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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ASSIGNMENT #1
SUBMITTED BY:
KEITH NESTER A. LAVIN
Student
SUBMITTED TO:
Atty. Michelle Basmayor
Professor
Statutory Construction
B. Power to Construe
Not in all occasions, however, are the courts duty bound to construe and interpret
the laws. Two requisites must concur:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy, meaning, a case brought to the
court by party litigants to hear and settle their disputes. If there is no case or
controversy, there is no way for the court to construe or interpret a law.
CASE DIGESTS:
1. Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines (GR No. 180016, April 29, 2014)
The primordial duty of the court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall
not illegally take legal powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation or under the
form of interpretation modify, revise, amend distort, remodel or rewrite the law, or
give the law a construction which is unacceptable to its terms.
FACTS:
Lito Corpuz (Petitioner) and Danilo Tangcoy (Complainant) met in Admiral
Royal Casino in 1990.
May 2, 1991: In the same casino, complainant was engaged in lending money
for casino players and had some jewelries for sale. Petitioner offered to sell
the pieces of jewelry
Complainant turned over the jewelries to the petitioner which are: 18k
diamond ring for men, a woman’s bracelet, 1 men’s necklace and another
men’s bracelet with the estimated value of 98,000 as evidenced by a receipt.
They both agreed that the petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale,
and/or, if unsold return the same items within 60 days.
Period expired and petitioner failed to fulfill the agreement.
The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The accused was sentenced to an imprisonment under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law of four years and two months of Prison
Correccional in its medium period as MINIMUM to fourteen years and eight
months of Reclusion temporal in its minimum period as MAXIMUM.
The CA denied the appeal petitioner and affirmed the RTC’s decision with
MODIFICATION of 4 years and 2 months of prison correccional as minimum
to 8 years of prison mayor, as maximum plus 1 year for each additional
P10,000 or total of 7 years.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court can adjust the penalties provided under the law to
prevent injustice.
RULING:
The court cannot modify the range of penalties because that would constitute
judicial legislation.
What the legislature’s perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for
in the said crimes cannot be remedied thought the Court’s decisions, as that
would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government.
The primordial duty of the court is merely to apply the law in such a way what
it shall not take illegally the legislative powers by judicial legislation.
It should now make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or
give the law a construction which is unacceptable to its terms.
The petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED.
FACTS:
December 8, 1986: Private respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.
The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and
assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, during the pendency of his petition, the applicant died.
His heirs Margarita, Marissa, Maribella, Arnold, and Mary Ann Abistado
represented by their Aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed as their
guardian substituted as the applicants.
The LRC in its decision dated June 13, 1989, dismissed the petition “for want
of jurisdiction”.
It was also found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and peaceful possession of the
subject land since 1938.
The applicants failed to comply with the provision of Sec. 23 of PD 1529
requiring the applicants to publish the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines. The initial hearing was published only
in the Official Gazette.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court ruling
that the publication in the newspaper of general circulation was merely
procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the
trial court of its authority to grant the application.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the land registration court can validly confirm or register the
title of private respondents in the absence of publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
RULING:
The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter’s receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing.
There was a failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the
law. Private respondents did not offer, any excuse, even if they had, it would
not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.
The law is unambiguous, and its rationale is clear.
The Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation, or equivocation; there
is only room for application.
The application for land registration by the respondents must be dismissed
without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with.
3. Secretary of the DPWH and Highways vs. Tecson (G.R. No.179334, April 21,
2015)
When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or erroneous. The
Courts’ first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its
express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is
impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need to be resorted to where
a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Equity and equitable principles
only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.
FACTS:
1940: The Department of Public Woks and Highways DPWH took
respondents – movants subject property without benefit of expropriation
proceedings for the construction of MacArthur Highway.
December 19, 1994: respondents – movants demanded the payment of the
fair market value of the subject parcel of land.
Celestino R. Contreras (Contreras), District Engineer of the First Bulacan
Engineering District of DPWH, offered to pay for the subject land at the rate of
Seventy centavos per square meter per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal
Committee.
Unsatisfied with their offer, respondents demanded the return of their
property, or the payment of compensation at the current fair market value.
The respondents file a complaint for recovery of possession with damages
and they were able to obtain favorable decisions in the RTC and the CA, with
the subject property valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos per square
meter, with interest at six percent per annum.
ISSUES:
Whether or not just compensation should be based on the value of property at
the time of the taking.
RULING:
The Court maintain its conclusions in the assailed July 01, 2013, decision with
modification on the amount of interest awarded, as well as the additional grant
of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The Court had adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is
the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being
called for only when such literal application is impossible.
To entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to those
established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of
economic policies.
Equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in
the law and jurisprudence.
Motion for reconsideration DENIED.
FACTS:
Accused – appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by
the RTC of Davao City and was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Accused – appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel
and harsh as a penalty and pleads for sympathy.
ISSUES:
Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the
promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished
and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of
murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any
modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium period
or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
RULING:
Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy
DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere – clemency from the
executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this
point, this Court cannot but apply the law.
7. Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila vs. CA (G.R. No. 1251183, September
29, 1997).
The issuance of proclamation no. 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power
and ruled that proclamation no. 164 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino was null
and void.
FACTS:
On February 17, 1978, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government Center Site
Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was
occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare
land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San
Juan started to develop its government center by constructing the INP
Building, which now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire Station
Headquarters, and the site to house the two salas of the Municipal Trial
Courts and the Office of the Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon
are the Central Post Office Building and the Municipal High School Annex
Building. On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July
26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164,
amending Proclamation No. 1716. On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus
Homeowners Association, Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch
159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order against
the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of
Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing or demolishing the
houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they
occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164. On
September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that
the property in question is being utilized by the Municipality of San Juan for
government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No.
164 is absent. The appeal before the CA was dismissed in a decision dated
July 17, 1991. This decision became final and the said judgment was duly
entered on April 8, 1992.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents
hired a private surveyor to make consolidation subdivision plans of the land in
question, submitting the same to respondent Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their application for a grant
under Proclamation No. 164. To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to
private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition with
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
against respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus
Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality,
enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the parcels of land covered
by Proclamation No. 164. The CA reversed the said decision.
ISSUES:
Is Proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power? More
specifically, is Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation?
RULING:
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation —Proclamation
No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos on February
17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him by
Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said
Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of legislation.
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-
called bloodless revolution on February 1986, President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more
popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1
of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise
legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
constitution. Then came the ratification of the draft constitution, to be known
later as the 1987 Constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26,
1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was
issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely vested
in Congress.
The Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid
exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby
declared NULL and VOID - There is a long-standing principle that every
statute is presumed to be valid (Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCR4 734 [1970]).
However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by
legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of
legislative power by the executive branch. For th[e] Court to allow such
disregard of the most basic of all constitutional principles by reason of the
doctrine of presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back to its
sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus, also, it is in the
discharge of this task that we take this exception from the Court's usual
practice of not entertaining constitutional questions unless they are
specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.