The Supreme Court said that that provision in the
dangerous drugs act was violative of the rule-making authority of the Supreme court. This one also is interesting.

Case:
PHILIP A. AGUINALDO v. HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III |
Nov 29, 2016 | GR No. 224302 | LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
This is about the questering. You know when you have shortlists in terms of vacancies in judicial post. A practice was
adopted by the JBC where they decided to fill in the position of associate justice in the senate when there were 6 newly
created slots for associate justice. Into 6 shortlists, in 6 separate letters. And then, you can only choose from within.
Now the Supreme court was asked whether or not this was violate of the Supreme Court Power to appoint. Would
you limit the president only to those slots? What happened here was that the President chose from particularly
justices, Musngi and Econg in one cluster, and all the rest from the rest of the cluster. The nominees for justices in the
shortlist argued that this practice actually violated the presidential power to appoint. They cited the appointments of
Musngi and Econg who belong to the same shortlist for the term for associate justice were in violation of presidential
powers of the President’s prerogative. Did the presidential power violate when he appointed 2 from that shortlist and
chose? The Supreme court said the clustering is unconstitutional. If you have six, you might as well have all the list
down and let the president choose. But here, it’s like you’re limiting the president in his position and can only choose
among these six. So the president cannot do that. So the president’s act was sustained. He can actually choose from all
the universe of the 6. Which will fill in 6, so this is 36 nominees as againsts 6 positions. So it would have limited the
President’s power. So the appointments of Musngi and Econg, two from one cluster, was still valid according to the
Supreme Court. So the court noted that clustering is a new practice of the JBC. And previously the JBC only
submitted one shortlist for two or more vacancies in the collegiate court and that should be the case. Presumably from
the court’s suggestion. So to meet the minimum requirement under Article 8 Section 9 on the three nominees per
vacancy. There should be 6 nominees for each.

LEAGUE OF CITIES v COMELEC | Nov 18, 2018 | G.R. No. 176951 | Carpio, J.
League of cities, this is old but I just want to flag you on this because of the flip flopping decisions. This is the one
that had almost five judgements and it was very confusing to do a bar review or MCLE. This is about the cityhood
laws. Where the application of cityhood was overtaken. There were a group of 24 municipalities, who’s conversion to
cityhood was not acted upon. In the meanwhile, the income requirement had changed from PhP 20 million to PhP
100 million. So this, who was left for some time are wondering when they’re going to be adjudged on the basis of the
PhP 20 million or the PhP 100 million. They have been overtaken by events because Congress has not been acting on
the petitions at the time or the resolutions. The Supreme Court said in the long run that you cannot fault those 24
municipalities. Eventually, 16 that filed for cityhood bills much much much later. Will they be covered by the
proposed bill of PhP 100 million or PhP 20 million when they applied. Supreme Court said that on the issue of
fairness, they should be adjudged on the basis of the PhP 20 million requirement as compared to those who applied
much much later. So that’s the distinction between the two sets of applicants for cityhood. There’s substantial
distinction that they made there.

NAVARRO v ERMITA | April 12, 2012 | G.R. No. 180050 | Nachura, J.

This one is about the creation of Dinagat. Remebber that the Province of Dinagat, arose out of Surigao del Norte.
Petitioners oppose the law because Dinagat only had 802 sq km and a population of 106,000++. Contrary to the
requirement in Article 10, Section 10 of the Constitution and the Local Government Code. What did the Local
Government Code provide? It provided for 2,000 sq meters and 250,000 population for a creation of a province
under the LGC. Now they looked into the Constitutionality of the creation of Dinagat Island. Again, another alleged
flip flop. First it was unconstitutional, the second was constitutional. Let’s look at the reasoning here of the court why
they had to sustain this one. This was, if you were to read it’s decision to its face, would have really been an undue
delegation of legislative power. It amounted to almost a judicial legislation upholding the IRR when in fact, the tenure
of the IRR was not even reflected in the LGC. And the Supreme Court said that judging from the deliberations, it was
meant to correct. Mainly an oversight by the legislators. So under the Article 9-2 of the IRR in the LGC, its says that
the land are requirement should not apply when the proposed province is composed of 1 or more islands. That would
have been Dinagat. So they tried to cure a gap in the LGC provision that allowed a similar situation for the creation of
municipalities and cities. But they did not include provinces. So how come you would allow that for a municipality and
a city but would not allow it with the provinces. So they tried to craft in the IRR a provision that would allow a land
area requirement exception where the province would be composed of 1 or more islands, such as Dinagat. So they
wanted to correct it. In the LGC, section 442-450, if the LGU is to be created is a municipality or components of a
city consisting of two or more islands, these are exempt from the land area requirement. This is absent from Section
461 referring to the province. So they just wanted to correct that lapse. There appears neither rhyme and reason why
this exemption applies to cities but not to provinces. So there was an inadvertent omission in Section 461. Why not do
curative legislation. Here, the SC corrected it by itself. Isn’t that judicial legislation? Violation of principle of undue
delegation. The SC spoke, follow the SC. Justice Carpio dissent, pointing out that possibility.

ABAS KIDA v SENATE | Oct 18, 2011 | G.R. No. 196271 | Brion, J.
Anyway, Article 10 Sections 15 to 22 on Avas Kida, this is on the matter of the super majority vote. An autonomous
region cannot provide for a super majority vote for example in regard to validity of the actions of the ARMM since
majority vote is really the standard for purposes of legislative, actions, noh? So the supermajority vote that was written
or provided under the ARMM law was actually violative. So the supermajority voting in RA 9054 was unconstitutional
because even Article VI 6, Section 15 (2) only requires simple majority.
Ok we're nearing impeachment. You know the quo warranto, right? I'm not going to discuss that. That's too far, too
far from your coverage, besides it might revive some very strong political sentiments that laid to rest. But, of course
impeachment, quo warranto is available for some other grounds.

I just want to flag you in on the rules of impeachment enriched by the quo warranto option. Which is quo warranto,
it's not impeachment. It's just in the realm of impeachment vicinity or premises because of the way it developed,
initially out of the impeachment process. But in the case of impeachment now, what you really have to remember is
this decision of Justice Carpio-Morales on simultaneous impeachments in Gutierrez, that's the former ombuds person.

[MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON

JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN
PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF
PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON,
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS), FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR| G.R. No. 193459| March 8, 2011| CARPIO
MORALES, J.]

Merceditas Gutierrez's impeachment in the house was triggered by at least 3 impeachment complaints.

How do you determine the rule on a bar to a subsequent impeachment?

Previous to that was the Davide impeachment or the moment it's taken by the Committee on Justice. That's already
an initiation already and any subsequent impeachment complaint will bar already because it was already an initiation.

But you have a situation where 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 impeachment complaints were filed before the Committe on Justice at
the house but were not lit in succession but in one sitting. So, imagine a candle lit once depending on your perspective
several matches lit one but it is just one set of impeachment complaints but triggered simultaneously.

Is that a violation of the one year bar rule?

No, there is no violation there. When you consider all comlaints simultaneously altogether. So, the analogy si that of a
candle. Justice Carpio-Morales said "The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent, Committee on
Justice, to impeachment complaints to impeachment complaints presents a noble situation to invoke judicial power.

[RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ and VIRGILIO ECARMA v. THE HONORABLE RONALDO B. ZAMORA,

THE HONORABLE BLAS F. OPLE, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER
NESTOR LIM, PHILIPPINE AIR LINES PILOT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and ORTIZ’
GROUP| G.R. No. L-51382| December 29, 1986| FERNAN, J ]

[FRANCISCO CHAVEZ V. RAUL M. GONZALES| G.R. No. 168338| February 15, 2008| PUNO, C . J . ]

Can you circumvent an impeachment by questioning let's say the qualifications of a person?
You cannot skirt that issue if it will amount into having to remove a person who is an impeachable officer using
different qualifications standards. But I think Gutierrez is the most important in recent years, the simultaneous trigger.

[EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING

THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-
CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY.
RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D.
CATAYONG| G.R. No. 196231| January 28, 2014| BRION, J . ]

Remember the case of Gonzales this was somehow related to this former military or police who went AWOL and
decided to kidnap a member or hold a bus with foreigners. That's the Luneta siege but this is part of that series of
incidents that went up to the ombudsman. Anyway, the question that was raised in Gonzales v Office of the President
was really very simple. On the matter of jurisdiction on the president regarding disciplinary, administrative jurisdiction
over a deputy ombudsman. The supreme court finally settled this rule and said that the Office of the President does
not have administrative, disciplinary jurisdiction over a deputy ombudsman. Of course it's being tested right now
some other cases. But this is the standing at the moment. It is the ombudsman that exercises administrative,
disciplinary jurisdiction over the deputy ombudman.

Carpio-Morales again, the lack of significant case law.

[CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA| GR Nos. 217126-27| Nov 10, 2015| PERLAS-BERNABE, J .]
This time this should be asked in the bar about the situation of, and it's good also for the jurisdictional issue on the
review powers with regard to the acts of the ombudsman. So the ombudsman issued an order preventively suspending
Mayor Junjun Binay. In relation to certain cases, plunder and corruption, these were projects of the Makati City Hall.
Junjun Binay, among others, argued that he has been elected and for purposes of the imposition on the preventive
suspension he should have been forgiven by virtue of the reelection following the existing rule at that time which was
Pascual. Long-standing rule of Pascual. It's been for a long time.

[ARTURO B. PASCUAL v. HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA| G.R. No. L-11959|
October 31, 1959| GUTIERREZ DAVID, J .]
Now, the rule applied, they reversed, this was an outright reversal of Pascual v Board of Nueva Ecija. So the
condonation rule has been abandoned official with this case. But this case is also good for another rule concerning a
provision in RA 6667770, that's the ombudsman act that provides no appeal or application for remedy may be heard
against a decision or findings of the Ombudsman with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure question of law.
This was considered as vague and the Supreme Court said Congress cannot alter procedural matter in the Rules of
Court and this was a questionable provision in the Ombudsman Act. This also increased the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction without its consent. So, that's good for that provision also.

[Carpio-Morales v. CA | November 10, 2015 | G.R. Nos. 217126-27 | Perlas- Bernabe, J.]
So, finally, they said that election is not a mode of condemning or condoning an administrative offense. However,
liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President under Sec. 19 Art. VII. Mayor Junjun
Binay got scot-free here for that particular situation because they applied it in a very prospective manner. But, they
abandoned the doctrine. Okay?

[Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes | April 21, 2015 | G.R. No. 180771 | Leonen, J.]
National Economy and Patrimony, service contract, resident marines, the mammals, do they have standing? This is
also good for Article VIII Sec. 1, and Article VIII Sec. 5 on standing. Do the mammals have standing? They don't.
They are inanimate. They are not natural or juridical persons under the Rules of Court on the natural or juridical
persons may have standing. But this is also good on other issues. Who will have standing? The stewards. The service
contract was considered void here it was not signed by the President. So there is a need for a service contract. This
case clarified the La Bugal decision, do you remember the La Bugal decision which defined the service contracts? The
Court said that the deletion of the word service contract in the 1987 Constitution did not per se amount to a ban on
service contracts. So, it can still be, according to the Supreme Court. And under the provisions of Article 12 Sec. 2,
you can see that the President can enter into financial and technical assistance agreements. For purposes of exploit of,
what do you call this, exploration development utilization of natural resources. And that will have to be supplied to
the Congress by way of information. Any contracts entered into by the President with a foreign company, 100%, only
for that particular purpose, the exploration development utilization of natural resources will still be valid. So, thats the
FTAA application.

[Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes | April 18, 2017 | G.R. No. 213948 | Carpio, J.]
Knights of Rizal. It's still within your cut! Do you remember Jose Rizal's back view was blocked by DMCI. So, they
had proposals. How do we make this correctible? Probable we can paint the DMCI 43-floor structure with the flag of
the Philippines, 'no? So, Rizal would be proud of his back, they have the flag, 'no? Such very strange suggestions at
that time. But you cannot down a 43-floor structure too late. Besides, it was outside the premises of Rizal Park. And
there were other structures, probably on different oblique view of Rizal. That, to your left, was Hilton. The old
Hilton, which became Holiday Inn and eventually, I don't know what it is now, but there used to be a hotel there.
Then, you have at the back.
And what about Manila Hotel? It's over there. Well, of course, you will say part of national patrimony. Manila Prince
case, very interesting. But here, Rizal's view was blocked and they were saying we have provisions in Art. IX,
concerning national patrimony. National patrimony to protect. so, the argument being raised in Knights of Rizal was
there are standards on the protection of heritage sites. That's the Denis Charter. And the Supreme Court said the
Denis Charter is not a treaty, it is a set of guidelines and it may yet to harden as a treaty. Until such time, then we are
not bound by it. Besides, the issues raised before the Supreme Court, according to the Supreme Court was purely
factual and may they still need to thresh it out. So, they brought it back to the RTC. But, at least, on the matter of
national economy and patrimony, the Supreme Court was saying that, well, there is no law that prohibits the
construction. Of course, the city ordinance also, that historic sites is not a source of obligation. So, DMCI's
condominium is not a nuisance, per se. If it were, you can summarily abate it, right? But it is not according to the
Supreme Court. Again, it identified Art XIV Sec. 15, as not self-executing provision.

[Gamboa v. Teves | June 28, 2011 | G.R. No. 176579 | Carpio, J.]
Let's go to capital. Gamboa, this was asked already, I think by Justice Velasco, but anyway, there is a sequel to this
which is Dean Jad Roy's case against the SEC. Of course the issue here on foreign ownership and public utility was
very simple. What does the word capital mean there? The first decision said, capital refers to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors. And that's only to common shares not to the total outstanding capital stock, common
and non-voting shares. In a Motion for Reconsideration, it was denied, the Court emphasized that the term capital
refers to shares with full beneficial ownership for purposes of voting. So, this is precisely because the right to vote in
the election of Directors coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks translate to effective control of a
corporation. Now, that was the ruling there. Dean Roy questions now the implementation by the SEC Chairperson
because SEC was ordered by the Supreme Court to implement. And what was questioned was this 'no? There was
memo circular where it interpreted Article 12 Section 11 as follows, so the term capital here. The question circular, or
Securities and Exchange Commission Memo, is here. All category shall at all times observe the constitutional statutory
ownership requirement for purposes of determining therewith the required percentage of Filipino ownership shall be
applied to both the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and the
total number of outstanding shares of stock whether or not they are entitled to vote. There was a question whether it
was constitutional or not. The Supreme Court said this is consistent with the Gamboa decision, and is not tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. What Dean Roy wanted was to open it up to almost everyone and the Supreme Court said
you cannot do that because it will violate the tenor of beneficial ownership, they wanted it expanded.

[HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED v PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL |

April 24, 2012 | G.R. No. 171101 | J. Velasco, Jr.]
This is probably the last case. Hacienda Luisita is an old case already. It’s about the stock distribution option. At the
time they were choosing whether stock distribution option or actual land ownership. That’s an option, that’s a choice,
on the part of the land reform beneficiaries, we cannot prevent them as far as the choice is concerned. That was held
to be valid, the stock distribution option.

[COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY | November 9, 2016 |

G.R. No. 196596 | J. Brion]
What happened in CIR v DLSU, now this one is new. This is a very interesting case to remember. This is good for
two provisions; Article 6 Section 28 on real property exemption of educational institutions and there’s a whole series
of case law on actual direct, and exclusive use for charitable education institutions, but it’s also good for Article 14
Section 43 more in particular because of exemptions of education institutions were on certain taxes, not just real
property exemption. You have to link the two because here the question was an assessment on DLSU for deficiency
taxes on income tax, on rental earnings from restaurants, canteens, and bookstores operating within campus. The
VAT on the business income and Documentary Stamp Tax on loans and lease contracts. DLSU protested, citing
exemption from, and this was the more relevant part, revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes from taxes and duties.

The one in Article 6 was pretty easy, flowing from Abra Valley College. Remember, Abra Valley was a building, and
then there were lease portions of that college. There was a second floor where the teaching was done in the rooms,
and then there’s a residential portion of the second floor where the administrator or the director was actually staying.
So, in that scenario, you have proportionate charges based on the actual use of the ground floor and the residential
part which is incidental to the pursuit of educational purposes. So they applied the proportionate ruling there. De La
Salle was deriving income from various sources; leases, or even investments. This was an issue, they charge you so
highly on tuition and then they invest it. Right, I mean how do you earn? You invest the money.

If it earns, is the interest income chargeable also?

The rule now is for as long as you plow it back into activities of an educational character, that will be exempt. That is
the universal rule now.

DLSU exempt from a portion of its income. The taxpayer institution must show proof that the revenues and assets of
his institution must have been used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purpose before it can claim
exemption. DLSU is currently granted a broader tax privilege. That’s the reconciliation of the real property tax
exemption and the other exemptions based on income derived from tuition and other sources but plowed back for
educational purpose.