Criminal procedure cases (Jurisdiction – RA 7691)

PEOPLE v. MARIANO
71 SCRA 600

1. JURISDICTION

FACTS: Hermogenes Mariano is a Liaison officer by Mayor Constantino Nolasco of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. Mariano is authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC.
Instead of delivering it to the Office of the Mayor, Mariano misappropriated, misapply and converted the
items for his personal benefit. The Office of Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing
Mariano of Estafa. Mariano filed a motion to quash the information. He claimed that the items which
were the subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor Nolasco
was indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of malversation of public property. The judge
of RTC granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisction. It held that it had already taken
cognizance of the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter, as such
the court has without the jurisdiction to pass upon anew the same subject matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of
estafa of goods allegedly committed by a civilian.

RULING: yes, Sec. 44 of Judicary Act of 1948 provides that:

CFI shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months

The offense charged against Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and prision
correccional in its maximum period. Thus, Mariano falls under the original jurisdiction of the CFI.

In a previous case decided by SC, it ruled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. In this case, the law in force vesting jurisdiction
upon CFI was the Judiciary Act of 1948.

SC also made it clear that Estafa and Malversation are two and separate distinct offenses.

Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the particular offense charged
against respondent Mariano. Estafa falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.

2. DOCTRINE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION

SIA vs PEOPLE (#24)

G.R. No. 159659, October 12, 2006

TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

PRINCIPLE: The prosecution for the violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 is not included in the functions of the
enforcement officers (under Executive Order No. 71) authorized to investigate and enforce laws pertaining to subdivisions. It
remained with the City Prosecutors Office of Naga City. The offense charge – punishable with a fine of not more than Twenty
Thousand Pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years – is well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.

FACTS: Petitioners Ruben and Josephine Sia were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 27 with
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three counts of violation of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957, otherwise known as The Subdivision and
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Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, by failing to register with the Register of Deeds of Naga City, the Contracts to Sell
they executed in favor of respondent Teresita Lee over several subdivision lots she purchased.
On October 15, 2001, the petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash alleging that (1) the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged; and (2) the City Prosecutors Office of Naga City has no authority to file the informations. The trial
court denied their motions holding that it had jurisdiction over the case and stating that the city prosecutor was authorized to
file the informations.

Before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They allege the same grounds and further state that only the enforcement officers under
Executive Order No. 71 are authorized to investigate and enforce laws pertaining to subdivisions.

The appellate court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court ruling that the acts complained of were within the trial courts
territorial jurisdiction; and the penalty provided by law for the violation, i.e., imprisonment of not more than ten years, is within
the trial court’s jurisdiction. Similarly, the appellate court sustained the city prosecutors’ authority to file the informations
conformably with Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE #1: Does the City Prosecutors Office of Naga City have authority to file the informations even without a prior
determination thereof by the Enforcement Officers of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)?

RULING #1:
YES. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 71, the enforcement officers of local government units shall only have full power to monitor,
investigate and enforce compliance with the provisions of national laws and standards whose implementation have been
devolved to the local government in accordance with E.O. No. 71, Section 1. Noteworthy, the prosecution for the violation of
Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 is not included in the foregoing functions. Hence, it follows logically that it remained with the City
Prosecutors Office of Naga City.

ISSUE #2: Does the Regional Trial Court of Naga City have jurisdiction over the offense charged?

RULING #2:
YES. The jurisdiction of the court or agency is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend on
the defenses made by the defendant in his Answer or Motion to Dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely on the defendant. The informations rest the cause of action on the petitioners’ failure to register
the Contracts to Sell in accordance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 957. The penalty imposable is a fine of not more than Twenty
Thousand Pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years. Once again, clearly, the offense charged is well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court.

3. FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT AND THE LAW IN DETERMNE THE JURISDICTION

G.R. NO. 169004: S EPTEMBER 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , PETITIONER , V. S ANDIGANBAYAN (T HIRD DIVISION ) A ND ROLANDO PLAZA , RESPONDENTS .

FACTS: RESPONDENT ROLANDO PLAZA , A M EMBER OF T HE SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF TOLEDO CITY, CEBU , WITH
SALARY GRADE 25, H AD BEEN CHARGED IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN WITH VIOLATION OF SECTION 89 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE (P.D.) N O. 1445, O R THE AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES F OR HIS FAILURE TO LIQUIDATE T HE CASH
ADVANCES HE RECEIVED ON DECEMBER 19, 1995 I N T HE AMOUNT OF THIRTY -THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00) .

RESPONDENT PLAZA FILED A MOTION T O DISMISS WITH THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHICH WAS GRANTED F OR LACK OF
JURISDICTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE T O ITS FILING IN T HE PROPER COURT .

PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT T HE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING PUBLIC OFFICIALS
AND EMPLOYEES ENUMERATED UNDER SECTION 4 (A) (1) O F P.D. 1606, (A S AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT [R.A.] NOS. 7975
AND 8249), W HETHER OR NOT OCCUPYING A P OSITION CLASSIFIED UNDER SALARY GRADE 27 AND ABOVE , WHO ARE
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CHARGED NOT ONLY FOR VIOLATION OF R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 O R ANY OF T HE F ELONIES INCLUDED IN CHAPTER II,
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SECTION 2, TITLE VII, BOOK II OF T HE REVISED PENAL CODE, BUT ALSO F OR CRIMES COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE.
ISSUE: WHETHER O R NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS J URISDICTION O VER A MEMBER O F THE SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD
WHOSE SALARY GRADE IS BELOW 27 A ND CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF T HE AUDITING CODE OF T HE PHILIPPINES .

POLITICAL LAW : SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER OFFICERS FALLING BELOW T HE SALARY GRADE 27 P ROVIDED
THAT T HEY HOLD T HE POSITIONS T HUS ENUMERATED BY THE SAME LAW.

HELD : I N RULING THAT T HE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A M EMBER OF T HE SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD
WHOSE SALARY GRADE IS BELOW 27 A ND CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF T HE AUDITING CODE OF T HE PHILIPPINES , THIS
COURT CITED THE CASE OF SERANA VS SANDIGANBAYAN , ET .AL., AS A BACKGROUND ON T HE CONFERMENT OF
JURISDICTION OF T HE SANDIGANBAYAN , T HUS:

THE JURISDICTION OF A C OURT T O T RY A C RIMINAL CASE IS TO BE DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF THE INSTITUTION OF T HE
ACTION , N OT AT T HE T IME OF T HE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE . THE EXCEPTION CONTAINED IN R.A 7975, A S WELL AS
R.A. 8249, W HERE IT EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT T O DETERMINE THE JURISDICTION OF T HE SANDIGANBAYAN IN CASES
INVOLVING VIOLATIONS OF R.A. NO. 3019, A S AMENDED , R.A. N O. 1379, A ND CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, T ITLE VII OF T HE
REVISED PENAL CODE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN T HE PRESENT CASE AS T HE OFFENSE INVOLVED HEREIN IS A V IOLATION OF
THE AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES .

IN ORDER F OR T HE SANDIGANBAYAN T O ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE SAID OFFENSES , T HE LATTER MUST BE
COMMITTED BY, AMONG OTHERS, OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OCCUPYING POSITIONS OF REGIONAL DIRECTOR
AND HIGHER , OTHERWISE CLASSIFIED AS GRADE 27 A ND HIGHER , OF T HE COMPENSATION AND POSITION CLASSIFICATION
ACT OF 1989. H OWEVER , T HE LAW IS NOT DEVOID OF EXCEPTIONS . THOSE T HAT ARE CLASSIFIED AS GRADE 26 AND
BELOW MAY STILL FALL WITHIN T HE J URISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN PROVIDED T HAT THEY HOLD THE POSITIONS
THUS ENUMERATED BY T HE SAME LAW . CLEARLY , AS DECIDED IN T HE EARLIER CASE AND BY SIMPLE APPLICATION OF THE
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE LAW , RESPONDENT PLAZA , A M EMBER OF T HE SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD DURING T HE
ALLEGED COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE IN RELATION T O HIS OFFICE, NECESSARILY FALLS WITHIN THE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF T HE SANDIGANBAYAN .

4. EQUITY JURISDICTION

Poso vs. Mijares:

The instant administrative case stemmed from the proceedings in a criminal case for murder which was
raffled to the court presided over by respondent judge. The accused pleaded guilty to the lesser offense
of homicide.
The instant case was referred to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals for
investigation report and recommendation. His report called attention to the reprehensible actuations of
respondent Judge when he reduced the penalty to ridiculous terms so as to qualify the accused for
probation; hastily ordered the discharge of the accused from jail on recognizance without the benefit of
notice and hearing; and illegally admitted the accused to probation despite the appropriate maximum
penalty for homicide exceeding (6) years which he should have been sentenced.

The Court found him guilty of Gross Dishonesty for foisting upon this Court a fraudulent copy of his 10
January 1996 Resolution, or otherwise, of Gross Inexcusable Negligence for allowing a draft of his 10
January 1996 Resolution to circulate freely and unhampered, in violation of the rule of strict
confidentiality, and of Gross Ignorance of the Law, Knowingly Issuing Unjust Orders and Commission of
Acts punishable under Sec. 3, par. (e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal case against De Guia be restored to status quo ante prior to his
release on recognizance.
HELD: Yes. A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process does not exist in
legal contemplation and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void
judgment has no legality from its inception. It may be attacked directly or collaterally and set aside as in
the instant case.
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As a general rule, the Court does not review a trial court's decision in an administrative proceeding since
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its main concern is to determine the ethical responsibilities of judicial conduct. Nonetheless, in the
instant case, the salutary principle is not controlling. The situation calls for the exercise of our equity
jurisdiction to the end that we render complete justice to all affected parties. According to the Court,
"Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of
law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by
different courts." Indeed, a court of equity which has taken jurisdiction and cognizance of a cause for any
purpose will ordinarily retain jurisdiction for all purposes and award relief so as to accomplish full justice
between the party litigants, prevent future litigation and make performance of the court's decree perfectly
safe to those who may be compelled to obey it.
In this regard, RTC-Br. 21, Laoang, Northern Samar, in Crim. Case No. 2477 was instructed to call the
case once again taking stock of the Court’s pronouncements in the instant case. The trial court shall
order the arrest of accused Virgilio de Guia to restore the status quo ante prior to his release on
recognizance.
5. PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HEIRARCHY

17. Rennie Declarador vs Hon. Gubaton et. al.

GR. 159208 (August 18, 2006)
Re: Principle of Judicial Hierarchy

Facts:
Accused (Bansales) was 17 years old when he stabbed his female teacher in high school (Mrs. Declarador) 15 times which
resulted to the latter's death. Based on the evidence and his plea of guilt, accused was convicted of murder with qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation but the court considered accused's minority as a special mitigating circumstance thus
his sentence was lowered. Instead of reclusion perpetua, the maximum term of imprisonment of reclusion temporal was given
in view of the mitigating circumstance. Further the sentence was suspended and commitment to youth rehabilitation center
was ordered. This is pursuant with Art. 192 of PD 603 as amended known as "Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of
Youthful Offender".
Petitioner husband of the deceased, however, claimed that under Art. 192 of PD 603 and AM 02-1-18-SC, the sentence
should not have been suspended since the juvenile convicted committed an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: (na’a ni 3rd issue pls refer sa case *wink)

1. Whether the petitioner has standing to file the petition?
2. Whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition with this Court

RULING:
1. Yes.
Being the surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party, he has sufficient personality to file the instant special civil
action for certiorari. This is in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote
their object.
2. No.
 The rule is that a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify an order of the RTC should be filed in the
Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. A direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue
writs of certiorari may be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is an established policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this Court’s time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
overcrowding of the Court’s docket.
 However, in Fortich v. Corona, the Court held that considering the nature and importance of the issues raised and in
the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari
directly filed before it. Moreover, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the interests of justice so require.
 In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and the application of the Rule
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
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6. Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability

6.1. Doctrine of Judicial Stability

Victory Liner vs. Bellosillo

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321; March 10, 2004
Posted By: Alaine Joyce on July 24, 2018

FACTS:

On March 2, 2000, while a Victory Liner bus was cruising along the National Highway of Dinalupihan, Bataan, it accidentally
hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista Morales. Marciana died the following day. VLI shouldered all the funeral and burial
expenses. VLI and the heirs of the victim entered into an Agreement where the heirs executed a Release of Claim and an
Affidavit of Desistance in favor of VLI and the driver Reino De la Cruz. However, two or Marciana's sons executed a
Pinagsamang Salaysay against De la Cruz. On the strength of the document, a criminal complaint was filed with the MCTC of
Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan.

On March 13, 2000, Judge Bellosillo ordered the immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest against De la Cruz and fixed his
bail at P50, 000 to be posted in cash. He further directed the Chief of Police to immediately impound the bus involved in the
accident, which could be released only upon the posting of a cash bond in the amount of P50, 000.

On June 23, 200, VLI filed a verified complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against Judge Bellosillo. The
complaint claimed that Judge Bellosillo (a) is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in impounding its bus and requiring it to post
a cash bond for the release of the bus; (b) gravely abused his authority when it revoked the surety bond of one of VLI's driver
Edwin Serrano in Crim. Case No. 9373; and (c) knowingly rendered an unjust and oppressive order when he increased the
bond to P350, 000 and required it to be posted in cash.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the judge is administratively liable for imposing excessive cash bail bonds.

HELD:

Yes, Judge Bellosillo is administratively liable for imposing excessive cash bail bonds on accused Reino De la Cruz in Crim.
Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Crim. Case No. 9373.

The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right to bail except those charged with offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides that in fixing the amount of bail, the judge must primarily consider the following factors: a) Financial ability of the
accused to give bail; b)Nature and circumstances of the offense; c) Penalty for the offense charged; d) Character and
reputation of the accused; e) Age and health of the accused; g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial; h) Forfeiture of
the bonds; i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and j) The pendency of other cases in which
the accused is under bond.

The amount of bail should, therefore, be reasonable at all times. It should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to serve this purpose. Excessive bail shall not be
required. In implementing this mandate, the accused's financial capability should particularly be considered. What is
reasonable to a wealthy person may not be so to a man charged with a like offense, where the right to bail exists, it should
not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.

De la Cruz and Serrano were both charged with the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Although
permanently employed as drivers of VLI, it could not be said that each was capable of posting a cash bail bond of P50, 000
and P350, 000, respectively. The bail fixed is all the more excessive because it was in the form of cash. While cash bail is
authorized under our rules, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused.
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6.2. Jurisdiction by Estoppel

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FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

JULY 14, 2008

NACHURA, J.

SUBJECT AREA: Estoppel by laches

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The RTC found him guilty. In his
appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the case.

The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner
from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and
without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.

The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time
even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, constitute laches in relation to the
doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s
appeal to the CA

HELD: No.

RATIO: the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel.

In the case at bar, Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of
contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in
initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial
proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of
the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.

The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack
thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.

7. Nature of the offense charged

RODOLFO DELA CRUZ vs. HON. FELIX MOYA

G.R. No. L-65192, April 27, 1988 | Cortes, J.:

FACTS

Dela Cruz of the AFP received a mission to apprehend persons who were engaged in illegal cockfighting. His team
caught in flagrante the cockfighting operators but the latter resisted arrest.

 On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned to the Intelligence
and Operations Section of the 432nd PC Company, together with other PC men, received a mission order to proceed to
Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were allegedly
engaged in illegal cockfighting.

 Dela Cruz and company proceeded to Maco, Davao del Norte and caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal
cockfighting, but said operators resisted arrest.

While the soldiers were bringing back the evidence of the crime, the operators, including one Cabilto, followed the
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officers and fought with them. Dela Cruz shot Cabilto during the scuffle, and was charged with homicide by the CFI
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Davao.
 The soldiers left the place but they brought with them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the crime, such as gaffs and
fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfights followed the soldiers on their way back to the PC Headquarters.
Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot the deceased Eusebio Cabilto

 On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the CFI of Davao, in an information filed by the Provincial
Fiscal.

PDs 1822 and 1822-A, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over AFP cases, were promulgated during the pendency
of Dela Cruz’s case. Dela Cruz’s motion to transfer the case to military authorities was denied.

 While the case was pending trial, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President of the
Philippines on January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the Armed
Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in performance of their duties.

 Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed in relation to the performance of his duties, Dela Cruz
filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the military authorities so he could be tried
by court martial. Motion was denied.

ISSUE(S)

1. W/N civil courts have jurisdiction over Dela Cruz’s homicide case [NO – MILITARY COURTS HAVE IT]

RULING

PREFATORY: jurisdiction over the subject matter

 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action …
and once jurisdiction is vested in the Court, it is retained up to the end of litigation

Here, the law in force at the time the Information was filed was General Order 59. Military Tribunals exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by AFP personnel in the performance of their duty…

 Under Gen Order 59: military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll
offenses committed by military personnel of the [AFP] while in the performance of their official duty or which arose out of
any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty;

 Provided, that for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty
or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary
of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by the President. . . " (Section 1.)

 No amendatory law was ever published.

Significance of the proviso re: DND Secretary Certificate – in this case, while there was no certificate presented in
Court, the SC was able to determine that the military courts had jurisdiction instead of civil court since the Mission
Order was presented in court.

 The certificate issued by the DND Secretary is conclusive for the purpose of determining whether an offense was
committed while in the performance of official duty, or arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official
duty. It does not in any way preclude the courts from making any [other] finding as to whether an offense is duty-
connected.

 Here, even as no such certificate was presented in court, the record contains a copy of Mission Order No. 7, signed by
one Lt. Huerta, directing Dela Cruz, among others, to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Davao to verify and apprehend persons
reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. The evidence of the prosecution presented in court likewise shows that Cabilto
was shot while petitioner was executing the mission order.

FURTHER, PDs 1822 and 1822-A were not yet in force.

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DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petition GRANTED; Criminal Case No. 4008 are declared null and void but without prejudice to the filing of another action in
the proper forum

8. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

34 DAVID VS AGBAY AND PEOPLE GR 199113 MARCH 18, 2015

Re: Jurisdiction over the parties
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. In 2000, they purchased a beach lot in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro
where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built
their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in
Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed
the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. In his defense,
petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had
been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino.

Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was
issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at
that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and
for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225?
2. Whether or not the MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner)?
RULING:
1. Yes. Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to
the first category (re-acquiring) of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship
by naturalization in a foreign country.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the
rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos (as cited by petitioner) on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself
treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos
who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers
Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3,
the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of
said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as
his dual citizenship status is concerned.
2. No. The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioner’s
motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of
the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
We clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly
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erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC’s order,
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the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of
merit.
9. Territorial Jurisdiction

Fukuzume vs People (2005) G.R. 143647

Facts:
Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires, accompanied by Jovate,
went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from
Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this information
and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s
representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later turned
uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his undertaking to return Yu’s money when Yu was refused by NAPOCOR, thus,
prompting Yu to file an estafa case.
Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as charged. Aggrieved by the trial
court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial courts’ decision modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition
before the SC.
Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of
Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed by Fukuzume. With
respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he
gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzume’s
contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s
house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque.
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the
testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the
former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume
or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals:  However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement
executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu’s sworn
statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. From the
foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any
of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting
Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of
appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

10. MTC

GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG, Complainants

vs.
JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA CASTELLANA, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL

FACTS: An administrative case was filed against Judge Javellana arising from a verified complaint for
“gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and
unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others,” filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of the
Public Attorneys Office.

The complaint/allegations involve cases decided and/or were handled by Judge Javellana and his
alleged business relation as co-agent in a surety company. In People vs Lopez, a case of malicious
mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead,
conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then
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set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses
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had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a
ground for dismissal of said case.

ISSUE/S

Whether Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

RULING: Yes. Without any showing that the accused in People vs Lopez, et al were charged with the
special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code the
appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which
under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1)
day to six (6) months. Clearly, this case should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Also, the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under Rule 16, but in People vs. Lopez, Judge
Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was not required or justified.

Section 11 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure states:

The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be etiher by complaint or by
information; Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.”

On the other hand, Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a
preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without
regard to the fine. As has been previously established herein, the maximum penalty imposable for
malicious mischief in People vs. Lopez, et al is just six (6) months.

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