REGISTRATION

D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Incorporated vs. Panes

GR NO 167232 | July 31, 2009 | Nachura, J.

PETITIONER(S): D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED,

RESPONDENT(S): RICAREDO PANES, ANGELITO PANES, SALVADOR CEA,

ABOGADO MAUTIN, DONARDO PACLIBAR, ZOSIMO
PERALTA and HILARION MANONGDO

DOCTRINE: Civil Law; Reconveyance; Prescription; An action for reconveyance

can be barred by prescription; When an action for reconveyance is
based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of
the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the
issuance of the original certificate of title; An action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years
from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or
transfer certificate of title.—An action for reconveyance can be barred
by prescription. When an action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it
must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, and
such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the
original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of
title or transfer certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an
instrument in the Office of the RD constitutes constructive notice to the
whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have
taken place at the time of registration.

Same; Same; Same; If the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property
also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to
recover title and possession of the property does not run against him.—
The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to
reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property. If the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains
in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title
and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a
case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

Same; Same; Same; Laches; The doctrine of laches is inapplicable

where the action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by
law.—Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have
held, nonetheless, that in some instances, the doctrine of laches is
inapplicable where the action was filed within the prescriptive period
provided by law. Therefore, laches will not apply to this case, because
respondents’ possession of the subject property has rendered their
right to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence,
not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity,
acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and
unequivocal so as to avoid injustice. Laches will operate not really to
penalize neglect or sleeping on one’s rights, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation.
 Same; Same; Same; No title to registered land in derogation of the
rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.—It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction
that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Article 1126 of the Civil Code in connection with Section
46 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act), as amended by Section
47 of P.D. No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree), clearly
supports this rule. Prescription is unavailing not only against the
registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.

SUMMARY (PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals)

FACTS: Panes, et al., filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against B.B. Regalado, D.B.T Mar-Bay, et al., alleging
that he is the lawful owner of the subject property, being in actual possession of the portions of the property for
more than 30 years in the concept of an owner. To perfect his title in accordance with P.D. 1529, he filed a case with
RTC QC. Ricardo averred that in the process of complying with the requirements, it was discovered that there
existed an overlap portions of the land of Ricardo and B.C. Regalado. The said portion was, by then, already
conveyed by B.C. Regalado to herein petitioner D.B.T. Regalado alleged that he found that there was fraud and that
the subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado was deliberately drawn to cover portions of the subject property. DBT claims
that he is the legitimate owner pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C. Regalado in DBT’s favor. SC ruled
that DBT has a better right over the subject property. PD No. 1529 provides that no title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the land was for a lump sum as according to Art. 1542 of the NCC
HELD: The Court, however, clarified that the rule laid down in Article 1542 is not hard and fast and admits of an
exception. It held:
“A caveat is in order, however. The use of “more or less” or similar words in
designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of
land sold in gross or with the description “more or less” with reference to its
area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land. Numerical
data are not of course the sole gauge of unreasonableness of the excess or
deficiency in area. Courts must consider a host of other factors. In one case (see
Roble v. Arbasa, 414 Phil. 343; 362 SCRA 69 [2001]), the Court found
substantial discrepancy in area due to contemporaneous circumstances. Citing
change in the physical nature of the property, it was therein established that the
excess area at the southern portion was a product of reclamation, which
explained why the land’s technical description in the deed of sale indicated the
seashore as its southern boundary, hence, the inclusion of the reclaimed area was
declared unreasonable.”

In the instant case, the deed of sale is not one of a unit price contract. The parties agreed on the purchase price of
P40,000.00 for a predetermined area of 4,000 sq m, more or less, bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on the
East by Lot No. 11908, on the South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No. 11910. In a contract
of sale of land in a mass, the specific boundaries stated in the contract must control over any other statement, with
respect to the area contained within its boundaries.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the phrase “more or less” to mean:
“About; substantially; or approximately; implying that both parties assume the risk of any ordinary
discrepancy. The words are intended to cover slight or unimportant inaccuracies in quantity,
Carter v. Finch, 186 Ark. 954, 57 S.W.2d 408; and are ordinarily to be interpreted as taking care
of unsubstantial differences or differences of small importance compared to the whole number of
items transferred.”
Clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a slight difference in quantity. The difference in the
area is obviously sizeable and too substantial to be overlooked. It is not a reasonable excess or deficiency that
should be deemed included in the deed of sale.