Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436 (1966)
Doctrine:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
The standard Miranda warning: "You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say
can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to speak to an
attorney, and to have an attorney present during any questioning. If you cannot afford a
lawyer, one will be provided for you at government expense."

Facts:
On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the
police station where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a
kidnapping and rape. The victim identified Miranda in a line-up. Miranda also identified
her as the victim at the police station. He was taken to an interrogation room for two
hours. He did not request a lawyer; neither was he informed that he had the right to
have an attorney present.

After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda.
The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite the objection of the
defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted that they had not advised
Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation.The confession
included the acknowledgement: “I do hereby swear that I make this statement
voluntarily and of my own free will with no threats, coercion or promises of immunity and
with full knowledge of my legal rights understanding any statement I make may be used
against me.”

The jury found Miranda guilty. Miranda was convicted of kidnapping and rape and
sentenced to two twenty to thirty-year terms. He challenged the constitutionality of his
conviction because he had not been advised of his rights to remain silent and have a
lawyer present during questioning. His case eventually went to the Supreme Court. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda’s constitutional
rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel.

Issue:
Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation” are admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether “procedures
which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself” are necessary.
Held:
The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves.” As such, “the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a defendant “must be warned
prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.”

The Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their
right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police
custody.

Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority, concluding that
defendant’s interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment. To protect the privilege, the
Court reasoned, procedural safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be
warned before questioning that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he
said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required to be told that
he had the right to an attorney, and if he could not afford an attorney, one was to be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were
given, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the
warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived.

Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s
opinion created an unnecessarily strict interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that
curtails the ability of the police to effectively execute their duties. He wrote that the state
should have the burden to prove that the suspect was aware of his rights during the
interrogation, but that statements resulting from interrogation should not be
automatically excluded if the suspect was not explicitly informed of his rights. In his
separate dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that the judicial precedent
and legislative history surrounding the Fifth Amendment does not support the view that
the Fifth Amendment prohibits all pressure on the suspect. He also argued that there
was no legal precedent to support the requirement to specifically inform suspects of
their rights. Justices Potter Stewart and Byron R. White joined in the dissent.

Justice White wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Fifth Amendment
only protects defendants from giving self-incriminating testimony if explicitly compelled
to do so. He argued that custodial interrogation was not inherently coercive and did not
require such a broad interpretation of the protections of the Fifth Amendment. Such an
interpretation harms the criminal process by destroying the credibility of confessions.
Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion. The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona.

U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)

Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969)

Doctrine
Use of admissions at petitioner's trial for murder which were obtained by officers who, while he
was in their custody in his bedroom at the boardinghouse where he lived, questioned him about
incriminating facts without first informing him of his rights to remain silent, to have a lawyer's
advice before making a statement, and to have lawyer appointed to assist him if he could not
afford to hire one, held to have violated Self-Incrimination Clause of Fifth Amendment made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. (Miranda v. Arizona)
Facts:
• Pursuant to the evidence presented, petitioner (Reyes Arias Orozco) and the deceased
had quarreled outside the El Farleto Cafe in Dallas shortly before midnight on the date of the
shooting. The deceased had apparently spoken to petitioner's female companion inside the
restaurant. In the heat of the quarrel outside, the deceased is said to have beaten petitioner
about the face and called him "Mexican Grease." A shot was fired killing the deceased.
• Petitioner left the scene and returned to his boardinghouse to sleep. At about 4 a.m. four
police officers arrived at petitioner's boardinghouse, were admitted by an unidentified woman,
and were told that petitioner was asleep in the bedroom. All four officers entered the bedroom
and began to question petitioner. From the moment he gave his name, according to the
testimony of one of the officers, petitioner was not free to go where he pleased, but was "under
arrest." The officers asked him if he had been to the El Farleto restaurant that night and when
he answered "yes" he was asked if he owned a pistol. Petitioner admitted owning one. After
being asked a second time where the pistol was located, he admitted that it was in the washing
machine in a back room of the boardinghouse. Ballistics tests indicated that the gun found in the
washing machine was the gun that fired the fatal shot.

Criminal District Court of Dallas Country, Texas: The petitioner was convicted of murder
without malice and was sentenced to serve in the state prison not less than two nor more than
10 years.
At petitioner's trial, held after the effective date of this Court's decision in Miranda v.
Arizona, the trial court allowed one of the officers, over the objection of petitioner's lawyer, to
relate the statements made by petitioner concerning the gun and petitioner's presence at the
scene of the shooting.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas: Affirmed the conviction,rejecting petitioner's contention

that a material part of the evidence against him was obtained in violation of the provision of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment, that: "No person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."

Issue: WON a material part of the evidence against Orozco was obtained in violation of the
provision of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

Ruling: Yes, conviction is reversed.

Ratio:
• The trial testimony clearly shows that the officers questioned petitioner about
incriminating facts without first informing him of his right to remain silent, his right to have the
advice of a lawyer before making any statement, and his right to have a lawyer appointed to
assist him if he could not afford to hire one. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held, with one
judge dissenting, that the admission of testimony concerning the statements petitioner had
made without the above warnings was not precluded by Miranda. We disagree, and hold that
the use of these admissions obtained in the absence of the required warnings was a flat
violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment as construed in Miranda.
• The State has argued here that, since petitioner was interrogated on his own bed, in
familiar surroundings, our Miranda holding should not apply. It is true that the Court did say in
Miranda that "compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be
greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to
guard against intimidation or trickery." But the opinion iterated and reiterated the absolute
necessity for officers interrogating people "in custody" to give the described warnings.
• According to the officer's testimony, petitioner was under arrest, and not free to leave,
when he was questioned in his bedroom in the early hours of the morning. The Miranda opinion
declared that the warnings were required when the person being interrogated was "in custody at
the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The decision of
this Court in Miranda was reached after careful consideration, and lengthy opinions were
announced by both the majority and dissenting Justices. There is no need to canvass those
arguments again. We do not, as the dissent implies, expand or extend to the slightest extent our
Miranda decision.

U.S. v. Brown, 990 F.2d 397 (1993)

U.S. v. BROWN
990 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1993)
Decided April 2, 1993.
DOCTRINE:
Miranda warnings must be given prior to questioning whenever an individual is in custody. "An individual
is `in custody' when he has been formally arrested or his freedom of movement has been restrained to a
degree associated with a formal arrest."
CASE:
Jesse A. Brown was convicted of two counts of sexual acts with a minor and was sentenced to 235
months in prison. Brown appeals his conviction on the ground that the district court erroneously
found that an inculpatory statement made by Brown was admissible at trial. Brown appeals his
sentence on the ground that the district court incorrectly applied the sentencing guidelines. We affirm the
conviction, but we remand for resentencing.
FACTS:
In the spring of 1991, Brown, a thirty-eight-year-old Caucasian male transient, arrived in Pine Ridge,
South Dakota, on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. While in Pine Ridge, he stayed at the residence of
Gary and Mary Moore. On July 4, 1991, Brown went to a softball game at Wakpamni Lake, which is
approximately thirty minutes from Pine Ridge. He returned to Pine Ridge in a car with seven other people:
three adults were in the front seat; Brown, two other adults, and two eight-year-old girls were in the back
seat. The two girls sat on Brown's lap, one on each knee.
On July 7, the two girls and their mothers complained to the Pine Ridge Police Department that Brown
had touched the two girls between their legs during the drive back from Wakpamni. Later that day, Rick
Esselbach, an FBI Special Agent, and Barney White Face, a Criminal Investigator for the Oglala Sioux
Tribe, went to the East Ridge Housing area in Pine Ridge to look for Brown, whom they found in the front
yard of the Doris Poor Bear residence.
Upon approaching Brown, Esselbach introduced himself and White Face. Esselbach informed
Brown that they were investigating allegations that Brown had sexually abused two young girls.
Esselbach advised Brown that he was not under arrest but that they wanted to get his side of the
story if he wanted to be interviewed. Brown indicated that he wanted to talk with the officers so
that he could get to the bottom of the matter. The two officers then followed Brown into the Poor
Bear house and back into a bedroom, which Brown stated was his room.
Once they were in the bedroom, Esselbach told Brown that two girls had complained that he had sexually
abused them on July 4 during a trip from Wakpamni to Pine Ridge. Brown initially denied having had any
sexual contact with the two girls. Esselbach then informed Brown that the girls had given statements to
the police and asked why the girls would lie. Esselbach asked Brown if he could have accidently touched
the girls. Brown answered that he may have unintentionally touched the vagina of one of the girls while
attempting to make himself comfortable in the cramped back seat of the car. After Esselbach explained
to Brown in more detail the statements the girls had given, Brown admitted having intentionally
touched one girl's vagina. He confessed that he had reached down the girl's pants with his left
hand, had rubbed her vagina area for about two minutes, and had slipped one of his fingers inside
her vagina.
Brown was indicted on two counts of sexual abuse of a minor. Count I charged him with aggravated
sexual abuse of a person who had not attained the age of twelve years, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2241(c). Count II charged him with abusive sexual contact with a person who had not attained the age of
twelve years, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1).
Prior to trial, Brown made a motion to suppress his inculpatory statement on the ground that he
had not been given the Miranda warnings prior to making the statement. After conducting a
motion/suppression hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding that Brown had not been in
custody when he made the statement to the officers.
At trial, Brown renewed his objection to the admission of his incriminating statement, and the district
court once again found that the statement was admissible.
The district court sentenced Brown to 235 months in prison pursuant to the sentencing guidelines.
Brown argues that his conviction should be reversed because the district court erred in holding
that his inculpatory statement was admissible. Brown maintains that the court incorrectly found
that he was not in custody when he made the statement.
ISSUE: WON the district court is correct in ruling that Brown had not been in custody during his
questioning? - YES.
RULING:
We review the district court's finding under the clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., Carlson v. State,
945 F.2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1347 (8th Cir. 1990)).
"We will affirm the finding unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, is based on an
erroneous interpretation of the law, or we are left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Id. at 1028-29 (citing United States v. Jorgensen, 871 F.2d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 1989)).
Miranda warnings must be given prior to questioning whenever an individual is in custody.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). "An individual is
`in custody' when he has been formally arrested or his freedom of movement has been restrained
to a degree associated with a formal arrest." United States v. Goudreau, 854 F.2d 1097, 1098 (8th Cir.
1988) (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983)
(per curiam)). In United States v. Griffin we enumerated six indicia of custody:
(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that
the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered
under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning;
(3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official request to
respond to questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during
questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the questioning was police dominated; or, (6) whether the
suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the questioning.
Id., 922 F.2d at 1349. The presence of the first three indicia tends to mitigate the existence of
custody at the time of questioning; the presence of the last three indicia aggravate the existence
of custody. Id.
Applying the Griffin indicia to the facts of this case, we find that all of the mitigating and none of
the aggravating indicia were present during Brown's interview.
(1) When Esselbach initially approached Brown outside the Poor Bear residence, he specifically
advised Brown that he was not under arrest. Esselbach also informed Brown that the questioning was
voluntary; he told Brown that the officers wanted to get Brown's side of the story if Brown was willing to
talk to them.
(2) Brown was free to move around during the entire interview. The officers did not handcuff Brown
or physically restrain him in any other manner. Furthermore, both officers testified that the bedroom door
had remained open and unblocked throughout the interview and that Brown could have ended the
interview and left the room at any time.
(3) Brown voluntarily initiated contact with the officers. Brown was inside the Poor Bear residence
when he observed Esselbach and White Face leaving the neighboring Moore residence. Upon learning
that they were law enforcement officers, Brown exited the Poor Bear home and presented himself to the
officers because he believed that they were looking for him. Furthermore, Brown voluntarily acquiesced to
the interview. When Esselbach asked Brown if he was willing to talk to the officers, Brown responded: "I'd
like to get to the bottom of this, too, myself because I don't know what's going on." When asked at the
suppression hearing if he felt compelled to talk to the officers, Brown testified: "[T]he only reason I talked
to them is because I wanted to get to the bottom of it because I didn't understand . . . why they were
saying that I did something that I didn't do. So I figured that if I talked to them, maybe we could get it
straightened out. . . ."
(4) The officers did not employ any strong-arm tactics. During the forty-minute interview, Esselbach
and White Face did not yell at Brown, threaten him, or employ any deceptive stratagems, such as the
good-cop, bad-cop routine. In fact, White Face remained silent until the end of the interview, when he
asked Brown a few personal data questions. The absence of any coercive tactics is a factor indicating
that a reasonable person would not have believed that he was under formal arrest. Griffin, 922 F.2d at
1351.
(5) The atmosphere of the questioning was not police dominated. In making this determination, we
examine such factors as the length and place of the interview. Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1352. As noted earlier,
the interview lasted only forty minutes. The interview took place at the Poor Bear residence, a place
where Brown could feel comfortable, as opposed to a police-operated facility, such as a jail. See United
States v. Goudreau, 854 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988) (interview held in building housing defendant police
officer's chief of police and not in an FBI facility). When an interview is conducted at a site not normally
controlled by law enforcement, we also consider whether the officers took control of the site and persons
present there. Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1352. In addition to Brown, two individuals were present in the Poor
Bear house when the officers first entered it. Neither Esselbach nor White Face instructed these
individuals to do, or not do, anything. The officers merely entered the house and followed Brown into the
bedroom.
(6) Brown was not arrested at the end of the interview. In fact, Brown was not even instructed to stay
in the Pine Ridge area. In concluding the interview, Esselbach informed Brown that the U.S. Attorney's
office would decide whether to prosecute. Esselbach asked Brown whether he would let the officers know
where he was going if he left the Pine Ridge area so that they could contact him if they needed to do so.
Brown was not arrested until five weeks later on August 15, 1991, after further evidence and an
indictment had been obtained.
Having found that all of the mitigating and none of the aggravating indicia of custody were
present when Brown was interviewed, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
holding that Brown had not been in custody during his questioning.
The conviction is affirmed. The sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court
for resentencing.

People v. Maqueda, G.R. No. 112983, March 22, 1995

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means—by telephone if
possible—or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to
it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed
by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the reason
for the arrest and show him “the warrant of arrest, if any.” The underscored phrase simply
means that a case had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original
jurisdiction and that the court had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. From the
foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof
under the second paragraph of Section 20 are available to a person at any time before
arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense. This paragraph was
incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III of the present Constitution with the following additional
safeguards:
(a) the counsel must be competent and independent, preferably of his own choice,
(b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel, he must be provided with one,
and
(c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean
Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under
the Bill of Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the
course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda’s plea to be utilized as a state
witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the
Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without
governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that government has the
duty to protect; or restrictions on the power of government found “not in the particular specific
types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the
doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited.”

Accordingly, Maqueda’s admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in
evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs.
People, this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of
the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to
testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of
what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral
confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial
admissions.

People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997

G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide
committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design,
by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes against her will and without her consent; and the
above-named accused in order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the victim, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said Marianne Guevarra y
Reyes, attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different parts
of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her death.
Contrary to Law.1
 · The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision,
Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima
School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
· Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house. He used the
pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to
take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody
was inside the house.
· Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her.
· Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. When the girl
moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on
the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it
towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.
· The following day, the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her
brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin.
· The autopsy conducted revealed that Marianne died of "traumatic injuries" CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to Traumatic Injuries, Face.
THE SEARCH:
· Mayor trinidad form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where
Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained
with what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes
which were identified as Marianne's.4
· A police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him aboard the
patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated.
· Appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed
Marianne and that he was merely a lookout.
· Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The following day, a
physical examination was conducted on the suspects wherein the appellant was found to sustain: with
multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with abrasions Extremities: freshly-healed
wound along index finger.
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results
of the investigation.
· Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant
approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately.
· The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said
"Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne."
· The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the
proceedings photographed and videotaped.
· In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and
son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them
the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely
implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his
mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. His confession
was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
· Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days more newspaper, radio and
television reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor
and reenacted the crime.
ON ARRAIGNMENT:
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty."
· He testified at the tiem of the incident he was at his parent's house attending to a party wherein the next
day he woke up and he was picked up by the policemen who coerced him to confess that he raped
and killed Marianne. Weakened, appellant confessed to the crime.
TRIAL COURT: convicted appellant and sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court
based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor
of Baliuag and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on
photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime.

Accused-appellant: assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news reporters
because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
 Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial oral confession unassisted by a counsel is admissible in evidence.
RULING: YES.
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the
commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a
confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As intended by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by
the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government."
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne.
Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear
from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime.
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police
failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His
confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house.
SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified.
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence,
hence also inadmissible.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor
is inadmissible. It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant
to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private
meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the
mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights.
(DOCTRINE OF THIS CASE)
Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not
to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to
the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are
primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of
any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to
protect. 47 Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the
individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. 48
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No.
1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex crime
of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality
of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise
of the pardoning power.

People v. Muleta, G.R. No. 130189, June 25, 1999

People v. Obrero, G.R. No. 122142, May 17, 2000

People v. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, February 20, 2001

G.R. No. 133026 February 20, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.

GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.

DOCTRINE: Admission of videotaped confessions is proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-
appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part
of custodial investigation, as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and
forgiveness from the public.

Facts:

· Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino lunged at Dennis and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest.
Dennis' girlfriend Clara pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself
but Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the
direction of the airport.

· Clara with the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis died.

· An Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and Gerry Galgarin and
warrants were issued for their arrest.

· Galgarin was arrested and was immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police then he was
transferred in Palawan.

· On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was
interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while
pointing to his nephew Endino as the gunman.

· Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN
evening news program TV Patrol.

· The case against Galgarin was established through the testimony of Clara that Galgarin stabbed Dennis and
Edward, a spurned lover who harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis.

· The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by next-door neighbor of Dennis.

Galgarin’s claim:
· Disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of Dennis. Galgarin asserted that he was in Antipolo to help his
common-law wife give birth to their first born. He stayed with her until she was discharged. The midwife who
delivered his son, supported the alibi of Galgarin.
· Galgarin disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats
of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution. 8

Trial Court: Admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the police officers that no force or compulsion was
exerted. The court gave credence to the arresting officers' assertion that it was even Galgarin who pleaded with them that he
be allowed to air his appeal on national television for Edward to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing evidence to support his allegation that he was not at
the crime scene. Accordingly, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.

Issue: WON the admission of videotaped confession of Galgarin is proper.

Ruling: YES

Admission of Galgarin’s videotaped confession by the court is proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed
Galgarin unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of
custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness
from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen
who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision

Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview, freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward
Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his will.
Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein.

We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the
recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken
in further admitting similar confessions.

We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the
presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a
difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a
confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.

With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that next presents itself is whether the trial court
correctly denominated the crime as murder qualified by treachery. Doubtless, the crime committed is one of murder
considering that the victim was stabbed while he was simply standing on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride,
blissfully oblivious of the accused's criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting victim, without the
slightest provocation from him who had no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to murder.
People v. Amestuzo, G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001

Jesalva v. People, G.R. No. 187725, January 19, 2011

DOCTRINE: Custodial investigation refers to “any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to
elicit information or a confession from him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct
interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements.

FACTS: The petitioner, Jesalva, was charged with the crime of Murder 4 days after the crime. When
arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc, together with the victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva
(petitioner), Elog Ubaldo,12 Jo Montales and Romy Paladin were at Nena’s place playing mahjong. A certain Mrs. Encinas
and Atty. Alibanto were also there. At about 10 o’clock that night, Gloria’s group left Nena’s place and boarded the Isuzu
panel of petitioner. With the exception of Jo Montales, the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and drink. While
Gloria had softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest consumed beer and [F]undador until 11:30 in the
evening.

After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo who flagged down a tricycle, once again boarded
petitioner’s Isuzu panel as it was usually petitioner who drove them home. The victim Leticia Aldemo was seated at the
front seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at his house first, followed by Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away from
Leticia’s house. While at Gloria’s house, petitioner wanted to drink some more but Gloria told him to defer it until the next
day because the stores were already closed. Gloria then gave Leticia three (3) sticks of barbecue and accompanied her
and petitioner at the gate. After petitioner and Leticia boarded the Isuzu [panel], the former immediately accelerated his
car and went to the direction of 6th Street instead of towards 7th Street where Leticia’s house was situated.

At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1 Mendoza of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol
Section chanced upon petitioner’s Isuzu [panel] in St. Rafael Subdivision in [Our Lady’s Village] OLV, Pangpang,
Sorsogon. The police patrol team approached the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a flashlight at the front portion of
the vehicle to check what was going on. There, SPO1 Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since childhood seated in
front of the wheel so he called out his name. Instead of heeding his call, however, petitioner did not respond, immediately
started the engine and sped away toward Sorsogon town proper which is directly opposite his place of residence which is
Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters holding office at the Bishop’s Compound in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV Pangpang. While he was walking from a certain Lea’s house, he saw a woman
naked from the waist down and lying on her belly on the highway. Her jeans and [panty] were beside her. Because it was
raining, Olbes pitied her so he carried her and her things to the shed some 10 meters away. As he was doing so, a tricycle
being driven by Eduardo De Vera focused its headlight in his direction. De Vera called out, "What is that?" Because he
received no response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger home first and just come back to check the site
later.

Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was bleeding that he even got stained with her blood.
Afraid that he might be implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at Hazelwood such that when De Vera came back, he no
longer found Olbes. De Vera then proceeded to the police station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.

De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the area but to no avail. On their way back at
about 1:15 o’clock (sic) in the morning, they met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel Olbes. De Vera lost no time in identifying him
to be the man he saw with the woman. At this point, Olbes admitted the allegation but professed innocence. He admitted
he left the woman in Hazelwood where the police found her.

Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released until the next day. However, because the evidence
pointed to petitioner as the last person seen with the victim, a search for him was conducted. He "surrendered" at one (1)
o’clock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his first cousin.13
However, the petitioner denied that he killed Leticia. He testified that he did not have any reason to kill
her, and that he had many reasons why he should not kill her. 24 The prosecution manifested that it would
not conduct a cross-examination on the person of petitioner as his testimony was tantamount to pure
denial.25 To prove that there was a broken chain of circumstantial evidence, the defense presented, as
witness, Eduardo de Vera.

On cross-examination, de Vera admitted that he has known [petitioner] for a longtime; and he has good
relationship with him; [petitioner] was his bondsman in Criminal Case for illegal possession of firearms
and because of this, he is indebted to him and he thus wants to repay his gratitude to [petitioner];
[petitioner] requested him to be a witness in the case. 26

The RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on
circumstantial evidence, not of the crime of Murder, but of Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated that, in the
absence of any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery was not established, and that
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not duly proven.

The CA found that the prosecution’s evidence suffice to sustain the accused-appellant’s conviction for
homicide.

ISSUE: WON the lower courts erred in ruling that statements made by petitioner in the police station were
admissible as he was then not under custodial investigation despite sufficient evidence on record that he
would have been detained by the police had his fiscal-companion not [taken] him under his custody – NO

RULING: Custodial investigation refers to “any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to
elicit information or a confession from him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct
interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements.

The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited
through questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally
went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at
around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992.41 The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding that the
constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant case.

Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be convicted of the crime of
Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial evidence, which
were credible and sufficient, and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner committed the
said crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances point to petitioner as the culprit.

DOCTRINE

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)

DOCTRINE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE: the principle that evidence seized by police in violation of the Bill of
Rights, that forbids unreasonable searches and seizures of individuals and property to the
Constitution may not be used against a criminal defendant at trial.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

FACTS: The case originated in Cleveland, Ohio, when three police officers forced their way into Dollree
Mapp's house without a proper search warrant. These police officers believed that Mapp was concealing
a suspected bomber, and demanded entry but Mapp, after calling her attorney, she refused to admit them
without a search warrant. After several hours, additional officers arrived at her place and they forcibly
opened her door. Mapp, in handcuffs, was then forcibly taken upstairs to her bedroom where the officers
searched a dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet and some suitcases. They also looked into a photo
album and through personal papers belonging to Mapp. However, no suspect was found, but police
discovered a trunk of obscene pictures (lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs)
in Mapp's basement. Mapp was arrested for possessing the pictures, and was convicted in an
Ohio court on the basis of the evidence presented and she was sentenced to 1-7 years in the
penitentiary. At the trial no search warrant was produced by the prosecution. There was no
testimony as to who issued any warrant or as to what any warrant contained, and the absence
from evidence of any such warrant is not explained or otherwise accounted for in the record.

Mapp contends that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States was violated by her conviction for possession and control of these books and pictures since
that conviction was based primarily upon their unlawful seizure from her during an unlawful search of her
home.

Mapp's lawyer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court on the basis that Ohio's obscenity law violated the
right to privacy, and only secondarily that the conduct of the police in obtaining the evidence was
unconstitutional. The court affirmed the conviction, and despite the absence of a search warrant, also
ruled that illegally seized evidence could be entered in a criminal trial.

ISSUE: WON the evidence discovered during the search and seizure conducted in violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution shall be admissible in the court

RULING: No, the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s
search and seizure clause in all State prosecutions. Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has
been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same sanction of exclusion is also enforceable against them. The purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter illegally obtaining evidence and to compel respect for the constitutional
guarantee in the only effective manner. Otherwise, a State, by admitting illegally obtained evidence,
disobeys the Constitution that it has sworn to uphold. A federal prosecutor may make no use of illegally
obtained evidence, but a State prosecutor across the street may, although he supposedly is operating
under the enforceable prohibitions of the same Amendment. If the criminal is to go free, then it must be
the law that sets him free. Our government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a 5-3 vote in favor of Mapp. The high court said evidence seized
unlawfully, without a search warrant, could not be used in criminal prosecutions in state courts.
People v. Alicando, G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995

DOCTRINE:

EVIDENCE GATHERED BY THE POLICE AS A RESULT OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WHERE

THE ACCUSED VERBALLY CONFESSED TO THE CRIME WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF COUNSEL IS
INADMISSIBLE.

UNDER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE KNOWN AS THE “FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE,” ONCE
THE PRIMARY SOURCE (THE “TREE”) IS SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED, ANY
SECONDARY OR DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE (THE “FRUIT”) DERIVED FROM IT IS ALSO
INADMISSIBLE.

The Case:

AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Br. 38.

Case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty.

Facts:

The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide
in an Information which reads:

That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force,
violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a
minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with her and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation fractured cervical vertebra and
lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse hemorrhages and other injuries which are
necessarily fatal and which were the direct cause of her death

Arraignment: On June 29, 1994, Alicando was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera
of the PAO, Department of Justice. He pleaded guilty.

After pleading guilty, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence.

That the father of the victim, joined by the Alicando, was drinking liquor in his house. Alicando,
however, would every now and then take leave and return. Appellant was living in his uncle's house
some five (5) arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking
and left.

The Witness of the case, Luisa Rebada, heard the victim crying, she approached appellant's house
and peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The sight shocked her appellant was
naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck.

That when the father of the victim went back home, Khazie Mae was no longer found. Another
neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to answer the call of nature. He discovered the
lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her parents were informed and so was the police.
Aware that the parents of the victim were looking for the victim, Rebada stayed quiet.
At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie
Ann, that appellant committed the crime. Forthwith, Alicando was arrested and interrogated by
PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel.

On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came
to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence
for the prosecution.

The autopsy report of Dr. Doromal was adopted as documentary evidence to prove that the proximate
cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation.

On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death.

The case then was for automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the trial court.

Issue:

WON the evidences obtained, STAINED PILLOW AND T-SHIRT, through Alicando’s uncounselled
verbal confession may be admitted as evidence in the court? – NO – EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Ruling:

The court find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of errors,
both substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of inadmissible and incredible
evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.

First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void.

In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the
language or dialect known to him.

It violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void.

The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant.

The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed
judgment.

The trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions
demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea.

TOPIC: EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were
inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.

The trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the prosecution.

To quote its Decision:

“The physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its
center and the T-shirt of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom .

These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of
Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.”

These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP
as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the
benefit of counsel.

It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence
uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution provides:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him.

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important
confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant
waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel despite the blatant
violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to
flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.

It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence
derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from
the uncounseled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. Again, the testimony of
PO3 Tan makes this all clear

The court have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in their jurisdiction. They have also
adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule,
once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also inadmissible.

Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is
at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based
on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence
because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.

Even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence, still, the trial court
erred in holding that they "strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim
was raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that the stains on the pillow and t-
shirt were human bloodstains. The pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. In addition,
there was no testimony that the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly committed
the crime. It must also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt as he
is a butcher by occupation.

The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel
before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the
burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as
"fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence.

In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of the
procedural irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by the trial
court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel Alicando of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set
aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.

People v. Januario, G.R. No. 98252, February 7, 1997

FACTS: xxxx

People v. Samontanez, G.R. No. 134530, December 4, 2000

People v. Mojello, G.R. No. 145566, March 4, 2004

DOCTRINE

The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion
or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving
claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. Bare assertions
will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption.

The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's will was
overborne at the time he confessed. In cases where the Miranda warnings have been given, the
test of voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight of
the confession.

FACTS:
· On December 1996, around 9:00 p.m., Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a group, then
he left the group to go home
· On his way home, he saw his niece, Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo Mojello walking together
· Since he was used to seeing them together on other occasions, he did not find anything strange
about this so he proceeded to his house.
· The next day, the Rayco family was informed that the body of Lenlen was found at the seashore
of Sitio Kota.
· Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the site and saw the lifeless, naked and bruised body of
his niece.
· Appellant Dindo Mojello was arrested
· On an investigation conducted, he admitted that he was the perpetrator
· Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial interrogation.
· His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains
 · One of the Brgy Captain testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were
read to appellant who later on voluntarily signed it.
· Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge of the (MCTC)
· Then, an autopsy was conducted on the victim's cadaver and the Doctor testified that the swelling
of the labia majora and hymenal lacerations positively indicate that the victim was raped.

· Appellant was arraigned on July 1997, entering a plea of "not guilty."

· Trial followed
· On January 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.

Appellant Dindo Mojello Contention:

· Dindo Mojello contends that the lower court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the alleged
extrajudicial confession which he executed on December 23, 1996
· He avers that the confession which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily
entered into.
· He argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights before
the confession was taken from him.
· Hence, his confession, and admissions made therein, should be deemed inadmissible in
evidence, under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

(Note: fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine - evidence obtained from illegal arrest, search or seizure is not
admissible in the court of law)

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence?

YES. The appellant failed to present independent evidence that he was coerced for his confession on
the crime.

RULING:

Under Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitution:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

The Miranda doctrine requires that:

(a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent;
(b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law;
(c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when
being questioned; and
(d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.
 · On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby
inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the
person who threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel.
· He further claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was
read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily
discourse.

Factors indicating voluntariness of confessions

In People v. Pia, it was stated that all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of
confessions:
- Where appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on
their persons;
- where they failed to complain to officers who administered the oaths;
- where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their
alleged maltreatment;
- where there appears no marks of violence on their bodies and
- where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress
their claim

The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who
allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the
execution of his confessions.

· To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere allegation of
threat, torture, coercion, intimidation or inducement, without any proof whatsoever.
· People v. Enanoria further declared that another indicium of voluntariness is the
disclosure of details in the confession which could have been known only to the declarant.

DOCTRINE IN THIS CASE

“The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion
or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving
claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. Bare assertions
will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption.”
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's will was
overborne at the time he confessed. In cases where the Miranda warnings have been given, the
test of voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight of
the confession.

CONCLUSION
- Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession remains
unrebutted by his failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced.
- Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements under
Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant.
- It follows that the admission of culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore not
"fruit of the poisonous tree" since the tree itself is not poisonous.
Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011

FACTS:

In 1991, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists.
At the arrival area, the group leader Sonny Wong presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs
Examiner Cinco. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers.

From the first traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and chocolate
boxes which she pressed. When the second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were
almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out 4 of the chocolate boxes
and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was white crystalline substance
contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco upon the advise of her superiors, called the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU)
while bringing with her the 4 chocolate boxes earlier discovered.

At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and further examined
their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioner’s
bag which contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two of the chocolate
boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing Sum’s bag followed with 3 chocolate
boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained 2/3 similar chocolate
boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the 6 accused.

NARCOM Agent de Castro conducted a test on the white crystalline substance contained in said chocolate
boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test which yielded positive from methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
The following day, the 13 tourists were brought to the NBI for further questioning. The confiscated stuff were
turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them, which showed that its total weight is
31.1126 kilograms and that the representative samples were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his
5 co-accused.

Accordingly, six separate Informations were filed against petitioner and his co-accused.

When petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation which was granted, it was found that there is conspiracy
among the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single Amended Information.

After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, that they have no knowledge about the transportation of
shabu which were provided by the travel agency.

RTC: found all the accused guilty of conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 and were
sentenced to suffer the PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO PAY THE AMOUNT
OF THIRTY (30) THOUSAND PESOS (p30,000.00) each as FINE.

All of the accused appealed to this Court. Later, all the accused except for petitioner, filed on separate dates
their respective withdrawal of appeal. Consequently, petitioner was the only one left to pursue his appeal.

SC referred the appeal to CA.

CA: affirmed RTC. While conceding that petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel during the custodial
investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient
to warrant his conviction.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Won the evidences taken during the custodial investigation should be excluded?

2. WON petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him?

As to the 1st issue:

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER: he was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the
custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent counsel of his choice.

RULING: No.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohib- its as evidence only confessions and admissions of the
accused as against himself.

While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the
customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the
Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits
as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,
555 SCRA 255 (2008), the Court categorically ruled that “the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights
render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.’
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise
excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.”

In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence of
his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in
evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court
based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated
shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran, 325 SCRA 476 (2000), “[a]ny allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.” Hence, petitioner’s claim that
the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant
consideration.

Petitioner’s conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been caught in flagrante delicto
transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the
testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court, hence it need not be
corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very
act of the commission of the crime.

AS TO THE 2ND ISSUE:

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER: he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses
testified to. Only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to
comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own
countervailing evidence

OSG: petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution
when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioner’s call to hire an interpreter, if he could not, he should
have manifested it before the court.

RULING: No. Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.

As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the
prosecution’s evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. Still
and all, the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and
the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a
defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution.

DOCTRINE IN THIS CASE:

Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such investigation. “The admissibility
of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is
not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.”
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)

U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)

There were 3 defendants in this case: Armstrong, Petschen and Knotts

FACTS: Chemical manufacturer 3M Company informed a Minnesota Bureau of Criminal

Apprehension narcotics officer that Tristan Armstrong (defendant) was stealing chemicals used to
make drugs.

Police began investigating Armstrong and learned that he purchased additional chemicals from
Hawkins Chemical Company and delivered them to Darryl Petschen (defendant).

Hawkins allowed police to place a transmitter called a beeper inside a container of chloroform, which
they gave to Armstrong during his next purchase. Using the beeper and visual surveillance, police
followed the container to Knotts’ (defendant) cabin in Wisconsin.

Over the next three days, the police gathered enough evidence to obtain a search warrant. Inside
the cabin, they discovered chloroform container and a fully stocked drug laboratory, including
chemicals and formulas for producing amphetamine. The defendants were charged with conspiracy
to manufacture controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. and brought before the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota.

Armstrong pled guilty and testified against Knotts and Petschen at trial. Knotts filed a motion to
suppress on the grounds that the use of the beeper without a warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment. The motion was denied, and Knotts was convicted and sentenced to five years in
prison.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the monitoring of the beeper was prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment.

ISSUE: WON monitoring of the beeper was prohibited? No.

RULING: Monitoring the beeper signals did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on
respondent's part, and thus there was neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the contemplation of
the Fourth Amendment.

RATIONALE: The beeper surveillance amounted principally to following an automobile on public

streets and highways. A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements. While respondent had the traditional
expectation of privacy within a dwelling place insofar as his cabin was concerned, such expectation
of privacy would not have extended to the visual observation from public places of the automobile
arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway, or to movements of objects such as the
chloroform container outside the cabin.

The fact that the officers relied not only on visual surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper,
does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting
their sensory faculties with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.
There is no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the movement
of the chloroform container within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been visible to the
naked eye from outside the cabin.
Gaanan v. IAC, G.R. No. L-69809, October 16, 1986

GAANAN v IAC

FACTS:

· Atty Pintor and his client Manuel were in the living room of Atty Pintor discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico.

· Afterwards, Atty Pintor made a telephone call to Laconico

· That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. Appellant then proceeded to the office
of Laconico as per the latter’s request

· When Atty Pintor called Laconico via telephone, Laconico requested appellant to
secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to
hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant
enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault:

a) 5k increased to 8k of which 5k was for Atty pintor because of the latter’s action in persuading
his client to withdraw the direck assault case against Atty Laconico

b) public apology made by Laconico to students of Don Bosco

c) P1,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;

d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical
High School;

e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against
Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office, whereas Montebon’s affidavit of desistance
on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;

f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School

g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;

h) P2,000.00 attorney’s fees for Atty. Pintor.

· 20 minutes later, Atty Pintor called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to
the conditions. Laconico answered `Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for
instructions on where to deliver the money.

· Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his
wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted
his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money.

· When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by
agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

· Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard

complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.

· Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent,

complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Act."

CONTENTION OF GAANAN:

· telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly

known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated
electronic devices contemplated by law.

· He maintains that telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of
the Act.

RESPONDENT PEOPLE ARGUMENT:

· extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of
the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone
apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a
wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be
detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be
 plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication coming from
the other party or end.

TRIAL COURT RULING:

· Gaanan (appellant) and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No.
4200.

IAC RULING

· affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between
the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore,
covered by Rep. Act No. 4200

· Gaanan overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of

the complainant

· extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device"
as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

ISSUES:

· Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement"

under Rep. Act No. 4200 – NO

SC RULING:

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or taperecorder, or however otherwise described;

It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the
next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally
or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition."

· There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty.

Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered
were made between one person and another as distinguished from words between a
speaker and a public.
 · It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to
listen to and overhear the caller’s message with the use of an extension telephone
line.

· Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have
discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 if he knew that another lawyer was also
listening.

· telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines."

· An unwary citizen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the
details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be
accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private
communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such
mischievous results.

· The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement"
for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record
the spoken words.

· An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,

dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use.

· Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of
the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to
tapping the main line of a telephone.

· It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party

or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and
their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

· An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that
the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he
runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which
shares its line with another.

· In the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):

"Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to
ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes
the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to
overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any
privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of, interception,
has not occurred."

· the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an
extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

SPS. BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY (2013)

G.R. No. 179736

DOCTRINE: The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is used to determine whether there is a violation of the right to privacy.

The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test:

1. whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and

2. this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.

FACTS: On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the RTC of Mandaue City a Complaint for Injunction
and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by TCT No. 42817 situated in
Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu. It is also alleged that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
(Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C which are adjacent to the property of petitioners. Respondents constructed an auto-repair
shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C.

In April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO. In that case,
Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of
its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property. The Supreme Court in that said case eventually denied Aldo’s application for
preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations. In order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on
June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo, 2 video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property.
Respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going
construction. The acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy. Therefore, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered
to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras, nor did they order
their employees to take pictures of petitioners’ construction. They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere
stockholders.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT: On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the application for a TRO. The respondents
were directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side of
petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed within a
distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.

Respondents moved for a reconsideration but was denied by the RTC.

Respondents elevated the case to the CA via a a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

COURT OF APPEALS: On July 10, 2007, the CA annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The CA explained that the
right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not
used as a residence. The CA also said that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video
surveillance cameras. They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.

PETITIONERS’ CONTENTIONS: Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because
respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving camera covering a significant
portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy. They cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which
enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of others. Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s
residence, petitioners opine that according to Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, it includes business offices. Thus, even assuming
arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said provision.
They further allege that respondents and Aldo are one and the same and that if respondents are not the real owners of the building,
where the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by
the court.

RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS: Respondents, argue that petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property
involved is not used as a residence. Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance
cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner of the building, as additional security for its building. Hence, they
were wrongfully impleaded in this case.

ISSUES:

(1) WON there is a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy [main issue]

(2) WON respondents are the proper parties to this suit

RULING:

(1) YES.

The test applicable in order to determine whether there is a violation of the right to privacy is the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test.

This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In
Ople v. Torres, the Court enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1)
whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable
expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case
basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The
installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the
privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic
Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

The Supreme Court held that the RTC was correct in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction. The RTC ruled to wit:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by
respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of petitioners,
who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on respondents’ property or the roof of the factory
at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the
revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on-going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a
portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the
building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents’
camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the
petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."

The RTC, to which the Supreme Court affirmed, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their
property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly
facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.
Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.

(2) YES.

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not have
installed the video surveillance cameras. Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered
owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which
could be used against petitioners in another case. During the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill
testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not
seem to care, and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents
before the RTC. He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy
family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties. With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that
respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-
owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October
18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Vivares, et al. v. St. Theresa’s College, et al., G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND
DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
v.
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DOCTRINE:
1. The WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It
seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.
Habeas data was designed “to safeguard
individual freedom from abuse in the information
age.” As such, it is erroneous to limit its
applicability to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances only.
2. There are three strands of the right to privacy, viz:
(1) locational or situational privacy; (2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.
RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY is
usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.
It is incumbent upon internet users to exercise due
diligence in their online dealings and activities and
must not be negligent in protecting their rights.
Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from
the courts requires that claimants themselves take
utmost care in safeguarding a right which they
allege to have been violated. These are
indispensable. The Court cannot afford protection
to persons if they themselves did nothing to place
the matter within the confines of their private zone.
FACTS: NENITA JULIA V. DALUZ (Julia) and JULIENNE
VIDA SUZARA (Julienne), both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high school students at St.
Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City.
It appears that Julia and Julienne, along with several others,
took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments, which were then uploaded by Angela
Lindsay Tan on her Facebook profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero),
a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,
learned from her students that Julia, Julienne, and Chloe
Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others posted pictures
online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only
in brassieres.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to
their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed
her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia
and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes
inside a bar; (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu
wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of
their black brassieres; and that (c) access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not
confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter to Kristine
Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation,
STC found the identified students to have violated the
school’s Student Handbook.
Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the
pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr.
Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe, STC’s high school principal and
ICM Directress. They were informed that they are barred
from joining the commencement exercises.
A week before graduation, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M.
Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before
the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al.
The RTC issued a TRO allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
STC, nevertheless, barred the students from participating in
the graduation rites.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, alleging that an invasion
of their children’s privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the
RTC, through an Order, issued the writ of habeas data.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and
filed their verified written return, laying down the grounds for
the denial of the petition, among others, (a) that the Writ of
Habeas Data was enacted solely for the purpose of
complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances and (b) that there can
be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
habeas data.
ISSUES:
a) WON a writ of habeas data is confined to cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances [NO]
b) WON there was indeed an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case. [NO]
RULING:
out that:
1) The WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent
and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to
the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to
protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined
HABEAS DATA as “a procedure designed to safeguard
individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” The
writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an
alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.
Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a
person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at
least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may
be extended.
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of
Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of
complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a
petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances,
the petition may be filed by:
a) Any member of the immediate family of the
aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or
b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity,
in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation
of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section
2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not
have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed “to safeguard
individual freedom from abuse in the information age.”17 As
such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the
annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ
of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed
The writ of habeas data, however, can be
availed of as an independent remedy to
enforce one’s right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy.
The remedies against the violation of such right
can include the updating, rectification, suppression
or destruction of the database or information or
files in possession or in control of respondents. 18
(emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data
may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
2) The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly
evolved, with technological advancements having an
influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s
speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he
explained the three strands of the right to privacy,
viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational
privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is
relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational
privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to
control information about themselves.
To address concerns about privacy, but without
defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information
uploaded by the user. For instance, a Facebook user
can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin
or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by
selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook
user can view the photo;
b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook
friends and their friends can view the photo;
c) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends
can view the photo;
d) Custom - the photo is made visible only to
particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
e) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed
only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook
users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit
the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among others, from another
user’s point of view. It is through the availability of said
privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a
subjective expectation that only those to whom they
grant access to their profile will view the information
they post or upload thereto.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or
her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user,
in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto
or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the
OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of
these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed
Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are
the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos
using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to
show that no special means to be able to view the
allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to
assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts
is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook,
absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were
the case, they cannot invoke the protection
attached to the right to informational privacy.
That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not
necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s
or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance
that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is
not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content
or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the
post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared
the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.”
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are
visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook
friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task
for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the
minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures
to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what
were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily
given to them by persons who had legitimate access to
the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the
friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however,
neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed
the images to Escudero.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in
question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor
students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to
affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the
minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However,
the records are bereft of any evidence, other than
bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s
privacy settings to make the photos visible only to
them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed
the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of
their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist
that they have an expectation of privacy with
respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures
posted were limited to the original uploader, through the
“Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list
has been screened to limit access to a select few,
through the “Custom” setting, the result may have been
different, for in such instances, the intention to limit
access to the particular post, instead of being
broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s
friends en masse, becomes more manifest and
palpable.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise
due diligence in their online dealings and activities and
must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity
serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as
here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost
care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have
been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot
afford protection to persons if they themselves did
nothing to place the matter within the confines of their
private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to
learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire
to keep the information private, and to keep track of
changes in the available privacy settings, such as those
of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious
for changing these settings and the site’s layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did
not violate the minors’ privacy rights, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and case
disposition of the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED.