1. ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER GRIMM vs. ESTATE OF CHARLES PARSONS No. 580 was temporary.
No. 580 was temporary. Parsons was thus in contextually in estoppel to deny, thru the
Facts: Grimm and Parsons are 2 0f the 3 original partners of G P and company. Both of
them own shares on MGCC. Later on Grimm desires to assign his playing rights to Yoshida
and to make it possible Grimm needs to transfer some of his shares to Parsons and make
Yoshida an assignee of the company. But after the transfer but before they were able to
inform the MGCC about the company the MGCC board accommodated Yoshida even not
being an assignee, by then Parson wrote a letter to MGCC that the name of the shares to be
retained in his name but he recognizes Grimm as the real owner, but on the other hand
Grimm also emphasizes that he is still the original owner. But on the demise of Grimm the
Partnership was continued by the Parsons and the other partner and adding up the sons of
Parsons. And time came when Parsons also died. The issues arise when the Estate of Grimm
is claiming back the shares and transfer it to their name. But the Estate of Parsons claimed
that it was theirs and it was entrusted to the G P and company as beneficiary of Parson,
where by this time the Grimm is not already a part owner as part of dissolution of the old
Partnership. The CA also decided in favor of the Parsons because the estate Grimm failed to
present evidence to prove that Grimm really bought the property in question.
Issue: Who is the real owner?
Ruling: Trust is the legal relationship between one having an equitable ownership in
property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable
ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise
of certain powers by the latter. Trust relations between parties may be express, as when
the trust is created by the intention of the trustor. An express trust is created by the direct
and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed or by words evidencing an intention
to create a trust; the use of the word trust is not required or essential to its constitution, it
being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. Implied trust comes into existence by
operation of law, either through implication of an intention to create a trust as a matter of
law or through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even contrary to any such
intention. Judging from their documented acts immediately before and subsequent to the
actual transfer on September 7, 1964 of MC No. 590, Parsons, as transferee, and Grimm, as
transferor, indubitably contemplated a trust arrangement.
And lest it be overlooked, Parsons had previously acknowledged Grimm to be the owner of
MC No. 1088, after his earlier repeated declarations that the transfer of the replaced MC
Letter of Trust aforementioned, hypothetically assuming its authenticity, Grimms
ownership of the replacement certificate.
2. FREDERICK GARFIELD WAITE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES J. PETERSON, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. WRONGFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY; SALE OR TRANSFER; ACTION BY THE TRANSFEREE.
When the property of one person is unlawfully taken by another, the former has a right of
action against the latter for the recovery of the property or for damages for the taking or
retention, and he is entitled to his choice of these two remedies. This is also a right which
may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property, and the transferee can
maintain either action against the wrongdoer.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SHERIFF. When, however, the owner seeks to
make the sheriff responsible for such wrongful act he must, in order to preserve his right
against the sheriff, comply with the provisions of section 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. LEVY UPON PROPERTY; RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CREDITOR. If a sheriff levies upon
property at the instance of a creditor and is indemnified by the latter, the creditor is
thenceforward liable for the acts of the sheriff with respect to the property.
WILLARD, J. :
The appellant (Kwong We Shing) has not caused the proof in this case to be brought here.
The only question therefore is whether the facts admitted in the pleadings and those found
by the court below in its decision sustain the judgment appealed from. That court found
among other things as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the evidence presented at the trial, the court finds that on December 8, 1905, one
Henry Manheim delivered to L.K. Tiao Eng a diamond ring one consignment for 800 pesos,
to be returned, if not sold, in sixty days; that on the 22d day of January, 1906, while the ring
was in the possession of L.K. Tiao Eng, the defendant, as sheriff of Manila, levied upon the
said ring; that on the 23d day of January, 1906, the aforementioned Henry Manheim, for
value received, assigned all his right to and interest in said ring to the said plaintiff herein;
that on the 25th day of January, 1906, the plaintiff made demand upon the sheriff of Manila,
who had made the levy, as before said, for the said ring, and alleged the value thereof to be
800 pesos; that the sheriff was indemnified by the judgment creditor, in whose favor the
levy had been made, as provided by law, and retained possession of the ring and sold the
same at public sale; that the said Henry Manheim has never been paid for the said ring, in
accordance with the terms of the contract hereinbefore mentioned or any part thereof; that
at the time of the levy by the sheriff upon the said ring, as before stated, the said Henry
Manheim was the owner of and entitled to possession of the said ring; that while the ring
was in the possession of the sheriff the said Henry Manheim transferred his ownership and
right to possession of said ring to plaintiff herein and that the plaintiff thereupon became
the owner and entitled to possession of said ring."cralaw virtua1aw library
Judgment was rendered against both of the defendants for the return of the ring, and, if
that could not be had, for the sum of 725 pesos, with interest, and costs.
I. The appellant claims that by the terms of section 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure this
action can not be maintained by the plaintiff because he was not the owner of the ring at
the time the levy was made. In other words, as we understand it, his claim is that no action
for the value of the property taken can be maintained except by the person who was the
owner thereof at the time it was seized by the sheriff. We do not think that this contention
can be sustained. Said section 451 is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Claims by third persons to property levied on. Property levied on can be claimed by a
third person as his property, by a written claim, verified by the oath of such claimant, setting
out his title thereto, his right to possession thereof, stating the ground of such title, and
served upon the governor, or his deputy, or officer making the levy. The officer in such case
is not bound to keep the property, unless the plaintiff, or the person in whose favor the writ
of execution runs, on demand, indemnify the officer against such claim by an obligation,
signed by the plaintiff, with good and sufficient surety, and no claim to such property shall
be valid against the officer, or shall be received or be notice of any rights against him, unless
made as herein provided; but nothing herein contained shall prevent such third person from
vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action."cralaw virtua1aw library
The vice in the argument of the appellant consist in the fact that he assumes that section
451 is the only law which gives the plaintiff a right of action against the sheriff, and that if he
is not included within that section, he can not maintain any action. This is manifestly
erroneous. So far from being the origin of any rights on the part of the owner of property
wrongfully taken by the sheriff, it is rather a limitation upon his rights previously existing. If
property of a person is taken by the sheriff upon an execution against another person, the
sheriff is liable thereof in the absence of statute, as any private person would be. When
ones property is wrongfully taken by another, the former has a right of action against the
person who interfered with his property, whether for the recovery of the property itself or
for damages for its taking, and he has his choice of these remedies. If section 451 did not
exist, by the general principles of the law the sheriff would always be responsible for
wrongfully taking the property of another. For the purpose of limiting the responsibility of
the sheriff in such cases, and to provided that some notice should be given to him of the
claims of third persons, this section requires such third persons to make such claims in
writing, so that the sheriff, after the notice is given to him, can decide for himself whether
he will proceed with the levy or abandon the property.
The right of action given by the general principles of law to the person whose property has
wrongfully been taken from him, either to recover damages or the possession of the
property, is a right which can be transferred by him, and his transferee can maintain either
one of these actions against the wrongdoer. On this first claim of the appellant, then, the
only question is whether this section 451 has taken away from the assignee of the owner his
right to maintain an action to recover the value of the property.
An examination of the section will show that there is no distinct statements therein, that the
claim can only be made by a person who was the owner of the property at the time the levy
was made. As the section is written, we do not think that it should be so construed. Such a
construction would, in case of the involuntary transfer of rights, deprive the transferee of
actions which might be absolutely necessary to him for the protection of his interest. If we
so construed the section, we should have the levy his executor or administrator would have
no right to make a claim against the sheriff for the return of the property and would be
deprived of an action against the sheriff for the recovery of damages for such wrongful
taking. The same rule would have to be made if an order in bankruptcy was passed against
the owner of the property the day after the levy. We do not think that the section requires
any such construction.
II. It is further claimed by the appellant that in no event should judgment have been entered
against him that is to say, against Kwong We Shing. It will be noticed that the court found
that the sheriff was indemnified by the judgment creditor. This statement is sufficient to
make the judgment creditor liable for the acts of the sheriff. In the case of Lovejoy v. Murray
(3 Wall. U.S., 1) the court said, at page 9:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The demand for indemnity, and the giving of it by the defendants, proceeded upon the
supposition that the sheriff would without it go no further in that direction, but would give
up the property to the claimant, the present plaintiff, and make his peace on the best terms
he could. By the present statute of Iowa he had a right to do this, if the plaintiff in
attachment refused to assume the hazard of indemnifying him. And if there were no such
statute, he had a right to deliver the property to the claimant, and risk a suit by the plaintiff
in attachment rather than a contest with a rightful claimant of the goods.
"The giving of the bond by the present defendants must, therefore, be held equivalent to a
personal interference in the course of the proceeding, by directing or requesting of the
defendants in attachment. In doing this they assumed the direction and control of the
sheriffs future action, so far as it might constitute a trespass, and they became to that
extent the principals, and he their agent in the transaction. This made them responsible for
the continuance of the wrongful possession and for the sale and conversion of the goods; in
other words, for all the real damages which plaintiff sustained."cralaw virtua1aw library
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant, Kwong We Shing. So ordered.
3. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, ALBAY VS. ONATE
FACTS:
Spouses Claro Onate and Gregoria Los Banos owns the disputed lot Lot No. 6849 (27,907
sqm) registered under the Torrens System of land registration with an Original Certificate of
Title (OCT). This lot was already settled through a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
and Cession in 1991, in favor of respondent as his three sisters waived their rights to the
property. It turns out that the same land was where the Daraga North Central Elementary
School was built and had been operating since 1940, then named Bagumbayan Elementary
School of Daraga. The Municipality of Daraga gave that land to Dept. of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS), now Dept. of Education (DepEd) through a Deed of Donation, confident
that the municipality owned the land through buying it from Claro Onate, the respondents
grandfather, sometime in 1940.
Respondent testified that he only knew of the dispute on 1973, from which he took
possession of the lot the same year; that he knew only of the schools occupation on a
portion of the land on 1991 and knew of the Deed of Donation on 1992. The petitioner then
claimed that respondent was guilty of laches.
Petitioner only gives tax declaration as evidence of ownership while respondent shows TCT.
ISSUE
Who owns the subject property?
RULING
Between a clear showing of ownership evidenced by a registered title and a
certification in a tax declaration, albeit done in an official capacity, the former holds
as the latter is only persuasive evidence. Indeed, tax declarations in land cases per
se do not constitute ownership without other substantial pieces of evidence.
4. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWARAGE SYSTEM (MWSS) VS. ACT THEATRE,
INC (2004)
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
THE CASE:
Petition for review on certiorari by the MWSS seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision of CA which affirmed the Decision of RTC directing MWSS to pay Act
Theatre damages and attorney fees
FACTS:
September 22, 1988- 4 employees of Act Theatre (Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar
Arnel Concha, and Mondesto Ruales) were apprehended and charged by the
members of Q.C. police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of PD
401, as amended by BP 876. Because of the said incident, their water service was cut
off.
-Thus, A complaint was filed by the respondents against the MWSS for damages. The
respondents alleged that MWSS acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously in
cutting off their water service. This cutting off allegedly affected the sanitation and
health of respondents patron as well as their surrounding premises.
-MWSS justified its act of disconnecting the water supply of respondent without prior
notice by relying on Article 429, NCC.
-RTC acquitted respondents and ordered MWSS to pay damages in favor of
respondents
-CA affirmed
ISSUE:
WON the act of disconnecting the water supply was justified.
HELD:
NO. Article 429, NCC provides:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonable to repel or
prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or
decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally
enforceable claim of one person against the other.
In the case at bar, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to
certain customers including respondents, had the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without
limitations. Thus, Article 19, NCC provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. (Emphasis supplied)
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting to
damage to another, there is a legal wrong committed for which the actor can be
held liable.
In this case, petitioner failed to act with justice and give respondent what is due to
them when the petitioner cut off the respondents water service connection without
notice. As found by CA, the respondents were denied of due process even if it was
true that MWSS had sent notice of investigation to respondents prior to the said
disconnection of water service, because such was done only a few hours before the
actual disconnection.
5. PNB VS. CA (2002)
YNARES- SANTIAGO, J.:
THE CASE:
Petition for review under Rule 45 of Rules of Court to reverse CAs resolution which
affirmed the order of RTC Makati
FACTS:
-Sps. Godofredo and Wilma Monsod obtained a loan (P120, 000) from PNB, secured
by a parcel of land located within Monte Villa de Monsod Subdivision in Rizal
-The Monsods failed to pay, thus, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. PNB
was declared as highest bidder in the auction. A certificate of sale was issued in
favor of PNB. Upon the expiration of redemption period, the ownership and title of
the subject land was vested to PNB
June 28, 1992- PNB filed an Ex- parte Petition for the issuance of Writ of Possession with
RYC Makati. PNBs representative testified that the foreclosed property is occupied
by one Ernesto Austria, who was invited by the bank to discuss the ownership of the
foreclosed lot but Austria did refused.
RTC granted in favor of PNB
December 11, 1992- Ernesto and Loreto Austria filed a Motion to stop the
enforcement of the writ. They alleged that they are the actual occupants of the
subject lot, which they bought from the Monsods as early as 1974. They also alleged
that this was known by PNB
-The writ was not implemented because of the Austrias refused to vacate the land
-Several motions were filed by the Austrias. The trial court denied, BUT it ruled that any
writ issued in this case is declared as unenforceable against the Austrias.
CA affirmed, despite PNBs motion for reconsideration
ISSUE:
WON an ex- parte writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135 as amended, is
unenforceable against a TP who is:
-in actual possession of the foreclosed property; and
-NOT privy with the debtor/mortgagor
HELD:
YES. PNB should have instituted an action for ejectment in court, NOT the petition of
ex- parte writ of possession. The law protects the actual possessor of a property.
Article 433, NCC provides:
Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property.
Thus, the one who claims to be the owner of the property possessed by another must
bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term judicial
process could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which
the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and
adjudicated.
An ex- parte petition for the issuance of a possessory writ under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135
is NOT a judicial process as contemplated by the above-mentioned law. Even if the
same may be considered as a judicial proceeding, it is NOT an ordinary suit filed in
court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or prevention or redress of a wrong. It is a non- litigious proceeding authorized in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Here, the property bought within the ambit of
the Act is foreclosed by the filing of a petition with the office of the sheriff and NOT
with any court of justice. In effect, any third person in possession of an extrajudicially
foreclosed realty, who claims a right superior to the original mortgagor, has NO
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD on their claims. Thus, this would tantamount to that third
persons summary ejectment in violation of due process.
In the case at bar, PNB admitted that as early as 1990, it was aware that the subject
lot was occupied by the Austrias; yet, instead of bringing an action in court for
ejectment, PNB chose to simply file an ex- parte petition for a writ of possession. To
enforce the writ against an unwilling third party possessor, who took no part in the
foreclosure proceedings, would be tantamount to the taking of real property without
the benefit of proper judicial intervention.
6. CALUB VS. CA (2000)
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
January 28, 1992- Forest Protection and Enforcement Team of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended 2
motor vehicles, which are both loaded with illegally sourced lumber
-Abuganda and Gabon (the drivers) failed to present proper documents and/ or
licenses. Therefore, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles, as
well as the loads of lumber, at the DENR Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts were
issued BUT the drivers refused to accept
-Felipe Calub, Privincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, filed before the
Provincial Prosecutors Office- Samar a criminal complaint against Abuganda for
violation of Section 68, PD 705 as amended by EO 277, otherwise known as the
Revised Forestry Code.
Jan. 1992- The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda
from the custody of DENR, prompting Calub to file another complaint for grave
coercion. However, this was dismissed.
Feb. 1992- one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by a composite team of
DENR-CENRO-Catbalogan and Philippine Army at Samar. It was again loaded with
forest products valued at P10, 054. 70. Hence, Calub filed criminal complaint against
Abegonia, Abuganda, and several John Does, for violation of the Revised Forestry
Code.
-TC acquitted Abegonia and Abuganda on the ground of reasonable doubt
because it appeared that it was Paragao who charted the subject vehicle and
ordered that the cut timber be loaded on it; BUT noted that necessary action may be
filed by DENR against Noe Paragao and all other persons responsible for the violation.
-Subsequently, private respondents (owners of vehicle and driver) filed a complaint
for recory of possession of 2 impounded vehicles with an application for replevin
against petitioners before RTC- Catbalogan.
TC granted.
-Petitioners filed petition for TRO with the Supreme Court, which the latter granted
and declared the seized properties are in custodial egis; SC also referred the case to
CA
CA- denied the petition for TRO and held that mere seizure of a motor vehicle
pursuant to the authority granted by the Revised Forestry Code does not
automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. It further ruled that authority
of DENR to confiscate is not absolute.
ISSUE:
1. WON mere DENR-seized vehicle pursuant to the Revised Forestry Code is in
custodia legis.
2. WON it can be subject to an action for replevin
3. WON the complaint for recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with
an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
HELD:
1. Yes, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure
was in accordance with law, vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis.
The sheriff could NOT insist on seizing the property already subject of a prior
warrant of seizure.
2. No, it cannot be subject to an action for replevin. For it is a property lawfully
taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law. In
the case at bar, the properties were legally seized.
3. No, it is a well established doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent, and a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a
suit against the sate if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. But the
protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to
activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without
 willfulness, malice or corruption. In the case at bar the acts for which
petitioners are being called into account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties. There was no malice or bad faith on their
part; hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent DENR is a suit against
the State and cannot prosper without the States consent.
PAUL
7. SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v PNCC
Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing public
transportation. On December 13, 1990, one of its buses, while traveling north and
approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, swerved and crashed into the radio room of
respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC).
The incident was initially investigated by respondent PNCCs toll way patrol,
Salvanera, and respondent Balubal, then head of traffic control and security department of
the South Luzon tollway.
Because of lack of adequate space, the bus was, towed by the PNCC patrol to its
compound where it was stored.
Petitioner made several requests for PNCC to release the bus, but respondent
Balubal denied the same. Respondent Balubal instead demanded P40,000.00, for PNCCs
estimate of the cost of reconstruction of the damaged radio room. By petitioners estimate,
however, the damage amounted to P10,000.00 only.
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property (replevin) with
damages against respondents PNCC and Balubal.
Issue:
WoN the owner of a personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a
depositary and recover damages for illegal distraint.
Held:
YES. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is
either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered,
and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the
same.
Petitioners ownership of the bus being admitted by respondents, consideration of
whether respondents have been wrongfully detaining it is in order.
Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident, the bus was towed by
respondents on the request of Lopera. It was thus not distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis.
The Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures. Thus, Section 2,
Article III provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable...
The seizure and impounding of petitioners bus, on Loperas request, were
unquestionably violative of the right to be let alone by the authorities as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
SUAREZ v SPS. EMBOY JR.
Facts:
Respondent spouses Felix and Marilou Emboy inherited a 222sq.m. lot, Lot No. 1907-A-2 covered
by TCT No. T-174880, from theirmother, Claudia. The lot was originally part of a bigger property, LotNo. 1907-
A, which was partitioned into 5 different lots for Claudiaand her siblings as inheritance from their parents Carlos
Padilla andAsuncion Pacres. In 2004, the respondents were asked by theircousins, the heirs of Vicente
(Claudia's brother) to vacate thesubject lot and transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5 which was a landlockedportion
without a right of way. The respondents refused, insistingthat Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-
2. Shortlythereafter, the respondents received a demand letter from counselof the petitioner, requiring them to
vacate the said lot on theinformation that petitioner had already purchased the said lot fromthe respondent's
relatives on Feb. 12, 2004. Respondents refusedand went on to file a complaint for nullification of the partition
andfor the issuance of new TCTs covering the heir's respective portionsof Lot No. 1907-A after examining the
records pertaining to thesubject lot and uncovering possible anomalies like forged signaturesand alterations in
the execution of a series of deeds of partitionrelative to the same lot.The petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer againstrespondents on Dec. 8, 2004 before the MTCC alleging that shebought the subject lot from
Remedios, Moreno, Veronica andDionesia, the registered owners thereof and the persons whoallowed the
respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance
Felix and Marilou argued that the complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally
inadequate. There was practically no specific allegation as to when and how possession by
tolerance of them began.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint for unlawful detainer was inadequate.
Held:
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following requisites must be alleged:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show a
statement of facts to determine the class of case and remedies available to the
parties. When the complaint fails to state the facts constituting a forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how the dispossession started,
the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria.
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent.
Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the
subject lot and constructed a house upon it. Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent
about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how
and when such tolerance came about. Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal
conclusion, sans factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents initial occupation of the
subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents
became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lots possession after Carmencita, as
purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property. It
is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the
light of the respondents claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as
owners thereof.
We should stress that respondents claim to physical possession is based not on an
expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way
prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present
exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.
Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the CA did not
commit an error in dismissing Carmencita's complaint.
9. ASIS V ASIS
Facts
Respondent Consuelo Asis Vda. De Guevarra, claiming to be the owner of the
apartment units located at 1495, 1497 and 1499 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision, Paco, Manila,
filed separate ejectment cases with the MeTC of Manila against her brothers Romeo, Oscar
and Eduardo. In her complaint, respondent admits that the land on which the apartment units
were built are owned in common by her and her siblings but alleges that she alone owns the
apartment units, having paid for the construction of the same, and that the name of
petitioners had only been included in the title of the property at the instance and benevolence
of respondent. She then alleges that petitioners, as lessees of the apartment units, had been
paying her for several years monthly rentals of P500.00, P1,000.00 and P2,000.00
respectively, for their occupation of the apartment units. All of a sudden, and she states that
for no justifiable reason, petitioners stopped paying rent. Despite repeated demands, they
failed and refused to pay. When the matter could not be settled by the Barangay Lupon, a
Certification to File Action was issued. The cases against petitioners were then consolidated,
as they involved common issues and questions of fact and law.
In their respective Answers, petitioners claim that they are co-owners not only of the
lot but also of the apartment units, by virtue of inheritance, because it was their parents the
original owners of the land who had constructed the apartment units by way of loan and
mortgage of the land with the Philippine National Bank in 1964. They each claimed that they
have never paid any rental for the occupation of the apartment units to respondent. Petitioner
Eduardo added that any money he may have given to respondent was in the form
of abuloy (alms), since respondent was their eldest sister, and a widow without children. In
their petition with this Court, they admit to having previously paid the exact amounts specified
by respondent monthly, but averred that these were not rentals but contributions for the
upkeep and maintenance of the premises.
The records show that petitioners claim of co-ownership over the apartment units is
solely based on the principle of accession. They argue that since they can establish
possession of the apartment units during the lifetime of their parents who were then owners
of the parcel of land and the buildings/improvements situated thereon, then their inheritance
as compulsory heirs must necessarily include ownership not only of the land but also of the
improvements.
The MeTC ruled in favour of respondent, finding sufficient basis for the ejectment.
RTC reversed on the ground that the latter had no jurisdiction over the case since it involved
not only possession of the lot but of the rights of the parties on the building constructed
thereon.
Issue:
WoN the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear the case and that petitioners could not be
ejected because they are co-owners of the apartment unit.
Held:
YES. In an action fo unlawful detainer, the municipal or metropolitan trial court has
jurisdiction when the plaintiff really and primarily seeks the restoration of possession; even if
there is possession. As long as the issue of ownership of the dispute property to determine
who has prior possession. As long as the issue of ownership is to be ascertained ONLY for
the purpose of determining the issue, then the court canmeke a declaration who among the
contending parties is the real owner of the property. And such pronouncement is to be
regarded involving title to the disputed property.
Petitioners cannot negate the jurisdiction of the MeTC by invoking the Chua Peng
Hian case. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the RTC erred when it was applied to the case
at bar. What was filed therein was an action for specific performance [with the then Court of
First Instance], and it was the defendant there who raised the issue that the CFI ha no
jurisdiction. Implying that the case was really an issue of possession. Thus, it was in this
context that this Court held that the CFI had jurisdiction over the case, not only because the
issues raised do not only involve the possession of the land, but also the rights of the parties
to the building constructed thereon.
From the foregoing, it is clear that unless petitioners are able to show that the
real purpose of the action for ejectment is to recover title to the property, or otherwise show
that the issue of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, then the municipal or
metropolitan trial court retains jurisdiction. This the petitioners failed to prove.
Finally, a careful evaluation of the records of this case also convinces us that the
findings of the MeTC are in order, insofar as to the validity of the grant of eviction. Again, we
stress that the decision of the MeTC finding respondent as the owner of the apartment units
is merely to determine the right of possession. It will not bar any of the parties from filing a
suit with the proper court to determine conclusively the title to the disputed property.

TITLE:
10. Republic of the Philippines and National Power Corporation vs. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation
G.R. NO.:
194880
DATE:
June 30, 2012
PONENTE:
Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno
DOCTRINE:
The mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination ofthe cases subject of summary procedure. To achieve
this, rules like Section 19 of the Revised Rule on SummaryProcedure were created to
bar petitions for relief from judgment, or petitions for certiorari, mandamus,
or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court in order to avoid wh
at former Chief Justice
Panganiban calls a sorry spectacle of a counterproductive ping pong every time
a party is aggrieved by an
interlocutory order.
FACTS:
Petitioners Republic and NAPOCOR are registered co-owners of a parcel of land
which they leased to theTechnology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a
period of 25 years ending on December 31, 2002. TheTRCFI was given the right to
sublease this land, which it did, to Sunvar, through sublease agreements with
thecommon provision that their sublease agreements were going to expire on
December 31, 2002, the date that the
TRCFIs lease agreements with
the petitioners would expire.
In 1987, when the government was reorganized, the TCFRI was replaced with the
Philippine DevelopmentAlternatives Foundation (PDAF). Before the expiration date,
Sunvar wrote to PDAF and expressed its desire torenew the sublease over the subject
property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another25
years. PDAF forwarded the letter to petitioners. By June 25, 2002, PDAF had informed
Sunvar of petitioners
decisions not to renew the lease.When the lease contract and the sublease
agreements expired, petitioners recovered all the rights over thesubject property.
Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property.Six years after the
expiry date, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
advisedrespondent Sunvar to vacate the subject property. Although Sunvar duly
received the Notice, it did not vacate
the property. Almost a year after the first notice, respondent Sunvar received from res
pondent OSG a final notice tovacate within 15 days. When the period lapsed,
respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property.Petitioners then filed a
Complaint for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City.Sunvar moved to dismiss the complaint, questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC
as the action was supposed to an
accion publiciana rather than one for unlawful detainer. The MeTC denied
respondents Motion to Dismiss and
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and required Sunvar to submit their
Answer.Despite filing an Answer, Sunvar still filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with
the RTC of Makati City to
assail the denial by the MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss.
To answer this petition, petitioners questioned
the RTC
s jurisdiction and prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition. The RTC denied the
motion for
dismissal and granted the Rule 65 Petition, directing the MeTC to dismiss the
Complaint for unlawful detainer forlack of jurisdiction. Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC violate the Rules on Summary Procedure when it took cognizance and
granted the certiorari petition filed by Sunvar?
HELD:
YES
RATIO:
The RTC should have dismissed
Sunvars petition
outright for being a prohibited pleading.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an
interlocutory orderissued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited
pleading.
According to former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, the proper remedy in such
cases is an ordinaryappeal from an adverse judgment on the merits incorporating in
said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the
sorry spectacle of a
case being subject of a counterproductive ping pong to and from the appellate Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the
court as often as a trial courtis perceived to have made an error in any of its Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited pleading
interlocutory rulings RULING 1. The Petition is meritorious. First, in forcible entry, one employs force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of
11. [G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002] TERESITA BONGATO, Petitioner, v. Spouses
land or building. [13] Thus, the plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession
SEVERO A. MALVAR and TRINIDAD MALVAR,Respondents.
of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant Second, as a
general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
FACTS: 1. The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or
against petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that petitioner Bongato unlawfully
before the same judge. Third, factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed
entered a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-16200 belonging to the said spouses
by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the review of
and erected thereon a house of light materials. 2. The petitioner filed a motion for
such findings is not a function that this Court normally undertakes. [24] However, this
extension of time to file an answer which the MTCC denied; it being proscribed under
Rule is not absolute; it admits of exceptions, such as (1) when the findings are
the Rule on Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice of hearing 3. With
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower courts
a new counsel, petitioner filed an answer which the MTCC disregarded, the same
inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
having been filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period 4. with still another
when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the
counsel of the Public Attorneys Office, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss which the
findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the
MTCC denied as being contrary to the Rule on Summary Procedure. 5. MTCC
admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which -- if
rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate the land in question, and to pay
properly considered -- will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a
rentals, attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit 6. The decision was affirmed by
misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
respondent RTC judge. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 7. respondent
mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the
Judge issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration only insofar as to
absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record 2. The property
determine the location of the houses 8. The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim.
involved in these two criminal cases and in the instant case for forcible entry is one
Case No. 4659) was filed by private respondents Malvar against petitioner Bongato.
and the same -- petitioners house. The allegation of petitioner that there is only one
The case is still pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City. 9.
house involved in these three cases has not been controverted by respondents.
petitioner filed a motion for extension of the March 29, 1994 deadline for the
Neither was there evidence presented to prove that, indeed, she had constructed
submission of the relocation survey and to move the deadline 10. respondent Judge
one house on Lot 1 and another on Lot 10-A. On the contrary, she correctly points out
noted that no survey report was submitted and ordered the record of the case
that the house involved in these three cases is found on one and the same location
returned to the court of origin for disposal 11. CA held that the lot referred to in the
Based on these factual antecedents, there is cogent basis for petitioners contention
present controversy was different from that involved in the anti-squatting case.[6] It
that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction in this case. In the case at bar, the MTCC should
further ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction, and that it
have squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of erroneously holding that it
did not err in rejecting petitioners Motion to Dismiss. The appellate court reasoned
was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Because the
that the MTCC had passed upon the issue of ownership of the property merely to
Complaint for forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on
determine possession -- an action that did not oust the latter of its jurisdiction
Summary Procedure was applicable. Finally, the MTCC should have taken into
account petitioners Answer, in which she averred that she had been in constant
ISSUE Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not finding
occupation on said land in question since birth on March 17, 1941 up to the present,
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint was filed beyond the one-
being an heir of the late Emiliana Eva-Bongato who inherited said property from her
year period from date of alleged entry
father Raymundo Eva with considerable improvements thereon. It should have heard
and received the evidence adduced by the parties for the precise purpose of
determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter.[65] And
after such hearing, it could have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.[66] In this
way, the long, drawn out proceedings that took place in this case could have been
avoided 7. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The Complaint for forcible entry is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction
12. Sarmiento vs CA 250 SCRA 108
FACTS:
Cruz was the owner of a parcel of land. Adjacent to this lot is one wherein Sarmiento
had a house built on. On trying to cause the relocation of her lot, Cruz found out that
Sarmiento was encroaching on her property. When Cruz talked to Sarmiento about
constructing a new fence, which will cover her true property, the latter vehemently
refused to do so and threatened Cruz with legal action. For fear of being sued in
court, she sought judicial relief. The trial court decided in favor of Cruz. Sarmiento
tried to assail this decision by saying that the issue was on ownership of the portion of
land and thus, the action should have been an accion reivindicatoria and not
forcible entry.
HELD:
A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by Cruz reveals
that the action is neither of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially
involves a boundary dispute, which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on
the issue of ownership over the portion of a lot.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are distinct actions.
Cruz cannot belatedly claim that petitioners possession of the controverted
portion was by mere tolerance. The complaint didnt characterize
Sarmientos alleged entry on the landwhether legal or illegal. The complaint
admitted also of the fact that the fence had already preexisted on the lot when she
acquired the same.
This was definitely not a situation obtained in and gave rise to an
ejectment suit for two reasons. First, forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the lawful possessor, the violation of which
right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for in the
Rules. Second, if a forcible entry action in the court is allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be no action of forcible
entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, the plaintiff may just throw in a demand, file a suit in court and summarily
throw him out of the land.
G.R. No. 169380 November 26, 2012
13. FIORELLO R. JOSE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERTO ALFUERTO,
Facts:
The land in Paraaque City, was registered under the name Ronaldo Chua Sing
which he purchased on 1991. On 1999, Chua Sing leased the property to the
petitioner. Their contract of lease was neither notarized nor registered with the
Registry of Deeds. he term of the lease shall be FIVE (5) years and (5yrs again) upon
mutual agreement of the parties to commence upon the total eviction of any
occupant or occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers all its rights and prerogative to
evict said occupants in favor of the LESSEE which shall be responsible for all expenses
that may be incurred without reimbursement from the LESSOR. It is understood
however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor of the LESSEE any and all
damages that may be recovered from the occupants.
On the other hand, respondent already occupying the land even before the lease
was constructed. Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the lease contract, the
petitioner demanded respondents to vacate the property within 30 days and that
they pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property. The
respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. Petitioner filed an ejectment case
against respondents before the MeTC. Petitioner claimed that as lessee of the subject
property, he had the right to eject the respondents who unlawfully occupy the land.
The respondents likewise pointed out that they have been in possession of the land
long before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and that the lease contract
between the petitioner and Chua Sing does not affect their right to possess the land.
The respondents also presented a Deed of Assignment,14 dated February 13, 2000,
issued by David R. Dulfo in their favor.
The MeTC resolved the case in the petitioners favor and that the respondents had
no right to possess the land and that their occupation was merely by the owners
tolerance. The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision that a case for ejectment was
proper. The petitioner, as lessee, had the right to file the ejectment complaint; the
respondents occupied the land by mere tolerance and their possession became
unlawful upon the petitioners demand to vacate on April 28, 1999. Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions.
ISSUES: 1. Whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.
2. Whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated as accion publiciana
HELD:
1. No. Unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy for the present case.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property.
This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as
his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied
contract between them. However, the defendants possession became illegal when
the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the
defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be
instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of possession. The allegations in the
complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.
The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the
absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the
proper remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction
over the case. The petitioners allegations in the amended complaint run counter to
the requirements for unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the possession
of the defendant was originally legal and his possession was permitted by the owner
through an express or implied contract.
Respondents occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual
or legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendants possession becomes
illegal only upon the plaintiffs demand for the defendant to vacate the property
and the defendants subsequent refusal. In the present case, the defendants
occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand letters were written by the
petitioners counsel. Under these allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession
should not be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged
unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date. No allegation in the
complaint nor any supporting evidence on record, however, shows when the
respondents entered the property or who had granted them permission to enter.
Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim regarding "tolerance"
cannot be upheld. Tolerance or permission must have been present at the beginning
of possession; if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed. the CA correctly
ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry an action that
had already prescribed, however, when the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999.
The prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date
of defendants actual entry into the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.
the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance
must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry.
Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons:
First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided
for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed,
then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived
his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the
inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well
be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in
the inferior court upon plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in and
summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if
we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are summary in nature, and that the one-year time-bar to the suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action.
2. No. The Court cannot treat an ejectment case as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. Forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry
should be filed within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property,
while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real
property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to the
physical possession of the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of
litigation is the better right to possession over the real property. Third, an action for
forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion
publiciana is a plenary action in the RTC. The cause of action in ejectment is different
from that in an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is
brought before the proper inferior court to recover physical possession only or
possession de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry
cases are not processes to determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC
on the issue of ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is
therefore inconclusive.47 Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto,
ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for the recovery
of possession) and accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary
actions.48 The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to
be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and
expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly
taking and continuing his possession during the long period it would take to properly
resolve the issue of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the
maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally
deprived of possession might take the law in his hands and seize the property by
force and violence.49 An ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial
for the purpose of determining rights of possession or ownership. DENY the petition,
and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' decision.
14. [G.R. No. 157536. May 16, 2005]
MELCHOR CARO, petitioner, vs. SUSANA SUCALDITO
FACTS:
Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land on October 21, 1953 situated in Sitio in Iloilo
City, consisting more or less of 17.9849 hectares. Then, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of
the said lot to his son Melchor Caro, consisting of 70,124 square meters and executed
a Deed of Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973. On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro
applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands, District Land Office No. 6-1,
covering the said area of the property which he bought from his father. The
application was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. De la Cruz testified
that the land in controversy was bought by him from Cipriano Gallego in 1965; that
he thereafter occupied, possessed and improved the land by planting coconut
trees; and that in 1968 he was forcibly driven out by Gregorio Caro from the land in
question. The Regional Director rendered a Decision canceling the application.
Caro filed a Complaint against Sucaldito for Annulment of Title, Decision, Free Patent
and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession with Damages before the RTC.
Caro alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject lot in favor of
Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right whatsoever over the subject
lot. Hence, as a trustee of a constructive trust, she was obliged to return the same to
him as the lawful owner.
The trial court ruled that Caro had no personality to file the action for the annulment
of the free patent issued in favor of Sucaldito, which could only be brought by the
Solicitor General. The appellate court agreed with the ruling of the RTC that the
petitioner had no personality to file the action under Section 101 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, considering further that he was a mere applicant for a free patent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the personality to file a suit for reconveyance.
HELD:
None. Petitioner has no personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject
property. The Court notes that the petitioners complaint before the RTC prays for the
annulment of the free patent issued in the respondents favor. Considering that the
ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to return the subject property to him, it is in
reality an action for reconveyance. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court
held that [t]he essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer
of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
persons name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. Indeed, in an action
for reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not go back to the
State. Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to
revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering
that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit. Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as
a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material
interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished
from a mere incidental interest in the question involved. Clearly then, a suit filed by
one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not
being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent,
cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for
reconveyance.
In fact, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 states
Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth
[now Republic] of the Philippines
Under Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead may bring the action for reversion. Denied. Affirm.
15. G.R. No. 170189
SPOUSES ELEGIO* CAEZO and DOLIA CAEZO vs SPOUSES APOLINARIO and
CONSORCIA L. BAUTISTA
FACTS:
Spouses Elegio and Dolia Caezo are the registered owner[s] of a parcel of land.
Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia Bautista are the registered owners of a parcel of
land. Both parcels of land are located in Mandaluyong City and registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Appellants lot is adjacent to that of
appellees. In 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot. During
the construction, appellees discovered that their lot was encroached upon by the
structures built by appellants without appellees knowledge and consent. Despite oral
and written demands, appellants failed and refused to remove the structures
encroaching appellees lot. Appellees initiated a complaint with the RTC for the
issuance of a writ of demolition.
For failure to file an Answer within the extended period granted by the court,
appellants were declared in default. Appellees were allowed to present their
evidence ex parte before an appointed commissioner. Thereafter the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of the spouses Caezo. The trial court also ordered the issuance of a
writ of demolition directing the removal of the structures built by the spouses Bautista
on the portion of the land belonging to the spouses Caezo. The appellate court
rendered its Decision which reversed of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Writ of Demolition with Damages is an action to recover a
parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria
HELD:
YES. Article 434 of the Civil Code reads: In an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendants claim. Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of
ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper
regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. In order that
an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is indispensable, in accordance with
the precedents established by the courts, that the party who prosecutes it must fully
prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the
same.[9] However, although the identity of the thing that a party desires to recover
must be established, if the plaintiff has already proved his right of ownership over a
tract of land, and the defendant is occupying without right any part of such tract, it is
not necessary for plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the portions
occupied by the defendant within the plaintiffs property.
The spouses Caezo were able to establish their ownership of the encroached
property. Aside from testimonial evidence, the spouses Caezo were also able to
present documentary and object evidence which consisted of photographs, transfer
certificates of title,] and a relocation survey plan. The relocation survey plan also
corroborated Elegio Caezos testimony on the reason for the spouses Bautistas
attitude regarding the encroached property. The relocation survey plan showed that
the spouses Bautistas property encroached upon that of the spouses Caezo by 0.97
centimeters, while the spouses Bautistas property was encroached upon by 1.01
centimeters by another landowner.
The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses Bautista
were aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the owner of Lot 15 and thus they
made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the spouses Caezo. This
awareness of the two encroachments made the spouses Bautista builders in bad
faith. The spouses Caezo are entitled to the issuance of a writ of demolition in their
favor and against the spouses Bautista, in accordance with Article 450 of the Civil
Code. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. A writ of demolition of the encroaching
structures should be issued against and at the expense of Spouses Apolinario and
Consorcia L. Bautista upon the finality of this judgment
16. Emilia vs. Bado
Doctine: When the owner is unlawfully deprived of his possession, he has ample
remedies to seek its recovery, such as by accion reinvindicatoria (recovery of
ownership), and accion interdictal (unlawful detainer or forcible entry), including the
applicable ancillary remedies appurtenant thereto.
FACTS: On December 12, 1963 with the complaint, as amended, that on or about
December 1, 1962, defendants, confederating and helping one another, entered
plaintiff's land and commenced the construction of a house of light materials on the
northern boundary of her Lot 1131 in Iligan City bordering the bank of Salabao Creek,
covered by her Torrens Title 0-267; that the continuance of such act against the will of
plaintiff would cause great and irreparable damage and injury and injustice to her;
and that there is no other plan, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Whereupon, she prayed for preliminary and final injunction and damages.
Preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte.
Emilia said complaint was met by defendants' motion to dismiss upon the ground of
lack of cause of action. They attached to their motion the sketch of a private land
surveyor, Flordelito Aragon, and his affidavit, both of which were intended to convey
the alleged fact that the new house being constructed was inside defendant
Glicerio Bado's Lot 2894 (covered by his Torrens Title 0-275) being held by him. They
averred, too, that the house did not encroach upon the boundaries of plaintiff's
adjoining property (Lot 1131). The belief that procedural niceties should not bar
consideration of the equities of the case, the trial court, on the face of the conflicting
assertions of fact, called for a summary hearing.
On February 27, 1964, the trial court came out with an order sustaining the motion to
dismiss. The court gave credence to the testimony of surveyor Flordelito Aragon (also
a deputy public land surveyor) that the house under construction was within Glicerio
Bado's Lot 2894 (Torrens Title 0-275) and not on plaintiff's Lot 1131 (Torrens Title 0-267).
The trial court took the position that to stop defendants from building a house within
Glicerio Bado's lot "would be tantamount to depriving the enjoyment of his lawful
dominical rights; that even on the assumption that defendant Glicerio Bado's title to
Lot 2894 was obtained through fraud, as plaintiff avers, nonetheless, said title subsists
until declared null and void by a competent court; and that these circumstances
would tie up the hands of the court from granting the relief prayed for. Whereupon,
the court dissolved the preliminary injunction theretofore issued, and dismissed the
complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not injuction is the proper remedy in the premise?
HELD:
No. Plaintiff's principal suit for injunction cannot, at bottom, prosper because there is amicably settle before the Barangay. On the other hand, the defendants claim that
an adequate remedy in law open to her. It is elementary to the point of triteness that petitioners failed to state grounds for unlawful detainer (prior physical possession of
the special remedy of injunction may not issue where there is a plain, speedy and the property or that they were the lessors thereof). In the alternative, private
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
respondents claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in
It is in line with the principle just enunciated that in affirming Devesa vs. Arbes, supra,
Palafox vs. Madamba, 19 Phil. 444, 446, declared in no uncertain terms that injunction open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as
is not the appropriate remedy where "there exists the ordinary remedy of action for attested by an ocular inspection report from the DENR.
property of possession, which may be either plenary or summary, according to the MTC: ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
method by which she may have been deprived of her alleged possession." A long RTC: affirmed MTC
line of cases has since then stabilized the principle. CA: reversed RTC and said that plaintiffs failed to allege prior material possession
There are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) which is mandatory in forcible entry nor was their tolerance on the part of the owner
the summary action for forcible entry (where preliminary mandatory injunction may
to make out a case for unlawful detainer
be sought within ten days from the filing of the complaint under Article 539 of the Civil
Code) or illegal detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is
brought within one year in the municipal court; (b) the accion publiciana, which is for
the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil ISSUES: whether petitioners have made a clear case of unlawful detainer/ whether
proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (c) accin de reivindicacin, which seeks MTC had jurisdiction
the recovery of ownership, which includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, also
brought in the Court of First Instance.12
Plaintiff Cirila Emilia claims ownership of a 48-square meter portion of land, which she
HELD/RATIO:NO. The case was actually one for forcible entry and not unlawful
avers is covered by Torrens title in her name. Defendant Glicerio Bado, on the other
hand, also professes ownership over the same portion of land backed up, too, by a detainer. MTC had no jurisdiction.
Torrens title in his name. From these two directly opposing positions, a legitimate issue
of ownership emerges. This guides us to no other conclusion than that plaintiff Cirila Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry and
Emilia should have brought suit for ownership (accin de reivindicacin). Correctly unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real
did the trial judge dissolve the preliminary injunction wrongfully issued and refuse the property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in
grant of a perpetual injunction sought by her.
unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination
of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are
17. Spouses Valdez Jr. v. CA
distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the
489 SCRA 369
defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de
facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
FACTS: The case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed
Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca
acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which
Fabella before the MTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs are
is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the
the registered owners of a residential lot at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz,
start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Indeed, to vest
Antipolo, Rizal which they acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. by virtue of Sales
the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the
Contract. It is alleged also that defendants, without any color of title, occupied the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within
said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
rightful possession thereof; that they were asked several times to peacefully surrender
summary in nature. The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was
the premises to the plaintiffs but the defendants refused and likewise did not want to
illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint,
considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house
thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their
mother. Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without
the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth
which is forcible entry. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case. Petition denied and CA decision affirmed.
1. Galang vs. Reyes
FACTS: Spouses Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties:(1) a subdivision
project known as Ponderosa Heights Subdivision , and (2) an adjoining property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 185252, with an area of 1,201 sq.m
where the properties were separated by the Marigman Creek which dried up
sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through Ponderosa. That
the Galangs, by employing manipulation and fraud, were able to obtain a certificate
of title over the dried up creek bed DENR, through its PENRO. That they discovered
the existence of the certificate of title sometime in March 1997 when their caretaker,
Enteroso informed them that the subject property had been fraudulently titled in the
names of the Galangs; that in 1984, prior to such discovery, Enteroso applied for the
titling of the property, as he had been occupying it since 1968 and had built his
house on it; that, later, Enteroso requested them to continue the application
because of financial constraints on his part;5 that they continued the application, but
later learned that the application papers were lost in the Assessors Office; 6 and that
as the owners of the land where the new course of water passed, they are entitled to
the ownership of the property to compensate them for the loss of the land being
occupied by the new creek.
The Galang denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and
countered that it was issued to them after they had complied with the free patent
requirements of DENR,through PENRO. that they and their predecessor-in-interest had
been in possession, occupation, cultivation, and ownership of the land for quite some
time; that the property described under TCT No. 185252 belonged to Apolonio
Galang, their predecessor-in-interest, under OCT No. 3991; that the property was
transferred in the names of the Reyeses through falsified document;8 that assuming ex
gratia argumenti that the creek had indeed changed its course and passed through
Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already claimed for themselves the portion of the dried
creek which adjoined and co-existed with their property; that Enteroso was able to
occupy a portion of their land by means of force, coercion, machinations, and
stealth in 1981; that such unlawful entry was then the subject of an Accion Publiciana
before the RTC of Antipolo City and they filed a case for the annulment of the
property against spouses Galangs.
RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for being an erroneous
remedy.
CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and ordered the cancellation of the
property and the reconveyance of the land to the Reyeses.
ISSUE:
Whether the Reyeses can file the present action for annulment of a free patent title
and reconveyance; (2) if they can, whether they were able to prove their cause of
action against the Galangs.
HELD:
In this case, the complaint instituted by the Reyeses before the RTC was for the
annulment of the title issued to the Galangs, and not for reversion. Thus, the real party
in interest here is not the State but the Reyeses who claim a right of ownership over
the property in question even before the issuance of a title in favor of the Galangs.
Although the Reyeses have the right to file an action for reconveyance, they have
failed to prove their case.
Thus, on the second issue, the Court agrees with the RTC that the Reyeses failed to
adduce substantial evidence to establish their allegation that the Galangs had
fraudulently registered the subject property in their names.
The CA reversed the RTC decision giving the reason that the property was the former
bed of Marigman Creek, which changed its course and passed through their
Ponderosa property, thus, ownership of the subject property was automatically
vested in them.
If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and
passed through the property of the claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461, the
ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course
was automatically acquired by the claimant.18 Before such a conclusion can be
reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is,
it must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-
made intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove three key
elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old course of the
creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3) the change of course of the creek
from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence.
In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old
course, its natural abandonment and the new course.
#2 Gulla vs Heirs of Labrador
FACTS:
Respondent Labradors filed a complaint against the spouses Pelagio and Perlita Gulla in the
RTC of Iba, Zambales for "Cancellation of Tax Declaration and Recovery of Possession with
Damages". The complaint involved two lots abutting the titled property. According to the Labradors,
the property was declared for taxation purposes under their names and the corresponding taxes were
paid thereon. In 1996, the spouses Gulla occupied a portion of the property fronting the China Sea, as
well as the lot within the salvage area. The spouses Gulla then constructed a house and fenced thereon.
The Labradors pointed out that whatever alleged claims the spouses Gulla had on the property was
acquired through a Deed of Waiver of Rights executed in their favor by another "squatter" Alfonso
Bactad. To verify the exact location of the portion, a verification survey of the land was conducted in
the presence of Pelagio Gulla. Geodetic Engineer Crisostomo A. Magarro prepared a sketch indicating
portions occupied by the spouses Gulla, as well as a report.
For their part, the petitioners claimed that they have been in the possession of the property for
since 1984 and declared the property for taxation purposes under their names in Tax Declaration. In
1994, they filed an application for miscellaneous sales patent which was certified as alienable and
disposable land by the barangay captain, former Mayor Edilberto A. Abille, and Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer Jaime Centeno. The property was likewise declared for
taxation purposes in their names.
In 1998, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of the Labradors, ordering the spouses Gulla to
vacate that portion of the property. The Labradors were able to establish ownership over the subject
property, as evidenced by the title under their name. For their part, the defendant-spouses failed to
overcome the evidence of the plaintiffs, and not being the riparian owners of Lot A which is within the
salvage zone, they have no right to possess the same. The RTC rendered judgment affirming the
appealed decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the possession of the area outside the titled property
of the respondent and are within the Salvage Zone.
RULING: No. petitoners should be ejected even if the portion occupied by them is in the salvage
zone. The ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially (Article 440, Civil
Code). Accession is the right of an owner of a thing to the products of said thing as well as to whatever
is inseparably attached thereto as an accessory.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the area is outside the titled property of the respondents and is
within the salvage zone adjacent to respondents' property. However, while it is true that the salvage
zone cannot be the subject of commerce, the adjoining owner thereof, the respondents in this case, has
the priority to use it. Otherwise stated, herein do not own the salvage zone but as an adjacent owner, he
has the right to use it more than the petitioners applying the basic rule as stated above.
Moreover, the law provides the different modes of acquiring ownership, namely: (a) occupation; (b)
intellectual creation; (c) law; (d) donation; (e) succession; (f) tradition, as a consequence of certain
contracts; and (g) prescription. It will be noted that accession is not one of those listed therein. It is
therefore safe to conclude that accession is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The reason is simple:
accession presupposes a previously existing ownership by the owner over the principal. This is not
necessarily so in the other modes of acquiring ownership. Therefore, accession is a right implicitly
included in ownership, without which it will have no basis or existence. (p. 179, Paras, Vol. II,
Thirteenth Edition (1994), Civil Code). In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure),
requiring no prior act on the part of the owner of the principal (Villanueva v. Claustro, 23 Phil. 54).
#3 Equatorial Realty and Development vs. Mayfair Theater Inc.
FACTS:
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with two 2-storey buildings at Claro M. Recto
Avenue, Manila, and covered by TCT No. 18529.
On June 1, 1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. fpr 20 years. The
lease covered a portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a two-storey building with about 1,610
square meters of floor area, which respondent used as Maxim Theater.
Two years later, on March 31, 1969, Mayfair entered into a second Lease with Carmelo for another
portion of the latters property this time, a part of the second floor of the two-storey building, and two
store spaces on the ground floor. In that space, Mayfair put up another movie house known as Miramar
Theater. The Contract of Lease was likewise for a period of 20 years.
Both leases contained a clause giving Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject properties.
Sadly, on July 30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject properties were sold by Carmelo
to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. for eleven million smackers, without their first being offered to
Mayfair.
As a result of the sale of the subject properties to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila for the recission of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and
Equatorial, specific performance, and damages. RTC decided for Carmelo and Equatorial. Tsk tsk.
CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. The SC denied a petition questioning the CA decision. What
happened is that the contract did get rescinded, Equatorial got its money back and asserted that Mayfair
have the right to purchase the lots for 11 million bucks.
Decision became final and executory, so Mayfair deposited with the clerk the 11M (less 847grand
withholding) payment for the properties (Carmelo somehow disappeared).
Meanwhile, on Sept 18, 1997, barely five months after Mayfair submitted its Motion for Execution,
Equatorial demanded from Mayfair backrentals and reasonable compensation for the Mayfairs
continued use of the subject premises after its lease contracts expired. Remember that Mayfair was still
occupying the premises during all this hullabaloo.
ISSUE: Whether or not Equatorial was the owner of the subject property and could thus enjoy the
fruits and rentals.
RULING: NO. Nor right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial since there was
failure to deliver the property to the buyer. Compound this with the fact that the sale was even
rescinded.
The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that belonged to the owner of the property
producing it by right of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the
sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property
during that period.We remember from SALES that in a contract of sale, one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the other to pay
therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to
him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an
agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. This right is transferred,
not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. There is delivery if and when the thing sold is
placed in the control and possession of the vendee.
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the
thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It is nullified by the failure
of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.
For property to be delivered, we need two things. Delivery of property or title, and transfer of control
or custody to the buyer. Possession was never acquired by the petitioner. It therefore had no rights to
rent.
#4 Sulo ng Nayon, Inc. vs. Nayong Pilipino
FACTS:
In 1975, respondent leased a portion of the Nayong Pilipino Complex, to petitioner Sulo sa
Nayon, Inc. for the construction and operation of ahotel building, to be known as the Philippine
VillageHotel. The lease was for an initial period of 21 years, or until May 1996. It is renewable for a
period of 25years under the same terms and conditions upon due notice in writing to respondent of the
intention torenew.
In 1995, petitioners sent respondent a letter notifying the latter of their intention to renew the
contract for another. July of the same year, parties agreed to the renewal of the contract for another
25years, or until 2021. Under the new agreement, petitioner PVHI was bound to pay the monthly
rentals. Beginning January 2001, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their monthly rental.
Respondent repeatedly demanded petitioners to pay the arrears and vacate the premises.
MeTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent. RTC which modified the ruling of the
MeTC.CA which held that the RTC erroneously applied the rules on accession, as found in Articles448
and 546 of the Civil Code
ISSUE: Whether or not the rules on accession, as found in Articles 448 and 556 of the Civil Code,
apply to the improvements made by the lessee?
HELD: No. Article 448 is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds, plants, or
sows on land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to lands where the only
interest of the builder, planter or sower is that of a holder, such as a tenant.
In the case at bar, petitioners have no adverse claim or title to the land. In fact, as lessees, they
recognize that the respondent is the owner of the land. What petitioners insist is that because of the
improvements, which are of substantial value, that they have introduced on the leased premises with
the permission of respondent, they should be considered builders in good faith who have the right to
retain possession of the property until reimbursement by respondent.
We affirm the ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable improvements on the leased
premises does not give the petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully
belongs to a builder in good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the lessee to easily
"improve" the lessor out of its property. We reiterate the doctrine that a lessee is neither a builder in
good faith nor in bad faith that would call for the application of Articles 448and 546 of the Civil Code.
His rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code
#5) PNB vs. De Jesus
Facts:
In 1995, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before RTC for
recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, over the property. In his
complaint, respondent stated that he had acquired a parcel of land situated in
Occidental Mindoro, and that in 1993, he had caused a verification survey of the
property and discovered that the northern portion of the lot was being encroached
upon by a building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters. Despite two
letters of demand sent by respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the
area.
 Petitioner asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building sometime in
1981 from then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in
existence and to remedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area in
question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to petitioner at P100.00 per square
meter which offer the latter has accepted. The sale, however, did not materialize
when, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later
mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines.
The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be the
rightful owner of the disputed 124-square-meter portion of the lot and ordering
petitioner to surrender possession of the property to respondent and to cause, at its
expense, the removal of any improvement thereon. The Court of Appeals, on appeal,
sustained this decision.
Issue:
WON the petitioner is the rightful owner of the disputed portion of the lot
Held:
A builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the
builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land
Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He much choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the
building to instead remove it from the land. In order, however, that the builder can
invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a
choice be made by the landowner, he should be able to prove good faith on his
part.
Good faith implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith
lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is
considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode
of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Given the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, it should be evident
enough that petitioner would fall much too short from its claim of good faith.
Evidently, petitioner was quite aware, and indeed advised, prior to its acquisition of
the land and building from Ignacio that a part of the building sold to it stood on the
land not covered by the land conveyed to it.
#6) Macasaet vs. Macasaet
Facts:
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and
Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and
Teresita is his wife.
In 1997, the respondent parents filed with the MTCC of an ejectment suit
against the children. Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2)
parcels of land covered situated in Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease
agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them
as their residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite
repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per week.
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement.
They claimed that respondents had invited them to construct their residence and
business on the subject lots in order that they could all live near one other and to
foster family solidarity. They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the
land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children On the
other hand, the other lot was allegedly given to petitioners as payment for
construction materials used in the renovation of respondents house.
The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate
the premises. It opined that Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue
of a verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. On appeal,
the RTC upheld the findings of the MTCC. However, the RTC allowed respondents
to appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by petitioners, after
payment of the indemnity provided for by Article 448 of the Civil Code in relation to
Articles 546 and 548.
Issue:
WON Article 448 is applicable
Held:
In some special cases, the Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith
beyond its limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia, this provision was
applied to one whose house -- despite having been built at the time he was still co-
owner -- overlapped with the land of another. This article was also applied to cases
wherein a builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the owner. The
Court ruled that the law deemed the builder to be in good faith. In Sarmiento v.
Agana, the builders were found to be in good faith despite their reliance on the
consent of another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the owner of the land.
Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the present factual
milieu. The established facts of this case show that respondents fully consented to
the improvements introduced by petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied
the lots upon their invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved of the
construction of the improvements introduced thereon. Thus, petitioners may be
deemed to have been in good faith when they built the structures on those lots.
#7) Pleasantville Devt. Corp vs. CA
Facts:
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9
located at Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975,
respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot
9 was vacant. Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of
Deeds of Bacolod City a TCT in his name. It was then that he discovered that
improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had
taken possession thereof.
It appears that in, 1974 Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same
subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI). Under the Contract to Sell on
Installment, Kee could possess the lot even before the completion of all installment
payments. Amounts were paid by Kee prior to his taking actual possession of Lot 8.
After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through
its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kees wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect
Lot 8. Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter,
Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other
improvements on the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him.
The parties tried to reach an amicable settlement, but failed. On January 30, 1981,
Jardinicos lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all improvements and
vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the MTCC a
complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee.
Issue:
WON Kee is a builder in good faith
Held:
No. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building
on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. To demonstrate Kees
bad faith, petitioner points to Kees violation of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract
of Sale on Installment. However, such violations have no bearing whatsoever on
whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he
built the improvements on Lot 9. The Court also does not agree with the
interpretation of petitioner that Kee contracted away his right to recover damages
resulting from petitioners negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to public
policy and cannot be allowed. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.
#8) Reynante vs. CA
Facts:
More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the
late Don Cosme Carlosover a fishpond located and registered in Bulacan.
During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa hut where
he and his family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on
lots 1 and 2. These lots are located between the fishpond covered by the and the
Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Petitioner harvested and sold said nipa palms
without interference and prohibition from anybody. Neither did the late Don Cosme
Carlos question his right to plant the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest and
appropriate them as his own.
 After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs entered into a written 9. Augustine vs IAC
agreement petitioner Reynante whereby the latter for and in consideration of the sum
of P200,000.00 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme
Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker. Petitioner surrendered the
fishpond and the two huts located therein to private respondents. Private
respondents thereafter leased the said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz. Petitioner
continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care
of the nipa palms he had planted therein.

Private respondents then formally demanded that the petitioner vacate said
portion since according to them petitioner had already been indemnified for the
surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner refused and
failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2. Private respondents then filed a
complaint for forcible entry. The trial court rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint and finding that petitioner had been in prior possession of lots 1 and 2.

Issue:

WON prior possession is indicative of a better title

Held:

An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title to the
property is never determined. A party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of
his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

Hence, the Court of Appeals could not legally restore private respondents'
possession over lots 1 and 2 simply because petitioner has clearly proven that
he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2.

The evidence on record shows that petitioner was in possession of the

questioned lots for more than 50 years. It is undisputed that he was the caretaker of
the fishpond owned by the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and that
he constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and planted nipa palms therein.
 - Celestial contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Cachoperos petition
for certiorari as it is in the nature of an appeal falling within the jurisdiction of
the CA and that the Cachopero has not exhausted all administrative
remedies.
-
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition

(b) Whether or not the land in question owned by one of the parties when it is
classified as outside the commerce of man
HELD:

RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and SC over original petitions for
certiorari, prohibinition and mandamus.

- Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the

jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction
refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit and not
a commencement of a new action. In contrast, to invoke a courts jurisdiction
to issue the writ of certiorari requires the commencement of a new and
original action therefore, independent of the proceedings which gave rise to
the questioned decision or order. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
10. Celestial vs. Cachopero Supreme Court over original petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Section 21 of B.P. 129.
-
RACHEL C. CELESTIAL v. JESSE CACHOPERO
A dried up creek is property of public dominion and not susceptible to acquisitive
- Petitioner Rachel Celestial is the sister of defendant Jesse Cachopero. They
prescription
had a dispute over a piece of land which was a dried-up creek, as
Cachopero was trying to obtain a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) to
As for Celestials claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) alleging that
of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and
he had been the owner of that land whereon he built a house and other
that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22,
improvements.
1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right
- Celestial protests that she has preferential right over the land because it is
of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the
adjacent to and is the only outlet from her house.
Civil Code, the same must fail.
- According to the Bureau of Land, the land in dispute was a creek and is
therefore outside the commerce of man. The first MSA was denied by the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) prompting Cachopero to obtain another MSA
which was granted by the DENR. Due to conflicting interests of the parties, the
land in dispute must be sold in a publicauction.
- Cachopero then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the DENR with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) but was denied. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is
only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
11. Modrante vs CA (not avail)
12. Jagualing vs CA
FACTS:
Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents, which later
increased in size due to erosion caused by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing asked
her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they prevent squatters to
come to the area.
The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs
of Antonio Factura which was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the
amicable settlement of the parties. In the amicable settlement the heirs of Antonio
Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of the land with an area of 1,289 square meters
more or less to Eduave.
Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that they
are the real owners of the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square
meters more or less. According to them, they acquired the land by acquisitive
prescription since they have occupied the land since 1969. They presented tax
declarations and photos of actual occupation to prove claim of prescription.
Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in
question against Jagualing. RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to
establish by preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over the land in
litigation and that the land is a delta thus is part of public domain not susceptible of
appropriation.
The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and
subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles
463 and 465 of the Civil Code the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true owners of the land subject
of this case and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of
the land to private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?
HELD: No.
From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the finding that the
property of Eduave actually existed and was identified prior to the branching off or
division of the river. The CA, therefore, properly applied Article 463 of the Civil Code
which allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or isolated by river
movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to such separation or isolation.
The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and
non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it
increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of
alluvial deposits. In this regard the CA also did not err in applying Article 465 of the
Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land along the
nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer
than the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the
owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their property along the
margin of the river.
It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This
preferential right is, under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in
the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the best position
to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific act of
possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner fails to assert
his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as
indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens system must itself still be
registered.
However, Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the required
period and their possession cannot be considered in good faith since by their
admission they have recognized Eduaves ownership over the land. Thus the land still
belongs to Eduave.
Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin.
However such accretion may be lost to third parties thru prescription.
13. OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR vs. EBIO
FACTS: Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land
inParaaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio.Said land
was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.Respondents assert that the original occupant
and possessor land wastheir great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his
son, PedroValdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively
occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit
declaring possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter, Zenaida. In April
1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Paraaque
municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On April 21, 1987,
Pedro transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio.On March 30, 1999,
the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of
1990 seeking assistance from theCity Government of Paraaque for the construction
of an access road alongCut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed
road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot
occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and the project
was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when severalofficials from the
barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cuteight (8) coconut trees
planted on the said lot.On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days,or be
physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their
claim over the subject property and expressing intent for afurther dialogue. The
request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Paraaque
City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.
HELD:No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial
deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek.This being the
case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remainsin effect, in relation to Article 457 of the
Civil Code. ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong
to the owners of such lands.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the
banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been
added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription.
No matter how long the possession of the properties has been,there can be no
prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,the land which is
formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks
does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.
14. LUCASAN vs. PDIC
FACTS: Petitioner Inocencio Y. Lucasan (Lucasan) and his wife Julianita Sorbito (now
deceased) were the owners of Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E situated in Bacolod City,
which are subject to mortgage loan and for failure to pay, the lots were sold at
public auction and were awarded to PBC.
Lucasan and the mortgage banks, PNB and RPB did not redeem the properties within
the redemption period. PBC did not file a petition for consolidation of ownership.
In January 1997, Lucasan, through counsel, wrote a letter to the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC), PBCs receiver and liquidator seeking the cancellation
of the certificate of sale and offering to pay PBCs claim against Lucasan. Not long
thereafter, Lucasan paid his loans with the PNB and RPB. Consequently, the
mortgagee banks executed their respective releases of mortgage, resulting in the
cancellation of the prior encumbrances in favor of PNB and RPB.
On August 13, 2001, PDIC denied Lucasans request for the cancellation of the
certificate of sale. Consequently, RTC denied his motion for reconsideration. On
appeal, CA affirmed RTC declaring that Lucasan had already lost his right to redeem
the properties when he failed to exercise it within the prescribed period. Thus, it
vested ownership to PBC.
ISSUE: WON RTC correctly dismissed Lucasans complaint for quieting of title.
HELD: Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud of
doubt or uncertainty with respect to real property. The Civil Code authorizes the said
remedy in the following language:
ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the
action. He need not be in possession of said property.
To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.[20] Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a
legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some
deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.
The payment of loans made by Lucasan to PNB and RPB in 1997 cannot, in any way,
operate to restore whatever rights he had over the subject properties. Such payment
only extinguished his loan obligations to the mortgagee banks and the liens which
Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the registration of the notice of
embargo and certificate of sale.
15 LASQUITE vs. VICTORY HILLS
Facts:
1971: Jose Manahan executed a Deed of Quitclaim or Assignment of Rights in
over a parcel of land in favor of Conrado Lasquite.
Lasquite applied for a Free Patent over the lot. Pending the approval of the
application, he sold 1/2 of the land to Juanito Andrade.
Upon the grant of the patent application, OCTs were issued in their names.
1983: Prescillas filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands to question the grant of
free patent in favor of Lasquite and Andrade claiming that they have been in
possession of the lot since 1940.
Prescillas also instituted a case for reconveyance alleging that Lasquite forged
the signature of Jose Manahan in the deed since Manahan died prior to its
execution.
The Manahans filed complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and
damages.
Claiming to be the owner of the lot (OCT 380) which was allegedly registered in
1937 to to Jose Manahan by virtue of Homestead Patent, Victory Hills filed a
motion to intervene.
RTC upheld the title of Lasquite and Andrade. It disregarded OCT 380 and ruled
that it lacked the signature of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
which is a requirement for the patent's validity.
The CA reversed the RTC's ruling and declared victory Hills as the Absolute
owner of the lot.
Issues:
1. WON Victory Hills is entitled to reconveyance of the lot since their Homestead
Patent cannot be simply defeated by the subsequent grant of Free Patent to
Lasquite and Andrade.
2. WON the claim of Victoria Hills had prescribed.
Held:
1. No. To give OCT No. 380 probative value in court would be to allow variance or an
evasion or circumvention of the requirement laid down in Section 105 of Act No.
2874. We are thus warned that any title sourced from the flawed OCT No. 380 could
be void. On this basis, we are justified to consider with great care any claims derived
therefrom.
The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is
that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence
but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. It
is rather obvious from the foregoing disquisition that respondent failed to dispense
such burden. Indeed, the records are replete with proof that respondent declared
the lots comprising Lot No. 3050 for taxation purposes only after it had instituted the
present case in court. This is not to say of course that tax receipts are evidence of
ownership, since they are not, albeit they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner, for no one would ordinarily be paying taxes for a property not in
his actual or at least constructive possession.
2. The action has not prescribed.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The
reference point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the date of registration of the
deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an
actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property.
However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of
the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property
does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless
filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible.
The action assumed the nature of a suit to quiet title; hence, imprescriptible.
However, in our view, respondent Victory Hills has failed to show its entitlement to a
reconveyance of the land subject of the action.
16 TANDOG vs. MACAPAGAL
FACTS: The subject of the controversy is a land consisting of 147,991 square meters
situated at Sitio Inarawan, Barangay Inuman, San Isidro, Antipolo City. Petitioners
claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since time immemorial.
They trace their rights to Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried, who died in 1945. He was
survived by his nephews and nieces, now deceased, except Maria Bautista
Catanyag. She and Casimiros grand nieces and grand nephews (herein petitioners)
have continued possessing and cultivating the land.
When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they
found that portions of the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina
Calderon and Renato Macapagal, respondents. According to petitioners, spouses
Calderon used falsified documents to justify their possession of 20,116 square meters
of the land which they sold to the government. For his part, Renato Macapagal
applied for and was granted Free Patent No. 045802-1165 which led to the issuance
to him of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-665 over an area of 18,787 square
meters. Because of these incidents, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Bracnh 73, Antipolo City a complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No.
92-2418. Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petitioners
allegations in their complaint. She alleged that she and her husband bought their
property in 1958 and, since then, have been in possession of the same. They planted
trees and crops thereon. Also, they have been paying the corresponding realty
taxes. She does not know petitioners who are all strangers in the place.
After petitioners had presented their evidence, spouses Calderon filed a demurrer to
evidence. The trial court granted and the CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the allegations of the respondent are judicial admissions that can be
considered as cloud to the interest of petitioners in the disputed property
HELD: No. Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created
by mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in property. This rule is
subject to qualification, where there is a written or factual basis for the asserted right.
Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse possession has
been held to constitute a removable cloud on title.
While petitioners alleged that respondents claim of adverse possession is a cloud on
their (petitioners) interest in the land, however, such allegation has not been proved.
The alleged falsified documents relied upon by respondents to justify their possession
were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offered in evidence by
petitioners. We have consistently ruled that documents which may have been
marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which were not formally offered in
evidence, cannot be considered as evidence, nor can they be given any
evidentiary value.
It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. 5 Petitioners
failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did not present any evidence to prove that
Casimiro Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-in-interest. Their
testimonies can not be considered declarations about pedigree. In order that
pedigree may be proved by acts or declarations of relatives under Section 39 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence, it is necessary that (a) the actor or declarant is dead or
unable to testify; (b) the act or declaration is made by a person related to the
subject by birth or marriage; (c) the relationship between the declarant or the actor
and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration; and (d) the
act or declaration was made ante litem motam, or prior to the controversy.
17. Rumarate vs Hernandez
Petitioner spouses Teodulo Rumarate (Teodulo) and Rosita Rumarate filed an action
for reconveyance of real property and/or quieting of title with damages against
respondent heirs of the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.[4] Teodulo
averred that Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and cultivated by his godfather,
Santiago Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live with the Rumarate family
in San Pablo City. Between 1923 and 1924, Santiago and the Rumarate family
transferred residence to avail of the land distribution in Catimo, Guinayangan,
Quezon. From 1925 to 1928, Santiago occupied Lot No. 379 cultivating five hectares
thereof. Before moving to Kagakag, Lopez, Quezon in 1929, Santiago orally
bequeathed his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo and entrusted to him a copy of a
Decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tayabas dated April 21, 1925
recognizing his (Santiago) rights over Lot No. 379.[5] Since Teodulo was only 14 years
old then, his father helped him cultivate the land.[6] Their family thereafter cleared the
land, built a house[7] and planted coconut trees, corn, palay and vegetables
thereon.[8] In 1960, Santiago executed an Affidavit (quit-claim)[9] ratifying the transfer
of his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo.Between 1960 and 1970, three conflagrations
razed the land reducing the number of coconut trees growing therein to only 400,
but by the time Teodulo testified in 1992, the remaining portions of the land was
almost entirely cultivated and planted with coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, mangoes
and vegetables.[10] From 1929, Teodulo and later, his wife and 11 children possessed
the land as owners and declared the same for taxation, the earliest being in 1961
n 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta,
respondents predecessors-in-interest, were able to obtain a title over Lot No. 379. He
did not immediately file a case against respondents because he was advised to just
remain on the land and pay the corresponding taxes thereon.
Santiago sold the questioned lot to their parents, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta, for P9,000.00.
Cipriano Hernandez planted coconut trees on the land through the help of a certain
Fredo[16] who was instituted as caretaker. In 1970, Fredo informed Cipriano Hernandez
that he will no longer stay on the land because there are people instructing him to
discontinue tilling the same.
After the death of the spouses,[18] respondents executed a deed of partition over the
subject lot and were issued TCT No. T- 237330 on June 28, 1988 in lieu of OCT No. O-
11844
Respondent Joaquin Hernandez (Joaquin) testified that in 1964, he accompanied his
father in inspecting the lot which was then planted with coconut trees.[20] Thereafter,
he visited the land twice, once in 1966 and the other in 1970. From 1966 up to the
time he testified, his family declared the lot for taxation and paid the taxes due
thereon.[21] Joaquin explained that after the death of his father in 1971, he no longer
visited the land and it was only when the complaint was filed against them when he
learned that petitioners are in actual possession of the property.[22] He added that his
siblings had planned to convert Lot No. 379 into a grazing land for cattle but decided
to put it off for fear of the rampant operations then of the New Peoples Army
between the years 1965-1970.
the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. It held that since the latter
possessed the land in the concept of an owner since 1929, they became the owners
thereof by acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years, pursuant to the Code of
Civil Procedure. Thus, when Santiago sold the lot to respondents parents in 1964, the
former no longer had the right over the property and therefore transmitted no title to
said respondents.
ISSUE: To whom should Lot No. 379 be awarded? To petitioners who possessed and
cultivated the lot since 1929 up to the present, but do not have a certificate of title
over the property, or to respondents who have a certificate of title but are not in
possession of the controverted lot?
HELD: In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine the respective
rights of the parties so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be
forever free from any danger of hostile claim.[26] Under Article 476[27] of the Civil Code,
the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainants title to real
property or any interest therein. Article 477 of the same Code states that the plaintiff
must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the suit.
 For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.[28]
In Evangelista v. Santiago,[29] it was held that title to real property refers to that
upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the
extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert a
right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.
In the instant case, we find that Teodulos open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years vested him and his heirs title over the said lot. The law applicable
at the time Teodulo completed his 30-year possession (from 1929 to 1959) of Lot No.
379, in the concept of an owner was Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the
Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, effective June 22,
1957[30] which provides:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Courts) of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter,
under the Land Registration Act (now Property Registration Decree), to
wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been, in continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant,
without necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and the land ceases to be part
of the public domain. The confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is
of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not
originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such
conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete. [31]
In the instant case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the
testimony of Teodulo and his witnesses that his (Teodulos) possession of the land since
1929 was open, continuous, adverse, exclusive, and in the concept of an owner. It is
a settled rule in civil cases as well as in criminal cases that in the matter of credibility
of witnesses, the findings of the trial courts are given great weight and highest degree
of respect by the appellate court considering that the latter is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[32]
A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that Teodulo
possessed and occupied Lot No. 379 in the concept of an owner. Since 1929,
Teodulo cultivated the controverted land, built his home, and raised his 11 children
thereon. In 1957, he filed a homestead application over Lot No. 379 but failed to
pursue the same.[33] After his demise, all his 11 children, the youngest being 28 years
old,[34] continued to till the land. From 1929 to 1960, Santiago never challenged
Teodulos possession of Lot No. 379 nor demanded or received the produce of said
land. For 31 years Santiago never exercised any act of ownership over Lot No.
379. And, in 1960, he confirmed that he is no longer interested in asserting any right
over the land by executing in favor of Teodulo a quitclaim.
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated the land as
owner thereof since 1929. While the oral donation in 1929 as well as the 1960
quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to Teodulo are void for non-compliance with the
formalities of donation, they nevertheless explain Teodulo and his familys long years
of occupation and cultivation of said lot and the nature of their possession thereof.
In Bautista v. Poblete,[35] the Court sustained the registration of a parcel of
land in the name of the successors-in-interest of the donee notwithstanding the
invalidity of the donation inasmuch as said donee possessed the property in the
concept of an owner.
It follows therefore that Teodulos open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 for 30 years, or from 1929 to 1959 in the
concept of an owner, earned him title over the lot in accordance with Sec. 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act. Considering that Lot No. 379 became the private property of
Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had no more right to sell the same to spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta in 1964. Consequently, the latter and herein respondents
did not acquire ownership over Lot No. 379 and the titles issued in their name are
void.
Furthermore, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta cannot be considered as
purchasers in good faith because they had knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.[38] The Court notes
that Santiago was not residing in Lot No. 379 at the time of the sale. He was already
81 years old, too old to cultivate and maintain an 18-hectare land. These
circumstances should have prompted the spouses to further inquire who was actually
tilling the land. Had they done so, they would have found that Teodulo and his family
are the ones possessing and cultivating the land as owners thereof.
On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for quieting of title is
imprescriptible, as in the instant case, where the person seeking relief is in possession
of the disputed property. A person in actual possession of a piece of land under
claim of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed possession gives
him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
title.[40] Considering that petitioners herein continuously possessed Lot No. 379 since
1929 up to the present, their right to institute a suit to clear the cloud over their title
cannot be barred by the statute of limitations.
Neither could petitioners action be barred by laches because they
continuously enjoyed the possession of the land and harvested the fruits thereof up to
the present to the exclusion of and without any interference from respondents. They
cannot therefore be said to have slept on their rights as they in fact exercised the
same by continuously possessing Lot No. 379.
On the contrary, we find that it is respondents who are actually guilty of
laches. Though not specifically pleaded, the Court can properly address the issue of
laches based on petitioners allegation in the complaint that [n]either spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta x x x nor [herein respondents] had taken steps to
possess or lay adverse claim to said parcel of land from the date of their registration
of title in November, 1965 up to the present.[41] Such averment is sufficient to impute
abandonment of right on the part of respondents. At any rate, laches need not be
specifically pleaded. On its own initiative, a court may consider it in determining the
rights of the parties.[42]
The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier constitutes laches. It
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to
assert it. While it is by express provision of law that no title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may
be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.[43]
In applying the doctrine of laches, we have ruled that where a party allows
the following number of years to lapse from the emergence of his cause of action
without enforcing his claim, laches sets in: 36 years; 12 years; 50 years; 34 years; 37
years; 32 years; 20 years; 47 years; 11 years; 25 years; 40 years; 19 years; 27 years; 7
years; 44 years; 4 years; and 67 years.[44]
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct of a party on the basis of which the
other party seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting ones rights, despite having had
knowledge or notice of the other partys conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of a party
that the person against whom laches is imputed would assert the right; and (4) injury
or prejudice to the party asserting laches in the event the suit is allowed to prosper.
Finally, payment of taxes alone will not save the day for respondents. Only a
positive and categorical assertion of their supposed rights against petitioners would
rule out the application of laches. It means taking the offensive by instituting legal
means to wrest possession of the property which, however, is absent in this
case. Respondents payment of taxes alone, without possession could hardly be
construed as an exercise of ownership.What stands out is their overwhelming passivity
by allowing petitioners to exercise acts of ownership and to enjoy the fruits of the
litigated lot for 22 years without any interference.
In sum, the Court finds that Lot No. 379 should be adjudicated in favor of
petitioners.
METROPOLITAN BANK, & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon. FLORO T. ALEJO, in His
Capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela;
and SY TAN SE, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, SIAN SUAT NGO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In a suit to nullify an existing Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT) in which a real estate
mortgage is annotated, the mortgagee is an indispensable party. In such suit, a
decision canceling the TCT and the mortgage annotation is subject to a petition for
annulment of judgment, because the non-joinder of the mortgagee deprived the
court of jurisdiction to pass upon the controversy.
 The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the March 25, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR SP No. 50638, which states in full:
This resolves the petition for annulment of judgment based on external (sic) fraud filed
by petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company seeking to annul the Decision
dated August 12, 1998 rendered by respondent judge, Honorable Floro T. Alejo,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in
Civil Case No. 4930-V-96 entitled Sy Tan Se, represented by his attorney-in-fact Sian
Suat Ngo v. Raul Acampado, et al.
This Court has observed that petitioner knew of the questioned Decision sometime
[i]n October 1998 (Petition, Rollo, p. 3). This being the case, petitioner should have first
sought recourse by way of petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the petition for annulment of judgment is
DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED outright for being insufficient in form and
substance (Section 2, Rule 47, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Also challenged is the January 27, 2000 CA Resolution [2] denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
FACTS: On November 21, 1995[3] and January 30, 1996,[4] Spouses Raul and
Cristina Acampado obtained loans from petitioner in the amounts of P5,000,000
and P2,000,000, respectively. As security for the payment of these credit
accommodations, the Acampados executed in favor of petitioner a Real Estate
Mortgage[5] and an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage[6] over a parcel of land
registered in their names. The land was covered by TCT No. V-41319 in the Registry of
Deeds of Valenzuela City, where the contracts were also registered on November 20,
1995 and January 23, 1996, respectively.[7]
On June 3, 1996, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of TCT No. V-41319 was
filed by Respondent Sy Tan Se against Spouses Acampado. In the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Valenzuela, Branch 172, it was docketed as Civil Case No. 4930-V-96,[8]the
progenitor of the present controversy.
Despite being the registered mortgagee of the real property covered by the title
sought to be annulled, petitioner was not made a party to Civil Case No. 4930-V-
96,[9] nor was she notified of its existence.
Because the spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan, extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property were initiated on April 19,
1997.
On June 17, 1997, the sheriff of Valenzuela conducted an auction sale of the
property, during which petitioner submitted the highest and winning bid. [10] On July
15, 1997, a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor.[11] This sale was entered in the
Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela on July 28, 1997.
When the redemption period lapsed exactly a year after, on July 28, 1998,
petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership to enable the Registry
of Deeds of Valenzuela to issue a new TCT in its name.
Upon presentation to the Register of Deeds of the Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, petitioner was informed of the existence of the August 12, 1998 RTC
Decision in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96, annulling TCT No. V-41319. The dispositive portion
of the Decision[12] stated:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as null and void Transfer
Certificate of Title No.V-41319 in the name of defendant Raul Acampado for having
proceeded from an illegitimate source. With costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.
On January 27, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Annulment of the RTC Decision.
First, a petition for relief, the remedy pointed to by the Court of Appeals, was not
available to petitioner. Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, states:
Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.-When a judgment or
final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside. (Italics supplied)
It must be emphasized that petitioner was never a party to Civil Case No. 4930-V-
96. In Lagula et al. v. Casimiro et al.,[15] the Court held that -- relative to a motion for
relief on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence -- Rule 38
of the Rules of Court only applies when the one deprived of his right is a party to the
case. Since petitioner was never a party to the case or even summoned to appear
therein, then the remedy of relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
was not proper. This is plainly provided in the italicized words of the present provision
just quoted.
Second, in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment, the Court of Appeals reasoned
that another remedy, an action for quieting of title, was also available to petitioner.
We do not agree. It should be stressed that this case was instituted to ask for
relief from the peremptory declaration of nullity of TCT No. V-41319, which had been
issued without first giving petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner focused on
the judgment in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96 which adversely affected it, and which it
therefore sought to annul. Filing an action for quieting of title will not remedy what it
perceived as a disregard of due process; it is therefore not an appropriate remedy.
Equally important, an action for quieting of title is filed only when there is a cloud
on title to real property or any interest therein. As defined, a cloud on title is a
semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact
unfounded.[16] In this case, the subject judgment cannot be considered as a cloud
on petitioners title or interest over the real property covered by TCT No. V-41319,
which does not even have a semblance of being a title.
It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment as a cloud that would
warrant the filing of an action for quieting of title, because to do so would require the
court hearing the action to modify or interfere with the judgment or order of another
co-equal court. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that a court has no
power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the
administration of justice.[17] Clearly, an action for quieting of title is not an appropriate
remedy in this case.
Third, private respondent cites a last remedy: the intervention by petitioner in
Civil Case No. 4930-V-96. The availability of this remedy hinges on petitioners
knowledge of the pendency of that case, which would have otherwise been alerted
to the need to intervene therein. Though presumed by private respondent, any such
knowledge prior to October 1998 is, however, emphatically denied by petitioner.
The Petition for Annulment before the Court of Appeals precisely alleged that
private respondent purposely concealed the case by excluding petitioner as a
defendant in Civil Case No. 4930-V-96, even if the latter was an indispensable
party. Without due process of law, the former intended to deprive petitioner of the
latters duly registered property right. Indeed, the execution of the Decision in Civil
Case No. 4930-V-96 necessarily entailed its enforcement against petitioner, even
though it was not a party to that case. Hence, the latter concludes that annulment of
judgment was the only effective remedy open to it.
The allegation of extrinsic fraud, if fully substantiated by a preponderance of
evidence, may be the basis for annulling a judgment.[18] The resort to annulment
becomes proper because of such allegation, coupled with the unavailability of the
other remedies pointed to by respondents.
19. SALIGUMBA VS PALANOG
FACTS: Monica Palanog, assisted by her
husband Avelino Palanog (spouses Palanogs), filed a complaint dated 28 February
1977 for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, spouses
Valeria Saligumba and EliseoSaligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas), before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 3). The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 2570. In the complaint, spouses Palanogs alleged that they have
been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50
years of a parcel of land located in Solido, Nabas, Aklan.
The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the
subject premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land.
Spouses Palanogs prayed that they be declared the true and rightful owners of the
land in question.
Atty. Edilberto Miralles (Atty. Miralles), counsel for spouses Saligumbas.
The hearing set on 25 October 1984 was reset to 25 January 1985 and the trial court
directed that a copy of this order be sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. at COA,
PNB, Manila.[8]
The presentation of evidence for spouses Palanogs resumed on 25 January
1985 despite the motion of Atty. Miralles for postponement on the ground that his
client was sick. The exhibits were admitted and plaintiffs spouses Palanogs rested their
case. Reception of evidence for the defendants spouses Saligumbas was scheduled
on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985.[9]
On 3 June 1985, only spouses Palanogs and counsel appeared. Upon motion of the
spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas were deemed to have waived the
presentation of their evidence.
On 3 August 1987, after a lapse of more than two years, the trial court considered the
case submitted for decision.
On 7 August 1987, RTC-Branch 3 rendered a judgment in Civil Case No. 2570
declaring spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the subject land and ordering
spouses Saligumbas, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in privity with
them to vacate the premises and restore possession to spouses Palanogs.
The trial court, in a separate Order dated 7 August 1987, directed that a copy of the
courts decision be furnished plaintiff Monica Palanog and defendant
Valeria Saligumba.
Thereafter, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was
filed but the trial court, in its Order dated 8 May 1997, ruled that since more than five
years had elapsed after the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be
executed by mere motion.
Thus, on 9 May 1997, Monica Palanog (respondent), now a widow, filed a Complaint
seeking to revive and enforce the Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No.
2570 which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of limitations.
She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs
and children of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5288 before the RTC-Branch 5.
Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, for himself and in representation of his brother Ernesto
who was out of the country working as a seaman, engaged the services of the Public
Attorneys Office, Kalibo, Aklan which filed a motion for time to allow them to file a
responsive pleading.
Petitioner Generoso Saligumba filed his Answer[10] alleging that: (1) respondent had
no cause of action; (2) the spouses Saligumbas died while Civil Case No. 2570 was
pending and no order of substitution was issued and hence, the trial was null and
void; and (3) the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the heirs of the
spouses Saligumbas and therefore, the judgment was not binding on them.
Meanwhile, on 19 December 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion
to implead additional defendants namely, Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and
Eduardo Saligumba, who are also the heirs and children of
spouses Saligumbas.[11] They were, however, declared in default on 1 October
1999 for failure to file any responsive pleading.
HELD: The instant case is an action for revival of judgment and the judgment sought
to be revived in this case is the decision in the action for quieting of title with
damages in Civil Case No. 2570. This is not one for annulment of judgment.
Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action
involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 [16] as
the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an
action that survives.
Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper
notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir of the
deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial
court, after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the
envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir of the
deceased. There was no court order for deceaseds legal representative or heir to
appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted
for the deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such
legal representative, nor did the heirs ever ask to be substituted.
It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while
Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985. No motion for the substitution of the
spouses was filed nor an order issued for the substitution of the deceased
spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and
petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear, never
confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is
bereft of any evidence proving the death of the spouses, except the mere notations
in the envelopes enclosing the trial courts orders which were returned unserved.
Section 17 is explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir
to appear arises only upon proper notice. The notation Party-Deceased on
the unserved notices could not be the proper notice contemplated by the rule. As
the trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of
a party without the proper manifestation from counsel, the trial court was well within
its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. Moreover, there is no showing that
the courts proceedings were tainted with irregularities.[18]
Likewise, the plaintiff or his attorney or representative could not be expected to know
of the death of the defendant if the attorney for the deceased defendant did not
notify the plaintiff or his attorney of such death as required by the rules.[19] The judge
cannot be blamed for sending copies of the orders and notices to defendants
spouses in the absence of proof of death or manifestation to that effect from
counsel.[20]
It is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his client.
The failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to
inform the court of the death of his client and the non-substitution of such party will
not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the
death of such party. The decision rendered shall bind the partys successor-in-
interest.[21]
The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a
better position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his
client and to inform the court of the name and address of his legal representative.[22]
Atty. Miralles continued to represent the deceased spouses even after the latters
demise. Acting on their behalf, Atty. Miralles even asked for postponement of the
hearings and did not even confirm the death of his clients nor his appointment as
Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge. These clearly negate petitioners contention that
Atty. Miralles ceased to be spouses Saligumbas counsel.
Atty. Miralles still remained the counsel of the spouses Saligumbas despite the alleged
appointment as judge. Records show that when Civil Case No. 2570 was called for
trial on 25 October 1984, Atty. Miralles appeared and moved for a postponement.
This notwithstanding, when Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985,
Atty. Miralles again did not inform the trial court of the death of Valeria Saligumba.
There was no formal substitution nor submission of proof of death of
Valeria Saligumba. Atty. Miralles was remiss in his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The counsel of record is obligated to protect his clients interest
until he is released from his professional relationship with his client. For its part, the
court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such
counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.[27]
An attorney must make an application to the court to withdraw as counsel, for the
relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at least, so
far as the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end
of the litigation.[28] Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the conduct
of the case.[29] Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains
counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the
interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of hearing for the
attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of
record.[30]
In the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners have not shown
much interest in the case. Petitioners Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and
Eduardo Saligumba were declared in default for failure to file their answer. Petitioner
Ernesto Saligumba was out of the country working as a seaman. Only
petitioner Generoso Saligumba filed an Answer to the complaint. The petition filed in
this Court was signed only by petitioner GenerosoSaligumba as someone signed on
behalf of petitioner Ernesto Saligumba without the latters authority to do so.
20. CLADO- REYES VS LIMPE
FACTS: On February 1, 1995,[5] petitioners filed an action to quiet title, reconveyance
and damages against respondents and alleged that they have been occupying the
disputed lot since 1945 through their predecessor-in-interest, Mamerto B. Reyes. They
claimed that during his lifetime, Mamerto had accepted a verbal promise of the
former lot owner, Felipe Garcia, to give the disputed lot to him in exchange for the
surrender of his tenancy rights as a tiller thereof. To prove that Mamerto was a former
tenant of Felipe; that during his lifetime he had worked on the lot; and that he owned
and possessed the same,[6] petitioners presented two documents, namely:(1)
Certification[7] dated October 12, 1979 and (2) Pagpapatunay[8] dated November 17,
1982 allegedly executed by Simeon I. Garcia, the eldest son of Felipe, attesting to
such facts. Petitioners also alleged that whenever respondents visited the lot,
respondent Julius Limpe would promise to deliver the certificate of title to
them. However, sometime in October 1994, petitioners received a letter [9] from
respondents asserting ownership over the disputed lot.
In their answer, respondents contended that they are the legal owners of the
lot by virtue of a Deed of Exchange of Real Estate [10] and Deed of Absolute
Sale[11] executed on July 5, 1974 and February 28, 1974, respectively, between them
and Farm-Tech Industries, Incorporated. To further assert ownership over the lot, they
presented TCT No. T-199627, Tax Declaration Nos. 15172[12] and 9529[13] and realty tax
receipts[14] of the lot, which were all registered and declared in their names.
In its Decision dated January 9, 2001, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondents and held that the certificate of title, tax declarations and realty tax
receipts presented in court indisputably established respondents ownership over the
lot. The certificate of title was registered in respondents names and the realty tax
receipts showed that respondents consistently paid the corresponding real property
taxes. These pieces of evidence, said the trial court, prevail over petitioners allegation
of an undocumented promise by the former lot owner, which in itself, is ineffective or
unenforceable under the law. Accordingly, the trial court ordered petitioners to
reconvey the disputed lot to respondents.
On February 20, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling and
held that petitioners have no title whatsoever upon which respondents title could
cast a cloud, as they were the ones casting doubt on respondents title. [15] It held that
the documents allegedly executed by Simeon I. Garcia showed no indicia that the
alleged owner, Felipe Garcia, donated the disputed lot to them. It further held that
Simeon I. Garcia was not the real owner of the lot; thus, he could not make an
effective conveyance thereof. Consequently, it upheld respondents title over the
disputed lot. The decretal portion of the decision reads,
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 81, dated January
9, 2001 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[16]
ISSUE: WHETHER THE [PETITIONERS] HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION TO QUIET TITLE,
RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES AGAINST RESPONDENTS.
HELD: To begin with, an action for quieting of title originated in equity
jurisprudence to secure an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in
property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and
those claiming under him may be forever free from any danger of hostile claim. Thus,
our courts are tasked to determine the respective rights of the contending parties,
not only to put things in their proper places, but also to benefit both parties, so that
he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated,
and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to
use and even to abuse the property as he may deem best.[21]
Under Articles 476[22] and 477[23] of the New Civil Code, there are two
indispensable requisites in order that an action to quiet title could prosper: (1) that
the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facieappearance of validity or legal
efficacy.[24]
To prove their case, petitioners merely cited Section 4 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution and Section 2 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and stated
that their title was founded upon those provisions.They hardly argued on the
matter. Neither was there positive evidence (1) that their predecessor had legal
title, i.e., a certificate of land transfer;[25] (2) that the lot was an agricultural lot and not
a commercial one as contended by respondents; and (3) that they are qualified
beneficiaries under the Agrarian Reform Law. Time and again we have held that a
mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of proving the
allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence.[26]
Next, the documentary evidence petitioners presented, namely, the
Certification and Pagpapatunay, did not confirm their title over the disputed lot. First,
original copies of those documents were not presented in court.[27] Second, as the
appellate court pointed out, Simeon I. Garcia, the declarant in those documents,
was not presented in court to prove the veracity of their contents.[28] Third, even a
cursory examination of those documents would not show any transfer or intent to
transfer title or ownership of the disputed lot from the alleged owner, Felipe Garcia,
to petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest, Mamerto B. Reyes. Fourth, petitioners did
not bother to adduce evidence that Simeon I. Garcia, as the eldest son of the late
Felipe Garcia, inherited the entire lot as to effectively convey title or ownership over
the disputed lot, i.e. thru extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Felipe
Garcia. Accordingly, we agree that the documents allegedly executed by Simeon I.
Garcia are purely hearsay and have no probative value.
In contrast, respondents presented evidence which clearly preponderates in
their favor. First, the transfer certificate of title, tax declarations and realty tax receipts
were all in their names. Second, pursuant to the Torrens System, TCT No. RT-32498 (T-
199627) enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity and is the best proof of
ownership of the lot.[29] Third, although tax declarations or realty tax receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession
in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. As we previously
held, such realty tax payments constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property.[30]
Worth stressing, in civil cases, the plaintiff must establish his cause of action by
preponderance of evidence; otherwise, his suit will not prosper.[31] After carefully
considering the arguments of the parties, as well as their respective evidence, we
unanimously agree that the petitioners were not able to prove that they have any
legal or equitable title over the disputed lot. Thus, we find no reversible error in the
assailed decisions of the courts below.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit.
21. MARIANO TANENGLIAN VS. SILVESTRE LORENZO
March 28, 2008
- NO DIGEST
22. SPOUSES SOFRONIO SANTOS VS. HEIRS OF DOMINGA LUSTRE
August 6, 2008
Title of the Case: Sps Santos v Heirs of Lustre August 6, 2008 NACHURA
CivPro: forum shopping, prescription
Facts:
Lustre owned a lot which she mortgaged & later on sold to Natividad Santos who
subsequently sold it to her son Froilan for which a TCT was issued in his name.Lustres
heirs Macaspac & Maniquiz filed w/ RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a Complaint for
Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages against Froilan Santos. Lustres other heirs filed a Complaint for Annulment
of Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed of Absolute Sale against spouses Santos,
Froilan Santos, R Transport Corp, Cecilia Macaspac with the same RTC. Macaspac
was impleaded as defendant in the 2nd case because she refusedto join the other
heirs as plaintiffs. Alleging that the plaintiffs right of action for annulment of the Deed
of Sale and TCT had long prescribed and was barred by laches, petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss, also on the ground of litis pendentia. The RTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss. They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) which
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Issue #1: Was there forum shopping Decision:
No Ratio: Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or
when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Its
elements are identity of the subject matter, identity of the causes of action and
identity of the parties in the two cases. There is substantial identity of parties when
there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the
second case. There is no forum shopping because there is no identity of parties
because the plaintiff in the 1st case (Macaspac) does not, in fact, share a common
interest with the plaintiffs in the 2nd case. Plaintiffs in both cases are the heirs of Lustre;
they are therefore co-owners of the property. However, the fact of being a co-owner
does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff is acting for the benefit of the co-ownership
when he files an action respecting the co-owned property. Co-owners are not parties
inter se in relation to the property owned in common. The test is whether the
additional party, the co-owner in this case, acts in the same capacity or is in privity
with the parties in the former action. [28] Macaspac filed the 1st case seeking the
reconveyance of the property to her, and not to Lustre or her heirs. This is a clear act
of repudiation of the co-ownership which would negate a conclusion that she acted
in privity with the other heirs or that she filed the complaint in behalf of the co-
ownership. In contrast, respondents were evidently acting for the benefit of the co-
ownership when they filed the 2nd case wherein they prayed that TCT Lustre be
reinstated, or a new certificate of title be issued in her name.
Issue #1: Does prescription or laches apply?
Decision: No
Ratio: The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was
obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration
of its nullity, which does not prescribe. Moreover, a person acquiring property through
fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the prescriptive period applies only if
there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not
in possession of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property,
prescription does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for
reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of
title, an action that is imprescriptible. It follows then that the respondents present
action should not be barred by laches. Laches is a doctrine in equity, which may be
used only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Obviously, it cannot be
set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.[39
23. HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, VS. SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO
FACTS:
Petitioners claim to be the rightful owners of three lots situated in Dipolog City under
CA 141. Respondents are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject
lots. Petitioners claim that their parents acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel
of land situated in Dipolog City. Since 1931, the spouses Concha preserved the forest
in this land including the excess four hectares untitled forest land, and they possessed
this excess land continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely, peacefully, in good
faith, and in concept of owner. On November 12, 1996, respondents, by force,
intimidation and stealth forcibly entered the premises and disposed of 21, 22, and 6
trees for the three lots, respectively. Thus, Valeriano Sr. and his children, herein
petitioners, filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with
Damages against Spouses Gregorio Lumocso and Bienvenida Guya. They sought to
annul the free patent and the corresponding OCT issued in the latters name for one
of the lots. Therafter, two separate complaints for Reconveyance with Damages
were filed by petitioners against Cristita Lumocso Vda. De Daan and Spouses Jacinto
Lumocso and Balbina T.Lumocso for the other two lots. Respondents moved to dismiss
their respective cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC, failure to state
causes of action for reconveyance, prescription, and waiver, abandonment, laches,
and estoppel. Petitioners opposed contending that the instant cases involve actions
the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, these cases
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that they
have two main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of
the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be considered
which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
The RTC denied the motions to dismiss. Respondents filed a Joint motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. On appeal, the CA reversed the order of the RTC
because an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in ten years, and
the complaints involved titles issued for at least 22 years prior to their filing; hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases.
HELD:
NO. The instant cases involve actions for reconveyance. The applicable law to
determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of BP 129 as amended by R.A.
No. 7691. In the cases at bar, the subject lots are situated in Dipolog City and their
assessed values are less than Php20,000. Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over
the instant cases. Petitioners contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject
properties constitutes any interest therein (in the subject properties) that should be
computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the subject properties is
unavailing. Section 19(2) of BP 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC
shall exercise jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Php20,000 or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Php50,000. In determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed
value of the realty involved that should be computed.
CA DECISION AFFIRMED
24. IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA
October 27, 2006
CO-OWNERSHIP- Action Reinvindicatoria
FACTS:
In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Thelma Ponferada, et al., G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2007
(Callejo, J), only one of co-owners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or
Accion Publiciana before the RTC, Quezon City. A motion to dismiss was filed alleging
that there was no showing that he was authorized to do so by the other co-owners.
He alleged that after the death of their father in 1970, they inherited the property;
their father, Enrique Santos, during his lifetime, and plaintiffs, after the death of the
former, had been in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the property until
1994 when petitioner claimed ownership based on TCT No. 321744 issued on
September 18, 1984 and barred them from fencing their property.
Petitioners claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the property
since 1984 when TCT No. 321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations in
the complaint that respondents had been in actual and material possession of the
property since 1961 up to the time they filed their complaint on October 24,
2001.Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action
against petitioner. An accion reinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that
the actual and material possession of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff
seeks the recovery of such possession from defendant. It bears stressing that an
accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of ownership and includes
jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an action whereby a party
claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.
(Capacete v. Baroro, 453 Phil. 392, 402 (2003). Thus, the owner of real property in
actual and material possession thereof may file an accion reinvindicatoria against
another seeking ownership over a parcel of land including jus vindicandi, or the right
to exclude defendants from the possession thereof. In this case, respondents filed an
alternative reinvindicatory action claiming ownership over the property and the
cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the name of petitioner. In fine, they sought to
enforce their jus utendi and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and
prevented them from fencing the property.

Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they
filed their complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period
for the reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner
was able to secure TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984. The reason for this is
that:

x x x one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner

thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
(Vda. de Cabrera v. CA, 335 Phil. 19 (1997).