Defensor-Santiago vs. Ramos, P.E.T. Case No.

001, February 13, 1996

Facts: After Fidel Ramos was declared President, defeated candidate Miriam
Defensor-Santiago filed an election protest with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET). Subsequently, while the case is pending, she ran for the office of Senator and,
having been declared elected, assumed office as Senator.
Issue: Was Santiago's election protest deemed abandoned with her election and
assumption of office as Senator?
Held: Yes. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively
abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, abandoned her determination
to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice
of the electorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant
protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would
dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election,
thereby enhancing the all-to crucial political stability of the nation during this period of
national recovery. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the
public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds: (1) The
petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond the periods
provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods
provided for in these Rules; (4) The cash deposit, or the first P 100,000.00 thereof, is
not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies
thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. Other
grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply
in a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the
answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on
such grounds. In sum, if an election be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be,
for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the
Protestant. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Sec. 4, Art. VII,
1987 Constitution)

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

Salary

Facts: Respondents Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr. (Marcos, Jr.), Maria Imelda
R. Marcos (Imee), and Irene Marcos Araneta (Irene) appear to be the registered owners
of a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna (Cabuyao property)
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-85026. The petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government, filed
before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting, and damages against Former President Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, their
children, Marcos, Jr., Imee, and Irene, and their sons-in-law, Tomas Manotoc and
Gregorio Ma. Araneta III. Marcos, Jr. filed a Motion praying for the cancellation of the
notice of Lis Pendens and pointing out that the Cabuyao property was not specifically
mentioned in the original and amended Complaints. Therafter, petitioner filed a Motion
for Leave to Admit Fourth Amended Complaint. The Fourth Amended Complaint was
substantially identical to the admitted Complaint, but with the amended annex List of
Assets and Other Properties of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and Immediate
Family. The list specifically mentioned the Cabuyao property as one among the assets
of the Marcoses. The Sandiganbayan did not admit the Fourth Amended Complaint and
ordered the cancellation of the annotation of Lis Pendens. It held that because the
admitted (original)Complaint did not specifically mention the Cabuyao property, the
Cabuyao property was not involved in the Civil Case; therefore, petitioner has over the
property no actionable claim that needs to be protected via a notice of Lis Pendens.
Petitioner filed a review before the SC seeking reversal of the order of the
Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether or not, the Fourth Amended Complaint should have been admitted and
notice of lis pendens of the question property should have been granted.

Held: The Sandiganbayan should have admitted the fourth amended complaint.
According to the SC, Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases
involving the ill-gotten wealth of Former President Marcos and his family, associates,
dummies, agents, and nominees, specifically states that the technical rules of procedure
and evidence shall not be strictly applied to the civil cases filed under it. Thus, the Court
has emphasized this provision and pointed out that strict adherence to technical rules
will hamper the efforts of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. In other
words, Sandiganbayan should have relaxed the rules in admitting the amended
complaint. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions dated January 11, 2010 and December 1, 2010, insofar as they direct the
cancellation of the notice of Lis Pendens, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Register of Deeds of Cabuyao, Laguna is ORDERED to re-annotate the notice of Lis
Pendens on TCT No. T-85026. • No increase during their term. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the
incumbent during which such increase was approved. • No additional emolument
during their tenure. They shall not receive during their tenure any other
emolument from the Government or any other source. The salaries of the
President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure.
Soliven vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988.
Immunity from suit from non-official acts

Facts: Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran
argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue
of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in
an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran
also contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would
produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
Issues: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for
libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case
was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant
and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate
criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Held: (1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation
is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion
to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by
filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is
deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity
to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded. (2) What the Constitution underscores is
the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates
this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing
and deciding cases filed before their courts. (3) The rationale for the grant to the
President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
holder's time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of
the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a
criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot
be assumed and imposed by any other person. (4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of
facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point. The
President may not be prevented from instituting suit. There is nothing in our laws
that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The President may
shed the protection afforded by the privilege. By reason of public convenience,
the grant is to be assure the exercise of presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the Chief Executive is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided
attention

Gloria vs. CA, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000

Immunity from suit from non-official acts

Facts: In 1989, Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed by Pres. Cory Aquino as
Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City. In 1994, upon recommendation of
DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the
Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by
the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994. Pres. Ramos approved the
recommendation. Sec. Gloria transmitted a copy of the recommendation to Director
Rosas for implementation. Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injunction
enjoining the implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the
petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to security
of tenure. The Sec. Gloria argued that the filing of the case is improper because the
same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity
from suit.
Issues: 1. May heads of executive department invoke the president's immunity from
suit?
2. Is Icasiano's reassignment violative of his security of tenure?
Held: 1. No. Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President, he cannot
invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the
questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely those of a
department Secretary. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned
before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the
reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred
from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect
that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and
experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be
gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent
has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides,
there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as
no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners
to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the
reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private
respondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil
service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without
cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal
removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183
SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA
138).
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the
employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step
toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer
would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those
who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano,
109 Phil. 116)."
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his
security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.
CA decision affirmed.
 G.R. No. 83896. February 22, 1991 and G.R. No. 83815. February 22, 1991
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Ex-officio Capacity
Fernan, C.J
FACTS: On July 25, 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284
which allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries
to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The
petitioner maintain that this is not in accordance with Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which provides that the President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. The E.O. No.
283 was issued based on the opinion of Secretary of Justice Ordoñez construing
Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B declaring that
Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold
other public office, including membership in the boards of government
corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the
Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-Doctrine: The President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants are prohibited from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government. Except in those
cases provided in the Constitution itself and with respect to posts held without additional
compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office.

Dela Cruz vs COA, G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001

Ex-officio Capacity

FACTS: Petitioners De la Cruz et al. we’re sitting as “alternates” of the Cabinet

members mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA Board of Directors. Their acts
are “considered the acts of their principals.” Pursuant to Civil Liberties Union v. Exec
Sec (1991), respondent COA issued a Memorandum calling for, among others, the
disallowance of payments of representation allowances and per diems of “Cabinet
members who were the ex-officio members of the NHA Board… and/or their respective
alternates who actually received the payments.” De la Cruz et al. appealed the
disallowance to COA but was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Are the alternates of the ex-officio members of the NHA Board entitled to
receive compensation in addition to their salary?
RULING: No. The Court reiterated Civil Liberties Union v. Exec Sec (1991) which stated
that “[t]he ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position.* x x x For such attendance, therefore,
he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per
diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever
name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.”
Since the Executive Dept Secretaries, as ex-officio members of the NHA Board, are
prohibited from receiving “extra (additional) compensation,” it follows that De la Cruz et
al. who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation.
A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals. * To illustrate,
“[i]t should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the
Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in
monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department.”

De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010.

Kinds of Presidential Appointment

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These cases
trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering
that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18,
2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next
Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to
apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers
also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power
to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications
for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. A part of the question to be reviewed
by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence
from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether
the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision
of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.

HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two
constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1).
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section
15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer
to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are
obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to
appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the
Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of t he
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all
kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments
to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof. 1.
Appointments made by an Acting President (Section 14); 2. Appointments made
by the President within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term or otherwise called “Midnight Appointments” (Section 15);
3. Regular Appointments (Section 16); 4. Recess or Ad-interim Appointments
(Section 13).

Soriano vs Lista G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003

Officials to be appointed by the President

Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed public respondents to different

positions in the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). Petitioner questioned the said
appointments for failure to undergo the confirmation process in the Commission on
Appointments.
Issues: 1. Does petitioner have any legal personality to file the instant petition?
2. Do the appointments of respondents required confirmation of the CA?
Held: 1. No. A private citizen is allowed to raise constitutional questions only if he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government, the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. In the
case at bar, petitioner has failed to clearly demonstrate that he has personally suffered
actual or threatened injury. It should be emphasized that a party bringing a suit
challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the law or
act is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as
a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not
involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
2. No. The PCG used to be administered and maintained as a separate unit of the
Philippine Navy under Section 4 of RA 5173. It was subsequently placed under the
direct supervision and control of the Secretary of the Department of National Defense
(DND) pursuant to Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it was integrated into the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a major subordinate unit of the Philippine Navy under
Section 54 of Chapter 8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO 292, as amended.
However, on March 30, 1998, after the aforesaid changes in the charter of the PCG,
then President Fidel V. Ramos, in the exercise of his statutory authority to reorganize
the Office of the President, issued EO 475 transferring the PCG from the DND to the
Office of the President. He later on again transferred the PCG from the Office of the
President to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Now that
the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of
the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not
require confirmation by the CA. It is clear from Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution that
only appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces
require confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous
language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a
construction that changes its meaning. The enumeration of appointments subject to
confirmation by the CA under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
exclusive. The clause officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain refers to military officers alone. This is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Since the promotions and appointments of respondent officers are not
covered by the above-cited provision of the Constitution, the same need not be
confirmed by the CA. 1. Those officials whose appointments are vested in him by
the Constitution. (See Section 16, 1st sentence); 2. Those whom he may be
authorized by law (Section 16, 2nd sentence); 3. Any other officers of the
government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law (Constitution
or statutes) [Section 16, 2nd sentence].

Manalo vs. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999.

 Where COA Confirmation is not needed

Facts: On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
Republic Act 6975, creating the DILG. The said Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief
Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino,
through Executive Secretary Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions
in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The
said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions.
Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary
Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other
emoluments. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the
legality of subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contents that: (1)
RA 6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior
superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where
the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent
Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers
despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Issues: 1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation
2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional
Held: 1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of
officers of the government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require
the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent
officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law
expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of
Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be
composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and service, as
may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the
State.” On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that:
“The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in
scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law.” The police force is different from and independent of the
armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine
National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the
herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on
Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are
not required by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of
Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void
are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions
would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute
remains valid without its voided sections.

Planas vs. Gil, G.R. No. L-46440, January 18, 1939

Power of Supervision over LGU
Facts:
Petitioner, a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila, criticized the acts of
certain government officials in connection with the general election for Assemblymen
held on November 8, 1938 in one of the local dailies. The statement as published in the
issue of La Vanguardia of November 17, 1938, included the following statements:
“… In Manila, the opposition should have won the November 8 elections, but lost
instead because of a disastrous division due to people who commercialized their
candidacies.
"The Constitution prohibits the reelection of the President precisely so that the President
may devote all his time to the administration of public affairs for the welfare of the
people, but the President was the first to play politics. Publicly expressing his
preference for candidates of his liking; and with the President all other officials of the
government also moved, taking part in electoral campaigns.
"With the government machinery feverishly functioning to flatten the opposition and
prevent candidates supported by the people from going to the National Assembly, and
with frauds and violations of all rules of the civil service to push to victory the candidates
of the Nacionalista Party and the administration, all constructive opposition in the
country is useless ...
"… It is reasonable to believe that the President is from this moment paving the way for
his reelection. It is to be feared that the new National Assembly will change this wise
provision of our Constitution to permit the reelection of President Manuel L. Quezon."
The day following the publication of the foregoing statement, the petitioner received a
letter, where she is informed that she needs to appear before the Commisioner of Civil
Service to prove her statements otherwise she may be suspended or removed from
office. At the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by her counsel, appeared at
the office of the respondent and delivered to him a letter, Annex B, in which she voiced
objection to the authority of the respondent to conduct the investigation. The respondent
Commissioner did not desist from proceeding with the investigation, but announced
before adjourning the hearing of November 22nd that he would decide the question
raised as to his jurisdiction on November 26, 1938. It was at this state of the
investigation that the petitioner filed in this court her original petition for prohibition of
November 25, 1938, in which she at the same time prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent commissioner from continuing with the
investigation.
Issue: WON the president has the power to order the investigation
Held: Yes. It is not denied that the President did authorize the issuance of the order, but
it is contended "that the said investigation with a view to petitioner's suspension or
removal is against Article VII, sec. 11 (1) of the Constitution of the Philippines and is not
warranted by any statutory provision." (Par. XV [b], amended petition.) It, therefore,
becomes necessary to inquire into the constitutional and legal authority of the President
to order the investigation which has given rise to the present controversy. A perusal of
our Constitution will show that extensive authority over the public service is granted the
President of the Philippines. Article VII of the Constitution begins in its section 1 with the
declaration that "The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines."
All executive authority is thus vested in him, and upon him devolves the constitutional
duty of seeing that the laws are "faithfully executed." (Art. VIII, sec. 11, subsec. 1, last
clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which he cannot evade, he is granted specific and
express powers and functions. (Art. VII, sec. 11.) In addition to these specific and
express powers and functions, he may also exercise those necessarily implied and
included in them. (Myers vs. United States [1926]) The National Assembly may not
enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred upon the
President of the Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921]) The Constitution
provides that the President "shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law" (Ibid, second
clause). This power of control and supervision is an important constitutional grant. The
President in the exercise of the executive power under the Constitution may act through
the heads of the executive departments. Independently of any statutory provision
authorizing the President to conduct an investigation of the nature involved in this
proceeding, and in view of the nature and character of the executive authority with
which the President of the Philippines is invested, the constitutional grant to him of
power to exercise general supervision over all local governments and to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to order an
investigation of the act or conduct, of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a
meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at
least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power
real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic
and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions
disclosed after careful study and investigation. Viewed from the totality of powers
conferred upon the Chief Executive by our Constitution, we should be reluctant to yield
to the proposition that the President of the Philippines who is endowed with broad and
extraordinary powers by our Constitution, and who is expected to govern with a firm and
steady hand without vexatious or embarrassing interference and much less dictation
from any source, is yet devoid of the power to order the investigation of the petitioner in
this case. We should avoid that result. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Convention show that the grant of the supervisory authority to Chief Executive in this
regard was in the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of views in that
body, mainly between the historical view which recognizes the right of local self-
government (People ex rel. Le Roy vs. Hurlbut [1871]) and the legal theory which
sanctions the possession by the state of absolute control over local governments
(Booten vs. Pinson, [1915]). The result was the recognition of the power of supervision
and all its implications and the rejection of what otherwise would be an imperium in,
imperio to the detriment of a strong national government. Apart from the constitutional
aspect, we find that section 64 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides as follows:
"In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General (President) shall
have such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by
law and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among such special powers and duties shall be:
*******
"(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an
investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and
in connection therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such
investigation shall be conducted."
This provision of the law, in existence before the taking effect of the Constitution, still
subsists. It is not inconsistent with the Constitution and has not been abrogated or
repealed by the National Assembly. (See sec. 2, Art. XV, Constitution.) The power of
the President over local governments is only one of general supervision (See
Article X, Sections 4 and 16). The President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a local government unit if he finds that the latter had acted contrary
to law.

Zabal vs. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

Power of Control

FACTS: President Duterte ordered the shutting down of Boracay in a cabinet meeting
held on April 4, 2018. This was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson Harry L.
Roque, Jr. in a press briefing the following day wherein he formally announced that the
total closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months starting April 26,
2018.
Following this pronouncement, petitioners contend that around 630 police and military
personnel were readily deployed to Boracay including personnel for crowd dispersal
management. They also allege that the DILG had already released guidelines for the
closure. Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's closure came about,
fewer tourists had been engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their
earnings were barely enough to feed their families. They fear that if the closure pushes
through, they would suffer grave and irreparable damage. On May 18, 2018, petitioners
filed a Supplemental Petition stating that the day following the filing of their original
petition or on April 26, 2018, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475 formally
declaring a state of calamity in Boracay and ordering its closure for six months from
April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018.
ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation No. 475 in unconstitutional
HELD: NO. The closure of Boracay, albeit temporarily, gave the island its much needed
breather, and likewise afforded the government the necessary leeway in its
rehabilitation program. Note that apart from review, evaluation and amendment of
relevant policies, the bulk of the rehabilitation activities involved inspection, testing,
demolition, relocation, and construction. These works could not have easily been done
with tourists present. The rehabilitation works in the first place were not simple,
superficial or mere cosmetic but rather quite complicated, major, and permanent in
character as they were intended to serve as long-term solutions to the problem. In any
case, the closure, to emphasize, was only for a definite period of six months, i.e., from
April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. To the mind of the Court, this period constitutes a
reasonable time frame, if not to complete, but to at least put in place the necessary
rehabilitation works to be done in the island. Indeed, the temporary closure of Boracay,
although unprecedented and radical as it may seem, was reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive under the circumstances. It was the most practical and realistic
means of ensuring that rehabilitation works in the island are started and carried out in
the most efficacious and expeditious way. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb
the executive determination that the closure of Boracay was necessitated by the
foregoing circumstances. As earlier noted, petitioners totally failed to counter the factual
bases of, and justification for the challenged executive action. Executive power is the
power to enforce and administer laws. It is the power of implementing the laws
and enforcing their due observance. And in order to effectively discharge the
enforcement and administration of the laws, the President is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices, which includes the power of
control. The power of control, in turn, refers to the authority to direct the
performance of a duty, restrain the commission of acts, review, approve, reverse
or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units, and prescribe
standards, guidelines, plans and programs.
Immunity from Suit President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for
it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs
his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed
upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government.

Emilio A. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit
vs. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January
28, 2014.
No disciplinary authority over the ombudsman

Facts: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion
and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian
M.Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said
cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police
Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave
Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police
officers in the Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of
the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by
the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the
indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs
Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice
of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant
to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the
recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which
was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it remained
pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of
foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in desperate attempt to have him
reinstated in the police service. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which
ended in the tragic murder of eight Hong Kong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven
others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando? Mendoza, a public outcry against the
blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation
and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident
through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross
violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in
administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is
gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated
the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence
the petition. G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their
sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several
unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia’s urgent petition for bail holding that
strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the
government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought
the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea-bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered
into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of
plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines. Outraged
by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with
nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong
evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives
‘Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of
these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee
Resolution No. 3,recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-
Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and
Assistants before the appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or
omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public
trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds
for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
Issue: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to
the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
Held: • Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770 vesting disciplinary authority on the President over
the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is, thus, unconstitutional. • Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman
to discipline and removal by the President, who’s own alter egos and officials in
the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority,
cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman itself. The law directly collided not only with the independence that
the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with
the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office
seeks to revitalize. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is
extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the
exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject
to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770
declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section
8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two
apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No.6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that
Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions -
Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external
authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of
administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without
in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over
all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of
"check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative
liabilities. By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is,
however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with theremoval from office of a
Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2)
of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any
provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under
Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers,
including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment. The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutors Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid
down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's
constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military
watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and
professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the
President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be
incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary
authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement
offices. Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not
Diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. he claims that Section 8(2)
of R.A. No.6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman
from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is
vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for
the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means
nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline
of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians.
"Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling
short of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's
act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman
without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, is considered a manifestation of his
undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all,
taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is
part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the
"champion of the people. “The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to
the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner’s request; that administrative liability was
pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying
the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the
motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot
be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the
lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the
parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no
evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable
motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner
and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed
and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to
a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority,
cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no
intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public
trust. The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the
grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act.

People vs. Salle, Jr., G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995.

Scope of Pardon

Facts: After having convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson
before the RTC of Quezon City, Salle and Mengote appealed their case to SC. While
their cases were pending, they were granted conditional pardon by the President on
December 9, 1993. Mengote immediately left for his province without consulting her
lawyer. Salle, on the other hand, filed an urgent motion to withdraw appeal. The
Supreme Court granted Salle's motion. Considering that Mengote did not file a motion to
withdraw appeal, the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for
Mengote to submit their memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional
pardon and (2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to
inform the Court why it recommended to the President the grant of the conditional
pardon despite the pendency of the appeal. In its Memorandum, the Office of the
Solicitor General maintains that the conditional pardon granted to Mengote is
unenforceable because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the
pendency in this Court of his appeal. Mengote's counsel, on the other hand, submits
that the conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., Mengote's counsel argued that although Mengote did not
file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by
his acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of his conviction.
Issue: Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his
appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.
Held: Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads as follows: Except in cases
of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction
by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. Citing the above provision, the Court
ruled that no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final. It
held that a judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably
perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right
to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed
by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his
right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet
therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be
granted to the appellant. The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under
Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon,
whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from
his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not
be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is
withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned
must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or
that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued
by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the
pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of
an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the
withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable.
Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a
basis for the release of the accused from confinement. The Court gave Mengote's
counsel thirty (30) days from notice within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal
of his appeal and to submit it to the Court. The Court said that the conditional pardon
granted the Mengote shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such
withdrawal and in case of non-compliance with the Resolution, the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back Mengote into his
custody.

Torres vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987.

Scope of Pardon
Facts: 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was was granted conditional
pardon by the president on condition that he "would not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines". He accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement. In 1982, he was charged with 20 counts of estafa (pending
trial) while in 1985, he was convicted of sedition (pending appeal). In 1986, Justice
Secretary Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the
president cancelled the pardon. Torres was accordingly arrested and confined in
Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres thus filed a petition for
habeas corpus before the SC questioning the validity of the arrest order. He claimed
that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment of 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition.
Issue: Is conviction by final judgment necessary before a person may be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his condition pardon?
Held: The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and
the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it
may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to
proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction
therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for
the violation of his conditional pardon. Since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final
judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned
and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum
period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has
chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative
and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. A convict who has already served his prison
term may still be extended a pardon for the purpose of relieving him of whatever
accessory liabilities have attached to his offense.

Pimentel vs Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005

 Treaty

Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of

their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
while Congress is in their regular session. Subsequently after the Congress had
adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity. Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert
that “while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or
acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, without first having obtained its consent. Respondent secretaries
maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while
Congress is in session. EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of
appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the power to appoint
such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. — (1) The President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person
to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is
vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to
perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a
vacancy[.]
Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries while Congress is in session.
Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature.
It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment
of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an
alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President
must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. The office of a department
secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her
choice even while Congress is in session. Ad interim appointments and acting
appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are
extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments
are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way
of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The
absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim
appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the
lapse of one year.
Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the undersecretary?
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. The power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of
this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it
to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against
the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to
appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office.
Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications
to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office. • Two General Steps: 1. Negotiation - Here the
President alone has authority 2. Treaty Approval • Effect of Treaties: a. Contract
between states as parties b. It is a law for the people of each state to observe
(municipal law)

Saguisag vs Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016

When concurrence of senate needed

FACTS: petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER,

REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new
Decision GRANTING the instant consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the
Philippine government, with the United States of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation. petitioners claim this Court
erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to this, petitioners
move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the
constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on
foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their
arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed
in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact
that the plain meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of
foreign bases, troops, and facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has
simply applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10]
Necessarily, once entry has been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of
entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state
that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the
Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) constitutional
Held: Yes. The EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has
long been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as
the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.
Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to
the Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the
government's continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various
military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has
not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision.
Principles: On verba legis interpretation... verba legis Petitioners' own interpretation
and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity, which legal
construction strictly abhors. The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous
language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a
construction that changes its meaning. With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured into a
construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is
patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said constitutional provision.
Concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of Senate is need for the validity
and effectivity of: 1. Treaties of whatever kind, whether bilateral or multilateral. 2.
International Agreements (that which are permanent and original).

Constantino vs Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005

Power to contract or guarantee foreign loans

Facts: During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce
the country’s external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three
restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are
basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer
and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred
that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute
the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution.
And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be
validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly
reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity
by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the
President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior
concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–
reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President “alone and personally”
can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant
to the scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the
respondents.
HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the
president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that
a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can
delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief
contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a
strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of
the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding,
achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management
goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing
power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a
welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing
loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this
end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the
concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the
public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the
documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded
and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. The act
of the respondents is not unconstitutional.
Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent
approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in
person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of
those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of pardon (mercy). There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of
fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the superdense of executive prerogatives over
those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law,
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines: 1. With the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and 2.
Subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Ampatuan vs. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011.

Calling-out power does not need Congressional Authority

FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and
women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing
“the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a
state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures
as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents
of lawless violence” in the named places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the
DILG the supervision of the ARMM. The petitioners claimed that the President’s
issuances encroached the ARMM’s autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of
emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,
where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be
declared unconstitutional. The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to
deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. It
is pursuant to her “calling out” power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the
need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom. The President merely delegated
her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego
any way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass
killings
ISSUE: WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called
out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces.
HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law
enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling
out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a
power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same. (2): Yes. The President’s call on the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in
her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may
inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, unless it
is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court
will accord respect to the President’s judgment. There is no need for congressional
authority to exercise the calling out power of the President since calling out of
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. As in the case where the President
did not proclaim a national emergency but only a state of emergency in 3 places
in Mindanao and she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.

Fortun vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012.

(Grounds) Factual bases for the suspension

FACTS: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on
a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President
Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar
lawless violence in Central Mindanao. Believing that she needed greater authority to
put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of persons that have taken up
arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President
Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring... martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session,
convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the
validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on December 12 before
Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial
law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Proclamation of Martial Law and suspension of
the privilege of Habeas Corpus in 2009 in Central Mindanao which were withdrawn after
just eight days is constitutional
Held: It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act
in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly... since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only
the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the
Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is... automatic
rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart.
The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or... suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it
becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here, President Arroyo withdrew
Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened,
could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot
and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and... restoration of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that
obliterated any justiciable controversy. 1. In case of invasion or rebellion. 2. When
the public safety requires it.

Lagman vs Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

Existence of rebellion

FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a
written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as
required by the Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the
Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an
affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and
might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing
rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.
Issue: Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
Held: Yes. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President
prior to or at the time of the declaration. The determination by the Court of the
sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned
in the Report and Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion
exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of
Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-
evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither
the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court
has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus
without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of
the matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces
and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other
independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists. Since the
Constitution did not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to have the
same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In
determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince
himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than
not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. To require him to satisfy a
higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers.

Lagman vs Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018

Requisites in proclaiming martial law

FACTS: The President asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to
further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to
December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine. On December
13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one
year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. Petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of both the extension and suspension. The manner that the Congress
approved the extension of martial law in Mindanao is being put into a question and
characterized the same as done with undue haste.
ISSUE: Did the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proc.
No. 216?
RULE: YES. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual
bases for the extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists;
and (b) public safety requires the extension. A review of the facts in the case at bar
similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No.
216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. Events
and circumstances disclosed by the President in the present case strongly indicate that
the continued implementation of martial law in Mindanao is necessary to protect public
safety.