SATURNINO OCAMPO ET. AL. VERSUS REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO ENRIQUEZ ET.

AL
(G.R. NO. 225973, AUGUST 8, 2017)

FACTS:

During his campaign for the 2016 Presidential Election, then Presidential candidate and previous
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte stated that he would allow the burial of the remains of former
President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.

As Duterte was elected President, then Rear Admiral Ernesto Enriquez issued a memorandum
and directive in compliance with the verbal order of former President Duterte to bury the remains
of Marcos Sr. at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. In response, petitioners filed a petition assailing the
memorandum which the Court dismissed. Subsequently, Marcos Sr. was buried at the Libingan
ng mga Bayani around noontime of November 18, 2016.

Following this, the petitioners filed motions for reconsideration, motions for the exhumation of
Marcos’ remains at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, and petitions to cite respondents in contempt of
court.

Petitioners contend that their right to dispute Marcos Sr’s’ burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
rests on their right to full and effective remedy and entitlement to reparation as guaranteed by the
State under the Constitution as well as the domestic and international laws.

In particular, they cite Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368, arguing that Marcos Sr.’s burial at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani distorts the historical bases upon which their rights to other nonmonetary
compensation were granted, and is an affront to their honor and dignity that was restored to them
by law.

Petitioners decry that Marcos Sr.’s burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani results in illegal use of
public funds, re-traumatization, historical revisionism, disregard of their state recognition as
heroes and their rights to effective reparation and to satisfaction.

ISSUE:

The procedural issue/s raised:

1.) Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

2.) Whether or not the issue regarding the burial of the remains of Marcos Sr. at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani is of transcendental importance.

3.) Whether or not petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts.

RULING:

1.) The Court liberally recognized the legal standing of the petitioners.

There are three (3) requisites to determine whether petitioners have locus standi:

(1) they have personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.

In accordance with these requisites, the Court initially deemed that the petitioners were unable to
show the direct injury they suffered or would suffer on account of the assailed memorandum and
directive allowing Marcos Sr.’s burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, but the Court still decided to
liberally recognize the legal standing of concerned citizens who invoked a public right allegedly
breached by a governmental act.

However, despite liberally recognizing petitioners’ legal standing, the Court stated in its decision
that Marcos Sr.’s burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani does not contravene the provisions in the
Constitution because the historical and legal bases governing the Libingan ng mga Bayani
unequivocally reveal its nature and purpose as an active military cemetery/grave site over which
then President Rodrigo Duterte has certain discretionary authority, pursuant to his control and
Commander-in-Chief powers, which is beyond the Court’s judicial power to review.
In addition, the petitioners were unable to prove that Marcos Sr. is disqualified from being buried
at the Libingan ng mga Bayani pursuant to the provisions in AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines)
Regulations G 161-375.

Moreover, the provisions in R.A. No. 10368 cannot be extended to interpret that Marcos Sr.’s
disqualification from being buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani is a form of reparation for the
victims of Human Rights Violations. Doing such would be judicial legislation and, thus, is
unconstitutional.

2.) While the Court liberally recognized the legal standing of the petitioners, the petitioners
must still prove that the issue being raised had transcendental importance, however the Court
ruled that the petitioners failed to prove such.

Due to a lack of exact definition of the term, the Court provided requisites to determine whether
or not the issue being raised had transcendental importance:

(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.

The Court held that the petitioners were unable to satisfy the said requisites because the
petitioners failed to prove that there was an illegal disbursement of public funds and that there
was special disbursement.

3.) Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative
processes available.

If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be
sought.

For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system
of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners
failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking
in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court.

The Regional Trial Court is not just a trier of facts but can also resolve questions of law in the
exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.

NOTES:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368:

-Known as the "Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013″.
-The policy of the State to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims
of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance and other gross human
rights violations committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering
the period from September 21, 1972, to February 25, 1986 and restore the victims’ honor and
dignity.

AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) Regulations G 161-375.

-Qualified to be interred in the LNMB are the remains of those with military service2, Filipinos of
historical interest3, and others4 whose remains were allowed to be interred therein.
-A military memorial consistent with the purpose for which it was established in 1947 and renamed
as such in 1954.
NAGA TELEPHONE CO., INC. VERSUS COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 107112, FEBRUARY
24, 1994)

Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioners.

Luis General, Jr. for private respondent.

FACTS:

November 1, 1977
-Naga Tel. Co. and Camarines Sur II Electric Coop. entered into a contract (Exh. “A”) for the use
by petitioners in the operation of its telephone service the electric light posts of private respondent
in Naga City.
-In consideration therefor, petitioners agreed to install, free of charge, ten (10) telephone
connections for the use by private respondent in six (6) places.

Contract also stated:

“(a) That the term or period of this contract shall be as long as the party of the first part has need
for the electric light posts of the party of the second part it being understood that this contract
shall terminate when for any reason whatsoever, the party of the second part is forced to stop,
abandoned [sic] its operation as a public service and it becomes necessary to remove the electric
light post;”

First Cause of Action:

After ten (10) years, on January 2, 1989, CASURECO II filed a petition against NATELCO for
reformation of the contract with damages on the grounds that:
1.) the contract is in favor of NATELCO;
2.) it is not in conformity with the guidelines of the National Electrification Administration (NEA)
which direct that the reasonable compensation for the use of the posts is P10.00 per post, per
month;
3.) the cables strung on the posts became too heavy, NATELCO’s linemen bore holes through
the posts which were then destroyed by typhoon/s, and that new posts cost PHP 2,360.00 each;
and
4.) inequities should be abolished.

Second Cause of Action:

CASURECO II alleged that starting with the year 1981, NATELCO used 319 posts in the towns
outside of Naga City without contract and that NATELCO refused to pay for it despite demands.

Third Cause of Action:

CASURECO II t complained about the poor servicing by petitioners of the ten (10) telephone units
which had caused it great inconvenience and damages to the tune of not less than PHP
100,000.00.

The Regional Trial Court ruled for the reformation of the agreement. Upon disagreeing with the
decision of the Trial Court, NATELCO then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. However,
in its decision, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but on different grounds.

Hence, this petition on the grounds that the respondent court erred in:
1.) making a contract for the parties by invoking Article 1267 of the New Civil Code;
2.) ruling that prescription of the action for reformation of the contract in this case commenced
from the time it became disadvantageous to private respondent; and
3.) ruling that the contract was subject to a potestative condition in favor of petitioners.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the respondent court, the Court of Appeals, erred in applying Article 1267 of
the New Civil Code.

2.) Whether or not the contract was subject to a potestative condition.

RULING:

1.) The Court held that the respondent court did not err in affirming the decision of the RTC
for the reformation of agreement provided that Article 1267 of the New Civil Code is applicable in
this case.

The Court stated that Article 1267 refers to “service” as the “performance” of an obligation which
in this case, is the obligation of private respondent to allow petitioners to use its posts in Naga
City. Additionally, the article does not require thereunder that the contract be for future service
with future unusual change.

The allegations and evidence presented by private respondent CASURECO II made out a cause
of action under Article 1267.

2.) The Court ruled that the contract is not purely subject to a potestative condition but,
instead, is a subject to mixed conditions.

A potestative condition is a condition, the fulfillment of which depends upon the sole will of the
debtor, in which case, the conditional obligation is void. As such, the provision ““(a) That the term
or period of this contract shall be as long as the party of the first part (petitioner) has need for the
electric light posts of the party of the second part (private respondent) x x x.” is subject to a
potestative condition.

However, the other condition in the same provision, “x x x it being understood that this contract
shall terminate when for any reason whatsoever, the party of the second part (private respondent)
is forced to stop, abandoned (sic) its operation as a public service and it becomes necessary to
remove the electric light post (sic);” is a casual condition which depends on chance, hazard, or
the will of a third person.

The petition is hereby denied.

NOTES:

General rule: The impossibility of performance releases the obligor.

Petitioner Naga Telephone Co., Inc. (NATELCO)

-A telephone company rendering local as well as long distance telephone service in Naga City.

Private respondent Camarines Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO II)

-A private corporation established for the purpose of operating an electric power service in the
same city.

Article 1267
- When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the
parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part.

EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. VERSUS HON. SALVADOR Y. APURILLO (G.R. NO. 168746,
NOVEMBER 5, 2009)

FACTS:

YKS Realty Development, Inc. was a client of Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB)
and Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC), the predecessors of herein petitioner Equitable PCI
Bank, Inc.

In their commercial transactions, PCIB and EBC granted YKS a series of loans and credit facilities
secured by real estate mortgages.

Through its transactions with EBC, YKS was granted a series of credit lines by the former.

The entire line was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage on two properties covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-22461 and T-22460 owned by YKS situated in Tacloban City.

The credit line was initially in the amount of PHP 4,000,000.00, but as a result of several
amendments to the real estate mortgage, the initial loan consideration of PHP 4,000,000.00
ballooned to PHP 53,000,000.00 which YKS failed to pay its outstanding obligations after EBC
made demands.

EBC filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban
City, an extrajudicial petition for the sale of the mortgaged properties in order to satisfy the
mortgage indebtedness in the amount of PHP 10,400,000.00, exclusive of interests, penalties,
and other charges.

Sheriff Leonardo G. Aguilar, issued a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale, setting the auction sale of the
subject properties in the morning of June 29, 2001.
On August 13, 1997, YKS obtained a dollar denominated loan from PCIB in the amount of US$
2,500,000.00 but was actually converted to peso.

In one of the promissory notes executed by YKS, it appeared that the total obligation of YKS was
PHP 140,967,120.36.

It also stated therein that the purpose of the loan was for “working capital” and that it would mature
six (6) years after date or on December 17, 2004.

On the same day, December 24, 1998, PCIB credited the amount of PHP 103,240,277.90 to YKS’
account as proceeds of the loan under “PN No. 756/98.”

At the same time, PCIB debited the amount of $ 2,633,680.55 from YKS’ account as payment of
the loan principal and interest for the converted dollar denominated loan under PN No. 095/97-
344.17

On January 23, 2001, PCIB sent YKS a letter demanding the latter to pay its total obligation, which
the former pegged at PHP 162,295,233.54, exclusive of interest, penalty, and other charges.

PCIB also warned YKS that its failure to heed the demand would result in the filing of appropriate
actions against it, including the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties.

PCIB ignored YKS’ request for a breakdown of amount.

On May 23, 2001, petitioner filed a Petition for Sale before the Office of the Executive Judge,
RTC, Tacloban City, praying that the mortgaged properties be sold thru extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings to the highest bidder, in the manner and form prescribed by law.

On May 25, 2001, Sheriff Luis G. Copuaco issued a Sheriff’s Notice of Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Sale setting the public auction of the mortgaged properties in the morning of June 29, 2001 at the
RTC, Branch 7, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Tacloban City.

Thus, on June 19, 2001, as a result of the filing of the two petitions for sale, YKS filed before the
RTC a Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Annulment or Declaration of Nullity of Foreclosure,
Application for Foreclosure, Notice of Foreclosure Sale, Documents, Interest, Etc., Release of
Mortgages, Injunction, and Damages, later docketed as Civil Case No. 2001-06-93.

On June 25, 2001, the RTC heard YKS’ application for temporary restraining order.

On December 3, 2001, after the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the RTC issued
a Resolution granting YKS’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 20,
2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court wherein it prayed for the nullification of the resolutions of the RTC granting the
writ of preliminary injunction and denying its motion for reconsideration.

On June 27, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision denying the petition for lack of merit and ordered
the RTC to proceed with the trial of the main case on its merits.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ of preliminary
injunction to YKS.

2.) Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
RTC.

RULING:

1.) The Court held that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right
must be shown.
Moreover, the rule is well entrenched that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction as an
ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the right of a party in a pending case rests upon the
sound discretion of the trial court.

In the exercise of its discretion, the trial court found all the requisites for the issuance of an
injunctive writ to be attendant.

First, it was well established that YKS had a clear and unmistakable right over the mortgaged
properties.

Second, there clearly exists an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious injury on the
part of YKS.

A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The
sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final
order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts.

It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests

pending the final judgment on the principal action.

2.) The Court ruled that the issue assailing the decision of the CA is bereft of merit.

NOTES:

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that:

“SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunctions. — A preliminary injunction may be

granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.”

NORBERTO LUMPAY ET. AL. VERSUS HON. SEGUNDO MOSCOSO (NO. L-14723, MAY 29,
1959)

FACTS:

Petitioners in the above-entitled case were the defendants in a criminal complaint filed by a
sergeant of the Constabulary.

The complaint charges the defendants in that case, petitioners herein, with the crime of robbery
in band with double homicide, frustrated homicide, and less serious physical injuries, committed
in said municipality of Tunga, Leyte.

On June 18, 1958, the provincial fiscal of Leyte petitioned the Secretary of Justice for authority to
file said case in the branch of the Court of First Instance at Tacloban, instead of before the branch
of the Court at Carigara, 6th Branch.

The reason alleged for transferring the trial of the case is that the accused have many relatives
and followers in the towns of Jaro and Tunga, and may harass the prosecution witnesses while
going back and forth to Carigara.

On July 3, the Secretary of Justice approved the petition of the fiscal, so the information was filed
before the Tacloban Branch of the court.

It so happened, however, that on July 2, counsel for the accused moved the Court of First Instance
to have the case transferred to Carigara for trial on the merits. In the meanwhile, said counsel
had secured a telegraphic order from the Secretary of Justice.
In accordance with this order, Executive Judge Segundo C. Moscoso ordered the case to be
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Carigara for trial.

Thereupon, the fiscal and private prosecutors moved to reconsider the order for the transfer of
the case to Carigara, alleging the same reason that had been given by the fiscal in asking for
permission was registered by counsel for the defense.

The court thereupon set the motion and the opposition thereto for hearing, and on September 27,
1958, it reconsidered its order transferring the case to the 6th Branch at Carigara for trial.

The judge ruled that Administrative Order No. 175 of the Department of Justice, dated December
13, 1954, while not illegal, was intended merely to distribute equally the burden of work among
the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte and to facilitate the speedy
administration of justice; that said administrative order cannot confer exclusive jurisdiction,
because the matter of jurisdiction is beyond the said department's prerogative and is fixed by law.

The court further held the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte had equal or
concurrent jurisdiction over all cases filed therein, and the judge assigned to a branch before
whom a case has been presented may refuse to follow the above-mentioned administrative order
or may transfer a case on appropriate motion or motu propio to a proper branch.

It moreover reasoned that no administrative regulation can vest jurisdiction upon the courts, for
jurisdiction is conferred by law and that once the court has taken jurisdiction of a case, it may not
be removed therefrom by mere department order.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to transfer
the case to Carigara in accordance with Administrative Order No. 175 of the Department of
Justice.

RULING:

1.) Yes, the Court ruled that respondent judge erred in failing to adhere to Administrative
Order No. 175 of the Department of Justice.

While the Court agrees with the argument of the court below that jurisdiction is fixed by law and
that once jurisdiction has attached by the filing of a complaint or information with a court of
concurrent jurisdiction, the latter may not be divested thereof especially by an administrative order
or circular, but there is only one Court of First Instance in Leyte.

Each of its six (6) branches is not a court separate and distinct from each other.

Jurisdiction, furthermore, is vested in the court, not in the judges. So, when a complaint or
information is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch or judge
alone, to the exclusion of the others.

Trial may be had, or proceedings may continue by and before another branch or judge.

The administrative arrangement does not violate jurisdiction because as we have stated above
jurisdiction to try cases is vested in the court or in all the branches thereof in the province or
judicial district.

NOTES:

Administrative Order No. 175 of the Department of Justice.

- Administrative Order No. 175 and the law under which it is adopted are based on the theory that
authority to try cases is vested in the whole court, or in all or any of the branches or judges of the
province or judicial district, and that the actual determination of who among the judges should try
a given case is an administrative matter to be made pursuant to the arrangement to be adopted
in accordance with Section 57 of the Judiciary Act.
- Cognizant of the difficulties that may arise in the apportionment of the cases among the different
branches of the court sitting in different municipalities, the legislature has authorized the district
judge and the Secretary of Justice to adopt an apportionment best suited to the interests of a
speedy administration of justice.
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VERSUS JUDGE JOSE B. HERRERA (NO.
36098, JANUARY 21, 1983)

FACTS:

On August 14, 1969, petitioner and private respondent entered into an agreement thereby for and
in consideration of PHP 55,430.00, the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land with a
special condition that should private respondent as purchaser complete the construction including
the painting of his residential house on said lot within two (2) years from August 14, 1969,
petitioner, as owner, has agreed to refund to private respondent the amount of P10.00 per square
meter.

When the aforesaid special condition was fulfilled, private respondent on May 17, 1971
accordingly notified in writing the petitioner of the same and requested for his refund amounting
to PHP 4,820.00.

Upon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation, private respondent, on May 6, 1972, filed a
complaint for sum of money and damages with the City Court of Manila, Branch II, against
petitioner.

A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action and improper venue.

City Court Judge Jose B. Herrera, in his order dated June 27, 1972, held in abeyance the
resolution on the motion until after the trial of the case on the merits.

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

A motion to dismiss was filed by private respondent. The petition was dismissed on the ground
that the claim of private respondent in his complaint, being less than PHP 10,000.00, is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the city court.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the City Court of Manila, Branch II, has jurisdiction over the complaint.

RULING:

1.) The Court ruled that the City Court of Manila, Branch II, has no jurisdiction over the
complaint.

Although private respondent’s complaint in the court a quo is designated as one for a sum of
money and damages, an analysis of all the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows
that what private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner’s obligation under the written
contract to make the refund of the rate of PHP 10.00 per square meter or in the total amount of
PHP 4,820.00, but only after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions that will give rise to
petitioner’s obligation, a matter clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation.

NOTES:

The City Court, not the CFI, has jurisdiction over ejectment cases where the issue of ownership
was intertwined with possession pursuant to R.A. 5967.