POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER another a superior right which he believes to be

ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.

1. Possession as an owner or holder;
(Art. 525 , NCC)
Carlos acknowledges the sale of the property to the
corporation and in fact promised to deliver the
certificate of title to the corporation upon its obtention.
Possession as an owner
Hence, it cannot be said that her possession
- A possessor in the concept of an owner maybe
since 1996 was under a bona fide claim of
the owner himself or one who claims to be so.
ownership. Under the law, only he who possesses
Possession in the concept of a holder of a
the property under a bona fide claim of ownership
thing or right
is entitled to confirmation of title. Appeal of the
- A lessee or usufructuary are considered as
Republic was GRANTED.
possessors in the concept of a holder with respect
to the thing itself
- By reason of the sale, the applicant was no longer
Considered as possessor in the concept of
in possession of the property in the concept of
an owner with respect to their right over the property
owner. (OCEAN not present)
as lessee or usufructuary thereof.
- The corporation was in possession ,has a bona
fide claim of ownership and is entitled to
Carlos v Republic
confirmation of title.
- Possession was in the concept of a holder
Carlos filed an application for registration of a parcel
of land. She claims to have been in open, continuous,
Bukidnon Doctor’s Hospital v MBTC
exclusive and notorious possession of the property
since 1945. At the time of her application, she alleged
Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital obtained a loan from
that her possession of the property has been for over
MBTC. As security, it mortgaged the parcel of land
fifty years. The trial court granted her application.
on which the hospital stood. Upon default in the
payment of the loan, the said parcels of land were
The Republic appealed. The decision was reversed
extrajudi cially foreclosed and put in a public auction
because at the time when she filed her application for
and were sold to MBTC.
registration, the property had been sold by her mother
In order to continue its business the hospital proposed
to a corporation, and the fact of sale was admitted by
that it would lease the land for a period of three years.
Carlos.
MBTC agreed to the proposal.
It was shown that at the time of her application for
About 20 months after the agreed effectivity date of
titling, possession and occupation of the land in
the lease contract, MBTA asked the hospital to vacate
question did pertain not to her but to the corporation
the leased premises within fifteen days. The hospital
refused, invoking the subsisting lease agreement.
An applicant for titling must have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
By reason of the hospital’s refusal, MBTC filed for Ex
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
Parte Motion for a Writ of Possession. RTC granted
ownership. The applicant must show that she is in
the motion.
actual possession of the property at the time of the
The hospital did not appeal the RTC Decision.
application. Actual possession of a land consists in
Instead, it filed a petition before the Supreme Court
the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
asking whether or not a writ of possession is the
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his
proper remedy for evicting a mortgagor who became
own property.
a lessee of the mortgaged properties after the
mortgagee has consolidated ownership over the
By reason of the sale, the applicant was no longer
properties and was issued new certificates of title.
in possession of the property in the concept of
owner. Even if it were true that she had actual
The law and jurisprudence are clear that in
possession of the land at that time, such possession
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, an order for a
was no longer in the concept of an owner; she was in
writ of possession issues as a matter of course, after
possession in the concept of a holder. One who
the expiration of the redemption period without the
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in
mortgagor exercising the right of redemption, or even
during the redemption period provided a bond is
posted to indemnify the debtor in case the foreclosure
sale is shown to have been conducted without
complying with the requirements of the law or without
the debtor violating the mortgage contract.
The rationale for the ministerial issuance of a writ of
possession is to put the foreclosure buyer in
possession of the property sold without delay, since
the right to possession is founded on ownership of the
property.
Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment
of a right.
By material occupation of a thing, it is not necessary
that the person in possession should be the occupant
of the property; the occupancy can be held by another
in his name.
Thus Articles 524 and 525 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one's own
name or in that of another; and in Art. 525, it says:
The possession of things or rights may be had in one
of two concepts: either in the concept of owner, or in
that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy
it, the ownership pertaining to another person.
In other words, an owner of a real estate has
possession, either when he himself is physically
occupying the property, or when another person who
recognizes his rights as owner is occupying it.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the parties in
this case entered into a contract of lease.
By this new contractual relation the hospital
recognized that possession of the properties had
been legally placed in the hands of MBTC, and that
it had taken such possession but delivered it to the
hospital as lessee of the property.
By paying the monthly rentals, the hospital also
recognized the superior right of the respondent to the
possession of the property as owner thereof. And by
accepting the monthly rentals, the bank enjoyed the
fruits of its possession over the subject property.
Clearly, the bank is in material possession of the
subject premises. Thus, the trial court’s issuance
of a writ of possession is not only superfluous,
but improper under the law.
Moreover, as a lessee, the hospital was a legitimate
possessor of the subject properties under Article 525
of the Civil Code. Thus, it could not be deprived of its
lawful possession by a mere ex parte motion for a writ
of possession.
Where a lease agreement, whether express or
implied, is subsequently entered into by the
mortgagor and the mortgagee after the expiration of
the redemption period and the consolidation of title in
the name of the latter, a case for ejectment or unlawful
detainer, not a motion for a writ of possession, is the
proper remedy in order to evict from the questioned
premises a mortgagor-turned-lessee.
A new relationship between the parties has been
created. What applies is no longer the law on
extrajudicial foreclosure, but the law on lease.
And when an issue arises regarding the right of the
lessee to continue occupying the leased premises,
the rights of the parties must be heard and
resolved in a case for ejectment or unlawful
detainer.
- The rationale for the ministerial issuance of a writ
of possession is to put the foreclosure buyer in
possession of the property sold without delay,
since the right to possession is founded on
ownership of the property.
- The hospital recognizes the superior right of
MBTC by paying the monthly rentals
- MBTC was in material possession of the property,
thus, writ of possession is improper under the law.
- Possession of MBTC was in the concept of an
owner.
- Any issues that arises in the contract of lease are
subject to ejectment or unlawful detainer.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
It is ruled that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of
land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. But this rule applies
only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is
not in possession of the property since if a person
claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of
the property the right to seek reconveyance, which in
effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.
Reyes v CA
Reyes sold to Raymundo, initially, one half of a parcel of
land. A new title was consequently issued by reason of
such sale.
Raymundo used her one-half share as a collateral in
obtaining a loan from GSIS.
In 1969, Reyes sold her remaining interest in the property
to Raymundo and their old title issued replaced by a new
one (TCT No. 149036) in the name of Raymundo.
Since 1967 the house standing on the property was being
leased by the Palacios spouses from Reyes.
But in 1987, Raymungo intervened and claimed
ownership of the entire property as well as of the
existence of a lease contract between her and the
Palacios spouses supposedly dated 17 March 1987 but
retroactive to 1 January 1987.
On 23 August 1987 Reyes filed a complaint against
Raymundo for cancellation of TCT No. 149036 and
reconveyance. Reyes alleged that the sale in 1969 was
simulated since she was merely constrained to execute
the deed without any material consideration pursuant to
an agreement with Raymundo that she will obtain a new
loan from the GSIS for the construction of an apartment.
But should the loan fail to materialize, Raymundo would
reconvey the property subject of the second sale to
Reyes. After she learned that the loan was disapproved
she repeatedly asked Raymundo for reconveyance but to
no avail. Their true agreement was embodied in a private
writing dated 10 January 1970.
The trial court found that the second deed of sale was
indeed simulated since despite its execution Raymundo
allowed Reyes to exercise ownership over the property by
collecting rentals from the Palacio spouses until
December 1986. It was only in 1987 that Raymundo
asserted ownership thereof.
The CA, however, ruled that as between a notarized deed
of sale earlier executed and the 1970 agreement
contained in a private writing, the former prevailed. It also
found that Reyes's cause of action had prescribed since
the complaint should have been filed either within ten
years from 1969 as an action to recover title to real
property, or within ten years from 1970 as an action based
on a written contract.
The Supreme Court ruled that in the case of Heirs of Jose
Olviga v. Court of Appeals, it ruled that an action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed or
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over
the property. But this rule applies only when the
plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in
possession of the property since if a person claiming
to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property the right to seek reconveyance, which in
effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.
Actual possession of land consists in acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as those a party would naturally
exercise over his own property. It is not necessary that
the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy
the property as someone in his name may perform the
act. The owner of real estate has possession, either
when he himself is physically in occupation of the
property, or when another person who recognizes his
rights as owner is in such occupancy.
In a lease agreement, the lessor merely transfers the
temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased. The
Palacios spouses have been the lessees of Reyes since
1967. Thus, Reyes was in actual possession of the
property through the Palacioses and remained so
even after the execution of the second deed of sale. It
was only in 1987, when Raymundo asserted ownership
over the property that Reyes’ possession was disturbed.
Consequently, the action for reconveyance filed a couple
of months later has not prescribed.
The SC also held that the second deed of sale was
simulated. It is true that as between a public
document and a private document, the former
prevails. But in one case, the SC ruled that although
the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests
in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the
intention or the function of the notary public to
validate and make binding an instrument that did not
intend to have any binding legal effect upon the
parties thereto. The intention of the parties still is and
always will be the primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract which in the
present case was contained in the agreement of 10
January 1970.
Moreover, the fact that Raymundo was able to secure a
title in her name did not operate to vest ownership upon
her of the property. The SC has already ruled that the act
has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership. The Torrens system does not create or vest
title. It only confirms and records title already existing and
vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner.
It cannot be a shield for the commission of fraud. It does
not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another.
Where one does not have any rightful claim over a real
property, the Torrens system of registration can
confirm or record nothing.
 - Sale was simulated
- Reconveyance of a parcel of land based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years (only applies if the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property; If the plaintiff asking
for reconveyance is in actual possession of the
property and seeks for quieting of title to the
property, does not prescribe.)
- In lease agreement, the lessor merely transfer
temporarily use and enjoyment of the thing
leased. Reyes was in actual possession of the
property through the palacioses as their lessees.
- Possession in the name of another
- Torrens system does not create or vest title. It
does not protect the usurper from the true owner.
- Notarization is for the presumption of regularity
but does not determine the intention of the
contracting parties.
ARTICLE 624
Provides for acquisition of easement by title through the
operation of law.
Article 624 of the Civil Code reads:
x x x. The existence of an apparent sign
of easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered,
should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that
the easement may continue actively and passively,
unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates
is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the
deed. This provision shall also apply’ in case of the
division of a thing owned in common by two or
more persons.
This Article contemplates of a situation where an estate
belonged previously to one person. If one of the estates
was alienated, resulting in the division of the property, but
prior to the division, an apparent sign of an easement was
present, an easement is created by way of title upon the
division of the two estates, unless at the time of the
division of the ownership, the contrary should be provided
in the title of conveyance; or the apparent sign should be
removed before the execution of the deed.
ALIENATION BY SAME OWNER OF TWO ESTATES
WITH SIGN OF EXISTENCE OF SERVITUDE
For the acquisition of easement by title under Art. 624, the
following should concur:
1. That there exists an apparent sign of servitude
between the two estates;
2. That at the time of the establishment of such sign, the
ownership of the two estates resided in one person
3. That the sign of the easement was established by the
owner of both estates;
4. That the ownership over the two estates is later
divided, either by alienation or partition
5. That at the time of the division of ownership, nothing is
stated in the document that is contrary to the easement,
nor is the sign of the easement removed before the
execution of the document.
GARGATOS V TAN YANON
Sanz was the owner of a parcel of land which he
subdivided into several lots. One lot, which had a house
thereon, was sold to Tan Yanon, another, with a
warehouse and a small building thereon, was sold to
Gargantos.
The house purchased by Yanon’s house had doors and
windows over-looking the parcel of land acquired by
Gargantos.
Sometime after the purchase by Gargantos, he asked for
a permit from the Municipal Council to construct a
combined residential house and warehouse on his lot.
Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application and filed
an action to restrain Gargantos from constructing a
building that would prevent him from receiving light and
enjoying the view through the window of his house. He
will withdraw his objection if the building is erected at a
distance of not less than three meters from the boundary
line between their lots.
Has Tan Yanon acquired an easement of light and view
against the property of Gargantos?
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, pursuant to
Art. 624 of the Civil Code.
The two estates in this case, that now owned by
Gargantos, and that owned by Tan Yanon, were formerly
owned by just one person, Sanz. It was Sanz who
introduced improvements on both properties. The
windows and doors in the house of Tan Yanon were in
existence when Tan Yanon purchased the house and lot
from Sanz. The deed sale did not provide that the
easement of light and view would not be established.
This then is the case covered by Article 624 which
provides that the existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established by the
proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is
alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue
actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership
of the two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the
deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to
disappear before the instrument is executed.
The existence of the doors and windows on the
northeastern side of Tan Yanon, is equivalent to a title, for
the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title
that characterizes its existence. Thus, by reason of his
easement Gargatos cannot construct on his land any
building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than
three meters from the boundary line separating the two
estates.
AMOR V FLORENTINO
It appears that over 50 years ago, Maria Florentino owned
a house and a warehouse. The house had, on the north
side, three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one
on the ground floor. Through these windows the house
receives light and air from the lot where the warehouse
stands.
Maria Florentino made a will, devising the house and the
land on which it is situated to her nephew Gabriel
Florentino.
In said will, the Maria also devised the warehouse and the
lot where it is situated to Maria Encarnacion Florentino.
Upon the death of the testatrix, nothing was said or done
by the devisees in regard to the windows in question.
Maria Encarnacion Florentino sold her lot and the
warehouse thereon to Severo Amor, the deed of sale
stating that the vendor had inherited the property from her
aunt, Maria Florentino.
After the sale, Amor destroyed the old warehouse and
started to build a two-story house. The Florentinos filed
an action to prohibit Amor from building higher than the
original structure and from executing any work which
would shut off the light and air that had for many years
been received through the four windows referred to. The
lower court denied the petition.
The Supreme Court held that the existence of the
apparent sign, to wit, the four windows under
consideration, had the same character and effect as a title
of acquisition of the easement of light and view by
Florentino upon the death of the original owner.
Upon the establishment of that easement, the
concomitant easement was also constituted on the
warehouse and its lot, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, not
having objected to the existence of the windows.
The existence of the apparent sign is equivalent to a title,
when nothing to the contrary is said or done by the two
owners. There is an implied contract created between
them that the easements in question should be
constituted.
Easements are established by law or by will of the owners.
Acquisition of easements is can be by title. What acts take
the place of title? They can be (1) a deed of recognition
by the owner of the servient estate; (2) a final judgment;
and (3) an apparent sign between two estates,
established by the owner of both.
When Amor bought this lot from the original coheir, the
windows on Florentino’s house were visible. It was Amor's
duty to inquire into the significance of those windows.
Having failed to do so, he cannot now question the
easement against the property which he purchased.
Amor was not an innocent purchaser, as he was in duty
bound to inquire into the significance of the windows.
Justice and public policy are on the side of the
Florentinos.
Can a notice of adverse claim interrupt the running of
prescription ?
The execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did
not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial
determination of its judicial validity. What existed was
merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article
1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no action
was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As
a consequence, no judicial summons was received by
respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its
affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse
Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which
produces the civil interruption provided for under the law.
In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt
respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period
of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in
respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse
Claim. (G.R. No. 175763. Aoril 11,2012)
For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit
any right. Just title must be proved for purposes of
prescription; it is never presumed.
INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair
price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any
notice of another person’s claim.

Good faith is satisfied with the concurrence of the
following:
1. The seller is the registered owner of the land;
2. He is in possession thereof;
3. At the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any
claim or interest of some other person in the property, or
of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his
capacity to convey title to the property.
A PURCHASER WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECT
OF HIS VENDOR’S TITLE CANNOT CLAIM GOOD
FAITH.
A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should
put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that
he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor.
His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his
willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence
of a defect in his vendor’s title will not make him an
innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that
the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had
such notice of the defect as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution
which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a
like situation.
PURCHASER CHARGED ONLY WITH NOTICE OF
LIENS NOTED ON THE TITLE..
A person dealing with registered land is only charged with
notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on
the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require
him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of
the Torrens system.
But there are exceptions to this rule.
When a person has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry, a prudent man would proceed
with such inquiry,
One who purchases real property which is in the actual
possession of others should at least make some inquiry
concerning the rights of those in possession.
THE “MIRROR DOCTRINE”
The doctrine provides that every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged
to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of
the property.
Every registered owner and every subsequent purchaser
for value in food faith holds the title to the property free
from all encumbrances except those noted in the
certificate. As such, a defective title or one the
procurement of which is tainted with fraud and
misrepresentation may be the source of a completely
legal an valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent
third person, or an innocent purchaser for value, who, in
good faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of
title.
.LOCSIN V HIZON
Enriqueta M. Locsin was the registered owner of a parcel
of land. In 1992, she filed an ejectment case against one
Billy Aceron to recover possession over the land in issue.
Eventually, the two entered into a compromise
agreement, which the MTC approved on August 6, 1993.
Locsin went to the United States without knowing whether
Aceron has complied with his part of the bargain under
the compromise agreement. In spite of her absence,
however, she continued to pay the real property taxes on
the subject lot.
In 1994, after discovering that her copy of the title to her
land was missing, Locsin filed a petition for administrative
reconstruction in order to secure a new one. She was
then issued TCT No. RT-97467.
Sometime in early 2002, she then requested her counsel
to check the status of the subject lot.
It was then that they discovered that one Marylou Bolos
had TCT No. RT-97467 cancelled on February 11, 1999,
and then secured a new one, TCT No. N-200074, in her
favor by registering a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 3, 1979 allegedly executed by Locsin; Bolos
later sold the subject lot to Bernardo Hizon. Bernardo had
it titled under the name of his son Carlos Hizon. On
October, 1999, Bernardo filed a Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the court-
approved compromise agreement in the earlier Civil Case
filed by Locsin against Aceron. Finally, the property was
already up for sale.
Locsin requested for the return of the property since her
signature in the purported deed of sale in favor of Bolos
was a forgery. Carlos insisted he was an innocent
purchaser for value but discussed the possibility of a
compromise and promised to come up with a win-win
situation for all of them; only that he instead sold the
property to his sister and had a new certificate of title
issued in their names. The sister then mortgaged the said
property.
The Supreme Court stated that an innocent purchaser
for value is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to
or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at
the time of the purchase or before receiving any
notice of another person’s claim.
As such, a defective title–– or one the procurement of
which is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation––may
be the source of a completely legal and valid title,
provided that the buyer is an innocent third person
who, in good faith, relied on the correctness of the
certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for value.
The mirror doctrine echoes the doctrinal rule that every
person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is
in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine
the condition of the property.
The Court found that Hizon was not a innocent purchaser
for value. He knew of the compromise agreement
between Locsin and Aceron, which was entered into by
the parties before Bolos had the property titled in her
name and before she sold it to Hizon.
If Bolos already acquired ownership of the property before
the compromise agreement, Hizon should have wondered
why it was Locsin who entered into a compromise
agreement with Aceron and not Bolos. It should have
struck Hizon as odd that it was Locsin, not Bolos, who filed
the ejectment case against Aceron, and entered into a
compromise agreement with Aceron years after the
alleged sale by Locsin in Bolos’ favor.
The Supreme Court also ruled that Hizon’s sister was not
a purchaser for value.
The fact that they are siblings renders incredible the
argument that Lourdes had no knowledge whatsoever of
Locsin’s claim of ownership at the time of the purported
sale.
The fact that Lourdes was not an owner in good faith and
for value of the lot is further made manifest by her lack of
interest in protecting her claim over the property.
POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH
Possessor in Good Faith – if he is not aware
that there exist in his title or mode of acquisition
any flaw which invalidates it.
Requisites for possession in good faith
1. The possessor as a title or mode of
acquisition;
2. There is flaw or defect in the title or mode of
acquisition which invalidates it;
3. The possessor is unaware of the flaw or
defect, or he believes that the thing belongs
to him.
Florentino v Supervalue
Florentino was engaged in the retail of empanada
with outlets in different malls and business
establishments within Metro Manila. Supervalue
was engaged in the business of leasing stalls and
commercial store spaces located inside SM Malls
found all throughout the country.
Due to several infractions of their lease contract,
Supervalue refused to renew its Contracts of
Lease with Florentino. It also took possession of
the store space and confiscated Florentino’s
equipment and personal belongings found therein
after the expiration of the lease contract.
Florentino filed a case for Specific Performance,
Sum of Money and Damages against
Supervalue.
Supervalue, on its part, alleged that Florentino
committed several violations of the terms of their
Contracts of Lease by not opening from on certain
dates, and by introducing a new variety of
empanada without their prior consent, as
mandated by the Contract of Lease.
Florentino also frequently closes earlier than the
agreed closing hours.
Supervalue claimed that the seizure of
Florentino’s personal belongings and equipment
was in the exercise of its retaining lien,
considering that the she failed to settle the said
obligations up to the time the complaint was filed.
When the case went up to the Supreme Court,
one of the issues was whether or not Supervalue
is liable to reimburse Florentino for the sum of the
improvements she introduced in the leased
premises.
Court said: in Geminiano v. Court of Appeals, this
Court was emphatic in declaring that lessees are
not possessors or builders in good faith. Being
mere lessees, they know that their occupation of
the premises would continue only for the life of
 the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as
possessors nor builders in good faith.
It has been held that Article 448 of the Civil Code,
in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which
allows full reimbursement of useful improvements
and retention of the premises until reimbursement
is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he
is the owner thereof. It does not apply where
one's only interest is that of a lessee under a
rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in
the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord
out of his property.
Since Florentino’s interest in the store space
is merely that of the lessee under the lease
contract, she cannot therefore be considered
a builder in good faith.
Consequently, Supervalue may appropriate
the improvements introduced on the leased
premises without any obligation to reimburse
the Florentino for the sum expended. Every
improvement he introduced to the property
was done so at his own risk.
- Lessees are not possessors or builders in good
faith. Their occupation is of the premises will only
continue for the life of the lease.
- Reimbursement only applies to possessors in
good faith. It does not apply where one’s interest
is that of a lessee under a rental contract.
- Florentino was only a lessee
- Supervalue may appropriate the introduced on
the leased premises without any obligation to
reimburse the petitioner for the sum expended.
Rivera v Trinidad
The property subject matter of this case was a
parcel of land which was owned by Dolores.
Maximo Trinidad entered the lot with Dolores’
consent. On the land, Maximo constructed a
building which he used for repairing and tuning
pianos. At the time Maximo built his shop, the
parties had a harmonious relationship that no
written contract was executed to define the rights
of Maximo. But over a year later, a
misunderstanding arose between Dolores and
the wife of Maximo.
Dolores filed a case of unlawful detainer against
Maximo. The case was hotly contested by
Maximo. There were those who advised Dolores
that the action would have better success if the
property should be transferred to some other
person, who, as purchaser, will exercise the
power of terminating the lease . So Dolores sold
the property to Rivera and a new Torrens
certificate was issued to Rivera.
Believing that the sale of the property from
Dolores to Rivera, her nephew was a simulated
one, Trinidad raised the issue of whether the
court had jurisdiction of an action in which a
purchaser seeks to oust a tenant under the
conditions existing in this case. The issue went
up to the Supreme Court where the court ruled
that the lower court had jurisdiction.
The court ruled that Rivera is merely
proceeding in the character of owner, to
recover possession from a tenant holding
over after the termination of the right to hold
possession. When attention is given to this point
it is quite clear that the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment. So far as this case is concerned it
is wholly immaterial whether the plaintiff has
paid anything for the lot or not; and the
supposed collusion between him and Dolores
is likewise without significance.
The plaintiff is declared to be entitled to
possession of the lot in question.
Rivera, being the new owner of the property, is
entitled to possession; Maximo, as lessee, merely
possesses the property as a holder.
- Sale was simulated
- Rivera is merely proceeding in the character of
owner, to recover possession from tenant holding
over after the termination of the right to hold
possession.
- Rivera, being the new owner of the property, is
entitle to possession, even if there is supposed
collusion or if he had paid or not has no
significance, since he is still the new owner and
has the right to file for unlawful detainer; Maximo,
as lessee, merely possess the property as a
holder.
Wong v CA
Manuel acquired his right to possess the land in
litigation from William Giger by virtue of a deed of
sale with right to repurchase executed in 1972.
Since then Manuel began harvesting coconut
fruits and he paid the taxes on the land. He went
periodically to the land to make copra but he
never placed any person on the land in litigation
to watch it. Neither did he reside on the land as
he has business elsewhere. Neither did he put
any sign or hut to show that he is in actual
possession.
He knew that there laborers of Wong were in the
land as early as August, 1976 and that they have
a hut there but he did not do anything to stop
them. Instead he was happy that there were
people and a hut on the land.
Before July, 1976, Wong went to the land in
litigation to find out if there were other people
residing there or claiming it besides the owner.
He found none. So on the said month, he bought
the parcel of land from William, the same person
from whom Manuel bought the land.
After the execution of the deed of sale, Wong
asked for the delivery of the title to him and it was
so given. Mr. Wong declared the land in suit for
taxation purposes in his name. He tried to register
the pacto de retro sale with the Register of Deeds
by paying the registration fee but due to some
technicalities, the pacto de retro sale could not be
registered. He placed laborers on the land, built a
small farm house and also placed signboards.
On September 27, 1976, Manuel went to the land
to make copras.
On November 18, 1976, when Wong ordered the
harvest of the coconuts from the land, nobody
disturbed him. It was on November 29, 1976, that
he received a copy of Manuel's complaint for
forcible entry with summons to answer which is
the case now before the Court.
The MTC found that Wong had prior, actual and
continuous physical possession of the disputed
property and dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the RTC ruled in favor of Manuel. Wong
appealed but since the issue was on pure
question of law, the CA certified the case to the
SC.
The SC ruled that the execution of a sale thru a
public instrument shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing. If, however, despite the
execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot
have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the
thing and make use of it herself, because such
tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another,
then delivery has not been effected.
In this case, it is clear that possession first passed
from vendor William to Manuel by virtue of the first
sale a retro, and accordingly, the later sale a retro
in favor of Wong failed to pass the possession of
the property because there is an impediment —
the possession exercised by Manuel.
The act of entering the property and excluding the
lawful possessor therefrom, necessarily implies
the exertion of force over the property, hence the
validity of the complaint for Forcible Entry.
One of the issues raised in Wong’s appeal is the
validity of the Decision which orders him to pay a
monthly rental from August, 1976 until the
property is returned.
Wong argued that there is no legal or factual
basis for the payment of monthly rentals because
bad faith on his part was never proved.
While Wong is correct that possession acquired
in good faith does not lose this character,
such good faith, however, ceases from the
moment facts exist which show that the
possessor is not unaware that he possesses
the thing improperly or wrongfully. (Art. 528,
Civil Code).
Possession in good faith ceases from the
moment defects in the title are made known to
the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by
suit for recovery of the property by the true
owner.
Whatever may be the cause or the fact from
which it can be deduced that the possessor has
knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of
acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to
show bad faith. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil.
Vol. II, p. 226).
Such interruption takes place upon service of
summons.
A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits
only so long as his possession is not legally
interrupted, and such interruption takes place
upon service of judicial summons (Arts. 544 and
1123, Civil Code).
 A perusal of the records of the case shows that
Wong received Manuel's complaint for forcible
entry with summons on November 29, 1976. His
good faith therefore ceased on November
29,1976. Accordingly, the computation of the
payment of monthly rental should start from
December, 1976.
- The execution of sale through public instrument
shall be equivalent to the delivery of a thing.
- Good Faith ceases from the moment facts exist
which show that the possessor is not aware that
he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully
or form the moment that facts in the title are made
known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence
or by suit for recovery of the property by the true
owner.
DELIVERY OR TRADITION
Distinction between Mode and Title
A mode is the legal means by which dominion or
ownership is created, transferred or destroyed; title is only
the legal basis by which to affect dominion or ownership.
For example, in a Contract of Sale of a laptop between A
and B. The Contract of Sale is the title that will serve as
the basis for the transfer of ownership. The transfer of
ownership will be done through delivery or
tradition. The delivery or tradition is the mode of acquiring
ownership
Mode and title may be distinguished as follows:
1. A mode requires not only the intention to acquire but
also either a right previously vested over the thing on the
part of the person who makes the transmission or the
special condition or state of the thing to be transferred;
whereas title requires mere intention;
2. A mode directly and immediately produces a real right;
a title merely serves as a means and a pretext to that
acquisition;
3. Mode creates a real right; title creates merely a
personal right.
Contracts, under our laws, only constitute titles or rights
to the transfer or acquisition of ownership. Delivery or
tradition is the mode of accomplishing
the same. Ownership is transferred not by contract alone
but by delivery. The delivery of the thing constitutes a
necessary and indispensable
requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the
same by virtue of a contract.
As such, in relation to the acquisition and transfer of
ownership, it should be noted that sale is not a mode, but
is merely a title. Sale by itself does not
transfer or affect ownership; the most that sale does is to
create the obligation to transfer ownership. It is tradition
or delivery, as a consequence of sale, that actually
transfers ownership.
Tradition or delivery refers to the transfer of possession
accompanied by an intention to transfer ownership or
other real rights. In order that there be
tradition, the following requisites must be present:
1. pre-existence of the right to be transmitted in the estate
of the grantor;
2. just cause or title for the transmission, such as sale;
3. intention on the part of the grantor to grant, and on the
part of the grantee to acquire;
4. capacity to transmit on the part of the grantor; and
capacity to acquire on the part of the grantee;
5. an act which gives it outward form, physically or
symbolically or legally. tracts
As a consequence of these principles, it is a rule that
ownership can never pass by the bare delivery of the thing
(example, for safekeeping, or by way of
loan for use).No delivery can be tradition unless it is
accompanied by an intention to transfer ownership, or an
intention which is expressed, as a rule, by some
juristic act which precedes the tradition.
Hence, in all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act
of delivery, whether constructive or actual, should be
coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. The act,
without the intention, is insufficient.
The critical factor in the different modes of affecting
delivery which gives legal effect to the act, is the actual
intention of the vendor to deliver, and its
acceptance by the vendee.
Norkis Distributor, Inc. v CA 193 SCRA 694
Alberto Nepales bought from Norkis Distributors, Inc. a
brand-new Yamaha motorcycle payable by a means of
Letter of Guaranty from the Development Bank of the
Philippines. As security, Alberto executed a chattel
mortgage on the motorcycle in favor of DBP. To facilitate
the mortgage, Norkis Distributors issued a sales invoice
in favor of Albert. Further, the motorcycle was also
registered with the Land Transportation Office in the
name of Alberto. The motorcycle was delivered to a
certain Julian Nepales who allegedly was an agent of
Alberto. But Alberto denied that Nepales was his agent.
Norkis Distributor, Inc. v CA In the possession of Julian
Nepales, the motorcycle met an accident which resulted
to its total wreck.
Meanwhile, DBP released the loan proceeds to Norkis
Distributors, which prompted Alberto to demand the
delivery of the motorcycle. When Norkis Distributor could
not deliver, Alberto filed an action for specific
performance.
Norkis Distributor put up the defense that the motorcycle
had been delivered already. After trial, the RTC ruled in
favor of Alberto. The decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Norkis Distributor filed a Petition before the Supreme
Court averring that the motorcycle had been delivered as
evidenced by the issuance of the Sales Invoice and
registration of the motorcycle under the name of Alberto.
Is Norkis correct?
The Supreme Court ruled that the act of delivery, whether
constructive or actual, must be coupled with the delivery
of the thing, without which the act is insufficient.
When the motorcycle was registered by Norkis in the
name of private respondent, Norkis did not intend yet to
transfer the title or ownership to Nepales, but only to
facilitate the execution of a chattel mortgage in favor of
the DBP for the release of the buyer's motorcycle loan.
The Letter of Guarantee issued by the DBP, reveals that
the execution in its favor of a chattel mortgage over the
purchased vehicle is a pre-requisite for the approval of the
buyer's loan. If Norkis would not accede to that
arrangement, DBP would not approve private
respondent's loan application and, consequently, there
would be no sale.
The critical factor which gives legal effect to the act is the
actual intention of the vendor to deliver, and its
acceptance by the vendee. Without that intention, there is
no tradition.
The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to
deliver the thing sold. The thing is considered to be
delivered when it is "placed in the hands and possession
of the vendee." (Civil Code, Art. 1462). It is true that the
same article declares that the execution of a public
instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which
is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic
delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary
that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing
sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery
could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon
the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession.
The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there
is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold
passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will
of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of
a public instrument is sufficient.
But if notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the
purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material
tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through
another in his name, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another
will, then fiction yields to reality-the delivery has not taken
effect.
The Civil Code provides that the thing sold remain at the
seller’s risk until ownership thereof is transferred to the
buyer, in the absence of an express assumption of risk by
the buyer, for there was neither an actual or constructive
delivery of the thing.
Therefore, Norkis should bear the loss.
Kinds of tradition:
1. Real tradition
2. Constructive tradition
3. Quasi-tradition
4. Tradition by operation of law
1. Real tradition is by delivery or transfer of a thing from
hand to hand if it is movable, or by certain material and
possessory acts of the grantee performed in the presence
and with the consent of the grantor if it is immovable.
Real tradition, which is the physical or actual delivery,
takes place when the thing is placed in the control and
possession of the grantee
2. Constructive tradition is by delivery of a movable or
immovable thing by means of acts or signs thereof. The
change of possession or delivery is not materially visible.
Delivery may exist even when the change of possession
is not actual or material but represented by other signs or
acts indicative thereof.
Constructive delivery may take place in the following
ways:
a. Traditio symbolica is by delivery of a symbol
representing the thing which is delivered, such as the key
to a warehouse.
b. Traditio longa manu by the grantor pointing out to the
grantee the thing which is delivered which at the time must
be withing sight..
c. Traditio brevi manu is when the grantee is already in
possession of the thing under a title which is not of
ownership, such as when the lessee purchases from the
lessor the object of the lease. In this
case, a mere declaration on the part of the grantor that
the grantee shall now hold the thing which is already in
his control and possession, as owner, operates as a form
of delivery.
d. Traditio constitutum possessorium by the grantor
alienates a thing belonging to him, but continues in
possession thereof under a different title, such as that of
a lessee, pledgee or depositary. Delivery is effected by
the mere declaration on the part of the transferor that he
will hold the thing for the transferee.
While it may appear in tradicio longa manu, tradicio brevi
manu and tradicio constitutum possessorium that the
transfer of ownership is brough about by a mere
declaration of consent, this declaration effects a change
in the physical control of the thing.
There should be a change in the actual possession of the
thing and it is only through the medium of this change that
the transfer of ownership is accomplished.
In tradicio brevi manu, for example, the grantee, by
purchasing the thing leased, acquires a different power
over the thing from that which he had before.
3. Quasi-tradicion is used to indicate the exercise of a
right by the grantee with the acquiescence of the grantor,
such as delivery which may be made by the execution of
a public instrument with respect to incorporeal property.
(See Art. 1501)
4. Tradicion por ministerio de la ley or is delivery which
takes place by operation of law, such as by the
registration of a deed of transfer of titled land which is also
the operative act in order to bind
innocent persons in such deeds.
Execution of a public instrument:
The execution of a public instrument is recognized by law
as equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract. Under the Law on Sales, the
execution of a public instrument of sale is equivalent to
the delivery of the thing sold. It has been held, however,
that the execution of a contract of sale as
a form of constructive delivery is but a legal fiction. It holds
true only then there is no legal impediment that may
prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the
vendor into those of the vendee.
When there is such an impediment, fiction yields to reality
– the delivery has not been effected.
The execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a
prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is
destroyed when the instrument itself expresses or implies
that delivery was not intended, or if by other means, it is
shown that such delivery was not effected, because a
third person was actually in possession of the
thing.
EQUATORIAL REALTY v MAYFAIR
Carmelo owned a parcel of land on which a two-storey
building stood. On June 1, 1967, Carmelo entered into a
Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater. The lease was
for a period of 20 years. Two years later, on March 31,
1969, Mayfair entered into a second Contract of Lease
with Carmelo for the lease of another portion of the latter's
property, likewise for a period of 20 years. Both leases
contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first
refusal to purchase the subject properties.
However, on July 30, 1978. Carmelo sold the properties
to Equatorial Realty for the total sum of P11,300,000,
without their first being offered to Mayfair.
As a result of the sale to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a
Complaint for (a) the annulment of the Deed of Absolute
Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, (b) specific
performance, and (c) damages. After trial, the lower court
decided in favor of Carmelo and Equatorial. This case
reached the Supreme Court, where it was entitled
"Mayfair" Theater, Inc. v. Carmelo Inc., et al.,“ and
docketed as Civil Case No. 118019.
At the Supreme Court, the SC rescinded the Deed of Sale
between Equatorial and Carmelo; Carmelo was ordered
to return to Equatorial the purchase price; and Equatorial
was directed to execute the deeds and documents
necessary to return ownership of the disputed lots to
Carmelo.
Carmelo was ordered to allow Mayfair Theater, Inc. to buy
the aforesaid lots for P11,300,000.00."
The Decision became final and executory on March 17,
1997.
On April 25, 1997, Mayfair filed a Motion for Execution,
which the trial court granted.
But Carmelo could no longer be found.
Still, following the order of execution of the trial court,
Mayfair deposited with the clerk of court its payment to
Carmelo.
The lower court issued a Deed of Reconveyance in favor
of Carmelo and a Deed of Sale in favor of Mayfair.
On the basis of these documents, the Registry of Deeds
of Manila cancelled Equatorial's titles and issued new
Certificates of Title in the name of Mayfair.
Barely five months after Mayfair had submitted its Motion
for Execution Equatorial filed an action for the
collection of a sum of money against Mayfair,
claiming payment of rentals or reasonable
compensation for Mayfair's use of the subject
premises after its lease contracts had expired.
In its Complaint, Equatorial alleged among other things
that the Lease Contract covering the premises occupied
by Maxim Theater expired on May 31, 1987, while the
Lease Contract covering the premises occupied by
Miramar Theater lapsed on March 31, 1989.
Representing itself as the owner of the subject
premises by reason of the Contract of Sale it had with
Carmelo on July 30, 1978, it claimed rentals arising
from Mayfair's occupation thereof.
Is Mayfair liable to pay rentals to Equatorial?
The Supreme Court ruled that no right of ownership was
transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial in view of a patent
failure to deliver the property to Equatorial.
Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the
property producing it by right of accession.
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer
acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him "in any of
the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee.“
This right is transferred, not merely by contract, but also
by tradition or delivery. And there is said to be delivery if
and when the thing sold "is placed in the control and
possession of the vendee."
Thus, it has been held that while the execution of a public
instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to
the delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or
symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemed
negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold.
Delivery is an act by which one party parts with the title to
and the possession of the property, and the other acquires
the right to and the possession of the same. In its natural
sense, delivery means something in addition to the
delivery of property or title; it means transfer of
possession. In the Law on Sales, delivery may be either
actual or constructive, but both forms of delivery
contemplate "the absolute giving up of the control and
custody of the property on the part of the vendor, and the
assumption of the same by the vendee."
In this case, Equatorial never took actual control and
possession of the property sold, in view of Mayfair’s timely
objection to the sale and the continued actual possession
of the property.
The objection took the form of a court action impugning
the sale which was rescinded by a judgment rendered by
this Court in the mother case. It has been held that the
execution of a contract of sale as a form of constructive
delivery is a legal fiction. It holds true only when there is
no impediment that may prevent the passing of the
property from the hands of the vendor into those of the
vendee. When there is such impediment, "fiction yields to
reality — the delivery has not been effected."
Hence, Mayfair's opposition to the transfer of the property
by way of sale to Equatorial was a legally sufficient
impediment that effectively prevented the passing of the
property into the latter's hands.
The sale to Equatorial may have been valid from
inception, but it was judicially rescinded before it could be
consummated. Equatorial never acquired ownership, not
because the sale was void but because the sale was not
consummated by a legally effective delivery of the
property sold.
Ownership of the property not having been transferred to
Equatorial, it does not have the right to collect rent from
Mayfair.
ARTICLE 748 & 749
Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally
or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the
thing or of the document representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five
thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall
be made in writing, otherwise, the donation shall be void.
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may
be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not
take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the
donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments
IMPORTANCE OF THE DISTINCTION
It is important as the validity or revocation of the donation
depends upon its nature.
If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and
accepted with the formalities described in Art. 748 and
749 of the Civil Code, except for onerous donation, in
which case the rules on contracts will apply.
If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a
will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills. If these
are not complied with, the donation is void and cannot
transfer ownership.
FORMALITIES IN DONATION:
A donation is a solemn contract which requires form for
purposes of validity. If the formalities required in Art. 748
and 749 are not followed, the donation shall be void.
The formalities set in Art. 748 and 749 are applicable only
to donations inter vivos and to simple and remuneratory
donation. The two articles do not apply to transfer mortis
causa because donations mortis causa are governed by
the formalities for the validity of wills.
Donations propter nuptias are also governed by Art. 748
and 749.
Form of Donation of Personal Property:
Donation of personal property may be made either orally
or in writing. If the value of the property does not exceed
five thousand, the donation may be made orally but there
must be simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the
document representing the right donated.
If there is no simultaneous delivery, the donation is void.
If the donation is in writing, there is no requirement of
simultaneous delivery and the law does not require that
the acceptance must also be in writing.
DONATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
If the value of the personal property to be donated does
not exceed 5K and the donation is made in writing, the
acceptance may be made either orally or in writing,
expressly or tacitly, and without need of simultaneous
delivery.
If the value of the personal property exceeds 5K, both the
donation and the acceptance must be in writing, otherwise
the donation shall be void.
The donation and acceptance must be in a document,
which may be private or public. It need not be in a single
document. Hence, the acceptance may be made in a
separate instrument and such fact nee not be noted in
both instruments of donation and acceptance.
Form of donation of real property:
Requisites for a valid simple donation of real property:
1. It must be made in a public instrument, regardless of
the value of the real property;
2. It must be accepted, which acceptance may be made
either in the same Deed of Donation or in a separate
public instrument;
3. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
donor must be notified in an authentic form, and the same
must be noted in both instruments.
All of these requisites must be complied with, otherwise
the donation shall be void.
Art. 749 further requires that the real property donated
and the value of the charges which the donee is required
to satisfy must be specified in a deed of donation.
The charges referred to are the burdens, which must be
inferior in value to the property donated. These charges
are required to be specified in the deed of donation for the
purpose of determining the true amount of the donation.
If the charges are equal to or more than the value of the
property donated, the donation is, in reality, a contract,
and as such, will be governed by the law on contracts.
Where the Deed of Donation fails to show the acceptance,
or where the formal notice of acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or
else is not noted in the Deed of Donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
If the notification and notation are not complied with, the
donation is void.
REGISTRATION NOT NECESSARY FOR VALIDITY OF
DONATION
It is enough, between the parties to a donation of an
immovable property, that the donation be made in a public
instrument, but in order to bind third persons, the donation
must be registered in the Registry of Property.
Such registration is not, however, necessary for the
donation to be considered valid.
As between the parties to the donation and their assigns,
the registration of the deed of donation with the Register
of Deeds is not needed for validity and efficacy.
Shopper’s v Roque
Efren P. Roque, one of the sons of Dr. Felipe Roque,
alleged that on Dec. 26, 1978, his parents executed in his
favor a deed of donation inter vivos over a parcel of land.
The donation was made in a public instrument duly
acknowledged by the donor-spouses before a notary
public and duly accepted on the same day by their son
Efren before the notary public in the same instrument. The
title to the property, however, remained in the name of Dr.
Roque, and it was only transferred to and in the name of
Efren sixteen years later, or on 11 May 1994.
This parcel of land, on Dec. 23, 1993, became the subject
of a 25-year contract of lease between Shopper’s
Paradise Realty & Development Corp., and Dr. Roque, for
which a downpayment was made by Shopper’s.
Simultaneously, Shopper’s and Dr. Roque likewise
entered into a memorandum of agreement for the
construction, development and operation of a commercial
building complex on the property. Conformably with the
agreement, Shopper’s, issued a check for another
P250,000.00 "downpayment" to Dr. Roque.
The contract of lease and the memorandum of
agreement, both notarized, were to be annotated on the
title of the property within sixty days from 23 December
1993 or until 23 February 1994. The annotations,
however, were never made because of the untimely
demise of Dr. Felipe C. Roque on Feb. 10, 1994.
Because of the death of Dr. Roque, Shopper had to deal
with Efren. By reason of the earlier mentioned donation,
Efren, instead, instructed Shopper’s "to desist from any
attempt to enforce the aforementioned contract of lease
and memorandum of agreement".
On 15 February 1995, Efren filed a case for annulment of
the contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement
between Shopper’s and his father.
But the trial court dismissed the complaint of Efren,
saying: "Ordinarily, a deed of donation need not be
registered in order to be valid between the parties.
Registration, however, is important in binding third
persons.
The court stated that when Dr. Roque entered into a lease
contract with Shopper’s, Efren could no longer assert the
unregistered deed of donation and say that his father,
Felipe, was no longer the owner of the subject property at
the time the lease on the subject property was agreed
upon.
On appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the lower court
decision and held to be invalid the Contract of Lease and
Memorandum of Agreement. It likewise ruled that
Shopper’s was not a lessee in good faith having had prior
knowledge of the donation in favor of Efren, and that such
actual knowledge had the effect of registration insofar as
Shopper’s was concerned.
Shopper’s appealed to the Supreme Court which ruled
that the non-registration of a deed of donation does not
affect its validity, which has resulted in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the
donee.
In donations of immovable property, for validity, the law
requires that it be contained in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of
the charges which the donee must satisfy. But the law
provides that "titles of ownership, or other rights over
immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice
third persons." In order to bind third persons, the donation
must be registered in the registry of Property.
But, where such party has knowledge of a prior existing
interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a
right thereto, his knowledge of that prior unregistered
interest would have the effect of registration as regards to
him. In this case, it was shown that Shopper’s was aware
that Dr. Roque was not anymore the owner of the
property. And since Dr. Roque was not an agent of Efren,
the contract of lease and memorandum of agreement
entered into between Dr. Roque and Shopper’s is not to
be binding on Efren.
MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
I. Original mode, which is independent of any pre-
existing or preceding title or right of another. Original
mode of ownership result in the independent
creation of a new right of ownership. Their effect is
independent of the ownership of a definite third person.
It includes:
1. Occupation - Things appropriable by nature that are
without an owner, such as animals that are the object of
hunting and fishing, hidden treasure, and abandoned
movables, are acquired by occupation. 2. Creation or
work (intellectual creation) 3. Prescription, as when
ownership of land is acquired by adverse
possession for the period of time required under the law,
provided the necessary legal conditions or requisites are
present;
4. Law e.g accession, fruits naturally falling on adjacent
land.
Derivative mode of acquiring ownership is when there
was a previous owner of the property. It is an acquisition
which depends on the existence of the right of a certain
other person. It includes:
1. Succession or through inheritance;
2. Donation, as when a parcel of land is given gratuitously
and accepted and in a public instrument;
3. Tradition, as a consequence of certain contracts (like
the contract of sale, barter, assignment, simple loan or
mutuum).
Law as a mode of acquiring ownership refers to special
legal provisions which directly vest ownership or real
rights in favor of certain persons, independently of the
other modes of acquiring and transmitting ownership or
other real rights. Examples are found in Art. 624; Art. 681
and Art. 1434 of the Civil Code.
According to Art. 624, there arises a title to an easement
of light and view, even in the absence of any formal act
undertaken by the owner of the dominant estate, if this
apparent visible sign. Article 681 provides that: “Fruits
naturally falling upon adjacent land belong to owner of
said land.
In Art. 1434 it is provided that: When a person who is not
the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and
later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title
passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
ARTICLE 764
Art. 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of
the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the
conditions which the former imposed upon the latter.
In this case, the property donated shall be returned to the
donor, the alienations made by the donee and the
mortgages imposed thereon by him being void, with the
limitations established, with regard to third persons, by the
Mortgage Law and the Land Registration Laws.
This action shall prescribe after four years from the
noncompliance with the condition, may be transmitted to
the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the
donee's heirs.
ART. 764 - FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONDITIONS:
in relation to Art. 733- If the conditions refer to obligations
or charges imposed by the donor on the donee, then it
takes the character of an onerous donation, which under
Art. 733, should be governed by the rules on contracts,
which provides that an action to enforce a written contract
prescribes in 10 years.
But Art. 764 which also refers to failure to comply with any
of the conditions imposed by the donor. In such a case,
the action will prescribe in four years.
When there is a failure to comply with the conditions of a
donation, which between Art. 764 and 733 should apply?
It appears from jurisprudence that Art, 764 applies where
there is a provision in the deed of donation for the
automatic reversion of the property.
The prescriptive period in Art. 764 does not apply when
the deed of donation expressly provides for automatic
reversion of the property donated in case of violation of
the condition therein and there is no challenge to the
revocation.
If the contract of donation expressly provides for
automatic rescission in case of breach of condition
therein, and the donee violates or fails to comply with the
condition, the donated property reverts back to the donor
automatically. There is no more need for a judicial
declaration revoking the same.
DE LUNA V ABRIGO
Prudencio de Luna donated a parcel of land to the
Luzonian Colleges.
The donation was subject to certain terms and conditions
and provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of
the donated property in case of violation or non-
compliance.
The donee failed to comply with the conditions of the
donation. On April 9, 1971, de Luna "revived" the said
donation in favor of the foundation, in a document entitled
"Revival of Donation Intervivos" subject to terms and
conditions which among others, required the donee to
construct a chapel, nursery and kindergarten school,
among other conditions.
The document also provided that the construction should
be completed after five years. The donation also provided
for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated
area in case of violation of the conditions, without the
need of executing any other document for that purpose
and without obligation whatever on the part of the donor.
On September 23, 1980, the heirs of the late Prudencio
de Luna filed a complaint praying for the cancellation of
the donation made by their father since the school was
not able to comply with the conditions of the donation.
In their Answer, the school claimed that there was
substantial compliance with the conditions of the donation
and that the donor has granted the foundation an
indefinite extension of time to complete the construction
of the chapel. It also invoked the affirmative defense of
prescription of action and prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint.
The lower court dismissed the complaint of the heirs on
the ground of prescription.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it held that the donation
in this case was an onerous donation since it created a
burden on the donee. Being onerous, it will be governed
by the law on contracts.
In prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous
donation, the general rules on prescription applies. Article
733 provides: “Donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts.”
Even if Article 764 provides that actions for the revocation
of a donation must be brought within four years from the
non-compliance of the conditions of the donation,
however, said article does not apply to onerous donations
in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing
that onerous donations are governed by the rules on
contracts.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the
general rules on prescription and not the rules on
donations are applicable in the case at bar.
The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the
complaint of the de Luna heirs was barred by prescription
under Article 764 because Article 764 does not apply to
onerous donations.
As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971,
compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract
of donation, shall be made within five) years from its
execution. The complaint which was filed on September
23, 1980 was then well within the ten year prescriptive
period to enforce a written contract,, counted from April 9,
1976.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case
No. 8624 is hereby ordered reinstated. Respondent judge
is ordered to conduct a trial on the merits to determine the
propriety of the revocation of the subject donation.
Effects of Revocation under Art. 764.
When the donation is revoked for failure to comply with
the charges imposed on the donation, the property
donated shall be returned to the donor. Any alienation or
encumbrance made by the donee with respect to the
donated property shall be considered void, subject to the
right of a buyer or mortgagee in good faith.
If the revocation is based upon noncompliance with any
of the conditions imposed in the donation, the donee shall
return not only the property but also the fruits thereof
which he may have received after having failed to fulfill
the condition.
REVOCATION BY REASON OF INGRATITUDE
The action for revocation by reason of ingratitude may not
be renounced in advance. Prescribes within one year,
counted from the time that the donor had knowledge of
the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action.
REVOCATION BY REASON OF INOFFICIOUSNESS
Donations which exceed the freely disposable portion
of the donor’s estate are inofficious and subject to
reduction with regards to the excess.
If no action for revocation is filed or if it is filed after
the lapse of the prescriptive period, the donation is
forever considered as valid.
WHO MAY QUESTION INOFFICIOUS DONATION
Only those who, at the time of the donor’s death, have a
right to the legitime, may ask for the reduction or
revocation of inofficious donations.
Persons who are not compulsory heirs cannot ask for
reduction or revocation of inofficious donations.
Creditors cannot ask for reduction of the donation.
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
DOCTRINE OF IRREVINDICABILITY
Possession of movables acquired in good faith does not
only create a presumption of ownership but it is already
equivalent to title. Unlike in the case of immovable
property where actual possession under claim of
ownership will only create a disputable presumption of
ownership and that the possessor has just title, the
possession of a movable property acquired in good faith
is already equivalent to title. Further proof is no longer
needed.
Art. 559 establishes not merely a presumption in favor of
the possessor, but an actual right, valid even against the
true owner, except upon proof of loss or illegal
deprivation.
For possession of a movable to be considered
equivalent to title, the following requisites must be
present:
1. The movable property must be acquired in good
faith;
2. The possession must be in the concept of an
owner.
As a consequence of this principle, when a movable
property is in the possession of one who has acquired it
and holds it in good faith, the true owner cannot recover it
as a general rule for the title is valid, even against him.
For possession of a movable to be considered
equivalent to title, the following requisites must be
present:
Exceptions to the rule on irrevindicability:
1. When the thing was lost;
2. When the owner has been unlawfully deprived
thereof.
Under these circumstances, the owner has a right to
recover the thing, not only from the finder, thief or robber,
but also from a third person who may have acquired it in
good faith from such finder, thief or robber.
The owner can always recover the movable from the
possessor in cases where the same was lost or the owner
was unlawfully deprived thereof.
The only difference is that if the movable was acquired by
a possessor in good faith, at a public sale, the owner can
recover it only upon reimbursement of the price paid by
the possessor.
But if it was not acquired at a public sale, the owner can
recover it without paying any indemnity.
Public sale is one where there has been public notice of
the sale and in which anybody has a right to bid and offer
to buy.
PALERO-TAN v. URDANETA
Tan is a Court Stenographer. She charged Urdaneta,
Utility Worker of the same court of having stolen her ring
and bracelet.
Tan claimed that it has been her practice to keep her and
her sister's pieces of jewelry in the locked drawer of her
table at her RTC office because she fears that they might
be lost at the boarding house she is renting.
However, on 8 July 2005, she discovered that her ring and
bracelet were missing. Tan remembered that on 18 June
2005, a Saturday, her younger sister went to the RTC to
ask for her necklace.
She took out from her table drawer a transparent plastic
sachet which contained her ring and bracelet, and her
sister's necklace, and after handing over to her sister the
necklace, she returned the plastic sachet, still containing
the bracelet and ring, to her table drawer.
She maintained that the only person who was present and
saw her take out the jewelry from her table drawer was
Urdaneta, whose table is adjacent to hers.
According to Tan, when she found out that her ring and
bracelet were missing, she informed her officemates
about it, but nobody claimed to have seen the missing
jewelry. On 28 July 2005, an officemate confided to her
that he heard from his landlady that Urdaneta and his wife
had a quarrel because the wife discovered a ring and a
bracelet in Urdaneta's coin purse. Milagros suspected that
Urdaneta bought the jewelry for his mistress.
Complainant approached the RTC presiding judge and
relayed to him the information she gathered. The judge
called the persons involved.
The wife admitted that she had a fight with Urdaneta
because she found a ring and bracelet inside his coin
purse which she believed he would give to his mistress.
The description given by the wife of the jewelry made Tan
conclude that it was hers.
In a separate meeting with the judge, Urdaneta confessed
that he found Tan’s jewels in the court's premises, but he
could no longer return them because he already threw
them away when his wife fought with him. He thought it
was fancy jewelry that belonged to a litigant and was
going to return it.
When a person finds a thing that has been lost or
misplaced by the owner, and takes the thing into his
hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not
become vested with legal possession.
In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the
obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus
Urdaneta’s duty to report to his superior or his officemates
that he found something.
The Civil Code, in Article 719, explicitly requires the finder
of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities, thus:
Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not
treasure, must return it to its previous possessor. If the
latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it
with the mayor of the city or municipality where the finding
has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for
two consecutive weeks in the way he deems best.
If the finder does not comply with the procedural
requirements and appropriates for himself the movable he
found, he shall be guilty of theft.
Contrary to Urdaneta's claim, the Supreme Court was
convinced that he had the intention to appropriate the
jewelry to himself had these not been discovered by his
wife. His claim that the ring and bracelet were worthless
"fancy" jewelry is immaterial because the basis for his
liability is his act of taking something which does not
belong to him.
CRUZ V PAHATI
The car subject matter of this case was originally owned
by Northern Motors and was subsequently purchased by
a Chinaman. This Chinaman then sold it to Belizo, who in
turn sold the same to Cruz.
Belizo was a second-hand car dealer. He offered to Cruz
that he will sell the car to a prospective buyer. Since the
car registration was missing, Belizo convinced Cruz to
issue an authorization letter to him (Belizo) to obtain
another certificate of registration.
Cruz turned over the car to Belizo. But Belizo falsified the
letter and converted into an absolute deed of sale.
Because of this, he was able to secure a car registration
in his name and was later able to sell the car, which was
finally sold to Pahati. This prompted Cruz to file an action
for replevin against Pahati.
Who between Cruz and Pahati has a better right over the
car?.
One who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same and the only defense the latter
may have is if he "has acquired it in good faith at a public
sale" in which case "the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefor."
Also, Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that "where
goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof,
and who does not sell them under authority or with the
consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to
the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the
goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the
seller's authority to sell.”
Applying the above legal provisions to the facts of this
case, it can be concluded that Cruz has a better right to
the car for it cannot be disputed that Cruz had been
illegally deprived thereof because of the ingenious
scheme utilized by Belizo to enable him to dispose of it as
if he were the owner thereof.
Cruz therefore can still recover the possession of the car
even if Pahati acquired it in good faith.
EDCA v. SANTOS
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor
Jose Cruz who ordered these by telephone, which was
agreed to be payable on delivery. The said Prof. Cruz
represented himself as a Dean of the dela Salle
University, which turned out to be false.
The books were subsequently delivered to him with the
corresponding invoice, and he paid with a personal check.
Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who
asked for verification, and was then showed the invoice
for the books.
EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another set
of books even before his check could be cleared. Upon
investigation, EDCA found that he wasn’t the person he
claimed to be. EDCA had the police capture Cruz, as well
as seize the books from Santos. Santos demanded the
return of the books.
Should the books be returned to Santos?
It is the contention of EDCA that Santos have not
established her ownership of the disputed books because
she was not able to produce a receipt to prove they had
bought the stock. Such proof is not necessary because
the first sentence of Article 559 provides that "the
possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title."
The argument that Santos did not acquire the books in
good faith is not correct. Santos was able to ascertained
the ownership of the books from the EDCA invoice
showed to her by Cruz, proving that the same were sold
by EDCA to Cruz.
When Cruz alleged that he was selling them for a discount
because he was in financial need, the same did not
appear suspicious to Santos since as one who was in the
business of buying and selling books, she often dealt with
hard-up sellers who urgently have to part with their books
at reduced prices.
To Santos, Cruz must have been only one of the many
such sellers she was accustomed to dealing with. It is not
bad faith for any one in the business of buying and selling
books to buy them at a discount and resell them for a
profit.
By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too
trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had never
transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books
he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted
his personal check in payment. I
t did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to
do this. It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown
drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to
him, by the printed terms thereon, that the books had
been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in
the buyer.
By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too
trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had never
transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books
he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted
his personal check in payment. I
t did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to
do this. It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown
drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to
him, by the printed terms thereon, that the books had
been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in
the buyer.
EDCA insists that it had been unlawfully deprived of the
books because the check issued by the impostor in
payment therefor was dishonored.
Citing jurisprudence, it mentioned that the owner who has
been unlawfully deprived of personal property is entitled
to its recovery except only where the property was
purchased at a public sale, in which event its return is
subject to reimbursement of the purchase price. EDCA
argues that because Cruz acquired no title to the books
that he could have validly transferred to the private
respondents.
Its reason is that as the payment check bounced for lack
of funds, there was a failure of consideration that nullified
the contract of sale between it and Cruz.
But a contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once
agreement is reached between the parties on the subject
matter and the consideration. Art. 1477 provides that
ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the
vendee upon actual or constructive delivery thereof. On
the other hand, Art. 1478 provides that the parties may
stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the
purchaser until he has fully paid the price.
It is clear from the above provision that ownership in the
thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of
the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect.
Otherwise, ownership shall pass upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase
price has not yet been paid.
If the term "unlawfully deprived" were to be interpreted in
the manner suggested by EDCA, a person relying on the
seller's title who buys a movable property from him would
have to surrender it to another person claiming to be the
original owner who had not yet been paid the purchase
price therefor. The buyer in the second sale would be left
holding the bag, so to speak, and would be compelled to
return the thing bought by him in good faith without even
the right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for.
Santos did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy
herself that the books being offered for sale by Cruz
belonged to him; yet she did.
It would certainly be unfair now to make Santos bear the
prejudice sustained by EDCA as a result of its own
negligence. The Supreme Court found no justice in
transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted
in good faith, and with proper care.
CASES WHEN THERE IS NO RECOVERY:
There are cases where the owner may no longer recover
the movable property even if he has lost the same or he
has been unlawfully deprived thereof, as in the following
cases:
1. If the possessor acquired the thing at a
merchant’s store, or in fairsm or in markets in
accordance with the Code of Commerce and
special laws;
2. Where the possessor acquired the thing by sale
under statutory power of sale or under the order
of a court of competent jurisdiction;
3. Where the possessor is a holder in due course of
a negotiable document of title to goods, or where
the owner is barred by the principle of negotiable
instruments;
4. When the owner is barred by reason of his own
acts or neglect from denying the seller’s title;
5. If prescription has set in.
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA & INTERVIVOS
A donation mortis causa is actually a legacy.
As such, this kind of donation should be embodied in a
last will and testament and should comply with its
solemnities. It should be probated, proved and allowed in
the proper court, otherwise, no right to the subject
property is transmitted to the donee.
In this kind of donation, the full ownership of the property
will pass to the donee only because of the donor’s death.
It is at this time that the donation takes effect.
Concept of a donation inter vivos
If the donated property passes to the donee during the
lifetime of the donor, not by reason of his death but
because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter
vivos.
The designation of the donation as mortis cause, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is to
take effect at the death of the donor are not controlling
criteria. Such statements are to be construed together
with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the
real intent of the transferor.
The title given to the deed of donation is not the
determinative factor which makes the donation inter vivos
or mortis cause. It is the provisions stated in the deed,
the statements contained in the document, and not the
title, which determines the kind of donation that is made.
If the donation, by its terms, is inter vivos, this character
is not altered by the fact that the donor titled it as a
donation mortis causa.
In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to
avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.
In a donation mortis causa – the alienation should be
revocable at the discretion of the donor. The donor can
change his mind.
No title is conveyed to the transferee before the death of
the transferor. The transferor retains the ownership and
control of the property while he is still alive.
Before the death of the transferor, the transfer is
revocable by the transferor at will; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed.
The transfer will be void if the transferor should survive
the transferee.
Donations inter vivos, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable.
Upon acceptance by the donee, the donor can no longer
withdraw and he can be compelled to comply with his
offering or to deliver the things he wanted to donate.
It may not be revoked unilaterally or by the sole and
arbitrary will of the donor.
But the donation may be made revocable by the fulfillment
of a resolutory condition or for the reasons provided for in
Art. 760, 764 and 765.
MODE BY WHICH POSSESSION IS ACQUIRED
1. By material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a
right;
2. By subjecting the thing or right to the action of our will;
and
3. By the proper acts and legal formalities established for
the acquisition of such right.
Material occupation referred to in Art. 531 involves only
corporeal objects and not to acquisition of possession
over a right. It is used in its ordinary meaning of being in
actual possession of the object. It is synonymous to
“occupation” as a mode of acquiring ownership under Art.
712.
Art. 531 includes two forms of constructive delivery:
1) tradicion brevi manu (like when a lessee of a
private property ultimately becomes its owner);
and
2) tradicion constitutum possessorium (seller
transfers ownership and retains a usufruct).
SUBJECTING THE THING TO THE ACTION OF OUR
WILL
This mode of possession does not involve any material
occupation. It connotes, however, a mode of control over
the thing sufficient to subject the same to the action of
one’s will.
What is important in this mode is the intention to possess
manifested by certain fact which are present. Included in
this mode are the two forms of constructive delivery where
material occupation is not involved: tradicion symbolica
and tradicion longa manu.
Tradicion symbolica takes place through the delivery of
symbols or some object to represent those to be
delivered, thus placing the thing under the control of the
transferee.
Tradicion longa manu is effected by the transferor
pointing out to the transferee the things which are being
transferred.
PROPER ACTS AND LEGAL FORMALITIES
This mode of possession refers to any juridical acts by
which possession is acquired or to which the law gives the
force of acts of possession.
Juridical acts are acts to which the law gives the force of
possession. Examples are donations, succession,
execution and registration of public instruments and the
inscription of possessory information titles.
The reason for this rule again is that possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession.
MANGASER V UGAY
Mangaser alleged that he was the registered owner and
possessor of a parcel of land covered by an OCT. On
Oct., 2006, Mangaser discovered that Ugay stealthy
intruded and occupied a portion of his property by
constructing a residential house thereon without his
knowledge and consent; and that demand letters were
sent to Ugay but he still refused to vacate the premises,
thus, he was constrained to seek judicial remedy by filing
a complaint for Forcible Entry.
Ugay denied the allegations in the complaint, putting up
the defense that he has been a resident of the area since
birth. He alleged having started occupying a parcel of
land since then.
That place was then known as Sta. Lucia, Aringay, La
Union; that years later, this parcel of land was designated
as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union due to a survey
made by the government; that he introduced more
improvements on the property by cultivating the land, and
in March 2006, he put up a “bahay kubo”; that in October
2006, he installed a fence made of “bolo” to secure the
property; that in installing the fence, he was guided by the
concrete monuments which he knew to be indicators of
the boundaries of petitioner’s property; that while he could
not locate some of the monuments, he based the
boundaries on his recollection since he was around when
these were installed; that he knew the boundaries of
petitioner’s property because he knew the extent of the
“iron mining” activities done by a company on the said
property.
Ugay alleged that Manager was never in actual
possession of the property occupied by him, and it was
only on October 31, 2006 when he discovered the alleged
intrusion.
Ugay further alleged that after he received the demand to
vacate, he assured Manager that he would voluntarily
vacate the premises if he would only be shown to have
intruded into his titled lot after the boundaries were
pointed out to him. But instead of showing the boundaries
to him, Mangaser filed an action for forcible entry before
the MTC.
After conflicting decisions in the lower court and appellate
court, the case finally reached the Supreme Court.
One of the issues identified was whether Mangaser was
able to established prior possession over the subject
property.
The Supreme Court ruled that possession can be
acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the
fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by
the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right.
In this case, the Court finds that Mangaser acquired
possession of the subject property by juridical act,
specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent
registration with the Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987
such that it is now covered by an Original Certificate of
Title.
Mangaser's OCT and his tax declarations should
absolutely not be disregarded. The issuance of an original
certificate of title to Mangaser evidences ownership and
from it, a right to the possession of the property flows.
Well-entrenched is the rule that a person who has a
Torrens title over the property is entitled to the possession
thereof.
Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax
declarations. While tax declarations are not conclusive
proof of possession of a parcel of land, they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or constructive possession.
Together with the Torrens title, the tax declarations dated
1995 onwards presented by Mangaser strengthens his
claim of possession over the land before his
dispossession on October 31, 2006 by Ugay.
If the Court were to disregard juridical acts to obtain prior
possession, then it would create an absurd situation by
putting premium in favor of land intruders against Torrens
title holders, who spent months, or even years, in order to
register their land, and who religiously paid real property
taxes thereon.
ARTICLE 649 & 650
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway,
is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner
that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the
dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the
indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied
and the amount of the damage caused to the servient
estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary
passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by
others and for the gathering of its crops through the
servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity
shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by
such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
Under Art. 649, it is the owner, or any person who by
virtue of a real right, may cultivate or use any immovable
surrounded by other immovable pertaining to other
persons, who is entitled to demand a right of way through
the neighboring estates.
A usufructuary is entitled to demand a right of way but a
mere lessee does not enjoy the same right. The lessee’s
action must be against the lessor who is bound to
maintain him in the enjoyment of the property.
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.
COSTABELLE V CA
Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two
criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient
state; and (2) where the distance to a public highway may
be the shortest. But "least prejudice" prevails over
"shortest distance." Yet, each case must be weighed
according to its individual merits, and judged according to
the sound discretion of the court. "The court is not bound
to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be
established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such
as when there are constructions or walls which can be
avoided by a roundabout way, or to secure the interest of
the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance
would place the way on a dangerous decline.“
FRANCISCO V IACC
The Supreme Court observed that Ramos was granted
access to the public road through Lot B but he gave up
that right of access by walling off his property from the
passageway, which was wide enough to accommodate
his truck. If, at the time of the negotiation with Ramos, lot
B could no longer be used, it was because he himself
have closed it off by erecting a stone wall on his lot.
An owner cannot by his own act, isolate his property from
a public highway and then claim an easement of way
through an adjacent estate. The third of the cited
requisites under Art. 649: that the claimant of a right of
way has not himself procured the isolation of his property,
had not been met.
Mere inconvenience attending the use of a then existing
right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement
in an alternative location.
All the four requisites prescribed in Articles 649 and 650
must be established in order to warrant the creation of a
legal or compulsory easement of way.
CALIMOSO V ROULLO
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement
of right-of-way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. If these two criteria do not concur in a single
tenement, the least prejudice criterion must prevail over
the shortest distance criterion.
the easement were not yet defined, the Court remanded
the case to the trial court for the determination of the same
and of the corresponding indemnity, hinting that the trial
court may take into consideration the fact that the affected
road lot is being used by the general public in mitigating
the amount of damage that the servient estate is entitled
to.
MERGER IN EASEMENT

In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through

the Calimoso’s lot would cause the destruction of the wire An easement can exist only when the servient and
fence and a house on Calimoso’s property. dominant estates belong to different owners.
Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a In a real easement, there should two distinct immovables
public road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the belonging to different owners. If there is a merger in the
destruction pointed out, and that an option to traverse two same person of the ownership of the dominant and
vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is servient estate, the easement is extinguished.
available. But when a person acquires only a partial interest of the
servient estate, it cannot be held that there has been a
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is merger.
required by law and that a longer way may be adopted to
avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are
A personal easement established for the benefit of a
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-
particular person is also extinguished if the holder of the
about way.
easement acquires ownership of the servient estate. But
if the personal easement is established for the benefit of
WOODRIDGE V ARB
a community, the fact that one of the members of the
community acquires ownership of the servient estate will
When the case reached the Supreme Court, it affirmed
not result in a genuine merger that will terminate the
the grant of right of way. With respect to the indemnity
personal easement. (Solid Manila v Bio Hong)
awarded, the Court said in the case of a legal easement,
Article 649 of the Civil Code prescribes the parameters by
which the proper indemnity may be fixed. Since the
intention of Woodridge is to establish a permanent
passage, the second paragraph of Article 649 of the Civil
Code particularly applies:

Art. 649 xxx

Should this easement be established in such a manner

that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the
dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the
indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied
and the amount of the damage caused to the servient
estate. Xxx

The SC held that the CA was wrong in arbitrarily awarding

indemnity for the use of the road lot. The Civil Code
categorically provides for the measure by which the
proper indemnity may be computed: value of the land
occupied plus the amount of the damage caused to the
servient estate.

The Supreme Court held that to award the indemnity

using factors different from that given by the law is a
complete disregard of these clear statutory provisions and
is evidently arbitrary. This the Court cannot countenance.
The Civil Code has clearly laid down the parameters and
we cannot depart from them.

Since the metes and bounds of the property covered by