Property-Case Digests-Bathan-Part7

PROPERTY | MBL | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – WEEK 5
1. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN, G.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952 (ANDRIN)
PETITIONERS: HIDALGO RESPONDENTS: GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and
ENTERPRISES, INC. THE COURT OF APPEALS
LAW/PRINCIPLES:
DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE

• One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises.
• The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is
apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach,
get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.
FACTS:
• Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc.
o An ice-plant factory that has a wide gate entrance wherein anyone could easily enter.
o Installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep for cooling purposes of its engine
o Compound was surrounded with fence but the tanks were not provided with any kind of fence or
top covers
o No guards were assigned
• Mario – 8 year old, son of respondent
o While playing with boys his age, went inside the factory.
o They took a bath inside one of the tanks.
o While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom. Died.
• RULINGS:
o CA and CFI – Hidalgo maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the
necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises.
o It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this Jurisdiction
in Taylor vs. Manila Electric 16 Phil., 8.
ISSUES:
Is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little children in play? In other
words is the body of water an attractive nuisance?
RULING:
NO. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the
absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. The reason why
a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the
Indiana Appellate Court as follows: Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking
in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own
property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of
having created an "attractive nuisance. Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the
question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial.
2. HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO v. HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE LEON, G.R. No.
149570. March 12, 2004 (ANDRIN)
HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO, as represented by HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE LEON as
ESTRELLITA FLORENCIO-CRUZ and RODRIGO R. FLORENCIO represented by VALERIANA MORENTE
LAW/PRINCIPLES:
SEE: NOTES
FACTS:
• Teresa de Leon, owned a residential lot (subject lot).
o She allowed the spouses Florencio to construct a house on the said property and stay therein
without any rentals therefor.
o She leased the same parcel of land for P5 per month to Santos "for as long as the lessor (de Leon)
had an outstanding loan with the Development Bank of Quezon City but not to exceed the period
of 15 years."
▪ De Leon assigned Santos the leasehold right in favor of the Bank and such leasehold
was annotated at the back of the title.
▪ Thereafter, Santos constructed a house.
Page 1 of 47
o De Leon, died intestate and her heirs allowed Florencio to continue staying in the property.
Florencio died intestate, but his heirs, the respondents, remained in the property.
• April 1995 - the heirs of De Leon, through counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, demanding that
they vacate the property within 90 days from receipt thereof.
o The latter refused and failed to vacate the property.
o The heirs of De Leon filed a complaint for ejectment against the heirs of Florencio before the MTC.
• Heirs of De Leon alleged:
1. They were the pro-indiviso owners of the subject land, which they inherited from their mother.
2. During her lifetime, their mother allowed florencio and his family to occupy the property without
any compensation, subject to the condition that they shall vacate the same upon demand; such
arrangement went on even after their mother's demise.
3. They further averred that sometime in 1995, they demanded that the heirs of florencio vacate the
property, but that the latter refused to do so.
• Heirs of Florencio alleged:
1. That the plaintiffs had no cause of action against them, as de Leon had executed a Deed of
Donation over the said parcel of land in favor of their predecessor.
2. The latter accepted the donation, as shown by his signature above his typewritten name on page
one of the deed.
3. The execution of the deed was witnessed by Manotoc and Morente. Atty. Manguiat notarized the
deed on said date and entered it in his notarial record
4. Since then, their predecessor and his family possessed the aforesaid property as owners.
▪ After De Leon's death, Florencio and his children, arranged for the registration of the land
subject of the donation in the name of Florencio, which was, however, superseded by de
Leon's death.
▪ Thus, the property remained in the name of Teresa Sevilla de Leon, even after
Florencio's death.
• RULINGS:
o MTC: Rendered a decision in favor of the defendants (Florencio) and against plaintiff (de Leon).
o RTC: Reversed the decision. Deed of donation was insufficient to support the claim of the heirs of
Florence.
o CA: Affirmed RTC decision
ISSUES:
WON the petitioners, who appears to be the donee under the unregistered Deed of Donation, have a better right to
the physical or material possession of the property over the respondents, the registered owner of the property.
RULINGS:
The deed of donation relied upon by the petitioners is unreliable as evidence on which to anchor a finding that the
latter have a better right over the property than the respondents, the registered owners.
• The deed of donation, on its face, appears to bear all the essential requisites of a valid donation inter vivos.
However there are cogent facts and circumstances of substance which engender veritable doubts as to
whether the petitioners have a better right of possession over the property other than the respondents
based on the Deed of Donation.
1. Florencio should have sought the registration of the deed and the transfer of the title to and under
Florencio's name. However there is no evidence showing that such was even filed and registered
in the register of deed.
2. It was only 18 years after the death of De Leon when the respondents sued the petitioners for
ejectment that the Florencio claimed, for the first time, that De Leon had executed a deed of
donation over the property in favor of their predecessor.
3. Respondents continued to pay the realty taxes completely oblivious to the existence of the deed
of donation despite Florencio's continued stay.
4. Petitioners never adduced in evidence the owner's duplicate under De Leon which means that the
title was not turned over to Florencio after such donation; hence, their failure to secure title over
the property.
5. One of the witnesses of the deed to the deed, for falsification and perjury against Florencio and
Atty. Tirso Manguiat. However, the petitioners failed to adduce in evidence a counter-affidavit from
Atty. Manguiat explaining the facts and circumstances surrounding the notarization of the deed of
donation.
6. Reading of the deed will show that Florencio was to subscribe and swear to the truth of his
acceptance of the donation before Municipal Mayor Aure of Bulacan. However, the mayor did not
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affix his signature. And it appears that a second page was added, with the name of Atty. Manguiat
typewritten therein as notary public, obviously, with the use of a different typewriter.
NOTES:
• Donation is one of the modes of acquiring ownership. Among the attributes of ownership is the right to
possess the property.
• The essential elements of donation are as follows: (a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
(b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be made
in a public document and that the acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public
instrument; in cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor
be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.
• As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance by
the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation.
• Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute
owner of the property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charge
imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.
• The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be
made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donee’s acceptance must come to the
knowledge of the donor.
• In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a public document.
Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the Assessor’s Office is not necessary
for it to be considered valid and official. Registration does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title
over a particular parcel of land. The necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third
persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by their
predecessors-in-interest.
• On the other hand, the fundamental principle is that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein as
the registered owner.
• The registered owner has the right to possess, enjoy and dispose of the property without any limitations
other than those imposed by law.
3. HEIRS OF CIPRIANO REYES V. CALUMPANG, G.R. No. 138463 October 30, 2006 (ANDRIN)
HEIRS OF CIPRIANO REYES: RICARDO REYES, JOSE CALUMPANG, GEOFFREY CALUMPANG,

DAYLINDA REYES, BEATRIZ REYES, JULIAN AGAPITO AGALA, LORENZO MANABAN,
CUECO, ESPERANSA REYES, VICTORINO REYES, RESTITUTO MANABAN, OLYMPIA MANABAN,
AND JOVITO REYES, petitioners PELAGIA MANABAN AND FELIPE
CUECO, respondents
SPECIAL DETAILS:
• Case is a war between relatives.

o Subject property involves a lot in Negros.
o Originally owned by Isidro Reyes
▪ Petitioners – Children of Higino and Policarpio
▪ Respondents – Grandchildren of Victoriana, Agapito, and Pelagia, Grandchildren of
Telesfora,
• Isidro had 8 children - Victoriana, Telesfora, Leonardo, Juan, Eduarda, Miguel, Eleuteria, and Hermogenes.
o Victoriana had 5 children - Antonia, Emerencia, Juana, Lope and Arcadia
▪ Emerencia (5) - Agapito, Cresencio, Nicasia, Filomena, Baldomera, and Pelagia.
• Baldomera, and Pelagia (illegitimate)
▪ Antonia – no issue
▪ Juana (8) - Fructuoso, Salvadora, Delfin, Rufina, Felomina, Ceferino, Lucia, and Cipriano
▪ Lope (7) - Aniana, Lucas, Isidro, Genera, Abadias, Jose, and Gabriela
• Isidro – 1 son: unnamed
▪ Arcadia (7) - Lucrecia, Bienvenida, Gregoria, Antonio, Moises, Marcela, and Maria
Page 3 of 47
o Telesfora – 1 child: Valentin

▪ Valentin – Olympia, Restituto, Lorenzo
o Leonardo – 6 children: Higino, Policarpio, Ines, Exaltacion, Honorata and Sofia
▪ Higino – 6 children: Victorino, Cipriano, Luis, Ricardo, Jesus, and Daylinda
▪ Policarpio – 3 children: Beatriz, Guillermo, and Jovito
▪ Ines – 5 children: Jose, Pedring, Cesar, Zosima, and Angel
• Jose – 1 son: Geoffrey
▪ Exaltacion – 7 children: Rafael, Remedios, Cordova, Natividad, Rogelio, Ramon, and
Zenaida.
▪ No records for heirs of Honorata and Sofia
o No records of last 5 children of Isidro – Juan, Eduarda, Miguel, Eleuteria, and Hermogenes.
o Leonardo was the manager of their father’s properties, in behalf of 7 sibs.
FACTS:
• Cadastral survey was conducted.

o Leonardo, as answer, named all 8 children as claimants.
o A certain Dominador filed a claim over the disputed lot naming some grandchildren of Leonardo
Reyes, including most children of Higino and Policarpio.
o DECISION: granted the imperfect title of petitioners.
• Petitioners did not take actual possession.
o Victorino and Cipriano paid land taxes.
o Heirs of Telesfora and Victoriana retained possession over said lot where they built their houses
and planted various crops and fruit bearing trees.
o Jose (GS of Leonardo) took possession over a hectare and planted sugarcane.
o THUS: Jose and son, HO Telesfora and Victoriana occupied the said lot.
• Agapito was informed land was already registered.
o Agapito seek advice from a judge who suggested they file a quitclaim.
o A conference was held where three (3) of the registered co-owners––Victorino, Luis, and Jovito –
–signed a Deed of Quitclaim, for a consideration of one peso (P1.00), they agreed to release,
relinquish and quitclaim in favor of the legal heirs of the late Victoriana Reyes and Telesfora
Reyes.
o The Deed of Quitclaim was annotated.
o Respondents had Police Constabulary summon the other registered co-owners to sign another
deed of quitclaim which they were ignored.
• HO Victoriana and Telesfora filed a Civil Case, for Reconveyance of Real Property, Cancellation of
Certificate of Title and Damages against the registered co-owners of the disputed lot who did not sign a
deed of quitclaim and Dominador.
o RTC dismissed complaint. Ruled in favor of registered owners. CA affirmed. Was not raised for
review. Thus, attained finality.
• Petitioners filed instant civil case.
o Civil case: Recovery of Possession, Declaration of Non-existence of a Document, Quieting of Title
and Damages
o Petitioners alleged:
▪ By tolerance they allowed respondents to cultivate and occupy the property.
▪ Petitioners were bewitched into signing the deed of quitclaim.
o Respondents alleged:
▪ They were in actual and adverse possession and, the existence and due execution of
the assailed Deed of Quitclaim in their favor which was duly annotated on the back of
OCT.
• RULINGS:
o RTC decision: Deed of Quitclaim null and void.
o CA decision: RTC did not have a basis in fact and law to declare the deed of quitclaim null and
void and concluded that it remained valid and binding to all the signatories.
ISSUES:
1. WON fraud and mistake was substantiated (NO)
2. WON respondents were barred by laches (YES BUT NOT ANYMORE)
3. WON Deed of Quitclaim was valid (YES)
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4. WON Deed of Quitclaim was not a valid contract (IT WAS)

5. WON Deed of Quitclaim a donation (NO NOT A DONATION)
RULINGS:
WON fraud and mistake was substantiated (NO)
Petitioners failed to present evidence in support of their allegation. It revealed that no evidence was adduced
substantiating petitioners’ allegation of fraud and mistake in the execution of the assailed quitclaim. Thus, by
admission coupled with absence of evidence, the court is constrained to conclude that the deed of quitclaim is valid.
WON respondents were barred by laches (YES BUT NOT ANYMORE)

YES barred on the first case filed. BUT the execution of the DOQC revived their equitable rights. White it is
true that the indefeasibility of petitioners’ title on the ground of laches bars the rights or interests of the heirs of
Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes over the disputed lot, still, the indefeasible rights of a holder of a Torrens Title may
be waived in favor of another whose equitable rights may have been barred by laches. Verily, laches serves
to deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial remedies. However, the equitable rights barred by laches still subsist and
are not otherwise extinguished. Thus, parties guilty of laches retains equitable rights albeit in an empty manner as
they cannot assert their rights judicially. However, such equitable rights may be revived or activated by the waiver
of those whose right has ripened due to laches, and can be exercised to the extent of the right waived. In the case
at bar, the SC held that in the 1st civil case it did not pronounce that the HO V&T had no rights over the disputed
land. Their pronouncements were only as to the extent that V&T equitable rights over the subject land has already
been barred by laches. Thus, the voluntary waiver of petitioners-VLJ, activated the equitable rights of HO V&T, but
only to the extent of the rights of Victorino, Luis, and Jovito.
WON Deed of Quitclaim was valid (YES. VALID AF)

Essential elements of a valid waiver:
1. Existence of a right
2. Athe knowledge of the existence thereof
3. Intention to relinquish such right
These elements are all present in the case at bar. The three (3) executors, who were co-owners and titleholders of
the said lot since 1954, were aware of their rights, and executed the Deed of Quitclaim in clear and unambiguous
language to waive and relinquish their rights over subject lot in favor of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes.
Thus, the existence of a valid waiver has been positively demonstrated. Moreover, they failed to adduced evidence
evidence showing that the assailed quitclaim was done absent such standard (Valderama standard).
WON Deed of Quitclaim was not a valid contract (IT WAS)

The essential requisites of a contract were complied with:
1. consent of the parties
2. object certain that is the subject matter of the waiver and quitclaim – the subject lot.
3. the cause of the waiver and quitclaim that is established – which is the recognition by the executors of the
rights of the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes over the disputed lot.
WON Deed of Quitclaim a donation (NO NOT A DONATION)

NO. Deed of quitclaim was not a donation. Based on the facts of the case, HOT&V should have filed for an action
for reconveyance to recover their shares over the subject lot because considering it was a donation by Isidro.
However, instead of such, they convinced VLJ to execute a DOQC restoring their shares. Therefore, the DOQC was
not a donation for the VLJ merely acknowledged the ownership of and the better right over the said lot by the HOT&V.
It, merely acknowledging the legal rights of respondents, it need not have formal acceptance from Agalas and
Manabans.
NOTES:
• In Soliva v. The Intestate Estate of Villalba, ‘laches’ is defined as: the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which — by the exercise of due diligence — could
or should have been done earlier. It is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
period, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to
assert it. Under this time-honored doctrine, relief has been denied to litigants who, by sleeping on
their rights for an unreasonable length of time — either by negligence, folly or inattention — have
allowed their claims to become stale. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. The laws aid
the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
Page 5 of 47
• In People v. Bodoso, cited in Valderama, it was held that the standard of a valid waiver requires that it "not
only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences."
1. Seventh Day Adventist vs. Northeastern Mindanao Mission, G.R. No. 150416. July 21, 2006
(Odchigue)
PETITIONER: SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST RESPONDENT: NORTHEASTERN MINDANAO

CONFERENCE CHURCH OF SOUTHERN MISSION OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST, INC., and/or
PHILIPPINES, INC., and/or represented by MANASSEH represented by JOSUE A. LAYON, WENDELL M.
C. ARRANGUEZ, BRIGIDO P. GULAY, FRANCISCO M. SERRANO, FLORANTE P. TY and JETHRO CALAHAT
LUCENARA, DIONICES O. TIPGOS, LORESTO C. and/or SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH [OF]
MURILLON, ISRAEL C. NINAL, GEORGE G. NORTHEASTERN MINDANAO MISSION (Won)
SOMOSOT, JESSIE T. ORBISO, LORETO PAEL and
JOEL BACUBAS (Lost)
● at the time of the donation, SPUM-SDA
Bayugan could not legally be a donee because,
● petitioners asserted ownership over the not having been incorporated yet, it had no
property juridical personality.
● declared themselves as a de facto corporation ● Petitioners members of the local church then,
and may benefit from a donation. hence, the donation could not have been made
particularly to them
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another person
who accepts it. The donation could not have been made in favor of an entity yet inexistent at the time it was made.
Nor could it have been accepted as there was yet no one to accept it.
FACTS:
● Felix Cosio and his wife were original owners of a land in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur.
● April 21, 1959 - the spouses Cosio donated the land to the South Philippine Union Mission of Seventh Day
Adventist Church of Bayugan Esperanza, Agusan (SPUM-SDA) which was also accepted by Libarato
Rayos – an elder of the Seventh Day Adventist church on behalf of done.
● February 28, 1980 – 21 years afrer, the same parcel of land was sold by the spouses Cosio to the Seventh
Day Adventist Church of Northeastern Mindanao Mission (SDA-NEMM).
● September 28, 1987 – petitioners filed an action for cancellation of title, quieting of ownership and
possession, declaratory relief and reconveyance with prayer for preliminary injunction and damages
RTC Decision: (Nov. 20,1992)
● upholding the sale in favor of respondents.
CA Decision
● affirmed RTC decision
● deleted the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees
ISSUES:
1. W/N there is a valid donation to SPUM-SDA. (NO)

2. W/N there is a de facto corporation of SPUM-SDA. (NO)
3. W/N SDA-NEMM's ownership of the lot covered by TCT No. 4468 be upheld. (YES)
RULING:
1. The alleged donation to petitioners was void.
Page 6 of 47
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another
person who accepts it. The donation could not have been made in favor of an entity yet inexistent at
the time it was made. Nor could it have been accepted as there was yet no one to accept it.
The deed of donation was not in favor of any informal group of SDA members but a supposed SPUM-SDA
Bayugan (the local church) which, at the time, had neither juridical personality nor capacity to accept such
gift.
2. No existence of a de facto corporation. Thus, there was no donation.
In order to qualify as a de facto corporation, the requisites are:

· the existence of a valid law under which it may be incorporated - there may be a law
· an attempt in good faith to incorporate – but there is no proof of an attempt to incorporate
· assumption of corporate powers – no such assumption existed
Petitioners themselves admitted that at the time of the donation, they were not registered with the SEC,
nor did they even attempt to organize to comply with legal requirements.
Petitioners obviously could not have claimed succession to an entity that never came to exist. Neither could
the principle of separate juridical personality apply since there was never any corporation to speak of.
3. SDA-NEMM is the owner of the land. There is a valid sale.
Although Cosio contended that he has no intention to sell the property since he already donated the same,
it was held under Article 1355 of the Civil Code that lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a
contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. There is no showing of fraud, mistake
or undue influence thus the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid.
Transfer of ownership from the spouses Cosio to SDA-NEMM was made upon constructive delivery of the property
on February 28, 1980 when the sale was made through a public instrument.
NOTES:
2. Jutic vs. CA, G.R. No. L-44628. August 27, 1987 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, RESPONDENT:THE COURT OF APPEALS,

CELESTINO SEVILLE, TIBURCIO SEVILLE, RAVELLO MANILA, VICENTE SULLAN, TRINIDAD SULLAN,
SEVILLE, SONITA SEVILLE, LUCY SEVILLE, EPIFANIA TERESITA SULLAN, ULYSSES SULLAN,
SEVILLE, NARACY SEVILLE, EMMANUEL SEVILLE, ALEJANDRINO SULLAN, BUENAVENTURA
ORLANDO MANICAN, and PACIFICO MANICAN (Lost) SEVILLE, and ZOILO SEVILLE (Won)
● Claiming ownership over Lot 170 and 172 and its

improvement on the basis of the affidavit executed ● private respondents as legal heirs of
by Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville. Arsenio Seville have actual and substantial
● contend that the document was a valid donation as interests in the subject of litigation thus
only donations are accepted by the donees. qualifying them as real parties-in-interest.
Page 7 of 47
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
1. CIVIL LAW; DONATIONS; INSTRUMENT IS A MERE DECLARATION OF AN INTENTION AND A DESIRE

NOT CONSIDERED A CONCRETE AND FORMAL ACT OF GIVING OR DONATING; THERE IS NO
INTENTION TO TRANSFER OWNERSHIP. —
The form and contents of said Exhibit 4 amply support this conclusion." There clearly was no intention to transfer
ownership from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time of the instrument's execution. It was a mere
intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that in the event of his death at some future time, his properties
should go to Melquiades Seville.
2. .ID.; ID.; DONATIONS WHICH ARE TO TAKE EFFECT AFTER THE DEATH OF THE DONOR PARTAKES
THE NATURE OF TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION. —
It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession (". . . in case I will die, I will assign all my rights,
share and participation over the above-mentioned properties and that he shall succeed to me in case of my death. .
. . "). Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary
provisions and shall be governed by the rules established in the title on succession (Art. 728, Civil Code).
FACTS:
● Arsenio Seville owned several parcels of land.
● March 4, 1963 - executed an affidavit in favor of Melquiades Seville saying that since he has no one to
inherit all his properties except his brother Melquiades Seville.
O “That it is my desire that in case I will die I will assign all my rights, interest share and
participation over the above-mentioned property and that he shall succeed to me in case of my
death…”
● May 24, 1968 – Arsenio Seville mortgaged said properties to the Philippine National Bank in consideration
of a loan, with the knowledge and acquiescence of Melquiades Seville.
● May 15, 1970 – Arsenio Seville died intestate, single and without any debt.
● The children of Melquiades Seville are now claiming exclusive ownership of the properties and
improvements thereon on the basis of the instrument executed by Arsenio Seville in favor of Melquiades
Seville and on their alleged actual possession, occupation, and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172 since
1954 continuously and peacefully in the concept of owner up to the time of Arsenio Seville's death.
RTC Decision (September 19, 1972)
● In favor of respondents.
CA Decision:
● Affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUES:
W/N there was a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville.
RULING:
No.
Page 8 of 47
Exhibit 4 (affidavit) is not a donation inter vivos or mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention and a desire.
Certainly, it is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donating. The form and contents of said Exhibit 4 amply
support this conclusion."
There clearly was no intention to transfer ownership from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time
of the instrument's execution. It was a mere intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that in the
event of his death at some future time, his properties should go to Melquiades Seville.
Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and
shall be governed by the rules established in the title on succession (Art. 728, Civil Code).
As to the petitioner’s contention that it is a valid donation since only donations are accepted by donees – it cannot
prosper since petitioners could not have accepted something, which by the terms of the supposed "donation" was
not given to them at the time. The affidavit could not transmit ownership except in clear and express terms.
NOTES:
3. Di Siok Jian vs. Sy Lioc Suy et. al, G.R. No. L-17783. June 22, 1922.] (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: DI SIOCK JIAN, as guardian of the RESPONDENT: SY LIOC SUY ET AL., (Won)
minors Sy Kiong Chuan and Florencia Sy Lioc Suy (Lost) ● ask that judgment be entered to the effect that
● asks that the contract of purchase and sale the document Exhibit A (of donation) is null and
Exhibit C be declared void as it was made to void;
defraud said minors ● that the defendants See Kiong Pha, See Kiong
● that the title of the said minors to the property Land, See Kiong Chian and See Kong Thi are
donated to them and described in Exhibits A the only legal owners of the property described
and B recognized in the said document, and
● that the defendants be prohibited from selling, ● that the plaintiff render an account of all the
transferring, or otherwise, disposing of the moneys received by her as rent of said property
property thus donated pending this litigation with interest and costs.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
1. DONATIONS; PURE AND CONDITIONAL. —
Where, in a donation, an obligation is imposed upon the donee to support the donor and defray his necessary
expenses during his lifetime, the donation is not a pure, but a conditional, one, since the obligation imposed upon
the donee is in the nature of the condition without which the donation would not have been made.
2. ID.; DONATION TO A MINOR; ACCEPTANCE BY NATURAL GUARDIAN. —
A conditional donation in favor of a minor is not perfected unless it is duly accepted by his legal
representative. The acceptance made by the mother of said minor is not sufficient for the perfection of the donation
unless said mother had been appointed by competent court as guardian of the property of her minor child to whom
the donation was made.
3. ID., REVOCATION. —
A conditional donation which has been accepted in accordance with the law may be revoked by the donor,
who afterwards dispose of the property donated, as though no donation had been made.
Page 9 of 47
4. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES; DAMAGE ESSENTIAL IN FRAUD; RIGHTS OF HEIRS. —
In order that the conveyances of the property may be held fraudulent, it is necessary that the person alleging the
fraud be possessed of an existing right over the said estate, and not merely a right in expectancy. A donation which
has not been accepted in accordance with the law does not transmit any right to the donee, and the donor
has power to dispose of the thing donated in favor of the third person after the revocation of said donation.
The donee in such a case cannot allege that the conveyance is fraudulent on the mere ground that the purchaser
had knowledge of the donation, inasmuch as the donee has not acquired any right over the estate which could have
been injured, and even if the donee were a presumptive heir, he cannot allege the conveyance to be fraudulent, for
his right as an heir is but a right in expectancy.
FACTS:
● April 23, 1918 - Sy Lioc Suy, one of the defendants, executed a deed of donation Exhibit A in the favor of
his minor children represented by their mother, the herein plaintiff, which was accepted on the same date
in the document Exhibit B.
● That on the date of execution of Exhibit B attached to the complaint, Di Siock Jian was not the judicially
appointed guardian of the property of the plaintiff minors, but she was the mother of said minors; that later,
on December 9, 1919, she was appointed by the Court of First Instance of Manila as guardian of the persons
and properties of said minors;
● July 5, 1919 - the same Sy Lioc Suy executed the document Exhibit D, revoking said donation.
● That after the execution of Exhibits A and B, Di Siock Jian took possession of, and managed, the property
described in the said exhibition, and collected the rents on said property and paid tax thereon up to the end
of July, 1919, on behalf of the said minors;
● July 12, 1919 - the defendant Sy Lioc Suy executed the deed, a copy of which marked Exhibit C is attached
to the complaint, which deed was presented to the registrar of deeds, and a certificate of title issued under
Act No. 496 in favor of Sy Lioc Suy's codefendants who are mentioned in said exhibits as purchasers;
● the land in litigation was registered under the provisions of the Mortgage Law in the name of Sy Lioc Suy
in the year 1899, and that said land, with the improvements thereon, was registered under the provisions
of the Act No. 496 in the year 1914 and stood in his name in the registry under said Act No. 496 until the
conveyance was effected by virtue of the deed Exhibit C;
ISSUES:
1. W/N the donation is pure or conditional.

2. W/N donation is duly accepted.
3. W/N defendant’s title to the property is valid.
RULING:
1. It is a conditional donation. It involves a condition or burden which must be complied with by the
donees.
The fifth clause of the deed of donation contains an obligation on the part of the person, accepting the
donation on behalf of the donees, to provide the donee with lodging, food, clothing, and laundry, medical
attendance and medicine, and all other things necessary for his subsistence during his lifetime, this
obligation to cease upon the destruction of the property by accident of fortuitous event.
2. Article 626 (now Art 741) of the Civil Code provides that a person who cannot enter into a contract
cannot accept conditional or onerous donations without the intervention of their legal
representatives. It was stated in the stipulation of the facts, the mother of the minors had not been
appointed by the court as guardian of her children when she accepted said donations. She needs to be the
legal representative of her children, to validly accept said donation, for while she is considered as the natural
guardian of her minor children and by virtue thereof she has the right to have them in her custody and
educate them, yet this right does not extend to the properties of said minors unless declared so by the
court. (Sec. 553. Code of Civil Proc.) If the donation was not duly accepted in accordance with the
Page 10 of 47
article 623, there was not any contract binding upon the donor, and nothing could, therefore prevent
him from withdrawing the offer, as he did, in the document Exhibit D.
But in a conditional or onerous donation in favor of minors, as is the case under consideration, there is a
stronger reason for requiring the intervention of their legal representatives. If certain obligations are
imposed upon the donees, that the consent to assume them is required to be given by their legal
representative to protect the rights of the donor. If the mother who accepted the conditional donation
was a legal representative of her children, the acceptance is valid; if she did not have their legal
representation, it is void, as made in violation of the law.
Articles 626 (now Art 741) provided for procedure to be followed in order that a conditional or onerous
donation may be validly accepted by an incapacitated person. If this procedure is not followed, there is
no valid acceptance, and without acceptance, there is and cannot be any donation.
3. YES.
There is not in the record any evidence of fraud, with the exception of the knowledge which the defendants
had of the documents, Exhibits A and B. The due execution of the document Exhibit C being admitted in
the stipulation of facts, and it appearing that the registered title of the vendor contained nothing restrictive
of his title of the purchasers having been registered in the registry of property, it is clear, in our opinion, that
said purchasers acquired an irrevocable right over the said property.
NOTES:
Bernabe vs. Sauer (18 La. Ann., 148). We have examined the case cited, and are of the opinion that the doctrine
therein laid down is not applicable to the case at bar in which a conditional or onerous donation is involved. The rule
established in that case is that a defect in the acceptance of a pure donation in favor of a minor makes it relatively
void, and incapacitated donee. The soundness and justice of this rule are apparent if the fact is taken into account
that in a pure donation no obligation is imposed upon the donee, and consequently, after the donation is perfected,
no right is acquired by the donor which need be protected. In such a case, the acceptance may be said to be mere
formality required by the law of the perfection of the contract.
4. City of Manila vs. Rizal Park Co (G.R. No. 31063. September 13, 1929) Artillero
PETITIONER: THE CITY OF MANILA RESPONDENT: THE RIZAL PARK CO., INC.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

GIFT OF LANDS; ONEROUS DONATION. — This is a case of a contract of assignment, or more specifically, a
contract of onerous donation by virtue of which the defendant binds itself to convey gratuitously in favor of the plaintiff
the land in question, in consideration of the improvements the plaintiff agrees to make in the defendant's lands; and
the plaintiff agrees to make certain improvements in said lands, in consideration of the assignment of a portion
thereof which the defendant binds itself to make in favor of the plaintiff.
FACTS:
This is an action to compel the defendant, Rizal Park Co., Inc., the successor in interest of C. W. Rosenstock
& Company to execute the transfer and conveyance of the parcel of land known as block 44 of the Rizal Park
subdivision in the City of Manila to the plaintiff, the City of Manila.
The record shows that by the instrument Exhibit A, C. W. Rosenstock & Co., bound itself to assign, transfer and
convey to the City of Manila, gratuitously and irrevocably, the absolute ownership of said block 44, whereon the
city may build or erect a school or schools, or buildings for educational purposes, with playgrounds, within the
period of three years from the date of the execution of said instrument.
Page 11 of 47
The City of Manila, complying with the obligations contracted in said instrument, opened and constructed the main
street named Washington, and in proportion as it decided to open them, constructed and opened the streets, and
established adequate gutters and drains in the streets of the blocks in which five or more houses had been built.
And having required the defendant, the Rizal Park Co., Inc., that succeeded to the rights and obligations of C. W.
Rosenstock & Co., in the block in question, to execute the deed of conveyance of said block, the defendant refused
to comply with this obligation, thus giving rise to this action wherein the plaintiff prays for judgment against the
defendant compelling it to execute the necessary deed assigning, transferring and conveying to the City of Manila
gratuitously and without any payment or compensation, irrevocably and free from all conditions, the full and
absolute ownership of the parcel of land described in the complaint, whereon the City of Manila may construct a
school or schools, or any building for educational purposes, and the necessary playgrounds for the recreation of
the school children.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the construction of the buildings for the school in the block in question is a condition precedent to
the assignment of said block to the City of Manila
2) Whether the three- year period from the date of the deed fixed therein was given for the execution of the
deed of gift by the defendant, and not for the building of the schoolhouses by the City of Manila
RULING:
A careful reading of the contract, reveals the fact that the construction of the buildings for the school in the block in
question is not a condition precedent to the assignment of said block to the City of Manila, and that the three- year
period from the date of the deed fixed therein was given for the execution of the deed of gift by the defendant, and
not for the building of the schoolhouses by the City of Manila. This is a contract of assignment, or, more
specifically, a contract of onerous donation by virtue of which the defendant binds itself to convey
gratuitously in favor of the plaintiff the land in question, in consideration of the improvements that the City
of Manila agrees to make in the Rizal Park subdivision; and the City of Manila agrees to make certain
improvements in said subdivision, in consideration of the assignment of a portion thereof which the
defendant binds itself to make in favor of the plaintiff.
The designation of the purpose to which block 44 in question is to be devoted, namely, that the City of Manila may
construct institutions of learning, only shows, to our mind, that the partnership C. W. Rosenstock & Co., intended to
provide said subdivision with an element which would naturally encourage persons to acquire the several parcels of
which it is composed. There is nothing in paragraph I of the deed in question requiring the City of Manila to construct
buildings on the block in question before the defendant would be obliged to execute the promised assignment. If this
was the intention of the parties, they would have clearly stated it in the contract. And of course it would have been
impossible for the City of Manila to accept such a condition, knowing, as it should have known, that it cannot erect
any building on land that is not its absolute and exclusive property. (See Act No. 1801, sec. 1.) Such a designation
has not the character of a condition precedent to the execution of the deed of assignment.
5. Lagazo vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112796. March 5, 1998) Artillero
PETITIONER: TITO R. LAGAZO RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO CABANLIT
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

SIMPLE DONATION DIFFERENTIATED FROM ONEROUS DONATION. — At the outset, let us differentiate
between a simple donation and an onerous one. A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no
strings attached), while onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.
FACTS:
Page 12 of 47
Catalina was the grantee of the Monserrat estate. She had to leave for Canada to become a permanent resident
therein and she appointed Espanol to be her attorney-in-fact to fix the requirements needed.
Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Español to accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney granted to him, Catalina
Jacob revoked said authority in an instrument executed in Canada. Simultaneous with the revocation, Catalina Jacob
executed another power of attorney of the same tenor in favor of Lagazo (plaintiff-appellee).
Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of plaintiff-appellee. Following
the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the Register of Deeds and found out that the property was in the
delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and the remaining balance on the lot and declared the said
property in the name of Catalina Jacob.
Plaintiff-appellee thereafter sent a demand letter to defendant-appellant Cabanlit asking him to vacate the premises.
A similar letter was sent by plaintiff-appellee’s counsel to defendant. However, defendant-appellant refused to vacate
the premises claiming ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiff-appellee instituted the complaint for recovery of possession
and damages against defendant-appellant.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not be stated on the
deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically impose any charge, burden or condition to be
satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality paid for the installments in arrears and for
the remaining balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be express or
implied, as provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by Art. 749
of the same code. His payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his right of possession against
private respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation.
ISSUES:
1. Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose any burden — the expressed consideration being
purely one of liberality and generosity — but the recipient actually paid charges imposed on the property
like land taxes and installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed onerous and thus governed by
the law on ordinary contracts?
2. Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not formally communicated to
the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered complete, valid and subsisting?
RULING:
1. NO. At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation and an onerous one. A simple or pure
donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which
is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value than the thing donated. Under
Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts;
hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.We rule that the donation was
simple, not onerous. Even conceding that petitioner’s full payment of the purchase price of the lot might
have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the
donation.It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee.
The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the
payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This much can be gathered from his testimony
in court, in which he never even claimed that a burden or charge had been imposed by his grandmother.The
payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by Catalina Reyes in
favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her
obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in the donation.
2. NO. As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply. The donation, following the theory
of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee.” Furthermore, “[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.”Acceptance
of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and void
Page 13 of 47
6. Gestopa vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 111904. October 5, 2000) Artillero
PETITIONER: SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES
ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA DANLAG y PILAPIL
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor
intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. In ascertaining the intention
of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together.
ACCEPTANCE CLAUSE IS A MARK OF A DONATION INTER VIVOS - an acceptance clause is a mark that the
donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the
form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.
A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee
to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke any of these
reasons in the deed of revocation.
FACTS:
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed three (3)
deeds of donation mortis causa in favour of private respondent Merecedes Danlag-Pilapil (Diegos’ illegitimate child).
All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors 910 to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during
their lifetime, and 92) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donor’s lifetime, if deemed
necessary.
Years later, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, catalina Danlag, executed another deed of donation inter
vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land and two others in favour of Mercedes containing the two
conditions, that 1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2)
the done cannot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and
approval. Thereafter, Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels’ tax declarations to her name and paid the taxes
on them.
Subsequently, the spouses Danlag sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners Spouses Gestopa, and executed a deed of
revocation on the donation inter vivos covering the six parcels of land given to private respondent Mercedes.
The Court of Appeals held that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to
Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties; that the right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's
right referred to that of merely giving consent; that the donor changed his intention by donating inter vivos properties
already donated mortis causa; that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertaining to the donated
properties implied that the donation was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of
land donated to her.
Hence, this instant petition for review filed by the Gestopa spouses.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of
the deed.
2. Whether the revocation was valid.
RULI
1. SC affirmed the decision of CA. As may be aptly analysed form the provisions of the deed, (1) the granting
clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee which is a
mark of DONATION INTER VIVOS; (2) the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended
to transfer the naked ownership over the properties; (3) donor reserved sufficient properties for his
Page 14 of 47
maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the
6 parcels; (4) done accepted the donation in which in the case of Alejandro v. Geraldez, it is said that
acceptance clause is a mark that a donation is a donation inter vivos because a donation mortis causa
being in the form of a will does not require an acceptance from the done during the donor’s lifetime. CA
was right that the right to dispose of the properties belonged to the done and the donor’s right to give
consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary rights.
The attending circumstances in the execution of the donation in this case demonstrated the real intent of
the donor to transfer ownership over the parcels of land upon execution of the deed. It is to be noted that
prior to the execution of donation inter vivos, Danlag sps already executed 3 donation mortis causa which
means that they were aware of the difference of the 2 types of donations. If they did not intend to donate
inter vivos, they would not again donate the lots already donated mortis causa.
2. A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the
done to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. However, the donor spouses did
not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation. Mercedes allegedly intensely prohibited the
donor from gathering fruits from the coconut trees but the SC said that nothing on record showed that
Mercedes indeed prohibited the donor from doing so and assuming that Mercedes really did, this could
hardly be considered an act under Art. 765 of the New Civil Code which will warrant the revocation of the
donation.
Hence, supposed revocation had no legal effect.
7. Cuevas vs. Cuevas (G.R. No. L-8327. December 14, 1955) Artillero
PETITIONER: ANTONINA CUEVAS RESPONDENT: CRISPULO CUEVAS
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

DONATION; CHARACTERISTIC OF DONATION "INTER VIVOS." — Where the donor stated in the deed of
donation that he will not dispose or take away the land "because I am reserving it to him (donee) upon my death,"
he, in effect, expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a right essential to
full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title to the property in favor of the
donee. A stated in the case of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568, Phil., 481, such irrevocability
is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post mortem.
ACCEPTANCE; WHAT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT ACCEPTANCE. — To respect the terms of the donation and
at the same time express gratitude for the donor's benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance of the donation.
FACTS:
Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled "Donacion Mortis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo
Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in barrio Sinasajan, municipality of Peñaranda, Province
of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A). In the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.
Subsequently, the donor executed another notarial instrument entitled "Revocacion de Donacion Mortis Causa"
purporting to set aside the preceding conveyance. She brought action in the Court of First Instance to recover the
land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the donor;
and (2) even if it were a donation inter vivos, the same was invalidated because (a) it was not properly accepted; (b)
because the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own maintenance, and (c) because the donee was
guilty of ingratitude, for having refused to support the donor.
The crux of the controversy revolves around the following provisions of the deed of donation:
Page 15 of 47
"Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ang lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa
kaniya ay ako pa rin ang patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagpapatrabaho, makikinabang at ang iba pang
karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindi ko binabawian ng buhay ng Maykapal at ito
naman ay hindi ko ñga iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya."
There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that the donor reserves to herself "the right of
possession, cultivation, harvesting and other rights and attributes of ownership while I am not deprived of life by the
Almighty"; but right after, the same donor states that she "will not take away" (the property) "because I reserve it for
him (the donee) when I die."
ISSUES:
1. Whether the donor intended to part with the title to the property immediately upon the execution of the deed,
or only later, when she had died. If the first, the donation is operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be
confronted with a disposition mortis causa, void from the beginning because the formalities of testaments were not
observed.
RULING:
The decisive proof that the present donation is operative inter vivos lies in the final phrase to the effect that the
donor will not dispose or take away ("hindi ko ñga iya-alis" in the original) the land "because I am reserving it to him
upon my death." By these words the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in favor
of another (a right essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title
to the property in favor of the donee. As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante, such
irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post
mortem.
Witness article 828 of the New Civil Code, that provides: A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before
his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor intended that she should retain the entire
beneficial ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title should irrevocably pass to the donee. It is only thus
that all the expressions heretofore discussed can be given full effect; and when the donor stated that she would
continue to retain the "possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she meant
only the dominium utile, not the full ownership. As the Court below correctly observed, the words "rights and attributes
of ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of "possession, cultivation and
harvesting" expressly enumerated in the deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership she had no
need to specify possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in full or absolute
ownership; nor would she then have excluded the right of free disposition from the "rights and attributes of ownership"
that she reserved for herself.
Hence, the Court rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid donation inter vivos, with reservation of
beneficial tit]e during the lifetime of the donor.
NOTES: It has been ruled that neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that a donation is "to take
effect at the death of the donor", is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of donations (Laureta vs. Mata,
44 Phil., 668; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil., 823).
8. Alejandro v. Geraldez, GR NO. L-33849 , (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Teoderico Alejandro, Ireneo Policarpio, RESPONDENT: Hon. Geraldez, Andrea Diaz,
Virginia Alejandro, Maria Alejandro, Salud Alejandro, Angel Diaz
Emilia Alejandro, Florencio Alejandro, Dionisia - Andrea Diaz contends that the 1949 deed of
Alejandro donation is a valid donation inter vivos and
- Alejandro intervenors contend that the said that the trial court erred in deleting the
donation is mortis causa award for attorney's fees.
Page 16 of 47
- that they are entitled to a one-third share in Lot No.

2502, and that the trial court erred in characterizing
the deed as a valid partition.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

"ART. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary
provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession.
"ART 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor, though the
property shall not be delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter vivos.The fruits of the property
from the time of the acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides otherwise.
"ART. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive condition, which may take place beyond the
natural expectation of life of the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a donation a inter vivos,unless a
contrary intention appears.
"ART. 731. When a person donates something subject to the resolutory condition of the donor's survival, there is a
donation inter vivos
"ART. 732. Donations which are to take effect inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on contracts
and obligations in all that is not determined in this Title
INTER VIVOS
An inter vivos donation of real property must be evidenced by a public document and should be accepted by the
donee in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument.
while, a converso, the express waiver of the right of free disposition would place the inter vivos character of the
donation beyond dispute.
If the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's death, meaning that the
full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor's
lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
The habendum clause indicates the transfer of the ownership over the donated properties to the donees upon
the execution of the deed. But the reddendum clause seems to imply that the ownership was retained by the
donors and would be transferred to the donees only after their death.
Inter vivos because (1) the ownership of the things donated passed to the donee; (2) it was not provided that
the transfer was revocable before the donor's death, and (3) it was not stated that the transfer would be void
if the transferor should survive the transferee.
MORTIS CAUSA
The donor should be notified of the acceptance in an authentic form and that step should be noted in both
instruments.
A transfer mortis causa should be embodied in a last will and testament (Art. 728, supra).It should not be called
donation mortis causa.It is in reality a legacy. If not embodied in a valid will, the donation is void.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the
donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the
donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
● It is evident that it is the time of effectivity which distinguishes a donation inter vivos from a donation mortis
causa. And the effectivity is determined by the time when the full or naked ownership (dominium
plenum or dominium directum) of the donated properties is transmitted to the donees.The execution
of a public instrument is a mode of delivery or tradition
● In a donation mortis causa it is the donor's death that determines that acquisition of, or the right to,
the property donated, and the donation is revocable at the donor's will. Where the donation took effect
immediately upon the donee's acceptance thereof and it was subject to the resolutory condition that
the donation would be revoked if the donee did not give the donor a certain quantity of rice or a sum of
money, the donation is inter-vivos
Page 17 of 47
FACTS:
● Spouses Gabino Diaz and Severa Mendoza, their daughter-in-law Regina Fernando, and their three
children, Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, executed a deed of donation covering eight lots of the
Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate, owned by the Diaz spouses, located at Bulacan.
● Gabino Diaz died in 1962. Severa Mendoza and her two children, Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz, executed
a deed of donation denominated as Donation Mortis Causa. In that deed of donation, Severa Mendoza
donated to Andrea Diaz her one-half share in Lot 2377-A, on condition that Andrea Diaz would bear the
funeral expenses to be incurred after the donor's death. She died in 1964.
● The other one-half share in Lot 2377-A was previously adjudicated to Angel Diaz because he defrayed the
funeral expenses on the occasion of the death of Gabino Diaz.
● Andrea Diaz sued-her brother, Angel Diaz for the partition of Lots Nos. 2377-A and 2502. Teodorico
Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia Diaz, and their children intervened in the said case. They claimed
one-third of Lot No. 2502. Angel Diaz alleged that he had been occupying his share of Lot No. 2502 "for
more than twenty years".The intervenors claimed that the 1949 donation was a void mortis causa
disposition.
CFI: Held that the said deed of donation was a donation mortis causa because the ownership of the properties
donated did not pass to the donees during the donors' lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only "upon the
death of the donors".
ISSUES: Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa
RULING:
● The donation in the instant case is inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors. It
was already effective during the donors' lifetime, or immediately after the execution of the deed, as
shown by the granting, habendum and warranty clause of the deed.
● In that clause it is stated that, in consideration of the affection and esteem of the donors for the donees and
the valuable services rendered by the donees to the donors, the latter, by means of the deed of donation,
wholeheartedly transfer and unconditionally give to the donees the lots mentioned and described in the
early part of the deed, free from any kind of liens and debts
● Habendum and warranty clause is the donors' declaration that they donate (ipinagkakaloob) Lot No.
2502, the property in litigation, in equal shares to their children Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, the western
part to Angel and the eastern part to Andrea.
● The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being
in the form of a will, are never accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. Acceptance is a
requirement for donations inter vivos.
● In the acceptance clause herein, the donees declare that they accept the donation to their entire
satisfaction and, by means of the deed, they acknowledge and give importance to the generosity and
solicitude shown by the donors and sincerely thank them. cdll
● In the reddendum or reservation clause of the deed of donation, it is stipulated that the donees
would shoulder the expenses for the illness and the funeral of the donors and that the donees cannot
sell to a third person the donated properties during the donors' lifetime but if the sale is necessary to
defray the expenses and support of the donors, then the sale is valid.
● The limited right to dispose of the donated lots, which the deed gives to the donees, implies that
ownership had passed to them by means of the donation and that, therefore, the donation was already
effective during the donors' lifetime. That is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos.
● The habendum clause indicates the transfer of the ownership over the donated properties to the
donees upon the execution of the deed. But the reddendum clause seems to imply that the ownership
was retained by the donors and would be transferred to the donees only after their death.
● the reddendum or reservation clause refers to the beneficial ownership (dominium utile) and not to
the naked title and that what the donors reserved to themselves, by means of that clause, was the
management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof. The donation, as shown in the habendum clause,
was already effective during their lifetime and was not made in contemplation of their death because
the deed transferred to the donees the naked ownership of the donated properties.
● Severa Mendoza executed a donation mortis causa wherein she conveyed to her daughter, Andrea Diaz
,her one-half share in Lot No. 2377-A, which one-half share is known as Lot No. 2377-A-1, the other half
Page 18 of 47
or Lot No. 2377-A-2 having been already conveyed to Angel Diaz. That disposition given to Andrea clearly
implies that the conveyance in the deed of donation as to Lot No. 2377 took effect during the lifetime
of the donors, and proves that the 1949 donation was inter vivos.
● Under these facts, it was held that the 1948 deed of donation mortis causa was inter vivos in character
in spite of repeated expressions therein that it was a mortis causa donation and that it would take effect
only upon the donor's death.
● But the 1949 deed of donation was declared void because it was a true conveyance mortis causa which
was not embodied in a last will and testament. The mortis causa character of the disposition is shown
by the donor's reservation of the right to alienate or encumber the donated properties to any person or
entity.
● It was held that the donation was inter vivos because the phrase "hindi ko nga iya-alis" ("I will not take
away the property") meant that the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the
property in favor of another person and thereby manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the
naked title to the donee. The donor retained the beneficial ownership or dominium utile. Being an inter
vivos donation, it could be revoked by the donor only on the grounds specified by law. No such grounds
existed. The donee was not guilty of ingratitude.
The deed of donation is void. That donation is declared valid as a donation inter vivos.
NOTES:
9. Vita v. Montanano, GR NO. 50553 , (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:Soledad Montanano, Etanislao Jovellano, Estebana Jovellano, Jose,

Nazario Vita Elena, Alodia-all surnamed Montanano
(LOST) - They pray that these parcels of land be adjudicated to them in the manner set forth
in their counterclaim; that plaintiff-appellant be ordered to account for the harvests
from these parcels of land from the time he took possession; and that they be
awarded damages corresponding to their litigation expenses
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
It is explicit in Article 725 of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies to all kinds
of donation because the law does not make any distinction. The rationale behind the requirement of acceptance is
that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will.
A donation mortis causa takes effect only after the death of the donor, consequently it is only after the
latter's death that its acceptance may be made
Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion:
". . ., even if he (donor) says it (the donation) is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the
instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of
the donor but rather services rendered to him, by the donee or his affection for the latter, then the donation
should be considered as inter vivos, . . ., and the condition that the donation is to take effect only after the death
of the donor should be interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the property donated
should take place only after donor's death."
FACTS:
● Nazario Vita, as the administrator of the estate of Edilberto Vita, filed a case before the CFI of Laguna
seeking to recover from respondents the possession of 3 parcels of land located in Barrio Talangan,
Nagcarlan, Laguna and their annual yield amounting to P 1,100.00 a year.
● Vita claims that during the lifetime of Edilberto Vita, he was the owner and possessor of these 3 parcels of
land covered by tax declarations and was enjoying the fruits therefrom. However, upon Edilberto Vita’s
passing, the respondents through stealth and strategy took possession of the parcels of land and gathered
the fruits therefrom.
Page 19 of 47
● Despite the demands from the petitioner, respondents refused to surrender the possession of these lands.
Respondents denied that Edilberto Vita owned the parcels of land and claimed that the two parcels of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 and Tax Declaration No. 1231 belong to Soledad Montanano which
were conveyed to her by Isidra Montanano (her aunt and wife of Edilberto Vita) and Edilberto Vita in a
document signed and executed by them on November 22, 1938 and ratified by one Mr. Matienzo, a Notary
Public. However, all copies of said document were lost during the last war.
● The parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 is owned in common by Soledad Montanano, her
brother Jose and sisters Elena and Alodia and originally belonged to the deceased sister of their
grandmother. It was transferred to them under the arrangement sanctioned by Edilberto Vita himself
wherein the proceeds from the harvests shall be spent for the masses for the souls of Francisca Asilo and
Isidra Montanano.
● Petitioner is now estopped from instituting this action. Respondents claim also that Edilberto Vita could not
have inherited these parcels of land from Isidra Montanano since the estate has never been the subject of
a judicial or extra-judicial proceeding. The erroneous inclusion of these parcels of land in the estate of
Edilberto Vita does not make them a part of his estate.
● There is no fixed income from these parcels of land because petitioner, with unknown persons, has been
gathering whatever crops that may be taken.
● Petitioner claims that Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita never executed any document and if they had, it
was thereafter repudiated and the land remained in the possession of the Vita spouses. Isidra Montanano,
had no heirs, so her surviving spouse Edilberto Vita succeeded her and took possession of her estate.
● Respondents allege that they acquired ownership over the parcel of lands which are in the possession of
Soledad Montanano by virtue of donation mortis causa executed by Isidra Montanano by a donation which
was confirmed by Edilberto.
● Petitioner denied all the allegations and reiterated that there was no such donation executed by Isidra
Montanano. If such donation were really executed, she was forced to do so at a time when she was not
mentally in a position to execute and sign freely said document.
TRIAL COURT: The trial court dismissed the case since petitioner did not present preponderance of evidence that
the estate belonged to Edilberto and respondents have not shown that the parcels of land were validly donated to
them.
All the parties appealed to the CA.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not the three parcels of land mentioned in the complaint are included in the estate of Edilberto
Vita (NO)
2.
a) whether or not acceptance is necessary in a donation mortis causa (YES)
b)whether the donation dated December 20, 1940 is mortis causa or inter vivos (INTER VIVOS)
RULING:
1. We are in conformity with the finding of the trial court that the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the
complaint were paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano, being supported by documentary and
testimonial evidence.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, it is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper
disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. In
the present case, therefore, the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be
liquidated in the testate proceedings of the latter.
2. a) It is explicit in Article 725 of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies
to all kinds of donation because the law does not make any distinction. The rationale behind the requirement
of acceptance is that nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will.
b) The quoted provision in the second deed of donation should be understood in its entirety. It was obviously
the intention of Isidra Montanano to grant a donation inter vivos to defendants-appellants and
intervenors-appellants.
Page 20 of 47
We have adjudged in the case of Heirs of Juan Bonsato, et al. v. Court of Appeals:
"It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase 'that after the death of the donor
the aforesaid donation shall become effective.' . . . However, said expression must be construed
together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the
donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the
donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor
reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or
encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in
the donees."
Furthermore, mention must be made of the fact that the consideration of the second deed of donation
is love and services rendered by defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants to Isidra
Montanano, as revealed by the third and fourth paragraphs
Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion:
". . ., even if he (donor) says it (the donation) is to take effect after his death, when from the body of
the instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not
the death of the donor but rather services rendered to him, by the donee or his affection for the
latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos
Petitioner is ordered: a) to deliver the possession of the properties donated to defendants-appellants and
intervenors-appellants by virtue of the deed of donation dated December 20, 1940, and b) to render an
accounting of the products harvested therefrom from January 23, 1962 up to the present.
NOTES:
Balaqui, et al. v. Dongso:
". . ., that as the donor guaranteed the right which she conferred on the donee by virtue of the deed of gift,
wherein, in recompense of the latter's good services to the former, she donates to her the two parcels of
land with their improvements, said gift is inter vivos and irrevocable, and not mortis causa, notwithstanding
the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she did not transfer the ownership of the two parcels of land donated,
save upon her death, for such a statement can mean nothing else than that she only reserved to herself the
possession and usufruct of said property, and because the donor could not very well guarantee the aforesaid right
after her death."
10. Sicad v. Court of Appeals, GR NO. 125888 , (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad RESPONDENT: CA, Catalino Valderrama, Judy
Valderrama, Jesus Valderrama
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties
as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution. In this respect, case law has laid down
significant parameters.
● Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized that the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis
causa, which it had taken into account in David v. Sison, were that the donor not only reserved for herself
all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided
that without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed
of in any way, thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the
power to dispose of the properties."
● A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to dispose of
the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa
"the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.
Page 21 of 47
● In Alejandro v. Geraldez, this Court also observed that "the fact that the donation is given in
consideration of love and affection . . . is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos (solely) because
transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.
● The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa; It is void because
the essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with.
FACTS:
● That deed, entitled "DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS," was executed by Aurora Montinola and named
as donees her grandchildren (respondents), namely: Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and
Jesus Antonio Valderrama for a parcel of land. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in
acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation.
● Montinola's Secretary presented the deed for recording in the Property Registry, and the Register of Deeds
cancelled the donor's title and in its place, issued a TCT in the names of the donees. Montinola however
retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title, as well as the property itself, until she transferred the
same ten years later to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.
● Aurora Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of the donation and caused it to be annotated as an adverse
claim on the TCT issued in her grandchildren's names. She filed a petition with the RTC in Roxas City for
the cancellation of said TCT and the reinstatement of the TCT in her name.
● Her petition was founded on the theory that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis
causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void
and could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of the TCT.
● The donees opposed the petition. They averred that the donation in their favor was inter vivos which, having
fully complied with the requirements set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code, was perfectly valid and
efficacious. They also expressed doubt about the sincerity of their grandmother's intention to recover the
donated property, since she had not pursued the matter of its revocation after having it annotated as an
adverse claim.
TRIAL COURT: Rendered judgment holding that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora
Montinola's petition for lack of merit. The matter of its revocation was not passed upon.
● Montinola elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. She however died while the appeal was pending.
● Petitioners then filed a Manifestation and Motion which they alleged that they had become the owners of
the property in virtue of a "deed of definite sale accomplished and confirmed by an affidavit by Montinola.
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the donation was inter vivos and in not giving due weight to the
revocation of the donation
RULING: Yes, the donation is mortis causa.
● These acts denoting retention of ownership of the property was Montinola's openly expressed view
that the donation was ineffectual and could not be given effect even after ten (10) years from her
death.
● The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties
as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution. In this respect, case law has laid down
significant parameters.
● Thus, in a decision handed down in 1946, this Court construed a deed purporting to be a donation inter
vivos to be in truth one mortis causa because it stipulated. On these essential premises, the Court said,
such a donation must be deemed one "mortis causa, because the combined effect of the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation and of the above-quoted clauses
thereof . . . (was that) the most essential elements of ownership — the right to dispose of the
donated properties and the right to enjoy the products, profits, possession — remained with
Margarita David during her lifetime, and would accrue to the donees only after Margarita David's death. So,
too, in the case at bar, did these rights remain with Aurora Montinola during her lifetime, and could
not pass to the donees until ten (10) years after her death.
● Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized that the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis
causa, which it had taken into account in David v. Sison, were that the donor not only reserved for herself
all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided
that without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed
of in any way, thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the
power to dispose of the properties."
Page 22 of 47
● A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to dispose of
the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa
"the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.
● In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation in question
to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not get possession of the property
donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits or any other right of dominion over the property.
● They did not acquire the right to dispose of the property — this would accrue to them only after ten
(10) years from Montinola's death. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property.
● All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation — reserving
the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the properly
until ten (10) years after her death — ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was
a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's
demise.
● Article 1378 of the Civil Code to the effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the
construction must be that entailing "the least transmission of rights and interests."The donation in
question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa; It is void because the
essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with.
NOTES:
11. Austria Magat v. Court of Appeals, GR NO. 106755 , (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Apolinaria RESPONDENT: CA, Florentino Lumubos, Domingo Comia, Teodora

Austria-Magat Carampot, Ernesto Apolo, Segunda Sumpelo, Mamerto Sumpelo, Ricardo
Sumpelo
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● The express irrevocability of the same ("hindi na mababawi") is the distinctive standard that identifies
that document as a donation inter vivos. The other provisions therein which seemingly make the
donation mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable character of the subject donation.
● The prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property during her lifetime is proof that naked
ownership over the property has been transferred to the donees. It also support the irrevocable nature
of the donation considering that the donor has already divested herself of the right to dispose of the donated
property. On the other hand, the prohibition on the donees only meant that they may not mortgage or
dispose the donated property while the donor enjoys and possesses the property during her
lifetime. However, it is clear that the donees were already the owners of the subject property due to the
irrevocable character of the donation.
● Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the acceptance clause therein
of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
● The act of selling the subject property to the petitioner herein cannot be considered as a valid act
of revocation of the deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke the donation must be
filed pursuant to Article 764 of the Civil Code which speaks of an action that has a prescriptive period
of four (4) years from non-compliance with the condition stated in the deed of donation. The rule
that there can be automatic revocation without benefit of a court action does not apply to the case at bar
for the reason that the subject deed of donation is devoid of any provision providing for automatic revocation
in the event of non-compliance with any of the conditions set forth therein. Thus, a court action is
necessary to be filed within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the condition violated.
● In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the characteristics of a donation mortis causa, to
wit:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
Page 23 of 47
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
FACTS:
● Basilisa Comerciante executed a deed of donation over a parcel of residential land together with the
improvements thereon in favor of her four children (one if which is respondent Florentino Lumubos) with
express irrevocability and prohibition to alienate the said property. Basilisa and her said children likewise
executed another notarized document denominated as "Kasulatan" which is attached to the deed of
donation.
● Thereafter, Basilisa executed a Deed of absolute Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of herein
petitioner and as a result of which a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds in the
name of petitioner.
● Herein respondents filed an action against the petitioner for annulment of the Transfer Certificate of Title
and other relevant documents and for reconveyance and damages.
RTC:
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on the ground that the donation was void because it did not comply
with the formalities of a will, it being a donation mortis causa. Hence, the sale by the donor of the said property was
valid since she remained to be the absolute owner thereof during the time of the said transaction.
CA: On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals declaring null and void the Deed
of Sale of the subject property because the donation is inter vivos.
Hence, the appeal.
ISSUES:
W/N the CA erred in when it considered the donation as inter vivos (NO, donation is inter vivos)
RULING: Decision of the CA is affirmed.

● It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor
intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. In Bonsato v. Court of
Appeals, this Court enumerated the characteristics of a donation mortis causa, to wit:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
● Construing together the provisions of the deed of donation, we find and so hold that in the case at bar
the donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of the same ("hindi na mababawi") is the distinctive
standard that identifies that document as a donation inter vivos. The other provisions therein which
seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable character of the subject
donation.
● We arrive at no other conclusion in that the petitioner's cited provisions are only necessary assurances that
during the donor's lifetime, the latter would still enjoy the right of possession over the property; but, his
naked title of ownership has been passed on to the donees; and that upon the donor's death, the donees
would get all the rights of ownership over the same including the right to use and possess the same.
● Furthermore, it also appeared that the provision in the deed of donation regarding the prohibition to alienate
the subject property is couched in general terms such that even the donor is deemed included in the said
prohibition.
● Both the donor and the donees were prohibited from alienating and encumbering the property
during the lifetime of the donor. If the donor intended to maintain full ownership over the said property
until her death, she could have expressly stated therein a reservation of her right to dispose of the same.
Page 24 of 47
The prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property during her lifetime is proof that naked
ownership over the property has been transferred to the donees. It also supports the irrevocable
nature of the donation considering that the donor has already divested herself of the right to
dispose of the donated property. On the other hand, the prohibition on the donees only meant that
they may not mortgage or dispose the donated property while the donor enjoys and possesses the
property during her lifetime. However, it is clear that the donees were already the owners of the
subject property due to the irrevocable character of the donation.
● Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the acceptance clause
therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter
vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. On the other hand, donations mortis
causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donor's lifetime.
● The act of selling the subject property to the petitioner herein cannot be considered as a valid act
of revocation of the deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke the donation must
be filed pursuant to Article 764 of the Civil Code which speaks of an action that has a prescriptive
period of four (4) years from non-compliance with the condition stated in the deed of donation. The
rule that there can be automatic revocation without benefit of a court action does not apply to the case at
bar for the reason that the subject deed of donation is devoid of any provision providing for automatic
revocation in the event of non-compliance with the any of the conditions set forth therein.
● Thus, a court action is necessary to be filed within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
condition violated. As regards the ground of estoppel, the donor, Basilisa, cannot invoke the violation of
the provision on the prohibition to encumber the subject property as a basis to revoke the donation thereof
inasmuch as she acknowledged the validity of the mortgage executed by the donee, Consolacion Austria,
when the said donor asked respondent Domingo Comia to redeem the same.
● Thereafter, the donor, Basilisa likewise asked respondent Florentino Lumubos and the petitioner herein to
redeem the same. Those acts implied that the donees have the right of control and naked title of
ownership over the property considering that the donor, Basilisa condoned and acknowledged the
validity of the mortgage executed by one of the donees, Consolacion Austria.
NOTES:
Gestopa v. Court of Appeals:
This Court held that the prohibition to alienate does not necessarily defeat the inter vivos character of the
donation. It even highlights the fact that what remains with the donor is the right of usufruct and not anymore the
naked title of ownership over the property donated. In the case at bar, the provision in the deed of donation that the
donated property will remain in the possession of the donor just goes to show that the donor has given up his
naked title of ownership thereto and has maintained only the right to use (jus utendi) and possess (jus
possidendi) the subject donated property.
In Cuevas v. Cuevas, we ruled that when the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or
take away the property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation
inter vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a
donation inter vivos despite an express provision that the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the
donated property while he is alive.
12. DEL ROSARIO v. FERRER, G.R. NO. 187056, September 20, 2010 (ARRIESGADO)
PETITIONER: Jarabini G. RESPONDENT: Asuncion G. Ferrer, substituted by her heirs Vincente, Pilar,
Del Rosario Angelito, Felixberto, Jr., all surnamed G. Ferrer, and Miguela Ferrer Alteza
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● The difference between donations mortis causa and donations inter vivos is that one mortis causa,
acceptance is not needed in order for the donation to be perfected during the donor’s lifetime. On the
other hand, one inter vivos is perfected from the moment the donor learns of the donee’s acceptance of
the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.
● In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that “irrevocability” is a quality absolutely
incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where “revocability” is precisely the essence of
the act.
Page 25 of 47
● A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: (1) it conveys no title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) that before his death, the
transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) that
the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
FACTS:
● Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled “Donation Mortis Causa” in
favor of their two (2) children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini del Rosario,
covering the spouses’ 126-square meter lot and the house on it in equal shares.
● A few months after the death of Guadalupe, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a Deed of Assignment
of his rights and interests in the subject property to their daughter Asuncion. He died in June 1972.
● In 1998, Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Asuncion opposed
the petition, invoking her father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her.
● After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding that the donation was, in fact, one made
inter vivos.
● On Asuncion’s appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter rendered a decision reversing the decision of the
RTC. It held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the probate of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa,
collaterally attack Leopoldo’s Deed of Assignment in Asuncion’s favor.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation was a donation mortis causa. (NO)
● Whether or not the assignment of Leopoldo’s rights and interests was valid. (NO)
RULING:
● The Court ruled in favor of Jarabini Del Rosario and the RTC that the donation was, in fact, a donation inter
vivos.
● The fact that the document in question was denominated as a donation mortis causa is not controlling if
a donation, by its terms, is inter vivos.
● In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that “irrevocability” is a quality absolutely
incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where “revocability” is precisely the essence of
the act.
● A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: (1) it conveys no title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) that before his death, the
transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) that
the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
● In the present case, the donors plainly said that it is “our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be
irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse.”
● Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The
reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s
acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.
● The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor
shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Thus, given that the donation was indeed inter vivos,
Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion is void.
● In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa.
This is to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. Since the donation is
inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed
perfected from the moment the donor learns of the donee’s acceptance of the donation. Thus, the
acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.
NOTES:
● Notably, the three (3) donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required.
Thus, this Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is one inter vivos, since
acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations.
Page 26 of 47
13. MAGLASANG v. HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, G.R. NO. 131953, June 5, 2002 (ARRIESGADO)
PETITIONER: Ma. Estela RESPONDENT: The Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan, namely Luz M. Boquia, Perla
Maglasang, Nicolas M. Abella, Estrella M. Cañete, Lourdes M. Yuson, and Julia L. Mayol, The Heirs
Cabatingan, and Merly S. of Genoviva C. Natividad namely, Oscar C. Natividad, Olga Natividad, Odette
Cabatingan Natividad, Ophelia Natividad, Richard Natividad, Raymund Natividad, Richie
Natividad, Sonia Natividad and Encarnacion Cabatingan Vda. de Trinidad,
Alfredo Cabatingan, and Jesusa C. Navada
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● In a donation mortis causa, “the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive.”
● In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into
account: (1) it conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive; (2) that before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will,
ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) that the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.
FACTS:
● On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas
Cabatingan, a “Deed of Conditional Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot,” covering ½ of the portion of
the former’s house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.
● Four (4) other Deeds of Donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14,
1995, bestowing upon petitioners Nicolas, Merely S. Cabatingan, and Estela C. Maglasang two (2) parcels
of land.
● One of the provisions in the deeds are as follows: “that for an in consideration of the love and affection of
the donor for the donee, the donor does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation,
unto the donee the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing
thereon, to become effective upon the death of the donor; provided, however, that in the event that the
donee should die before the donor, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and
of no further force and effect.”
● When Conchita died on May 9, 1995, and upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents filed an action with the RTC of Mandaue for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Deeds of Donations and Accounting, which seeked to annul the said four (4) Deeds of Donation
executed by Conchita.
● Respondents allege that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies, took advantage of
Conchita Cabatingan’s fragile condition, causing the execution of the Deeds of Donation, and that the
documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills
and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa.
● Petitioners deny respondents’ allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments.
● The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents by declaring the four (4) Deeds of Donation as null and void
ab initio since it has failed to comply with the formal requirements and solemnities under Article 806 of
the Civil Code.
● Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not the donation was a donation mortis causa. (YES)
RULING:
● The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents, finding that the RTC did not commit any reversible
error in declaring the subject Deeds of Donation null and void.
● In a donation mortis causa, “the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive.”
Page 27 of 47
● The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any
clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Conchita’s death.
Instead, it has been specified that a transfer of proprietary rights will only take effect after the death of
Conchita. This meant that Conchita had no intention to transfer such rights during her lifetime.
● In this case, the phrase “to become effective upon the death of the donor” admits no other interpretation
but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her
lifetime.
● The reason that the donations were made in consideration of the love and affection of the donor Conchita
does not qualify the donations as inter vivos. Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied for lack of merit.
NOTES:
● For a donation mortis causa to be valid, it must conform with the following requisites under Article 805,
namely that:
○ Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three (3) or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of one another;
○ The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.
○ The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witness, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
○ If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
● Furthermore, Article 806 provides that: “every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses; the notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another
with the office of the Clerk of Court.”
14. CARIÑO v. ABAYA, G.R. NO. 46706, June 26, 1940 (ARRIESGADO)
PETITIONER: Jose M. Cariño RESPONDENT: P. Fernando Ma. Abaya
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposal of
property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions as provided
for under Article 620 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
● The root cause of the present legal controversy is a document executed by the sisters Petrona Gray and
Dorotea Gray.
Page 28 of 47
● Both sisters died intestate and without either ascendants or descendants. Miguel Cariño was thus
designated to administer or deliver the properties therein of the predeceased Dorotea Gray.
● After the lapse of about seven (7) years from the death of Dorotea Gray, Jose Cariño, son of Miguel Cariño,
and herein petitioner, commenced intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance, in which he prayed
that he be appointed administrator of the estate left by the Gray sisters.
● Subsequently, Jose Cariño filed an amended petition praying that the properties described in paragraph 3
thereof be declared trust properties and that the be appointed trustee of the same.
● Father Fernando Ma. Abaya, respondent herein and first cousin of Petrona and Dorotea Gray, interposed
an opposition to the amended petition, alleging that the document executed by the Gray sisters is null and
void and praying that the court make an adjudication to that effect.
● While on the one hand Jose Cariño contended that Exhibit C-1 is a donation inter vivos creating at the
same time a trust, Father Abaya, on the other, alleged that the said document is a will.
● The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur rendered judgment declaring that the properties described in
paragraph 2, 3, and 4 of Exhibit C-1 are trust properties destined by the trustors for religious and pious
purposes; and that the properties enumerated in paragraphs 5 and 6 are invalid trusts for the reason that
the properties described in paragraph 5 did not belong to the said trustors, and, that the properties
described in paragraph 6 thereof were destined for a trust, the purpose of which is uncertain; and that while
the designation of said Jose Cariño is invalid, still the court may appoint one to act as such.
● Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals which held that Exhibit C-1 was neither a donation inter vivos
as contended by the petitioner, nor a will as alleged by the respondent, but a void donation mortis causa
- as it was a donation mortis causa that was not executed with the formalities of a will.
ISSUES:
● Whether Exhibit C-1 is a donation inter vivos as claimed by the petitioner, or a will as insisted by the
respondent. (NEITHER)
RULING:
● The Supreme Court in this case concurred with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the document
in dispute is a donation mortis causa.
● The seventh clause of the document reciting that “we the sisters do hereby order that all these properties
shall be given after the death of the last one to die between us,” considered in conjunction with the fact that
the grantors employed the terms “there shall be given to,” “shall administer,” and “shall be administered,”
which have reference to the future, clearly brings forth the intention on the part of the Gray sisters to make
the distribution of their estate effective after their death.
● It is worthy of observation, also, that in the ninth clause of Exhibit C-1, the phrase “together with those who
had been mentioned to inherit from us,” supplies a cogent reason for concluding that the grant therein made
was meant to take effect after the death of the grantors, for the word “inherit,” as used here, implies the
acquisition of the property by the heirs after the death of the Gray sisters.
● Accordingly, said donations can only be made with the formalities of a will.
● As the document Exhibit C-1 was not executed in conformity with the provisions of Section 618 of the
Codes of Civil Procedure, conspicuously for the lack of an attestation clause and marginal signatures, the
Court is constrained to hold that the same cannot be accorded any force and effect.
NOTES:
● Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposal of
property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions as provided
for under Article 620 of the Civil Code.
15. CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 112127, July 17, 1995
(ARRIESGADO)
PETITIONER: Central RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals, Remedios Franco, Francisco N. Lopez,

Philippine University Cecilia P. Vda. de Lopez, Redan Lopez, and Remarene Lopez
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Article 1181 : In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of
those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.
Page 29 of 47
● Article 1197 : If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof. The court shall also fix the
duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor. In every case, the courts shall determine
such period as may, under the circumstances, have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed
by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.
● Article 1191 : The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfilment
and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfilment, if the latter should become impossible. The court shall
decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. This is
understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance
with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
FACTS:
● In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was then a member of the Board of Trustees of the Central
Philippine College - now the Central Philippine University (CPU), executed a Deed of Donation in favor of
the latter of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3174-B-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-1144, then a portion
of Lot No. 3174-B, for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3910-A was issued in the name of the donee
CPU with the following annotations copied from the Deed of Donation:
○ (1) The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the establishment and use of a
medical college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum;
○ (2) The said college shall not sell, transfer, or convey to any third party, nor in any way encumber
said land; and
○ (3) The said land shall be called “RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS,” and the said college shall be under
obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name. Any net income from the land or any of its
parks shall be put in a fund to be known as the “RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS FUND” to be used for
improvements on the said campus, and the erection of a building thereon.
● On May 31, 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed an action for
annulment of donation, reconveyance, and damages against the CPU, alleging that since 1939 up to
the time the action was filed, the latter had not complied with the conditions of the donation.
● On May 31, 1991, the RTC held that the petitioner failed to comply with the conditions of the donation
and declared it null and void.
● On June 18, 1993, the Court of Appeals ruled that the annotations at the back of the petitioner’s certificate
of title were resolutory conditions - the breach of which should terminate the rights of the donee, thus making
the donation revocable.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not there was a breach of the resolutory condition imposed upon the respondent. (YES)
RULING:
● The Supreme Court held that the donation was onerous. A clear perusal of the conditions set forth in the
Deed of Donation executed by Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., gives the Court no alternative but to conclude that
his donation was onerous, one executed for a valuable consideration which is considered the equivalent
of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value of the donation.
● The donation had to be valid before the fulfilment of the condition. If there was no fulfilment or compliance
with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may now be revoked and all
rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.
● Furthermore, the Court held that the action had not prescribed. It has been held that its absolute
acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the Deed of Donation were sufficient to
prevent the Statute of Limitations from barring the action of private respondents upon the original
contract which was the Deed of Donation.
● Lastly, the Court held that the fixing of a period is now moot and rescission is proper. This is because
the petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and
equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked, so that
petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, herein private
respondents, by means of reconveyance.
NOTES:
● Fifty (50) years had lapsed before the action against petitioners was filed by respondents.
Page 30 of 47
16. QUIJADA V. CA, GR NO. 126444, (RUBENECIA)
PETITIONER: ALFONSO QUIJADA, RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS, REGALADO

CRESENTE QUIJADA, REYNELDA QUIJADA, MONDEJAR, RODULFO GOLORAN, ALBERTO ASIS,
DEMETRIO QUIJADA, ELIUTERIA QUIJADA, SEGUNDINO RAS, ERNESTO GOLORAN, CELSO ABISO,
EULALIO QUIJADA, and WARLITO QUIJADA FERNANDO BAUTISTA, ANTONIO MACASERO, and
NESTOR MAGUINSAY
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

When a person donates land to another on a condition. The condition imposed is not a condition precedent or a
suspensive condition but a resolutory one.
FACTS:
● Petitioners are the children of the late Trinidad Quijada. Trinidad and her siblings executed a deed of
donation of a two-hectare lot in favor of the Municipality of Talacogon (Agusan del Sur), exclusively for the
purpose of constructing the proposed provincial high school. However, possession remained with Trinidad.
She subsequently sold the two hectares on two separate occasions to Regalado Mondejar, who sold it to
different persons. Eventually, the Municipality, failing to construct the high school, reverted ownership to
the donors. Petitioners filed an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession and ownership. RTC
ruled in favor of petitioners, but CA reversed.
ISSUES:
Whether the deed of donation had a suspensive condition or a resolutory condition
Whether the sale was valid
RULING:
When the donation was accepted, the ownership was transferred to the school, only subject to a condition that a
school must be constructed over the lot. Since ownership was transferred, and failure to fulfill the condition reverts
the ownership back to the donor, it is a resolutory condition.
(Not really a discussion in Property) When Trinidad sold the parcels of land to Mondejar, she was not the owner of
the land. Petitioners also did not sleep on their rights to recover the possession and ownership over the property
since they immediately filed the action when the municipality passed the resolution, reverting the ownership of land
to the donors. However, a sale being a consensual contract, it can be perfected upon meeting of the minds, and
completing the three essential elements of a valid contract of sale. Even when Trinidad was not the owner when the
sale was perfected, tradition through delivery is only important upon the consummation stage. Such transfer of
ownership through actual or constructive delivery only happened when the lands reverted back to petitioners. Art
1434 is applicable, stating that seller's "title passes by operation if law to the buyer," and therefore making the sale
valid. The donated lots cannot be considered outside the commerce of man, since nowhere in the law states that
properties owned by municipality would be as such.
NOTES: Laches presupposes failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; 14 "it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it." 15 Its essential elements of:
a) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of;
b) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an
opportunity to sue;
c) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and,
d) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.
Page 31 of 47
17. DOLAR V. BARANGAY LUBLUB, GR NO. 152663, (RUBENECIA)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: BARANGAY LUBLUB (now P.D. Monfort North) of the Municipality of
EDGARDO D. Dumangas, herein represented by its Punong Barangay, PEPITO DUA, PHILIPPINE
DOLAR LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, DUMANGAS WATER DISTRICT, 4th ILOILO
MOBILE GROUP, ILOILO PROVINCIAL POLICE, ILOILO REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 68
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

When a deed of donation, . . . expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated,
the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since
Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to law,
. . . public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing
for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the
determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court
will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
FACTS:
● Petitioner and Serafin Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 4.6 hectares, identified
as Lot No. 1, Pcs-06-000744 (Lot No. 1, for brevity), situated in Brgy. Lublub, Municipality of Dumangas,
Iloilo. Said property forms part of Lots No. 4181 and 4183 of the Dumangas Cadastre. Then barangay
captain Jose Militar accepted the donation in behalf of Brgy. Lublub. Sometime in June 1989, petitioner
executed another deed [5] donating to Brgy. Lublub, represented by its incumbent barangay captain, the
very same area he and Serafin Jaranilla had earlier donated to the same donee. The second deed of
donation contained exactly the same conditions expressly set forth in the first. On May 6, 1998, in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Iloilo City, petitioner filed against Brgy. Lublub a complaint for Quieting of
Title and Recovery of Possession With Damages involving the 4.6-hectare area he had earlier donated.
Basically, petitioner claimed that the donation in question had ceased to be effective, the donee barangay
having failed to comply with the conditions of the donation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not his action is one for revocation of donation instead of for quieting of title; whether or not
the action for quieting has prescribed.
2. Whether or not the deed of donation in question is (a) valid for defective acceptance and/or (b) no longer
effective by reason of the automatic reversion clause therein.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the donation being valid and effective, virtually forecloses any claim which petitioner
may have over the donated property against the donee and other occupants thereof, and his action to quiet title has
no merit. Militar was clothed with authority to accept the donation for respondent barangay. On this point, petitioner
cites Section 88 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 [16] - the law then in force - and Sections 91 and 389 the Local
Government Code of 1991. In gist, these provisions empower the punongbarangay to enter into contracts for the
barangay upon authorization of the Sangguniang Barangay, or, in the alternative, theSanggunian may authorize the
barangay head to enter into contracts for the barangay.
When a deed of donation expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the
rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since
Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to law,
. . . public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing
for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the
determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court
will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act. In the case at bench, it cannot be
gainsaid that respondent barangay denied or challenged the purported revocation of the donation
Page 32 of 47
NOTES:
If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides for automatic rescission and/or reversion in case of
breach of the condition therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply with the condition, the donated property
reverts back automatically to the donor. Such provision, De Luna teaches, is in the nature of an agreement granting
a party the right to rescind a contract in case of breach, without need of going to court and that upon the happening
of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically
revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. Where, however, the donee denies, as here, the
rescission or challenges the propriety thereof, then only the final award of the court can, to borrow from University
of the Philippines v. de los Angeles,21 "conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not." Or, in the
language of Catholic Archbishop of Manila:22
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is
necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by
virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether
or not the rescission was proper.
18. ARANETA V. PEREZ, GR NO. L-18872, (RUBENECIA)
PETITIONER: In the Matter of the Trusteeship of Minors RESPONDENT: ANTONIO PEREZ, Judicial
Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed Perez y Guardian of Angela and ANTONIO PEREZ Y
Tuason. TUASON
J. ANTONIO ARANETA
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

There being nothing in the old Civil Code which prohibits a trustee from donating properties under trusteeship, and
considering that the powers given to herein appellee as trustee are of a plenary character, subject only to the
limitation that they should be permissible under the law; considering further that when the testatrix conferred such
powers she must have had in mind the law that was in force at the time; and considering finally that after all a trust
is created for the benefit of the cestuis que trust and that in this particular case the acts of the trustee are subject to
the supervision of the Court, We see no reason why the donation in question should not be allowed.
The new Civil Code, in prohibiting a trustee from donating properties entrusted to him does so for the protection of
the trust beneficiaries and evidently contemplates gifts of pure beneficence, that is, those which are supported by
no other cause than the liberality of the donor. But when the donation, as in the present instance, is clearly in their
interest, to say it cannot be done would be contrary to the spirit and intent of the law.
FACTS:
● A trust was established pursuant to the will of the late Angela S. Tuason. J. Antonio Aranetawas appointed
trustee and he qualified when he took his oath of office. The beneficiaries of thetrust are Benigno, Angela
and Antonio, all surnamed Perez y Tuason, the last two beingrepresented by appellant Antonio
Perez, who is their father and judicial guardian. In the orderappealed from the lower court approved,
upon petition of the trustee, a deed of donationexecuted by him in favor of the City of Manila covering a
lot pertaining to the trusteeship. Suchapproval was given over the opposition of appellant Antonio Perez.
On the lot in question thetrustee had been paying an annual realty tax.Appellant does not deny the
beneficial aspects of the donation. But he maintains that it isinvalid on the ground that under Article 736 of
the Civil Code "guardians and trustees cannotdonate the properties entrusted to them".
ISSUES:
Whether guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them.
RULING:
In this case, the guardian may donate the properties entrusted to him. Although Article 736,New Civil Code provides
that, "guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrustedto them", the same cannot be applied
considering that the aforecited provision only took effecton August 30, 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) and does not apply
retroactively to the testamentarytrust established upon the death of Angela S. Tuason on March 20, 1948.There
being nothing in the old Civil Code which prohibits a trustee from donating propertiesunder trusteeship, and
Page 33 of 47
considering that the powers given to herein appellee as trustee are of aplenary character, subject only to the
limitation that they should be permissible under the law;considering further that when the testatrix conferred such
powers she must have had in mindthe law that was in force at the time; and considering finally that after all a trust
is created forthe benefit of the cestuis que trust and that in this particular case the acts of the trustee aresubject to
the supervision of the Court.
NOTES:
19. SSS V. DAVAC, GR NO. L-21642, (RUBENECIA)
PETITIONER: SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM RESPONDENT: CANDELARIA D. DAVAC, ET AL.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Article 2012 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2012. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary
of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make any donation to him according to said article.
And Article 739 of the same Code prescribes: The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between
persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
If there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid (as it is not so in this case), it is not the heirs of the
employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless they are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is
only when there is no designated beneficiaries or when the designation is void, that the laws of succession are
applicable. And we have already held that the Social Security Act is not a law of succession.
FACTS:
● The late Petronilo Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay, became a member of the SSS. He designated
Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his relationship to her as that of "wife". He died then
each of the respondents (Candelaria Davac and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with
the SSS. The deceased contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano and the second
with Candelaria Davac. The processing was withheld. The SSS filed this petition praying that the two parties
be required to litigate their claims.
● The SSS issued the resolution naming Davac as the valid beneficiary. Not satisfied with the resolution,
Lourdes Tuplano brought the appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Social Security Commission acted correctly in declaring respondent Candelaria Davac
as the person entitled to receive the death benefits in question.
RULING:
Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, provides:
1. SEC. 13. Upon the covered employee's death or total and permanent disability under such conditions as the
Commission may define, …his beneficiaries, shall be entitled to the following benefit…
The beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer is the one entitled to the death benefits.
The appellant contends that the designation made in the person of the second and bigamous wife is null and void,
because (1) it contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code, and (2) it deprives the lawful wife of her share in the
conjugal property as well as of her own and her child's legitime in the inheritance.
As to the first point, appellant argues that a beneficiary under the Social Security System partakes of the nature of
a beneficiary in life insurance policy and, therefore, the same qualifications and disqualifications should be applied.
Article 739 and 2012 of the civil code prohibits persons whoi cannot receive donations from being beneficiaries of a
Page 34 of 47
policy. The provisions mentioned in Article 739 are not applicable to Candelaria Davac because she was not guilty
of concubinage, there being no proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband Petronilo.
Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the benefits accruing from membership in the Social Security
System do not form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership of the covered member. They are disbursed
from a public special fund created by Congress in pursuance to the declared policy of the Republic "to develop,
establish gradually and perfect a social security system which ... shall provide protection against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age and death."
The sources of this special fund are from salary contributions. Under other provisions, if there is a named beneficiary
and the designation is not invalid, it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless
they are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only when there is no designated beneficiaries or when the
designation is void, that the laws of succession are applicable. The Social Security Act is not a law of succession.
NOTES:
The sources of this special fund are the covered employee's contribution (equal to 2-½ per cent of the employee's
monthly compensation); the employer's contribution (equivalent to 3-½ per cent of the monthly compensation of the
covered employee); and the Government contribution which consists in yearly appropriation of public funds to assure
the maintenance of an adequate working balance of the funds of the System. Additionally, Section 21 of the Social
Security Act, as amended by Republic Act 1792, provides:
SEC. 21. Government Guarantee. — The benefits prescribed in this Act shall not be diminished and to guarantee
said benefits the Government of the Republic of the Philippines accepts general responsibility for the solvency of
the System.
From the foregoing provisions, it appears that the benefit receivable under the Act is in the nature of a special
privilege or an arrangement secured by the law, pursuant to the policy of the State to provide social security to the
workingmen. The amounts that may thus be received cannot be considered as property earned by the member
during his lifetime. His contribution to the fund, it may be noted, constitutes only an insignificant portion thereof.
Then, the benefits are specifically declared not transferable, and exempted from tax legal processes, and lien.
Furthermore, in the settlement of claims thereunder the procedure to be observed is governed not by the general
provisions of law, but by rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission. Thus, if the money is payable to the
estate of a deceased member, it is the Commission, not the probate or regular court that determines the person or
persons to whom it is payable. that the benefits under the Social Security Act are not intended by the lawmaking
body to form part of the estate of the covered members may be gathered from the subsequent amendment made to
Section 15 thereof, as follows:
SEC. 15. Non-transferability of benefit. — The system shall pay the benefits provided for in this Act to such
persons as may be entitled thereto in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Such benefits are not transferable,
and no power of attorney or other document executed by those entitled thereto in favor of any agent, attorney, or
any other individual for the collection thereof in their behalf shall be recognized except when they are physically and
legally unable to collect personally such benefits: Provided, however, That in the case of death benefits, if no
beneficiary has been designated or the designation there of is void, said benefits shall be paid to the legal heirs in
accordance with the laws of succession. (Rep. Act 2658, amending Rep. Act 1161.)
20. GENATO VS. DE LORENZO [G.R. No. L-24983. May 20, 1968.]
RESPONDENT:
PETITIONER: FLORENTINO GENATO, FRANCISCO GENATO and GENATO
COMMERCIAL CORPORATION
1. Respondent and respondent-appellee failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that

there was fraud committed by petitioners in the transfer of the shares of stock in their names.
2. There has been no showing that the transfer made by Simona Genato of her shares of
stock to petitioners was not made validly and regularly.
Page 35 of 47
3. The evidence shows that there was a simple donation made by Simona Genato in favor of
the herein petitioners Florentino Genato and Francisco Genato.
LAW & PRINCIPLES: The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by donee must be simultaneous, and the
acceptance by a person other than the true donee must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set forth in a
public document.
FACTS:
● The Genato Commercial Corporation is a family corporation, founded by the spouses Vicente Genato and
Simona D. de Genato. The spouses had six children named Francisco, Florentino, Manuel, Carmen, Felisa
and Juan all surnamed Genato. As of March 26, 1928, Simona B. de Genato had 430 shares of stock, par
value P100.00 per share, represented by share certificate No. 7 signed by Vicente Genato, President, and
Simona B. de Genato, Secretary-Treasurer.
● Simona Genato died. Now, an intestate proceeding of her estate was filed.
● Francisco Genato, herein petitioner, as the special administrator, presented inventory of the estate and
showed that the value of the estate left by the decedent was approximately P39,806.58. However, such did
not include the shares in litigation.
● Now, in July 1948, the Philippine Trust Company, judicial administrator of the intestate estate, and the legal
heirs Manuel Genato, Felisa Genato de Lorenzo and Juan Genato filed the complaint in the case at bar to
recover from the other two legal heirs, Florentino Genato and Francisco G. Genato, the 530 shares of stock
in order that they may be included in the inventory of the intestate estate of their deceased mother and in
due course distributed among all the surviving children of the decedent.
● In their answer, the defendants Florentino Genato and Francisco G. Genato alleged that they had acquired
the ownership of the 530 shares by simple donation from their mother.
● A testified by FLORENTINO GENATO, in December 1942, Juan Camus, an employee of the Corporation,
came to see him and told him that his mother wanted to see him; that he immediately left and saw his
mother at the residence at the back part of the premises of the Corporation; that his mother delivered to
him the two (2) share certificates Nos. 7 and 18, already endorsed; that is, with the blank spaces of the
endorsement already filled by typewriter and her signature already affixed at the bottom of the endorsement
and that his mother told him 'transfer them’. Thus, after 2/3 days as Assistant Secretary-Treasurer of the
Corporation, he cancelled share certificates Nos. 7 and 18 and issued in lieu thereof the new share
certificates No. 118 in favor of Florentino Genato for 265 shares and No. 119 in favor of Francisco G.
Genato for 265 shares.
● TRIAL COURT: DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT and found that defendants Francisco G. Genato and
Florentino Genato had acquired the ownership of the 530 shares by simple donation from their widowed
mother on December 25, 1942.
● FELISA GENATO LORENZO: appealed in the CA, contending that there was no simple donation of the
530 shares in litigation.
● CA: finding that there had been neither consideration for the sale of shares nor valid donation of the same,
due to lack of proper acceptance and non-compliance with statutory requirements, INVALIDATED the
transfer of the shares to Florentino and Francisco Genato, and decreed that said stock remained a part of
the estate of the transferor.
ISSUES: whether there has been a valid donation as appellants claim
Page 36 of 47
RULING: No. Assuming, ad arguendo, that the late Simona Vda. de Genato gave the Certificates of Stock Nos. 7
and 18 to Florentino with instructions to transfer the same to him and his brother, this act did not constitute a valid
manual donation in law for lack of proper acceptance (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 630).
Incontestably, one of the two donees was not present at the delivery, and there is no showing that he, Francisco
Genato, had authorized his brother, Florentino to accept for both of them. As pointed out by Manresa in his
Commentaries to the Civil Code of 1889 (Vol. V, 6th edition, pp. 131-132, 141-142), the delivery by the donor and
the acceptance by donee must be simultaneous, and the acceptance by a person other than the true donee must
be authorized by a proper power of attorney set forth in a public document. None has been claimed to exist in this
case.
Since by appellants' own version, the donation intended was a joint one to both donees, one could not accept
independently of his co-donee, for there is no accretion among donees unless expressly so provided (Art. 637) or
unless they are husband and wife.
There being neither valid donation, nor sale, the cancellation of the original certificates of stock as well as the
issuance of new certificates in the name of Florentino and Francisco Genato was illegal and improper for lack of
valid authority. It is a consequence of this that the shares in question are deemed never to have ceased to be
property of their mother, Simona B. de Genato, and must be considered still forming part of the assets of her estate.
NOTES:
21. GONZALES vs. CA [G. R. No. 110335]
PETITIONER: insist that the deed of donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales validly RESPONDENT:
transferred the ownership and possession of Lot 551-C which comprises an area of 46.97
hectares to his 14 grandchildren
LAW & PRINCIPLES: As between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said
donation to be contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the
donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).
FACTS:
● The late spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of two parcels of
agricultural Land situated at Barrio Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2742 and denominated as Lot 551-C and Lot 552-A.
● Lot 551-C contains an area of 46.97 hectares while Lot 552-A contains an area of 37.5735 hectares.
● Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972
conveying his share of the property, specifically Lot No. 551-C, in favor of his 14 grandchildren, herein
petitioners.
● The said donation was not registered.
● When Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of the spouses
Gonzales were placed under "Operation Land Transfer" by virtue of said decree, and private
respondents were accordingly issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and
Emancipation Patents.
● The administratrix, Lilia Gonzales, filed an application for retention with the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform, requesting that their property be excluded from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
Page 37 of 47
● On September 3, 1991, Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary issued an order declaring that the
subject landholdings covered by the deed of donation are exempt from Operation Land Transfer, and
cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued in favor of private respondents.
● Aggrieved by this ruling, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
● CA: reversed the action of the DAR and upheld the certificates of land transfer and emancipation patents.
● Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the above decision, but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals.
● Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES: whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27 took
effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer
RULING:
No. The unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the
Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. Accordingly, the Certificates of Land
Transfer and the Emancipation Patents respectively issued to private respondents over the land in question cannot
be cancelled.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must
be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee
must satisfy."
Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable
property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons."
From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property,
all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the
donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the non-
registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the
rights of third persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
It is actually the act of registration that operates to convey registered land or affect title thereto. Further, it is an
entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that registration in a public registry creates constructive notice to the whole
world. (Olizon vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 148 [1994])
It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren, although
in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be binding
upon private respondents who did not participate in said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the
deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-farmers
who were not parties to the donation. As previously enunciated by this Court, non-registration of a deed of donation
does not bind other parties ignorant of a previous transaction (Sales vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 858 [1992]).
NOTES:
It is actually the act of registration that operates to convey registered land or affect title thereto.
Thus, Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), provides:
SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by the registered owner — . . . But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other
voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance
or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register
of Deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar
as third persons are concerned, . . .
Page 38 of 47
It is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that registration in a public registry creates constructive
notice to the whole world.
Thus, Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by Section 52 of P.D. No. 1529, provides:
SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration — Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the
time of such registering, filing or entering.
22. J. L. T. AGRO INC. vs. BALANSAG. [G. R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005]
PETITIONER: J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its RESPONDENT: ANTONIO BALANSAG and
Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES HILARIA CADAYDAY
LAW & PRINCIPLES: The title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed
of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof.
FACTS:
● The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering 954 square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the
Bais Cadastre, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and
Antonia.
● Antonia died and Don Julian contracted a second marriage with Milagro Donio. During the first marriage
he had 2 children, namely: JOSEFA AND EMILIO. he also had children with Milagros.
● When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages
docketed as Civil Case No. 3443. Hereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement
which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
● On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court of First Instance (CFI)
declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian
and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of
Don Julian.
● On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with
Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa
and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with
the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed).
● This instrument which constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership
over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner.
● Sometime in 1974, Don Julian died intestate.
● In the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the registration of the subject lot in
its name. A court, so it appeared, issued an order cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don
Julian and Antonia on 12 November 1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was issued in the name
of the petitioner.
● Since then, the petitioner has been paying taxes assessed on the subject lot.
● Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after
the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with
spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday, respondents herein.
Page 39 of 47
● Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate.
In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn
and Jose Catalino.
● Milagros Donio SOLD THE LAND TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Estate Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner in 1979,
respondents bought Lot No. 63.
● Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC Branch 45 of Bais City, seeking
the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the
title to Lot No. 63 in their names.
● TRIAL COURT: ruled that at the time of Don Julian's death in 1974, Lot No. 63 was no longer a part of his
estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a
proper subject of extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the owners they
could not have sold it.
● CA: reversed the trial court's decision, declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375 registered in the
name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as null and void; the two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of
the properties respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no longer
dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI decision constitutes res judicata.
● Aggrieved by the appellate court's decision, petitioner elevated it to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUES:
a. W/N appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the
death of Don Julian
b. W/N Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot to herein petitioners during his lifetime
RULING:
a. Yes. The CA erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to
the death of Don Julian.
We defined future inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the
contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the
object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the
exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
In interpreting this provision (Art. 1080), Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the partition is made by
an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article. The partition will of course be effective only after
death. It does not necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of
acquiring ownership.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However,
considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the
second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian
remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second
marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to
dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground
that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
b. No. A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental Deed discloses that the assignment
is not supported by any consideration.
Page 40 of 47
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the instrument(see notes) does not represent the
consideration for the assignment made by Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the fair market value of all
the nineteen (19) properties enumerated in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one, that were transferred by
Don Julian in favor of petitioner.
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid contract, namely: (1) consent of the
contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) Cause of the obligation
which is established.
Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause produce no effect whatsoever.
Those contracts lack an essential element and they are not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article
1409, paragraph (2).
Finally, neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. Article 749 of the New Civil Code
is clear on the point.
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al. , this Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the donor
to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the
donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance
does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the
donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. In the
case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public document, the absence of acceptance by the
donee in the same deed or even in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.
In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public document, the absence of acceptance by
the donee in the same deed or even in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.
Thus, this Court is also resolute in striking down the alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its face to
be a blatant nullity.
Thus, upheld CA’S decision.
NOTES:
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays down the effect of the
eventual death of Don Julian vis-à-vis his heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaño and
Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories
and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one half share which they inherited from their mother
but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to
their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second
marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural
children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves
and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis supplied)
A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph
of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and therefore aligns with the
general rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
Supplemental Deed: an excerpt

WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in order to effect the registration of the transfer
of the above corporation.
Page 41 of 47
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys, and
assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., the above described parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of EIGHTY-FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and assignment shall
become absolute upon signing. (Emphasis supplied)
23. ORTIZ vs. CA [G. R. No. L-7307]
PETITIONER: PACITA ORTIZ, ET AL RESPONDENT: THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANDRES BASADA
LAW & PRINCIPLES: From the time the public instrument of donation was executed and acknowledged by donors
and donees, the latter acquired not only the ownership but also the possession of the donated property, since the
execution of a public instrument of conveyance is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands
may be made, unless from the terms of the deed, the contrary is expressed or inferable. .
FACTS:
● The parcel of land in question belonged originally to the Spouses Bonifacio Yupo and Vicenta de Guerra.
● In 1940, the owners donated the lot (among others) to their grandchildren, petitioners Ortiz, by public
document acknowledged before Notary Public.
● The donors were duly notified of donee's acceptance. Alejandro Ortiz died without issue in Capas, Tarlac,
as a prisoner of war, during the last occupation by the Japanese.
● In 1947, the first donee (Ortiz) filed reivindicatory action against the second donee (Basada) alleging that
in 1946, the latter entered and usurped the land donated to and owned by them, and refused to vacate the
same.
● Basada claimed ownership of the land on the ground that the donation in favor of the Ortizes had been
revoked.
● COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE: upheld Basada's claim and dismissed the complaint, on the ground that
the donees Ortiz had abandoned the donors "to public mercy", with" most base ingratitude and highly
condemnable heartlessness.
● CA: held that the donation in favor of appellants Ortiz had been duly perfected in accordance with law, and
it should "stand until after its revocation should have been asked and granted in the proper proceedings.”
BUT, upheld the dismissal of the complaint, holding that: "However, to all appearances, the donors in the
instant case had always reserved for themselves the possession and use of the properties donated.”
ISSUES: W/N CA erred in dismissing herein petitioners’ complaint against Respondent Basada for recovery of the
subject land
RULING:
Yes.
From the time the public instrument of donation (Exh. D) was executed and acknowledged by donors and donees in
1940, the latter acquired not only the ownership but also the possession of the donated property, since the execution
of a public instrument of conveyance is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be
made (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1463; new Civil Code, Art. 1498), unless from the terms of the deed, the contrary is
expressed or inferable.
In the present case, the donation (Exh. D) is on its face absolute and unconditional, and nothing in its text authorizes
us to conclude that it was limited to the naked ownership of the land donated.
Considering that under the law, a donation of land by Public instrument is required to express the charges that the
donee must assume (old Civil Code, Art. 633; new Civil Code, Art. 749), the absence in the deed of any express
reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors is proof that no such reservation was ever intended.
Page 42 of 47
The mere fact that the donors remain in the property after donating it is susceptible of varied explanations and does
not necessarily imply that possession or usufruct was excluded from the donation. And the donees Ortiz having been
vested with ownership and attendant possession since 1940, it is clear that the subsequent donation of the property
in favor of respondent Basada conferred on the latter no right whatever over the property as against the former
donees.
Hence, Respondent Andres Basada is sentenced to restore possession to petitioners Cresencia and Pacita Ortiz.
NOTES:
24. Lydia Sumipat vs. Brigido Banga G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004, (ALOLOR)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
LAW & PRINCIPLES: Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a
deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not
appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given
to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null
and void.
FACTS:
● On January 5, 1983, Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated "DEED OF ABSOLUTE
TRANSFER AND/OR QUIT-CLAIM OVER REAL PROPERTIES" (the assailed document) in favor of his
illegitimate children (defendants-appellees) covering the three parcels of land (the properties). On the
document appears the signature of his wife Placida which indicates that she gave her marital consent
thereto. That time, Lauro was already very sick and bedridden; that upon defendant-appellee Lydia’s
request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his
(Lauro Sumipat’s) hand in affixing his signature on the assailed document which she had brought; that
Lydia thereafter left but later returned on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife Placida to
sign on the assailed document, as she did in haste, even without the latter getting a responsive answer to
her query on what it was all about.
●
● After Lauro Sumipat’s death on January 30, 1984, his wife Placida and defendants-appellees jointly
administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to plaintiff-appellant. As plaintiff-appellant’s
share in the produce of the properties dwindled until she no longer received any and learning that the titles
to the properties in question were already transferred/made in favor of the defendants-appellees, she filed
a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, contracts, partition, recovery of ownership now the subject of
the present appeal.
●
● Defendant-appellee Lydia disclaims participation in the execution of the assailed document, she claiming
to have acquired knowledge of its existence only on January 10, 1983 or five days after its execution when
Lauro Sumipat gave the same to her.
●
● The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant-appellees, because it found that the subject properties are
conjugal having been acquired during the marriage of Lauro Sumipat and Placida Tabotabo (Placida).
However, because Placida failed to question the genuineness and due execution of the deed and even
admitted having affixed her signature thereon, the trial court declared that the entirety of the subject
properties, and not just Lauro Sumipat’s conjugal share, were validly transferred to the defendants, the
petitioners herein.
●
Page 43 of 47
● On appeal, the appellate court held that since Placida was unlettered, the appellees, the petitioners herein,
as the parties interested in enforcing the deed, have the burden of proving that the terms thereof were fully
explained to her. This they failed to do.
●
ISSUES: Whether the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has validly
transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners.
RULING: Art. 749 of the Civil Code states that:
"In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall
not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form,
and this step shall be noted in both instruments."
Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until
and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance
may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where
the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else
not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.20
In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate
document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.
NOTES:
25. ELVIRA T. ARANGOTE v. SPS. MARTIN MAGLUNOB AND LOURDES S. MAGLUNOB, GR No.
178906, 2009-02-18 (ALOLOR)
LAW & PRINCIPLES: Article 749 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
Page 44 of 47
FACTS:
● Elvira Arangote acquired the subject parcel of land from Esperanza Maglunob, who is grand aunt of
respondents Martin Maglunob and Romeo Salido. In June 1986, Esperenza executed an affidavit in which
she renounced her rights, share and participation in the land in favor of Elvira and her husband. It appears
that the lot was not exclusive property of Esperanza but also of the other heirs of Martin I whom she
represented in the partition agreement. Elvira and her husband, Ray constructed a house on the land in
1989 and in 1993, OCT was issued in her name by the DAR. However, respondents with the help of hired
persons entered the property and built a wall behind and in front of Elvira’s house. Elvira and Ray sued
respondents for quieting of title and declaration of ownership. Respondents averred that they were co-
owners of the land with Esperanza who allegedly inherited the land from Martin 1 together with Tomas and
Inocencia (Martin 2’s and Romeo’s predecessor in interest). They argued that Esperanza could not have
validly waived her rights in favor of Elvira and Ray. MCTC ruled for Elvira. RTC reversed MCTC and
declared respondents lawful owners of the land together with the other heirs of Martin I. Elvira went to the
CA but the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Before SC, Elvira argued that both RTC and CA erred in declaring
the affidavit of Esperanza void because it is a valid and binding proof of transfer of ownership of the subject
property as it was coupled with actual delivery.
ISSUES: Whether or not the donation to Elvira and her husband is valid.
RULING: Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA. SC ruled that the affidavit executed by Esperanza
wherein she renounced, relinquished and waived all her rights, share, interest and participation in the
subject property in favor of Elvira and Ray is in fact a donation.
It is clear from the records that the subject property was not Esperanza’s exclusive share, but also that of
the other heirs of her father, Martin I. Esperanza expressly affixed her thumbmark to the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of July 1981 not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I. Though in the
Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985 Esperanza affixed her thumbmark without stating that she was
doing so not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, this does not mean that
Esperanza was already the exclusive owner thereof. The evidence shows that the subject property is the
share of the heirs of Martin I. This is clear from the sketch attached to the Partition Agreement dated 29 April
1985, which reveals the proportionate areas given to the heirs of the two siblings, Pantaleon and Placida,
who were the original owners of the whole parcel of land from which the subject property was taken.
Further, it bears emphasis that the Partition Agreement was executed by and among the son, grandsons,
granddaughters and cousins of Victorino. Esperanza was neither the granddaughter nor the cousin of
Victorino, as she was only Victorino’s grandniece. The cousin of Victorino is Martin I, Esperanza’s father. In
effect, therefore, the subject property allotted to Esperanza in the Partition Agreement was not her exclusive
share, as she holds the same for and on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, who was already deceased at
the time the Partition Agreement was made.
To further bolster the truth that the subject property was not exclusively owned by Esperanza, the Affidavit
she executed in favor of petitioner and her husband on 6 June 1985 was worded as follows:
That I hereby renounce, relinquish, waive and quitclaim all my rights, share, interest and participation
whatsoever in the [subject property] unto the said Sps. Ray Mars Arangote and Elvira T. Arangote, their
heirs, successors, and assigns including the improvement found thereon;
Logically, if Esperanza fully owned the subject property, she would have simply waived her rights to and
interest in the subject property, without mentioning her "share" and "participation" in the same. By including
such words in her Affidavit, Esperanza was aware of and was limiting her waiver, renunciation, and quitclaim
to her one-third share and participation in the subject property.
Page 45 of 47
Going to the issues raised by the petitioner in this Petition, this Court will resolve the same concurrently as
they are interrelated.
In this case, the petitioner derived her title to the subject property from the notarized Affidavit executed by
Esperanza, wherein the latter relinquished her rights, share, interest and participation over the same in favor
of the petitioner and her husband.
A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is not what it purports to be. Esperanza’s Affidavit is, in
fact, a Donation. Esperanza’s real intent in executing the said Affidavit was to donate her share in the subject
property to petitioner and her husband.
As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner and her husband under the said Affidavit, the donation
is regarded as a pure donation of an interest in a real property covered by Article 749 of the Civil Code.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
From the aforesaid provision, there are three requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a real
property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a public instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which acceptance may
be made either in the same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3) if the acceptance is
made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified in an authentic form, and the same must be noted
in both instruments.
This Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Affidavit executed by Esperanza
relinquishing her rights, share, interest and participation over the subject property in favor of the petitioner
and her husband suffered from legal infirmities, as it failed to comply with the aforesaid requisites of the
law.
NOTES: In Sumipat v. Banga, this Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the
donor to the donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public
instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument
of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where
the Deed of Donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the Deed of Donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
26. NOCEDA vs CA [G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999], (ALOLOR)
LAW & PRINCIPLES: The acts of Noceda are acts of usurpation which is an offense against the property of
Directo and considered an act of ingratitude of a donee against a donor. The law doesn’t require conviction
of the donee, it is enough that his offense is proved in the action for revocation.
Page 46 of 47
FACTS:
● Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow,
respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo extrajudicially settled a parcel of land located at Bitaog, San Isidro,
Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directo’s share
was 11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square
meters went to Maria Arbizo. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant
Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister, Carolina. However, another extrajudicial
settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo.
Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-
fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121
in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to have an area of only 29,845
square meters.
● Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by plaintiff Directo.
Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated
portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier
constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo
without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter
refused.
● Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before the lower court.
● Trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff Directo ordering the revocation of the donation.
ISSUES: W/N petitioner Noceda’s acts of usurpation constitute an act of ingratitude sufficient to grant the revocation
of the donation?
RULING: YES. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private
respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent
Directo, thus petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latter’s
knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered
as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor.
The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.
NOTES:
Page 47 of 47

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PROPERTY | MBL | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – WEEK 5

DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE

HEIRS OF CIPRIANO REYES: RICARDO REYES, JOSE CALUMPANG, GEOFFREY CALUMPANG,

• Case is a war between relatives.

o Telesfora – 1 child: Valentin

• Cadastral survey was conducted.

4. WON Deed of Quitclaim was not a valid contract (IT WAS)

WON respondents were barred by laches (YES BUT NOT ANYMORE)

WON Deed of Quitclaim was valid (YES. VALID AF)

WON Deed of Quitclaim was not a valid contract (IT WAS)

WON Deed of Quitclaim a donation (NO NOT A DONATION)

PETITIONER: SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST RESPONDENT: NORTHEASTERN MINDANAO

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

1. W/N there is a valid donation to SPUM-SDA. (NO)

1. The alleged donation to petitioners was void.

2. No existence of a de facto corporation. Thus, there was no donation.

In order to qualify as a de facto corporation, the requisites are:

3. SDA-NEMM is the owner of the land. There is a valid sale.

PETITIONER: CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, RESPONDENT:THE COURT OF APPEALS,

● Claiming ownership over Lot 170 and 172 and its

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

1. CIVIL LAW; DONATIONS; INSTRUMENT IS A MERE DECLARATION OF AN INTENTION AND A DESIRE

● Arsenio Seville owned several parcels of land.

RTC Decision (September 19, 1972)

● Affirmed RTC decision.

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

1. DONATIONS; PURE AND CONDITIONAL. —

2. ID.; DONATION TO A MINOR; ACCEPTANCE BY NATURAL GUARDIAN. —

4. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES; DAMAGE ESSENTIAL IN FRAUD; RIGHTS OF HEIRS. —

1. W/N the donation is pure or conditional.

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

PETITIONER: TITO R. LAGAZO RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO CABANLIT

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Hence, supposed revocation had no legal effect.

PETITIONER: ANTONINA CUEVAS RESPONDENT: CRISPULO CUEVAS

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

8. Alejandro v. Geraldez, GR NO. L-33849 , (CABASAG)

- that they are entitled to a one-third share in Lot No.

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

ISSUES: Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa

9. Vita v. Montanano, GR NO. 50553 , (CABASAG)

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:Soledad Montanano, Etanislao Jovellano, Estebana Jovellano, Jose,

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion:

Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion:

Balaqui, et al. v. Dongso:

10. Sicad v. Court of Appeals, GR NO. 125888 , (CABASAG)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

RULING: Yes, the donation is mortis causa.

11. Austria Magat v. Court of Appeals, GR NO. 106755 , (CABASAG)

PETITIONER: Apolinaria RESPONDENT: CA, Florentino Lumubos, Domingo Comia, Teodora

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Hence, the appeal.

RULING: Decision of the CA is affirmed.

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

PETITIONER: Jose M. Cariño RESPONDENT: P. Fernando Ma. Abaya

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

PETITIONER: Central RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals, Remedios Franco, Francisco N. Lopez,

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

16. QUIJADA V. CA, GR NO. 126444, (RUBENECIA)

PETITIONER: ALFONSO QUIJADA, RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS, REGALADO

LAW & PRINCIPLES: