None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Harry Stonehill,etc. vs Hon. Jose Diokno, etc., G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967 Ponente:
Conception
FACTS:
Respondents issued 42 search warrants against the petitioners. However, petitioners
questioned the legality of the warrants on the ground that, according to them, (1) did not
describe the particularity of the documents to be seized, (2) cash money not mentioned in the
warrants were seized, (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence in a deportation case
against them, (4) the search and seizure were made in an illegal manner, (5) the seized
documents and money were not delivered to the courts.
In response, the respondents said that the (1) search was valid and if there are any defects, (2)
it has already been cured by the consent of the petitioners. The court granted the preliminary
injunction prayed by the petitioners, but it was partially dissolved as to the documents seized
from the office of the corporation. Maintaining the injunction as regards to the documents
seized in the residences of the petitioners.
In the corporate documents, the petitioners have no cause of action to question the legality of
the warrants because the corporation have a separate personality from its stockholders. But
with the documents seized in the residence may raise 2 questions to be settled:
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the search warrants were made under the authority and
(2) And if the answer is negative, whether those documents may be used as evidence against
the petitioners in deportation case.
RULING:
DOCTRINES UPHELD: (1) A general warrant is a warrant that sanctions seizure of records
whatever its nature. (2) General warrants contravene the Constitution about the particular
description of things to be seized. (3) The right to object to admission as evidence the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices of a particular corporation belongs
exclusively to such corporation and may not be invoked by its corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
Constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our
Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule.
We are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and
the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said
motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied
upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we
agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it
being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as
the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be,
as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Terry VS. Ohio, 392 US 1
RULE: There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable
cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in
determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be
given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.
FACTS:
The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while
repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a
store window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom they
eventually followed up the street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men
were “casing” a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for
questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick
search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed
weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
ISSUE:
Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
HELD:
The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that it is a reasonable search
when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that
the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly
burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be
armed.
There is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against him. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the
officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact
carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any
other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Thus it
must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used
to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less
than a full search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.
An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited
search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different. It
does not follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised
of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime,
the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions short
of an arrest.
There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the
protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime.
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he
is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.
AAA V. CARBONELL, 524 SCRA 496 (2007)
FACTS:
AAA failed to appear for the 4 consecutive orders to take the witness stand in order to satisfy
the judge for the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Because
of this, dismissed the Case for lack of probable cause.He claims that under Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause “to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Petitioner contends that the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses in satisfying himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the
documentary evidence and transcript of stenographic notes may sufficiently establish this.
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment that the finding of probable cause
by the investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and that he was justified in
requiring petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine
probable cause.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No.
6983 for lack of probable cause.
HELD:
YES. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required...
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a... warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released. The... determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest
is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the function of the
investigating... prosecutor.[
The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence
of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates... the documentary evidence in support
thereof.
Probable cause is that which engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the... respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not require that the evidence would justify conviction.
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not
rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez, we stressed
that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the
affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused
and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of
the Information. If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to
sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses be conducted.
RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD, Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al., Respondent. (G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014, Per Curiam)
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must concur: (a)
there must be a de jure office; (b) there must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public; and (c) there must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. The
existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case. Undoubtedly, there is a de
jure of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the said
office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only divested of the same by virtue
of a supervening legal technicality – that is, the operation of Section 5, Chapter III of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC as above-explained; also, it may be said that there was general acquiescence
by the public since the search warrant application was regularly endorsed to the sala of
Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-RTC under his apparent
authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge. Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual physical possession of
the said office is presumed to be in good faith, as the contrary was not established.
Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be considered to have acted as a de facto officer when he
issued the Search Warrant, hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer
suffering no administrative impediment.
FACTS:
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior
Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the (RTC) of Manila, Branch50 (Manila-
RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3,
Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the allegedremains of the victims summarily executed by
the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found.
In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the RTC
and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December
2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the
Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued the
Search Warrant which was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of the Scene of the Crime Operatives
on July 15, 2009.
The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of human
remains.
On July 20, 2009, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash
and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence premised on the ground that Judge Peralta had no
authority to act on the application for a search warrant since he had been automatically
divested of his position as Vice Executive Judge when several administrative penalties were
imposed against him by the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated the Search
Warrant? (NO)
RULING:
Judge Peralta can be considered to have acted as a de facto officer when he issued the Search
Warrant, hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer suffering no
administrative impediment. Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which
provides that "the imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an
administrative penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his
position as such," Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as Vice-Executive
Judge and accordingly issue the Search Warrant in view of the Court’s Resolution in Dee C.
Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta wherein he was administratively penalized with fines of
P15,000.00 and P5,000.00.
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties did operate to
divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as Vice Executive Judge, it must be qualified that the
abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of Search
Warrant considering that Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance as a de
facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid. Funa v. Agra defines who a de
facto officer is and explains that his acts are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure
officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He
may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging his duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must concur: (a) there
must be a de jure office; (b) there must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public; and (c) there must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case. Undoubtedly, there is a de
jure office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the said
office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only divested of the same by virtue
of a supervening legal technicality – that is, the operation of Section 5, Chapter III of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC as aboveexplained; also, it may be said that there was general acquiescence
by the public since the search warrant application was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge
Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as
2nd Vice Executive Judge. Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual physical possession of the said
office is presumed to be in good faith, as the contrary was not established. Accordingly,
Judge Peralta can be considered to have acted as a de facto officer when he issued the Search
Warrant, hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer suffering no
administrative impediment.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. (G.R.
No. 157870, 158633, 161658, EN BANC, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.)
Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It
is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution.
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary
level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and
suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the
process "the well-being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs." Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and
so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to
fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug
test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices
is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The employees' privacy interest in an
office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their
privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor
under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other
laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.
And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason
that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to
be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and
efficiency.
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When
persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case,
do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.
FACTS:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
ISSUES:
(1) Does Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? (YES)
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution? (NO) and
(2) Whether or not mandatory drug testing can be imposed on secondary and tertiary level
students? (YES)
Officials and employees in public and private offices? (YES) Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure,
and the equal protection clause? (NO)
(3) Whether or not mandatory drug testing can be imposed on persons accused of crimes?
(NO)
RULING:
(1) Pimentel Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486.)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that,
subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet
the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2)
voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is
hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates
any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. If Congress
cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC,
to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of
election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal – drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with
the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership
in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be
hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little
value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the
provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a
disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may
be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of
the law, without exception, made drug testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily
suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not
adhering to the statutory command.
(2) SJS Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary
level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and
suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the
process "the well-being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs."
The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal
drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may
even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo
rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point.
What can reasonably be deduced from US jurisprudence and applied to this jurisdiction are:
(1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2)
minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody
and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis,
have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the
right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of
students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level
students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers
and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same
reason.
The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace.
Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree
of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. Like their counterparts in the private
sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and
restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the
people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
(3) Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students,
the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the
parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds
from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. The Court finds the situation
entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with
criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are
charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged,
by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the
stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
(G.R. No. 200748, FIRST DIVISION, July 23, 2014, SERENO, CJ.)
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. The constitutional
right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby
speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence
of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman
charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her
pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have
a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering
from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to
have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his
body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
In the instant case, the Court fails to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge
of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and
tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in
exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to
submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
FACTS:
Jaime D. dela Cruz was a public officer, having been duly appointed and qualified to such
public position as Police Officer 2 of the PNP assigned in the Security Service Group of the
Cebu City Police Office, after having been arrested by agents of the NBI in an entrapment
operation, was found positive for use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, the
dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.
Dela Cruz was then charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation
and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an Information.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
RTC Branch 58 of Cebu City found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory
rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate
Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the urine test
despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for its
admission. First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite
the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right.
Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of
sufficient basis to convict him. The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the
ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extraction of urine for purposes of drug testing in this case violates the
Constitution? (YES)
RULING:
Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower
court reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to
extract urine because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement
or testimony against himself. Extracting urine from one’s body is merely a mechanical act,
hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. The constitutional
right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition
as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of
counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it
has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to
physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination
as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel
morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with
bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
In the instant case, the Court fails to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge
of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation. "In the face of the constitutional guarantees
in Sections 2 and 17, Article III, the Court cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons
regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
BRICCIO “RICKY” A. POLLO, Petitioner, - versus - CHAIRPERSON KARINA
CONSTANTINODAVID, Respondent G.R. No. 181881, EN BANC, October 18, 2011,
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a two-fold inquiry: first, one must
consider whether the action was justified at its inception, x x x; second, one must determine
whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-
investigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file x x x. The search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of
work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the
Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals
with pending cases in the CSC. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search
was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they
could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action.
Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the work related investigation.
FACTS:
Pollo is a government employee whose computer was searched pursuant to the anonymous
letter complaint to the Office of Chairperson David. The government employer used Pollo’s
personal files stored in the computer as evidence of misconduct. Thereafter, Pollo was
charged administratively and dismissed from service. Pollo now assails the validity of the
search and resulting evidence thereby being the fruit of the poisonous tree.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Pollo has reasonable expectation of privacy. (NONE)
2. Whether the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files
without his knowledge and consent was reasonable. (YES)
RULING:
1. In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States, it was noted that existence of privacy right under
prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
In the 1987 case of O’Connor v. Ortega, the US Court categorically declared that "individuals
do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead
of a private employer. In the matter of government employees’ reasonable expectations of
privacy in their workplace, O’Connor teaches: x x x Public employees’ expectations of
privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the
private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by
legitimate regulation. x x x the employee’s expectation of privacy must be assessed in the
context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by
supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases
offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of
government offices that others – such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors,
and the general public – may have frequent access to an individual’s office. We agree with
JUSTICE SCALIA that "constitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the
government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make
reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer," x x x but some government offices may be
so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x
Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question of whether an
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
One of the factors stated in O’Connor which are relevant in determining whether an
employee’s expectation of privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a
workplace privacy policy. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy (computers are to
be used for legitimate purpose only, an explicit waiver of the expectation of privacy despite
the use of passwords) that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the
CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means.
This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources
were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
2. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of
the employee’s legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need for
supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. To the Court’s view,
therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches for a work-related purpose would
impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The governmental interest justifying work-
related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and proper operation of the workplace.
When employers conduct an investigation, they have an interest substantially different from
"the normal need for law enforcement”. Government agencies provide myriad services to the
public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have
probable cause before they entered an employee’s desk for the purpose of finding a file or
piece of office correspondence. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by
the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible
and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest.
Public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government
employees for no investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work
related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of
the intrusion must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a two-fold inquiry: first, one must
consider whether the action was justified at its inception, x x x; second, one must determine
whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-
investigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file x x x. The search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.
This test was found to be fulfilled in the case at bar. The search of petitioner’s computer files
was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an
anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the
CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is
supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the CSC.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the
complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources
in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search
was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they
could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action.
Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the work-related investigation. Worthy to mention, too, is the
fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent manner.
Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were
on hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was
duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of files
from his computer.
JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner, -versus- JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent. G.R. No.
190710, SECOND DIVISION, June 6, 2011, NACHURA, J.
A court order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as
in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as
a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a
court may order a compulsory blood test.
FACTS:
Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties
to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his
mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also
submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s
baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint
Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about petitioner, as a musical prodigy. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to
Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order setting the case for hearing and urging
anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis
of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father. Acting on Jesus’ Motion for
Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of
Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy,
and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
ISSUE:
Whether prima facie showing of legitimacy is necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing. (YES)
RULING:
It is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA
testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. In some states, to warrant
the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours),
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement
of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart
of a finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained; “Although a paternity action is civil,
not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.
Courts in the various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing
must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order
for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a
party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show-cause hearing must be
held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.”
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing,
the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, Petitioner – versus - COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Respondents. G.R. No. 110662, SECOND DIVISION,
August 4, 1994, PADILLA, J.
R.A. No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such
tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject
tapes is mandatory under R.A. No. 4200.
FACTS:
Respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages
against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent
were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and
unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent
allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. The cassette tapes were
admittted as evidence.
A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner in the CA assailing the admission in evidence
of the cassette tapes. CA dismissed the petition stating that the tape recordings are not
inadmissible per se.
ISSUE:
Whether the tape recordings are admissible as evidence. (NO)
RULING:
R.A. No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such
tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Clearly, respondent’s trial court and Court of
Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions (Sec 1 and 4) of the law in admitting
in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject
tapes is mandatory under R.A. No. 4200.
CECILIA ZULUETA, Petitioner, – versus - COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO
MARTIN, Respondents. G.R. No. 107383, SECOND DIVISION, February 20, 1996,
MENDOZA, J.
The only exception to the constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication
and correspondence to be inviolable is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence
of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether the documents seized may be used against the respondent in the case filed by his
wife. (NO)
RULING:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands’
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither one may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
BLAS F. OPLE, Petitioners, – versus - RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P.
AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents. G.R. No. 127685, EN BANC, July 23,
1998, PUNO, J.
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No.
308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
The indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his
PRN.
It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for
what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity
of the information.
FACTS:
Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the Administrative Order No.
308 entitled “Adoption of Computerized Identification Reference System” - providing for a
national computerized identification system with the goal of providing convenient way to
transact business with the government. Among the grounds raised is that the A.O.
impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right of privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy. (YES)
RULING:
If we extend our judicial gaze, we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. The Court prescind from the premise that
the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the
burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1)
the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions
and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. The heart of
A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through
the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state
whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes
In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System
will contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning." This is an
admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other
data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness
of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
underplayed. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN
everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His
transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the electronic
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes;
but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation
to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address
and other basic personal infomation about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption
will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us
in clear and categorical terms how theseinformation gathered shall he handled. It does not
provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what
purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the
information.
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information
which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it
may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the
right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities
of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when
we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much
less verify the correctness of the data encoded.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, Petitioner, – versus - THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent. G.R. No.
167798, EN BANC, APRIL 19, 2006, CARPIO, J.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government
entities.
EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be
collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities.
EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected,
in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420 that directs a unified
ID system among government agencies and Government owned and controlled corporations
in order to have a uniform ID for all government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and other
respondents assailed this executive order that it infringes the citizens’ right to privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy. (NO)
RULING:
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government
entities. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have
been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been
no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right
to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the
collection and recording of personal identification data.
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and
extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government
entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In
addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data.
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing
safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to
protect the right to privacy. Now, under EO 420, safeguards are instituted.
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data
that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of
government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality
of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict
administrative safeguards.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot
show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws
the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA,
Petitioners, – versus -ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents. G.R. No. 202666, THIRD DIVISION,
September 29, 2014, VELASCO, J.
It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a
subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the
information they post or upload thereto.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that
the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
FACTS:
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded
on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara)
wearing only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos
to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded
said pictures. Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page,
showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action.
STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from
“marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012. Subsequently, Rhonda
Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data against the school. They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit
with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared
illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether the right to privacy of the childred was violated. (NO)
RULING:
The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the
three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at
bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves. With the availability of numerous avenues for information
gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to
attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow
of information should be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable
expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Since gaining popularity, the online social network(OSN) phenomenon has paved the way to
the creation of various social networking sites, including the one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook). To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its
purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the
South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy
settings. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said
to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their
profile will view the information they post or upload thereto.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networking (OSN)
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the
utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts.
Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however,
neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who
showed the images to Escudero.
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner,- versus - P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN,
Respondent. G.R. No. 203254, FIRST DIVISION, October 08, 2014, PERLAS-
BERNABE, J.
In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the Habeas Data Rule essentially
requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “the manner the right to privacy
is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party.” The petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the
right to privacy on one hand, and the right to life, liberty, or security on the other, which
must be supported by substantial evidence.
In this case, Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to life, liberty or security
was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of
the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video
– which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for
public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the
matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the
cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a
failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
FACTS:
Police Superintendent Neri Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee were
former common law partners. In July 2011, Ilagan visited Lee at the latter’s condominium,
rested for a while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his
digital camera was missing. Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported
sex video she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman.
Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail.
During their confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his
office and walked away. This prompted Lee to utilize said video as evidence in filing various
complaints – criminal (in violation of the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004”), and administrative [for misconduct before the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM)] – against Ilagan.
Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute
the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated
not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and
thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor is warranted. The RTC issued a
Writ of Habeas Data directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s
digital camera as well as the negative/original copy of the subject video.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data in favor of Ilagan was proper. (NO)
RULING:
The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.”
In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the Habeas Data Rule essentially
requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “the manner the right to privacy
is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.” The petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to
privacy on one hand, and the right to life, liberty, or security on the other, which must be
supported by substantial evidence.
In this case, Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to life, liberty or security
was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of
the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video
– which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for
public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the
matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the
cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a
failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
Nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards
the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything
on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject
video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to
ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only
reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence
in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the
insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the
Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, Petitioner, – versus - RAUL M. GONZALES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 168338, EN BANC, February 15, 2008, PUNO, C.J.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally
to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger
test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is
no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the
national security of the State.
FACTS:
On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was
planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation
was audiotaped allegedly through wiretapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of
Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the
compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable
under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes
were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal
knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.
On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued a press release giving fair warning to radio and television
owners/operators to observe anti-wiretapping law and pertinent circulars on program
standards. The acts of respondents are alleged to be violations of the freedom on expression
and of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Respondents denied that the acts transgress the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the
media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other
personalities constitute unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press. (YES)
RULING:
The Supreme Court applied the Content-based restriction test and ruled that respondents’
evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. With respect to content-
based restrictions, the government must show the type of harm the speech sought to be
restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm
otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only by showing a substantive and imminent
evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground. As formulated, the question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to
all kinds of media, including broadcast media. This outlines the procedural map to follow in
cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the
burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence
necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to
show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the
clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent
is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records
of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short
of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press
Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of
the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions,
one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence
of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially
considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its
commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case.
Fourthly,given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing
would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger
test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is
no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the
national security of the State.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., et al., Petitioners, – versus - SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
et al., Respondents. G.R. No. 203335, EN BANC, February 11, 2014, ABAD, J.
The government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and
punish wrongdoings. Hence not all provisions of the cybercrime law could be declared
unconstitutional
FACTS:
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. And because
linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated
can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his
bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can
use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless
children who have access to the internet.
For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and
contain and punish wrongdoings.
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the following provisions of the Cybercrime Law:
1. Section 4(a)(1) which punishes Illegal Access- The access to the whole or any part of a
computer system without right. Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict
scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and
should thus be struck down.
2. Section 4(a)(3) which punishes Data Interference. – The intentional or reckless alteration,
damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data
message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses. Petitioners
claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling
and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
3. Section 4(a)(6) which punishes Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of domain name over
the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from
registering the same, if such a domain name is: (i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to
an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the
domain name registration; (ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other
than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and (iii) Acquired without right or with
intellectual property interests in it. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting
violates the equal protection clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user
using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of
another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.
4. Section 4(b)(3) punishes Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition,
use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging
to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet
been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower. Petitioners claim that
Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence and transgresses the freedom of the press.
5. Section 4(c)(1) punishes Cybersex– The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or
operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration. Petitioners claim that
the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. They express fear
that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting
adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as
crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes
"gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as
a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously." This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces
socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the
bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
6. Section 4(c)(2) punishes Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined
and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009,
committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1)
one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775. Petitioners point out that
the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture
or create any form of child pornography" clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid
and abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to punish. Petitioners are wary that a person who
merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable
for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be.
Further, if the author bounces off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet could
be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime.
7. Section 4(c)(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of
commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic communication
contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further
commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The commercial
electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message;
and (cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading
information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of
internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes
with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass
to one’s privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipient’s domain without
prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
8. Section 4(c)(4) punishes Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or
any other similar means which may be devised in the future. Petitioners dispute the
constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyber libel. Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the
penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the
requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with
the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that
inferring "presumed malice" from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article
354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
9. Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense: (a) Aiding or
Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission of anyof the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable. (b) Attempt in
the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerate in this Act shall be held liable. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers
from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
10. Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications
technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the
penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.
ISSUE:
Whether the questioned provisions are constitutional.
RULING:
1. YES. The Court found nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is
essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right. It is
a universally condemned conduct.
2. YES. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally
subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject
broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not
encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,
the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection
to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and
private documents. Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since
Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to
intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.
3. YES. It is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is
reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead,
destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of
denial of equal protection is baseless.
4. YES. The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his
citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of
his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or use
such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail
to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to
privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law. Also, the charge of
invalidity of this section based on the over breadth doctrine will not hold water since the
specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly,
what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of
personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s
personal data. Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press
in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person
in the news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the
essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of
identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and
disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of
theft.
5. YES. The deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act give a proper perspective on the issue. These deliberations show
a lack of intent to penalize "private showing x x x between and among two private persons x
x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some." The understanding of those who drew
up the cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a business" is necessary to
constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white
slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive
prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam. The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1)
unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in
the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress
has intended.
6. YES. The provision merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
(ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the
government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPA’s definition of child pornography
already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other
means." Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
7. NO. People, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such
unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have
interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or
reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to
delete or not to read them. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a
person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
8. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected
speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from
defamation. Indeed, cyber libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to
Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c) (4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel. But the
Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the
libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the
penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is
distinct from that of print.
9. Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the
freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors
in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal
crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation
tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries,
Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny. But the
crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be
permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference,
Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on
Computer related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses
borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression. That Section 5 penalizes aiding or
abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and
CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on
Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System.
10. Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction
between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology
and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the
offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater
harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN
PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, Mendoza,J.
Under the O’Brien test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.
Applying the O’Brien Test in this case, the Court ruled that Section 5.4 is invalid, because (1)
it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means
other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
FACTS:
Comelec sought to enforce Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:
“Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before
an election.” Petitioners brought an action for prohibition to enjoin Comelec from enforcing
such provision, claiming that it constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraints.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
speech, expression and the press. (YES)
RULING:
The Court applied the O’Brien Test under, under which even if a law furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to
the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on
freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in
question.
Applying the O’Brien Test in this case, the Court ruled that Section 5.4 is invalid, because (1)
it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means
other than the suppression of freedom of expression. Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor
General, the prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is
only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but
the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a
total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a
period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days
immediately before a local election.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. AND PULSE ASIA, INC., v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 208062, April 07, 2015, J. Leonen
The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of
survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Sec. 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act. This
requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects the constitutional
policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service. The nature of the
speech involved, as well as the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political equality,
calls into operation the equality-based approach to weighing liberty to express vis-a-vis
equality of opportunities. In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech
prevails over regulation but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech.
FACTS:
Comelec Resolution No. 9674 (Resolution) directed SWS, Pulse Asia and other survey firms
of similar circumstanceto submit to Comelec the names of all commissioners and payors of
all surveys published from Feb. 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of their
“subscribers.” SWS and Pulse Asia assailed the Resolution as having been issued ultra vires.
They contended that the Resolution is in excess of what the Fair Election Act requires.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by the requirement to
submit the names of their subscribers. (NO)
RULING:
The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of
survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Sec. 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act. This
requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects the constitutional
policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service. The nature of the
speech involved, as well as the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political equality, calls
into operation the equality-based approach to weighing liberty to express vis-a-vis equality of
opportunities. In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech prevails over
regulation but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into
speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party
if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a
whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a)
should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of
enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the
guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that
object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the
rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the
basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on
private property.
SWS and Pulse Asia’s free speech rights must be weighed in relation to the Fair Election
Act's purpose of ensuring political equality and, therefore, the speech of others who want to
participate unencumbered in our political spaces. On one hand, there are petitioners' right to
publish and publications which are attended by the interests of those who can employ
published data to their partisan ends. On the other, there is regulation that may affect equality
and, thus, strengthen the capacity of those on society's margins or those who grope for
resources to engage in the democratic dialogue. The latter fosters the ideals of deliberative
democracy. It does not trump the former; rather, it provides the environment where the
survey group's free speech rights should reside.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP
VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER
OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015, LEONEN, J.
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was
not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group. Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the
second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining “political
advertisement” or “election propaganda.”
FACTS:
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six feet (6')
by ten feet (10') in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins stated: "Conscience Vote" and lists of candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as comprising "Team
Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay. When the said tarpaulin came to
the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to Bishop Navarra ordering the immediate removal of
the tarpaulin because it was in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the lawful size
for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against the latter.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, Bishop
Navarra, et al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of Comelec as
unconstitutional, and permanently restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice and
hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the Comelec has
the power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment of freedom of
speech. (NO)
RULING:
It is not election propaganda.While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group. Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages,
are not covered by the second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615
defining “political advertisement” or “election propaganda.”
The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That petitioners chose
to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue—and a
complex piece of legislation at that—can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the
candidates and party list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were
expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of
petitioners. But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our
fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space
for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in
judgment of the acts of others.
Bayan et.al. vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 226
FACTS:
The rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo
Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta
Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed,
causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested in the case of Bayan, et al
allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6,
2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections
4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive Response".
They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the
CPR policy recently announced.
Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it
is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The
words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some
cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the
law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a
content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 volated their rights as organizations and
individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
HELD:
Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in
peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is
directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly
assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public
assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be
validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other
hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held
without the permit.
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that
enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very
basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected.
Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for
that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to
engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX,
and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements
defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-
neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they
would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion,"
"protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they
can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances"
come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of
the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health the so-called
calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck
down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some
police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
"maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the
mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local
governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as
provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in
accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city
concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be
required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the
police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its National President,
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN,
Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA,
Respondent.
FACTS:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thru its president Jose Anselmo Cadiz filed a letter
application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 to
5:30 PM, before the Office of the City Mayor of Manila, Mayor Jose Atienza. The latter
granted a permit but changed the venue to Plaza Miranda, which permit the IBP received on
June 19, 2006. The IBP, Attys. Harry Roque, Joel Butuyan, and Anselmo Cadiz then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Action. Having been unacted within 24 hours from its
filing, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which it denied
because of the pendency of the CA petition. The rally pushed thru on June 22, 2006 at the
foot of the Mendiola Bridge, despite the Manila Police District barring them from doing so.
After the rally, they voluntarily dispersed. On June 22, 2006, the MPD filed a criminal case
against Atty. Cadiz for violation of the Public Assembly Act for staging a rally not indicated
in the permit, which he answered.
In the meantime, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari initially filed by the
petitioners for being moot and academic and lacking merit. It ruled that the city mayor did not
abuse his discretion when he modified the venue of the rally. The Public Assembly Act does
not require that the reason for the modification be put in writing. It merely requires that the
action taken shall be in writing and applicants be furnished within 24 hours. Hence the
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBP's rally
permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly
Act and violates their constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.
HELD:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
However, even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did
not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.
In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise
each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades
review, owing to the limited time in processing the application where the shortest allowable
period is five days prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court
to definitively resolve the issue at hand.”
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads: Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to
accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant
who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of
law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court,
its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after
receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be
immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours
from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. (underscoring
supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue.
The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may
directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against
the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable
condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would, when granted
imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may
possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is
that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the
language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be “abridged
on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action.
It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an
assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate
court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory provision,
not to have modified the permit “in terms satisfactory to the applicant.