PROPERTY CASES l TANYA IBANEZ

CASE PRINCIPLE

A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by
some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. Good faith
is always presumed and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of
Rosales v. Castelltort proof.

Good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.

JM Tuazon v. Lumanlan Estrella cannot be deemed a builder in good faith since there was a presumptive knowledge of the Torrens
title issued to Tuazon and its predecessors in interest since 1914.

EXCEPTION TO ART 448

It is true that Art 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to
be owners of the land or at least have a claim of title thereto and does not apply when the interest in the
Quevada v. Court of land is merely that of a holder such as a tenant. However, in special cases decided by the Supreme Court,
Appeals it can be applied to cases where a builder has constructed improvements with the consent of the owner.

In this case, while there is no supporting evidence presented showing that petitioner’s construction of
the house was with the consent of the land’s previous owner, good faith should still be presumed
BPS IN GOOD FAITH especially since the lease relationship was open and in plain view.
Article 448

This Court has used Art 448 by recognizing good faith beyond this limited definition. Thus, children are
Macasaet v. Macasaet deemed to have acted in good faith when they built structures on the lots owned by their parents who
invited them to occupy and use said lots and fully consented to the improvements introduced by them.

A tenant like the spouses Mores cannot be said to be builders in good faith as they have no pretension
Mores v. Yu-Go to be the owners of the property. Full reimbursement of the useful improvements is applied only to a
possessor in good faith. It does not apply where one’s only interest is that of a lessee under a rental
contract. Otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to “improve” his landlord out of his
property.

Del Campo v. Abesia When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of Bernarda which
she obviously built in good faith, overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 sqm of the land of spouses Del
Ocampo, then Art 448 should apply. Said provision may apply even when there was co-ownership,
provided good faith has been established.

If there was bad faith on the part of the owner of the land and the person who built on the land of
another, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.

Boyer-Roxas v. CA Respondent is a bona fide corporation. As such, it has a juridical personality of its own separate from
the members composing it. The separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded only when
the corporation is used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or where necessary to achieve equity.
Absent any showing of the same, the general rule stands.

Ernesto was a builder in good faith because as far as he knew, the land was owned by his mother in
law, who having stated that they could build on the property, could reasonably be expected to later on
give them the land.
Sarmiento v. Agana
The owner of the land has the option, under Article 448, either to pay for the building or to sell his land
to the owner of the building. But he cannot as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building
and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is
erected. He is entitled to such recourse only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party
fails to pay for the same.

The choice belongs to the landowner, a rule that accords with the principle of accession that that the
REASON FOR THE OPTION Ochoa v. Apeta accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.

The landowner cannot refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land – and compel the owner of
RIGHT OF LANDOWNER T the building to remove it from the land where it erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after
REMOVE OR DEMOLISH Depra v. Dumlao having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
IMPROVEMENT

Art 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and
useful expenses incurred. It also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made. A builder
in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his
BPS RIGHT TO RETAIN Nuguid v. CA possession by ordering him to vacate. In addition, landowner is prohibited from offsetting the expenses
IMPROVEMENT with the fruits received by the builder in good faith. Otherwise, the security provided by law would be
impaired.

THE RULE NOW (ACCDG TO ATTY. BATHAN): A builder in good faith has the right to retain the premises
until full reimbursement is effected. However, whatever fruits he receives during the period of retention
should be offset from the value of reimbursement.
PROPERTY CASES l TANYA IBANEZ

NO. Non-registration of the sale does not make Maximo a possessor in bad faith. Also, it was not proven
that Maximo was notified or had actual knowledge of the said proceeding for consolidation of ownership.
The deed of sale relied upon by Maximo was a good and sufficient title, it was acquired without any flaw
Rodriguez v. Francisco which would invalidate it. The possession having begun in good faith, the presumption is that it continued
to be enjoyed in the same character until it can be proven that the possessor was aware that his
possession was wrongful. In spite of the consolidation of ownership in Rodriguez’ name, he never
attempted to exercise possessory rights over the property or paid taxes, nor did he demand its possession.

Mindanao Academy v. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted
Yap and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons.

INSTANCES OF BAD FAITH

Articles 449-452 Lumungo v. Usman Because he purchased the property with the knowledge that the property was already in dispute and
this fact should have induced him to inquire into the status of the title. Considering further that he was
the nephew of the Atty. Usman and was even a law student who appeared as counsel for the
defendants, HE WAS A PURCHASER AND A BUILDER IN BAD FAITH.

Article 449 – he who BPS in bad faith of the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without any right to indemnity.

Santos v. Mojica A son in possession of a land, who built his house thereon after his predecessors-in-interest had been
summoned in an action for partition of the property – a builder in bad faith who must lose his improvement
to the owners of the land without right to indemnity.

Floreza’s right to retention of subject property until he is reimbursed for the value of his house, is
inextricably linked with the question of rentals. For if petitioner has the right to indemnity, he has the
right of retention and no rentals need be paid. Conversely, if no right of retention exists, damages in the
LANDOWNER AND BPS ARE Floreza v. Evangelista form of rentals should be allowed.
BOTH IN BAD FAITH
Article 448 is inapplicable – it applies only when the BPS is in good faith that is he believes he is BPS on
his own land or believes to have a claim of title. In this case, Floreza makes no pretensions of ownership
whatsoever.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek
Office of the City Mayor automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. In this case, the
v. Ebio Guaranteed Homes, Inc. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

A petition for registration is the proper remedy instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan. Even
assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian estate is registered does not automatically
Republic v. Abrille make the accretion part of the registered land. The riparian owner must still cause the registration of the
accreted land. Effect of failure to register – the accretion may be subject to acquisitive prescription by a
ALLUVION third person
Article 457

While it is true that Grande et al are the lawful owners of the said alluvial property as they are the
registered owners of the land to which it adjoins, it does not however, automatically become registered
Grande v. CA land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title. The riparian owner still has the
obligation to register the accreted land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, registration under the
Torrens system of that ownership is another. Failure to register would subject the property to acquisitive
prescription by the adverse possession of third parties.

Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive
Ignacio v. Director of department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard
Lands service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not available
for private appropriation or ownership.

Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the
portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Heirs of Emiliano v.
Navarro The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private respindents' own tract of land on the northern side. As
such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, hence part of public domain.

MEANING OF ACTION TO Heirs of E. Diaz v.

QUIET TITLE Virata An action for quieting of title is a remedy which may be availed of only when by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable
or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real property or any interest therein.

For an action for quieting of title to prosper:

Calacala v. Republic (1) Plaintiff must first have a legal or at least an equitable title on the real property
(2) The alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid despite of its appearance of
REQUISITES OF ACTION validity.
TO QUIET TITLE

While it was declared in the name of Exequiel in 1962, there was no instrument or deed of conveyance
Robles v. CA evidencing its transfer from the heirs of Silvino to him.
PROPERTY CASES l TANYA IBANEZ

Tan v. Valdehueza New Civil Code provides that suitors in action to quiet title "need not be in possession of said property.

SUITOR Whether the action for specific performance already prescribed NO. For although it was denominated as
Pingol v. CA one for specific performance, it is in effect an action to quiet title – to remove the cloud upon their
ownership by the refusal of Pingol to recognize the sale. An action to quiet title to property is
imprescriptible (when in possession).

The disputed land was not part of an undivided estate. The three deeds of absolute sale technically
described the portion sold to each son. After the physical division of the lot among the brothers,
Si v. Court of Appeals community ownership terminated and the right of pre-emption or redemption for each brother was no
longer available. There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are
CO-OWNERSHIP already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.
DISPUTED PORTIONS
ALREADY DETERMINED
Heirs of Cabal v. There is no co-ownership where the portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not
Spouses Cabal technically described. Thus, since Marcelino built a house and has been occupying the disputed portion
since 1949, with the consent of his father and knowledge of the co-heirs, it would have been just and
equitable to have segregated said portion in his favor and not one adjacent to it.

Navarro v. Escobido In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487
of the Civil Code, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned
properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery
of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. Hence, either of the spouses Go may bring
EJECTMENT an action against Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-
own.

Plasabas v. CA The allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in litigation
is immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves
and her siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the
latter's behalf.

Adlawan v. Adlawan Although Article 487 allows any one of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment, it should be stressed
that where the suit is for the benefit of the petitioner alone who claims to be the sole owner and
entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.

The only purpose of an action against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and
asserts exclusive ownership of the property is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership.
De Guia v. CA The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as a co-
owner he has a right of possession.

A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share. A sale of the entire property by one co-owner without
the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Bailon-Casilao v. CA
The sale affects only his proportionate or abstract share in the property owned in common, subject to
the results of the partition, but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.

RIGHTS OF CO-OWNER
NATURE OF RIGHT OF CO- The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location
OWNER BEFORE PARTITION and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erected without objection by the
Pamplona v. Moreto other co-owners. Hence, the factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was
created and barred the vendor and also his heirs from asserting against the right or title in derogation of
the deed of sale executed by Flaviano.

If a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
Del Campo v. CA others who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of
the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said owner to the buyer, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

Art 494 provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may
Cruz v. Cristobal demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. The
Court already interpreted this provision to mean that action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be
barred by prescription.
RIGHT TO DEMAND
PARTITION
Montereroso v. CA Partition is the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance
from the decedent. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.

Vda. De Alberto v. CA While as a general rule, the action for partition among heirs does not prescribe so long as the co-
ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, petitioners in this case never recognized respondent
as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Hence, the rule of non-prescription of action
for partition of property owner in common does not apply.

If a co-owner or co-heir holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting sole and
Bicarme v. CA exclusive dominion for the required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-
owners. The imprescriptibility of an action for partition cannot thus be invoked when one of the co-owners
has possessed the property as exclusive owner, and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription.
PROPERTY CASES l TANYA IBANEZ

As a general rule, possession by one co-owners will not be regarded as adverse to the others but in fact
beneficial to all of them. Hence, as long his co-ownership is recognized, an action to compel partition will
not prescribe.
Pangan v. CA
However, if the co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive dominion over it against the
other co-owners, the corollary of the rule is that he can acquire sole title to, it after the lapse of the
prescribed prescriptive period. From that moment, the question involved will be one of ownership and no
longer mere partition.

As a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
PRESCRIPTION Fangonil-Herrera v. absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is
Fangonil imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property

Mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property and payment
of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership and not clear indications of repudiation of
the co-ownership.

Although Jose wrested possession of the properties, it does not amount to adverse possession because
Vda. De Arceo v. CA as co-owner he had the right of enjoyment and his use cannot prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners.
The fact the Virginia sought to extra judicially divide the property is nothing conclusive because there is
no showing that Virginia had made this known to Pedro et al.

In order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to that of the cestui que trust or the other
co-owners, the following elements must concur:

(1) That he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners
(2) That such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners
(3) That the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Heirs of Reyes v. Reyes (4) Possession is open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

Alejandro did not have adverse and exclusive possession of the property, as, in fact, the other co-owners
had continued to possess it, with Alejandro and his heirs occupying only a portion of it. Neither did the
cancellation of the previous tax declarations in the name of Leoncia, the previous co-owner, and the
issuance of a new one in Alejandros name, and Alejandros payment of the realty taxes constitute
repudiation of the co-ownership.

REPUDIATION While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire
ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-
owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.
Heirs of Restar v.
Heairs of Cichon Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21,
1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the present petition. Thus, Flores possession
ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with
the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.

When a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof
obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one
Delima v. CA wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the
ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the
purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership
and of their rights thereunder

Since the action is was one for partition, the Court cannot order a division of the property unless it first
Ocampo v. Ocampo makes a determination as to the existence of a co-ownership. This action will not lie if the claimant has
no rightful interest in the subject property.

An order of partition presupposes a state of co-ownership as the status quo. The issue of ownership or
ACTION FOR PARTITION co-ownership must first be resolved in order to effect a partition of the properties. This should be done
Reyes-De Leon v. Del in the partition itself.
Rosario
To split the proceedings into declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and trial for the partition case or
suspend the partition case pending resolution of the nullity case would result to multiplicity of suits. After
all, the issue of nullity can property be ventilated before the partition court.

There was a prior oral partition. On general principle, independent and in spite of the Statute of Frauds,
APPLICATION OF THE Maglucot-Aw v. courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. A parol
STATUTE OF FRAUDS Maglucot partition may be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the
partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership or otherwise recognizing the
existence of the partition.