LEGAL PRINCIPLES MODULE 3: OWNERSHIP

ANDRIN, DANIELLE FAYE I.

1. PEREZ V. EVITE Ownership is different from possession. A person may be declared owner,
but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the
hands of another either as a lessee or tenant and may have improvements
thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may
have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgement of
ownership, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.
2. OLEGO V. RUBUENO The general rule is that adjudication of ownership does not include
possession of the property, except when the adjudication of ownership
would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not
shown any right to possess the land independently of his own claim of
ownership which was rejected. In such case, a writ of execution would be
required if the defeated party does not surrender the possession of the
property. The owner should enforce his right to possess the land (as an
incident to ownership) by asking a writ of execution within five years from
the finality of the decision.
3. NAZARENO V. CA Facts and circumstances indicate badges of a simulated sale which make a
Deed of Absolute Sale void and of no effect. Thus, court held that badges of
simulation make a deed of sale null and void, since the parties entered into
a transaction which they did not intend to be legally bound. Because of this,
Natividad never acquired ownership over the property because the Deed of
Sale in her favor was void for having lack of consideration.
4. FLANCIA V. CA In a contract of sale, title to the property passes to the vendee upon
delivery of the thing sold. In a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement,
reserved by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment
of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor
loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it unless and until the
contract is resolved or rescinded. In a contract to sell, title is retained by the
vendor until full payment of the price.
5. VDA. DE BAUTISTA V. It is an essential requisite for the validity of the mortgage that the
MARCOS mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus, the court
held that the mortgage in question is void and ineffective because at the
time it was constituted, the mortgagor was not yet the owner of the land
mortgaged and could not, for that reason, encumber the same.
6. GERMAN MANAGEMENT & The justification of the doctrine of self-help for bulldozing and destroying
SERVICES V. CA the crops is unavailing. The doctrine of self help can only be exercised at
the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at
bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of the property.
7. REPUBLIC VS. CA The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
The rights over the and are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical, the land
must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
8. ARABESQUE VS. CA The court held that a writ of replevin cannot be properly directed against a
lawful possessor of a chattel, and the matter of ownership. Thus, the chattel
was returned not because of the bond, but because of writ of replevin was
improperly issued.
9. CHUA VS. CA The writ of replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in
custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the
official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution
of a legal writ. The reason for such principle is that there would be
interference with the possession before the function of the law had been
performed as to the process under which the property is taken. Thus, a
defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods in a
possession of an officer in a valid process.
10. PERALTA-LABRADOR V. The case was denied on the ground of prescription. It was clear from the
 BAGARIN averments of the petitioner that the unlawful possession occurred 2 years
ago prior to her filing the complaint for forcible entry in the MTC. The cause
of action for forcible entry has prescribed, and the MTC had no jurisdiction
to entertain the case.
11. NUNEZ V. SLTEAS Prior physical possession is an indispensable requirement in a forcible entry
PHOENIX case. This requirement can be acquired not only by material occupation, but
also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
Possession can also be acquired by juridical acts to which the law gives the
force of acts of possession. e.g. donations, succession, execution, and
registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles
and the like, it has been held that one need not have actual or physical
occupation of every square inch of the property at all times to be considered
in possession.
12. DELA CRUZ V. TAN TE The court held that a person who occupies the land of another at the
latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them. Furthermore, it held that an ejectment complaint based on mere
tolerance is a specie of an unlawful detainer case.
13. SPS OCAMPO V. It held that a judgement rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful
DIONISIO detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only, and shall
no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land.
14. SUAREZ V. EMBOY If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder
within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the
entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one
of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date
of the last demand.
15. BOKINGO V. CA In this connection, it is well to note that the Court had the occasion to
explain that "in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal
action, or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the
subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is
cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
16. HILARIO V. SALVADOR Under RA 7691, the jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to
or possession of land is determined by the assessed value of the said
property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real
property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. The fair market value
is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not
compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
17. URIETA V. AGUILAR The objective in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has
the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final
and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership
is inseparably linked to the issue of possession.
18. BONGATO V. MALVAR An action for forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive
time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process.
The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when
entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the
time the plaintiff learned about it.
19. ENCARNACION V. AMIGO
20. MANLAPAS V. CA
21. VALDEZ JR. V. CA
22. CARO V. SUCALDITO
23. PEZA V. FERNANDEZ
24. GASATAYA V. MABASA
25. IDOLOR V. CA
26. FEDERATED REALTY
CORP V. CA
The material element that determines the proper action to be filed for the
recovery of the possession of the property in this case is the length of time
of dispossession. Thus, if the dispossession has not lasted for more than
one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court acquires
jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than
one year, the proper action is an accion publiciana which should be brought
to the proper Regional Trial Court.
An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct from an action for
recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case for
recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and
not that of ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. So if the plaintiff can prove prior physical
possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the
owner. But if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no
right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner
of the property.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant,
it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts
as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either
be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional
trial court.
Reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property
alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. To reiterate, the
petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that
would result in the reversion of the land to the government. The petitioner
has no personality to "recover" the property as he has not shown that he is
the rightful owner thereof.
An action for reconveyance of land, an equitable remedy recognized under
our land registration laws, is subject to the applicable rules on prescription.
Moreover, the right to pursue such reivindicatory action may be defeated
when the property sought to be recovered has been conveyed to an
innocent purchaser for value. In this regard, title to the property in the
present case was no longer in the name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs,
but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value — the government.
Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also
to the person with a better right than the person under whose name said
property was erroneously registered. While respondent is not the legal
owner of the disputed lots, she has a better right than petitioner to the
contested lots on the following grounds: first, the deed of conditional sale
executed by DBP vested on her the right to repurchase the lots and second,
her right to repurchase them would have subsisted had they (the
Gasatayas) not defrauded her.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights
and interests. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the
following requisites be present: 1. there must be an existence of a right to
be protected; 2. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a
violation of such right.
Certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It
becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. One who deals
 with property registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and
need not go beyond the same. Such principle of indefeasibility has long
been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of
the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no
application.
27. VENCILAO V. VANO If the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of real property, the
writ of execution must require the sheriff or other officer to whom it must
be directed to deliver the possession of the property, describing it, to the
party entitled thereto. It is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to
execute, to carry out the mandates of the judgment in question, and in fact,
it was he himself, and he alone, who was ordered by the trial judge who
rendered that judgment, to place the respondents in possession of the land.
28. JETRI CORP. V. BPI More succinctly, the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a
public auction is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the
buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ
of possession becomes a matter of right. And its issuance to a purchaser in
an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. It is
undisputed that herein petitioner failed to redeem the property within the
redemption period and thereafter, ownership was consolidated in favor of
herein respondent and a new certificate of title was issued.
29. A.G DEVELOPMENT CORP The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extra-judicial
V. CA foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. As such, the Court neither
exercises its official discretion nor judgment. In other words, the issuance of
the writ of possession is summary in nature, hence the same cannot be
considered a judgment on the merits which is defined as one rendered after
a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment
rendered upon some preliminary or formal technical point.
30. MAGLENTE V. BALTAZAR A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land
registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real
property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor
has possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales.
Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial court's decision
ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor.
The writ does not lie in such a case.
31. HEIRS OF VENCILAO V. In order that an action to recover ownership of real property may prosper,
CA the person who claims that he has a better right to it must prove not only
his ownership of the same but also satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.
As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor
when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what
appears on the face of the title. He is under no obligation to look beyond
the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face
of the certificate. By way of exception, the vendee is required to make the
necessary inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of title which
indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property. The exception
contemplates a situation wherein there exists a flaw in the title of the
vendor and the vendee has knowledge or at least ought to have known of
such flaw at the time he acquired the property, in which case, he is not
considered as an innocent purchaser for value.
32. HEIRS OF FABELA V. CA The invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an
action for recovery of ownership, the person who claims that he has a
better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the
property claimed but also the identity thereof. The party who desires to
recover must fix the identity of the land claimed by describing the location,
area and boundaries thereof. Petitioners failed to identify the land with that
degree of certainty required to support their affirmative allegation of
ownership.
33. REPUBLIC V. CARRASCO The Court cannot give full credence to respondent's Affidavit of Ownership
dated for he simply alleged therein that Mingao had occupied the land for
the last 25 years. Likewise, respondent's testimony regarding Mingao's
 possession and ownership, aside from being self-serving, consists merely of
general statements with no specifics even as to when his predecessor began
occupying the land. Indeed, such is hardly the well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence required in cases of this nature. Respondent must present proof of
specific acts of ownership to substantiate his claim and cannot just offer
general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence
of possession.
34. RAMOS-BALALIO V. ime and again, we have held that although tax declarations or realty tax
RAMOS payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or at least constructive possession.
35. SPS. AZANA V. LUMBO Equiponderance of evidence; When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise
and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the
other, the court will find for the defendant. Under said principle, the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than
that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if
such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.
36. FULE V. LEGARE When there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice
in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance therein, the
purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon
its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the
efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens
system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory as the public
shall then be denied its foremost motivation for respecting and observing
the Land Registration Act. In the end, the business community stands to be
inconvenienced and prejudiced.
37. RUMARETE V. The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Teodulo and
HERNANDEZ his witnesses that his (Teodulo's) possession of the land since 1929 was
open, continuous, adverse, exclusive, and in the concept of an owner. It is a
settled rule in civil cases as well as in criminal cases that in the matter of
credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial courts are given great
weight and highest degree of respect by the appellate court considering
that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.
38. ROSALES V. Miguel relied on the title which the intervenor showed to him, which has no
CASTELLTORT annotation of any prior adverse claim. They cannot be faulted for having
relied on the expertise of the land surveyor who is more equipped and
experienced in the field of land surveying. A builder in good faith is one who
builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by some
title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw
in his title. Good faith is always presumed and upon him who alleges bad
faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.
39. JM TUAZON V. VDA DE Estrella cannot be deemed a builder in good faith since there was a
LUMANLAN presumptive knowledge of the Torrens title issued to Tuazon and its
predecessors in interest since 1914. Hence, Estrella (buyer from Deudor)
cannot in good conscience say now that she believed her vendor had rights
of ownership over the lot purchased. She had chosen to ignore the Torrens
title of Tuazon and relied instead upon the Deudors’ claim of ownership
perhaps because such course appeared to her as more advantageous.
Hence, she has only herself to blame for the consequences. Had she
investigated before buying and building her house on the said lot, she
would have been informed that the land is registered under the Torrens
system in the name of Tuazon. If she failed to make the necessary inquiry,
she is now bound conclusively by Tuazon’s title.
40. QUEVADA VS. CA It is true that Art 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or
 planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or at least have a
claim of title thereto and does not apply when the interest in the land is
merely that of a holder such as a tenant. However, in special cases decided
by the Supreme Court, it can be applied to cases where a builder has
constructed improvements with the consent of the owner. In this case,
while there is no supporting evidence presented showing that petitioner’s
construction of the house was with the consent of the land’s previous
owner, good faith should still be presumed especially since the lease
relationship was open and in plain view. However, as a mere tenant,
petitioner must pay reasonable rent for the continued use and occupancy of
the leased premises from the time the last contract expired until he final
vacates and surrenders it.
41. MACASAET VS. Art. 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters acted in
MACASAET good faith – that is, they believe themselves to be owners of the land or at
least to have a claim or title thereto. It does not apply when the interest is
merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usurfructuary.
However, in some special cases, this Court has used Art 448 by recognizing
good faith beyond this limited definition. Article 448 applies to the present
case. The facts clearly shows that parents fully consented to the
improvements introduced by the children. In fact, they approved to the
construction of the same. Thus, children may be deemed to have been in
good faith when they built the structures on those lots.
42. MORES V. YU-GO A tenant like the spouses Mores cannot be said to be builders in good faith
as they have no pretension to be the owners of the property. Full
reimbursement of the useful improvements is applied only to a possessor in
good faith – one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where one’s only interest is that of a lessee under
a rental contract. Otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant
to “improve” his landlord out of his property.
43. DEL OCAMPO V. ABESIA It is true that Art 448 cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows
on the land owned in common for then he did not build, etc. upon land that
exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. However,
when the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that
the house of Bernarda which she obviously built in good faith, overlaps or
occupies a portion of 5 sqm of the land of spouses Del Ocampo, then Art
448 should apply. Said provision may apply even when there was co-
ownership, provided good faith has been established. Spouses Ocampo
have the right to appropriate said portion of the house, upon payment of
indemnity to Bernarda. They may also choose to oblige Bernarda to pay the
price of the land occupied by her house, provided that the value of the
same is not more than the value of the house. Otherwise, Bernarda could
not be obliged to buy the land – only pay the reasonable rent.
44. BOYER-ROXAS AND The construction of the unfinished building started when husband of
GUILLEMO ROXAS V. Rebecca was still alive and was the general managers of the corporation.
HEIRS OF EUGENIA The couple used their own funds to finance the construction. The Board of
ROXAS Directors did not object to the construction. Hence, Article 453 of the Civil
Code applies. Art 453 – if there was bad faith on the part of the owner of
the land and the person who built on the land of another, the rights of one
and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
45. SARMIENTO V. AGANA As far as they knew, the land was owned by Ernesto’s mother in law, who
having stated that they could build on the property, could reasonably be
expected to later on give them the land.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by
another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the
value of his building, under Article 546. The owner of the land, upon the
other hand, has the option, under Article 448, either to pay for the building
or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot as
respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the
land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where

46. OCHOA V. APETA
47. DEPRA V. DUMLAO
48. NUGUID V. CA
49. MINDANAO ACADEMY,
INC. V. YAP
50. LUMUNGO V. USMAN
51. SANTOS V. MONICA
52. OFFICE OF THE CITY
MAYOR V. EBIO
it is erected. He is entitled to such recourse only when, after having chosen
to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
The landowner is given by law options on how to deal with the
improvements introduced by another person on his land. However, it is first
important to determine whether petitioners were builders in good faith or
not. Good faith – It is an honest belief, absence of malice and absence of
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. Applied to
possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The
choice belongs to the landowner, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession that that the accessory follows the principal and not the other
way around.
The trial court erred when it ruled that DEPRA is “entitled to possession”,
implying thereby that he is entitled to have the kitchen removed. He is
entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his
encroached land, DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. In this case, DUMLAO
had expressed his willingness to pay for the land but DEPRA refused to sell.
The landowner cannot, as DEPRA here did refuse both to pay for the
building and to sell the land – and compel the owner of the building to
remove it from the land where it erected. He is entitled to such remotion
only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay
for the same.
Art 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement
for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred. It also gives him right of
retention until full reimbursement is made. The right of retention is
considered as one of the measures devised by law for the protection of
builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt
reimbursement. A builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals
during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering
him to vacate. In addition, landowner is prohibited from offsetting the
expenses with the fruits received by the builder in good faith. Otherwise,
the security provided by law would be impaired.
However, although both of them acted in bad faith which as a necessary
consequence would be treated by the law vis-à-vis each other as having
acted in good faith. However, this legal fiction of Yap’s good faith ceased
when a complaint was filed against him for the annulment of the sale. As a
result, he is liable for the rents thereafter.
Because he purchased the property with the knowledge that the property
was already in dispute and this fact should have induced him to inquire into
the status of the title. Considering further that he was the nephew of the
Atty. Usman and was even a law student who appeared as counsel for the
defendants, he was a purchaser and a builder in bad faith. Article 449 – he
who BPS in bad faith of the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without any right to indemnity.
he built his house and reconstructed the same after his parents had been
summoned in the partition case in 1959. As a builder in bad faith, he lost
the improvement made by him consisting of the reconstructed house to the
owners of the land without right to indemnity. A son in possession of a
land, who built his house thereon after his predecessors-in-interest had
been summoned in an action for partition of the property – a builder in bad
faith who must lose his improvement to the owners of the land without right
to indemnity. Therefore, the siblings became owners of the improvement
consisting of the house built in bad faith if they choose to appropriate the
accession or they may choose to have the improvements demolished
instead, as in this case.
While it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which
is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along
its banks does not form part of the public domain because the law provides
that it automatically belongs to the riparian owner. The subject land was
 formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the
banks of Cut-cut creek. Art 457 applies. Art 457 – To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters. It is therefore explicit
from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a
creek automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
been added. In this case, the Guaranteed Homes, Inc. The only restriction
provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register
the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
53. REPUBLIC V. ABRILLE Even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian estate
is registered does not automatically make the accretion part of the
registered land. The riparian owner must still cause the registration of the
accreted land. Effect of failure to register – the accretion may be subject to
acquisitive prescription by a third person
54. GRANDE V. COURT OF While it is true that Grande et al are the lawful owners of the said alluvial
APPEALS property as they are the registered owners of the land to which it adjoins, it
does not however, automatically become registered land just because the
lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title. The riparian owner still
has the obligation to register the accreted land. Ownership of a piece of
land is one thing, registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is
another. Failure to register would subject the property to acquisitive
prescription by the adverse possession of third parties. Grande et al never
sought registration of said alluvial property. The increment therefore never
became registered property hence not entitled to the protection of
imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
55. IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR Art. 447 shall not apply because it refers to accretion on banks of rivers,
OF LAND while in the present cause, it was caused by the action of the Manila Bay.
The law on waters was applicable because bay is a part of the sea, being a
mere indentation of the same. Consequently, until a formal declaration on
the part of the Government, through the executive department or the
Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for
coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to
be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership.
56. HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. The foreshore land was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters
IAC of Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by
the action of the sea which brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped
by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpico in
1948. Accretion as a mode of acquiring under Art 457 requires the
concurrence of 3 requisites:
1. Accumulation of soil is gradual and imperceptible
2. Result of the action of the waters of the river
3. Land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river

57. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE DIAZ
vs. VIRATA
Pascual’s claim of ownership over the subject land under the principle of
accretion is misplaced. The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank
but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which
adjoined private respindents' own tract of land on the northern side. As
such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, hence part of public domain.
An action for quieting of title is a remedy which may be availed of only
when by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable
or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real
property or any interest therein. Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on
title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
 record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title
to real property or any interest therein.
58. CALACALA V. REPUBLIC Under Art 476, the remedy may be availed of only when by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which appears valid,
but is in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is
thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real property.
Under Art 477, the complainant must have legal or equitable title in the real
property subject matter of the action. Hence, for an action for quieting of
title to prosper, (1) plaintiff must first have a legal or at least an equitable
title on the real property subject of the action and that (2) the alleged cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid despite of its appearance of
validity.
59. ROBLES V. COURT OF Two requisites; 1. The plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an
APPEALS equitable title to or interest in the real property; 2. The deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The two are clearly PRESENT: Petitioners allege that their title as owners
and possessors of the disputed property is clouded by the tax declarations
and, subsequently, the free patent thereto granted to Spouses Santos. In
the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property;
neither did he exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment
thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. Likewise, his act of
entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be
a repudiation of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided
interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he in fact did.
Neither should his payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by
the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The
assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation
was belied by the continued occupation and possession of the disputed
property by the petitioners as owners.
60. PINGOL V. COURT OF For although it was denominated as one for specific performance, it is in
APPEALS effect an action to quiet title – to remove the cloud upon their ownership by
the refusal of Pingol to recognize the sale. That a cloud has been cast on
the title of the private respondents is indubitable. Despite the fact that the
title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and
the delivery of the object of the contract, the petitioners adamantly refused
to accept the tender of payment by the private respondents and steadfastly
insisted that their obligation to transfer title had been rendered ineffective.
It is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an equitable title
being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet
title.