Stonehill v.

Diokno  In this case, none of these req has been complied

20 SCRA 383 (1967)
Search and Seizure: General
FACTS:
 Several judges (respondent judges) issued on
different dates, 42 search warrants against
petitioner to search the persons and/or the premises
of their offices, warehouses, and/or residences, and
to seize and take possession of the following
personal property:
o "Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
type¬writers, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."
as the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense or used as the means of
committing the offense, violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and RPC.
 Petitioners alleged that the warrants were issued to
fish evidence against petitioners; that the search
warrants do not describe with particularity the
things to be seized, and that the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner.
with in the warrants.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched.
First, No specific offense had been alleged (only “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
Code, and Revised Penal Code”), the offense committed were
abstract, and as a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of probable cause.
Second, under Rule 126 of the revised rules of court "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific of fense." And that “no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.”
The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners,
regardless if the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever
their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command
of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be
particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.

ISSUE/S:

 WON the search warrants, and the searches and

seizures made were valid or not;

HELD:

SC – NOT VALID.

 Search warrants are in the nature of general

warrants and that the seizures effected upon
authority thereof are null and void.
 In connection with Sec 2, Art III, Consti: no warrant
shall be issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge (after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce) AND that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

1
Burgos v. Chief of Staff
133 SCRA 800 (1984)
Search and Seizure: General
FACTS:
 Petitioners seeks to annul the 2 search warrants
which were issued by respondent Judge for the
search of the business offices of the “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, and seizure of
those “which have been used, and are being used as
instruments and means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under PD 885 as amended.”
 The search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants based on the description of the articles
sought to be seized:
"1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders,
dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the
printing of the "WE FORUM' newspaper and any and all
documents, communications, letters and facsimile of prints
related to the 'WE FORUM" newspaper. “

ISSUE:

WON the search warrants, and likewise the searches and

seizures are valid

HELD:

SC – NO, not valid search warrants.

 Petitioners contend that the search warrants,

although directed against petitioner Burgos alone,
articles belonging to his co-petitioners were seized.

Under Sec 2, Rule 126 ROC, it does not require that the
property to be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is directed. It is sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner
Burgos was alleged to have in relation to the articles and
property seized under the warrants.

 Petitioner also contend that the documents could

not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly
issued

The application for the search warrant must contain

specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. In this
case, the application stated that petitioner “is in possession
or has in control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were used and
are all continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree
885, as amended x x x" is a mere conclusion of law and does
not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.

2
People v. Marti agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the
parcels containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the
193 SCRA 57 (1991) case and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI
agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one.
Search and Seizure: General
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
FACTS:
seizures applies as a restraint only against the government to
 Appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
went to the booth of “Manila, Packing and Export exercise of power is imposed and cannot be extended to acts
Forwarders” to send 4 gift-wrapped packages to committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
Zurich, Switzerland. ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
 Anita Reyes (the proprietress) then asked the
appellant if she could examine and inspect the
packages. However, appellant refused, assuring her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars,
and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich.
 However, before delivery of the box to the Bureau of
Customs, Job Reyes (proprietor, husband of Anita),
following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection.
 When he opened appellant’s box, a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. And when he squeezed one of
the bundles allegedly containing gloves, he felt dried
leaves inside. When he opened one of the gloves, he
found dried marijuana leaves.
 Mr Reyes reported the shipment to the NBI and sent
samples he extracted from the box.
 An information was filed against appellant for
violation of RA 6425, or the Dangerous Drugs Act.
 Appellant claims that the evidence were in violation
of his constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and privacy of communication
(Sec 2 and 3, Art III, Constitution) and therefore the
same should be held inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE:

May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of

appellant’s constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State?

HELD:

SC – NO. the constitutional right against unreasonable

searches and seizure cannot be invoked against the State in
absence of governmental interference.

The inspection made by Mr Reyes was reasonable and a

standard operating procedure on his part as a precautionary
measure before delivering the packages to the BOC. And he
took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the
3
People v. Bangcarawan
 The vessel security personnel is, even though tasked
384 SCRA 525 (2002) to maintain peace and order like police authorities, a
private employee and does not discharge any
Search and Seizure: General
governmental function unlike police officers who are
FACTS: agents of the state who are tasked with the
sovereign function of enforcement of the law.
 Appellant was charged with violation of RA 6425 for
having in his possession, custody 8 packs of Shabu.
 While on board M/V Super Ferry 5 (from Manila to
Iligan City), a passenger complained about her
missing jewelry to security officer Mark Diesmo. She
suspected appellant, one of her co-passengers, as
the culprit.
 Appellant was informed of the complaint and was
escorted to get his baggage.
 When appellant opened his Samsonite suitcase, it
revealed a brown bag and small plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance. Thus, the
security personnel immediately reported the matter
to the ship captain and called for the Philippine
Coast Guard for assistance.
 Appellant explained that he was just requested by a
certain Alican Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the
latter’s brother in Iligan City.
 He claimed that when he refused to open the
Samsonite suitcase the security personnel forcibly
opened the suitcase and found the packs of shabu,
thus, a violation of his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and that the
evidence is inadmissible against him.

ISSUE:

WON the search and seizure made was in violation of

appellant’s constitutional right

HELD:

SC – NO.

 The search and seizure of the suitcase and the

contraband items was carried out without
government intervention, hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure
does not apply.

 Baggage of appellant was searched by the vessel

security personnel and it was only after they found
the shabu inside the suitcase that they called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.
4
U.S. v. Place
462 U.S. 696 (1983)
Search and Seizure: General
FACTS:
 Respondent Raymond Place was waiting in line at
the Miami International Airport to purchase a ticket
going to New York when he was approached by
police officers (his behavior aroused their suspicions)
and requested his airline ticket and identification. He
complied with the request and consented to a
search of the two suitcases, but because his flight
was about to depart, the agents decided not to
search the luggage.
 The agents inspected the address tags on the
luggage and found out that neither address existed.
Because of this info and the encounter with res, the
agents called Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) authorities in New York to relay their info
about res. The 2 DEA agents waited for res at the
arrival gate in New York.
 After res claimed his bags, the DEA agents
approached him and that they believed that he
might be carrying narcotics.
 The DEA agent informed him that they were going to
take the luggage to a federal judge and try to obtain
a search warrant, and that res was free to
accompany them. But declined.
 The agents then took the bags to Kennedy Airport,
where they subjected the bags to a “sniff test” by a
trained narcotics detection dog. The dog reacted
positively on the smaller bag.
 Because it was a late Friday afternoon, they retained
the bag until they secured a search warrant on
Monday morning.
 Upon opening the bag, they found 1,125g of cocaine.
 Res claimed that the warrantless seizure of the
luggage violated his 4th Amendment rights.
ISSUE:
WON the seizure of respondent’s luggage was unreasonable
under the 4th Amendment.
HELD:
SC – YES.
Seizure of personal property as per se unreasonable within
the meaning of the 4th Amendment unless it is accomplished
pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause
and particularly describing the items to be seized.
XPN: pending issuance of a warrant seizure of property is
permitted, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or
some other recognized exception
Court applies the principles of Terry v Ohio, where the court
permitted the seizures on the basis of reasonable, articulable
suspicion, premised on objective facts, that the luggage
contains contraband or evidence of a crime.
Basis – governmental interest (must be substantial) prevails
over individual’s 4th Amendment interest when the nature
and extent of the intrusion is limited in scope.
In this case, the purpose for which respondent’s luggage was
seized was to arrange its exposure to a narcotics detection
dog. A “canine sniff” does not require opening the luggage.
Thus, this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a
typical search. The information obtained is also limited since
the sniff disclosed only the presence or absence of narcotics.
The “canine sniff” is sui generis.
However:
 The DEA agents knew the time of res’ scheduled
arrival at New York, and had ample time to
arrange for their additional investigation at that
location, and thereby could have minimized the
intrusion on res’ 4th Amendment interests.
 The detention Res’ luggage went beyond the
narrow authority possessed by police to detain
briefly the luggage. (It was detained for a 90-
minute period).
 And the agents failed to accurately informed res
of the place to which they were transporting his
luggage, of the length of time he might be
dispossessed, and of what arrangements would
be made for return of the luggage if the
investigation dispelled the suspicion.
5
Pendon v. CA
191 SCRA 429 (1990)
Procedure for issuance of a search warrant
FACTS:
 First Lieutenant Felipe Rojas filed an application for a
search warrant for the search and seizure of the
“"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive
assembly; aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR
Tower parts and line accessories” allegedly in the
possession and concealed by Kenneth Siao.
 The application was subscribed before Judge
Magallanes (MTC of Bacolod City) and supported by
the joint deposition of 2 witnesses: an employee of
NAPOCOR and the CIS of Bacolod City.
 On the basis of the application and joint deposition,
Judge Magallanes issued the search warrant.
 Galvanized bolts, v chuckle and U-bolts; and an
angular bar were obtained.
 A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD
1612) was filed against Kenneth Siao.
 Petitioner contention – the application for the
search warrant and the joint deposition failed to
comply with the requisites of searching questions
and answers.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of the search warrant is valid
the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted."
In this case, the requirement that the judge must personally
examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant
was not sufficiently complied with.
 The applicant was not asked any searching question
by Judge Magallanes. Applicant merely subscribed
the application before Judge Magallanes.
 The application contained pre-typed questions, none
of which stated that applicant had personal
knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the
proceeds thereof are in the possession and control
of the person against whom the search warrant was
sought to be issued.
"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that
the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found
later that his declarations are false.’

HELD:

SC – NO. VOID.

The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a

finding of probable cause. In determining the existence of
probable cause, it is required that:

1. The judge (or) officer must examine the witness

personally;
2. The examination must be under oath; and
3. The examination must be reduced to writing in the
form of searching questions and answers.

These requirements are provided under Sec 4, Rule 126 of the

New Rules of Criminal Procedure:

"Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The

judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in

6
Silva v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Negros Oriental
203 SCRA 140 (1991)
Procedure for issuance of a search warrant
FACTS:
 An application for search warrant was filed with the
RTC of Dumaguete City against petitioners
Nicomedes and Marlon Silva for alleged violation of
RA 6425, (Dangerous Drugs Act). Judge Ontal issued
the search warrant.
 Petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant
No. 1 on the grounds that (1) it was issued on the
sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for
Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", which
were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks
and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the
complainant and witnesses by searching questions
and answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of the search warrant was illegal
HELD:
SC – YES.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private
security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted. 8
Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide
for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory
provisions, the judge must, before issuing a search warrant,
determine whether there is probable cause by examining the
complainant and witnesses through searching questions and
answers.
In this case, Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal
requirement that he must examine the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in
order to determine the existence of probable cause.
The joint deposition of witness submitted together with the
application were for the most part suggestive answers
answerable by merely placing “yes” or “no” in the blanks
provided.
Asking leading questions to the deponent in an application for
search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general
manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a
valid search warrant.
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused
their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta
Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva
was not even named as one of the respondents, that the
warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only of
marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the search
warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a)
subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as
means of committing an offense and NOT for personal
property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of
the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise
abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of
petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized
money.
7
People v. Mamaril favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment
upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the
420 SCRA 662 (2004) Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
Procedure for issuance of a search warrant

FACTS:

 Appellant Benhur Mamaril was found guilty of

violation of RA 7659 by the RTC of Lingayen,
Pangasinan for the possession of marijuana.
 SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied for a search warrant
authorizing the search for marijuana in the family
residence of appellant. Judge Ramos issued said
search warrant.
 The searching team found and confiscated plastic
sachets containing marijuana leaves.
 Appellant contend that: ) the exhibits of the
prosecution are inadmissible in evidence under
Section 2 and Section 3 (2) of Article III (Bill of Rights)
of the 1987 Constitution as the search warrant, by
virtue of which said exhibits were seized, was
illegally issued, considering that the judges
examination of the complainant and his two
witnesses was not in writing; and (2) said search
warrant was illegally or improperly implemented. 

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant was illegally issued

HELD:

SC – YES. Search warrant is void.

The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon finding

of probable cause. It is required that: (1) the judge must
examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2)
the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination
must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions
and answers.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that Judge Ramos

put into writing his examination of the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers.
The records only show the existence of an application for a
search warrant and the affidavits of the complainants’
witnesses.

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly

comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the
statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in

8
Malaloan v CA
232 SCRA 249 (1994)
Procedure for issuance of a search warrant
[Canlas, C]
FACTS:
Salboro of CAPCOM Northern Sector filed with RTC Kalookan City an
application for search warrant in connection with an alleged
violation of PD 1866 (Ilegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions). Members of CAPCOM armed with the subject
warrant proceeded to the situs of the offense where a labor seminar
was then taking place. Firearms, explosive materials and subversive
documents, among others were seized and taken during the search.
The petitioners presented a Motion for Quashal of Search Warrant
and For the Suppression of All Illegality Acquired Evidence. They
invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to
invalidate the search warrant issued by RTC Kalookan City because it
is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly
cached in Quezon City. It was claimed that the application for search
warrant was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since
venue in criminal actions involve territorial jurisdiction of the court,
that such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without
jurisdiction to do so. However, the validity of the warrant was
upheld.
ISSUE:
WON a court may take cognizance of an application for a search
warrant in connection with an offense allegedly committed outside
its territorial jurisdiction and to issue a warrant to conduct a search
on a place likewise outside its territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
YES. A search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the
Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has
already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter
contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial
clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a
criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no
such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed
in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles
sought to be seized are then located. This is aside from the
consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues
under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where
different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the
same criminal offense.
No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly
provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of
enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the
interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the
country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph
(a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the
processes contemplated in paragraph (b) in Sec 15.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the
following policy guidelines:
1.  The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary
jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for
purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be
filed with another court only under extreme and compelling
circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of
the latter court which may or may not give due course to the
application depending on the validity of the justification offered for
not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2.  When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to
quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court,
without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher
court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court.
All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be
raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of
the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3.  Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or
resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the
court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the
same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts
with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion
to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are
alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum
shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal
of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall
likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher
court.
4.  Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the
motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from
further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the
warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the
criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and
documentation therefor.
5.  These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same
criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints
and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction
over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the
case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as
vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search
warrants incident to the criminal case.
9
Groh v Ramirez

540 U.S. 551 (2004)

Procedure for issuance of a search warrant

[Garcia, J]

FACTS:

 Petitioner Groh, an agent of Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms agent, prepared and signed an
application for a warrant to search respondents’
Montana ranch which stated that the search was for
a specified weapons, explosives and records
believing such items were on the ranch
 The Magistrate Judge signed the warrant even it did
not identify any of the items.
 Petitioner led federal and local law enforcement
officers to the ranch but found no illegal weapons or
explosives.
 The District Court found that there is no Fourth
Amendment violation.

ISSUE:

WON there is a valid search warrant thus not violating the

fourth amendment.

Held:

No. The warrant was plainly invalid. It did not meet the
Fourth Amendment’s requirement. The Fourth Amendment
provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
search and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized”

The application adequately described those things to be

seized but was not enough to satisfy the particularity
requirement provided in fourth amendment it was necessary
that the things to be seized must be specifically described.

10
Paper Industries Corp. v. Asuncion
307 SCRA 687 (1984)
Procedure for issuance of a search warrant
[Garcia, J]
FACTS:
 Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied
for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City.
It was alleged that the management of Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at
PICOP compound, Surigao del Sure is in possession
or has in its control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of
the offense, or used or intended to be used in
committing the offense.
 The PICOP compound is made up 200 offices, 15
plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3piers all of which
are spread out over some 155 hectares with security
guards.
 Judge Maximo Asuncion issued the warrant after
examining under oath, SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod that
there is probable cause to believe that the
management of PICOP has in its possession or
control of the following: 70 M16 Aramalite, M14 US
rifles, AK47, UZI, grenade launchers and other high
powered firearms.
 The Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash believing
that the warrant was invalid and the search was
unreasonable and subsequently the RTC denied the
motions
ISSUE:
WON probable cause has been sufficiently established and
the warrant was validly issued.
Held:
No. The requisites of a valid search warrant are: 1. Probable
cause is present 2. Such presence is determined personally by
the judge 3. The complainant and the witnesses may produce
are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under
oath or affirmation 4. The applicant and the witnesses testify
on facts personally known to them and 5. The warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things
to be seized.
The foregoing requisites were not fully satisfied, first there
was no personal examination of the witnesses the hearing for
the issuance of the search warrant consisted ONLY of
introducing the witness. The complainant and the witness
was only introduced and said nothing more. In fact, they
failed to even affirm their application. The respondent judge
merely relied in their affidavits and the Supreme Court held
that: Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it
if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
Bacolod’s Testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known
to Him. When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated that
he was investigating the premises for allege assassination plot
of Congressman Amante and based from that he merely
believed that the PICOP nor their security guards had no
license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does
not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on
his personal knowledge, not belief. The complainant and the
witness failed to produce any document that the PICOP or the
its security agency has no license to firearms.
Lastly, the warrant failed to describe the place with
particularity. It simply authorizes a search of the
aforementioned premises, but it did not specify such
premises. As stated the PICOP compound is made up 200
offices, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3piers all of
which are spread out over some 155 hectares. Obviously, the
warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal
authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP
compound.
11
People v. Dichoso
223 SCRA 174 (1993)
Procedure for issuance of a search warrant
[Canlas, C]
FACTS:
Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.
Narctorics Command of the 4 th Regional Unit stationed at
Interior M. Paulino St., San Pablo City applied for a search
warrant to be issued on the house of spouses Dichoso. After
searching questions, the Court was satisfied that there
existed probable cause. Consequently, the warrant was
issued by the Court. The next day, Evangelista, the local
District Commander organized team to serve the warrant.
Upon approaching the said residence, the team met an old
man and Evangelista introduced himself and his companions
as Narcom agents duly armed with a search warrant and then
asked for the spouses. The old man led them to the nipa hut
where Redentor and three other persons were sitted near a
small table with suspected shabu and parapehernalia on top
thereof. The search ensued inside the nipa house. Evangelista
found marijuana and shabu in the said nipa house and none
was found in the main house.
known as the Dangerous Drug Act of 1992 as
amended,” it particularizes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized and specifies the offense
involved. Although the specific section of the DDA is
not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a
basis for finding probable cause.
2. The warrant rule that only those listed in the search
warrant may be seized is not without exceptions.
Among such exceptions is the plain view doctrine,
that objects falling in plain view of an officer who has
a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be introduced into
evidence.
3. The view of the appellant that the search was illegal
and the articles seized was illegal and the articles
seized cannot be used against him in evidence since
he doesn’t own the house is unmeritorious. It is not
necessary that the property to be searched or seized
should be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant issued; it is sufficient that property is
is under his control and possession.

Redentor filed a Notice of Appeal contending that the search

warrant should have been quashed for being a general
warrant, thus, the case against him should have been
dismissed.

ISSUES:

1. WON the warrant was a general warrant.

2. WON the ownership of the nipa hut is relevant to
the serving of the warrant.
3. WON the seizure of the brown notebook containing
list of names and figures which was not listed in the
warrant, thus should not have been seized. More
specifically, WON only items specifically mentioned
in the warrant may be the subject of seizure during
the search.

RATIO:

1. No, said warrant does not constitute a general

warrant because while it is for “Violation of RA6245

12
People v. Salanguit
356 SCRA 683 (2001)
Procedure for issuance of a search warrant
[Garcia, J]
FACTS:
 Accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty
criminal case No. Q-95-64357 in violation of Section
16 of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, and also found guilty in
Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358 in violation of Section
8 of the said law and sentencing him for such
violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
 Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search
the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit
y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He
presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who
testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to
purchase 2.12 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) from accused-appellant. The
application was granted, and a search warrant was
later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. The
warrant authorized the seizure of shabu and drug
paraphernalia.
 After showing the search warrant to the occupants
of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house. They found 12 small heat-
sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also
containing a white crystalline substance, and two
bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total
weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of
the items seized was prepared, but the accused-
appellant refused to sign it.
 The search warrant contains only as regards to
shabu and drug paraphernalia.
ISSUE:
WON there was a probable cause and WON the court a
quo erred in admitting in evidence the 2 bricks of
marijuana.
Held:
The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined
quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was
presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. There is
however, no sufficient evidence for the existence of drug
paraphernalia but the fact that there was no probable
cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the
search warrant is void. the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia,
but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochlorid (shabu) but not
marijuana. The seizure of the latter drug is being justified
on the ground that the drug was seized within the plain
view of the searching party. However, the location of
the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known
to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that
the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the
valid portion of the search warrant has been executed,
the plain view doctrine can no longer provide any basis
for admitting the other items subsequently found. 
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by
the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to accused-
appellants lawful arrest for possession
of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is
limited to the person of the one arrested and the
premises within his immediate control. The rationale for
permitting such a search is to prevent the person
arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or
to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the
marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the
warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-
appellants person or in an area within his immediate
control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the
search conducted after the shabu had been recovered
from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his
depostion, was invalid. Accordingly, for failure of the
prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana
without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the
plain view doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. 
13
Kho v. Macalintal
307 SCRA 70 (1999)
Procedure for issuance of a search warrant
[Pangan, DP]
FACTS:
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agents Salvador and Arugay applied for
the issuance of search warrants by Judge Makalintal in order
to search 2 separate residences of Kho. Prior to the
application of search warrants, teams of NBI agents
conducted personal surveillance and investigation in the two
houses on the basis of the confidential information they
received that the said places were being used as storage
centers for unlicensed firearms and chop-chop vehicles.
On the same day, Judge Makalintal conducted the necessary
examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after
which he issued the sought search warrants.
The next day, NBI agents, armed with the search warrants,
searched the subject premises and recovered various high
powered firearms, explosives, more than a thousand rounds
of ammunition, various radio and telecommunication
equipment, two units of motor vehicles, and one motorcycle.
On May 28, 1990, Kho and Alindogan presented a Motion to
Quash the said Search Warrants, contending that:
1. The subject search warrants were issued
without probable cause;
2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the
Constitution for being general warrants;
3. The said search warrants were issued in
violation of the procedural requirements set
forth by the Constitution;
4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in
violation of the Revised Rules of Court; and
5. The objects seized were all legally possessed
and issued.
On July 26, 1990, Judge Makalintal issued an Order denying
the said Motion to Quash interposed by the petitioners. Thus,
this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the subject search warrants were issued without
probable cause
WON the said search warrants were issued in violation of the
procedural requirements set forth by the Constitution
WON the same search warrants are prohibited by the
Constitution for being general warrants
HELD:
SC – No, records show that the NBI agents who conducted
the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocally that
they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two
houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were
stored therein. The witnesses also personally saw the
weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to
the premises referred to. It is clear that the application for
the questioned search warrants was based on the personal
knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.
No, Judge Makalintal personally examined the applicants and
their witnesses under oath, and asked them searching
questions on the facts and circumstances personally known
to them, in compliance with prescribed and legal
requirements. It was within the discretion of the examining
Judge to determine what questions to ask the witnesses so
long as the questions are germane to the pivot of inquiry –
the existence or absence of probable cause.
No, the law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail so as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities. The NBI agents could not have been in a position
to know beforehand the exact caliber or make of the firearms
to be seized. The failure to specify detailed descriptions in the
warrants did not render the same general.
14
Worldwide Web Corporation v. People HELD:

713 SCRA 18 (2014) SC – No, the transcript of stenographic notes during the
hearing for the application for search warrants on Sept. 25,
Procedure for issuance of a search warrant 2001 shows that Judge Lopez asked searching questions to
the witnesses and particularly sought clarification on the
[Pangan, DP]
alleged illegal toll bypass operations of WWC and Planet
FACTS: Internet as well as the pieces of evidence presented.

Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the Regional Intelligence
Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the PNP filed
applications for warrants before the RTC of QC branch 78, to
search the office premises of Worldwide Web Corporation
(WWC) and Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet). The
applications alleged that WWC and Planet Internet were
conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to
theft and violation of PD No. 401 to the damage and
prejudice of PLDT.
No, the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law
enforcement officers in describing the items to be searched,
especially when these items are technical in nature, and
when the extent of illegal operation is largely unknown to
them. The things to be seized must be described with
particularity and technical precision of description is not
required. Any description of the place or thing to be searched
that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable
certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.

On Sept. 26, 2001, the RTC granted the application for search
warrants and were implemented on the same day by RISOO
operatives of the NCRPO.

Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 CPUs, 10

monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a
laptop computer.

WWC and Planet Internet filed motions to quash the

search warrants, citing basically the same grounds:

1. The search warrants were issued without

probable cause, since the acts complained of did
not constitute theft;

2. Toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a

crime;

3. The search warrants were general warrants; and

4. The objects seized pursuant thereto were “fruits

of the poisonous tree”.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrants were issued without probable

cause

WON the search warrants were general warrants

15
Carroll v. U.S.

267 U.S. 132 (1925)

Warrantless Searches: Moving vehicles

[Pangan, DP]

FACTS:

On Sept. 29th, Cronewett and Scully (federal prohibition

agents) were in an apartment in Grand Rapids. Three men
came to that apartment, Kruska and the two defendants
Carroll and Kiro. Cronewett was introduced to them as one
Stafford, who wished to buy three cases of whisky. The three
men said they’d get the liquor and get back but they could
not get it that night but they’d deliver it the next day. They
rode an Oldsmobile Roadster, the number which both
Cronewett and Scully identified. They did not return the next
day to deliver the liquor. Cronewett and his subordinates
were engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to
Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. On
Oct. 6th, they were passed by Carroll and Kiro, riding the same
Oldsmobile Roadster but unfortunately they were not able to
catch up with them. On Dec. 15 th, they chanced upon them
again with the same car and this time successfully
apprehended them. They stopped and searched their car and
found 68 bottles of liquor.

ISSUE:

WON Cronewett and his subordinates effected a valid

warrantless search

HELD:

SC – Yes, Cronewett and his subordinates had reasonable

ground to believe that Carroll and Kiro, riding the same
vehicle as when they tried to apprehend them before and
when they tried to buy liquor from them even before that,
are engaged in illegal activities at the time they were
apprehended. It is known that Grand Rapids is about 152
miles from Detroit and that Detroit is one of the most active
centers for introducing illegally into the country spirituous
liquors for distribution in the interior. It is obvious from the
evidence that the prohibition agents were engaged in a
regular patrol along the important highways of Detroit to
Grand Rapids to stop and seize liquor carried in automobiles.
They knew or had convincing evidence to make them believe
that the Carroll boys were engaged in plying the unlawful
trade of selling such liquor in that city.

16
People v. Que

265 SCRA 721 (1996)

Warrantless Searches: Moving vehicles

[Pangan, DP]

FACTS:

On Mar. 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, Asuncion and Patoc, members

of the Provincial Task Force(PTF) on Illegal Logging, went on
patrol around the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in
Laoag City on an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing
plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will
pass through. At about 1:30 in the morning, they saw the said
truck which they followed and apprehended at the Marcos
Bridge.

SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it

contained coconut slabs. Also, Que told him that there were
sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs. When
asked for the supporting documents for the cargos, Que
could not provide any.

At 10:00 in the morning, the members of the PTF

together with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. It
was found out that 258 pieces of tanguile lumber with a total
assessed value of P93,232.50.

ISSUE:

WON the 258 pieces of lumber were inadmissible as evidence

because they were obtained through an illegal warrantless
search

HELD:

SC – NO, the Constitutional proscription against warrantless

searches and seizures admits of exceptions. Warrantless
searches of moving vehicles had been upheld on the ground
that the mobility of the motor vehicles makes it possible for
the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe before search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched.

17
Caballes v. CA
373 SCRA 221 (2002)
Warrantless Searches: Moving vehicles
[Pangan, DP]
FACTS:
At about 9:15pm of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan,
Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeepney unusually
covered with “kakawati” leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled
goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. They
then checked the cargo and discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires weighing 700kgs and
valued at P55,244.45.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless search and seizure made by the police
officers was valid
HELD:
SC – NO, the police officers who were on a routine patrol
flagged down the vehicle based merely on suspicion that it
might contain smuggled goods because it was unusually
covered with kakawati leaves. The Court held that the fact
the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does
not constitute probable cause as would justify the conduct of
a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities
do not claim to have received any confidential report or
tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable
wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained
their suspicion. It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires
found in petitioner’s vehicle were in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid. It is clear from the records of this
case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because
they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves.
U.S. v. Chadwick
433 U.S. 1 (1977)
Warrantless Searches: Moving vehicles
[Salta, R]
FACTS:
 Gregory Machado and Bridget Leary (Respondents)
were loading a brown footlocker onto a train bound
for Boston, when Amtrak railroad officials noticed
that the trunk was unusually heavy for its size, and
that it was leaking talcum powder, a substance often
used to mask the odor of marijuana.
 The railroad officials relayed the information to their
counterparts in Boston.
 When the train arrived 2 days later, the federal
narcotics agents were there but had not obtained an
arrest or search warrant, although they had with
them a police dog trained to detect marijuana.
 When the dog signaled the presence of a controlled
substance inside, it prompted the agents to arrest
the three respondents, while the latter were loading
the footlocker into the trunk of the automobile
waiting for them outside.
 The footlocker and the respondents were then taken
to the Federal Building in Boston.
 1 ½ hour after the arrests, the agents opened the
locked footlocker without respondents’ consent nor
a search warrant in hand (it was unclear how they
opened it).
 Large amounts of marijuana were found in the
footlocker. Thus, they were indicted for possession
of marijuana.
 During trial, the govt sought to justify its failure to
secure a search warrant under the “automobile
exception.”
ISSUE:
Whether the seizure of the footlocker falls under the
exceptions for a valid warrantless search and seizure
HELD:
SC – NO.
The footlocker’s brief contact with Chadwick’s car makes this
an automobile search. Like the footlocker, automobiles are
“effects” under the 4th Amendment, and searches and
18
seizures of automobiles are therefore subject to the
constitutional standard of reasonableness.

This is based on the inherent mobility which often makes

obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable.

The factors which diminish automobile privacy:

 A motor vehicle’s function is transportation;

 All states require vehicles to be registered and
operators to be licensed;
 Automobiles periodically undergo official inspection,
and are often taken into police custody in the
interest of public safety;

However, these factors do not apply to respondents’

footlocker.

 Luggage contents are not open to public view

(except as a condition to a border entry or common
carrier travel);
 Unlike an automobile, a luggage is intended as a
repository of personal effects.
 The initial seizure and detention of the footlocker
were sufficient to guard against any risk that
evidence might be lost. With the footlocker safely
immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the
additional and greater intrusion of a search without
a warrant.

** SIDE ISSUE:

Petitioner govt contends that the 4th Amendment Clause

protects only interests identified with homes, offices, and
private communications.

SC – NO.

 The Clause does not distinguish between searches

conducted in private homes and other searches.
 What is protects are “people” not “places.” It
protects people from unreasonable government
intrusions into their legitimate expectations of
privacy.

19
People v. Mariacos
621 SCRA 327 (2010)
Warrantless Searches: Moving vehicles
[Salta, R]
FACTS:
 Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
 At the dawn of Oct 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met with
a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network
who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had
been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about
to leave for the poblacion.
 The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 blue plastic bag.
The agent also described a backpack bag with an
“O.K.” marking.
 PO2 Pallayoc boarded the jeepney and found the
bag with an “OK” marking and peeked inside its
contents. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers.
 When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2
Pallayoc alighted and saw the 3 bags and the blue
plastic bag being carried away by 2 women.
 He caught up with the woman and informed them
that they were under arrest. However, one of the
other women got away.
 Appellant argues that her constitutional right against
unreasonable searches was violated by the
apprehending officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure
HELD:
SC – YES.
As a rule, no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue
of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining
the existence of probable cause.
Instances when a warrantless search is valid:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Sec 12 (now 13), Rule 126 of the
ROC;
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view”
Elements:
a. A prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
b. The evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
c. The evidence must be immediately
apparent; and
d. The “plain view” justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle
o Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity.
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency circumstances.
A search is made in a store, dwelling house, or other
immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant
when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft,
or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be
sought.
In this case, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle.
 The vehicle that carried the contraband or
prohibited drugs was about to leave, thus the
searching officer had not time to obtain a warrant.
He had only enough time to board the vehicle before
the same left for its destination.
 The dawn before the appellant’s arrest, PO2 Pallayoc
was informed by the secret agent that a baggage of
marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about
to leave for the poblacion. Thus, had probable cause
to search the packages allegedly containing illegal
drugs.
20
U.S. v. Gray The doctrine requires that:

484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir., 1978)
Warrantless Searches: Plain View
[Salta, R]
FACTS:
 Defendant Derl Gray was charged and found guilty of
violation of the federal firearms laws.
 He was the operator of a small grocery store.
Kentucky State Trooper John Miler received
information that defendant was selling beer without
a license.
 Miller, then, in plain clothes, went to the
defendant’s store and purchased 5 cans of beer. He
then left the store to procure a search and arrest
warrant.
 After obtaining the two warrants, the property was
searched. While conducting the search, Trooper
Brodt noticed 2 rifles leaning against the wall in an
upstairs clothes closet. He then removed the rifles
and took them downstairs to the store area where
he copied down the serial numbers of the weapons.
After which he returned the weapons to the upstairs
closet.
 The officers ran the serial numbers obtained from
the rifles and learned for the first time that the
firearms had been stolen in Tennessee.
 Trooper Brodt then obtained a search warrant for
the seizure of the rifles, as well as a warrant for
Grey’s arrest.
1. The police officer had a prior justification for an
intrusion; and
2. That during the search, he had “inadvertently” come
across an “immediately apparent” piece of evidence
incriminating the accused.
In this case, the officers met the 1 st requirement since they
were acting pursuant to a legitimate search warrant directing
the seizure of alcoholic beverages. However, although Brondt
inadvertently discovered the rifles, it was not “immediately
apparent” that the rifles were “evidence incriminating the
accused.”
 The rifles were not contraband;
 There is no connection between the rifles and the
crime of selling or possessing alcohol without a
license;
 At that time, the officers did not have any knowledge
that the rifles were evidence of any other crimes.
The doctrine recognized the fact that it would be a needless
inconvenience to require the police to obtain another
warrant. However, it must be “immediately apparent” to the
police that the object is in fact incriminating otherwise the
seizure of the object would be without probable cause and
would turn the search into a general or exploratory one.

ISSUE:

Whether the actions of Trooper Brodt in removing the rifles

from the closet, examining them, and copying down the serial
numbers pursuant to a warrant directing the seizure of
alcoholic beverages are valid

HELD:

SC – NO. Such actions violate defendant’s 4 th Amendment

right.

The 4th Amendment requires that warrants particularly

describe the things to be seized. An exception to this is the
application of the “plain view doctrine” which allows, under
certain circumstances, the police to seize objects not
specified in the warrant.
21
Arizona v. Hicks inches is much more trivial for purposes of the 4 th
Amendment.
480 U.S. 321 (1987)
Was then the search “reasonable” under the 4 th Amendment?
Warrantless Searches: Plain View
 YES.
[Salta, R]
It is established that police may seize evidence in plain view
FACTS: without a warrant. It would be then absurd to say that an
object could lawfully be seized and taken from the premises
 A bullet was fired through the floor of respondent’s
but could not be moved for closer examination.
apartment, striking and injuring a man in the
apartment below. Also, even if the “plain view” doctrine is to be applied in a
 Police officers arrived and entered respondent’s particular case, probable cause is still required.
apartment to search for the shooter, other victims,
and for weapons. In this case, Officer Nelson had probable cause to believe the
 They found and seized 3 weapons, sawed-off rifle, equipment was stolen.
and a stocking cap mask.
 Officer Nelson noticed expensive looking stereo
components, and suspected that they were stolen,
he recorded their serial numbers, by moving some of
the components in order to do so, which he then
reported to his headquarters.
 It was discovered that the stereo components and
turntable were stolen. A warrant was obtained and
the objects were seized.
 It was contended that the obtaining of the serial
numbers is an additional search unrelated to the
initial warrant, and thus a violation of the 4 th
Amendment.
 However, the State argues that the actions of Officer
Nelson constituted neither a “search” nor a “seizure”
within the meaning of the 4th Amendment.

ISSUE:

Whether the obtaining of the serial numbers constitute a

violation of the 4th Amendment

HELD:

SC – NO.

The recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a

seizure since it did not “meaningfully interfere” with
respondent’s possessory interest in the equipment.

However, the moving of the equipment did constitute a

“search” separate and apart from the search for the shooter,
victims, and weapons. The distinction between “looking” at a
suspicious object in plain view and “moving” it even a few

22
Horton v. California
496 U.S. 128 (1990)
Warrantless Searches: Plain View
[Salta, R]
FACTS:
 A policeman determined that there was probable
cause to search petitioner Horton’s home for the
proceeds of a robbery and the robbers’ weapons.
 His search warrant affidavit refer to the proceeds
and the weapons, however, the issued warrant was
only for the search of the proceeds.
 Upon executing the warrants, the officer did not find
the stolen property, but did find the weapons in
plain view and seized them.
 Horton avers that the seized evidence was not
discovered “inadvertently” since the officer was also
interested in finding other evidence connecting
petitioner to the robbery.
3. The prohibition against general searches and
warrants is based on privacy concerns, which are not
implicated when an officer with a lawful right of
access to an item in plain view seizes it without a
warrant.
In this case, the items seized from petitioner's home were
discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid
warrant. When they were discovered, it was immediately
apparent to the officer that they constituted incriminating
evidence. He had probable cause not only to obtain a warrant
to search for the stolen property, but also to believe that the
weapons and handguns had been used in the crime he was
investigating. The search was authorized by the warrant, the
seizure was authorized by the "plain view" doctrine.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain

view is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment if the discovery
of the evidence was not inadvertent.

HELD:

SC – NO.

The Court concludes that even though inadvertence is a

characteristic of most legitimate "plain view" seizures, it is
not a necessary condition.

1. The fact that an officer is interested in an item and

fully expects to find it should not invalidate its
seizure if the search is confined in area and duration
by a warrant’s terms or by a valid exception to the
warrant requirement.
2. The suggestion that the inadvertence requirement is
necessary to prevent the police from conducting
general searches, or from converting specific
warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive,
because the interest is already served by the
requirements that an unparticularized warrant not
be issued and that a warrantless search be
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation.

23
People v. Musa  In our present case, the mj inside the bag is not
considered as in plain view because the NARCOM
217 SCRA 597 (1993) were searching the house when they found the
plastic bag. They had no clue as to what the contents
Warrantless Searches: Plain View
were until they opened the bag. The contents of the
[Ocampo, P] bag were not immediately apparent from plain view
or were not obvious to an observer. Hence, plain
FACTS: view doctrine was not applied.

 The Narcotics Command (NARCOM) received

information from a civilian informer that a certain Conclusion: The bag of mj was considered inadmissible.
Musa was engaged in the selling of marijuana. A
member of the NARCOM was guided by the informer Note: The accused was still convicted. The exclusion of the
on how to reach and purchase mj from Musa. bag of mj as evidence against the accused did not diminish
 Upon obtaining the item, the member inspected the the guilt of accused as there were other evidence presented
contents and confirmed that it was mj. A buy bust to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
operation was then planned.
 The member again purchased from Musa and upon
inspecting the item, he signaled the NARCOM to
conduct the operation. Musa was then arrested.
 A plastic bag was found somewhere in the kitchen. A
member of the NARCOM asked what the contents of
the bag are, but they received no response.
 Upon opening the bag, the NARCOM discovered
additional pieces of mj. The bag of mj was then
received as additional evidence against the accused.
 The TC found Musa guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
 As a defense, Musa denied ownership of the mj
ceased. He also assails the admissibility of the
ceased plastic bag as evidence.

ISSUE:

WON the bag of mj is admissible as evidence.

HELD:

SC – NO.

Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides that objects
in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is applied
where the police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Hence, it must be immediately apparent
to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure.

24
People v. Doria and transparent to clearly manifest its contents to a
viewer. Each of the MJ were wrapped in newspaper
301 SCRA 668 (1999) and were placed in colored plastic bags. The officer
himself admitted that it was possible that the box
Warrantless Searches: Plain View
contained other items and that he did not really
[Ocampo, P] know what the contents were. It was not
immediately apparent to the officer that the
FACTS: contents were MJ. Since the MJ was not in plain view
and its seizure was without the requisite search
 A buy bust operation was conducted by the
warrant it was in violation of the law and the
NARCOM to confirm if accused Doria was engaged in
Constitution. Therefore, it is inadmissible.
illegal drug trade. One of the members bought from
Doria pieces of MJ he was then arrested by the
members of the NARCOM. Where he was asked Conclusion: Accused Doria was convicted but accused Gaddao
where the mark money was, he stated that he gave was acquitted.
it to accused Gaddao.
 Accused Doria led the team to the house of Gaddao.
Upon entering the premises, one of the members of
the team noticed a carton box under the dining
table. He peeked inside the box and found that it
contained MJ.
 Since accused Gaddao’s warrantless arrest was
illegal because there was no showing that the person
effected the warrantless arrest, had knowledge of
facts implication the person arrested to the
perpetration of a criminal offense, she is now
claiming that the box of MJ cannot be used against
her.

ISSUE:

WON the box of MJ is admissible.

HELD:

SC – NO.

The law provides that objects falling in plain view of an officer

who has a right to be in the position to have the view are
subject to seizure even without search warrant. In applying
the plain view doctrine, it is important that in the course of
lawful intrusion, n officer came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

 In our present case, the MJ in the box were not in

plain view. The officer who saw the box admitted
that he merely presumed the contents to be MJ
because it had the same plastic wrapping when they
conducted the buy bust operation. The records of
the case reveals that the wrapper was not colorless

25
Valeroso v. CA

598 SCRA 41 (2009)

Warrantless Searches: Plain View

[Ocampo, P]

FACTS:

 The police officers were serving a warrant of arrest

against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with
ransom.
 The officers saw Valeroso about to board tricycle.
They then arrested them and bodily search him and
they found a gun and live ammunitions tucked in his
waist. He was then charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions.
 As a defense, Valeroso was sleeping inside the
boarding house of his children when he was awaken
by the officers to arrest him. They searched the
room and found a gun.

ISSUE:

WON the gun was in plain view.

HELD:

SC – NO.

The doctrine of plain view is usually applied where police

officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes cross an incriminating
object.

 In our present case, the police officers had prior

justification for the intrusion, Consequently, any
evidence that they would inadvertently discover may
be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the
police officers did not just accidentally discover the
subject firers and ammunitions; they actually
searched for evidence against Valeroso. Since the
evidence was acquired in violation of his right, the
evidence is inadmissible against him.

Conclusion: the accused was acquitted from the illegal illegal

possession of firearms and ammunitions.

Note: The court accepted the narration of facts of the

defense.

26
Miclat, Jr. v. People being carried out in the area. The discovery of the
evidence was inadvertent because the officer came
656 SCRA 539 (2011) across of the evidence upon peeping in the window
and the sachets were plainly exposed .
Warrantless Searches: Plain View

[Ocampo, P]  The fourth requisite was satisfied because the

sachets were suspicious and it was possible that
FACTS: these were the reported item of the illegal trade.
Since, all the requisites were present, the seizure of
 Upon obtaining information of drug trading activities
the items were valid and are admissible in evidence.
being undertaken in a certain area, the police
officers deployed themselves to investigate.
 One officer peeped inside a small window and saw Conclusion: The accused was convicted.
the accused arranging several pieces of small plastic
sachet which he believes to contain Shabu.
 As the officer gained entrance to the place, the
accused voluntarily handed the small plastic sachet.
 The accused is now raising the error of WON peeping
through the small window is within the meaning of
plain view doctrine for a warrantless arrest to be
lawful.

ISSUE:

 WON peeping through the small window is within

the meaning of plain view doctrine for a warrantless
arrest to be lawful.

HELD:

SC – YES.

The requisites of the application of plain view doctrine are as

follows:

1. The law enforcement officer in search of the

evidence has prior justification for an intrusion or is
in position from which he can view particular area;
2. The discovery of evidence in plain view is
inadvertent;
3. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

In applying the plain view doctrine, it is important that in the

course of a lawful intrusion, the object must be open to eye
and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

 In our present case, there was lawful intrusion

because the officers were acting upon an
information received that illegal drug trading were
27
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte defendant in order to preserve a fair trial such as
waiver of counsel.
412 U.S. 218 (1973)
Conclusion:
Warrantless Searches: Waiver or consented searches
 The Court reversed the decision of the court below,
[Ocampo, P] reinstating the affirmation of respondent's
conviction and the denial of a writ of habeas corpus
FACTS:
to respondent, on the grounds that the
 The police stopped the vehicle containing the determination of voluntariness did not require proof
respondent and five other passengers after they of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non
noticed a broken headlight and license plate light. of an effective consent to a search.

 When the driver could not produce a license, the

police asked for someone who could produce
identification. Another passenger responded, and
when the police asked him if they could search the
vehicle he consented.

 Three stolen checks were found, and they were used

as evidence to convict the respondent.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent voluntarily consented to the search of

the vehicle.

HELD:

SC – YES.

The Court disagreed that proof of knowledge of the right to

refuse consent was a necessary prerequisite in demonstrating
voluntary consent. Rather, the Court held that individual
consent could only be ascertained by analyzing all of the
circumstances.

 In our present case, the officer asked the passengers

if he could search the vehicle and the passengers
agreed. One of the passengers even attempted to
help the officer in searching . The consent was freely
given without coercion or submission to authority.
Taken all of these together, consent was voluntarily
given.

 For a valid waiver, it was held that it must be done

knowing and intelligent. It was not, however, applied
in our present case because these standards were
used in the context of the safeguards of a fair
criminal trial. It was commonly applied to rights
which the Constitution guarantees to criminal

28
U.S. v. Matlock
415 U.S. 164 (1974)
Warrantless Searches: Waiver or consented searches
[Rojo, T]
FACTS:
 Respondent in this case was arrested for robbing a
bank, in the front yard of a house in which he lived
along with a Mrs. Graff.
 The arresting officers, who did not ask him which
room he occupied or whether he would consent to a
search, were then admitted to the house of Mrs.
Graff and with her consent but without a warrant,
searched the house, including the bedroom which
Mrs. Graff told them was jointly occupied by
respondent and herself, and in a closet of which the
officers found and seized money (in a diaper bag).
 Respondent was indicted for bank robbery and
moved to suppress the seized money as evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence presented with respect to the
voluntary consent of a third party to search the living
quarters of the respondent was legally sufficient to render
the seized materials admissible in evidence at the
respondent's criminal trial.
HELD:
When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by
proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that
consent was given by the defendant, but may show that
permission to search was obtained from a third party who
possessed common authority over or other sufficient
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected.
(District Court : excluded from evidence at the suppression
hearings, as inadmissible hearsay, the out-of-court
statements of Mrs. Graff with respect to her and
respondent's joint occupancy and use of the east bedroom,
as well as the evidence that both respondent and Mrs. Graff,
at various times and to various persons, had represented
themselves as husband and wife.)
Court finds otherwise.
It seems equally clear to us that the trial judge should not
have excluded Mrs. Graff's statements in the circumstances
present here.
In the first place, the court was quite satisfied that the
statements had, in fact, been made. Second, there is nothing
in the record to raise serious doubts about the truthfulness of
the statements themselves. Mrs. Graff harbored no hostility
or bias against respondent that might call her statements into
question.
Mrs. Graff responded to inquiry at the time of the search that
she and respondent occupied the east bedroom together. A
few minutes later, having led the officers to the bedroom, she
stated that she and respondent shared the one dresser in the
room and that the woman's clothing in the room was hers.
Later the same day, she stated to the officers that she and
respondent had slept together regularly in the room,
including the early morning of that very day. These
statements were consistent with one another. They were also
corroborated by other evidence received at the suppression
hearings: Mrs. Graff and respondent had lived together in
Florida for several months immediately prior to coming to
Wisconsin, where they lived in the house in question and
where they were seen going upstairs together in the evening;
respondent was the tenant of the east bedroom, and that
room bore every evidence that it was also occupied by a
woman; respondent indicated in prior statements to various
people that he and Mrs. Graff were husband and wife. Under
these circumstances, there was no apparent reason for the
judge to distrust the evidence and to exclude Mrs. Graff's
declarations from his own consideration for whatever they
might be worth in resolving, one way or another, the issues
raised at the suppression hearings. If there is remaining doubt
about the matter, it should be dispelled by another
consideration: cohabitation out of wedlock would not seem
to be a relationship that one would falsely confess.
Respondent and Gayle Graff were not married, and
cohabitation out of wedlock is a crime in the State of
Wisconsin. Mrs. Graff's statements were against her penal
interest, and they carried their own indicia of reliability. This
was sufficient in itself, we think, to warrant admitting them to
evidence for consideration by the trial judge.
Given the admissibility of Mrs. Graff's and respondent's out-
of-court statements, that the Government sustained its
burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that
Mrs. Graff's voluntary consent to search the east bedroom
was legally sufficient to warrant admitting into evidence the
$4,995 found in the diaper bag.
29
Bumper v. North Carolina
391 U.S. 543 (1968)
Warrantless Searches: Waiver or consented searches
[Rojo, T]
FACTS:
 Two days after the alleged offense (rape), but prior
to petitioner’s arrest, four white law enforcement
officers went to his house and asked his
grandmother if they could search the house on the
premise that they have with them a search warrant,
to which she merely replied “go ahead”. The officers
found a rifle in the kitchen, that was later introduced
in evidence at the petitioner’s trial after a motion to
suppress ahs been denied.
 Petitioner contends that the rifle introduced in
evidence against him was obtained by the State in
search and seizure violative of the 4th and 14th
Amendment.
ISSUE:
WON a search can be justified as lawful on the basis that
“consent” has been given only after the official conducting
the search has asserted that he possesses a warrant.
HELD:
There can be no consent under such circumstances.
A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later
be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the
warrant was invalid.The result can be no different when it
turns out that the State does not even attempt to rely upon
the validity of the warrant, or fails to show that there was, in
fact, any warrant at all.
When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a
home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the
occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is
instinct with coercion -- albeit colorably lawful coercion.
Where there is coercion, there cannot be consent.
Terry v. Ohio
392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Warrantless Searches: Stop and frisk
[Rojo, T]
FACTS:
 Officer McFadden was patrolling that afternoon,
when he saw accused herein and his codefendant
acting suspiciously (He saw them proceed alternately
back and forth along an identical route, pausing to
stare in the same store window, which they did for a
total of about 24 times.
 Each completion of the route was followed by a
conference between the two on a corner, at one of
which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who
left swiftly.) Acting under a suspicion that they were
“up to no good” he followed them and saw that they
were again conversing with the 3rd man he saw a
couple of blocks away in front of the store, the two
were hovering around.
 The officer approached the three, identified himself
as a policeman, and asked their names. The men
"mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun
petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing,
and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to
remove, a pistol.
 The officer ordered the three into the store. He
removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver,
and ordered the three to face the wall with their
hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of
Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's
outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands
under the outer garments of Katz
ISSUE:
WON search conducted by Officer in this case can be
considered as lawful and valid.
HELD:
In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need
for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
prospective victims of violence in situations where they may
lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified
in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he
is investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be
30
clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
necessary measures to determine whether the person is, in
fact, carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of
physical harm.

Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of

petitioner and his two companions. He did not place his
hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their
garments until he had felt weapons, and then he merely
reached for and removed the guns. He never did invade Katz'
person beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes, since he
discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a
weapon. Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to
what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men
were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the
weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory search for
whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find.

31
Minnesota v. Dickerson Regardless of whether the officer detects the contraband by
sight or by touch, however, the Fourth Amendment's
508 U.S. 366 (1993) requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe
that the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against
Warrantless Searches: Stop and frisk
excessively speculative seizures
[Rojo, T]
It is clear that the court was correct in holding that the police
FACTS: officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the "strictly
circumscribed" search for weapons allowed under Terry.
 Two police officers were patrolling the area where
the respondent was seen leaving a building that was The officer's continued exploration of respondent's pocket
considered a notorious crack house. after having concluded that it contained no weapon was
 Suspicion on the part of the police towards unrelated to "[t]he sole justification of the search [under
respondent arose when respondent abruptly halted Terry:] . . . the protection of the police officer and others
upon seeing the squad car and began walking in the nearby." 392 U. S., at 29. It therefore amounted to the sort of
opposite direction, turned and entered an alley on evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize,
the other side of the said building.
 The officers ordered respondent to stop and submit
to a pat-down search. The search revealed no
weapons, but the officer conducting the search did
take interest in a small lump in respondent’s jacket,
reaching into the pocket, the officer retrieve a small
plastic bag containing cocaine. Thus leading to the
arrest of the respondent.

ISSUE:

WON contraband detected through the sense of touch during

a patdown search may be admitted into evidence. (Whether
police officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected
during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by
Terry)

HELD:

We think the answer is clearly that they may, so long as the

officer's search stays within the bounds marked by Terry.

On contention of Minnesota Supreme Court that the sense of

touch is inherently less immediate and less reliable than the
sense of sight," and that "the sense of touch is far more
intrusive into the personal privacy that is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment

Terry itself demonstrates that the sense of touch is capable of

revealing the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to
support a seizure. The very premise of Terry, after all, is that
officers will be able to detect the presence of weapons
through the sense of touch and Terry upheld precisely such a
seizure.

32
People v. Solayao
262 SCRA 255 (1996)
Warrantless Searches: Stop and frisk
[Rojo, T]
FACTS:
 An intelligence patrol to verify the presence of
armed persons roaming around the barangays of
Caibiran was being conducted by the team of Police
Officer Nio.
 Upon their arrival at Barangay Onion, they met the
group of the accused-appellant. The former became
suspicious when they observed that the latter were
drunk and that accused-appellant himself was
wearing a camouflage uniform or jungle suit, and as
they approached, his companions fled.
 A homemade firearm wrapped in dried coconut
leaves (locally known as latong) was found to be in
the possession of the accused, and upon inquiry it
was found that such was illegally possessed by the
accused.
was a probable cause to conduct a search even before an
arrest could be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant
not to run away, the former identified himself as a
government agent.[16] The peace officers did not know that
he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of
illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report
that there were armed men roaming around in the barangays
surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably
drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They
could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut
leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance
where a search and seizure may be effected without first
making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and
frisk" accused-appellant when his companions fled upon
seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the
government agents could not possibly have procured a search
warrant first.

ISSUE:

WON the search made to the person of the accused was

valid.

HELD:

There was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against

unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error on
the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade
firearm as evidence.

The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining

in Posadas v. Court of Appeals[ where this Court held that "at
the time the peace officers identified themselves and
apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did
not know that he had committed, or was actually committing
the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions.
They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri
bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant."

This Court ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas
case brought about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas
himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There

33
People v. Sy Chua indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing
or attempting to commit an offense; and 2) such overt act is
396 SCRA 657 (2003) done in the presence of the arresting officer .

Warrantless Searches: Stop and frisk  The 2 elements were lacking in the case at bar.
When Chua arrived at the vicinity, he merely parked
[Flores, R]
his car along McArthur Highway, alighted from it and
FACTS: casually proceeded towards the entrance of the
Hotel clutching a box of Zest-O juice. There was no
 On the basis of a report from an informant, PNP overt manifestation that Chua has just committed, is
Chief Col. Gutierrez formed a team of operatives to actually committing or is about to commit an
conduct arrest of one Sy Chua who was reported to offense.
have been delivering shabu. At around 11:45 in the  Moreover, considering that the identity, address and
evening of September 21, 1996, the informant activities of the suspect was already ascertained,
pointed to a car driven by Chua which just arrived at there is no reason why the officers could not have
Thunder Inn. The operatives hurriedly introduced obtained a judicial warrant before arresting Chua
themselves as policemen after Chua alighted from and searching his person.
his vehicle, carrying a box of Zest-O juice. A small
transparent plastic bag was dropped by Chua when
he pulled out his wallet from his back pocket. Chua
was then subjected to a body search wherein live
bullets was found in his possession and white
crystalline substance was found inside the Zest-O
box.
 Chua denied the accusation against him and claimed
that on the night in question, he was driving and felt
sleepy so he stopped in front of a small store near
Thunder Inn. While inside the store he noticed a
man examining the inside of his car. When he called
the attention of the onlooker, the latter pulled out
a .45 caliber and introduced himself as a police
officer. During the arrest, the officer took out his
wallet and ordered him to open his car. Later on,
Chua was brought to the police station where he was
kept in the bathroom for 15 mins until Col. Gutierre
arrived.
 Chua was then charged with illegal possession of
firearms ammunition and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. He was acquitted of the former
and was found guilty on the latter.

ISSUE:

WON the search made was legal.

HELD:

SC – NO.

For in flagrante delicto to apply, 2 elements must concur: 1)

the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
34
Romines v. People HELD:

629 SCRA 370 (2010) Petitioner’s acts engendered the belief that a search against
her was warranted.
Warrantless Searches: Stop and frisk
 As a general rule, searches may be conducted only
[Flores, R] on the strength of a valid search warrant. Exceptions
to the rule are: 1) consented searches; 2) as an
FACTS:
incident to a lawful arrest; 3) searches of vessels and
 On the basis of an informant’s tip, PO1 Cruzin and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and
PO2 Aguas proceeded to Bayanihan St., Pasay City to drug laws; 4) searches of moving vehicles; 5)
conduct surveillance on the activities of a notorious searches on automobiles at borders; 6) plain view
snatcher, alias Ryan. As PO1 Cruzin alighted from doctrine; 7) searches of buildings and premises to
their vehicle, he saw petitioner who was standing 3 enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and
meters away, placing inside a yellow cigarette case a 8) “stop and frisk.
small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet  What is essential is that a genuine reason must exist
containing white substance. He approached to warrant the belief that the person who manifests
petitioner and introduced himself as a police officer unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or
and inquired about the small plastic sachet. Instead contraband concealed about him. The court found
of replying, petitioner tried to flee to her house that the petitioner exhibited suspicious behaviors
nearby but was restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then which prompted the police officers to conduct a stop
requested her to take out the transparent plastic and frisk search on her.
sachet. After apprising petitioner of her rights, PO1
Cruzin confiscated the sachet and marked his initials
“SRE”. Petitioner was then brought to the police
station for investigation. P/Insp. Almanza, Chief of
Drug Enforcement Unit made a memorandum
requesting for a laboratory examination of the
confiscated substance which was later on confirmed
to be Methampetamine Hydrochloride.
 The petitioner on the other hand claims that the
evidence against her was planted which the
petitioner’s daughter corroborated. The RTC found
petitioner guilty of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
 On appeal, appellant claimed that the arrest was
illegal and the evidence obtained is therefore
inadmissible as evidence. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC holding that the police officers
had probable cause to search petitioner under the
stop and frisk concept.

35
People v. Cogaed aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious
about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The
G.R. No. 200334, 30 July 2014 assessment of suspicion was not made by the police
officer but by the jeepney driver. The police officer
Warrantless Searches: Stop and frisk
should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
[Flores, R] person.

FACTS:

 On Nov 25, 2005, PSI Bayan received a text message

from an unidentified civilian informer that one
Marvin Bugat would be transporting Marijuana from
Brgy. Lunoy to Poblacion in La Union. PSI Bayan
ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac to set up a checkpoint
at a jeepney terminal in San Gabriel. A passenger
jeepney arrived and the driver alighted and signaled
SPO1 Taracatac of the 2 male passengers carrying
marijuana whom later on was identified as Victor
Cogaed and Santiago Dayao.

 SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Taracatac about

the contents of their bag and in reply, said that they
did not know since they were transporting them as a
favor for their friend Marvin. Taracatac opened the
Cogaed’s bag and found 3 bricks of suspected
marijuana thereafter arresting the 2 suspects and
filing a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
against them.

 The RTC dismissed the case against Dayao since he

was ony 14 at that time and found Cogaed guilty of
the crime charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

WON there was a valid search and seizure of the marijuana.

HELD:

SC – No.

 The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined

by implication in our Constitution. One of its
dimensions is protection against unreasonable
searches and seizure.

 The search involved in this case was initially stop and

frisk but it did not comply with the requirements of
reasonability required by the Constitution. Cogaed
was simply a passenger carrying a bag and travelling
36
Chimel v. California The court held that contemporaneous searches incident to a
lawful arrest are reasonable to seize weapons as well as
395 U.S. 752 (1969) prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence.
Searches beyond the scope of these justifications are
Warrantless Searches: Search incidental to a lawful arrest
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the
[Garcia, J] Constitution.

FACTS:

 The police came to Defendant’s home with an arrest

warrant for an alleged burglary. The police asked
permission to “look around” the house. The
petitioner objected, but was advised that, "on the
basis of the lawful arrest," the officers would
nonetheless conduct a search. No search warrant
had been issued.
 Accompanied by the petitioner's wife, the officers
then looked through the entire three-bedroom
house. In the master bedroom and sewing room,
however, the officers directed the petitioner's wife
to open drawers and "to physically move contents of
the drawers from side to side so that [they] might
view any items that would have come from [the]
burglary." After completing the search, they seized
numerous items -- primarily coins, but also several
medals, tokens, and a few other objects which were
later used to convict the defendant of burglary.

ISSUE:

WON a defendant lawfully arrested inside his home, and a

warrantless search of the area beyond the defendant’s
immediate control is valid.

HELD:

An arresting officer may search the arrestee's person to

discover and remove weapons and to seize evidence to
prevent its concealment or destruction, and may search the
area "within the immediate control" of the person arrested,
meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.

The scope of the search here was unreasonable under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as it went beyond
petitioner's person and the area from within which he might
have obtained a weapon or something that could have been
used as evidence against him, and there was no constitutional
justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending
the search beyond that area.

37
New York v. Belton justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy
interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies
453 U.S. 454 (1981) the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.

Warrantless Searches: Search incidental to a lawful arrest It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the
police may not conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral
[Canlas, C] magistrate that there is probable cause to do so. This Court has
recognized, however, that "the exigencies of the situation" may
FACTS: sometimes make exemption from the warrant requirement
"imperative." As stated in the case of Chimel, a lawful custodial
 An automobile in which Belton was one of the arrest creates a situation which justifies the contemporaneous
occupants was stopped by a NY State policeman for search without a warrant of the person arrested and of the
traveling at an excessive rate of speed. In the immediately surrounding area. Such searches have long been
process of discovering that none of the occupants considered valid because of the need "to remove any weapons that
owned the car or was related to the owner, the [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
policeman smelled burnt marijuana and saw on the escape," and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of
evidence. 
car an envelope suspected of containing marijuana.
He then arrested them for unlawful possession of
marijuana. After searching each of the occupants, he
searched the car compartment and found a jacket
which belong to Belton which also contained
cocaine. Belton was then indicted for criminal
possession of a controlled substance. He then filed a
motion to suppress the cocaine seized from his
jacket pocket which he claims to be in violation of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

ISSUE:

WON the search of Belton’s jacket was a search incident to a

lawful custodial arrest and hence did not violate the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments.

WON when the occupant of an automobile is subjected is

subjected to lawful custodial arrest, does the constitutionally
permissible scope of a search incident to his arrest include
the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he
was riding.

HELD:

YES. The search was lawful. The search of respondent's jacket

was a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, and hence did not
violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The jacket, being
located inside the passenger compartment of the car, was "within
the arrestee's immediate control" within the meaning of Chimel v.
California, wherein it was held that a lawful custodial arrest creates
a situation justifying the contemporaneous warrantless search of the
arrestee and of the immediately surrounding area. Not only may the
police search the passenger compartment of the car in such
circumstances, they may also examine the contents of any
containers found in the passenger compartment. And such a
container may be searched whether it is open or closed, since the

38
People v. Chua Ho San
308 SCRA 432 (1999)
Warrantless Searches: Search incidental to a lawful arrest
[Sotiangco, F]
FACTS:
While patrolling a coastal area in La Union, the police officers
spotted an unfamiliar speedboat which looked different from
the boats ordinarily used by the fisherfolk in the area. When
the speedboat landed, a lone male passenger alighted
carrying a multicolored straw bag and walked towards the
road. Upon seeing two police officers in uniform and with
issued side-arms, the man who was later identified to be
Chua Ho San suddenly changed direction and broke into a
run. However, a police officer prevented him from fleeing by
holding onto his right arm. Although they have introduced
themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive.
He was requested by the police officers to open his bag, in
different languages and dialects but the man did not seem to
understand so the police officer resorted to sign language and
the man acceded to the request. A search for the bag yielded
several plastic packets containing which was believed by the
officers to be metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. An
interpreter arrived for Chua Ho San, through whom the latter
was apprised of his constitutional rights. Chua was detained
at the police station and upon examination of the plastic
packets, it was established that the contents were indeed
metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Initially, Chua was
charged with illegal possession of shabu but pursuant to the
recommendation of the Office of the provincial prosecutor of
La Union, the information was subsequently amended to
allege that he transported shabu without authority to do so.
Trial ensued and the RTC found that the prosecution had
proven that Chua transported metamphetamine
hydrochloride without authority to do so and characterized
the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
hence it allowed the admission of the metamphetamine
hydrochloride as corpus delicti. Chua was found guilty of the
offense charged against him and was sentenced to die by
lethal injection.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted
under the facts of the case constitute a valid exemption from
the warrant requirement consequently making the contents
of the bag admissible in evidence
HELD:
SC – NO.
Chua was arrested and his bag was searched without the
benefit of a warrant. The general rule is that the Constitution
bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or
residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
warrant. However, the rule is not absolute since warrantless
search and arrests have been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence. Among these exceptions is an arrest in
flagrante delicto. In cases of in flagrante delicto, a peace
officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a
person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. The arresting officer must therefore have
personal knowledge of such facts or personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive
of probable cause. The term probable cause had been
understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case at
bar, the Sol Gen proposes that the following details are
suggestive of probable cause:
1.persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and
other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly
cruise over the Bacnotan seas
2.CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the
necessary travel documents or visa)
3.CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when
he saw the police authorities, and
4.the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the
high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws
These do not constitute "probable cause." There was no
classified information that a foreigner would disembark
atTammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in
question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a
police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried
him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the
area did not automatically mark him as in the process of
perpetrating an offense. And despite claims that Chua
attempted to flee, an officer testified that he was merely
walking and oblivious to any attempt at conversation when
39
the officers approached him. Chua obviously failed to
understand the events that overran and overwhelmed him.
The police officers already introduced themselves to CHUA in
three languages, but he remained completely deadpan. The
police hence concluded that Chua failed to comprehend the
three languages. When Chua failed to respond again to the
police's request to open the bag, they resorted to what they
called "sign language." They claimed that Chua finally
understood their hand motions and gestures. The Court
disagrees. If Chua could not understand what was orally
articulated to him, how could he understand the police's
"sign language." More importantly, it cannot logically be
inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language"
that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his
right against such an intrusive search.

It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the

regulated substance. However, evidence obtained during an
illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming
initial information or suspicion of felonious activity is
absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, how
much more of "forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any
initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this case —
because the police admitted that they never harbored any
initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as
evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient,
feeble and ineffectual to sustain CHUA's conviction.

40
Cadua v. CA
312 SCRA 703 (1999)
Warrantless Searches: Search incidental to a lawful arrest
[Sotiangco, F]
FACTS:
Police officers assigned in Quezon City were aboard a mobile
unit when they received a radio dispatch based on a repost
concerning an alleged holdup of two complainants who were
in need of police assistance and found both complainants
who stated that the alleged holduppers had just fled. They
were asked where the robbery took place. Complainants
replied that they were held up by two (2) men at the corner
of Archer and Regalado Streets, near their house. The police
officers also asked in what direction the alleged holduppers
fled and what they were wearing. Then, the police officers
requested the complainants to board the patrol unit in order
to facilitate the search for the two (2) men. As they were
patrolling around the area, complainants informed the police
officers that one of the suspects was dressed in jeans and a t-
shirt while the other was dressed in a black top and black
pants. The police officers then noticed two (2) men walking
alongside the street and as the officers slowed down the
mobile unit to get a closer look, the complainants identified
the men as the alleged holduppers, one of which is the
petitioner in this case. The police officers slowed down to a
stop, alighted from the vehicle, and called out to the
suspects. As An officer was approaching the suspects, he
noticed that petitioner Cadua was about to pull something
which was tucked at the right side of his waist. The officer
promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and warned him not to
move. He then frisked Cadua and found in his possession a 38
caliber paltik revolver. Another officer then apprehended
Caduas companion, who was later identified as Joselito
Aguilar. In Aguilars possession was found a fan knife.
Verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit revealed
that petitioner-accused Edwin Cadua is not a valid license
holder of a 38 caliber paltik revolver.
The assistant City prosecutor found only a case for Illegal
Possession of Firearms warranted the filing of an Information
because during the investigation for robbery, complainants
manifested their doubts as to the identity of the respondents,
hence he set this matter for further investigation. As to the
charge for Violation of City Ordinance 5121 against Aguilar,
for concealment of a deadly weapon, it was found that there
was sufficient evidence to warrant the filing of an information
against him. But, considering that said violation falls under
the Rules of Summary Procedure, it could not be included in
the Information for alleged possession of firearms, which
concerned only Caduas, herein petitioner. Trial on the merits
ensued, resulting in his conviction.
Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA ruled
that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was based on
probable cause and that the police officers had personal
knowledge of the fact which led to his arrest. The subsequent
search was therefore an incident to the arrest, making the
firearm found in his possession admissible in evidence.
Moreover, the CA stated that the positive declaration of
prosecution witness that the 38 paltik revolver was found in
petitioners possession, already proved one of the essential
elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms.
ISSUE:
whether or not Caduas' right to be protected from any
unlawful warrantless arrest has been violated
HELD:
No. Considering the circumstances in this case, the Court
found that there was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless
arrest of petitioner for illegal possession of firearms. Section
5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, provides that:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
41
The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate circumstances, indicated a high probability of an offensive
court, show the pertinence of paragraphs (a) and (b) of attack with a lethal weapon.
Section 5 abovecited. Through police dispatch to the scene of
a crime report and in the presence of complainants, it was
ascertained that a robbery had just been committed, and the
arresting officers had personal knowledge that petitioner was
directly implicated as a suspect.

Petitioner could not dispute that there was an initial report to

the police concerning the robbery. A radio dispatch was then
given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street
to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they
reached said place, they met up with the complainants who
initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers
invitation, both mother and daughter boarded the mobile
unit to join them in conducting a search of the nearby area.
The accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the
reported statements of complainants, he was identified as a
logical suspect in the offense just committed.

Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to

affirm the finding below that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner is lawful. We also agree that the incidental search
and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm in question
is likewise lawful and valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person lawfully

arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.

Noteworthy, among the exceptions to the necessity for a

search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either
while a crime is actually being committed, or soon after its
commission. The right to search includes in these instances
that of searching the person of one who is arrested, in order
to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits
or as the means for its commission.[41]

When petitioner was searched contemporaneously with the

arrest, the paltik was found in his possession, and seized.
Such seizure cannot be considered unlawful nor
unreasonable. Moreover, at that moment of search and
seizure, there was in the mind of the arresting officer more
than a mere suspicion that petitioner was armed. Petitioners
movements clearly suggested the presence of a weapon
tucked at the side of his waist. The fact that Burdeos made an
immediate draw for his service revolver was an instinctive
response to petitioners actions which, under the
42
Padilla v. CA
269 SCRA 402 (1997)
Warrantless Searches: Search incidental to a lawful arrest
[Sotiangco, F]
FACTS:
Following a report from a witness that a vehicle heading
north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and
run accident, a message was flashed to all units of PNP
Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle
resulting to a car chase. A Mobile car subsequently drove out
to intercept the vehicle and cut into the path of the vehicle
forcing it to stop. Two officers alighted from the Mobile and
instructed its driver to alight. The driver rolled down the
window and put his head out while raising both his hands.
They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in
this case. He was wearing a short leather jacket such that
when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun tucked on
the left side of his waist was revealed, its butt protruding.
SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but
appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was
covered by legal papers. SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if
the gun really was covered by legal papers, it would have to
be shown in the office After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja
told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily
denied by appellant. By that time, a crowd had formed at the
place. SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and found
six (6) live bullets inside.
SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant
that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident and
pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his
vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were
dented. Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed
and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands
with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand
saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko'. Because appellant's jacket
was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite
rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket SPO Mercado saw
this and so when appellant turned around as he was talking
and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the
magazine from appellant. Suspecting that appellant could
also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a
magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going
back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's
vehicle and saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at the
front by the driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with
live bullets in a semi-automatic mode. He asked appellant for
the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily
that they were at his home SPO Mercado modified the arrest
of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession of
firearms then read to appellant his constitutional rights.
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division
at Jake Gonzales Boulevard where appellant voluntarily
surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol with a
single round in its chamber and a magazine loaded with seven
(7) other live bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a
black bag containing two additional long magazines and one
short magazine. After appellant had been interrogated by the
Chief of the Traffic Division, he was transferred to the Police
Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City
Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions
were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio. During the
investigation, appellant admitted possession of the firearms
stating that he used them for shooting. He was not able to
produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover
the three firearms. A certification was later issued by Captain,
Senior Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of
the Firearms and Explosives Office , stating that the three
firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite
rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson
SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla. A second
certification stated the same.
ISSUE:
WON Padilla's arrest was illegal and consequently, the
firearms and ammunitions taken in course thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
HELD:
No. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the
arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his
apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
43
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he
has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person.
Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that
petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense
committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person,
who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at
this point that "presence" does not only require that the
arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears
the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the
scene." As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching
of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut
vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter
gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in
order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report
to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the
Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2
Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge
who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like
petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been
set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the
police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or
take action.The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a
fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the
raining nighttime - all created a situation in which speed is
essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges
police authority to make the forcible stop since they had
more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that
the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and
ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest
was proper as he was again actually committing another
offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and
this time in the presence of a peace officer.
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner
could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in
fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening
event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run
and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having
stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to
Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the
fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate
number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented
hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting
police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit
and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers
acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on
unreliable hearsay information.
As to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner
without a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of
which, the court upholds
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search
and seizure of property is valid,are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which
are:
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.
3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity.
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
44
The authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either
ammunitions without even undertaking any active search the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with
which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the
places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith & vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for the proceeds of some criminal offense.
they came within "plain view" of the policemen who
inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in
petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same
justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite
rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as
they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the driver's seat. Thus it has been held that:

"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of

a criminal offense, the . . . police officers should happen to
discover a criminal offense being committed by any person,
they are not precluded from performing their duties as police
officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the
taking of the corpus delicti."

"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law

inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even
without a warrant."

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing

assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them
to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a
waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and
that his failure to quash the information estopped him from
assailing any purported defect.

Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were

products of an active search done by the authorities on the
person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a
search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a
search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the
lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a
protective search of the passenger compartment and
containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner's
grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense.This
satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the
item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's
custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that
search are admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving
vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a
warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in
this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable

45
People v. Martinez
637 SCRA 791 (2010)
Warrantless Searches: Search incidental to a lawful arrest
[Sotiangco, F]
FACTS:
Accordingly ng to the prosecution, a concerned citizen
entered the precint and reported that a pot session was going
on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in
Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. As the police officers
entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Doria
coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him.
Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, A. Martinez,
Dizon, and R. Martinez in a room. The four were surprised by
the presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic
sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used
aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police
precinct. The items found in the room were seized and turned
over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory
Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory
examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic sachets,
11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49
pieces of used aluminum foil tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were
subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were
found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
According to the defense, through its witnesses, accused A.
Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez, they claimed that in the
morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along
Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet
with a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R.
Martinez and who was to give the materials for the painting
of said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision
looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and
asked him if he noticed a person pass by. While they were
talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven
policemen emerged and apprehended them. They were
handcuffed and brought to the police station in Perez,
Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and charged
with sniffing shabu.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless search was valid making the seizure of
the subject items in plain view valid and admissible in
evidence
HELD:
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs
cases that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search, such rulings cannot be applied in
the case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-
bust operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances
other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest.
None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a
house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure based
solely on an informer's tip.
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in
plain view. The elements of plainview are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence
must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search.[22]
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police
officers intentionally entered the house with no prior
surveillance or investigation before they discovered the
accused with the subject items. If the prior peeking of the
police officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to
constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless
search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search be
considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented
warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one
under exigent and emergency circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a
surveillance considering that the identity and address of one
of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting
the surveillance and determining the existence of probable
cause, then a search warrant should have been secured prior
to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the
ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence
procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded.[23] The subject items
seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The
drug, being the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus
precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the
accused.
46
Knowles v. Iowa prosecute that offense had been obtained. Iowa's argument
that a "search incident to citation" is justified because a
525 U.S. 113 (1998) suspect may try to hide evidence of his identity or of other
crimes is unpersuasive. An officer may arrest a driver if he is
Warrantless Searches: Search incidental to a lawful arrest
not satisfied with the identification furnished, and the
[Sotiangco, F] possibility that an officer would stumble onto evidence of an
unrelated offense seems remote.
FACTS:

An Iowa policeman stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding

and issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The
officer then conducted a full search of the car, without either
Knowles' consent or probable cause, found marijuana and a
"pot pipe," and arrested Knowles. Before his trial on state
drug charges, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence,
arguing that because he had not been arrested, the search
could not be sustained under the "search incident to arrest"
exception recognized in United States v. Robinson, 414 U. 
S. 218. The trial court denied the motion and found Knowles
guilty, based on state law giving officers authority to conduct
a full-blown search of an automobile and driver where they
issue a citation instead of making a custodial arrest. In
affirming, the State Supreme Court applied its bright-line
"search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, reasoning that so long as
the officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest,
there need not in fact have been an arrest.

ISSUE:

WON instead of making a custodial arrest, a citation issued

justifies the full-blown search of an automobile and driver

HELD:

The search at issue, authorized as it was by state law,

nonetheless violates the Fourth Amendment. Neither of the
two historical exceptions for the "search incident to arrest"
exception, see Robinson, supra, at 234, is sufficient to justify
the search in the present case. First, the threat to officer
safety from issuing a traffic citation is a good deal less than in
the case of a custodial arrest. While concern for safety during
a routine traffic stop may justify the "minimal" additional
intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it
does not by itself justify the often considerably greater
intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the
search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent
bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from
danger. Second, the need to discover and preserve evidence
does not exist in a traffic stop, for once Knowles was stopped
for speeding and issued a citation, all evidence necessary to
47
People v. Delos Reyes deal.
Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests
656 SCRA 417 (2011) of accused-appellants, the search of accused-appellants'
persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of
Warrantless Searches: Search incidental to a lawful arrest
the shabu from accused-appellants' possession, are also
[Santos, P] considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is excluded
in evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus
FACTS: delicti for the crime charged, then the acquittal of accused-
appellants is inevitable.
 Rolando delos Reyes and co-accused were all
arrested for illegal possession, sale, delivery,
distribution, and/or transportation of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). The
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, in itd
Resolution dated March 3, 2000, found probable
cause to indict accused-appellants for violation of RA
6425 and resolved to continue the preliminary
investigation.
 In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the arresting
officers, members of the Intelligence and
Investigation of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of
the NCR Police Office claims that a confidential
informant said that a narcotics drug deal will
commence at the parking area of Shangrila Plaza
Hotel, Mandaluyong.

ISSUE:

Whether there was a valid arrest

HELD:

SC – NO.

The police officers arrested accused-appellants and searched

the latter's persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando
delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro momentarily conversing
in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a
box or carton inside being passed to them. These
circumstances hardly constitute overt acts "indicative of
felonious enterprise". The police officers had no prior
knowledge of the suspects' identities, and they completely
relied on their confidential informant to actually identify the
suspects. None of the police officers saw that was inside the
box. There is also no evidence that the confidential informant
himself knew that the box contained shabu. The police
officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or
circumstance that would have reasonably invited their
attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that accused-
appellants "has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit" a crime, particularly, an illegal drug
48
People v. Dimalanta

727 SCRA 20 (2014)

Warrantless Searches: Search incidental to a lawful arrest

[Santos, P]

FACTS:

 Edwin Lojera asked for police assistance regarding a

shooting incident wherein he had a traffic dispute
with a white taxi cab. The passengers of said taxi
cab, one of them was the accused, alighted and fired
their guns. The police officers on duty found the
white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two
armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns
towards the policemen and ran away. The policemen
chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano
recovered from accused a black bag containing two
bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a
magazine of super .38 stainless with ammos, while
PO3 Ramirez recovered from the companion of the
accused a .38 revolver.

ISSUE:

Whether the search and seizure of Marijuana were valid.

HELD:

SC – Yes.

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure

incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting officer
from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter
from destroying evidence within reach." It is therefore a
reasonable exercise of the State's police power to protect (1)
law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them
by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence
from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the
safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the
evidence under the control and within the reach of the
arrestee.

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in

Calantiao's possession and within his immediate control. As
the black bag containing the marijuana was in his possession,
it was within the permissible area that the apprehending
officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.

49
People v. De Gracia
233 SCRA 716 (1994)
Warrantless Searches: Exigent and emergency circumstances
[Santos, P]
FACTS:
 The incidents involved in this case took place at the
height of the coup d' etat staged in December, 1989
by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the
Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino
People (RAM-SFP) against the Government.
 At that time, various government establishments
and military camps in Metro Manila were being
bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-
tora" planes. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia
was charged in two separate informations for illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted
homicide which were tried jointly by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
 The records show that in the early morning of
December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the
Intelligence Division, National Capital Region
Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota
car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in
Quezon City, together with his team composed of
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt.
Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos.
 The surveillance, which actually started on the night
of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was
conducted pursuant to an intelligence report
received by the division that said establishment was
being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
communication command post.
 On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment 5 acquitting appellant Rolando de Gracia
of attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession
of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced
him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Moreover, it made a recommendation that
"(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be
merely executing or obeying orders and pursuant to
the spirit contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135,
R. P. C., the court recommends that Rolando de
Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving
a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this
case.
HELD:
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the
Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at
that time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a
surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from
the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the
place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door
despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the
former to break into the office. 17
The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily
and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence
of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably
explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder
at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within
the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo
which was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the
surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter,
the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered
opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions
to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first
place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts
obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that
a crime was being committed. There was consequently more
than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested
that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his
court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
50
People v. Ayangao
427 SCRA 428 (2004)
Warrantless Searches: Exigent and emergency circumstances
[Santos, P]
FACTS:
 Two weeks before August 13, 1999, PO3 Bienvenido
Sagum and PO3 Nestor A. Galvez, members of the
Criminal Detection and Intelligence Group based at
Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City,
received information from one of their informants
that a certain woman from Mountain Province
delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale at Sapang
Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga to some drug pushers.
Said information was also relayed by the informant
to C/Insp. Rhodel O. Sermonia who instructed the
two operatives to conduct surveillance operation
against their target female who was described by
their informant as about 50 years old, 5 feet in
height, straight long hair and coming from Kalinga
province.
 At around 5:00 oclock in the morning of August 13,
1999, their informant went to their headquarters
and informed them that their suspect is due to arrive
at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat. PO3 Sagum and PO3
Galvez, together with the informant, immediately
went to Sapang Biabas and parked their car near the
entrance of the road going to Sapang Biabas.
 While they were in their car, the informer pointed to
them a woman bearing the same description given
by the former. The woman alighted from the tricycle
and subsequently loaded two sacks with camote
fruits on top. The two officers proceeded to the
place where the woman was and noticed marijuana
dried leaves protruding through a hole of one of the
sacks. Sagum and Galvez introduced themselves as
police officers and requested the woman to put out
the contents of the said sacks.
 The sacks yielded sweet potatoes mixed with 15
brick-like substance wrapped in brown paper and
masking tape. A brick, which was damaged on the
side and in plain view of the officers revealed dried
marijuana leaves. The woman who was arrested
identified herself as accused Lita Ayangao y Batong-
Og of Lacnog, Agbanawag Tabuk, Kalinga Province.
Ayangao and the suspected dried marijuana leaves
were brought to the police officers headquarter at
Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City. The evidence
confiscated from the accused were sent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas where it was
examined by Chief Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babor.
The Initial Laboratory Report issued indicated that
the specimens from the 15 bricks of suspected dried
marijuana leaves weighing 14.75 kilograms were
found to be positive for marijuana.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid arrest
HELD:
In the present case, the warrantless arrest was lawful
because it fell under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides that a
peace officer may arrest a person even without a warrant
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit
an offense. However, the police officer should be spurred by
probable cause in making the arrest.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.[16] The determination of
probable cause must be resolved according to the facts of
each case. In this case, the arresting officers had probable
cause to make the arrest in view of the tip they received from
their informant. This Court has already ruled that tipped
information is sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search.
51
People v. De Lara only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend
the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest".
236 SCRA 291 (1994)
The policemen's entry into the house of appellant without a
Warrantless Searches: Hot pursuit search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught
committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed
[Santos, P]
the hot-pursuit was valid (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
FACTS: Rule 113, Section 5[a]). We also find as valid the seizure of
the plastic bag of prohibited drugs found inside appellant's
 On January 9, 1987, the policemen, together with house. The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited
their confidential informant, went to Garrido Street. drugs was the result of appellant's arrest inside his house. A
Upon arriving thereat, they strategically positioned contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person
themselves. Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. and the confidential of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest
informant proceeded to the house of appellant was made (People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376 [1990]).
located at No. 2267 Garrido Street, where they saw
him standing outside.
 The confidential informant introduced Pfc. Orolfo, Jr.
to appellant as an interested buyer of marijuana.
Appellant asked Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. "Ilan ang bibilhin
ninyo?" (How much will you buy?). Pfc. Orolfo, Jr.
replied: "Two foils" handing at the same time the
marked twenty-peso bill to appellant. The latter,
after placing the money in the right pocket of his
pants, went inside his house.
 Minutes later, appellant came back and handed two
foils wrapped in onion paper. It was after he handed
the two foils to Pfc. Orolfo, Jr., that he sensed the
presence of the police operatives. He then tried to
retrieve the two foils but Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. prevented
him from doing so. During the scuffle, one foil was
torn. Appellant then ran inside his house with Pfc.
Orolfo, Jr. in pursuit. The latter was able to subdue
appellant. Sgt. David confronted appellant, who
admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house.
Appellant showed the arresting officers a blue plastic
bag with white lining containing prohibited drugs. A
receipt of the articles seized was made by Pfc.
Orolfo, Jr.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest was valid.

HELD:

In the case at bench, appellant was caught red-handed in

delivering two tin foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the
poseur-buyer. Applying the aforementioned provision of law,
appellant's arrest was lawfully effected without need of a
warrant of arrest. "Having caught the appellant in flagrante as
a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not
52
Boac, et.al. v. People of the Philippines
570 SCRA 533 (2008)
Warrantless Searches: Custom searches
[Santiago, C]
FACTS:
Raul Basilio Boac, Ramon Betuin Golong, Cesar Fantone
Beltran, Roger Alcantara Basadre, and Benjamin Castaneda
Alfonso are members of the Philippine National Police (PNP)-
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG).
Beltran allegedly informed Boac that three container vans
with contrabands were released by the BOC; thus, Boac
instructed Golong and his team to flag down the subject vans
however they did not found any contraband.
Boac et.al were found guilty of violating Section 2203 of the
Tariff and Customs Code.
 Boac’s Contention - they did not conduct any search,
seizure, or arrest; hence, there was no violation of
the Tariff and Customs Code. During the search
conducted in the consignee's warehouse, the
employees of the owner of the shipment unloaded
the goods under BOC personnel supervision.
Petitioners allege that they only witnessed the
search; they did not make any seizures or arrests.
After searching the first van and half of the second
van without any contraband being found, Customs
Police Yamit and Godoy decided to stop the search
despite the request of petitioners to continue. Since
the Customs Police were already leaving the area,
Boac instructed his team to leave the vicinity. 10
Issue:
WN Petitioners violated the Tariff and Customs Code
Held:
No. They should be acquitted.
 It is clear that petitioners neither searched the
container vans nor effected seizure and arrest. The
CIDG (petitioners did not open the van). The
container vans were searched but not by petitioners,
but by Bureau of Customs
 Petitioners did not seize anything nor arrested
anybody. They merely observed the search which
they requested to be undertaken to check for
contrabands.
Mere flagging down of the container vans is not punishable
under Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code
Tariff and Customs Code:
Section 602. The Bureau of Customs, headed by a
Commissioner, has, among other things, the following general
duties, powers and jurisdiction, in respect to the levy of
customs duties, to wit:
b. The prevention and suppression of smuggling and other
frauds upon the customs;
j. The enforcement of the tariff and customs laws and all
other laws, rules and regulations in relation to the tariff and
customs administration.
Sec. 2203. Persons Having Police Authority. - For the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, the following
persons are authorized to effect searches, seizures and
arrests conformably with the provisions of said laws.
d. Officers generally empowered by law to effect arrests and
execute processes of the courts, when acting under the
direction of the Collector.
Sec. 3612. Violations of Tariff and Customs Laws and
Regulations in General. - Any person who violates a provision
of this Code or regulations pursuant thereto, for which
delinquency no specific penalty is provided, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. If the
offender is an alien, he shall be deported after serving the
sentence; and if the offender is a public official or employee,
he shall suffer disqualification to hold public office, to vote
and participate in any public election for ten years.
The jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs is clearly
with regard to customs duties. Should the PNP suspect
anything, it should coordinate with the BOC and obtain the
written authority from the Collector of Customs in order to
conduct searches, seizures, or arrests. While it is an admitted
fact that there was no such coordination initiated by the PNP-
CIDG in this instance, nevertheless, petitioners cannot be
convicted under the Tariff and Customs Code since there is no
evidence that they did actually search the container vans.
53
Bureau of Customs, et.al. v. Ogario, et.al. seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau
of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these
329 SCRA 289 (2000) proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and
forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
Warrantless Searches: Custom searches
determine all questions touching on the seizure and
[Santiago, C] forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are
precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even
FACTS: through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of Cebu,

The actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the
issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention of 25,000 bags of
Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject
rice". The warrant was issued on the basis of the report of the
to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region
Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.
VII that the rice had been illegally imported.

Respondent Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of
rice, and his buyer, respondent Elson Ogario, filed a
complaint for injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, alleging:
7.) The acts of the defendants in stopping the loading and
unloading activities of the plaintiff's laborers [have] no basis
in law and in fact; thus, unlawful and illegal. A mere suspicion
which is not coupled with any proof or evidence to that effect
is [a] matter which the law prohibits.
14.) That a Warrant of Seizure and detention issued by the
Collector of Custom[s] dated December 9, 1998 be quashed
because the defendants' act of seizing and detaining the
herein-mentioned sacks of rice are illegal.  The continuing act
of detaining the herein-mentioned sacks of rice will lead to
the deterioration of the same.  That no public auction sale of
the same should be conducted by the Bureau of Custom[s] or
any government agenc[y].
The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers
over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing
no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive, not
only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs,
but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the
collection of import and export duties due the State, which
enables the government to carry out the functions it has been
instituted to perform.
Judges should never forget what the Court categorically
declared in Mison v. Natividad (213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992])
that "[b]y express provision of law, amply supported by well-
settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive
jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and
regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or
stifle or put it to naught."

 Petitioners Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu ]

and the EIIB, as well as the Philippine Navy and Coast
Guard, sought the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction.

Issue:

W/N the Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

SC – No.

Trial Court no jurisdiction

There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of

any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of

54
People v. Johnson There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of
accused-appellants passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other
348 SCRA 526 (2000) personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also
inadmissible, as are the girdle taken from her, and her
Warrantless Searches: Airport searches
signature thereon. 
[Santiago, C]
Rule 126, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
FACTS: authorizes the search and seizure only of the following:

-Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at NAIA
departure area.  When she frisked Leila Johnson, she felt
something hard on her abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs.
Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as
she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic
pregnancy.
Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and

-Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the
matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile. She was
directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest womens
room for inspection.  Leila brought out three plastic packs.
The substance which was found to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.
-Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant
should be returned to her.

Issue: W/N The search and seizure was valid

Held: YES. Valid. The methamphetamine hydrochloride

seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.

-Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure

clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public
in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security
procedures. Travelers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice
that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.

The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus

been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are
admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein.
Her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant,
was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto..

55
People v. Canton
Warrantless Searches: Airport searches
FACTS: SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA), When she passed through the metal detector booth,
a beeping sound was emitted.  Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian
employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and
Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called
her attention. Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something
bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand
under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several times
and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice
granules. When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar
packages in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs
shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger
and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures.  Passengers are also
subject to search for prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN
consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of
packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to
refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the
packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by
her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that
the packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of
the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal.

They discovered three packages individually wrapped and
sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily
handed to them.
 The first was taken from SUSANs abdominal area; the
second, from in front of her genital area; and the third, from
her right thigh.
when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.[10]
 It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for
prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of the
airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into
the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by
appellant), and thereby depriving them of the ability and
facility to act accordingly, including to further search without
warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society.[28] Thus, the strip search in the ladies
room was justified under the circumstances.

Issue:

W/N search and seizure valid

Held:

Yes. Valid

The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is

not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in
plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented
searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest

In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine

airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9
of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:

SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air

carrier concerned shall contain among others the following
condition printed thereon: Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of,
prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be
searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, which
56
U.S. v. Davis
482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir., 1973)
Warrantless Searches: Airport searches
[Santiago, C]
FACTS:
Davis was convicted of attempting to board an aircraft while
carrying a concealed weapon (49 U.S.C. Sec. 1472(l)). The
conviction was based upon the discovery of a loaded revolver
in appellant's briefcase by a Trans World Airlines employee
during a search of the carry-on luggage of boarding
passengers.
Appellant's motion to suppress (quash) was denied on the
grounds that he "impliedly consented" to the search and that,
in any event, "there was no governmental involvement."
Issue:
W/N The search is valid
Held:
Remanded.
Airport screening searches per se do not violate a traveler's
rights under the Fourth Amendment, or under his
constitutionally protected right to travel, such searches must
satisfy certain conditions, among which is the necessity of
first obtaining the consent of the person to be searched. A
remand is necessary in this case to determine whether
appellant gave such consent.
its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of
the administrative need that justifies it. 49 It follows
that airport screening searches are valid only if they
recognize the right of a person to avoid search by
electing not to board the aircraft. Although the right
to travel is not absolute,54 and its scope and
limitations remain uncertain,55 it is firmly settled that
freedom to travel at home and abroad without
unreasonable governmental restriction is a
fundamental constitutional right of every American
citizen. "This Court long ago recognized that the
nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional
concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all
citizens be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict
this movement."
The magistrate and the district court, as we have said, found
that appellant "consented" to the inspection of his briefcase,
and that the search was therefore lawful.
We have held that, as a matter of constitutional law, a
prospective passenger has a choice: he may submit to a
search of his person and immediate possessions as a
condition to boarding; or he may turn around and leave. If he
chooses to proceed, that choice, whether viewed as a
relinquishment of an option to leave or an election to submit
to the search, is essentially a "consent," granting the
government a license to do what it would otherwise be
barred from doing by the Fourth Amendment.

MUST PROVE THAT THERE WAS CONSENT ON THE PART OF

DAVIS

 Screening searches of airline passengers are

conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in
furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to
prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives
aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings.
The essential purpose of the scheme is not to detect
weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who
carry them, but to deter persons carrying such
material from seeking to board at all.

 One important caveat should be stressed, however.

To meet the test of reasonableness, an
administrative screening search must be as limited in

57