Facts and Case Summary - Miranda v.

Arizona
Facts
The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases
involving custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned
by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off
from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and
effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases,
the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that
were admitted at trial.

 Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police
station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by
two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial,
the oral and written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of
kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were
not violated in obtaining the confession.
 Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the
robbery of a dress shop that had occurred three days prior. He was first taken to the
17th Detective Squad headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad,
where he orally admitted the robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He was then
taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was questioned by an assistant
district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and
answers. At trial, the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury.
Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years
imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division
and the Court of Appeals.
 Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a
suspect in two Kansas City robberies and taken to a local police station. A report was
also received from the FBI that Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California.
Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest and the next morning by local police.
Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-half hours
of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been
prepared by one of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies in
California. These statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the
California robberies and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on each count. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
 California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in
which one of the victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart was identified
as the endorser of checks stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his
home. Police also arrested Stewart’s wife and three other people who were visiting him.
Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, was interrogated on nine
different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had
robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the
four other people arrested with Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any
of them with the crime. At trial, Stewart’s statements were introduced. Stewart was
convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised of his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel.

Issues
Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation” are admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether “procedures
which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself” are necessary.

Supreme Court holding

The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves.” As such, “the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a defendant “must be warned
prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.”

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda,
reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the
judgment of the Supreme Court of California in Stewart.

Argued: Feb. 28, March 1 and 2, 1966

Decided: June 13, 1966

Vote: 5-4

Majority opinion written by Chief Justice Warren and joined by Justices Black,

Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas.

Dissenting opinion written by Justice Harlan and joined by Justices Stewart and

White.

Dissenting in part opinion written by Justice Clark.

Follow-Up
Miranda v. Arizona: After Miranda’s conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court,
the State of Arizona retried him. At the second trial, Miranda’s confession was not
introduced into evidence. Miranda was once again convicted and sentenced to 20-30
years in prison.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON G.R.
No. 85215 July 7, 1989
DOCTRINE:

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It

must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not
come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a
failure to claim it at the appropriate time.

FACTS:

Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines
(PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him
of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. During the
investigation, Ramos’ answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made
disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team’s findings, that the proceeds had
been “misused” by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he
had been prevented from doing so, “perhaps (by) shame,” that he was still willing to
settle his obligation, and proferred a “compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and)
the amount would be known in the next investigation.”

About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him
with the crime of estafa. On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of
“Not Guilty,” and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by
lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.

The private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence which included “the (above
mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL
Baguio City Ticket Office,” which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his
handwritten admission given on February 8, 1986, also marked as Exhibit K.

The respondent judge declared Exhibit A “inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that the
accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was [not] with
the assistance actually of a counsel.” He also declared inadmissible “Exhibit K, the
handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, for the same reason stated
in the exclusion of Exhibit ‘A’ since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by
counsel when he made said admission.”

The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently
denied. Consequently, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:

WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it excluded the
People’s Exhibits A and K.
HELD:

Yes. At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, to
which respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The
section reads as follows:

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in
the section, namely:

1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to
be a witness against himself — set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim
reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that
accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and

2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect “under
investigation for the commission of an offense.”

That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on
the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative
obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom that every one
is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in
the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in
advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It

must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not
come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a
failure to claim it at the appropriate time.

The second sentence refers the rights of persons “under investigation for the
commission of an offense,” i.e., “suspects” under investigation by police authorities; and
this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that
against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in “custodial interrogations,” or “in-
custody interrogation of accused persons.” And, as this Court has already stated, by
custodial interrogation is meant “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.”

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense
under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and
during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which
he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore
come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded,
the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later
marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before
the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a
free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground
that the so-called “Miranda rights” had not been accorded to Ramos.

The writ of certiorari is granted.

People v. Benito Bravo

Facts: The decomposing body of a nine year old girl named,  Juanita Antolin, a resident
of Rosario, Santiago City and known in her neighborhood as Len-len, was found in a
vacant lot along the road leading to Patul, Rosario Santiago City.[i][1] Her body was
found between two concrete fences half naked, shirtless and skirt pulled up, her panty
stuffed in her mouth. Vaginal examination showed.The cause of death was cerebral
hemorrhage. An Information for rape with homicide was filed against Benito Bravo.
Evelyn, neighbor and cousin of the victim testified that she was with the deceased the
night before she disappeared. And positively identified the Bravo as the person last
seen with Len-len. Gracia Monahan , the owner of the house where Len-len and Evelyn
watched television corroborated Evelyns testimony that on the she saw Bravo talking to
Len-len while the two girls were watching television from her open window and that
when she looked again towards the end of the program to the direction where the girls
were situated, only Evelyn was left watching television.

Benito Bravo testified in court that on his way home after work he was invited to go on a
drinking spree. He then headed for home. He admitted in court that he passed by the
house of Gracia Monahan but stated that he did not see the two girls watching television
along the road. At home, he found his mother very sick and so he decided to stay home
all night. He woke up the following morning at around and prepared to go to work. A
policeman came to his place of work and apprehended him without a warrant of arrest
and at the police station he was forced to admit commission of the crime of rape with
homicide of Juanita Antolin.  Bravo denied the accusation and stated that the deceased
was his godchild and that he has known the mother of the child, for three years

The trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Accused pleads for the acquittal invoking the constitutionally guarded presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused and his right to remain silent and to counsel. The
testimony of the policeman that the accused admitted he was with the victim on the
same evening but the latter was too drunk to remember what happened should have
been held inadmissible by the trial court in view of the policeman’s own admission in
court that although he informed the accused that he is a suspect in the rape and killing
of one Juanita Antolin, he did not inform the accused of his constitutional rights before
he asked him of his participation in the crime under investigation. Both the appellant and
the appellee are in agreement that the trial court grievously erred in finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the sole circumstantial evidence that the
victim was last seen by her cousin in the company of the accused whereas the Rules of
Court clearly requires the presence of at least two proven circumstances the
combination of which creates an unbroken link between the commission of the crime
charged and the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The single
circumstance proven by the prosecution that the victim was last seen conversing with
the accused two days before she was found dead cannot serve as basis for any
conclusion leading to the guilt of the accused of the crime charged.

Issue: Whether or not Benito Bravo should be aquitted

Ruling: Yes Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory
protection afforded a person under investigation for the commission of a crime and the
correlative duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate – the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

The admission allegedly made by Bravo is not in the form of a written extra-judicial
confession; the admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer during an informal
talk at the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and killing of
Juanita Antolin. The arresting policeman testified that Bravo admitted that he was with
the victim on the same evening that he carried her on his shoulder but that he was too
drunk to remember what subsequently happened. The arresting policeman admitted
that he did not inform him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. We
note that the alleged admission is incriminating because it places the accused in the
company of the victim at the time the crime was probably committed.

The exclusionary rule applies.

Benito Bravo was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin and any
statement allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime
without prior notification of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. He was
not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry for any possible lead to the
perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the alleged admission was
made he was in custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and
killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission
was coerced. Supportive of such presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial
confession to that effect.

PEOPLE V. BRAVO

FACTS:

The decomposing body of nine year old girl Juanita Antolin (Len-len) was found in a vacant lot --
naked, shirtless and skirt pulled up, her panty stuffed in her mouth. Her body was found about 700
meters from her house. The scalp on the left side of her head was detached exposing a fracture on the
left temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal examination showed fresh laceration easily accepts two fingers.
The cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage.

An Information for rape with homicide was filed against herein accused-appellant. He was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
 Evelyn, an eight year old second grader and neighbor and cousin of the victim testified that she
was with the deceased the night before she disappeared. In court, Evelyn positively identified the
appellant as the person last seen with Len-len before she was found dead. The owner of the house
where Len-len and Evelyn watched television, Gracia Monahan, corroborated Evelyn's testimony.

The Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Santiago Police Department, Alexander Mico, testified
in court that at the police station the appellant admitted he was with the girl and he carried her on his
shoulder but he was so drunk that night that he does not remember what he did to her. On cross-
examination Mico admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain
silent, to counsel and of his right against self-incrimination before the appellant made the said admission
because according to Mico he was only informally interviewing the accused when he made the admission
and that custodial interrogation proper was conducted by the assigned investigator.

HELD:

We resolve to acquit Benito Bravo. Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the
mandatory protection afforded a person under investigation for the commission of a crime and the
correlative duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate. The mantle of protection under
this constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for
investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out
as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in custody. Law enforcement agencies are
required to effectively communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure that it is fully
understood. Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless
or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck
down as inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a
confidant of the accused is not covered by the exclusionary rule.

The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin and any statement
allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of his
constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's apparent attempt to circumvent the rule
by insisting that the admission was made during an "informal talk" prior to custodial investigation proper
is not tenable. The appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry for any
possible lead to the perpetrators of the crime under investigation.

People vs. Escordial, GR 138934, 16

January 2002
1/9/2021

0 COMMENTS
 

FACTS:
-          Accused Anthony Escordial, the herein accused appellant, was charged guilty of robbery
with rape and sentencing him to death and to pay private complainant Michelle Darunday the
amounts of Php 3,650 representing the amount taken by him Php50k as moral damages,
Php30k as exemplary damages, and the costs.
-          It was testified by eight witnesses namely Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda, Erma
Blanca,4 Dr. Joy Ann Jocson, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, Leo Asan, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, and
Michelle Darunday that:

-   Petitioners  (Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca and Ma. Teresa Gallaver) were all living on the
ground floor of a boarding house. On the night of the crime, Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda
and Mark Lucena were playing inside a jeepney parked in front of the boarding house. While
playing, a man sitting inside the jeepney told the boys to go home and that man was later
identified as the accused.

-   While the petitioners were sleeping, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man who had
his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches
long; warned her not to shout; asked her money and was able to get P500 from her. Then the
accused turned to Michelle and Teresa which he got P3,100 from Michelle only.  

-   Thereafter, the accused told them to blindfold one another and then proceed to have carnal
knowledge with Michelle. On the other hand, Erma claimed that she was able to see the man’s
face. After he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the bed and talked to the three
women. He then raped Michelle again and threatened her that it would be much worse if he’d
call his companions to rape her. Later, he left but warned them not to report the matter to
anyone or he would kill them.

-   Mark Esmeralda saw from his bedroom window a man wearing denim shorts coming out of
the boarding house and saw that man jumped over the fence and later told his parents about
what he had seen and told them to check what happened.
-   After Michelle Erma and Teresa were able to find help, Michelle was taken to the police
headquarters and referred to the Women’s Desk to report the rape.
-   PO3  Tancinco was one of those who responded to the crime. A report was made in the
police station.  Subsequent searches, through the descriptions of the petitioners, the children
playing in the jeep in front of the boarding house, and others led to the pinpointing of accused-
appellant .Accused was playing in basketball when the police “invited” him to the Pontevedra
police station for questioning. At the station Michelle saw him and she identified him as his
alleged robber and rapist. He was also brought to the Bacolod police station so that the other
witnesses could identify him. They picked him out of four in the line-up.

-          In defense, the accused-appellant claimed that he went home to Pontevedra, wherein he

was able to see and communicate with the witnesses for the defense namely Aaron Lavilla,
Elias Sombito. While the accused-appellant was in that place, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino and
Ricardo Villaspen led by PO3 Tancinco, witnesses, went to Ponteverde Police asking for help to
locate him, however, they were not able to show a warrant for accused-appellant’s arrest. Then,
they found the accused-appellant at the basketball court watching a game. After informing him
that he was a suspect in a robbery case, the group invited the accused-appellant to go with
them to the police headquarters. The accused-appellant however testified that the PO3
Tancinco and his companions beat and hit him with the butt of a shotgun to admit liability for the
crime and even subjected to torture.

-          With the testimonies of the witnesses and evidence, the trial court rendered a decision
finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Rape under Art 294 of the RPC. 
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant can invoke Art III, Sec 12 of the Constitution
 
RULING:
No. Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution which provides that "any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He contends
that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to remain
silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial
court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from him during such interrogation for violation of
accused-appellant's rights under this provision.
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that,
as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him – whether
inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show
that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In
fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to physical torture, did he
ever admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled
statement was obtained from the accused-appellant which should have been excluded as
evidence against him.

People vs. Escordial G.R. Nos. 138934-35 (January 16, 2002)

FACTS:

The complainant, Michelle Darunday, was living with Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver.
On the night of the incident, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his
head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long
and asked where the money was. Erma Blanca and Michelle Darunday gave the money
because they were threatened by the man to be killed. The assailant then blindfolded Michelle
and began to rape her. After satisfying his lust, the assailant conversed for a while with
complainants. The accused, threatening to call his companions, then, again, raped the
complainant in the other orifice of the complainant’s nether regions. Accused then warned the
women not to report or else they would be killed. After 30 mins. The complainants told their
neighbor of what happened. Then they told the owner of the boarding house what happened
who then told the police. Physical description of the assailant was given by the complainant at
the police station. Police found that the descriptions given by the complainant fit that of a worker
in the Coffee Break Corner, where the accused was employed. Heading there, the police asked
of the accused whereabouts which was, as they were told, watching a basketball game. The
police arrested the accused (w/o warrant) and proceeded to the police station where he saw the
complainant and inadvertently blushed. Complainant then identified him based on the marks on
the neck and matched other physical descriptions. Court of first instance ruled that accused is
found guilty of robbery and rape with no mitigating circumstances and is hereby sentenced with
maximum penalty of death.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid?

HELD:

NO. The accused-appellant was watching a basketball game when he was seized therefore he
was not 1.) In flagrante delicto 2.) He was not an escaped convict 3) the arrest was not after
direct consummation of the crime. The question here is whether these cases fall under
paragraph (b) because the police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would lead them to believe that accused-appellant had just committed a crime. The phrase
“personal knowledge” in paragraph Section 5(b) of Rule 113 has been defined that personal
knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon “probable cause” which
means “an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officer making the arrest. Here, in question of the “Personal Knowledge”,
the police were not at the scene of the crime when it happened, therefore “Personal Knowledge”
does not apply. Furthermore, there was ample time for police to procure a warrant and no
reason for them not to obtain one. This deficiency is, however, cured once accused-appellant
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and not questioning the invalidity of the arrest.
The accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had being
pointed by a Ramie as the possible suspect of the crime, was already under custodial
investigation when these outof-court identifications were conducted by the police. Thereby all
questions answered by accused-appellant is hereby deemed as hearsay. Furthermore, his right
to counsel was violated. Hence, evidence is inadmissible in court. Hence, it is found that the
prosecution has failed to meet the degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt required in a
criminal case. In lieu of the above mentioned, the Supreme Court hereby reverses the sentence
and acquits the accused-appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO LAYUSO 

FACTS: On or about the 14th day of October 1980, in the municipality of Pateros, Metro Manila, robbed
the house of Cesar C. Avila, and on the said occasion, assault and stab one Lucresia R. Dagsaan with
bladed weapons (knives), which directly caused her death.
Upon arraignment on April 22, 1981, the accused assisted by a counsel-de-oficio, pleaded "NOT GUILTY."
The accused-appellant contends that the prosecution has failed to prove that the articles allegedly
stolen were in fact in the house of Cesar Avila and it was the appellant who took them. He states that
the finding was based on his extra-judicial statement which he claims was extracted through the use of
force and intimidation.
The appellant admits that the confession was taken in the presence of counsel, a certain Atty. Casiano
Atuel, Jr. However, he states that the counsel was not present during the custodial interrogation which
preceded the taking down of his statement. He also questions the sufficiency of the lawyer's
representation. He states in his appeal that the lawyer should have participated by also asking him
questions.
 
HELD: We rule that the constitutional requirement on assistance of counsel was fulfilled. There is no
claim or showing that the accused asked for a lawyer from the moment he was apprehended or that he
was not informed of his right to counsel from the time that the warning or information should have
been given to him or that the alleged earlier questioning was already part of his confession. The appeal
is hazy on these points.
What is established was the presence of counsel during the taking of the confession. The attempt to
now discredit him has no merit. If the lawyer decided against advising the accused not to admit the
crime, he was only complying with his oath as a lawyer to abide by the truth and with the expressed
desire of the accused to unburden his conscience of the load it was carrying.
This Court denounces in the strongest terms possible the widespread misconception that the presence
of a lawyer under the "right to counsel" provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused
from saying anything which might incriminate him. The right to counsel is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extra-judicial
statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.

PEOPLE VS ESPANOLA

FACTS:

Appellants were identified in a police lineup as suspects in an investigation. Appellant Paquingan

manifested his intention to confess after the information for rape with homicide was filed. Not having a
counsel of his own choice, he was provided with the services of Atty. Leo Cahanap, a city legal officer,
and Atty. Susan Echavez. Appellant Paquingan confessed but refused to sign the stenographic notes. His
sworn statement was transcribed but only the two lawyers signed.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant was entitled to the right to counsel after an information for rape with
homicide had already been filed.

HELD:

NO. The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be considered "critical stages" in
the criminal process. Custodial interrogation before or after charges have been filed and non-custodial
interrogations after the accused has been formally charged are considered to be critical pretrial stages.
The investigation after Paquingan has been formally charged with the crime of rape with homicide, is a
critical pretrial stage during which the right to counsel applies. The right to counsel means right to
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

G.R. No. 119308 April 18, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CHRISTOPHER ESPANOLA y PAQUINGAN alias "Langga" or "Cocoy", JIMMY PAQUINGAN y
BATILO alias "Jimmy" and JEOFFREY ABELLO y SALADO alias "Beroy," accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision   dated November 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao
1

Del Norte, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 5, City of Iligan, finding the accused-appellants Christopher
Espanola y Paquingan, Jimmy Paquingan y Batilo and Jeoffrey Abello y Salado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals for the murder of Jessette Tarroza in Criminal Case No. 3773. The
three accused were meted a prison term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided
by law. They were ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Jessette Tarroza
the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as compensatory damages, P50,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Amended Information charging the accused-appellants with the crime of Murder and indicting
another accused in the person of Joel Gonzales reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned City Prosecutor of Iligan accuses CHRISTOPHER ESPANOLA y

Paquingan alias "Langga" JIMMY PAQUINGAN y Batilo, JEOFFREY ABELLO y
Salado alias "Beroy" and JOEL GONZALES alias "Awing" alias "Wingwing" of the
crime of MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about November 16, 1991, in the City of Iligan,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, who were all under the influence of drugs (Marijuana),
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each
other with intent to kill and by means of treachery and with abuse of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit one Jessette Tarroza, thereby
inflicting upon the said Jessette Tarroza the following physical
injuries, to wit:

— Incised wound 2.5 cms in length, lateral border of (R) ala nasi

— Triangular stab wound, neck (R) side, 4 cms x 3 cms x 5.5 cms

— Incised wound, anterior neck, 6 cms x 4 cms x 3.5 cms which

traversed thru the trachea, external jugular vein and 3/4 of the
esophagus

— Stab wound, anterior neck, (R) supraclavicular area, 2.5 cms x 1

cm x 4 cms

— Stab wound, (L) anterior chest, midclavicular line 1.5 cms 1 cm x

2.5 cms

— Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 4 cms x 2 cms with fracture of the
4th and 5th rib with lung tissue out

— Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, level of axilla, 2 cms x 1 cm x 5

cms

— Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 3rd ICS, midclavicular line 2.5 x
1.4 cms

— C-shaped stab wound, (R) anterior chest, midclavicular line, 3.5

cms x 2 cms x 3 cms, 2nd ICS

— Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 2nd ICS, (R) parasteal line, 2.5
cms x 1.5 cms x 4 cms

— Confluent abrasion (R) elbow joint, anteromedial aspect 3 cms in

diameter

— Multiple punctured wounds (5), back, (R) side

— Confluent abrasion 10 cms by 3 cms, back, lumbar area

and as a result thereof the said Jessette Tarroza died; that

immediately after inflicting fatal injuries on the said Jessette Tarroza
the, herein accused took turns in having sexual intercourse with the
victim.
 Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the
aggravating circumstances of: (1) treachery and abuse of superior strength; (2)
cruelty in all (sic) ignominy; (3) that the accused were under the influence of drugs at
the time of the commission of the offense and (4) outraging or scoffing of (sic) the
corpse of the victim.

City of Iligan, November 29, 1991.

The facts of the case show that Jessette Tarroza went to work at the Mercy Community Clinic,
Camague, Iligan City, as a medical technologist at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon of November 16,
1991. Her tour of duty was from 3 o'clock in the afternoon to eleven o'clock in the evening.   After
2

working for eight hours, she left the clinic at about 11:15 p.m., with Claro Liquigan, a co-employee.
When they reached the junction road leading to her house at about 11:30 p.m., Claro offered to
escort Jessette to her house but she refused saying that she knew the people in the area. She then
walked towards her house while Claro rode his bicycle and went home. When they parted ways,
Claro noticed four (4) persons in the pathway leading to Jessette's house. They were about 60 to 70
meters away from him and he did not recognize whether they were male or female.  3

Jessette Tarroza failed to come home that fateful evening. She was found dead. Her father, Romeo
Tarroza, rushed to the place where her body was discovered.   He was shocked to see Jessette
4

lying in a grassy area more or less fifty (50) meters from their home and only fifteen (15) meters from
the pathway. Her body bore stab wounds. Her red blouse was wide open and her pants removed.
Her panty was likewise removed while her bra   was cut. The red blouse   was torn with three (3)
5 6

holes at the back, ten (10) holes on the front and six (6) holes on the left sleeve. Her blouse, bra and
shoes were stained with blood. Her panty, found about two (2) feet away from her cadaver, had
blood on the front portion. A light green T-shirt with the print "Midwifery" at the back and "ICC" on the
front   was also found near the shoes of the victim. The T-shirt was not hers. 
7 8

The law enforcement officers of Iligan City immediately conducted an investigation. They found
blood stains along the pathway which was approximately fifteen (15) meters away from the place
where the victim was found. There was a sign of struggle as the plants and bushes at the scene of
the crime were destroyed and flattened. They extended their investigation to the neighboring sitios
and purok of Kilumco but found no lead as to the perpetrators of the crime.  9

In the morning of November 19, 1991, SPO 4 Ruperto Neri received an anonymous telephone call
suggesting that a certain "Wing-wing"   be investigated as he has knowledge of the crime. Antonio
10

Lubang, Chief of the Homicide Section, Intelligence and Investigation Division of the Iligan City
Police Station, and his men looked for "Wing-wing". Lubang knew "Wing-wing" as the latter
frequently roamed around the public plaza. They learned that the real name of "Wing-wing" is Joel
Gonzales. They then saw Gonzales at his house and invited him to the police station. At the police
station, Gonzales confessed that he was present when the crime was committed and that he knew
its perpetrators. He identified them as "Beroy", "Langga" and "Jimmy". He informed that the three
stabbed and raped Jessette Tarroza. Gonzales, however, did not give the surnames of the three
suspects. The policemen asked Romeo Tarroza whether he knew the suspects. Romeo Tarroza
declared that they were his neighbors. He identified "Jimmy" as Jimmy Paquingan, "Langga" as
Christopher Espanola and "Beroy" as Jeoffrey Abello.   On the same day, Gonzales was detained at
11

the police station.

In the early morning of November 21, 1991, Chief Lubang invited Jimmy Paquingan, Christopher
Espanola and Jeoffrey Abello to the police station where they were investigated. All denied the story
of Gonzales. A police line-up of twelve (12) persons which included the three accused-appellants
was then made in the police station. Gonzales was called and he pointed to Paquingan, Espanola
and Abello as his companions in the killing and rape of Jessette Tarroza. After the line-up, the three
suspects were brought to the City Health Office for check-up because the policemen saw that they
had bruises and scratches on their faces, foreheads and breasts.   They were examined by Dr. Livey
12

J. Villarin. With respect to Paquingan, the medical certificate (Exhibit "I") showed that he had scratch
abrasions on the right mandibular area (jaw), on the left side of the neck and on the right mid-axillary
(chest). Dr. Villarin testified that the abrasions could have been caused by any sharp object or
possibly fingernails. The medical certificate issued to Espanola (Exhibit "J") showed that he had
contusions on the right shoulder and hematoma. Dr. Villarin testified that the injuries could have
been effected by a jab or sharp blow. The medical certificate issued to Abello (Exhibit "K") showed
that he sustained abrasion and contusion at the right deltoid area which according to Dr. Villarin,
could have been caused by a sharp or hard object or a fist blow that hit that particular area of the
body.  13
On the same day, an information for rape with homicide   was filed against Paquingan, Espanola
14

and Abello. They were committed to the city jail after their warrant of arrest was issued by Executive
Judge Federico V. Noel.  15

In the afternoon of November 25, 1991, Chief Lubang brought Jimmy Paquingan to the City
Prosecutor's Office for the taking of his confession after he manifested to the jail warden his intention
to confess. City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao asked Paquingan if he would avail the services of
counsel and he answered in the affirmative. When asked if he had a counsel of his own choice, he
answered in the negative. He was provided with the services of Atty. Leo Cahanap, the legal counsel
of the City Mayor's Office, and Atty. Susan Echavez, a representative of the IBP Legal Aid, Iligan
City Chapter. They were given time to confer with him.   Paquingan then confessed. However, when
16

asked to sign the stenographic notes, Paquingan refused saying he would wait for his mother
first.   The sworn statement of Paquingan (Exhibit "L") was transcribed on November 29, 1991, but
17

signed only by the two lawyers. According to the statement, Abello slashed the neck of Jessette.
Jessette fell down and was brought to a bushy area where she was sexually abused. The first to
have sexual intercourse with the victim was Abello. Paquingan then followed him. Espanola had his
turn next; and Gonzales was the last.  18

Upon review of the records of the case, Fiscal Lagcao discovered that the victim was sexually
abused after she was murdered. Thus, he filed an Amended Information on November 29, 1991,
charging the three accused with the crime of murder and indicting Joel Gonzales as the fourth
accused.   A warrant for the arrest of Gonzales was issued on the same date by Executive Judge
19

Federico V. Noel.  20

All the accused pleaded "not guilty" when arraigned. After presenting several witnesses, the
prosecution filed on June 17, 1992, a motion to discharge accused Joel Gonzales as a state
witness   in accordance with Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, alleging:
21

1. That accused Joel Gonzales has intimated to the undersigned City Prosecutor that
he is willing to testify for the prosecution as state witness;

2. That there is absolute necessity for the testimony of accused Joel Gonzales
considering that the evidence for the prosecution in this case is mainly circumstantial;

3. That the testimony of accused Joel Gonzales can be substantially corroborated in

its material points;

4. That the said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

5. That he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.

In traversing the motion, the defense asserted:

1. That there is no showing in the face of said motion that Joel Gonzales agrees to
be utilized as state witness;

2. That Joel Gonzales appears to be the most guilty as he alone among the accused
has executed a confession regarding the killing of Jessette Tarroza.

In an Order   dated June 26, 1992, the trial court discharged Gonzales as a state witness.
22

In the course of the trial, Dr. Chito Rey Gomez, Medico-Legal Officer of the Iligan City Health Office,
testified that he conducted a post mortem examination on the cadaver of Jessette Tarroza. He
issued a Death Certificate (Exhibit "E") which indicated that the cause of death was cardiorespiratory
arrest due to pneumohemathorax of the right chest. He also prepared a Necropsy Report (Exhibit
"F") after the examination. He found five (5) stab wounds at the back of the victim and ten (10) stab
wounds at the front, consisting of an incised wound at the lateral border of the ala nasi, right;
triangular stab wounds on the right side of the neck and lower neck; an incised wound which
traversed through the trachea external jugular vein and three-fourths (3/4) of the esophagus; a C-
shaped stab wound that penetrated the thorax cavity and a stab wound above the breast near the
axilla. He testified further that the wounds inflicted must have reached some vital organs of the body,
possibly the lungs and blood vessels, and that the wounds were probably caused by three (3)
different instruments. He likewise conducted a vaginal examination on the victim and noted that
there was a fresh complete hymenal laceration at 3 o'clock and fresh complete lacerations at 7
o'clock and 8 o'clock, which could have been caused by a finger or a sex organ inserted into the
vagina. When asked if the victim was sexually molested, he answered in the affirmative.  23

Another witness for the prosecution was Dr. Tomas P. Refe, Medico-Legal Officer III of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office. He testified that he conducted an autopsy
examination on the cadaver of Jessette Tarroza and prepared Autopsy Report No. 91-27 (Exhibit
"H"). He found abrasions and thirteen (13) stab wounds on the front part of the chest, right side, and
at the back of the victim's chest. He also found an incised wound at the region of the nose involving
the upper portion of the right side of the mouth, an incised wound on the front part of the neck cutting
the trachea and partially the esophagus and an incised wound at the anterior aspect right side of the
neck.   He declared that death was caused by the incised wounds and multiple stab wounds. The
24

fatal wounds were wound nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 (Exhibits "H", "H-1"). He likewise examined the
vagina of the victim and found the hymen moderately thick and narrow with lacerations complete at 3
o'clock and 6 o'clock, deep at 7 o'clock, 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock and 11 o'clock, and the edges of the
lacerations were sharp and coaptable. He opined that there could have been a sexual intercourse
committed after the death of the victim considering that the lacerations did not show any evidence of
vital reaction which is commonly found in lacerations during lifetime. 
25

The prosecution also presented Joel Gonzales who turned state witness. On the basis of the
demeanor of Gonzales and the manner he answered
the questions, the trial court gathered the impression that he was mentally retarded.   Gonzales did
26

not know how to read and write.   In any event, he was able to testify that on the night of November
27

16, 1991, he went to Baybay, Camague, Iligan City, to witness a dance. His companions were
"Beroy", "Jimmy" and "Cocoy". He identified Jeoffrey Abello as "Beroy", Christopher Espanola as
"Cocoy" or "Langga" and Jimmy Paquingan as "Jimmy".

At the dance, they drank one (1) bottle of Tanduay and smoked one (1) stick of marijuana each.
After the dance, he and his three (3) companions proceeded to Bacayo. While on their way, they met
a woman whom Beroy, Cocoy and Jimmy followed. They brought the woman to a nipa hut and slept
("gidulgan") right beside the woman.

When asked who killed the victim on the night of November 16, 1991, at Kilumco, Camague, Iligan
City, he answered "sila", referring to herein appellants. He further testified that Beroy slashed the
neck of Jessette Tarroza, Langga slashed her breast, and Paquingan stabbed her at the back. The
victim resisted by scratching her attackers.   After she died, they carried her to a bushy area and all
28

of them sexually molested her. Beroy was first; Gonzales was second; Cocoy was third and Jeoffrey
was the last. Gonzales likewise identified the T-shirt worn by Jeoffrey Abello that night as "That one
Mercy." He declared that the brownish discoloration on the T-shirt was caused by the blood of
Jessette Tarroza. 29

On cross-examination, Gonzales said that Jessette Tarroza was not the one brought to the nipa hut,
but a woman from Tambacan who went home later on. He then reiterated that after their encounter
with the unnamed woman, they went to the school, met and followed Jessette Tarroza to a dark
place. They encountered her on the road. He affirmed that it was Beroy who slashed the neck of the
victim while Cocoy, also known as Langga, was the one who slashed her breasts.  30

For their defense, all the appellants took the witness stand. Jimmy Paquingan narrated that at about
6 o'clock to 9 o'clock in the evening of November 16, 1991, he watched "beta" (movie) in the house
of Sima Ybanez at Kilumco, Camague. Thereafter, he went to the house of his grandmother located
at the same barangay and slept there. He did not go out again and woke up at 6 o'clock in the
morning of November 17, 1991. His testimony was corroborated by Emma Mingo who testified that
at about 6 o'clock in the evening of November 16, 1991, she viewed "beta" in her residence at
Kilumco, Camague, with her daughter and accused Christopher Espanola. At about 9:30 in the
evening, the film ended and Christopher left. At about the same time, Jimmy Paquingan, her
nephew, came and proceeded to his room downstairs. As she waited for her husband to come
home, she continuously stayed at the porch until 1:30 in the early morning of November 17, 1991. In
her long wait, she did not see Jimmy leave his room.  31

Christopher Espanola alleged that he was at home in the evening of November 16, 1991. He went
out to view a "beta" in the house of Sima Ybanez. From there, he proceeded to a disco. On his way,
he passed by the house of Carmencita Gatase who was then with Jeoffrey Abello. They went to the
disco together. At the disco, he joined the group of Lito Moraira and Titing Mingo and drank with
them. There was no occasion that he left the disco place until after 1 o'clock in the early morning of
November 17, 1991, when they went home. He woke up at 7 o'clock the following morning and
proceeded to the house of his grandmother to fetch water.  32

Jeoffrey Abello narrated that in the early evening of November 16, 1991, he was at their house in
Kilumco, Camague. He left their house to watch a "beta" in the house of Sima Ybanez. However, he
was invited by Carmencita Gatase to go to a disco in Baybay, Camague. He acceded and went to
Gatase's house. Christopher Espanola joined them on their way to the disco. They arrived at the
disco at about 10 o'clock in the evening. He saw there a group of persons including Joel Gonzales
and Titing Mingo. While he saw Christopher at about 11 o'clock that evening, he did not see Jimmy
Paquingan. At about 1 o'clock in the early morning of November 17, 1991, he and Carmencita left
ahead of Christopher. They then proceeded to the house of Carmencita where they
slept. 
33

In her testimony, Carmencita Gatase identified the three (3) accused as her neighbors and long-time
acquaintances. At about 8 o'clock in the evening of November 16, 1991, Jeoffrey Abello went to her
house. At 9:30 in the evening, she asked Jeoffrey and Christopher Espanola, who was then
downstairs, to go with her to the disco. They reached the place at about 10 o'clock. Christopher then
asked permission to join the group of his Uncle Mingo. She and Jeoffrey remained conversing and
standing at the side of the disco. They left the dancing area at 1:30 in the early morning of
November 17, 1991, not noticing the whereabouts of Christopher. On their way home, the two of
them passed by the basketball court which was only eighty (80) meters from their house. They did
not notice anything unusual. Jeoffrey then slept in her house.  34

After considering the opposing versions of the parties, the trial court gave credence to the evidence
presented by the prosecution, particularly the testimony of state witness Joel Gonzales. It found that
Jessette Tarroza was killed by the accused Christopher Espanola, Jimmy Paquingan and Jeoffrey
Abello. It rejected the defense of the accused as unnatural, incredible and riddled with
inconsistencies. The three accused were convicted of the crime of Murder as the killing was
attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a total amount of One Hundred Seventy Five Thousand pesos
(P175,000.00) as damages to the heirs of the victim.

Hence, this appeal where accused-appellants contend:

1. THAT THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF JOEL GONZALES WHO
WAS AN ADDITIONAL ACCUSED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION OF (sic)
MURDER AND WHOSE DISCHARGE WAS SOUGHT BY THE PROSECUTION
AND GRANTED BY SAID COURT, INSPITE AND DESPITE OPPOSITION BY THE
DEFENSE.

2. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE

TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT PAQUINGAN THAT THE TAKING OF
HIS AFFIDAVIT OF CONFESSION BY CITY PROSECUTOR LAGCAO WAS NOT
VOLUNTARY, AND IN FACT, HE REFUSED TO SIGN THE SAME, CONTRARY TO
THE STATEMENT OF SAID PROSECUTOR THAT IT WAS VOLUNTARILY GIVEN
BY THE SAID ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT PAQUINGAN TO
COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE, PREMISED FROM (sic) THE TAKING OF THE
AFFIDAVIT OF CONFESSION BY PROSECUTOR LAGCAO, AGAINST HIS PENAL
INTEREST. IN FACT HE TESTIFIED THAT SAID LAWYERS, ATTYS. LEO
CAHANAP, THE CITY LEGAL OFFICER OF ILIGAN, AND SUSAN ECHAVEZ,
WERE NOT THE COUNSELS OF HIS OWN CHOICE AND WERE MERELY
SUPPLIED BY THE PROSECUTOR.

4. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UTILIZING THE GROUND OF ALIBI

WHEN IT SAID THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ADVANCED IT AS A
MATTER OF DEFENSE. THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DID NOT CLING TO IT AS
A MATTER OF DEFENSE. THEY MERELY STATED WHAT WAS TRUE AND
FACTUAL IN SO FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED, AND IT WAS AN ERROR
ON THE PART OF THE LOWER COURT TO RULE ON THE ISSUE AS ALIBI,
 WHICH PRECISELY, IN MANY DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT, (sic) THAT ALIBI NEED NOT BE INQUIRED INTO WHERE THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IS WEAK, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR.

5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY

OF JOEL GONZALES NOTWITHSTANDING THE IMPROPRIETIES OF HIS
DISCHARGE AS AN ACCUSED ON THE AMENDED INFORMATION OF (sic)
MURDER, MORE SO, ON THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF HIS
TESTIMONIES, AS BORNE OUT BY THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC
NOTES, AND MOST ESPECIALLY ON HIS MENTAL INCAPACITY, WHERE HIS
TESTIMONIES WERE RUMBLING. (sic)

6. THAT THE LOWER COURT, AT THE INSTANCE OF HON. MOSLEMEN

MACARAMBON ERRED IN METING A PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AS
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANTS, THE LATTER, (sic) BEING A DETAILED
JUDGE IN RTC, BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY, WAS THE ONE WHO PREPARED AND
RENDERED THE DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO
HEAR A SINGLE HEARING AND HAD NOT OBSERVED THE DEMEANOR AND
CHARACTER TRAITS OF WITNESSES AND ACCUSED IN SAID CASE, AND
INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE JUDGE WHO TOTALLY HEARD THE CASE
OF RTC, BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY, (sic) STILL CONNECTED WITH THE
JUDICIARY, BUT MERELY DETAILED IN ONE OF THE SALAS OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAVAO CITY, AND HENCE, NOT RETIRED OR FOR
(sic) OTHERWISE, AND APPROPRIATELY, THE RECORDS OF THE CASE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO HIM, FOR HIM TO PREPARE THE DECISION
AND TO (sic) SEND THE SAME TO THE CLERK OF COURT OF RTC, BRANCH V,
ILIGAN CITY, FOR PROMULGATION, AND THUS WAS (sic) THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION BY JUDGE MACARAMBON WAS NULL AND VOID.

We find the appeal unmeritorious.

We shall first discuss assigned errors numbers 1 and 5, in view of their inter-relationship.

The appellants contend that the trial court violated the rule in discharging Gonzales as a state
witness. They claim that Gonzales was the only one who executed an affidavit of confession, hence,
he was the most guilty of the accused and cannot be used as a state witness. To be discharged as
state witness, Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that:

1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused concerned;

2. his testimony must be absolutely necessary;

3. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed;

4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and

6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

We do not agree that Gonzales is the most guilty of the accused. From the evidence, it appears that
Gonzales is mentally retarded. He could not have been a leader of the group for he was intellectually
wanting. He did not inflict any of the fatal wounds that led to the death of the victim. The trial court's
assessment that he is not the most guilty is well-grounded.

It is also established that there was no eyewitness to the crime or other direct evidence. The
testimony of Gonzales was absolutely necessary for the proper prosecution of the case against
appellants. This was the decision of the prosecution itself when it moved for the discharge of
Gonzales as a state witness. Part of prosecutorial discretion is the determination of who should be
used as a state witness to bolster the successful prosecution of criminal offenses. Unless done in
violation of the Rules, this determination should be given great weight by our courts.
The records will also show that while Gonzales rambled in some parts of his testimony in view of his
low intellect, nonetheless, his testimony was substantially corroborated in its material points. His
declaration that the victim resisted and used her bare hands in scratching her attackers is confirmed
by the findings of Dr. Villarin in Exhibits "I", "J" and "K". His statement that Beroy slashed the neck of
the victim, Langga slashed her breast and Jimmy stabbed her at the back finds support in the result
of the autopsy of the victim's cadaver by Dr. Refe and Dr. Gomez showing incised wounds and
numerous stab wounds on the front and back of the victim and incised wounds on her trachea and
esophagus. His assertion that he and the appellants sexually abused the victim after her death is
corroborated by the lacerations found in the private part of the victim as determined by Dr. Gomez
and Dr. Refe.

Lastly, there is no showing that Gonzales has been convicted of an offense involving moral
turpitude. Gonzales also gave his consent to be utilized as state witness.   In sum, all the
35

requirements of Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied by the prosecution
and the trial court did not err in discharging Gonzales as state witness.

Appellants also assail the testimony of Gonzales on the ground of his alleged mental incapacity.
Section 20 of Rule 130 provides that "except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses."
Section 21, inter alia, disqualifies as witnesses, "those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others." A mental retardate is not therefore, per se, disqualified from being a witness.
As long as his senses can perceive facts and if he can convey his perceptions in court, he can be a
witness.   In the case at bar, we find that Gonzales had a tendency to be repetitious and at times
36

had to be asked leading questions, but he was not unintelligible to be beyond understanding. He
was clear and unyielding in identifying the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. On the whole,
his account of the crime was coherent enough to shed light on the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify
a witness.   As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the
37

only person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive.   Our rules follow the modern
38

trend of evidence.

Nor can the alleged inconsistencies between the sworn statement of Gonzales and his testimony in
court affect his credibility. Gonzales' testimony jibes on material points. His inconsistencies on minor
details of the crime are not earmarks of falsehoods. On the contrary, they show that his testimony is
honest and unrehearsed.   Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that affidavits should not be considered
39

as the final and full repository of truth. Affidavits are usually taken ex-parte. They are oftentimes
incomplete and inaccurate. Ordinarily in a question-and-answer form, they are usually and routinely
prepared in police precincts by police investigators. Not infrequently, the investigator propounds
questions merely to elicit a general picture of the subject matter under investigation.   Thus, the fact
40

that the sworn statement of Gonzales (Exhibit "M") did not mention a woman from Tambacan whom
they met and brought to a nipa hut and slept with on the night of November 16, 1991, is attributable
to the fact that he was not asked about women other than Jessette Tarroza. His line of questioning
was as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL LAGCAO:

Q: After 11:00 o'clock that night, where did you and your companions
go?

A: We went to a grassy place in Camague, Iligan City to wait for a

certain Jessette Tarroza.

Q: Whose idea was it that you will wait for Jessette Tarroza in that
secluded place at Camague, Iligan City?

A: Beroy, sir.

Q: And eventually, did you see this Jessette?

A: Yes, sir.
 xxx xxx xxx

The presence of another woman came out only in response to questions propounded to him
during his cross-examination, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. FLORES:

Q: Who was that woman killed?

A: Jessette Tarroza.

Q: The same woman brought to the nipa hut?

FISCAL LAGCAO:

I object, your Honor. . .

COURT:

Witness may answer, let him answer.

A: No.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. FLORES:

Q: You want to tell the Honorable Court, Mr. Witness that there was
another woman in the nipa hut?

A: Yes.

Q: Who was the woman in the nipa hut?

FISCAL LAGCAO:

Immaterial . . .

COURT:

Witness may answer.

A: She is from Tambacan.

Q: Do you know her name.

A: No.

COURT:

In other words, for the Court's clarification, there were two (2) women
during that night that you found in the nipa hut that you mentioned?

A: Yes.

COURT:
 The other woman was killed — Jessette Tarroza?

A: Yes.

COURT:

The other woman was not killed?

A: No.

Q: And this was not known to the authorities, the one that was not
killed?

A: No.

Q: What was only mentioned to the authorities was the one that was
killed?

A: Yes.

xxx xxx xxx  41

Indeed, there is no rule of evidence that would stop an affiant from elaborating his prior
sworn statement at the trial itself.   Testimonies given during trials are more exact and
42

elaborate for their accuracy is tested by the process of cross-examination where the truth is
distilled from half truths and the total lies.

The appellants also contend that Gonzales mixed-up his identification of appellants. In his sworn
statement, he mentioned "Beroy, Jimmy and Langga" as his companions on the night of November
16, 1991, and as the ones who killed Jessette Tarroza, while in his direct testimony, he named and
pointed at Beroy, Cocoy and Jimmy. A reading of his testimony, however, will reveal the fact that he
consistently referred to appellant Jeoffrey Abello as "Beroy", Jimmy Paquingan as "Jimmy" and
Christopher Espanola as "Cocoy" or "Langga", viz:

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL LAGCAO:

Q: Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Beroy?

A: Yes.

Q: If this Beroy is in court, will you please identify him by pointing at

him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Please point to him if he is around.

A: (Witness pointing to a person who when asked identified himself

as Jeoffrey Abello.)

Q: Do you know a certain Langga?

A: Yes.

Q: If he is around, will you please identify him by pointing at him?

A: Yes.

Q: Please point at him.

 A: (Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as Christopher
Espanola.)

Q: Do you know a certain Jimmy?

A: Yes.

Q: If he is around, will you please point to him?

A: (Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as Jimmy

Paquingan).

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL LAGCAO:

Q: Now, this Cocoy which you are referring to, is he in the courtroom
at present?

A: Yes, he is around.

Q: Please identify him if he is around.

A: (Witness pointing to a person who when asked to identify himself

answered that he is Christopher Espanola.)

xxx xxx xxx  43

The foregoing testimony of Gonzales clearly shows that appellant Christopher Espanola is
"Cocoy" or "Langga".

We are not also prepared to disbelieve Gonzales simply because of his inconsistent statement as to
the correct sequence the victim was sexually abused by the appellants. It matters little that Gonzales
was tentative on who molested the victim first, second, third and last. What matters is that all the
appellants molested the dead Tarroza.

The appellants also capitalize on the discrepancy in the identification of the print on the T-shirt worn
by appellant Jeoffrey Abello. When asked to recall the clothes worn by Abello that fateful night,
Gonzales stated "That one Mercy." In contrast, prosecution witness Romeo Tarroza testified that the
light green T-shirt found near the shoes of the victim was printed with "Midwifery" and "ICC". This
was corroborated by the testimony of Georgie Tarroza that he recalled having seen Abello wearing
that night a green T-shirt printed with "Midwifery" at the back and "ICC" on the front. We uphold the
explanation of the trial court that the discrepancy could be attributed to the fact that Gonzales does
not know how to read and write.

We now discuss assigned errors numbers 2 and 3. Appellants contend that the trial court erred when
it ruled that the sworn statement of Jimmy Paquingan was voluntarily given by him though he
refused to sign the same. Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to
be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the
confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.   In People v. Bandula,   we
44 45

ruled that an extra-judicial confession must be rejected where there is doubt as to its voluntariness.
The fact that appellant Paquingan did not sign his sworn statement casts serious doubt as to the
voluntariness of its execution. It is inadmissible evidence.

Additionally, the claim of appellant Paquingan that he was not assisted by a counsel of his own
choice when his affidavit of confession was taken is worth noting. Paquingan's sworn statement was
taken on November 25, 1991, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. At that time, an information for rape with
homicide had already been filed against him and his co-appellants. Hence, when Paquingan gave
his confession, Paquingan was no longer under custodial investigation   since he was already
46

charged in court. Nonetheless, the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be
considered "critical stages" in the criminal process.   Custodial interrogation before or after charges
47
have been filed and non-custodial interrogations after the accused has been formally charged are
considered to be critical pretrial stages.   The investigation by Fiscal Lagcao of Paquingan after the
48

latter has been formally charged with the crime of rape with homicide, is a critical pretrial stage
during which the right to counsel applies. The right to counsel means right to competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice.   It is doubtful whether the councels given to
49

Paquingan were of his own choice. In her rebuttal testimony, Rosita L. Abapo, declared to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. FLORES:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: In other words, you want to tell this Honorable Court as you stated
earlier that it was Fiscal Lagcao who called up for these lawyers? Do
you want to tell the Honorable Court that these lawyers were not the
counsel of choice of Jimmy Paquingan at that time? They were not
the counsel of choice of Mr. Paquingan at that time?

COURT:

Mr. Counsel, this witness does not know what is a counsel of choice.
Make it clearer. It was not Mr. Paquingan who asked that Atty.
Dalisay, Atty. Echavez and Atty. Cahanap be called to represent him?

WITNESS:

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx  50

Moreover, we hold that Atty. Cahanap cannot qualify as an independent counsel, he being a Legal
Officer of Iligan City. An independent counsel cannot be burdened by any task antithetical to the
interest of an accused. As a legal officer of the city, Atty. Cahanap provides legal assistance and
support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people,
including the maintenance of peace and order. His office is akin to a prosecutor who undoubtedly
cannot represent the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of interest.   Assigned
51

errors numbered 2 and 3 are therefore ruled in favor of the appellants.

As to the fourth assignment of error, we subscribe to the finding of the trial court that the evidence of
the accused-appellants proffers the defense of alibi. Time and again, we have ruled that both denial
and alibi are weak defenses which cannot prevail where there is positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses.   For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
52

accused is somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must likewise demonstrate that
he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission.   In the case at bar, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be
53

at the crime scene considering the proximity of the place where they claimed they were and the spot
where Jessette Tarroza was brutally murdered.

We also reject appellants' claim that the decision of the trial court is void on the ground that the
judge who penned the decision, Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, was not the one who heard and
tried the case. We have ruled in People v. Rayray, 241 SCRA 1 [1995], that the fact that the judge
who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision
constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per se render
his decision void. While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better
position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily
follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision.   For
54

a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the trial as basis of his decision.   Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural
55

due process of law.

We now review the award of damages to the heirs of Jessette Tarroza. When death occurs as a
result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
 the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages.   Accordingly, we award
56

P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jessette Tarroza for her death. As for actual damages, we find the award
of P50,000.00 proper considering that Romeo Tarroza spent more or less the same amount for the
interment and burial of his deceased daughter.  57

We have also awarded indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased — an amount to
be fixed by the court considering the victim's actual income at the time of death and his probable life
expectancy.   The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as compensatory damages. We find the same
58

inadequate considering that Jessette, who was twenty-four (24) years old at the time of her death,
was employed as a medical technologist earning P99.00 per day.   To compute the award for
59

Jessette's loss of earning capacity, her annual income should be fixed at P39,146.25.   Allowing for
60

reasonable and necessary expenses in the amount of P15,600.00 per annum, her net income per
annum would amount to P23,546.25. Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by this court: (2/3
x [80 - age of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which would have
been received by the heirs for support,   we fix the award for loss of earning capacity of deceased
61

Jessette Tarroza at P659,294.50.

We also find the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages proper considering the mental anguish
suffered by the parents of the victim on account of her brutal murder. We likewise uphold the award
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages considering that the killing of Jessette Tarroza was attended
by treachery. She was also raped while already lifeless. All these are shocking to conscience. The
imposition of exemplary damages against the appellants will hopefully deter others from perpetrating
the same evil deed.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the assailed Decision dated November 21,
1994, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 5) of Lanao del Norte, Iligan City, in Criminal Case No.
3773. Accordingly, the monetary awards granted in favor of the heirs of Jessette Tarroza are
modified as follows:

a) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death;

b) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as actual damages;

c) Six Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Four pesos and Fifty centavos
(P659,294.50) for loss of earning capacity of said deceased;

d) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and

e) Twenty Five Thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-59378 February 11, 1986

People vs. Nicandro 141 SCRA 289
 Leave a comment
G.R. No. L-59378 February 11, 1986      People vs. Nicandro 141 SCRA 289
Facts:

After the complaints and reports were verified to be true, an entrapment with the confidential informant acting
as the buyer of marijuana was organized. The police team formed to carry out the entrapment plan was alerted
of the presence of the drug pusher, the appellant Nelia Nicandro y Velarma, alias ‘Nel’. The informant asked to
buy some marijuana cigarette and gave appellant the two (2) marked P 5.00 bills Thereupon, the appellant
delivered to informant four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette. Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed
the appellant, was frisked and got from the right front pocket of her pants the two (2), marked P5.00 bills, and
from the left pocket of her pants the marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper. Upon being
investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, appellant orally admitted having
sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from
her pocket, but refused to reduce her confession to writing.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of the accused constitutional rights to be informed of his rights and to
warnings.

Held:

Yes.

When the Constitution requires a person under investigation “to be informed” of his right to remain silent and
to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be
sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20,
Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is
entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or
may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312: People
VS. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words, the right of a person under interrogation “to be informed” implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it
cannot truly be said that the person has been “informed” of his rights. Now, since the right “to be informed”
implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education,
intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a
simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.

RA 7438

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public
Officers. –

(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.

People vs. Bagnate, GRs 133685-68, 20 May 2004 

FACTS:
 Accused-appellant, Amado Bagnate, appealed  the Joint  Judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court Branch 15 of Tabaco, Albay,  finding  appellant  Bagnate guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. T-2874 for killing his
grandmother, Aurea Broña and of Rape with Homicide in Criminal Case No. T-2875 for
killing and raping his niece, Rosalie Rayala.
Appellant was turned over to SPO2 Junwel Ambion for custodial investigation. SPO2
Ambion informed him in the Bicol dialect of his constitutional rights. The accused
acknowledged that he clearly understood it. When appellant told SPO2 Ambion that he
is willing to confess,  SPO2 Ambion again informed appellant of his rights, and asked
him further if he wants to be assisted by counsel but appellant said that his counsel was
in Manila. He availed his Constitutional right of being assisted by a competent counsel. 
Since he does not  have his own counsel, he was provided with one in the person of
Atty. Paterno Brotamonte whom the appellant accepted.

Before proceeding with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte asked the policemen to leave
the investigation room and conferred with appellant. He introduced himself to appellant
and informed him of his rights. He also asked and examined appellant to see if he was
physically harmed by the policemen and found none.

Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give a statement. The investigation
was then conducted in the Bicol dialect, with SPO2 Ambion asking the questions. The
accused confessed on killing his grandmother and so as raping and killing his niece.
After typing the first page of the confession, Atty. Brotamonte translated and explained
the contents thereof to appellant, then Atty. Brotamonte and appellant signed thereon.

The next day, appellant was brought before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested the presence of Atty. Brotamonte
and subsequently examined the voluntariness and veracity of the confession as well as
the authenticity of the signatures of appellant and Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained
to appellant the consequences of his confession to the crimes charged and asked him if
he was coerced into admitting them. Judge Base inspected appellant’s body and asked
him if he was forced or coerced. Judge Base then asked appellant if he was still willing
to sign it again and appellant answered in the affirmative saying that his conscience
bothered him. Judge Base asked him to sign the confession again in the presence of
Atty. Brotamonte, after which appellant affixed his signature.

Accused was convicted on the strength of his extra- judicial confession during custodial
investigation.

Appellant raised that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial
confession of the accused-appellant. Appellant assailed its admissibility alleging that it
was executed in violation of his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent
and independent counsel of his own choice and that he was not fully apprised of the
consequences of his confession.
 
ISSUE: 
Whether the constitutional right of the appellant  to have a competent and independent
counsel was violated thereby rendering his extra judicial confession inadmissible.
 
RULING:
No, the failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of the
crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellant’s extrajudicial
confession.
What the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an
accused without having been informed of his right to remain silent, or, without having
been given competent and independent counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he
cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his
rights was not in writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he was tortured,
forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence or any other means that vitiated his free will.
There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the
possible penalty for the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that the
counsel is incompetent or not independent just because he failed to apprise the
accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit is death. After
all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his
guilt in the commission of a crime.
 
The modifier "competent and independent" stresses the need to assure the accused
under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed
judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer. To be
"competent" and "independent" it is only required for a lawyer to be: (1) Willing to fully
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights.
 
The decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 15 of Tabaco, Albay, in Criminal Case
No. T-2874 finding appellant Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to damages.

PEOPLE VS. BAGNATE

FACTS: Amado Bagnate was found guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. T-2874 for killing his
grandmother, Aurea Brona and rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. T-2875 for killing and raping his
niece, Rosalie Rayala. Accused was convicted on the strength of his extra- judicial confession. The RTC,
aside from the punishment of death penalty awarded P50,000.00 each to the victim.

ISSUE: W/N the grant of damages is correct.

RULING: The award of civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages, which
is based on a different jural foundation and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.
Considering that the prosecution failed to show any proof that the heirs of Aurea Broña are entitled to
moral damages, the same may not be awarded. In accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Considering the generic aggravating
circumstances of disregard of age of the victim and dwelling, the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages is in order.
The Court, however, has to modify the award of civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of Rosalie Rayala.
Recent rulings increased the amount of civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide to P100,000.00.
The heirs of Rosalie must be awarded the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages without need of proof,
in view of the rape suffered by victim Rosalie. Considering that the crime of rape was committed inside
the dwelling of the victim, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be awarded
to the heirs of Rosalie.
The Court finds that the heirs of both Aurea and Rosalie should be awarded the amount of P54,259.00 as
actual damages in view of the admission made by the defense that the family of Aurea and Rosalie
incurred expenses in said amount.

People v. Vallejo involved a rape incident wherein the conviction of the accused Gerrico Vallejo was
obtained by the prosecution using DNA evidence gathered from the victim's body. On the day of the
crime, the victim, Daisy Diolola, a nine-year old girl went to the house of her tutor, the defendant's
sister, for her lessons. An hour later, the victim returned home, accompanied by the defendant in
order to get a book for her lessons.

From the defendant's house, the victim proceeded to the house of her neighbor to watch television.
The defendant then arrived, whispered something to the victim and together they left heading
towards the compuerta. That was the last time the victim was seen alive. The defendant was
afterwards seen by some witnesses looking pale, uneasy and troubled, wearing clothes which were
wet. The next day, the body of the victim was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near
the compuerta. An autopsy on the victim revealed that she was raped and then manually strangled to
death. When the defendant was invited by the policemen for questioning, he executed an extra-
judicial confession admitting to the crime saying that he was under the influence of drugs. A complaint
was then filed against him for rape with homicide.

During the trial, the prosecution presented a number of witnesses. Some of them testified that the
victim was last seen in the company of the defendant. Other witnesses also testified as to the validity
of the defendant's extra-judicial confession, the same having been executed in the presence of a
lawyer. The key pieces of the prosecution's evidence, however, arose mainly from the testimony of a
forensic biologist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) who testified that blood samples were
taken from the defendant for the purpose of comparing with the blood found on his and on the
victim's clothes. The result of the examination was that the defendant's blood type belonged to Group
"0" while the blood found on his clothes and on the victim's clothes belonged to Group "A." which
was the victim's blood type. Furthermore, a forensic chemist of the NBI took specimens from the
vagina of the victim and conducted DNA tests on the specimens. She testified that the vaginal swabs
from the victim taken during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of the defendant and the victim.

The defendant raised the defense of alibi, saying that he was at home during the entire period of the
commission of the crime. He also alleged that he was tortured by the police into making and signing
the extra-judicial confession.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Based on the overwhelming evidence presented the court determined that the defendant
raped and killed the victim. On this account, the defendant was sentenced to death. The case was
then elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic appeal, and was affirmed on the ground that there
was enough circumstantial evidence to convict the defendant. The Court rendered much importance
to the findings of the NBI forensic biologists and chemists that the blood and DNA tests revealed the
identity of the defendant. Also, the Court upheld the validity of the extra-judicial confession executed
by the accused.

G.R. No. 144656            May 9, 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO alias PUKE, accused-appellant.

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: On July 10, 1999 (Rosario, Cavite), at about 1pm, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her
neighbor’s house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor,
helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child
wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of
Daisy’s whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank.
Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.

In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he was one
of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police
that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the
clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were
submitted for processing.

The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At
the instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs) from Vallejo and
a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains
in Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is
O.

Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile.

Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial
came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops;
that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy
(including his clothing – which in effect is an admission placing him in the crime scene – though
not discussed in the case) were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo
was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court
reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the
accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-
slay case.

The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the
first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus:

DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code.
Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.

When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then
matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence
sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical
processes to establish their profile.32 The test may yield three possible results:

1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;

2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar
DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then
be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or

3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a
case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical
significance of the Similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262

(1992)
12/27/2020

0 COMMENTS
 

People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262 (1992) 

FACTS:
On June 23, 1993, the deceased Oscar Pagdalian was found dead after a drinking spree with
two others, one of which being the accused, Ramon Bolanos. When the accused was nabbed
by the police upon corroborated testimonies, the gun of the deceased was found with him, thus
strengthening the case against him.
They boarded Ramon Bolanos and along with the other companion on the drinking spree on the
police vehicle and brought them to the police station. In the vehicle where the suspect was
riding, Ramon Bolanos accordingly admitted that he killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian
because he was abusive.

The admission was used by RTC of Malolos, Bulacan in holding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, arguing that the same was given freely and before the investigation, hence,
admissible as evidence.
 
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the accused-appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
 
RULING: Yes.
Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to
the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have
already been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides:

(1)          Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2)          No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3)          Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4)          The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as
compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families.
Failing to have the accused informed of this right and being unassisted by a counsel during the
alleged confession, the same cannot hold admissible in evidence against the accused.

People v. Bolanos
Facts: Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando
Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whom
the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the accused they
found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded
accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police
station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted him hence the
appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
Held: Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way
to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been
informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more
particularly par. 1 and par. 3.Doctrine: From the moment the accused is in a way significantly deprived
of liberty, he cannot be asked questions unless he is assisted by counsel and was informed of his rights.
Otherwise, any confession or admission made by him is inadmissible.

MAGTOTO v. MANGUERA
63 SCRA 4
March 3, 197
Article 3 Section 12: Right to be informed

FACTS:
No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera of the Court of
First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02) and Judge Judge Onoftre A. Villaluz of
the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-37424) declared admissible the confessions of the
accused in said cases (Clemente Magtoto in GR L-37201-02; and Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt,
Inocentes De Luna, Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo Suarez, Manuel Manalo, Alberto
Gabion, and Rafael Brill in GR L-37424). District Judge Asaali S. Isnani of Court of First Instance (Branch II)
of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L-38928), on the other hand, declared inadmissible the confessions of the
accused in said case (Vicente Longakit and Jaime Dalion), although they have not been informed of their
right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively.

HELD:
1. It applies prospectively. Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of
such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in
violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the
right already existed and had been violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in
GRs L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in
accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in
evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be
informed of such right," because, no such right existed at the time. The argument that the second
paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added by Republic Act 1083 enacted in
1954, which reads that "In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel," impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of
such right, is untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be
informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to claim the right
to communicate and confer with counsel at any time. The historical background of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution shows that the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel and
to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in evidence, has
and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect
to this constitutional guarantee to counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of
justice in this country. It may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the
People and the offended parties in many criminal cases where confessions were obtained before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and in accordance with the rules then in force although without
assistance of counsel. The Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a disastrous
consequence in the administration of justice. For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person
is convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.

Magtoto vs. Manguer G.R. No. L-37201-02, March 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguer G.R. No. L-37201-02, March 3, 1975

Case Digest

By: G-one T. Paisones

FACTS:

Petitioner Clemente Magtoto contended that the confession obtained from a person under investigation
for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence in accordance with Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution.
Petitioner Magtoto stressed that since Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution favor the
accused it should be given retroactive effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be given retrospective effect

HELD:

Supreme Court holds that Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be given a
prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to
counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the
accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented
after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave
the accused the right to be so informed before that date.

People vs Paule (wala ako makita digest)

[G.R. Nos. 118168-70. September 11, 1996.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REYNALDO PAULE y

DONATO, Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHT; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; PURPOSE OF

PROVIDING COUNSEL TO PERSON UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. — The purpose
of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized
practice of extracting confession by coercion. Any form of coercion, whether physical,
mental or emotional, in extracting confession, stamps the confession with the taint of
inadmissibility. We have stressed that in giving a person under custodial investigation
the right to counsel the Constitution did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and
vigilant counsel.
2 REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS; CREDIBILITY
STRENGTHENED BY HONEST INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR AND TRIVIAL MATTERS. —
A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony,
considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. Thus, we have
followed the rule in accord with human nature and experience that honest
inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy,
the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses of crimes shocking to conscience and
numbing to senses.

3. ID.; ID.; LACK OF NITRATE ON A SUSPECTS HANDS DOES NOT PRECLUDE

CONVICTION. — Appellant cannot unduly capitalize on the paraffin test showing that he
was negative fold nitrates. In the case of People v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-
08, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 103 we held: ". . . Scientific experts concur in the view
that the paraffin test has . . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it
can deliberately establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand.
It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites
was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number
of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as
explosives fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas,
beans and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposit
on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco.’ In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring
about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of gunman, viz: when the
assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the
shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of
firing." In People v. Realon, No. L-30832, August 24, 1980, 99 SCRA 422 we further
held that lack of nitrates on a suspect’s hands does not preclude a judgment of
conviction where the overwhelming evidence proves his guilt.

4. ID.; ID.; WHEN NON-PRESENTATION OF A WITNESS SHALL NOT BE PREJUDICIAL

AGAINST THE PROSECUTION’S CASE. — No prejudicial inference can arise against a
party who fails to call a witness where the only object of presenting him would be to
produce corroborative or cumulative evidence. Also, no unfavorable inference can
accrue against the prosecution where the records show that it used the coercive
process of subpoena to secure the presence of a witness at the trial, but said witness
could not be found.

5. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING; CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; PRESENT WHEN THE

VICTIM WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO DEFEND HIMSELF. — There is treachery when, at
the time of the attack, the unsuspecting victim was not in a position to defend himself
and the offenders consciously adopted the particular means, method and form of attack
employed by them. In this case, the unarmed victim was suddenly shot from behind
and on his head, thus, rendering him totally defenseless against his aggressors.
Treachery qualified the crime to murder.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Appellant REYNALDO PAULE y DONATO was convicted of the crime of MURDER 1 by the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City (Branch 74), for the death of one Carlos
Tubongbanua. 2

The Information 3 against appellant, a certain alias "Glenn", and Conrado Matawaran,
Jr., alias "Jun Matawaran", reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the eighteenth (18th) day of October, 1990, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed
with a gun, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and that the crime was committed
in consideration of a price, reward, or promise, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously assault, attack and shot therewith one Carlos Tubongbanua, and as a
result thereof, said Carlos Tubongbanua suffered Cardio Respiratory Arrest, Cerebral
Concussion and Hemorrhage due to Multiple Gunshot Wounds which caused the death
of said Carlos Tubongbanua, shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the latter.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon his arraignment on May 14, 1990, appellant pleaded ‘not guilty’ 4 and underwent
trial. His co-accused have remained at large.

The prosecution evidence reveals that at about 10 a.m. of October 18, 1990, Amos
Manalo was with a lady friend in the vicinity of the public market along Brill Street,
Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City. Carlos Tubongbanua passed by and Manalo made a sales
pitch to him saying: "Mamimili ka na naman." Tubongbanua did not respond and
walked by. Manalo noticed three (3) men following Tubongbanua, one of whom was
accused Reynaldo Paule. The three (3) men exchanged signals with each other. They
separately positioned themselves a few meters away from Tubongbanua after the latter
stopped in front of a store. One of them nodded at Paule who was about three (3) or
four (4) meters behind Tubongbanua. Paule then drew a .38 caliber revolver and fired
at Tubongbanua. The bullet hit the back of Tubongbanua’s head. As Tubongbanua
turned holding his nape, Paule shot him a second time near the right temple of his
head. Tubongbanua slumped on the ground. Paule approached him, held his wrist and
took his gold necklace. The dastardly deed done, Paule ran towards the nearby tricycle
parking lot while his companions fled towards the 23rd Street. 5

The Olongapo City police, led by Lieutenant Leonardo Esteban, repaired to the locus
criminis a few minutes after the shooting. They found the victim sprawled on the
ground, blood oozing from his left eye. 6 They gathered that the assailant wore a black
gray checkered polo shirt and headed towards the station of buses bound for Bataan.
The group of Lt. Miguel Corpuz immediately established a check point at the Los
Viajeros Canteen, located along the national highway, to watch vehicles leaving the
Olongapo city proper. Another team of policemen checked on the Bataan-bound buses
at the Victory Liner and Saulog Transit terminals in Olongapo.

Between 11:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m., of the same day, the police spotted a passenger
jeepney at the check point near the Los Viajeros Canteen. Among the three (3) male
passengers in the jeepney was Paule who was wearing a light cream yellow T-shirt. A
witness 7 identified Paule as the assailant of Tubongbanua. 8 Lt. Corpuz frisked Paule
and found a fragmentation hand grenade in his possession. Paule was arrested and
brought to Olongapo City Police Station A for investigation.

Paule was again bodily searched at the police station. The police recovered a gold
necklace with rectangular pendant hidden in the folded lower portion of Paule’s maong
pants. 9 Paule broke down and admitted his complicity in the crime. He disclosed that
he hid his black gray checkered polo shirt and the murder weapon in a house rented by
his uncle at No. 63-A Elicano Street, East Bajac-Bajac. The police fetched Paule’s uncle
from the market and they proceeded to his residence. They found there a .38 caliber
revolver, with serial number 1096046, two (2) empty shells of the .38 caliber revolver,
nine (9) live ammunitions, and Paule’s black gray checkered polo shirt. 10 The items
were hidden between the beddings and the mat of a wooden bed ("papag").

Paule was brought back to Police Station A. He was informed of his constitutional rights
to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel. When he said he could not afford a
lawyer, the investigator, Pfc. Leo Batinga, fetched Atty. Norberto Dela Cruz. Paule was
assisted by Atty. Dela Cruz, when he executed an extrajudicial confession, 11 dated
October 18, 1990, admitting that he and a certain "Glenn" were hired by Conrado
Matawaran, Jr. to kill Tubongbanua for a fee of P5,000.00 each. He pointed to "Glenn"
as the triggerman. The confession was taken and signed in the presence of Lieutenant
Leonardo Esteban, Chief of the Investigation Division of Olongapo City Police Station A
and Atty. Norberto Dela Cruz. 12 It was duly acknowledged by Assistant City Prosecutor
Carmelita Gutierrez Fruelda.

Dr. Richard Patilano, Medico-Legal Officer of Olongapo City, conducted the postmortem
examination of Tubongbanua. The result showed that the victim died due to "Cerebral
Concussion and Hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds." 13 The point of entry of
gunshot wound no. 1 was on the "right parietal area of the head." The point entry of
gunshot wound no. 2 was along the "right ear canal", and its point of exit was on the
left eye. 14 Dr. Patilano opined that the victim was shot at close range due to the
presence of smudge around the points of entry of the gunshot wounds. Based on the
locations of the gunshot wounds, he added that the assailant (assuming he is right
handed) was standing behind or at the right side of the victim during the shooting
incident. 15

Paule denied the charge. He revealed that he was a former commander of the New
People’s Army in Pampanga who quit in 1989 to start a new life.

He alleged that he visited his uncle, Marcos Paule, in Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, a
week before the incident. His uncle sells cooked food at the public market in Bajac-
Bajac. He stayed in his uncle’s rented house along Elicano Street.

On October 18, 1990, at about 11:00 a.m., he was in a minibus on his way to his
hometown in Dinalupihan, Bataan. Their vehicle was stopped and someone pointed to
him. The police then arrested him and took him to the city hall where he was mauled.
The asked for his residence in Olongapo and he led them to his uncle’s house in Elicano
Street. They ransacked the place but did not find anything. He was brought back to the
police station. 16

Paule disowned his written extrajudicial confession. He averred that it was obtained
under duress and without the assistance of counsel. He denied ownership of the polo
shirt, the .38 caliber gun and the hand grenade. He also submitted the paraffin test
result showing that his left and right hands were negative for nitrates. 17

Yolando Ocampo, a sidewalk vendor in Bajac-Bajac public market, testified in favor of

Paule. She declared that shortly after the incident, the authorities arrived at the scene
of the crime and took the personal belongings of Tubongbanua, including the latter’s
gold necklace.

The trial court found Paule guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the legal heirs of Carlos
Tubongbanua the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) for moral damages, plus the costs of suit. 18

Hence, the appeal.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred: (1) in admitting his extrajudicial
confession which was taken without the assistance of counsel; (2) in giving credence to
the testimony of eyewitness Amos Manalo; (3) in not considering the result of the
paraffin test in his favor; and (4) in not taking into consideration the weakness of the
prosecution evidence in view of the non-presentation of the alleged witness (Susi) who
assisted the policemen in arresting him.

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel." cralaw virtua1aw library

The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb

the uncivilized practice of extracting confession by coercion. 19 Any form of coercion,
whether physical, mental or emotional, in extracting confession, stamps the confession
with the taint of inadmissibility. 20 We have stressed that in giving a person under
custodial investigation the right to counsel, the Constitution did not mean any kind of
counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. 21 In the case of People v. Bacamante, 22
we elucidated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The term ‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily and logically requires that the
lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant
answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is
made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature
and consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A
contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain
silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent." cralaw virtua1aw library

In this case, we have no doubt that Atty. Dela Cruz was called to assist the appellant
during his custodial investigation. Lieutenant Leonardo Esteban, Chief of the
Investigation Division of Olongapo City Police Station, testified that appellant was
assisted by Atty. Dela Cruz. He identified the signature on the left bottom portion of
appellant’s extrajudicial confession as that of Atty. Dela Cruz.

The more important question, however, is whether Atty. Dela Cruz extended effective
and vigilant counsel to the appellant before the latter signed his extrajudicial
confession. On this factual issue, the only evidence given by the prosecutor is the
testimony of Lt. Esteban who declared under cross-examination: 23

"(ATTY. MENDOZA): jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q: I would show you Exhibits "G" to "G-6", is this the written admission of Paule
having committed the charge of murder . . .?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: Were you present when this alleged admission was taken by a certain Pfc. Leo
Batinga?

"A: I was there, sir.

x       x       x

"Q: And in all the investigation conducted resulting to the execution of this document
Exhibit G, you were present?

"A: Sometimes I am going out of my office for personal necessity.

x       x       x

"(COURT): jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q: Before Atty. Dela Cruz assisted the accused in the preparation of his statement, did
they talk to one another?

"(LT. ESTEBAN): jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A: Yes, your Honor.

"Q: Did you hear the conversation?

"A: Partly, some parts only of the conversation.

"Q: As far as you can recall, what was the conversation between the two?

"A: Atty. Dela Cruz informed him of his constitutional rights like saying, ‘mabigat ang
kasong ito, nais kitang paalalahanan: may karapatan kang manahimik at kumuha ng
abogado.’

"Q: And it was your impression that the accused was agreeable to have Atty. Dela Cruz
as his lawyer.

"A: Yes, sir." cralaw virtua1aw library

It cannot be gainsaid that Lt. Esteban was not in a position to give relevant and reliable
information on whether Atty. Dela Cruz provided appellant effective and vigilant counsel
in the course of appellant’s custodial investigation. He only overheard snatches of
conversation between Atty. Dela Cruz and appellant. He admitted he was." . . going out
of my office for personal necessity" in the course of appellant’s custodial interrogation.
Thus, the records do not show whether Atty. Dela Cruz effectively counselled appellant
during the crucial aspects of his custodial interrogation. During these times, Atty. Dela
Cruz could have been out of sight and out of hearing distance. Given the circumstances
of the case, Atty. Dela Cruz was the best witness to establish the critical fact the he
gave effective and vigilant counsel to the appellant. Unfortunately, the prosecution did
not present him for reason difficult to divine. By this lapse, the prosecution failed to
discharge the state’s burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that
appellant enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his
guilt to the police authorities. Consequently, the extrajudicial confession of appellant
cannot be given any probative value.

Be that as it may, appellant cannot be acquitted in view of his positive identification as

the gunman. Eyewitness Amos Manalo testified as follows: 24

x       x       x

"Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court how or what you saw at that time that Mr.
Carlos Tubongbanua was shot?

x       x       x

"A: On that date, October 18, 1990, that was Thursday, at 10:00 o’clock in the morning
I saw Mr. Carlos Tubongbanua walking at Brill Street and I called or told him, he is
again going to the public market and I noticed certain persons following him and I was
or I kept on observing their movements and I saw the person behind him was pulling
something from his waist.

"Q: Now, Mr. witness, how many persons did you see at that time, I mean, did you see
at that time following Mr. Carlos Tubongbanua?

"A: Three (3) persons, Ma’am.

"Q: And will you please describe these persons that you saw following Mr. Carlos
Tubongbanua?

"A: I just saw the one who shot or who killed him, Ma’am. (Witness at the same time
pointing to the accused).

"Q: Now, you saw two (2) other persons following Mr. Tubongbanua if you have the
chance to see these persons would you bale to identify them?

"A: If I could see them again I could recognize and identify them.

x       x       x

"ATTY. DAQUIS

"Q: Now, Mr. Witness, how many times at that time or what was your distance from the
accused at that time you saw shot Mr. Carlos Tubongbanua?

"A: Four to five (4 to 5) arms length, Ma’am.

"Q: And how many shots were fired by the accused in this case, if you can recall?

"A: Two (2) Ma’am.

"Q: Will you please describe what you saw when he fired the first shot? Will you please
describe?

"A: At the first shot, Mr. Tubongbanua was shot on his or was hit on his back of the
head (witness is pointing at the back of the head) and then he turned around and shot
again Mr. Tubongbanua hitting him on his temple (witness pointing to the right side of
the head).

"ATTY. DAQUIS

"Q: Now, what was the distance of the accused with reference to Mr. Tubongbanua at
the time he fired the first shot?

"A: About that distance, Ma’am (witness point a distance).

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Can the parties agree on that distance pointed by the witness.

"A: Between three and four (3 and 4) meters.

"ATTY. DAQUIS

"Q: Now, Mr. Witness, you said there were three (3) of them at that time accused fired
the first shot what happened to the other two (2)?

"A: One of the two gave a signal to the accused.

"COURT: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q: Name that accused you are referring?

"A: The accused Paule.

"ATTY. DAQUIS.

"Q: And what happened next?

"A: Then the other companion of accused Paule gave signal and then he turned around
and Reynaldo Paule approached the victim and took something and even got hold of the
wrist of the victim.

"Q: And what did you see the accused took from the victim at that time, Mr. Witness?
"A: The necklace, Ma’am.

"COURT: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q: Whose necklace?

"A: Necklace of Mr. Tubongbanua, sir.

"ATTY. DAQUIS

"Q: Now, what else, if any, did the other two companion of the accused do at that time
after the signal was given to Paule?

"A: They just left.

"Q: And in what direction did Paule follow after the killing, Mr. Witness?

"A: On the road where people passes and tricycle passes and then he went towards the
parking area of the tricycle.

"Q: How about the two (2) other companions, in what direction did they go?

"A: I did not see them anymore." cralaw virtua1aw library

On cross-examination, 25 Manalo further testified: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

"ATTY. MENDOZA

"Q: You made mention that these three (3) persons were trailing Mr. Tubongbanua in
this sketch you made, (1) person appear to be ahead (of) the other one who is just
across the street and Mr. Tubongbanua is behind, do you mean what the term trailing
mean they are that kind (sic) of position?

"ATTY. DAQUIS

The question is not clear. He mentioned about these two other companions of Paule
who are across the street.

"COURT

"Q: You mentioned in the direct testimony that these three (3) persons were trailing or
following the deceased whereas in this sketch three (3) persons were not actually
trailing but situated separately, how could you explain that?

"A: Because in this sketch Mr. Tubongbanua stopped and the three (3) persons who
were then trailing or following him separated each other and behind him was left Mr.
Paule and he drew his hand.

"Q: The first time that you saw these three (3) what were their positions in relation to
Mr. Tubongbanua? The first time you noticed them?

"A: Actually the two (2) other companions of Reynaldo Paule were standing at the
corner of Brill Street while Reynaldo Paule was actually at the Brill Street and when
they noticed Mr. Tubongbanua the two (2) companions of Reynaldo Paule walked side
by side and touching their shoulder.

"Q: You made mention a while ago that you shouted at Mr. Tubongbanua and you made
mention ‘mamimili ka na naman’ correct?
"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: And this incident took place at 10:15 in the morning, how long have you talked to
Mr. Tubongbanua before the incident took place at 10:15 in the morning?

"A: We did not talk with each other, actually Mr. Tubongbanua just passed by the place
where I was standing and I did not notice him immediately and he did not notice me. I
just noticed him when he was already (4) arms length away from me and that was the
time I talked or rather that was the time I called him but I am not sure whether he
heard me or not.

"Q: In short Mr. Tubongbanua did not make any response?

"A: Yes, sir.

x       x       x

The probability that Manalo misidentified appellant is remote. The crime was committed
in broad daylight and Manalo was barely four (4) arms length away from appellant
during the shooting incident. Manalo was able to narrate the minute details on how
appellant and his companions trailed the victim and properly positioned themselves
before gunning him down. The records show that no ill-motive could be attributed to
Manalo for imputing such a grave offense against appellant. His identification of
appellant should be given full faith and credit. 26

Appellant discredits Manalo on account of his inconsistent declarations on the number of

times he saw the gun. It is pointed out that Manalo testified in court that he saw the
weapon twice — the first time, during the shooting incident and the second time, when
he was asked to identify it during his testimony. He also averred that the gun was not
shown to him during the investigation. In contrast, he stated in his sworn statement
that, during the investigation, the gun was shown to him by the investigator for
identification. purposes.

These inconsistencies cannot destroy the totality of Manalo’s testimony. A truth-telling

witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory. Thus, we have followed the rule in accord
with human nature and experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial
matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy, the credibility of a witness, especially
of witnesses to crimes shocking to conscience and numbing to senses. 27

More. Manalo’s version of the incident is supported by the physical evidence of the
case. His testimony that the victim was shot twice from behind by appellant was
corroborated by Dr. Patilano who testified as follows: 28

"(Court): jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q: Just a moment doctor, on the basis of the location and the nature of the gunshot
wound, what was the position of the assailant in relation to the deceased?

"A: . . . if the assailant was right handed, he must be standing at the right side of the
victim or at the back of the victim.

x       x       x

"Q: How many gunshot wounds did you find?

"A: There were two points of entry, your Honor.

"Q: All in the head?

"A: All in the head, your Honor.

"Q: Both wounds fatal?

"A: Yes, Your Honor." cralaw virtua1aw library

Appellant cannot unduly capitalize on the paraffin test showing that he was negative for
nitrates. In the case of People v. Teehankee, Jr., 29 we held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ‘. . . proved
extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can deliberately establish is the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from
this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm.
The person may be handled one or more of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans and alfalfa. A person who
uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposit on his hands since these
substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco.’ In numerous rulings,
we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his
hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction
of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing." cralaw virtua1aw library

In People v. Realon, 30 we further held that lack of nitrates on a suspect’s hands does
not preclude a judgment of conviction where the overwhelming evidence proves his
guilt.

Appellant also bewails the non-presentation of the witness 31 who pointed to the
appellant on board a Bataan bound vehicle. The omission did not, however, materially,
dent the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. His testimony would only be
corroborative of the testimony of the arresting officers. No prejudicial inference can
arise against a party who fails to call a witness where the only object of presenting him
would be to produce corroborative or cumulative evidence. 32 Also, no unfavorable
inference can accrue against the prosecution where the records show that it used the
coercive process of subpoena to secure the presence of a witness at the trial, but said
witness could not be found. 33 In this case, prosecution witness Rodolfo Susi was
ordered to appear in court but the subpoena was returned unsatisfied because he was
no longer residing at his given address. 34

We now come to the correct categorization of the crime at bar. The prosecution
successfully proved that the crime was committed with treachery. There is treachery
when, at the time of the attack, the unsuspecting victim was not in a position to defend
himself and the offenders consciously adopted the particular means, method and form
of attack employed by them. 35 In this case, the unarmed victim was suddenly shot
from behind and on his head, thus, rendering him totally defenseless against his
aggressors. Treachery qualified the crime to murder. Considering the presence of
treachery, appellant’s prison sentence is reclusion perpetua. We need not pass upon the
question of whether the other aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
commission of the crime in consideration of a price or reward were properly appreciated
by the trial court as the same will not alter the prison sentence of Appellant.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the court a quo, finding appellant REYNALDO PAULE
y DONATO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER is AFFIRMED. Costs
against Appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

People vs Mahinay
FEBRUARY 24, 2015 | KAAARINA
People vs Mahinay
G.R. No. 122485.  February 1, 1999
 
Facts:  Appellant was charged with rape with homicide for the sexual assault and death of Maria
Victoria Chan, 12 years old.  Evidence disclosed that Maria, on that fateful afternoon, went to the
second floor of the house where appellant was staying.  Appellant pulled her hand and her head hit
the table causing her to become unconscious.  At this stage, appellant, who was then drunk, had
sexual intercourse with her.  He then dumped the still unconscious victim inside the septic tank and
thereafter took flight.  The body of the victim was retrieved the following day wearing only a blouse
without underwear.  Recovered in the unfinished house where accused slept on the night of the
incident was the victim’s pair of shorts, brown belt and yellow hair ribbon.   Weight was given to
appellant’s extrajudicial confession containing details consistent with the post mortem findings
on the victim that she was raped.  The trial court, notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence
relative to the commission of the crime, rendered judgment of conviction. It based its judgment on
circumstantial evidence.
Issue:         Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused merely on ground of
circumstantial evidence
Whether or not Mahinay’s rights to lawful custodial investigation was violated.

Held:           No. No.

The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant’s proffered excuse are
sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any
direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of
direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on
evidence and pursuant to settled  jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence
provided that the following requisites concur:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at
the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.  Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court.
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which upon
thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellant’s guilt beyond the shadow of
reasonable doubt.

 
IMPORTANT: So-called Miranda rights
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in
a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may
be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of
an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one
will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf,
or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his
behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a
valid waiver has been made;
 6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means – telephone, radio, letter or messenger – with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor,
priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel,
or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government
organization.  It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it
must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that
the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes
such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or
the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.

People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455

(1999)
12/27/2020

0 COMMENTS
 

People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999) 

 
FACTS:

 Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks
was to take care of Isip’s house which was under construction adjacent to the
latter’s residence. The victim was a 12-year old girl who used to frequent the
residence of Isip.
 On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her
mother. The following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and
disappeared. The victim’s body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same
day. She was found in the septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The
autopsy showed that the victim was raped and was strangled to death.
 Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short
pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victim’s
mother to belong to her daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue slippers which
Isip identified as that of the appellant. Also found in the yard, three arms length
 away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long
pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant’s belongings.
 The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession
wherein he narrated how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the
lower court convicted him of the crime of Rape and was sentenced to death. The
case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant’s extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in
accordance with his rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights.
 
RULING:
Yes. The conviction of the appellant is affirmed. Larry Mahinay during the custodial
investigation and after having been informed of his constitutional rights with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his
statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of Mahinay given with
the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily
given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on
his person. He did not even inform the Inquest Prosecutor when he was sworn to the
truth of his statement on 8 July 1995 that he was forced, coerced or was promised of
reward or leniency. That his confession abound with details known only to him. The
Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as
testified by said Atty. Viernes informed and explained to Mahinay his constitutional
rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the
statement given by Mahinay.
A lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to
notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the physical conditions of
the accused. The post mortem findings show that the cause of death Asphyxia by
manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent with
the testimony of Mahinay that he pushed the victim and the latter's head hit the table
and the victim lost consciousness. There being no evidence presented to show that said
confession were obtained as a result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation,
threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been
motivated to concoct the facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is
held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given. In his extrajudicial confession,
Mahinay himself admitted that he had sexual congress with the unconscious child. Such
circumstantial evidence, besides 8 others, established the felony of rape with homicide
defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11, RA 7659.

People vs. Fabro (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZENAIDO FABRO

G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017 

TIJAM, J.:

Facts: In an Information, appellant was charged with Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267
of the RPC, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, alleging that  accused, ZENAIDA FABRO
feloniously and by force take AAA 9 years old, minor, while the latter is in front of the school
whom the said accused detained and kept in the house of Brgy. Capt. Fabro, brother of the
accused for a period of four days under restraint and against her will.

Denying the charge, appellant claimed that she brought AAA to Nueva Ecija with the consent of
AAA's mother and teacher. She explained that she had intended to bring AAA along to the
Barangay Captain to prove that her husband had taken her luggage and some documents,
given that AAA used to clean their room. The Barangay Captain was not around so they
proceeded to Nueva Ecija after AAA requested to join her. After two days in Nueva Ecija, she
brought AAA to her brother's house where she was arrested.

Issue: Whether appellant is liable for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.

Ruling: Yes. The elements of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention
or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in this case, the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial.

There is no dispute that accused-appellant is a private individual and that she took AAA from
her school on March 2, 2006, brought her to Nueva Ecija and kept her there until she was
arrested on March 5, 2006. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way
home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to
deprivation of liberty. Under such a situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and
control of the abductor.

Ratio Decidendi: The curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint
upon the victim's person.15 For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the
victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly.

Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of  the CA, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC,
which found accused-appellant Zenaida Fabro guilty of Serious Illegal Detention.

PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO [251 SCRA 293; G.R. NO. 117487; 2

DEC 1995]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie
Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The
incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago
found the victim’s body and the parents and police were informed. Appellant
was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house.
Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally
confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his
uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to
know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair
of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which
were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the
assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The
RTC convicted him. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death
penalty.
Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.

Held: No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the
appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information
against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unknown whether
the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is
understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information
couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his
plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing
the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to
due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of
the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on
this rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption. The court must be
sure.

The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt
of the appellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial court
simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask
the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was
interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his
interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of
maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.

Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists
of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused
colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are
evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa
Rebada that the victim was raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they were
gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial
interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the
benefit of counsel.
PEOPLE v ALICANDO

251 SCRA 293

PUNO; December 12, 1995

NATURE
Automatic review

FACTS

- Alicando was charged of rape with homicide for the death of Khazie Penecilla on June 12, 1994 in Iloilo City. In the process of raping Khazie, he
choked her thus causing her death.

> Khazie’s father Romeo was having a drink with two friends in Romeo’s house. Alicando eventually joined them. At around 4:30 PM, Romeo’s
friends left.

> At around 5:30 PM, Rebada, one of Penecilla’s neighbors, spotted Khazie by the window of Alicando’s house. Khazie offered to buy yemas
from Rebada but Alicando closed the window. Rebada then heard Khazie crying so she approached the house and saw through an opening
between the floor and the door that Khazie was being raped.

> Khazie did not come home so Romeo and his wife looked for her. Rebada did not tell them what she saw.

> In the morning, Khazie’s corpse was found under the house of Santiago, another neighbor. Rebada then told the Penecillas what she knew.

> Alicando was arrested and her verbally confessed his guilt to PO3 Tan without the assistance of counsel. Based on his confession and follow-
up interrogations, Khazie’s slippers were recovered from Alicando’s home along with a stained T-shirt and pillow.

- June 29, 1994 – Alicando was arraigned and pleaded guilty. After the plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence.

- July 20, 1994 – The trial court sentenced Alicando to death by electric chair or, if the penal facilities would be available by then, by gas
poisoning.

ISSUE

WON the accused was properly meted the sentence of death

HELD

NO

1. Arraignment of the accused was null and void

Ratio

During arraignment, the complaint or the information should be read in a language or dialect which the accused understands.

Reasoning

- The trial judge failed to follow the procedure outlined in Rule 116 of the RoC.

- The information was written in English and it was unknown whether or not the accused could understand English well. It could not be said
with certainty that the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

2. The plea of guilt was null and void.

Ratio Rule 116, Sec. 3 provides that in a plea of guilt, the court should ascertain that the accused voluntarily entered into the plea and fully
comprehends the ramifications of such a plea and, in addition, the prosecution should also be required to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of culpability.

Reasoning

- This rule is a restatement of the doctrine laid down in People vs. Apduhan. The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the
voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.

- The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate
appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea.

> The records do not clearly illustrate the personality profile of the accused.

> The age, socio-economic status and educational background of the accused were not examined.

> With regard to voluntariness, questions regarding the presence or absence of maltreatment of the accused are deemed insufficient when a
record of events in the penal facility indicate that Alicando suffered a hematoma from being locked up in a cell with violent inmates upon his
arrest.

> With regard to comprehension, the trial court inadequately warned Alicando that a plea of guilt would result to a mandatory of penalty of
death without explaining to him what mandatory meant.
- The rule requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant
and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 116, Sec. 3 modifies priorituis prudence that a plea of guilt even in
capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof.

3. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial
court convicting the appellant.

Ratio “Fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine: once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. In other words, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible.

Reasoning

- The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained in Alicando’s house. These are inadmissible evidence for they were
gathered by PO3 Tan of as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel.
- This is in violation of Art. 3, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel for the accused as well as provides for
the right of the accused to remain silent and to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him and that these rights cannot be waived
subject to exceptions. A violation of this provision renders the evidence gathered inadmissible.
- Even if the evidence gathered were admissible, they are still insufficient as evidence.
> The alleged bloodstains on the pillow and shirt were never proven with laboratory tests.
> There was no testimony that the shirt in question was worn by the accused when he committed the crime. It was not unnatural for him to
have a shirt with bloodstains because he was a butcher.
- The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial
interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not
tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree."

Dispositive The Decision convicting accused of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled
and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SATURNINA SALAZAR y PALANAS, accused-appellant.

Facts:

In a buy-bust operation, the accused Salazar sold and delivered to a NARCOM Agent posing as a buyer,
marijuana sticks and leaves. Found in Salazar’s possession was the 5.00 marked bill and marijuana.
Salazar was then arrested and pleaded not guilty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act during
arraignment. Salazar was convicted of the crime charged.

Issue: WON Salazar is guilty?

Held: Yes, Salazar is guilty of the crime charged because she was positively identified by the NARCOM
Agents as the person who sold and delivered the marijuana to them during a buy-bust operation.

Apart from the positive identification of the NARCOM Agents, Salazar by her own confession admitted
the commission of the crime.

Her contention that a mother-of-five like her would not resort to selling illegal drugs in such a
small amount as the marijuana involved in this case, is belied by her own admission that
when she committed the crime, she was still on probation for having been caught in
occasion selling marijuana in 1986. Salazar’s confession appears in the stenographic notes
dated Nov. 9, 1990.

PEOPLE VS. SALAZAR

Not Cited Recently

Suggest Category

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SATURNINA SALAZAR Y PALANAS, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

As her defense in this appeal, appellant alleges violation of her constitutional rights against
warrantless search and seizure, and to counsel during custodial investigations. However, the
search, being merely an incident of a legitimate buy-bust operation against illegal drugs, needed
no warrant. And while her right to counsel during the custodial investigation was indeed violated,
there were other evidence sufficient to warrant her conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

This appeal seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] in Criminal Case No. 925 of the Regional Trial
Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 13, finding appellant Saturnina Salazar y Palanas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, and imposing upon her the penalty
of life imprisonment and payment of P20,000.00 as fine, with costs.

The Facts

According to the Prosecution

Appellant was tried under an Information [2] the accusatory portion of which reads: [3]

"'That on or about the 23rd day of August 1988, at 1:35 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, in
Barangay Poblacion II, Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused did then and there and without authority of law, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away five (5) marijuana sticks to a NARCOM Agent posing as a
buyer in consideration of the amount of Five Peso (P5.00) marked bill with Serial No. FJ526501;
and, as a result of the said Buy-Bust operation, confiscated from the control and possession of
the accused were six (6) marijuana sticks and five (5) grams, more or less, of dried marijuana
leaves in addition to the five (5) marijuana sticks aforestated.'

Contrary to law."

On arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. [4] The
prosecution presented Sgt. Jim Cubillan, Cpl. Emilio de Guzman, and Forensic Chemist
Bernabe Arenga and various evidence proving the following facts:

After being informed of the activities of drug pushers in Oroquieta City, Sgt. Cubillan and Cpl. de
Guzman of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), left
Ozamis City on August 23, 1988, for the former city. Upon their arrival at noon, they were met
by the police informer who accompanied them to the place where a pusher operated. Near the
City Hall, the informer pointed to them the residence-cum-store of appellant and thereafter left
the two constabulary operatives.

Right then and there, Sgt. Cubillan took a five-peso bill with Serial No. FJ526501 from his
billfold, marked it with his initials and handed it to Cpl. de Guzman. The latter then went to the
store and told the woman seated on the windowsill that he wanted "to score" [5] ("mag-score nga
ako"). [6] The woman nodded. After indicating that he wanted five (5) sticks of marijuana, Cpl. de
Guzman asked her if what she was about to give him was "genuine" and gave her the five-peso
bill. After the woman gave him five sticks of marijuana, Cpl. de Guzman unwrapped one stick.
He smelled its contents and at the same time noticed the seeds therein. He then placed the
contraband in his pocket, showed his identification card to the woman and told her that he was a
NARCOM agent. [7]

At that moment, Sgt. Cubillan approached the two. He had positioned himself at the back of the
store, around four or five meters away from Cpl. de Guzman and the woman. [8] He and Cpl. de
Guzman arrested the woman, whom they later learned to be Saturnina "Nena" Salazar. They
recovered from appellant the P5.00-bill. Upon being informed by Cpl. de Guzman that appellant
had taken the five marijuana sticks from a plastic container on the table inside the store, Sgt.
Cubillan took the container which had six (6) more marijuana sticks and around five (5) grams of
dried marijuana leaves. [9]

The NARCOM agents took appellant to the local PC headquarters. On board a motorcar, Sgt.
Cubillan asked her if she knew of other pushers in the vicinity. She pointed to the place of
Josephine Bayotas. When they passed by Bayotas' residence, the two PC operatives also
arrested her. [10]

At the PC headquarters in Camp Naranjo, Sgt. Cubillan interrogated appellant while Cpl. de
Guzman took her bio-data. [11] Her fingerprints were also taken. [12] Thereafter, Cpl. de Guzman
made her sign her bio-data and the paper containing her fingerprints. It was Sgt. Cubillan who
instructed her to sign the piece of bond paper which was used to wrap the marijuana sticks
before they were submitted to the laboratory for examination. [13]

For their part, Sgt. Cubillan and Cpl. de Guzman executed a joint affidavit to support the
complaint that was to be filed against appellant. [14]

The confiscated and dried leaves were turned over to Sgt. Dominador Berjuega who sent the
specimen to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Cagayan de Oro City. NBI Forensic
Chemist Bernabe Arenga, who conducted the examination, executed a Certification, dated
August 29, 1988, (Exh. D) [15] stating that the laboratory examinations conducted on the eleven
(11) confiscated cigarette sticks and the "crushed dried stalks and flowering tops suspected to
be marijuana" yielded "positive results for marijuana." [16] He also submitted Dangerous Drugs
Report No. DDM-88-107 (Exh. E) finding: [17]

"Gross weight of specimens . . . . . .15.3280 grams

Microscopic, chemical and chromatographic examinations conducted on the above-mentioned

specimens gave POSITIVE RESULTS for MARIJUANA."

According to the Defense

The defense presented Jeanife Mission, appellant's 12-year-old daughter, to testify on the
manner by which the arrest was conducted by the NARCOM agents. According to Jeanife, at
around 1:35 p.m. on August 23, 1988, she was at home with her mother. Jeanife was watching
their sari-sari store in front of their house as her mother took a nap. Two persons arrived and
went inside their house. One of them ransacked their things. When her mother woke up, she
was held by one of the two persons and taken to the sala. Jeanife failed to hear their
conversation, but she saw the two persons take her mother away. It was at the jail when she
next saw her mother. [18]

In her own defense, Nena Salazar testified that at around 1:30 p.m. of August 23, 1988, she
was sleeping in the only bedroom of their house which was separated from the sala by a
bamboo divider. When she heard someone "doing something" in the sala, she stood up to see
what the matter was, but she was met by a big fellow who, by the identification card he showed
her, was named Jimmy Cubillan. She also identified the other person as de Guzman by his ID
card.

Cubillan held her left hand. She tried to untangle herself from Cubillan's hold and asked him,
"why do you hold my hand, sir?" Cubillan said, "This is (a) raid, we are looking for something."
He did not, however, show any search warrant, but he asked her where she had placed the
marijuana that she was allegedly selling. She denied selling the contraband as she was still on
probation after she had been convicted of selling marijuana in 1986. [19]

Because Cubillan could not find marijuana in her house, he pulled out his pistol and told her
threateningly that should she refuse to tell him where the marijuana was, he would "salvage"
her. The two persons brought her to the PC headquarters where she was investigated by
Cubillan. She was not informed of her right to counsel nor her right to remain silent. However,
she kept silent, not answering any of Cubillan's questions. Later, they held her right hand and
forced her to sign something. They also asked her to affix her thumbmark to a piece of paper,
telling her that she could refuse to do so only if she would divulge to them the names of drug
pushers in the area. She just signed and affixed her thumbmark to a piece of paper the contents
of which she was not even allowed to read. By then, it was almost midnight. The following day,
she was brought to the city jail. Bayotas was also arrested, but she was already in the PC
headquarters when she (appellant) was brought there. [20]

As stated earlier, Saturnina "Nena" Salazar was convicted of the crime charged. Thus, the case
was disposed in this wise: [21]

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused Saturnina Salazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
selling a prohibited drug without being authorized by law, she is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

Costs against accused.

SO ORDERED."

Through her counsel, she interposed the instant appeal. [22]

After the parties had filed their respective briefs, appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office,
filed an urgent manifestation and motion stating that since she was found in possession of five
(5) grams of dried marijuana leaves and eleven (11) sticks of marijuana which, at .02 gram per
stick, would all sum up to less than 6 grams only and therefore would involve a penalty of only
six (6) years, her appeal should be referred to the Court of Appeals for review. As legal basis
therefor, she cited the Decision in People vs. Simon [23] and the August 15, 1994 Resolution in
G.R. No. 113360, People vs. Margarita Joseco y Magbanua, where the total weight of the
subject illegal drugs was 400 grams. [24] However, in the Resolution of March 27, 1995, the Court
merely noted the said urgent manifestation and motion. [25] Hence, notwithstanding the
insignificant amount of marijuana involved, the Court itself shall consider this case. [26] After all,
the penalty actually imposed by the trial court was life imprisonment.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. On
the other hand, it found that the defense was unable to sufficiently rebut the presumption of
regularity in the government witnesses' performance of their duty, finding it hard to believe that
the NARCOM agents brought her to their headquarters to force her into divulging the identity of
other drugs pushers in the area and that the case against her was only a "trumped-up charge".
Appellant's defense consisting of denials did not overcome the positive testimony of the
prosecution witnesses.

Assignment of Errors

Appellant alleges in this appeal that the trial court gravely erred in (a) convicting her of the crime
charged despite the unreasonable and unlawful search and seizure conducted by the NARCOM
agents; (b) disregarding her constitutional right to presumption of innocence, and (c) finding her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.

The Court's Ruling

Appelant's Guilt Sufficiently Proven

Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 provides:

"SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The

penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Indispensable in every prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the
submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the
seller thereof, coupled with the presentation of the Corpus Delicti as evidence in court. [27] The
element of sale must be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction.

This is precisely the import of the testimony of Cpl. de Guzman when he said: [28]

Q And what was your purpose in coming to Oroquieta City?

A We came here because we were informed by our informant that there were drung (sic)
pushers here.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And after you met your informant in Oroquieta City what happened next?
A He accompanied us to the store of the pusher.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And what happened when you reached the place where the pusher was?
A When he pointed to us the alleged drug pusher we talked with Sgt. Cubillan who got a marked
money and I posed as a buyer.

Q Did you approach the store pointed to you by your informant?

A Yes.

Q And what happened at the staore (sic) of the alleged pusher?

A I went to the store and talked to the owner that I wanted to buy marijuana.

Q How exactly did you tell the owner of the store?

A I said I wanted to score.

COURT:

Q Do you know what is the meaning of score?

A That is the term used by the users so that they will not be identified.

Q And what did the suspected pusher say?

A She nodded.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL RAMOS:

Q What happened after she gave you the five sticks of marijuana?
A I bought five sticks of marijuana and asked her if this is genuine and I gave the money. I
opened one stick, I smelled and saw that there were seeds inside. I placed it in my pocket and
then I showed my ID and edentified (sic) myself as a NARCOM agent.

Q What made you conclude that the 5 cigarette sticks which the alleged pusher gave you were
marijuana cigarettes?
A I learned that from my training and schooling.

Q What happened after you identified yourself as a NARCOM agent?

A Sgt. Cubillan came near and he arrested her.

Q What happened after that?

A I informed Sgt. Cubillan that the container from where the marijuana waa (sic) taken is on the
table and in it were 6 sticks and 5 grams of dried leaves.

Q What did Sgt. Cubillan do when you pointed to the container?

A He took it and looked inside.

Q And what happened after that?

A We brought her to the PC."

Sgt. Cubillan corroborated Cpl. de Guzman's account testifying that:

"Q And what did you do upn (sic) being informed that there is a pusher in Oroquieta City?
A I asked him to accompany me to where is (sic) pusher is.

Q Did your informant lead you to where the pusher was?

A Yes.

Q And what happened thereat?

A He led us and pointed to a woman inside a store and said that she is a pusher.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And after your informant pointed to you a particular woman inside a store as a pusher what
step if any did you take?
A I and Cpl. de Guzman decided to conduct a buy bust operation.

Q Please explain who (sic) that is done?

A That is entrapment by the use of marked money.

Q And from whom will this marked money come from?

A From me.

Q And who will be the buyer in that buy bust operation?

A Cpl. de Guzman.

Q And so you conducted a buy bust operation against the woman with Cpl. de Guzman as the
buyer, what happened next?
A I got a P5.00 bill in my folder and signed my signature thereon and gave it to Cpl. de Guzman
to buy marijuana.

Q How much was the money?

A P5.00.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL RAMOS:

Q What happened next after you gave this P5.00 bill to Cpl. de Guzman?
A He went to the store.

Q And how about you, where were you?

A I was just outside at the back of the store.

Q And did you see what happened after Cpl. de Guzman went to the store?
A Cpl. de Guzman talked to the woman.

Q Did you hear their conversation?

A No, because she has a low voice.

Q What else did you see?

A I saw that the woman gave something to Cpl. de Guzman.

Q And what did Cpl. de Guzman do after receiving that something given by the woman?
A He looked at it and examined it and smelled it.

Q And what happened next after Cpl. de Guzman examined and smelled that something given
by the woman?
A Cpl. de Guzman showed an ID and when I saw him do that I went near him.

Q What happened after you went near him?

A We arrested her.

Q And will you please tell us why you arrested that woman?
A We arrested her because our Narcom agent bought marijuana fromher (sic) and after that we
arrested her.

xxx xxx xxx

A We arrested her because she sold a suspected marijuana cigarette.

Q How many suspected marijuana cigarettes were sold to Cpl. de Guzman?

A Five sticks.

Q Were you able to recover those five sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes?
A These were delivered to Cpl. de Guzman and those five suspected sticks of marijuana were in
the possession of Cpl. de Guzman.

Q What else if any were you able to recover from the woman?
A The marked money, P5.00 bill, and also Cpt. de Guzman told me that the marijuana was
taken by the woman from the table in a plastic container.

Q And this table were (sic) the plastic container was placed from where the five suspected
marijuana cigarettes were taken, where was it located?
A Inside the store.

Q And what did you do after you were informed by de Guzman that the five suspected
marijuana cigarettes were taken from the plastic container?
A I got the plastic container and I saw six sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes and five
grams of dried marijuana leaves.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What did you do after confiscating from the woman the 6 suspected marijuana cigarettes and
5 grams more or less dried marijuana leaves in addition to the five rolled suspected marijuana
cigarettes, what happened next?
A I brought the suspect to the PC headquarters at Camp Naranjo." [29]

Combined with the findings of Forensic Chemist Arenga that the cigarette sticks confiscated
from appellant were marijuana, the Corpus Delicti of the crime had thus been established with
certainty and conclusiveness.

Search Warrant Unnecessary

In alleging that the NARCOM agents conducted an unlawful search and seizure in her house,
appellant contends that, because said agents had known of alleged drug-pushing activities in
Oroquieta City, they should have obtained a search warrant before intruding into her residence.
Appellant's contention is devoid of merit as the necessity of acquiring a search warrant has not
been proven in this case.

In going to Oroquieta City on the strength of reports of drug-pushing activities, the NARCOM
agents did not know of the identity of the alleged pushers. [30] When they conducted the buy-bust
operation, it was precisely for the purpose of entrapping and identifying the culprit. A buy-bust
operation has been considered as an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried
out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves
judicial sanction. [31]

Because the drug pusher had been caught in flagrante delicto, the arresting officers were duty-
bound to apprehend the culprit immediately and to search her for anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of the crime. [32] The search, being an incident of a lawful arrest,
needed no warrant for its validity. In fact, in People vs. Figueroa, [33] this Court said:
"The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his
immediate control. Objects in the 'plain view' of an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."

Hence, appellant may not successfully claim the right against a warrantless search, [34] even as
regards the plastic container with dried marijuana leaves which was found on the table in her
house/store. Contrary to appellant's contention, the contraband seized from her, having been
obtained as a result of the buy-bust operation to which the defense failed to impute any
irregularity, was correctly admitted in evidence.

Informer's Testimony Merely Corroborative

Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her affected by the prosecution's failure to
present the informer who pointed to her as a drug pusher. The presentation of an informant in
an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful
prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. [35] In a case
involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of
the sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the
contraband, the non-presentation of the informer on the witness stand would not necessarily
create a hiatus in the prosecutions' evidence. [36]

Appellant's claim that she was threatened by the NARCOM agents is self-serving. That her
daughter corroborated that portion of appellant's account did not make her claim credible. The
trial court, which was in a better position than this Court in determining the issue of credibility,
unequivocally said: [37]

"The Court finds that the defense has not sufficiently rebutted the presumption of regularity in
the government witnesses' performance of duty. Jennife (sic) Mission, for the defense, sought
refuge from cross-examination by resorting to evasive 'I don't knows' and her demeanor on the
stand did not inspire this Court's faith in her testimony. Accused herself claimed that she has
stopped selling marijuana after being charged in 1986, for which she is now under probation,
but she had no satisfactory explanation as to why she was brought to PC headquarters despite
the fact that the Narcom agents did not find any contraband in her house. The Court finds it hard
to believe that the Narcom agents brought her to headquarters only for the purpose of forcing
her to divulge the names of drug pushers in the city, failing in which they would hie her off to
court on trumped-up charges."

It should be added that, according to appellant, she recognized the NARCOM agents by the 5" x
7" identification cards they pulled from their shirts, which they showed her. [38] It is simply
contrary to human experience for an officer of the law to exhibit his identification card if his
intention in arresting an offender is to commit mischief.

Violation of Appellant's Right to Counsel

We find appellant's claim that she was not informed of her right to counsel during custodial
investigation to be correct. Moreover, the NARCOM agent's admission that they made her sign
and thumbmark the bond paper which they used to wrap the marijuana found in her possession
was violative of her constitutional right to counsel. While the bond paper does not appear to
have been considered as a pivotal piece of evidence against appellant, such act of the
NARCOM agents is worth noting if only to provide guidance to law enforcement operatives. In
People vs. Simon, [39] where the accused was made to sign the booking sheet and arrest report
stating that he was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana and the receipt for
the seized property, the Court said:

"x x x. Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit
admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to
show that he was assisted by counsel. Although appellant manifested during the custodial
investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the
presence of counsel, hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted
from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. Besides, the arrest report is
self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect."

Prosecution's Other Evidence

Sufficient for Conviction

As in the Simon case, where the non-admission of certain pieces of evidence did not weaken
the prosecution's case, there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the consummation of the sale
of marijuana by appellant to a NARCOM agent. Hence, the presumption of innocence in her
favor has been sufficiently overturned in accordance with law. Her contention that a mother-of-
five like her would not resort to selling illegal drugs in such a small amount as the marijuana
involved in this case, is belied by her own admission that when she committed the crime, she
was still on probation for having been caught in another occasion selling marijuana in 1986. [40]

Neither could the location of her residence and store behind the DSWD office and near the city
jail as well as the fact that she did not know Cpl. de Guzman deter her from committing the
offense. In People vs. Simon, [41] the Court noted that

"x x x (D)rug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of
crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place. It is not contrary to human
experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger, for what matters is not an existing
familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale
and delivery of the marijuana leaves. x x x."

Appellant's contention that she could not have taken the risk of selling the five (5) marijuana
sticks for only five pesos and therefore the contraband was "planted," is totally baseless. She
herself did not bring out this alleged irregularity in the performance of the NARCOM agents' duty
at the witness stand. On the other hand, the testimony of the two (2) peace officers carried with
it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. [42]

Appellant claims that the prosecution evidence is weak because Sgt. Cubillan was allegedly
caught lying on the witness stand. She alleges that the prevarication of said witness was
reflected by his testimony that after arresting appellant, they proceeded to the PC headquarters.
Later, he testified that they still dropped by Bayotas' residence to arrest her. This alleged
change in testimony which was explained by the witness himself, [43] is too inconsequential to
dent the prosecution's compelling evidence on the fact of sale of illegal drugs.

The Court also finds too preposterous to merit scrutiny appellant's contention that in convicting
her, the trial court relied on her previous conviction for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
Her being under probation was not alleged in the Information. It was brought out in the trial
where she herself admitted that she was on probation when she committed the offense in this
case. However, while the trial court mentioned that fact in the Decision of March 1, 1991, it
based its findings on evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense and not on
the fact that appellant was a probationer convicted of engaging in the abominable trade of illegal
drugs when she committed the offense.

The Proper Penalty

As in all other cases decided by the Court after the effectivity of Republic Act. No. 7659 on
December 31, 1993, the beneficial provisions of said law shall be applied to this case although
the offense was committed prior thereto. Because the marijuana recovered from appellant was
less that 750 grams, the penalty imposable upon her shall, under the ruling in the Simon case,
range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal or more specifically the penalty of prision
correccional, considering that the marijuana involved was less that 250 grams.

No mitigating circumstances have been proven in this case. In regard to aggravating

circumstances, the prosecutor volunteered at the start of the trial that appellant was then on
probation. Appellant herself admitted that she was on probation when she was arrested by Sgt.
Cubillan and Cpl. de Guzman. [44]

As such, the circumstance of quasi-recidivism should ideally aggravate her offense considering
that she committed the felony after having been convicted by final judgment and before serving
sentence. [45] That she was on probation would not erase the fact of her conviction even though
service of her sentence was suspended. However, for its appreciation as an aggravating
circumstance, quasi-recidivism must be proven by records of the previous sentence. [46] As this
Court stated in People vs. Capillas,[47] the evidence (or the lack of it) must prevail over
appellant's admission that she was a probationer when she committed the crime.

Consequently, under Art. 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that in the absence
of mitigating and aggravating circumstances the medium period of the penalty shall be imposed,
the penalty should be the medium period of prision correccional.[48] There being no circumstance
to disqualify appellant from availment of the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence law, the
same must be applied.

Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court is convinced that the guilt of appellant has been
sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision convicting appellant Saturnina Salazar y Palanas of the
crime of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act. No 6425, as amended, is hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
sentence of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum penalty to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as maximum penalty.

Considering that appellant has been detained for the maximum penalty herein imposed,
her IMMEDIATE RELEASE from custody, unless she is being held for other valid reasons, is
hereby ordered.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

People v. Luvendino G.R. No. L-69971 July 3,
1992 211 SCRA 36 (1992)

Facts: On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena

Capcap left her home at Deva Village, Tambak, Taguig, Metro Manila
to attend classes at the University of Manila where she was a
sophomore commerce student. She would usually be home by 7:30 to
8:00 on school evenings, 1 but on that tragic day, she would not reach
home alive. On that particular evening, her father Panfilo Capcap
arriving home from work at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and
was told by his wife and other children that Rowena was not yet home
from school. Later, a younger brother of Rowena, sent on an errand,
arrived home carrying Rowena’s bag which he had found dropped in
the middle of a street in the village. Panfilo Capcap lost no time in
seeking the help. The search ended in a grassy vacant lot within the
Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80 meters from the Capcap
residence, where lay the apparently lifeless body of Rowena, that the
presence of spermatozoa showed that the victim had sexual
intercourse prior to death; and that death was due to asphyxia by
mutual strangulation. By 5 March 1984, an information had been filed
in the trial court charging Ernesto C. Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias
“Cesar Putol” and Ricardo de Guzman alias “Ric” with the crime of rape
with murder. The trial court rendered a decision finding Luvendino
guilty, sentencing him to death, requiring him to indemnify the heirs
of the victim Rowena in the amount of P50,000.00 for the damages
suffered as a result of her death. Appellant Luvendino contends that
the trial court committed grievous error.

Issue: Whether the re-enactment of the accused of a  crime he was

charged of without the presence of an independent and competent
counsel can be admitted as evidience in the court.

Held: No, Clearly, the trial court took into account the testimony given
by Panfilo Capcap on what had occurred during the re-enactment of
the crime by Luvendino. We note that the re-enactment was
apparently staged promptly upon apprehension of Luvendino and
even prior to his formal investigation at the police station. The
decision of the trial court found that the accused was informed of his
constitutional rights “before he was investigated by Sgt. Galang in the
police headquarters” and cited the “Salaysay” of appellant Luvendino.
The decision itself, however, states that the re-enactment took place
before Luvendino was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not
clear from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by
Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional rights including,
specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right
before proceeding with the demonstration. Under these
circumstances, we must decline to uphold the admissibility of evidence
relating to that re-enactment. That the “demonstration” or re-
enactment and the accused extrajudicial confession were effected and
secured in the absence of a valid waiver by him of his constitutional
rights and that the re-enactment and the confession should be held
inadmissible in evidence because they had been involuntarily made.

People vs. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36

(1992)
1/9/2021

0 COMMENTS
 

People vs. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36 (1992) 

 
FACTS:
 
On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home at Deva Village,
Tambak, Taguig, Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of Manila where she was a
sophomore commerce student. She would usually be home by 7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings,
1 but on that tragic day, she would not reach home alive. On that particular evening, her father
Panfilo Capcap arriving home from work at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was told
by his wife and other children that Rowena was not yet home from school. Later, a younger
brother of Rowena, sent on an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena’s bag which he had found
dropped in the middle of a street in the village. Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking the help.
The search ended in a grassy vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to
80 meters from the Capcap residence, where lay the apparently lifeless body of Rowena, that
the presence of spermatozoa showed that the victim had sexual intercourse prior to death; and
that death was due to asphyxia by mutual strangulation. By 5 March 1984, an information had
been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C. Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias “Cesar Putol” and
Ricardo de Guzman alias “Ric” with the crime of rape with murder. The trial court rendered a
decision finding Luvendino guilty, sentencing him to death, requiring him to indemnify the heirs
of the victim Rowena in the amount of P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of her
death. Appellant Luvendino contends that the trial court committed grievous error.
 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the re-enactment of the accused of a crime he was charged of, without the
presence of an independent and competent counsel, can be admitted as evidence in the court.
 
RULING:
The trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what had occurred
during the re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. The re-enactment was apparently staged
promptly upon apprehension of Luvendino and even prior to his formal investigation at the
police station. The decision of the trial court found that the accused was informed of his
constitutional rights "before he was investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police headquarters" and
cited the "Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino. The decision itself, however, states that the re-
enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear
from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed
of his constitutional rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived
such right before proceeding with the demonstration. Under these circumstances, the Court
must decline to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment. 

People v Dy 158 SCRA 111 (1988)

Facts: Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the

trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the
presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a
confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the
accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such
statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial
investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the
accused.

Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An
oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to
surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such confession was
made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the
oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in
a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who
heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood
it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance.
Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be
admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of
the crime. 
PEOPLE VS. DY [158 SCRA 111; G.R. 74517; 23 FEB 1988]
Tuesday, February 10, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect
to the shooting incident at "Benny's Bar," at Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay,
Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which caused the death of Christian
Langel Philippe, tourist, 24 years old and a Swiss nationale. He was charged
with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed firearms. Appellant alleges that he
carried the victim to the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter,
and who facilitated the surrender to Pat. Padilla a gun which his helper found
the following morning while cleaning the bar. Accused posted bail which was
granted. The accused denied having made any oral confession alleging that he
went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy helper in
the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla
picked up the gun from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that even if
he did make such a confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence. He
was found guilty in the RTC. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the

constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the
instant case.

Held: YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely
found by a boy helper while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for, if it were
so, it would have been absurd for him to have placed himself under police
custody in the early morning after the incident. Sworn Complaint for "Murder
with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests to
Appellant's oral confession. That Complaint forms part of the record of the
proceedings before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Appellant's voluntary surrender
implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of
the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the
filing of the complaint." What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a
spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary
manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a
result of formal custodial investigation.
People vs. Samus [GR 135957-58, 17 September 2002] En Banc, Panganiban (J): 14
concur

Facts: Guillermo Samus was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of Miguel Completo at Barangay
Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. The victims, 62 year old Dedicacion Balisi and her grandson, 6 year old John
Ardee Balisi, were the neighbors of Samus’ father at San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang,
Calamba, Laguna. At 4:20 P.M. on 2 September 1996, Senior Police (SP) Inspector Rizaldy H. Garcia was
at his office at the 4th PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional Office at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba,
Laguna when he received an order from his superior to investigate the murder of the two victims. Their
office had received a telephone call from a local barangay official informing them of the victims’ deaths.
Arriving at the victims’ residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Garcia and
his team conducted an investigation, making a sketch of the relative positions of the victims, lifting
fingerprints from the crime scene and taking pictures. Thereafter, an investigation report was prepared
by Garcia and signed by his superior, Colonel Pedro Tango. The investigators likewise found a pair of
maong pants, a white T-shirt, a handkerchief and dirty slippers in the bathroom and roof of the house. A
pair of earrings worn by Dedicacion Balisi was likewise reported missing from her body by her daughter,
Nora B. Llorera. The victims’ bodies were brought to the Funeraria Señerez de Mesa in Calamba. On that
same day, Ponciano Pontanos, Jr., then a resident of Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao and an acquaintance of
Samus, happened to meet Samus at Sammy Pacheca’s house in the same barangay where Samus asked
Ponciano to accompany him to Ponciano’s wife to pawn a pair of earrings. Ponciano’s wife was mad at
first but upon Ponciano’s prodding, gave Samus P300.00 with no interest. The earrings were placed in a
jewelry box; thereafter, Samus received another P250.00. At 6:00 P.M. on 10 September 1996, Major
Jose Pante of the Criminal Investigation Group received information that Samus was the principal
suspect in the killing of the 2 victims and that he was sighted inside the residence of spouses Rolly and
Josie Vallejo at Barangay Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He then formed and led a team composed of
SPO3 Galivo, Intelligence Commission Officer Casis and SPO3 Mario Bitos. Arriving at the site at past 7:00
P.M., the team, accompanied by local barangay authorities, asked permission from the Vallejo spouses
to enter the house, which was granted. Shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof.
Rushing outside, they saw Samus crawling on the roof. They ordered him to stop, but he suddenly
jumped from the roof and landed hard on the ground, sustaining an injury on his ankle and bruises on
his left and right forearm. At that point, the police team closed in on Samus who, while trembling and
shaking, admitted the killings upon a query from Rolly Vallejo. Samus was brought to the Camp Vicente
Lim PNP Investigation Office where he was informed of his constitutional rights by SPO3 Alex
Malabanan. In the morning of 11 September 1996, Samus, assisted by Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his
statement admitting the killings. SPO3 Malabanan also took the statements of tricycle driver Rafael
Baliso, the victims’ relatives Salvacion and Mona Balisi and witness Mary Arguelles, who saw Samus
enter the house of Dedicacion Balisi. On the same Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) day, PNP Fingerprint Examiner Reigel Allan Sorra took fingerprint samples from Samus. His
prints exactly matched with a set of prints found at the crime scene. Later that day, SPO3 Mario Bitos
was able to recover the pawned earrings from Ponciano who turned them over to SPO3 Malabanan.
Two separate Informations were filed on 27 November 1996, charging Samus (in Criminal Case 5015-96-
C) with homicide for the death of one Dedicacion Balisi y Soriano (61 years old), and (in Criminal Case
5016-96-C) with murder for the death of one John Ardee Balisi y Soriano (6 years old). When arraigned
on 28 May 1997, Samus, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. In due course, the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, found Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide (Criminal Case 5015-96-C), sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years
and 1 day of Prision Mayor as minimum up to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and ordered
him to indemnify the heirs of Dedicacion Balisi the amount of P50,000.00 for her death and another
P50,000.00 as and for moral and actual damages and cost of suit. The trial court also found Samus guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder (Criminal Case 5016-96-C), sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of John Ardee Balisi the amount of P50,000.00
for his death and another P50,000.00 as and for moral and actual damages and cost of suit. Hence, the
automatic review.

Issue: Whether uncounselled admission are absolutely inadmissible.

Held: After being illegally arrested, Samus was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the law
enforcers during custodial investigation are normally inadmissible in evidence. In their affidavits, the
police officers readily admitted that Samus was subjected to a preliminary interview. Yet, during their
examination in open court, they tried to skirt this issue by stating that it was only the media that had
questioned Samus, and that they were merely present during the interview. However, an examination of
the testimonies of the three law enforcers show the folly of their crude attempts to camouflage
inadmissible evidence. In the absence of testimony from any of the media persons who allegedly
interviewed Samus, the uncertainties and vagueness about how they questioned and led him to his
confession lead us to believe that they themselves investigated Samus and elicited from him
uncounselled admissions. This fact is clearly shown by the Affidavits they executed on 11 September
1997, as well as by their testimonies on cross-examination. Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled
admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances the Court cannot rule it out
because of Samus' failure to make timely objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence
under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial
investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to
its presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to
its admissibility. If only Samus had made a timely objection to the admissibility of Pontaños testimony
and the picture of a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt, which Samus identified during
his testimony, the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to
support its case. To disregard unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can
no longer present additional evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible
goes against fundamental fairness.