MODULE 5: POSSESSION

ANDRIN, DANIELLE FAYE I.

1. REPUBLIC V. Under the principle of Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise
JACOB appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part
of the inalienable public domain. Hence, occupation thereof in the
concept of owner no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title. In this case, when private respondent filed her
application in 1994, the subject lot was no longer alienable and
disposable property of the public domain because it was declared part of
the reservation for the development of geothermal energy on August
1970. She was 24 years too late.
2. SARMIENTO V. If the sale should be made by means of a public instrument, the
LASACA execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is
the subject-matter of the contract unless the contrary appears or is
clearly to be inferred from such instrument. From the above it is clear
that when a contract of sale is executed the vendor is bound to deliver
to the vendee the thing sold by placing the vendee in the control and
possession of the subject-matter of the contract. However, if the sale is
executed by means of a public instrument, the mere execution of the
instrument is equivalent to delivery unless the contrary appears or is
clearly to be inferred from such instrument.
3. HEIRS OF MARIO Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and
MALABANAN V. their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since
REPUBLIC OF June 12, 1945. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under
THE Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Without satisfying
PHILIPPINES the requisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June
12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted
to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable.
4. CHUA-BURCE V. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a
CA right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the
owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily
responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging
to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank
employees. The possession of the teller is the possession of the bank.
Hence, petitioner can only be liable for qualified theft and not Estafa.
5. CARLOS Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of
VICTORIA V. an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an
REPUBLIC owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the
other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in
another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his
belief be right or wrong. Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the
property to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact
promised to deliver the certificate of title to the corporation upon its
obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her possession since 1996 was
under a bona fide claim of ownership. Under the law, only he who
possesses the property under a bona fide claim of ownership is entitled
to confirmation of title.
6. PO LAM V. CA A possessor in good faith has been defined as one who is unaware that
 there exists a flaw which invalidates his acquisition of the thing (See
Article 526, Civil Code). Good faith consists in the possessors belief that
the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same
and could convey his title (Pio v. CA, 198 SCRA 434 [1991]). In this
case, while petitioners bought Lot No. 2581 from LAHCO while a notice
of lis pendens was still annotated thereon, there was also existing a
court order canceling the same. Hence, petitioners cannot be considered
as being aware of a flaw which invalidates their acquisition of the thing
since the alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens, was already being
ordered cancelled at the time of the purchase. On this ground alone,
petitioners can already be considered buyers in good faith.
7. CABAL V. It has been said that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
SPOUSES CABAL alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof.
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical
meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other
things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An
individual's personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and,
therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations
alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence
of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach
another.]Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is
not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it.
8. NEGRETE V. A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware of any flaw in his title
COURT OF FIRST or mode of acquisition. The essence of good faith lies in the honest
INSTANCE OF belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim and
MARINDUQUE absence of intention to overreach another.
A deed of sale, to constitute a just title to generate good faith for the
ordinary acquisitive prescription of 10 years should refer to the same
parcel of land which is adversely possessed. In the case at bar, the deed
of sale covers a parcel of land patently different from the disputed land
owned by plaintiff in terms of location and boundary owners.
Hence, defendant cannot claim good faith in occupying said land on the
basis of said instrument of sale.
9. BALTAZAR V. Good faith must rest on a colorable right in the builder, beyond a mere
CARIDAD stubborn belief in one’s title despite judicial adjudication. The fact that in
1959, respondents demolished and replaced their old house with new
and bigger ones cannot enervate the rights of the registered owners.
Otherwise, the right of the registered owners to enjoy full possession of
their registered property could be indefinitely defeated by an
unsuccessful opponent through the simple subterfuge of replacing his
old house with a new one from time to time.
10. HEIRS OF T. DE Where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the
LEON V. CA vendor, the purchaser must go beyond the certificates of title and make
inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor. Indeed, one who
buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects of the title of
his vendor and of a pending litigation over the property gambles on the
result of the litigation and is bound by the outcome of his indifference. A
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable
man on guard and then claim that he acted in good faith believing that
 there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
11. BENIN V. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who
TUASON had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for
value. And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the property
registered may be demanded only from the person (or persons) who
procured the wrongful registration in his name. The holder of a
certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good
faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and
incontrovertible.
12. SUOBIRON V. CA It may be that petitioners acquired the disputed properties in good faith
and had since then occupied the same but such bona fide character of
possession ceased when they were served summons. Possession
acquired in good faith may not lose this character except in the case and
from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not
unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully,
conformably with Art. 528 of the Civil Code.
13. MANECLANG V. While the order granting the motion for authority to sell was actually
BAUN issued on September 9, 1949, the same was secured during the
incumbency of the then judicial administrator Pedro Feliciano. Even if it
is to be assumed that Mayor Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz induced
Oscar Maneclang to sell the property, the fact remains that there was
already the order authorizing the sale. Having been issued by a Judge
who was lawfully appointed to his position, he was disputably presumed
to have acted in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and that his official
duty was regularly performed.
14. VILLAFUERTE VS. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as
COURT OF long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that
APPEALS he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing,
must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse
to deliver the thing.
15. ARAMBULO V. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
GUNGAB permission, without any contract between them is bound by an implied
promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
Petitioners’ occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance,
they are not entitled to retain its possession under Article 448 of the
Civil Code. They are aware that their tolerated possession may be
terminated any time and they cannot be considered as builders in good
faith. Moreover, as aptly found by the CA, petitioners have not
presented evidence to prove that they made improvements on the
subject property and defrayed the expenses therefor.
16. BARNACHEA V. The best indicator of what the plaintiff in an ejectment case intends with
CA respect to the nature of his or her complaint can be found in the
complaint itself. It has been held that a person who occupies land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose terms has expired but whose occupancy
continues by tolerance of the owner.
17. LLOBRERA VS Petitioners failed to present any written memo of the alleged lease
FERNANDEZ arrangements between them and De Venecia. Absent such proof of any
contractual basis for their possession, the legal implication is that they
 were possessing by mere tolerance. Therefore, the person occupying is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he/she will vacate upon
demand.
18. SPOUSES Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
APOSTOL VS. CA different personalities except in cases of co-possession. Should a
question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor
shall be preferred, if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings.
19. AYSON VS. VDA The trial brought to light the true nature of the right of possession of
DE CARPIO respondent over the property, and the circumstances surrounding her
dispossession. The facts, as culled from the evidence presented by both
parties, unequivocally show that the instant case is one for unlawful
detainer. Respondent was able to present evidence showing that after
the foreclosure of the property, petitioner failed to redeem it within the
redemption period. Thus, the latter was divested of her ownership and
right to retain possession thereof. Respondent acquired a better right to
possess the property after acquiring title to it through a sale between
her and the mortgagee-bank.
20. DUMO VS. There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary
ESPINAS damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
21. CORPORATION The Court held that the ―rental or the ―reasonable compensation for
VS. TREYES the use of the premises or the fair rental value of the property and
attorney‘s fees may be recovered through a separate action while the
forcible entry case is pending. The recoverable damages in forcible entry
and detainer cases refer to ―rental or ―the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the premises or ―fair rental value of the
property and attorney ‘s fees and costs. There is no basis for the MTC to
award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule
that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the
fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property
22. WILMON AUTO The question of whether or not the lessor's unlawful detainer suits in the
SUPPLY CORP Municipal Trial Court against the lessees should be abated by the actions
VS. COURT OF filed in the Regional Trial Court by the latter based on the contention
APPEALS that they are entitled to a right of preemption or prior purchase of the
leased premises has been resolved by this Court in numerous cases and
one to which a negative answer has invariably been given. The
underlying reasons for the above rulings were that the actions in the
Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and,
on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was
merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that
the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. Thus, as regards
the seemingly contrary ruling in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, 79 SCRA
135 (1977), this court observed, in Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167,
172-173 (1983), that "the exception to the rule in this case of Vda. de
Legaspi is based on strong reasons of equity not found in the present
petition.
23. DE LUNA VS. Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only issue to be
COURT OF resolved therein is who is entitled to the physical or material possession
APPEALS of the premises, or possession de facto, independent of any claim of
ownership that either party may set forth in their pleadings. If the
petitioner can prove prior possession in himself, he may recover such
possession from even the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in is favor priority of time, he
has the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reindivicatoria. However, where the question of
possession can not be resolved without deciding the question of
ownership, an inferior court has the power to resolve the question of
ownership but only insofar as to determine the issue of possession.
24. SEMIRA VS. Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to sustain petitioner over
COURT OF private respondent when the latter failed even to prove prior possession
APPEALS in his favor. Absent such element, it cannot be said that he was forcibly
deprived of the disputed portion. Hence, his action for forcible entry
must fail.
25. REYNANTE VS. An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title
COURT OF of the property is never determined. A party who can prove prior
APPEALS possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.
Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his
favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right
by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria
26. SPOUSES BANES Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party
VS. LUTHERAN in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand,
CHURCH violence or terror. The owner who has title over the property cannot
PHILIPPINES take the law into his own hands to regain possession of said property.
He must go to court.
27. BALATERO AND The "constructive possession" over the parcel of land mentioned by the
HEIRS OF appellate court did not ripen into ownership. The rule is that only the
JOSEFA possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can seven as
BADELLES VS. CA a title for acquiring dominion. As can be gleaned from the facts earlier
stated, Juan Veloso never owned the subject parcel of land because the
contract over the same between Josefa Iglupas and Juan Veloso was
actually an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale.
28. DIRECTOR OF Well-entrenched is the rule that possession of forest lands, no matter
LANDS VS. how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Its inclusion in a title,
HEIRS OF whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the
ISABEL Torrens System, nullifies the title. In the case at bar, the lots were
TESALONA AND classified as swampy areas and was filled with mangrove trees. Being a
swampy area covered by mangrove trees and the like, these lots may
very well be considered and classified as forest lands.
29. RESURRECCION True that it was declared for tax purposes by Ursula’s deceased
BARTOLOME VS. husband, and was thereafter paid by his son. The ownership there was
CA not acquired by Ursula nor her heirs. Tax declarations and payments in
the name of the alleged property owner or of his predecessor-in-
interest, does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of
ownership. Neither does the payment of taxes conclusively prove
ownership of the land paid for.
30. ALONSO VS. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
CEBU COUNTRY strong evidence of ownership. This Court has ruled that although tax
 CLUB, INC. declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner for no one in his right mind will be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.
31. REPUBLIC OF Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not
THE conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
PHILIPPINES VS. possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would
COURT OF be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
APPEALS constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a
piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also
the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such
an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. In
the case at bar, record reveals that they have been paying taxes since
the property has been declared in their name.
32. CEQUENA V. The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it
BOLANTE prevails until the contrary is proven. That is, one who is disturbed in
one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto by the
means established by law. Article 538 settles only the question of
possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in
this case should be established in one of the ways provided by law.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession for ten years. Tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of
the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.
33. SERIÑA V. A person who claims ownership of real property is duty-bound to clearly
CABALLERO identify the land being claimed, in accordance with the title on which he
anchors his right of ownership. When the record does not show that the
land subject matter of the action for recovery of possession has been
exactly determined, such action cannot prosper, as in the case of
petitioners. In sum, proof of ownership coupled with identity of the land
is the basic rule. In order that an action for recovery of possession may
prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not
only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed, by
describing the location, area and boundaries thereof
34. RAMEL V. Absent any direct proof on the value of improvements and the fruits, it
ACQUINO is just to offset the claim of improvements to the claim of fruits derived
from the land and then place the parties in their previous positions
before the agreement. The records show that both parties failed to
prove their claims through any receipt or document. Despite the lack of
proof, the trial court ordered that whatever improvements spent on the
land shall be offset from the fruits derived therefrom.
35. MWSS V. Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that “he who
DAGUPAN builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.” The right given a
possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only to
improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing
suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to
retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into
possession
36. SABIDO V. IAC Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded
for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and
under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove
useful improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal
thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise
the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a
possessor in bad faith to remove improvements applies only to
improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing
suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to
retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into
possession.
37. EDU V. GOMEZ In the meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot
be compelled to surrender possession nor to be required to institute an
action for the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond
is issued in his favor. The filing of an information charging that the
chattel was illegally obtained through estafa from its true owner by the
transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the
possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor. There is no
merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or the purchaser in
good faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled to be respected
and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof
until a competent court rules otherwise.
38. EDCA The possession of a movable property acquired in good faith is
PUBLISHING & equivalent to title. There is no need to produce a receipt. Leonor Santos
DISTRIBUTING was a buyer in good faith after taking steps to verify the identity of the
CORP. V. seller. When she was shown the invoice, she reasonably believed that
SANTOS he was a legitimate seller. This did not amount to unlawful taking
because, by the delivery of Petitioner EDCA of the books to Cruz, the
ownership of the books had already transferred to him.