Rem Class Digest Leonen PDF

Remedial Law Review: Justice Leonen cases
IN RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY. LYNDA CHAGUILE, IBP IFUGAO PRESIDENT, AS

REPLACEMENT FOR IBP GOVERNOR FOR NORTHERN LUZON, DENIS B. HABAWEL.
A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC; December 10, 2013.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide
moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as
to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
(Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988; August 31, 2010)
Facts:
Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas sought to invalidate the Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors which approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as the
replacement of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. He noted that on the IBP By-
Laws which considers as ipso facto resigned from his or her post any official of the IBP who files a
Certificate of Candidacy for any elective public office. Under the amended By-Laws, the resignation
takes effect on the starting date of the official campaign period. Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel, filed a Certificate of Candidacy to run for the
position of Provincial Governor of the Province of Ifugao. Hence, he is considered ipso facto
resigned from the IBP. Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of Governors' approval of Atty.
Chaguiles succession as IBP Governor for Northern Luzon on two grounds: First, there was, as yet,
no vacancy. Atty. Habawel was himself present at the meeting where his replacement was named.
There was, therefore, no need to name a replacement. Second, the right to elect the successor of a
resigned IBP Governor is vested, not in the IBP Board of Governors, but in the delegates of the
concerned region; thus, the IBP Board of Governors approval of the nominee to succeed Atty.
Habawel is ultra vires.
In support of this second ground, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever
cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the
members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor
for the unexpired portion of the term.
In its Comment, the IBP Board of Governors assailed the first ground raised by Atty. Ubano by
saying that it was not necessary for a position to be absolutely vacant before a successor may be
appointed or elected.As for the second ground, the IBP Board of Governors argued that it has been
the "tradition"of the IBP that "where the unexpired term is only for a very short period of time, it is
usually the Board of Governors which appoint a replacement or an officer in charge to serve the
unexpired term." Meanwhile, Atty. Ubano filed another motion seeking to prevent Atty. Chaguile
from exercising the functions as IBP Governor of Northern Luzon. A.M. No. 13-05-08-SC: The
second Administrative Matter assails the conduct of the election of the IBP Executive Vice President
(EVP). In this election, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas was elected IBP Governor for Southern Luzon. Atty.
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Ubano sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election claiming that the IBP election of the EVP was
marred by inordinate haste, grave irregularities, patent hostility, manifest bias and prejudice, as well
as the presiding officers absolute lack of independence and that the election violated Section 47 of
the IBP By-Laws which requires that the EVP be elected by a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Atty.
Ubano emphasized that Atty. Chaguiles vote in favor of Atty. Joyas was invalid, as Atty. Chaguiles
appointment as governor was itselfultra vires, and therefore, voidab initio.
Issues:
[1] Whether the appointment of Atty. Chaguile as Governor ultra vires, therefore restraining her to
exercise functions relative to the position?
[2] Whether the election for the IBP EVP void in violation Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws and
restrained Atty. Vicente M. Joyas from discharging his duties?
Ruling:
As pointed out by the IBP Board of Governors in its Compliance, "the term of Atty. Lynda Chaguile
as Governor for Northern Luzon expired on June 30, 2013."A new Governor for Northern Luzon,
Atty. Oliver Cachapero, was elected.As Atty. Chaguile is no longer serving as IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon, the matter of ousting or restraining Atty. Chaguile from exercising the functions of
such office is no longer an available relief.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a
case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. (Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988; August 31, 2010)
However, we recognize that the validity of Atty. Chaguiles appointment as Governor for Northern
Luzon affects the validity of her actions as the occupant of this office, especially her participation in
the IBP Board of Governors election of the IBP EVP, which is the subject of the second
Administrative Matter. We hold that Atty. Chaguile took on the role of IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon in a de facto capacity. To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present: 1)
There must be a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public;
and 3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. Tuanda v.
Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460
In the present case, there is no dispute that a de jure office, that of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon
exists. Likewise, Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions of the IBP Governor
for Northern Luzon through a process, albeit "irregular or informal, so that she is not a mere
volunteer,"that is, not through her own actions but through those of the IBP Board of Governors.
Thus, she did so under "color of authority,Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., 473 Phil. 844 (2004).
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The IBP Board of Governors approval was secured through a process that it characterized as a
"tradition," allowing it to appoint a replacement for an officer who vacates his or her office shortly
before his or her term expires. Although being in violation of the IBP By-Laws, this supposed
tradition cannot earn our imprimatur. Be that as it may, in all of the occasions cited by the IBP Board
of Governors, the authority of replacement governors was derived from a process, which, though
irregular,enabled them to act as and be accepted as governors.
Having said these, we agree with a point raised by Atty. Ubano. As with statutes, the IBP By-Laws
"violation or non-observance [ought] not be excused by disuse, or custom, or practice to the
contrary." CIVIL CODE, Art. 7.We do not validate the IBP Board of Governors erroneous practice.
To reiterate our earlier words: "We cannot countenance this. No amount of previous practice or
"tradition" can validate such a patently erroneous action."
Having established that Atty. Chaguile was the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in a de facto
capacity, we turn to the validity of her actions as a de facto officer. Accordingly, all official actions of
Atty. Chaguile asde facto IBP Governor for Northern Luzon must be deemed valid, binding, and
effective, as though she were the officer validly appointed and qualified for the office. It follows that
her participation and vote in the election for IBP EVP held on May 22, 2013 are in order. DENIED.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officer-in-Charge,

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE - REGIONAL FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII) vs.
ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, et.al
G.R. No. 179492 June 5, 2013
This Court disregards the presence of procedural flaws when there is necessity to address the issues
because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service and the serious
implications the case may cause on the effective administration of the executive department.
Facts :
Petitioner Department of Agriculture–Regional Field Unit XII (DARFU XII) is a government
office mandated to implement the laws, policies, plans, programs, rules, and regulations of the
Department of Agriculture in its regional area, while respondents are officials and employees of DA-
RFU XII.
On March 30, 2004, Executive Order No. 304 (EO 304) was passed designating Koronadal
City as the regional center and seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region. It provides that all departments,
bureaus, and offices of the national government in the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their
regional seat of operations to Koronadal City
On April 1, 2005, a Memorandum by the Department of Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary for

Operations Edmund J. Sana was issued. It directed Officer-in Charge (OIC) and Regional Executive
Director of DA- RFU XII, Abusama M. Alid, to:
(1) Directed to immediately effect the transfer of the administrative, finance and
operations base of RFU XII from Cotabato City to Koronadal City.
(2) Action plan for transfer should be submitted to Edmund Sana’s office not later than 6
April 2005 so that appropriate funding can be processed.
(3) Execution of the plan should commence by 16 April 2005 or earlier so that concerned
personnel can benefit from the summer break to make personal arrangements for the
transfer of their work base.
On April 22, 2005, a memorandum was addressed to DA Secretary Arthur Yap. Herein,
private respondents opposed the implementation of the April 1, 2005 Memorandum alleging that :
(1) In 2004, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a pronouncement during

one of her visits in Cotabato City that the regional seat of Region 12 shall remain in
Cotabato City. Only three departments were not covered by the suspension of E.O.
No. 304, namely, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of
Tourism (DOT), and Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
(2) On March 7, 2005, they appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture that the
implementation of E.O. No. 304 be held in abeyance. A copy of the Petition was
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attached to the Memorandum. It cited reasons such as the huge costs the physical
transfer will entail and the plight of employees who have already settled and
established their homes in Cotabato City
On March 8, 2005, their Petition was endorsed by Department of Agriculture Employees

Association-12 (DAEAS-12) President Osmeña I. Motañer to then President Macapagal- Arroyo.
After which, this was referred to DA Secretary Yap for his information and appropriate action.
Respondents justified their appeal saying that:
(1) A building was constructed in Cotabato City that can accommodate the whole staff
of DARFU XII. On the other hand, there is no building yet in Koronadal City where
rent is very expensive.
(2) If the regional office remains in Cotabato City, the government need not spend over
₱7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay as well as other expenses for equipment hauling and
construction.
(3) Respondents alleged that the proposed third floor of the ATI Building in Tantangan
has a sub-standard foundation and will not be issued a certificate of occupancy by
the City Engineering Office of Koronadal City as per information from an auditor.
On May 17, 2005, OIC Abusama M. Alid held a meeting and ordered the transfer of the
regional office to ATI Building in Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, both located in South
Cotabato and Uptown, Koronadal City, to be carried out on May 21, 2005
Respondents file a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of
Cotabato City
RTC granted respondents' Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner went to the
Court of Appeals via Rule 65 on the ground that the assailed Order of the trial court is contrary to
the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees
CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioner to resort to a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order. Hence, the current petition.
Issues:
1. Whether a Petition via Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail the disputed Resolutions?
2. Whether the present case falls within the exceptions on the requisite for filing a Motion for
Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65?
3. Whether petitioner can raise other issues not addressed in the assailed Resolutions?
Ruling:
1. Yes. A dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a Petition via Rule 65 for failure to file a Motion
for Reconsideration may be assailed via Rule 45.
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Unlike a Petition via Rule 45 that is a continuation of the appellate process over the original
case, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action.
Consequently, the March 21, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition via
Rule 65 as well as its August 16, 2007 Resolution denying reconsideration are the final Resolutions
contemplated under Rule 45. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, these Resolutions would attain
finality if these are not elevated on appeal via Rule 45. As a result, the trial court Order dated
October 9, 2006 would also become unassailable.
2. Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non
for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is,
however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity,
as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law
or where public interest is involved.
The present case falls under the second exception in that a Motion for Reconsideration need
not be filed where questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court. In any case, this Court disregards the presence of procedural flaws
when there is necessity to address the issues because of the demands of public interest, including the
need for stability in the public service and the serious implications the case may cause on the
effective administration of the executive department.
The instant Petition involves the effective administration of the executive department and
would similarly warrant relaxation of procedural rules if need be. Specifically, the fourth clause of
E.O. No. 304 states as follows: "WHEREAS, the political and socio-economic conditions in
SOCCSKSARGEN Region point to the need for designating the regional center and seat of the region
to improve government operations and services."
3. No. The disputed Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals dwell solely on the
indispensability of the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court before filing
a Petition via Rule 65; thus, the other grounds in the present Petition need not be addressed.
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JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and

authorized representative Norma Tan, vs. HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding
Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA,
EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES"
G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013,
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
Facts:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly

authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance
003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle
immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
On May 7, 2003, respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does
forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car belonging to Jeffrey Walan which
was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was
earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel.
On May 17, 2003, the respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left
unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone.
On May 23, 2003, petitioner Jadewell filed an Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City charging the respondents for the felony of robbery which was later
dismissed. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, however, respectfully submit that the acts of
respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and
their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-
2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City dated July 25, 2003.
In their motion to quash, respondents argued, among others, that the offense charged in this
case was committed on May 7, 2003. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information,
the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the
alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if
any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.
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On the other hand, the petitioner argued that the offenses charged have not yet prescribed.
While it may be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the
private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the
prescribed period.
In an Order dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and
dismissed the cases.
Issue:
Does the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolls
the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance?
Ruling:
No. In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for
the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the
petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription
period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.
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As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information
tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent
judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured
similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11,
1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be
filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation."
Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a
preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when
it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation.
This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually
filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the
period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party."
The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings.
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ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS

ARARO PARTY-LIST, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013
"A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit." The party’s interest must be direct, substantial, and material.
Facts:
Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as
ARARO) was a duly accredited party-list under Republic Act No. 7941. In the May 10, 2010
elections, it garnered a total of 147,204 votes and ranked 50th. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc, then sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, initially proclaimed 28
party-list organizations as winners involving a total of 35 seats guaranteed and additional seats,
based on the COMELEC’s count of 121 Certificates of Canvass or a total of 29,750,041 votes for the
Party-List System.
This prompted the petitioner to file a Petition for Review for Certiorari with the Supreme Court,
praying for the modification of the COMELEC's interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT v.
COMELEC by making the divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total number of
votes cast minus the votes for the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of votes cast
regardless whether party-list groups are disqualified; and enjoin the public COMELEC from
proclaiming the remaining winning party-list candidates until it modifies the interpretation of the
formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to the formula proposed by the petitioner.
As the Court did not issue any Temporary Restraining Order, the National Board of Canvassers
issued a resolution proclaiming the winning party-list groups. The said resolution applies the
formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to arrive at the winning party-list groups and their
guaranteed seats, where:
Number of votes of
party-list
Proportion or
= Percentage of votes
Total number of votes garnered by party-list
for
party-list candidates
The Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list should be greater than or equal to
2% to entitle a party-list candidate to 1 seat in the first round. There will be a second round if the
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total number of guaranteed seats awarded in the first round is less than the total number of party-
list seats available.
If the total seats available for party-lists are not yet awarded after the second round (this is
computed by getting the sum of the seats awarded in the first round and the additional seats
awarded in the second round), the next in the party-list ranking will be given 1 seat each until all
seats are fully distributed. A three-seat cap per party-list, however, is imposed on winning groups.
Fractional seats are not rounded off and are disregarded.
The petitioner suggests that this formula is flawed because votes that were spoiled or that were
not made for any party-lists were not counted. It argues that the correct interpretation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 does not distinguish between valid and invalid votes.
Notably, a comparison of the figures resulting from the formula used by the COMELEC and
that of ARARO would show:
With Divisor of total

With Divisor of votes
valid votes cast for
cast for the party-list
party-list system minus
system as proposed by
votes cast for
ARARO
disqualified party-lists
(37,377,371)
or invalid votes
(30,264,579)
Votes garnered by
147,204 147,204
ARARO
Votes garnered over

total votes cast for party- 0.4864 0.3939
lists (%)
Guaranteed Seat 0 0
Issue: Taking into consideration the foregoing, does the petitioner have the legal standing to
institute the present case?
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Ruling:
None. The petitioner is not considered as a real party-in-interest.
"A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The party’s interest must be direct, substantial,
and material.
In this case, the petitioner attacks the validity of the formula used and upheld in BANAT and
proposes its own interpretation of the formula to determine the proportional representation of
party-list candidates in the House of Representatives. However despite any new computation,
ARARO’s proposed divisor of total votes cast for the party-list system whether valid or invalid still
fails to secure one seat for ARARO. Reviewing the figures presented by the petitioner would show
that the petitioner does not suffer a direct, substantial or material injury from the application of the
formula interpreted and used in BANAT in proclaiming the winning party-lists in the assailed
National Board of Canvassers Resolution. The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even
lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law for a guaranteed seat. Its arguments
will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise the argument in the
Supreme Court.
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RE: APPLICATION FOR SURVIVORSHIP PENSION BENEFITS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9946 OF MRS. PACITA A. GRUBA, SURVIVING SPOUSE OF THE LATE MANUEL K. GRUBA,
FORMER CTA ASSOCIATE JUDGE.
A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013
An initial look at the law might suggest that the retroactivity of Republic Act No. 9946 is limited to
those who retired prior to the effectivity of the law. However, a holistic treatment of the law will show that the
set of amendments provided by Republic Act No. 9946 is not limited to justices or judges who retired after
reaching a certain age and a certain number of years in service. The changes in the law also refer to justices or
judges who "retired" due to permanent disability or partial permanent disability as well as justices or judges
who died while in active service. In light of these innovations provided in the law, the word "retired" in
Section 3-B should be construed to include not only those who already retired under Republic Act No. 910 but
also those who retired due to permanent disability. It also includes judges and justices who died or were killed
while in service
Facts:
This case involves a judge of the Court of Tax Appeals who died while in service. He died at the age
of 55 years, two (2) months, and six (6) days. He died prior to the enactment of Republic Act No.
9946, which substantially amended the benefits provided in Republic Act No. 910.
Manuel K. Gruba (Judge Gruba) was born on April 19, 1941. He began his government service on
December 3, 1979 as Senior Revenue Executive Assistant I at the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He
rose from the ranks at the Bureau of Internal Revenue until he was appointed as an Associate Judge
of the Court of Tax Appeals on September 17, 1992.
On June 25, 1996, Judge Gruba passed away. The cause of his death was natural and was reported as
brain stem/midbrain stroke, basilar artery thrombosis, embolic event. He was 55 years old when he
died. He was in government service for a total of 16 years, six (6) months, and 21 days. In those
years, he rendered service for three (3) years, nine (9) months, and eight (8) days in the Judiciary.
The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba, Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba (Mrs. Gruba), applied for
retirement/gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 910.
In a Resolution dated September 24, 1996, this Court approved the application filed by Mrs. Gruba.
Per certification dated October 25, 2012 by the Court of Tax Appeals’ Office of Administrative and
Finance Services, the five-year lump sum retirement benefit under Republic Act No. 910 was
remitted to the Government Service Insurance System effective June 26, 1996. A total of
₱1,486,500.00, representing the five-year lump sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba, was paid to his
heirs.
On January 13, 2010, Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946.
Republic Act No. 9946 provided for more benefits, including survivorship pension benefits, among
others. The law also provides a retroactivity provision which states:
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“SEC. 3-B. The benefits under this Act shall be granted to all those who have retired prior to the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the benefits shall be applicable only to the members of the
Judiciary: Provided, further, That the benefits to be granted shall be prospective.”
On January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship pension benefits under Republic Act No.
9946. In a Resolution dated January 17, 2012, this Court approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. She
received ₱1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension benefits from January 1, 2011 to April 2012.
In a Resolution dated November 27, 2012, this Court revoked the Resolution dated January 17, 2012
and directed the Court of Tax Appeals to discontinue the payment of the survivorship pension
benefits to Mrs. Gruba. However, this Court stated that Mrs. Gruba was not required to refund the
survivorship pension benefits received pursuant to the Resolution dated January 17, 2012.7
This Court required the Office of the Chief Attorney to report on the matter. In a Comment dated
May 14, 2013, the Office of the Chief Attorney recommended that the heirs of Judge Gruba be
entitled to the 10-year lump sum death benefit under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 910, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9946.
Issues: (1) Whether Republic Act No. 9946 applies to Judge Gruba;
(2) Whether the heirs of Judge Gruba are entitled to the 10-year lump sum gratuity benefits under
Republic Act No. 9946; and
(3) Whether Mrs. Gruba is entitled to survivorship pension benefits under the same law.
Ruling:
This Resolution adopts in part the recommendation of the Office of the Chief Attorney. We decide
the first two issues in favor of the heirs of Judge Gruba. However, we deny the application for
survivorship pension benefits of Mrs. Gruba.
The rationale for retirement benefits
Retirement laws are social legislation. In general, retirement laws provide security to the elderly
who have given their prime years in employment whether in the private sector or in government.
These laws ensure the welfare of individuals who are approaching their twilight years and have
limited opportunities for productive employment that give them a steady income stream. In the
private sector, retirement packages are usually crafted as "forced savings" on the part of the
employee.
In government, lucrative retirement benefits are used as an incentive mechanism to encourage

competent individuals to have careers in government. This Court often states:
“Retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the consideration for
entrance into and continuation in public office or employment. They serve a public purpose and a
14
primary objective in establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and remain in public
employment and render faithful and efficient service while so employed.”
On several occasions, this Court has liberally interpreted retirement laws in keeping with its
purpose. In Government Service Insurance System v. De Leon:
“Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is
to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the
capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the
law in order that efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.
Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be
benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.”
This general principle for retirement benefits applies to members of the Judiciary. However,
Congress made a special law specifically for retiring justices and judges. This law on "retirement
pensions of Justices arise from the package of protections given by the Constitution to guarantee and
preserve the independence of the Judiciary." Aside from guaranteeing judicial independence, a
separate retirement law for justices and judges is designed to attract intelligent members of the Bar
to join the Judiciary. It compensates for the opportunity cost of having profitable private practices.
The rationale for death benefits
Aside from considering old age retirement benefits, the law also protects the welfare of the heirs and
surviving spouses of employees who die before or after retirement. "The law extends survivorship
benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner to cushion
the beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or
pensioner."
The law usually takes into account the nature of the employment and the vulnerability of the
individual to risks that might lead to an early demise. Therefore, military and justices and judges, by
virtue of are given generous death benefits. The law recognizes the threats these kinds of
government employees face because of their positions. In order to minimize the adverse effects of
unexpected deaths while in service, the law extends benefits to the deceased employee’s loved ones.
It is also the law’s way of sympathizing with the loss of these families. Death benefits remind the
heirs that despite their loss, their departed loved one had valuable contributions to society, and the
State is grateful for these contributions. These benefits also provide more incentive for the
independence of those who serve in the Judiciary. They allow peace of mind since members of the
Judiciary know that they could provide for their spouse and their children even beyond their death.
Issue 1
Republic Act No. 9946 applies to Judge Gruba.
15
Republic Act No. 9946 applies retroactively to those who died or were killed while they were in
government service.
Judge Gruba who passed away prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946 is still covered by the
law by virtue of Section 3-B. "Retired" here is not construed in the strict dictionary definition but in
its more rational sense of discontinuance of service due to causes beyond one’s control. It should
include the cessation of work due to natural causes such as death. Therefore, the death of Judge
Gruba produces effects under Republic Act No. 9946 for his family.
Issue 2
The heirs of Judge Gruba are entitled to the 10-year lump sum gratuity benefits under Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 9946, subject to the availability of funds.
Judge Gruba’s death follows the second scenario under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9946. He died
due to natural causes while serving the Judiciary. He rendered 16 years, six (6) months, and 21 days
in government service, thereby complying with the 15-year service requirement under the law. His
heirs became entitled to a lump sum of 10 years gratuity computed on the basis of the highest
monthly salary, plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation, and other
allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation
allowance.
The fact that the heirs of Judge Gruba received death benefits under Republic Act No. 910 prior to
amendments in Republic Act No. 9946 does not preclude the heirs from receiving the 10-year lump
sum in full. This is the effect of the retroactivity mentioned in Section 3-B of Republic Act No. 9946.
This is also in keeping with a policy declaration under Article XVI, Section 8 of the Constitution
stating that "the State shall, from time to time, review to upgrade the pensions and other benefits
due to retirees of both the government and the private sectors."
Issue 3
Mrs. Gruba is not qualified for survivorship pension benefits under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9946.
The fact that the heirs of Judge Gruba received death benefits under Republic Act No. 910 prior to
amendments in Republic Act No. 9946 does not preclude the heirs from receiving the 10-year lump
sum in full. This is the effect of the retroactivity mentioned in Section 3-B of Republic Act No. 9946.
This is also in keeping with a policy declaration under Article XVI, Section 8 of the Constitution
stating that "the State shall, from time to time, review to upgrade the pensions and other benefits
due to retirees of both the government and the private sectors."
However, Mrs. Gruba is not qualified for survivorship pension benefits under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9946.
16
When Mrs. Gruba applied for benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, she was not claiming additional
gratuity benefits. She was invoking the second paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 910 as
amended by Republic Act No. 9946.
According to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9946, survivorship pension benefits are given to
surviving spouses of retired judges or justices or surviving spouses of judges or justices who are
eligible to retire optionally. This means that for the spouse to qualify for survivorship pension, the
deceased judge or justice must (1) be at least 60 years old, (2) have rendered at least fifteen years in
the Judiciary or in any other branch of government, and in the case of eligibility for optional
retirement, (3) have served the last three years continuously in the Judiciary.
Mrs. Gruba could have been entitled to survivorship pension benefits if her late husband were
eligible to optionally retire at the time of his death. It was unfortunate that Judge Gruba died five
years short of the optional retirement age. However, survivorship benefits are an offshoot of
retirement benefits.
We note, however, that if Judge Gruba were eligible to optionally retire under Republic Act No. 9946
at the time of his death and despite the fact that he passed away prior to the amendatory law’s
passage, his widow would have been entitled to the survivorship pension. The law was passed on
January 13, 2010, and any surviving spouse of a judge or justice who died prior to this date but was
retired or eligible to retire optionally should be covered by Republic Act No. 9946 by virtue of its
retroactivity clause.
17
ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH, Petitioner, vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC., RUPERTO V. TANKEH, VICENTE ARENAS, and ASSET
PRIVATIZATION TRUST, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171428; November 11, 2013
"Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is
normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or
fact a mistake of judgment, appeal is the remedy."
Facts:
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is the president of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. It was incorporated
on April 23, 1979 to operate ocean-going vessels engaged primarily in foreign trade. Ruperto V.
Tankeh applied for a $3.5 million loan from public respondent Development Bank of the Philippines
for the partial financing of an ocean-going vessel named the M/V Golden Lilac. To authorize the
loan, Development Bank of the Philippines required that the following conditions be met:
1) A first mortgage must be obtained over the vessel, which by then had been
renamed the M/V Sterling Ace;
2) Ruperto V. Tankeh, petitioner Dr. Alejandro V. Tankeh, Jose Marie Vargas, as well
as respondents Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. and Vicente Arenas should become
liable jointly and severally for the amount of the loan;
3) The future earnings of the mortgaged vessel, including proceeds of Charter and
Shipping Contracts, should be assigned to Development Bank of the Philippines; and
4) Development Bank of the Philippines should be assigned no less than 67% of the
total subscribed and outstanding voting shares of the company. The percentage of
shares assigned should be maintained at all times, and the assignment was to subsist
as long as the assignee, Development Bank of the Philippines, deemed it necessary
during the existence of the loan.
On May 12, 1981, petitioner signed the Assignment of Shares of Stock with Voting Rights. Petitioner
then signed the May 12, 1981 promissory note in December 1981. He was the last to sign this note as
far as the other signatories were concerned.
The loan was approved by respondent Development Bank of the Philippines on March 18, 1981. The
vessel was acquired on September 29, 1981 for $5.3 million.
18
On December 3, 1981, respondent corporation Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. through respondent
Ruperto V. Tankeh executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Development Bank of the Philippines.
The deed stated that the assignor, Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.:
x x x does hereby transfer and assign in favor of the ASSIGNEE (DBP), its successors
and assigns, future earnings of the mortgaged M/V "Sterling Ace," including
proceeds of charter and shipping contracts, it being understood that this assignment
shall continue to subsist for as long as the ASSIGNOR’S obligation with the herein
ASSIGNEE remains unpaid.
On June 16, 1983, petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh saying that he was
severing all ties and terminating his involvement with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. He required that
its board of directors pass a resolution releasing him from all liabilities, particularly the loan contract
with Development Bank of the Philippines. In addition, petitioner asked that the private
respondents notify Development Bank of the Philippines that he had severed his ties with Sterling
Shipping Lines, Inc.
The accounts of respondent Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. in the Development Bank of the Philippines
were transferred to public respondent Asset Privatization Trust on June 30, 1986.
Presently, respondent Asset Privatization Trust is known as the Privatization and Management
Office. Its present function is to identify disposable assets, monitor the progress of privatization
activities, and approve the sale or divestment of assets with respect to price and buyer.
On January 29, 1987, the M/V Sterling Ace was sold in Singapore for $350,000.00 by Development
Bank of the Philippines’ legal counsel Atty. Prospero N. Nograles.
When petitioner came to know of the sale, he wrote respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines to express that the final price was inadequate, and therefore, the transaction was
irregular. At this time, petitioner was still bound as a debtor because of the promissory note dated
May 12, 1981, which petitioner signed in December of 1981.
Petitioner filed several Complaints against respondents, praying that the promissory note be
declared null and void and that he be absolved from any liability from the mortgage of the vessel
and the note in question.
In the Complaints, petitioner alleged that respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh, together with Vicente L.
Arenas, Jr. and Jose Maria Vargas, had exercised deceit and fraud in causing petitioner to bind
himself jointly and severally to pay respondent Development Bank of the Philippines the amount of
the mortgage loan. Although he had been made a stockholder and director of the respondent
corporation Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., petitioner alleged that he had never invested any amount
in the corporation and that he had never been an actual member of the board of directors. He alleged
19
that all the money he had supposedly invested was provided by respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh. He
claimed that he only attended one meeting of the board.
Petitioner further claimed that he had been excluded deliberately from participating in the affairs of
the corporation and had never been compensated by Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. as a director and
stockholder. According to petitioner, when Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. was organized, respondent
Ruperto V. Tankeh had promised him that he would become part of the administration staff and
oversee company operations. Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh had also promised petitioner that the
latter’s son would be given a position in the company. However, after being designated as vice
president, petitioner had not been made an officer and had been alienated from taking part in the
respondent corporation.
In their Answers to the Complaints, respondents raised the following defenses against petitioner:
Respondent Development Bank of the Philippines categorically denied receiving any amount from
Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.’s future earnings and from the proceeds of the shipping contracts. It
maintained that equity contributions could not be deducted from the outstanding loan obligation
that stood at ₱245.86 million as of December 31, 1986.
The trial proceeded with the petitioner serving as a sole witness for his case. In a January 4, 1996
Decision,34 the Regional Trial Court ruled:
WHEREFORE, this Court, finding and declaring the Promissory Note (Exhibit "C")
and the Mortgage Contract (Exhibit "A") null and void insofar as plaintiff DR.
ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH is concerned, hereby ANNULS and VOIDS those
documents as to plaintiff, and it is hereby further ordered that he be released from
any obligation or liability arising therefrom.
All the defendants’ counterclaims and cross-claims and plaintiff’s and defendants’
prayer for damages are hereby denied and dismissed, without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents Ruperto V. Tankeh, Asset Privatization Trust, and Arenas immediately filed their
respective Notices of Appeal with the Regional Trial Court. The petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with regard to the denial of his prayer for damages. After this Motion had been
denied, he then filed his own Notice of Appeal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of any competent proof, Ruperto V. Tankeh did not
commit any fraud. Petitioner Alejandro V. Tankeh was unable to prove by a preponderance of
evidence that fraud or deceit had been employed by Ruperto to make him sign the promissory note.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that:
20
Fraud is never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
party’s evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. The plaintiff
clearly failed to discharge such burden. (Citations omitted)
With that, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the judgment and ordered
that plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 25, 2005 that was denied in a Resolution42 promulgated on February
9, 2006.
Hence, this Petition was filed.
Collectively, respondents argue that the Petition is actually one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and not a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Thus, petitioner’s failure to
show that there was neither appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy merited the
dismissal of the Complaint.
Issue:
WON the Petition is actually one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Ruling:
Contrary to respondent’s imputation, the remedy contemplated by petitioner is clearly that of a Rule
45 Petition for Review. In Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, this Court made the distinction between a
Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari and a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari:
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason
for the rule in this light: When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed
while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed x x x. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable through the original civil
action of certiorari.
xxxx
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction,
but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment, appeal is the remedy.
21
In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of the Court of
Appeals. These errors pertain to the petitioner’s allegation that the appellate court failed to uphold
the findings of facts of the lower court. He does not impute any error with respect to the Court of
Appeals’ exercise of jurisdiction. As such, this Petition is simply a continuation of the appellate
process where a case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the Court of Appeals, and to this
Court via Rule 45.
Contrary to respondents’ arguments, the allegations of petitioner that the Court of Appeals
"committed grave abuse of discretion" did not ipso facto render the intended remedy that of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court has the
discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. This
is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a Petition for review; (2)
when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation
of the rules. When this Court exercises this discretion, there is no need to comply with the
requirements provided for in Rule 65.
In this case, petitioner filed his Petition within the reglementary period of filing a Petition for
Review. His Petition assigns errors of judgment and appreciation of facts and law on the part of the
Court of Appeals. Thus, even if the Petition was designated as one that sought the remedy of
certiorari, this Court may exercise its discretion to treat it as a Petition for Review in the interest of
substantial justice.
22
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. RETIRED JUDGE GUILLERMO

R. ANDAYA, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181; June 25, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 09-4-174-RTJ)
“In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed
during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of
respondent's cessation from office.”
Facts:
On January 19, 20, and 21, 2009, a judicial audit docketed as A.M. No. 09-4-174-RTC was conducted
on the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Quezon, then presided by the respondent Judge
Guillermo R. Andaya.
In a Memorandum and now Hon. Associate Justice Jose P. Perez recommended that a fine be
imposed on respondent Judge in the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00). The fine, which
was to be deducted from his retirement or terminal leave benefits was recommended based on the
findings that respondent Judge failed to take appropriate action, resolve the pending motions and
decide a number of civil and criminal cases.
In a Resolution dated April 29, 2009, the Second Division of this Court resolved to docket the judicial
audit report as an administrative complaint against respondent for gross incompetence, inefficiency,
negligence, and dereliction of duty against Judge Guillermo R. Andaya, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 53, Lucena City, Quezon, who retired on March 27, 2009.
Meanwhile, another administrative case, docketed as A.M. No. 09-11-477-RTC, arose in relation to
the Certificate of Clearance that the respondent Judge filed in relation to his application for
Compulsory Retirement Benefits.
In a Memorandum dated November 9, 2009, then Court Administrator and now Hon. Associate
Justice Jose P. Perez commended the imposition of a fine, to be deducted from his
retirement/gratuity benefits, in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). The
recommendation was made upon the finding that the respondent Judge had failed to decide forty-
five (45) cases submitted for decision beyond the reglementary period of three (3) months as per the
March 2009 Monthly Report of Cases.
In a Resolution dated November 24, 2009, the Court resolved to redocket A.M. No. 09-11-477-RTC as
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 and impose a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) on the respondent
Judge for his failure to decide forty-five (45) cases submitted for decision, with the amount to be
deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits.
23
The respondent Judge sent a letter dated March 4, 2010 addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, manifesting that: (a) both A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 and A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181 involves the charge
of gross inefficiency; and (b) that "the Court had not been given the opportunity to appreciate his
explanation regarding his health conditions" since he did not know about A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208
until he received a copy of the Resolution of this Court dated November 24, 2009.
Respondent prayed for the Court to take cognizance of: (a) his health problems; (b) the fact that he
had already been fined Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for gross inefficiency in A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2208; (c) that he has not received any benefit since he retired on March 27, 2009; and (d) that he had
served the government for thirty-four (34) years, twenty-two (22) of which were in the judiciary.
In a Memorandum dated June 11, 2010 signed by Court Administrator Marquez, the Office of the
Court Administrator ("OCA" for brevity) noted that the respondent Judge paid the Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) fine in the other complaint on April 14, 2010. The OCA also noted that twenty-
three (23) criminal cases and nine (9) civil cases included in the March 2009 Monthly Report of
Cases in A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 were included in the present complaint. The OCA then reiterated its
recommendation that respondent Judge be fined, but that the amount be reduced from Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
Respondent then sent a letter dated August 17, 2010 reiterating his manifestations in the letter dated
March 4, 2010. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the present case for the sake of justice
tempered by leniency on the following grounds: (a) his serious health problems that affected his
work efficiency in the last months of his service; (b) the penalty in A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 was
imposed without him being given a chance to explain; and (c) he has served twelve (12) years as an
assistant city prosecutor, three (3) years as a Municipal Trial Court judge, and nineteen (19) years as
a Regional Trial Court judge.
In subsequent letter pointed out an apparent overlap between A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 and the present
complaint and prayed that the two not be considered as separate complaints because to do so would
be akin to splitting the causes of a complaint. Respondent also prayed for the early resolution of the
present case.
In response to the letter, the OCA sent a Memorandum dated February 16, 2011, bringing to the
attention of the Court what respondent claimed as a similarity in the offenses involved in A.M.
No.RTJ-09-2208 and A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181 and the possibility that he may be penalized twice for the
same offense.
In a Resolution dated January 17, 2012, the Court resolved to approve the release of respondent's
retirement benefits subject to the retention of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and pending the
resolution of the present case. On January 24, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-
09-2208 considering the case as closed and terminated.
24
Issue:
WON the Court can acquire administrative jurisdiction over a Judge by filing a new administrative
case against him after he has ceased to be a public official.
Ruling:
No. A review of the records shows that the judicial audit was conducted on January 19, 20, and 21,
2009 during the respondent Judge's incumbency. However, the administrative complaint was
docketed only on April 29, 2009 after his compulsory retirement on March 27, 2009.
In the case of Re: Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City,
Davao del Norte, a Memorandum recommending that court's presiding Judge, Jesus L. Grageda, who
compulsorily retired on November 25, 2009, be held liable for not ordering a prompt investigation as
to missing court exhibits and properties and be made to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) was submitted by the OCA to the Court on July 10, 2012, or more than two (2) years
after he retired. In dismissing the complaint against him, We ruled that:
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be
filed during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by
reason of respondent's cessation from office. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Hamoy, the
Court held that:
Respondent's cessation from office x x x does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative
case moot and academic. The Court's jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency
of the case.
In the present case, Judge Grageda's compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right to institute
a new administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can no longer
acquire administrative jurisdiction over Judge Grageda by filing a new administrative case against
him after he has ceased to be a public official. The remedy, if necessary, is to file the appropriate civil
or criminal case against Judge Grageda for the alleged transgression. (emphasis provided)
Similarly, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda, the Court dismissed
another pending administrative case against him, thus:
Records show that Judge Grageda compulsorily retired on November 25, 2009 while the judicial
audit was conducted at RTC, Br. 4, Panabo City from November 17 to November 26, 2009. The OCA
then submitted its report only on March 24, 2010, which was re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter on April 28, 2010, or months after Judge Grageda retired from the judiciary. Consequently,
25
his retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant administrative proceeding that
was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less the OCA, of any
jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him
for the infractions committed while he was still in the service. As held in the case of OCA v. Judge
Celso L. Mantua [A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291, February 8, 2012]:
This Court concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit.
However, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to recommend the
imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were never given a
chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit.
In light of these pronouncements, the Court has lost jurisdiction to find him liable for the cases and
motions left unresolved prior to his retirement.
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the complaint against respondent Judge GUILLERMO
R. ANDAYA, formerly of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Quezon,
is DISMISSED. The Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator
is DIRECTED to release the Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) retained from his retirement pay
unless withheld for some other lawful cause.
26
PRYCE CORPORATION vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 172302. February 18, 2014
In res judicata, the primacy given to the first case is related to the principle of immutability of final
judgments essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice, viz: x x x Well-settled is the principle
that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will
be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Facts:
Pryce Corp. filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation. Rehabilitation court gave due course to its
petition, thus directed the rehabilitation receiver to evaluate and give recommendations on
petitioner Pryce Corporation’s proposed rehabilitation plan.
The rehabilitation receiver did not approve this plan and submitted instead an amended
rehabilitation plan, which the rehabilitation court approved by order dated January 17, 2005. The
court found petitioner eligible to be placed in a state of corporate rehabilitation.
Respondent China Banking Corporation elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, questioning the
January 17, 2005 order. Respondent contended that the rehabilitation plan impaired the obligations
of contracts. BPI, another creditor of petitioner, filed a separate petition with the CA assailing the
same order by the rehabilitation court.
On July 28, 2005, the Court of appeals Seventh (7th) Division granted respondent CBC’s petition and
reversed and set aside the rehabilitation court.
With respect to BPI’s separate appeal, the Court of Appeals First (1st) Division also granted the
petition initially and set aside the order of Rehabilitation court. On reconsideration, the court issued
a resolution dated May 23, 2007 setting aside its original decision and dismissing the petition. BPI
elevated the case to the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 180316 but it was denied and thereafter
attained its finality.
Meanwhile, Pryce also appealed to the Supreme Court assailing the July 28, 2005 decision of the CA
7th Division. In the decision dated February 4, 2008, the First (1st) Division of the Supreme Court
denied Pryce’s petition.
Pryce filed an omnibus motion for (1) reconsideration or (2) partial reconsideration and (3) referral
to the court En Banc. Respondent also filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the February
4, 2008 decision be set aside and reconsidered only insofar as it ordered the remand of the case for
27
further proceedings to RTC Makati, Branch 138 to determine whether petitioner’s financial condition
is imminent danger that it will lose its corporate assets.
Both motions for reconsideration filed by the parties were denied by resolution dated June 16,
2008.On September 10, 2008, petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration praying that the
CA’s decision dated February 4, 2008 be set aside. On June 22, 2009, Supreme Court’s 1st Division
referred the case to the En Banc en consulta. The court En banc, resolved to accept the case.
Petitioner and respondent filed a joint manifestation and motion to suspend proceedings. The
parties requested the court to defer its ruling on petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration so as
to enable the parties to work out a mutually acceptable arrangement. This court granted the motion
but only for two (2) months. However, more than two months had lapsed, but no agreement was
filed by the parties. Thus, this court proceeded to rule on petitioner’s second motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner argues that the issue on the validity of the rehabilitation court orders is now res judicata.
Petitioner submits that the ruling in BPI vs. Pryce Corporation docketed as G.R. No. 180316
contradicts the present case, and it has rendered the issue on the validity and regularity of the
rehabilitation court orders as res judicata.
Issue:
Whether the issue on the validity of the Rehabilitation order dated January 17, 2005 is now res
judicata in light of BPI vs. Pryce Corporation.
Ruling:
YES. According to the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.
The elements for res judicata to apply are as follows: (a) the former judgment was final; (b) the court
that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the judgment was based
on the merits; (d) between the first and the second actions, there was an identity of parties, subject
matters, and causes of action.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
Bar by prior judgment exists "when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action." On the other hand, the concept of conclusiveness of judgment finds application "when a fact
or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by
a court of competent jurisdiction." This principle only needs identity of parties and issues to apply.
The elements of res judicata through bar by prior judgment are present in this case.
28
On the element of identity of parties, res judicata does not require absolute identity of parties as
substantial identity is enough. Substantial identity of parties exists "when there is a community of
interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not
impleaded in the first case." Parties that represent the same interests in two petitions are, thus,
considered substantial identity of parties for purposes of res judicata. Definitely, one test to
determine substantial identity of interest would be to see whether the success or failure of one party
materially affects the other.
In the present case, respondent China Banking Corporation and BPI are creditors of petitioner Pryce
Corporation and are both questioning the rehabilitation court’s approval of the amended
rehabilitation plan. Thus, there is substantial identity of parties since they are litigating for the same
matter and in the same capacity as creditors of petitioner Pryce Corporation.
There is no question that both cases deal with the subject matter of petitioner Pryce Corporation’s
rehabilitation. The element of identity of causes of action also exists.
Since the January 17, 2005 order approving the amended rehabilitation plan was affirmed and made
final in G.R. No. 180316, this plan binds all creditors, including respondent China Banking
Corporation.
29
REPUBLIC rep. by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) vs.
ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
G.R. No. 171496. MARCH 3, 2014
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court to the
Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In which case,
the appeal shall not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright.
Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law must, in all cases, be
taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by
notice of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the
Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of
law.
Facts:
Respondent, Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the owner of a parcel of land known as
Lot 5-B-2 with an area of 70,278 square meters in Pasig City.
Upon the request of the DPWH, respondent caused the segregation of its property into five lots and
reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover project. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445
square meter portion of its property, for the road widening of Ortigas Avenue.
The C-5 Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999 utilizing only 396 square meters of the
1,445sqm allotment for the project. Consequently, respondent further subdivided Lot 5-B-2-A into
two lots: Lot 5-B-2-A-1, which was the portion actually used for road widening, and Lot 5-B-2-A-2,
which was the unutilized portion of Lot 5-B-2-A.
Respondent filed with the RTC Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the government Lot 5-B-A-1.
Respondent alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance of the property for road widening
purposes.
Finding merit in respondent’s petition, the RTC issued an order authorizing the sale of Lot 5-B-2-A-1
to petitioner Republic.
Petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition, alleging
that respondent’s property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing
Section 50 of PD No. 1529.
On June 29, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order, reiterating its
argument in its opposition. In an order dated October 3, 2001, RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner filed its notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals from the RTC’s order dated October 3,
30
2001. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the ground that an order or judgment
denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution. In its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner pointed out that its reference in the notice of appeal to the October 3, 2001
order denying the motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision was merely due to
inadvertence. In any case, Rule 37, Section 9 of the Rules of Procedure contemplates as non-
appealable only those orders which are not yet final. The October 3, 2001 order was already final as
it confirmed the June 11, 2001 judgment of the court.
In its resolution dated February 9, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals noted that even if the order denying the
motion for reconsideration was appealable, the appeal was still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction
because petitioner raised only a question of law.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying petitioner Republic’s appeal
based on technicalities.
Ruling:
NO. The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals is
whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance
with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. This question involves the interpretation and
application of the provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals to examine the truth or falsity
of the facts presented. Neither does it invite a review of the evidence. The issue raised before the
Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law. The proper mode of appeal is through a
petition for review under Rule 45. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal
on this ground.
Nevertheless, we take time to emphasize that Rule 41, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the Rules of Court,
which provides that "no appeal may be taken from an order denying a x x x motion for
reconsideration," is based on the implied premise in the same section that the judgment or order
does not completely dispose of the case. The pertinent portion of Rule 41, Section 1 provides:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
In other words, what Section 1 of Rule 41 prohibits is an appeal taken from an interlocutory order.
An interlocutory order or judgment, unlike a final order or judgment, does "not completely dispose
of the case [because it leaves to the court] something else to be decided upon." Appeals from
interlocutory orders are generally prohibited to prevent delay in the administration of justice and to
31
prevent "undue burden upon the courts."
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion for
reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if "it puts an end to a
particular matter," leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision.
"An appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself." It is an appeal from a final decision
or order.
The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for reconsideration of
the decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell its property to the government was not
an interlocutory order because it completely disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it
would not cause delay in the administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal
to the Court of Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the former used the wrong mode
of appeal.
32
LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION
and the PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 193494. March 12, 2014.
There should be no inexplicable delay in the filing of a motion to set aside order of default. Even when a motion
is filed within the required period, excusable negligence must be properly alleged and proven.
Facts:
Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corp. entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel
of land. On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of
Communications asking that payment of rent must be paid directly to them. Zuellig Pharma
promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of Communications’ claim. Lui
Enterprises wrote to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect the leased property’s rent.
Due to conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Phil. Bank of Communications over the rental
payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader with the RTC of Makati.
The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer to the complaint. On the other hand, Lui
Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged representative did
not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation. Zuellig Pharma
filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to dismiss should be denied
for having been filed late.
The RTC of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the
reglementary period. Thus, Lui Enterprises was declared in default.
RTC of Makati ruled that Lui enterprises was barred from any claim in respect of the rental
payments since it was declared in default. Thus, according to the trial court, there was no issue as o
which corporation had the better right over the rental payments.
On appeal, Court of Appeals found Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief insufficient. As to the denial of
Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.
In this petition for review on certiorari, Lui Enterprises argued that the Court of Appeals applied
“the rules of procedure strictly” and dismissed its appeal on technicalities. According to Lui
Enterprises, the Court of Appeals should have taken a liberal stance and allowed its appeal despite
the lack of subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited,
and the statement of issues in its appellant’s brief
Issues:
1. Whether or not Lui Enterprises complied with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s
brief.
33
2. Whether or not the RTC of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside
order of default.
Ruling:
1. NO. Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
of Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the
appellant’s brief lack specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d),
and (f):
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to
the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of Rule 44.
These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references to the record,
and a table of cases alphabetically arranged and with textbooks and statutes cited:
Section 13. Contents of the appellant’s brief. – The appellant’s brief shall contain, in the order herein
indicated, the following:
(a) A subject index of the matter in brief with a digest of the arguments and page references,
and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the
pages where they are cited;
(c) Under the heading “Statement of the Case,” a clear and concise statement of the nature of
the action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court, the
nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading “Statement of Facts,” a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of
the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the substance of
the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page references
to the record;
(f) Under the heading “Argument,” the appellant’s arguments on each assignment of error with
page references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the report
at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found;
Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and
table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises’ appeal.
2. NO. When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is
required to answer within 15 days from the day he or she was served with summons. The
defendant may also move to dismiss the complaint “within the time for but before filing the
answer.”
34
Fifteen days is sufficient time for a defendant to answer with good defenses against the
plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint. Thus, a defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from
service of summons either presents no defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint or
was prevented from filing his or her answer within the required period due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence.
Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 3. Default; declaration of. –
(b) Relief from order of default. – A party declared in default may at any time after notice
thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon
proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set
aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately
take steps to remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a motion to set
aside order of default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only “conveniently
blamed its x x x counsel for the late filing of the answer” without offering any excuse for the late
filing. This is not excusable negligence under Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not err in refusing to set aside the
order of default.
35
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA vs. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E.MALA
G.R. No. 188832. April 23. 2014.
When the property involved is real, such as land, the action to recover it is a real action otherwise, the action is
a personal action. In such actions, the parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly
take cognizance of them.
Facts:
On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located
in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Canete. On March 3,
1996 Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15633 was issued to Roldan’s name. At the time of the
purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land.By, 2002, Vivencio secure a Katibayan
ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the
same parcel of land. To settle the conflicting claim, Roldan initiated barangay conciliation
proceedings before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan.
Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession
of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court.
In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is the registered owner of the lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property,
depriving him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court order Vivencio to vacate his property. Respondent court took cognizance of the case
and ruled in favor of Roldan. It ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to
possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property. Vivencio filed a petition for
relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. In his petition for
relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines and argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions and
proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
Issue:
Whether or not Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of the
parties is a non-Muslim.
Ruling:
NO. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District
Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim
Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with “existing civil courts” over
36
real actions not arising from customary contracts[41] wherein the parties involved are Muslims:
ART 143. Original jurisdiction. -
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction
over:
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d) wherein the parties
involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court;
When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess and enjoy
it. If the owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has a right of action to recover its
possession from the dispossessor. When the property involved is real, such as land, the action to
recover it is a real action otherwise, the action is a personal action. In such actions, the parties
involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of them. In this case,
the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a
Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim,
Roldan did not dispute this claim. When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim,
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that
there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to decide Roldan’s
action because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction
over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession.
37
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUNO CARS, INC
G.R. NO. 197293. April 21, 2014.
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the prosecutor,
the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal
assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
Facts:
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a resolution finding probable cause
and recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. He then filed a petition for review
with the Department of Justice on May 16, 2008. While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still
pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two information for qualified
theft and estafa were filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On
March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable cause before the trial court. On
April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint. Juno Cars, complainant thereof filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint. It
argued that “the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal
case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor.’’
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and reinstated the case. Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a
petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence, he argued that the trial court was
correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the evidence on record. He argued
that “judicial determination of probable cause is broader than the executive determination of
probable cause’ and that “it is not correct to say that the determination of probable cause is
exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x x.”
Issue:
Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own
independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Ruling:
A complaint for qualified theft and estafa was filed. Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted “to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial,” in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
38
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the
existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor. If upon
evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she
shall then cause the filing of the information with the court. Once the information has been filed, the
judge shall then “personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence’’
to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial
determination of probable cause exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia, this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined
by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that
function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself
does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge
cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an
independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor
and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge
makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.
In this case, trial court made an independent assessment of the evidence on record and concluded
that “the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified
theft and estafa.’’ Specifically, she found that Juno Cars “failed to prove by competent evidence” that
the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or
that these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified theft.
39
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO FELICIANO, JR. et al.,
G.R. No. 196735. May 5, 2014
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable assumption that
it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, who reveal
much of themselves by their deportment on the stand.
Facts:
An information for murder, was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity,
namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran
Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund
E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Peñalosa, Jr. with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219.
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma Rho
fraternity members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Cristobal Gaston, Jr., and Leandro Lachica, and the
frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members Mervin Natalicio and Arnel Fortes. Only 11 of
the accused stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at large.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the finding that Robert Michael
Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder. The trial court, however,
acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and
Raymund Narag. The Court is of the considered view that of the ten accused, some were sufficiently
identified and some were not.
The Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on the basis of the
evidence, that accused- appellants were sufficiently identified.
Ruling:
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
given great weight and credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People v. Daniel
Quijada, as follows:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses,
are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the
witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an
40
insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant
answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame,
the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh,
the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and
mien.
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia Labarias, this court
stated that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable
assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies
of the witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by their deportment on the stand. The exception
that makes the rule is where such findings are clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when they are
tainted with bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to suggest that they were reached without
the careful study and perceptiveness that should characterize a judicial decision.
The accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the prosecution. The trial court, in
weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be
credible. The acquittals made by the trial court further prove that its decision was brought about
only upon a thorough examination of the evidence presented. It accepted that there were
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victims but that these were minor and did not affect their
credibility. It ruled that “such inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual ‘for there is no
person with perfect faculties or senses.
41
NESTOR T. GADRINAB vs. NORAT. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO AND ELENA LOPEZ
Gr. No. 194560 June 11, 2014
A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res judicata, and is
immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of
immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even if the
purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law.
Facts:
Respondents, together with Adoracion Gadrinab and Arsenia Talao, are siblings and heirs of the late
Spouses Talao, Nicolas and Aurelia. The Spouses Talao died intestate, leaving a parcel of land in Sta.
Ana, Manila.
The five Talao children divided the property among themselves through an extrajudicial settlement.
Subsequently, Arsenia Talao waived her share over the property in favor of her siblings.
Respondent Salamanca filed a complaint for partition against her siblings, Antonio, Elena (deceased,
now represented by her husband, Jose Lopez), and Adoracion (deceased, now represented by heirs,
petitioner Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
All parties claimed their respective shares in the property. They also claimed shares in the rentals
collected from one of the units of a duplex apartment on the property. The total amount of rental
collection in the possession of Jose Lopez was P528,623.00. The amount, according to Jose's counsel,
was ready for distribution.
Upon being referred to mediation, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. On April 10,
2003, the Regional Trial Court approved the compromise agreement. Based on the entry of
judgment, the case became final and executory on April 10, 2003.
Nestor Gadrinab filed a motion for execution of the compromise agreement. He demanded his one-
fourth share in the accumulated rentals. During the hearing on the motion for execution, the parties
agreed that the rentals shall be... divided only into three since Nestor had already been occupying
one of the duplex units. The parties also agreed that Antonio Talao would shoulder Nestor's share,
equivalent to one-fourth of the rental amount.
Because of the attitude of her co-heirs, respondent Salamanca moved for the physical partition of the
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. She prayed for the physical partition of the
property instead of having it sold.
Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab opposed the motion. They contended that the judgment on the
compromise agreement had already become final and executory and had the effect of res judicata.
Antonio Talao and Jose Lopez did not object to the motion for physical partition. The Regional Trial
Court of Manila granted the motion for physical partition.
42
Nestor and Francisco Gadrinab appealed to the Court of Appeals. They assailed the grant of
Salamanca's motion for physical partition after the issuance of the judgment on compromise
agreement. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
exception to the immutability of judgments, that is, "whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision... rendering its execution unjust and inequitable," applies in this case.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court's order
granting respondent Salamanca's motion for physical partition. A judgment on the compromise
agreement had already been rendered and had attained... finality.
In their separate comments, respondents Salamanca and Talao argued that this case fell under the
exception of the rule on immutability of judgments. The non-compliance of some of the parties with
the compromise agreement constituted an event that "makes it difficult if not totally impossible to
enforce the compromise agreement."
Issue:
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court's
decision allowing the physical partition of the property despite finality of a previous judgment on
compromise agreement involving the division of the same property.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
In a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. "A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits" of the case. It has the effect of res judicata.
These principles are impressed both in our law and jurisprudence.
There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule refers to "bar by prior
judgment," which means that actions on the same claim or cause of action cannot be relitigated. This
rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (b) of the Rules of Court. The second rule refers to
"conclusiveness of judgment." This means that facts already tried and determined in another action
involving a different claim or cause of action cannot anymore be relitigated. This rule is embodied in
Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court.
This case involves "bar by prior judgment." Respondents cannot file another action for partition after
final judgment on compromise had already been rendered in a previous action for partition
involving the same parties and property.
Courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action, parties, and subject matter
without violating the doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgments, unless
there is evidence that the agreement was void, obtained through fraud, mistake or any vice of
consent, or would disrupt substantial justice.
43
In this case, there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the compromise
agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of the parties simply do
not wish to abide by the compromise agreement's terms.
This court does not see how substantial justice will be served by disturbing a previous final
judgment on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties themselves.
Likewise, respondents' argument that a supervening event, i.e. disagreement among the parties, was
present to justify disturbance of the final judgment on compromise fails to persuade. A supervening
event may justify the disturbance of a final judgment on compromise if it "brought about a material
change in the situation" between the parties. The material change contemplated must render the
execution of the final judgment unjust and inequitable. Otherwise, a party to the compromise
agreement has a "right to have the... compromise agreement executed, according to its terms."
The subsequent disagreement among the parties did not cause any material change in the situation
or in the relations among the parties. The situation and relations among the parties remained the
same as the situation and their relations prior to the compromise agreement. They remained co-
owners of the property, which they desired to partition.
44
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A.

ROBLES vs. AURORA A. SALVAÑA
G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014
An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil Service Commission's repeal or modification of its
original decision. In such instances, it is included in the concept of a "party adversely affected" by a decision of
the Civil Service Commission granted the statutory right to appeal.
Facts:
On May 12, 2006, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, Melquiades Robles, issued
Office Order No. 119, series of 2006. The order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña's designation as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. It "directed her instead to handle
special projects and perform such other duties and functions as may be assigned to her" by the
Administrator.
Instead of complying, Salvaña questioned the order with the Office of the President. In the interim,
Salvaña applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and from May 15 to May 31, 2006. In
support of her application, she submitted a medical certificate issued by Dr. Grace Marie Blanco of
the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC).
LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr. Blanco also denied
having seen or treated Salvaña on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical certificate.
Administrator Robles issued a notice of preliminary investigation. The notice directed Salvaña to
explain in writing within 72 hours from her receipt of the notice "why no disciplinary action should
be taken against" for not complying with Office Order No. 119 and for submitting a falsified medical
certificate Salvaña filed her explanation on June 30, 2006. She alleged that as a member of the Bids
and Awards Committee, she "refused to sign a resolution" favoring a particular bidder. She alleged
that Office Order No. 119 was issued by Administrator Robles to express his "ire and vindictiveness"
over her refusal to sign.
The LRTA's Fact-finding Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory. It issued a formal charge
against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Insubordination, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
On August 5, 2006, "Salvaña tendered her irrevocable resignation." None of the pleadings alleged
that this irrevocable resignation was accepted, although the resolution of the Fact-finding
Committee alluded to Administrator Robles' acceptance of... the resignation letter.
In the meantime, the investigation against Salvaña continued.
On October 31, 2006, the Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution "finding Salvaña guilty of all
the charges against her and imposed [on] her the penalty of dismissal from service with all the
accessory penalties. The LRTA Board of Directors approved the findings of the Fact-finding
Committee. Salvaña appealed with the Civil Service Commission. In her appeal, she claimed that she
45
was denied due process and that there [was] no substantial evidence to support the charges against
her.
The Civil Service Commission modified the decision and issued Resolution No. 071364. The Civil
Service Commission found that Salvaña was guilty only of simple dishonesty. She was meted a
penalty of suspension for three months
LRTA moved for reconsideration of the resolution. This was denied. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and affirmed the Civil Service Commission's finding that Salvaña was only
guilty of simple dishonesty. The appellate court also ruled that Administrator Robles had no
standing to file a motion for reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission because that right
only belonged to respondent in an administrative case.
Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.
Issue:
Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal the modification
by the Civil Service Commission of its decision.
Ruling:
The parties may appeal in administrative cases involving members of the civil service.
It is settled that "the right to appeal is not a natural right [or] a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of the law." If it is not granted by the Constitution, it can only be availed of when a statute provides
for it. When made available by law or regulation, however, a person cannot be deprived of that right
to appeal. Otherwise, there will be a violation of the constitutional requirement of due process of
law.
This court explained that the right to appeal being merely a statutory privilege can only be availed
of by the party specified in the law. Since the law presumes that appeals will only be made in
decisions prescribing a penalty, this court concluded that the only parties that will be adversely
affected are the respondents that are charged with administrative offenses. Since the right to appeal
is a remedial right that may only be granted by statute, a government party cannot by implication
assert that right as incidental to its power, since the right to appeal does not form part of due
process.
In effect, this court equated exonerations in administrative cases to acquittals in criminal cases
wherein the State or the complainant would have no right to appeal. When the Civil Service
Commission enacted the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, or the
URACCS, on September 27, 1999, it applied this court’s definition. Thus, Section 2, paragraph
(l),Rule I, and Section 38,Rule III of the URACCS defined "party adversely affected" as follows:
46
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.
(l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a
disciplinary case has been rendered.
The Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service or RACCS was promulgated. The
Civil Service Commission modified the definition of a "party adversely affected" for purposes of
appeal.
Section 4. Definition of Terms
(k) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in an
administrative case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision
reversing or modifying the original decision.
The LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision.
The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy employees." When the government
office disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law, it exercises its
discretion. This discretion is inherent in the constitutional principle that "public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." This is a
principle that can be invoked by the public as well as the government office employing the public
officer.
Here, petitioner already decided to dismiss respondent for dishonesty. Dishonesty is a serious
offense that challenges the integrity of the public servant charged. To bar a government office from
appealing a decision that lowers the penalty of the disciplined employee prevents it from ensuring
its mandate that the civil service employs only those with the utmost sense of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
47
JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented by his attorneys-in-fact

and acting in their personal capacities, RODOLFO and RUBY BARTOLOME vs. SPOUSES
JESUS D. MORALES and CAROLINA N. MORALES
G.R. No. 199283 June 9, 2014
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief granted only under exceptional circumstances.1 To set
aside a judgment through a petition for relief, parties must file the petition within 60 days from notice of the
judgment and within six (6) months after the judgment or final order was entered; otherwise, the petition shall
be dismissed outright.
If the petition for relief is filed on the ground of excusable negligence of counsel, parties must show that their
counsel’s negligence could not have been prevented using ordinary diligence and prudence.2 The mere
allegation that there is excusable negligence simply because counsel was 80 years old is a prejudicial slur to
senior citizens. It is based on an unwarranted stereotype of people in their advanced years. It is as empty as the
bigotry that supports it.
Facts:
On January 9, 2001, Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for judicial foreclosure of a house and lot located in Bago Bantay,
Quezon City to which they alleged that on March 23, 1993, Spouses Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome
loaned P500,000.00 from them. The Spouses Bartolome agreed to pay within two months with
interest of five percent (5%) per month. To secure their loan, the Spouses Bartolome mortgaged the
Bago Bantay property to the Spouses Morales.
The obligation fell due, and after demand, the Spouses Bartolome only paid part of the loaned
amount.
In the meantime, the Spouses Bartolome died. The Spouses Morales, thus, filed a complaint for
judicial foreclosure of the Bago Bantay property against Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo Bartolome,
and the Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome.
The Spouses Morales sued Madarang as the latter allegedly represented herself as Lita Bartolome
and convinced the Spouses Morales to lend money to the Spouses Bartolome.
Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate heirs of the Spouses
Bartolome. Ruby Anne Bartolome is Rodolfo Bartolome’s wife.
In their answer, defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real estate mortgage covering the
Bago Bantay property, specifically, the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the instrument. Adding to
48
their statement that the complaint was already barred since it had been dismissed in another branch
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for failure to comply with an order of the trial court.
In its decision dated December 22, 2009, the trial court ordered defendants to pay the Spouses
Morales P500,000.00 plus 7% interest per month and costs of suit within 90 days but not more than
120 days from entry of judgment. Should defendants fail to pay, the Bago Bantay property shall be
sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.
Defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision. They amended their
motion for reconsideration and filed a request for a Philippine National Police handwriting expert to
examine the authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome’s alleged signatures on the deed of real estate
mortgage.
According to the trial court, the motion for reconsideration and its amendment were pro forma as
defendants failed to specify the findings and conclusions in the decision that were not supported by
the evidence or contrary to law.As to the request for a handwriting expert, the trial court ruled that
the "reasons given therein not well taken." Thus, in its order, the trial court denied the motion.
Defendants filed a notice of appeal. In its order dated August 13, 2010, the trial court denied due
course the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. This is evidenced by the registry return
receipt on file with the court. Consequently, they had 15 days from June 24, 2010, or until July 9,
2010, to appeal the trial court’s decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal only on August
11, 2010, which was beyond the 15-day period to appeal.
On September 24, 2010, defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment, blaming their 80-year-
old lawyer who failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They argued that
Atty. Tugonon’s failure to appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake and an excusable
negligence due to their former lawyer’s old age:
15. Undersigned Petitioner’s counsel is already eighty (80) years of age and the lapses and failure of
their counsel to take appropriate steps immediately for the protection of his client is a mistake and
an excusable negligence due to the latter’s age and should not be attributable to undersigned
defendants.
In its order dated April 27, 2011, the trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment. The trial
court held that the petition for relief was filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s
decision, contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On July 13, 2011, Madarang, Romeo, and Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome filed the petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. In its resolution dated July 27, 2011, the appellate court denied
outright the petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners did not file a motion
49
for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment, a prerequisite for
filing a petition for certiorari.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated
November 10, 2011. Petitioners filed the petition for review on certiorari with this court. They argue
that they need not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from
judgment because the questions they raised in the petition for relief were pure questions of law.
They cite Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appealsas authority.
Petitioners add that the trial court erred in denying their notice of appeal. They personally received
a copy of the decision only on August 11, 2011. They argue that the period to file on appeal must be
counted from August 11, 2011, not on the day their "ailing counsel" received a copy of the decision.
A comment was filed on the petition for review on certiorari by respondents Spouses Morales. They
argue that the trial court did not err in declaring pro forma petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of
the trial court’s decision.
Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition for certiorari
since petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for
relief from judgment.
Issues:
I. Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is excusable negligence; and
II. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright petitioners’ petition for
certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for
relief from judgment.
Ruling:
I. This court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time. However, the
trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from the date of finality of
the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-
day period must be counted after petitioner learns of the judgment or final order. The period
counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the six-month period. Section 3, Rule 38 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of
the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after
50
such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied
with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the
facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied
with. A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright.
This is because a petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the public policy of
immutability of final judgments.
This court set aside the order granting the petition for relief from judgment for having been filed
beyond the double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This court explained:
A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary
periods: (a) the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order
or other proceeding to be set aside; and (b) within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such
judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required because
provision for a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State,
which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment,
order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order at last to put an end to
litigation.
In this case, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of the trial court’s decision on January 29,
2010. They filed a motion for reconsideration and an amended motion for reconsideration, which
similarly alleged the following:
The defendants, by the undersigned counsel, to this Honorable Court, respectfully allege:
1. That on January 29, 2010, they received the decision in the above entitled case rendered by this
Honorable Court, dated December 22, 2009;
2. That with due respect to the Honorable Court, the decision is contrary to law & to the defendants’
evidence presented in court. Hence, this urgent motion.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court, that the decision sought to be
reversed be reconsidered and another one be rendered in favor of the defendants.
Although petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and amended motion for reconsideration,
these motions were pro forma for not specifying the findings or conclusions in the decision that
were not supported by the evidence or contrary to law. Their motion for reconsideration did not toll
the 15-day period to appeal.
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Petitioners cannot argue that the period to appeal should be counted from August 11, 2011, the day
petitioners personally received a copy of the trial court’s decision. Notice of judgment on the counsel
of record is notice to the client. Since petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the decision on January
29, 2010, the period to appeal shall be counted from that date.
Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010. Petitioners
had six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010, to file a petition for relief from
judgment.
Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition for
relief from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from finality of judgment. The trial court
should have denied the petition for relief from judgment on this ground.
II. Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment within the
reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove that their former counsel’s failure to file a timely
notice of appeal was due to a mistake or excusable negligence.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment
may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence:
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only in exceptional cases.
It is not available if other remedies exist, such as a motion for new trial or appeal.
To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the negligence must be so gross "that ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against." There is also no showing that the
negligence could have been prevented through ordinary diligence and prudence. As such,
petitioners are bound by their counsel’s negligence.
52
OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION and DR. PABLO R. OLIVAREZ, Petitioner, vs.

BENJAMIN CASTILLO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 196251 July 9, 2014
Trial may be dispensed with and a summary judgment rendered if the case can be resolved judiciously by plain
resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers filed by the parties.
Facts:
Benjamin Castillo was the registered owner of a 346,918-squaremeter parcel of land located in
Laurel, Batangas. The Philippine Tourism Authority allegedly claimed ownership of the same parcel
of land. Castillo and Olivarez Realty Corporation, represented by Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez, entered
into a contract of conditional sale over the property. Under the deed of conditional sale, Castillo
agreed to sell his property to Olivarez Realty Corporation for ₱19,080,490. Olivarez Realty
Corporation agreed to a down payment of ₱5,000,000. As to the balance of ₱14,080,490, Olivarez
Realty Corporation agreed to pay in 30 equal monthly installments every eighth day of the month
beginning in the month that the parties would receive a decision voiding the Philippine Tourism
Authority’s title to the property. Under the deed of conditional sale, Olivarez Realty Corporation
shall file the action against the Philippine Tourism Authority "with the full assistance of Castillo."
Castillo filed a complaint against Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez with the Regional
Trial Court of Tanauan City, Batangas. Castillo alleged that Dr. Olivarez convinced him into selling
his property to Olivarez Realty Corporation on the representation that the corporation shall be
responsible in clearing the property of the tenants and in paying them disturbance compensation.
The corporation neither cleared the land of the tenants nor paid them disturbance compensation.
Despite demand, Olivarez Realty Corporation refused to fully pay the purchase price. Arguing that
Olivarez Realty Corporation committed substantial breach of the contract of conditional sale and
that the deed of conditional sale was a contract of adhesion, Castillo prayed for rescission of contract
under Article 1191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In their answer, Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez admitted that the corporation only
paid ₱2,500,000 of the purchase price. In their defense, defendants alleged that Castillo failed to
"fully assist" the corporation in filing an action against the Philippine Tourism Authority. Neither
did Castillo clear the property of the tenants within six months from the signing of the deed of
conditional sale. Thus, according to defendants, the corporation had "all the legal right to withhold
the subsequent payments to [fully pay] the purchase price." Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr.
Olivarez prayed that Castillo’s complaint be dismissed. By way of compulsory counterclaim, they
prayed for ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses and ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees.
Castillo replied to the counterclaim, arguing that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez had
no right to litigation expenses and attorney’s fees. On January 10, 2005, Castillo filed a request for
admission, requesting Dr. Olivarez to admit under oath the genuineness of the deed of conditional
sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19972. He likewise requested Dr. Olivarez to admit the
53
truth of the following factual allegations: 1. That Dr. Olivarez is the president of Olivarez Realty
Corporation; 2. That Dr. Olivarez offered to purchase the parcel of land from Castillo and that he
undertook to clear the property of the tenants and file the court action to void the Philippine
Tourism Authority’s title to the property; 3. That Dr. Olivarez caused the preparation of the deed of
conditional sale; 4. That Dr. Olivarez signed the deed of conditional sale for and on behalf of
Olivarez Realty Corporation; 5. That Dr. Olivarez and the corporation did not file any action against
the Philippine Tourism Authority; 6. That Dr. Olivarez and the corporation did not pay the tenants
disturbance compensation and failed to clear the property of the tenants; and 7. That Dr. Olivarez
and the corporation only paid ₱2,500,000.00 of the agreed purchase price.
On January 25, 2005, Dr. Olivarez and Olivarez Realty Corporation filed their objections to the
request for admission, stating that they "reiterate[d] the allegations [and denials] in their [answer]."
Castillo filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. He argued that
Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez "substantially admitted the material allegations of
[his] complaint," specifically: 1. That the corporation failed to fully pay the purchase price for his
property; 2. That the corporation failed to file an action to void the Philippine Tourism Authority’s
title to his property; and 3. That the corporation failed to clear the property of the tenants and pay
them disturbance compensation. Should judgment on the pleadings be improper, Castillo argued
that summary judgment may still be rendered as there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
The trial court found that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s answer "substantially
[admitted the material allegations of Castillo’s] complaint and [did] not . . . raise any genuine issue
[as to any material fact]." Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez appealed to the Court of
Appeals. In its decision dated July 20, 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s
decision.
Issues:
1. Whether the trial court correctly rendered summary judgment, as there were no genuine issues of
material fact in this case?
2. Whether the trial court has acquired jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling:
1. Yes. A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a judgment on the pleadings. Under
Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, trial may likewise be dispensed with and a case
decided through judgment on the pleadings if the answer filed fails to tender an issue or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the claimant’s pleading. Judgment on the pleadings is proper
when the answer filed fails to tender any issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations in the
complaint. On the other hand, in a summary judgment, the answer filed tenders issues as specific
denials and affirmative defenses are pleaded, but the issues raised are sham, fictitious, or otherwise
not genuine.
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In this case, Olivarez Realty Corporation admitted that it did not fully pay the purchase price as
agreed upon in the deed of conditional sale. As to why it withheld payments from Castillo, it set up
the following affirmative defenses: First, Castillo did not file a case to void the Philippine Tourism
Authority’s title to the property; second, Castillo did not clear the land of the tenants; third, Castillo
allegedly sold the property to a third person, and the subsequent sale is currently being litigated
before a Quezon City court.
Considering that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s answer tendered an issue, Castillo
properly availed himself of a motion for summary judgment. However, the issues tendered by
Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s answer are not genuine issues of material fact. These
are issues that can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions,
and other papers on file; otherwise, these issues are sham, fictitious, or patently unsubstantial.
Petitioner corporation refused to fully pay the purchase price because no court case was filed to void
the Philippine Tourism Authority’s title on the property. However, paragraph C of the deed of
conditional sale is clear that petitioner Olivarez Realty Corporation is responsible for initiating court
action against the Philippine Tourism Authority. Neither can Olivarez Realty Corporation argue that
it refused to fully pay the purchase price due to the Philippine Tourism Authority’s adverse claim
on the property. The corporation knew of this adverse claim when it entered into a contract of
conditional sale. It even obligated itself under paragraph C of the deed of conditional sale to sue the
Philippine Tourism Authority. This defense, therefore, is sham.
Olivarez Realty Corporation, therefore, had no right to withhold payments of the purchase price.
Castillo’s alleged prayer for the irreconcilable reliefs of rescission of contract and reformation of
instrument is not a ground to dismiss his complaint. A plaintiff may allege two or more claims in the
complaint alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or in separate causes of action
per Section 2, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
As demonstrated, there are no genuine issues of material fact in this case. These are issues that can
be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on
file. As the trial court found, Olivarez Realty Corporation illegally withheld payments of the
purchase price. The trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment.
2. Yes. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over Castillo’s action as he paid the correct docket fees.
Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez claimed that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case. In the reply/motion to dismiss the complaint they filed with the Court of
Appeals, petitioners argued that Castillo failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees. Stating that
this action is a real action, petitioners argued that the docket fee Castillo paid should have been
based on the fair market value of the property. In this case, Castillo only paid 4,297, which is
insufficient "if the real nature of the action was admitted and the fair market value of the property
was disclosed and made the basis of the amount of docket fees to be paid to the court." Thus,
according to petitioners, the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Castillo countered that
his action for rescission is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, the Clerk of Court of
55
the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan City did not err in assessing the docket fees based on his prayer.
Although we discussed that there is no rescission of contract to speak of in contracts of conditional

sale, we hold that an action to cancel a contract to sell, similar to an action for rescission of contract
of sale, is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Like any action incapable of pecuniary
estimation, an action to cancel a contract to sell "demands an inquiry into other factors" aside from
the amount of money to be awarded to the claimant. Specifically in this case, the trial court
principally determined whether Olivarez Realty Corporation failed to pay installments of the
property’s purchase price as the parties agreed upon in the deed of conditional sale. The principal
natureof Castillo’s action, therefore, is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
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CITY OF DAGUPAN, represented by the CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. LIM vs. ESTER F.
MARAMBA, represented vy her ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JOHNNY FERRER
G.R. No. 174411 July 2, 2014
As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not
intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that
may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the
motion before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should
not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
Facts:
Respondent Ester Maramba was a grantee of a DENR miscellaneous lease contract for a 284-square-
meter property in Poblacion, Dagupan City, for a period of 25 years. She caused the construction of a
commercial fish center on the property.
On December 20, 2003, petitioner city caused the demolition of the commercial fish center, allegedly
without giving direct notice to Maramba and with threat of taking over the property. This prompted
Maramba, through her attorney-in-fact, Johnny Ferrer, to file a complaint for injunction and
damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
The complaint alleged that the demolition was unlawful and that the "complete demolition and
destruction of the previously existing commercial fish center of plaintiff is valued at Five Million
(₱10,000,000.00) pesos." The word, "ten," was handwritten on top of the word, "five." In the
complaint’s prayer, Maramba asked for a judgment "ordering defendant corporation to pay plaintiff
the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos for the actual and present value of the commercial
fish center completely demolished by public defendant." The word, "million," was handwritten on
top of the word, "thousand," and an additional zero was handwritten at the end of the numerical
figure. The handwritten intercalation was not explained in any part of the records and in the
proceedings.
The trial court decision (penned by Judge Laron), ruled in favor of Maramba and awarded 10
million as actual damages. In a separate order on the same date, the trial court also granted
Maramba’s motion for execution and ordered that "a writ of execution [be] issue[d] in the above
entitled case upon submission of the certificate of finality."
Petitioner city then filed a petition for relief with prayer for preliminary injunction dated October 29,
2004, together with an affidavit of merit. The city alleged that "the decision, were it not for the City
Legal Officer’s mistake, negligence and gross incompetence, would not have been obtained by the
plaintiff, or should have been reconsidered or otherwise overturned, the damage award in the total
amount of ₱11M being not only unconscionable and unreasonable, but completely baseless." The
trial court denied petitioner city’s petition for relief and ordered that the writ of execution be
implemented. The court stressed that "[t]he negligence of counsel binds the client." Petitioner city
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filed for reconsideration.
The trial court (penned by Judge Castillo )granted the petition for relief and consequently modified
its July 30, 2004 decision. It reduced the award of actual damages from 10 million to ₱75,000.00.
On June 15, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted Maramba’s petition for certiorari. It held that
petitioner city’s motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing and was a mere scrap of paper
that did not toll the period to appeal. The Court of Appeals also denied reconsideration, prompting
petitioner city to elevate the case before this court.
Issues:
1. Whether the lack of notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration is excusable negligence that
allows the filing of a petition for relief of judgment?
2. Whether the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment, when reckoned from receipt
of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, is considered filed on time?
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that courts have no legal power to amend or correct
a final judgment even if it later finds that its decision is erroneous?
4.. Whether actual damages must be substantiated in order to be awarded?
Ruling:
1. Yes. This Court has indeed held time and time again that, under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, mandatory is the notice requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by
failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered
pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading.
As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is
not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding
surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that
the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
Maramba was able to file an opposition to petitioner city’s motion for reconsideration on the ground
thatthe motion was not set for hearing. The opposition prayed that the motion be stricken off the
records. In its one-page opposition, Maramba did not address the substantive issues raised by
petitioner city in its motion for reconsideration such as the excessive award of actual damages.
Nevertheless, this opposition was an opportunity to be heard for Maramba on the matters raised by
petitioner city in its motion for reconsideration.
This court has relaxed procedural rules when a rigid application of these rules only hinders
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substantial justice. Procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons
in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes
of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the
outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
In this case, petitioner city received a copy of the trial court’s July 30, 2004 decision on August 11,
2004. Its motion for reconsideration filed on August 26, 2004 was filed within the 15-day period. The
purposes behind the required notice of hearing — provide the time to study the motion for
reconsideration and give an opportunityto be heard — were satisfied when Maramba filed an
opposition to the motion.
2. Rule 38 of the Rules of Court allows for the remedy called a petition for relief from judgment. This
isan equitable remedy "allowed in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate
remedy" that will allow for substantive justice. Excusable negligence as a ground for a petition for
relief requires that the negligence be so gross "that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against it." This excusable negligence must also be imputable to the party-litigant and not to
his or her counsel whose negligence binds his or her client. The binding effect of counsel’s
negligence ensures against the resulting uncertainty and tentativeness of proceedings if clients were
allowed to merely disown their counsels’ conduct.
Nevertheless, this court has relaxed this rule on several occasions such as: "(1) where [the] reckless
or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when[the rule’s]
application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the
interests of justice so require." Certainly, excusable negligence must be proven.
Fraud as a ground for a petition for relief from judgment pertains to extrinsic or collateral fraud.
On the other hand, mistake as used in Rule 38 means mistake of fact and not mistake of law. A
wrong choice in legal strategy or mode of procedure will not be considered a mistake for purposes
of granting a petition for relief from judgment. Mistake can be of such nature as to cause substantial
injustice to one of the parties. It may be so palpable that it borders on extrinsic fraud.
Atty. Laforteza’s "mistake" was fatal considering that the trial court awarded a total amount of ₱11
million in favor of Maramba based merely on her testimony that "the actual cost of the building
through continuous improvement is Five Million (5M) more or less"; that her husband spent $1,760
for a round trip business travel to the Philippines to attend to the case; and that "for his
accommodation and car rental, her husband spent more or less, ₱10,000.00 including round trip
ticket."
First, nowhere in the trial court’s July 30, 2004 decision penned by Judge Laron did it state or refer to
any document presented by Maramba to substantiate her claimed costs. In fact, the amounts she
testified on did not even add up to the ₱10 million the court awarded as actual damages.
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On the other hand, the August 25, 2005 trial court decision penned by Judge Castillo discussed that
"Marambawas only able to prove the amount of ₱75,000.00 as the appraised value of the
improvements made on the leased premises." The renewal lease agreement covering the property,
signed by Maramba, clearly stated this amount. The decision also explained that Maramba "was not
ableto show proof of the 5 million amount of improvements made on the establishment, as she was
claiming to have been made[,]" and "she did not show any single receipt for her traveling expenses
and for the car rental she made during her stay in the country for the purpose of prosecuting this
case."
Second, the body of the trial court’s July 30, 2004 decision mentioned that Maramba was entitled to 1
million as moral damages and ₱500,000.00 as attorney’s fees. This is inconsistent with the dispositive
portion that awarded ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and ₱500,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The affidavit
of merit discussed thatMaramba testified on her shock, sleepless nights, and mental anguish, but she
never expressly asked for moral damages or specified the amount of ₱500,000.00.
On the amount of attorney’s fees, the affidavit of merit explained that Maramba did not show a legal
retainer but only mentioned in passing, "Of course, (I am asking for) my attorney’s fees in the
amount of ₱500,000.00."
Maramba now wants this court to overlook all these blatant discrepancies and maintain the ₱11
million unsubstantiated award in her favor on the sole ground that petitioner city’s assistant legal
officer failed to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration that was filed within the
15-day reglementary period. She did not even attempt to address the lower court’s findings that her
claimed amounts as damages were all unsubstantiated.
The gross disparity between the award of actual damages and the amount actually proved during
the trial, the magnitude of the award, the nature of the "mistake" made, and that such negligence did
not personally affect the legal officer of the city all contributed to a conclusion that the mistake or
negligence committed by counsel bordered on extrinsic fraud.
There were discrepancy and lack of proof even on the amount of moral damages and attorney’s fees
awarded. This only heightened a sense of arbitrariness in the trial court’s July 30, 2004 decision.
Petitioner city’s petition for relief was correctly granted in the trial court’s August 25, 2005 decision.
Petitioner city followed the procedure under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Section 4 of Rule 38
provides that "[i]f the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify relief, the court in which
it is filed, shall issue an order requiring the adverse parties to answer the same within fifteen (15)
days from the receipt thereof." The trial court mentioned in its November 18, 2004 order denying
petitioner city’s petition for relief from judgment that an answer with motion to dismiss was filed
before it. Maramba prayed that the "petition for review be outright denied for lack of merit [and]
that the writ of execution dated October 26, 2004 be accordingly implemented."
Thus, the requirement under Section 4 of Rule 38 was complied with when Maramba filed an
answer with motion to dismiss, and the court considered this pleading in its resolution of petitioner
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city’s petition for relief from judgment.
3. The time for filing a petition for relief is found under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court,
which reads: SEC. 3 Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in
either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than
six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be.
The double period required under this provision is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied
with. Otherwise, a petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period will be
dismissed outright. The 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment is reckoned from
actual receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration when one is filed.
Petitioner city received a copy of the July 30, 2004 decision on August 11, 2004. It filed a motion for
reconsideration on August 26, 2004. On October 25, 2004, it received a copy of the October 21, 2004
trial court order denying its motion for reconsideration. Four days later or on October 29, 2004, it
filed its petition for relief from judgment. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment was considered
filed on time.
4. The issue on the amount of damages is a factual question that this court may not resolve in a Rule
45 petition. However, this rule admits of recognized exceptions:
The recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8); when said
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;(9)
when the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Petitioner city emphasized the argument it made in its motion for reconsideration that "the
improvements allegedly destroyed or damaged consists [sic] only of G.I. sheets and some makeshift
stalls used for buying and selling of fishery products [and] [b]y no stretch of imagination would said
materials amount to Php10,000,000.00 as claimed by the plaintiff." Considering the foregoing,
substantial justice warrants the grant of the petition.
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CATHAY METAL CORPORATION vs. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE,

INC.
G.R. No. 172204 July 2, 2014
The Rules of Court governs court procedures, including the rules on service of notices and summons. The
Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under the Rules of Court. Rule
14, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides an-exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive
summons for juridical entities. These persons are the juridical entity's president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Facts:
Respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a cooperative recognized under Republic

Act No. 6657. It allegedly entered into a joint venture agreement with farmer-beneficiaries through
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA). While respondent was negotiating with the farmer-
beneficiaries, petitioner Cathay Metal Corporation entered into Irrevocable Exclusive Right to Buy
(IERB) contracts with the same farmerbeneficiaries. Under the IERB, the farmer-beneficiaries
committed themselves to sell to petitioner their agricultural properties upon conversion to industrial
or commercial properties or upon expiration of the period of prohibition from transferring title to
the properties.
In 1996, respondent caused the annotation of its adverse claim on the farmer-beneficiaries’
certificates of title. In 1999, petitioner and the farmer-beneficiaries executed contracts of sale of the
properties. Transfer certificates of title were also issued in the name of petitioner in the same year.
Respondent’s Vice-President, Orlando dela Peña, sent two letters dated March 20, 2000 and April 12,
2000 to petitioner, informing it of respondent’s claim to the properties. Petitioner did not respond.
On September 15, 2000, petitioner filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claims on
its transfer certificates of title with the RTC of Tagaytay City. It served a copy of the petition by
registered mail to respondent's alleged official address at "Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna."
The petition was returned to sender because respondent could not be found at that address. The
postman issued a certification stating that the reason for the return was that the "cooperative [was]
not existing." Petitioner allegedly attempted to serve the petition upon respondent personally.
However, this service failed for the same reason.
Upon petitioner's motion, the Regional Trial Court issued an order on December 15, 2000 declaring
petitioner’s substituted service, apparently by registered mail, to have been effected. Petitioner was
later allowed to present its evidence ex parte.
Upon learning that a case involving its adverse claim was pending, respondent, through Mr.
Orlando dela Peña, filed a manifestation and motion, alleging that respondent never received a copy
of the summons and the petition. It moved for the service of the summons and for a copy of the
petition to be sent to No. 160, Narra Avenue, Looc, Calamba, Laguna.
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The Regional Trial Court granted respondent's manifestation and motion. It ordered that respondent
be furnished with a copy of the petition at its new address. Instead of furnishing respondent with a
copy of the petition, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Regional Trial Court order.
In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that the case was already submitted for decision
after all of petitioner’s evidence had been admitted, and a memorandum had been filed. Therefore, it
was too late for respondent to ask the court that it be furnished with a copy of the petition.
Moreover, because respondent was already in default, a manifestation and motion, without
allegations of grounds for a motion to lift order of default, would not give it personality to
participate in the proceedings.
Respondent received a copy of the motion for reconsideration after the hearing. On August 13, 2001,
respondent filed a motion for leave to admit attached opposition and opposition to petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the March 16,2001 Regional Trial Court order. Respondent argued that
since petitioner’s ex parte presentation of evidence was secured through extrinsic fraud, there
should be a new trial to give respondent a fair day in court. This was opposed by petitioner on
September 6, 2001. Petitioner emphasized its alleged compliance with the Cooperative Code rule on
notices and respondent’s failure to file its comment despite the court’s order that approved
petitioner’s substituted service. Petitioner further pointed out that it had always questioned the
authority of Mr. dela Peñato act for respondent.
On March 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued a decision granting petitioner’s petition for
cancellation of annotations. The Register of Deeds of Cavite was ordered to cancel the annotations
on the certificates of title. On April 3, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an order rescinding its
March 21, 2003 decision for having been prematurely rendered.
On June 23, 2003, the Regional Trial Court decided to grant petitioner's petition for cancellation of
annotation. According to the Regional Trial Court, since respondent was inoperative at the time
when its adverse claims were annotated, "there [was] no reason for [it] to believe that the person
who caused the annotations of adverse claim on the titles of the farmer-beneficiaries . . . was
authorized to do so." The Regional Trial Court ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the
annotations on the transfer certificates of title.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no valid
service of summons upon respondent in accordance with Rule 14, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. Hence, the "court acquire[d] no jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment in the case."
Issue:
Whether respondent was properly served with summons or notices of the hearing on the petition for
cancellation of annotations of adverse claim on the properties?
Ruling:
The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure is among the powers vested only in this court. Article
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VIII, Section 5(5) provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
This means that on matters relating to procedures in court, it shall be the Rules of Procedure that
will govern. Proper court procedures shall be determined by the Rules as promulgated by this court.
Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special proceeding is
court procedure. Hence, it shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure.
The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives’ activities as
administered by the Cooperative Development Authority. However, they are not procedural rules
that will govern court processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an
official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot take the place of the
rules on summonsunder the Rules of Court concerning a court proceeding.
This is not to say that the notices cannot be sent to cooperatives in accordance with the Cooperative
Code. Notices may be sent to a cooperative’s official address. However, service of notices sent to the
official address in accordance with the Cooperative Code may not be used as a defense for violations
of procedures, specially when such violation affects another party’s rights.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical
entity. It provides that summons may be served upon a juridical entity only through its officers.
Thus:
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive.102 Service of
summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid.103 Even
substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons.
This provision of the rule does not limit service to the officers’ places of residence or offices. If
summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons
may be served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found.
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Hence, petitioner cannot use respondent's failure to amend its Articles of Incorporation to reflect its
new address as an excuse from sending or attempting to send to respondent copies of the petition
and the summons. The Rules of Court provides that notices should be sent to the enumerated
officers. Petitioner failed to do this. No notice was ever sent to any of the enumerated officers.
This is not a matter of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of respondent since this is an action in
rem. In an action in rem, jurisdiction over the person is not required as long as there is jurisdiction
over the res. This case involves the issue of fair play and ensuring that parties are accorded due
process.
In this case, petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered mail and, allegedly, by
personal service at the office address indicated in respondent’s Certificate of Registration. Summons
was not served upon respondent’s officers. It was also not published in accordance with the Rules of
Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to present evidence, and petitioner was
able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court an order cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse
claims.
Respondent was, therefore, not validly served with summons.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO HOLGADO Y DELA CRUZ

AND ANTONIO MISAREZ Y ZARAGA, Accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 207992 August 11, 2014
Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic
Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be
scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be readily
planted and tampered.
Facts:
As alleged by the prosecution, in December 2006, the Pasig City Police received reports of illegal
drug activities of Holgado along C. Raymundo Street, Pasig City. After surveillance operations, a
search warrant was issued against Holgado. Acting on the search warrant, the Pasig City Chief of
Police instructed his officers to, if possible, first conduct a buy-bust operation before actually
enforcing the search warrant.
In the evening of January 17, 2007, police operatives went to No. 17, C. Raymundo Street for the buy-
bust operation. PO1 Philip Aure, acting as poseur-buyer and accompanied by the police informant,
approached Holgado who was then part of a drinking session with two (2) companions. Holgado
asked the informant if he was buying drugs while at the same time offering him a drink. The
informant accepted the drink and introduced PO1 Aure as a drug user. PO1 Aure thenhanded
Holgado two (2) marked one hundred peso bills. Holgado asked PO1 Aure and the informant to
wait as the drugs were with his "kumpare" who was then in the restroom.
Holgado called Misarez. After some time, co-accused Antonio Misarez stepped out of the restroom
and asked who was buying drugs. PO1 Aure and the informant answered, "Kami." Misarez then
handed a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to PO1 Aure. PO1 Aure examined
the sachet’s contents and took out his cellphone. This was the pre-arranged signal to the other police
operatives that the sale of drugs had been consummated.
The police operatives then approached PO1 Aure. When PO1 Aure saw his companions
approaching, he seized Misarez’s hand, but the latter was able to escape and lock himself inside the
house. Holgado, too, was able to flee into the house and join Misarez. The police operatives
managed to break open the wooden door with a crowbar. By then, however, Holgado and Misarez
had managed to leave the house through a passageway in the ceiling leading to an adjoining house.
PO3 Rolando Abuyme and PO2 Arnulfo Dancel managed to get inside the adjoining house where
they apprehended Holgado and Misarez.
The search warrant was then enforced "in coordination with a barangay official and in the presence
of some media people." The search allegedly yielded several drugs and drug paraphernalia. PO3
Abuyme prepared an inventory of the seized items. Specifically with respect to the plastic sachet
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which was the basis of the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, PO1 Aure supposedly marked
the plastic sachet handed to him by Misarez with "RH-PA"11 at the site of the buy-bust operation.
Following their arrest, Holgado and Misarez were charged with violating Sections 5, 11 and 12 of
R.A. 9165.
In their testimonies, accused-appellants claimed that no buy-bust operation was conducted. Instead,
the police operatives allegedly barged into Holgado’s house and arrested accused-appellants who
were then merely having a few drinks. While Holgado and Misarez were handcuffed, the police
operatives conducted a supposed search of Holgado’s house. They were then taken to the police
station. Defense witnesses Marquing and Villareal corroborated accused-appellants’ claims.
After trial, the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 154 found Holgado and Misarez guilty of
illegal saleof dangerous drugs (Section 5). They were acquitted of the charges pertaining to Section
11 as the drugs supposedly seized were not introduced in evidence.
On March 4, 2013, Holgado and Misarez filed their notice of appeal.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution was able to establish compliance with the requisites of Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165.
Ruling:
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
On corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640,
provides for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or
drug paraphernalia. Specifically with respect to custody before the filing of a criminal case, Section
21, as amended, provides: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
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representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided,
That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a
partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of
dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification.
As this court declared in People v. Morales, "failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 implies a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of
the corpus delicti." It "produces doubts as to the origins of the seized paraphernalia."
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a failure to
establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-
compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal.
It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect that "noncompliance of
(sic) these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." However, the prosecution has not shown
that when the buy-bust operation was allegedly conducted on January 17, 2007 and the sachet was
supposedly seized and marked, there were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with compliance
with Section 21. Rather, it merely insisted on its self-serving assertion that the integrity of the seized
sachet has nevertheless been, supposedly, preserved. The omission became more glaring
considering that the prosecution asserted that the events of January 17, 2007 entailed a carefully
planned operation, engendered by reports of drug-related activities along C. Raymundo Street. This
planning even led to the application for and issuance of a search warrant.
Apart from the officers’ glaring non-compliance with Section 21, two (2) circumstances are worth
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underscoring in this case. First, the shabu supposedly seized amounted to five (5) centigrams (0.05
gram). This quantity is so miniscule it amounts to only about 2.5% of the weight of a five-centavo
coin (1.9 grams) or a one-centavo coin (2.0 grams). Second, Holgado and Misarez were acquitted by
the Regional Trial Court of all other charges (i.e., for possession of dangerous drugs and for
possession of drug paraphernalia).While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a
ground for acquittal, this circumstance underscores the need for more exacting compliance with
Section 21. In Malilin v. People, this court said that "the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with
respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics
fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives."
Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of
Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced
narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent
with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule
amounts of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered. Also, doubt normally follows in
cases where an accused has been discharged from other simultaneous offenses due to mishandling
of evidence. Had the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals been so judicious in this case, a
speedier resolution would have been handed to Holgado and Misarez whose guilt beyond
reasonable doubt was not established.
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ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR. vs. JOHN S. UMALE, in substitution of HERNANDO F.

BALMORES; G.R. No. 172843; September 24, 2014
ODIVAL E. REYES, HANS M. PALMA and DOROTEO M. PANGILINAN vs. HERNANDO F.

BALMORES; G.R. No. 172881
The essence of a derivative suit is that it must be filed on behalf of the corporation. This is because the cause of
action belongs, primarily, to the corporation. The stockholder who sues on behalf of a corporation is merely a
nominal party.
Facts:
MC Home Depot occupied a prime property (Rockland area) in Pasig. The property was part of the
area owned by Mid-Pasig Development Corporation (Mid-Pasig). On March 1, 2004, PPC obtained
an option to lease portions of MidPasig’s property, including the Rockland area.
PPC’s board of directors issued a resolution7 waiving all its rights, interests, and participation in the
option to lease contract in favor of the law firm of Atty. Alfredo Villamor, Jr., petitioner in G.R. No.
172843. PPC received no consideration for this waiver in favor of Villamor’s law firm. PPC,
represented by Villamor, entered into a memorandum of agreement with MC Home Depot. Under
the MOA, MC Home Depot would continue to occupy the area as PPC’s sublessee for four (4) years,
renewable for another four (4) years, at a monthly rental of ₱4,500,000.00 plus goodwill of
₱18,000,000.00.
In compliance with the terms of the MOA, MC Home Depot issued 20 post-dated checks
representing rentalpayments for one year and the goodwill money. The checks were given to
Villamor who did not turn these or the equivalent amount over to PPC, upon encashment.
Hernando Balmores, a stockholder and director of PPC, wrote a letter addressed to PPC’s directors.
He informed them that Villamor should be made to deliver to PPC and account for MC Home
Depot’s checks or their equivalent value.
Due to the alleged inaction of the directors, respondent Balmores filed with the Regional Trial Court
an intra-corporate controversy complaint under Rule 1, Section 1(a)(1) of the Interim Rules for Intra-
Corporate Controversies (Interim Rules) against petitioners for their alleged devices or schemes
amounting to fraud or misrepresentation "detrimental to the interest of the corporation and its
stockholders."
In its resolution dated June 15, 2005, the Regional Trial Court denied respondent Balmores’ prayer
for the appointment of a receiver or the creation of a management committee.
Respondent Balmores filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. In the decision promulgated on March 2, 2006, the Court of Appeals gave due course
to respondent Balmores’ petition. It reversed the trial court’s decision, and issued a new order
placing PPC under receivership and creating an interim management committee.
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Issues:
1. Whether a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was proper
2. Whether respondent Balmores’ action in the trial court is a derivative suit
3. Whether Respondent Balmores has a cause of action that would entitle him to the reliefs sought
4. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to appoint the receiver or management committee
Ruling:
1. Yes. Respondent Balmores argued that the petition raises questions of fact.Under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be raised. There is a question of law "when there is doubt or controversy as to
what the law is on a certain [set] of facts." The test is "whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence." Meanwhile, there is a question of fact
when there is "doubt . . . as to the truth or falsehood of facts." The question must involve the
examination of probative value of the evidence presented.
In this case, petitioners raise issues on the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ conclusions.
Specifically, petitioners ask (1) whether respondent Balmores’ failure to implead PPC in his action
with the trial court was fatal; (2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly characterized respondent
Balmores’ action as a derivative suit; (3) whether the Court of Appeals’ appointment of a
management committee was proper; and (4) whether the Court of Appeals may exercise the power
to appoint a management committee.
These are questions of law that may be determined without looking into the evidence presented. The
question of whether the conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeals from a set of facts is correct is a
question of law, cognizable by this court. Petitioners, therefore, properly filed a petition for review
under Rule 45.
2. No. A derivative suit is an action filed by stockholders to enforce a corporate action. It is an

exception to the general rule that the corporation’s power to sue is exercised only by the board of
directors or trustees. Individual stockholders may be allowed to sue on behalf of the corporation
whenever the directors or officers of the corporation refuse to sue to vindicate the rights of the
corporation or are the ones to be sued and are in control of the corporation. It is allowed when the
"directors [or officers] are guilty of breach of . . . trust, [and] not of mere error of judgment."
In derivative suits, the real party in interest is the corporation, and the suing stockholder is a mere
nominal party. Rule 8, Section 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra Corporate Controversies
(Interim Rules) provides the five (5) requisites63 for filing derivative suits:
SECTION 1. Derivative action. – A stockholder or member may bring an action in the name of a
corporation or association, as the case may be.
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In case of nuisance or harassment suit, the court shall forthwith dismiss the case.
Respondent Balmores’ action in the trial court failed to satisfy all the requisites of a derivative suit.
Respondent Balmores failed to exhaust all available remedies to obtain the reliefs he prayed for.
Though he tried to communicate with PPC’s directors about the checks in Villamor’s possession
before he filed an action with the trial court, respondent Balmores was not able to show that this
comprised all the remedies available under the articles of incorporation, bylaws, laws, or rules
governing PPC.
Granting that (a) respondent Balmores’ attempt to communicate with the other PPC directors
already comprised all the available remedies that he could have exhausted and (b) the corporation
was under full control of petitioners that exhaustion of remedies became impossible or futile,
respondent Balmores failed toallege that appraisal rights were not available for the acts complained
of here. Neither did respondent Balmores implead PPC as party in the case nor did he allege that he
was filing on behalf of the corporation.
The non-derivative character of respondent Balmores’ action may also be gleaned from his
allegations in the trial court complaint. In the complaint, he described the nature ofhis action as an
action under Rule 1, Section 1(a)(1) of the Interim Rules, and not an action under Rule 1, Section
1(a)(4) of the Interim Rules, which refers to derivative suits.
Individual suits are filed when the cause of action belongs to the individual stockholder personally,
and notto the stockholders as a group or to the corporation, e.g., denial of right to inspection and
denial of dividends to a stockholder. If the cause of action belongs to a group of stockholders, such
as when the rights violated belong to preferred stockholders, a class or representative suit may be
filed to protect the stockholders in the group. In this case, respondent Balmores filed an individual
suit. Respondent Balmores did not bring the action for the benefit of the corporation. Instead, hewas
alleging that the acts of PPC’s directors, specifically the waiver of rights in favor of Villamor’s law
firm and their failure to take back the MC Home Depot checks from Villamor, were detrimental to
his individual interest as a stockholder. In filing an action, therefore, his intention was to vindicate
his individual interest and not PPC’s or a group of stockholders’.
The essence of a derivative suit is that it must be filed on behalf of the corporation. This is because
the cause of action belongs, primarily, to the corporation. The stockholder who sues on behalf of a
corporation is merely a nominal party. Respondent Balmores’ intent to file an individual suit
removes it from the coverage of derivative suits.
3. Respondent Balmores has no cause of action that would entitle him to the reliefs sought. In this
case, respondent Balmores did not allege any cause of action that is personal to him. His allegations
are limited to the facts that PPC’s directors waived their rights to rental income in favor of
Villamor’s law firm without consideration and that they failed to take action when Villamor refused
to turn over the amounts to PPC. These are wrongs that pertain to PPC. Therefore, the cause of
action belongs to PPC — not to respondent Balmores or any stockholders as individuals. For this
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reason, respondent Balmoresis not entitled to the reliefs sought in the complaint. Only the
corporation, or arguably the stockholders as a group, is entitled to these reliefs, which should have
been sought in a proper derivative suit filed on behalf of the corporation.
4. The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to appoint the receiver or management committee.
The Regional Trial Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate
controversies, including incidents of such controversies. These incidents include applications for the
appointment of receivers or management committees.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR

alias "NOY", Accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 207950 September 22, 2014
Every conviction for any crime must be accompanied by the required moral certainty that the accused has
committed the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove "the offender's intent to
take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide [was] actually carried out"
order to convict for the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused may nevertheless be convicted of the
separate crime of homicide once the prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt the accused's culpability
for the victim's death.
Facts:
On October 28, 2006, Peñamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from work as a janitor in
Eastwood City. When he was about to go inside his house, he saw a person wearing a black, long-
sleeved shirt and black pants and holding something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer
Duque (Barbie) just six meters across Peñamante’s house. There was a light at the left side of the
house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peñamante stated that he was able to see the face
of Chavez and the clothes he was wearing.
Chavez could not close the door of Barbie’s house/parlor so he simply walked away. However, he
dropped something that he was holding and fell down when he stepped on it. He walked away
after, and Peñamante was not able to determine what Chavez was holding. Peñamante then entered
his house and went to bed.
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI Cayrel.
She was joined by PO3 Rex Maglansi (photographer), PO1 Joel Pelayo (sketcher), and a fingerprint
technician. They conducted an initial survey of the crime scene after coordinating with SPO3
Casimiro of the Manila Police District Homicide Section. The team noted that the lobby and the
parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbie’s dead body inside. They took photographs and
collected fingerprints and other pieces of evidence such as the 155 pieces of hair strands found
clutched in Barbie’s left hand.
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At around 11:00 a.m., Peñamante’s landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found dead
at 9:00 a.m. He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbie’s house at 2:45 a.m. At
around 1:00 p.m., Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found that the time of death was
approximately 12 hours prior to examination. There were 22 injuries on Barbie’s body — 21 were
stab wounds in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed instrument, and one incised
wound was caused by a sharp object.
The next day, the police invited Peñamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement.
Peñamante described to SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the person he saw leaving
Barbie’s parlor.
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3

Casimiro at the police station. Chavez was then 22 years old. SPO3 Casimiro informed them ofthe
consequences in executing a written statement without the assistance of a lawyer. However,
Chavez’s mother still gave her statement, subscribed by Administrative Officer Alex Francisco.
The next day, Peñamante was again summoned by SPO3 Casimiro to identify from a line-up the
person he saw leaving Barbie’s house/parlor that early morning of October 28, 2006. Peñamante
immediately pointed to and identified Chavez and thereafter executed his written statement. On
August 19, 2011, the trial court31 found Chavez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide.On February 27, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide?
Ruling:
No.
Chavez invokes his constitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecution’s
evidence is purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral certainty of guilt.
The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
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The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts do not satisfactorily establish an original
criminal design by Chavez to commit robbery.
An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the infliction of no
less than 21 stab wounds in various parts of Barbie’s body. The number of stab wounds inflicted on
a victim has been used by this court in its determination of the nature and circumstances of the
crime committed. This court has also looked into the number and gravity of the wounds sustained
by the victim as indicative ofthe accused’s intention to kill the victim and not merely to defend
himself or others.
In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, homicide is committed in order "(a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the
loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the
commission of the crime."61 21 stab wounds would be overkill for these purposes. The sheer
number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it difficult to conclude an original criminal intent
of merely taking Barbie’s personal property.
But from the record of this case, we find that the prosecution palpably failed to substantiate its
allegations of the presence of criminal design to commit robbery, independent of the intent to
commit homicide. There is no evidence showing that the death of the victim occurred by reason or
on the occasion of the robbery. Where the homicide is not conclusively shown to have been
committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was not proven at all, there
can be no conviction for robo con homicidio.
This court finds that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Chavez for the
separate crime of homicide. First, the alibi of Chavez still placeshim at the scene of the crime that
early morning of October 28, 2006. Second, the number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie
strengthens an intention to kill and ensures his death.The prosecution proved that there was a total
of 22 stab wounds found indifferent parts of Barbie’s body and that a kitchen knife was found in a
manhole near Chavez’s house at No. 536, 5th Street, San Beda, San Miguel, Manila. Third, no reason
exists to disturb the lower court’s factual findings giving credence to 1) Peñamante’s positive
identification of Chavez as the person leaving Barbie’s house that early morning of October 28, 2006
and 2) the medico-legal’s testimony establishing Barbie’s time of death as 12 hours prior to autopsy
at 1:00 p.m., thus, narrowing the time of death to approximately 1:00 a.m. of the same day, October
28, 2006.
All these circumstances taken together establish Chavez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of homicide.This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves beyond
reasonable doubt that Chavez is guilty of the crime of homicide, and not the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide.
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THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. LEO VIGILDO DELOS REYES, JR.
G.R. No. 208976, October 13, 2014
The writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and is only granted when "there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. . . ." In Balbastro v. Junio, this court held that
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Verily, a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
was already proscribed for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
Facts:
Respondent Leovigildo Delos Reyes, Jr. (Delos Reyes) served as the COD Division Chief of
the Marketing and Online Division of PCSO’s Central Operations Department (COD). COD
Manager Josefina Lao instructed OIC-Division Chief of the Liaison and Accounts Management
Division Teresa Nucup (Nucup) to conduct an account validation and verification to reconcile
accounts due to substantial outstanding balances as of May 31, 2002.8 On August 16, 2002, Nucup
reported that there was an unremitted collections in the amount of P428,349.00 from May 21, 2001 to
June 3, 2001. The amount was subsequently reduced to P387,879.00 excluding penalties. Nucup also
found that “there was a deliberate delay in the submission of the periodic sales report; that the
partial remittance of total sales were made to cover previous collections; and that the unremitted
collections were attributed to some employees of the PCSO and Elizabeth Driz, the Assistant
Division Chief.
PCSO filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB). Delos Reyes and Driz
were criminally charged with malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, and administratively charged with dishonesty and gross neglect of duty under
Section 46(b)(1) and (3) of Book V of Executive Order No. 292.The OMB rendered the decision
finding Delos Reyes and Driz guilty of grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty and ordering
their dismissal from service.
Respondent filed a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. The CA granted
the petition and reversed and set aside the OMB’s decision and resolution. According to the CA, the
OMB disregarded the PCSO’s findings as to Delos Reyes’ liability for grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty. The OMB failed to prove Delos Reyes’ guilt with substantial evidence, and the
ruling must be overturned.
Issue:
Is the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
despite availability of the remedy under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling:
No. The CA, thus, erred in granting respondent’s petition for certiorari.
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It is settled that appeals from decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases should be
appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail
the OMB’s decision when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
involves a “capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.” It
must be shown that the OMB exercised its power “in an arbitrary or despotic manner — which must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial
intervention.”
The prevailing view is that the remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the
OMB is available only in the following situations: a) in administrative cases that have become final
and unappealable where respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted and the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to a one-month salary; and b) in criminal cases involving the OMB’s determination of
probable cause during preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the writ of certiorari is an
extraordinary remedy and is only granted when “there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law”.
In Balbastro v. Junio (554 Phil. 548), this court held that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
Verily, a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was already proscribed for being
filed beyond the reglementary period, thus: Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary
cases of the OMB should be taken to the CA by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Rule 43 which prescribes the manner of appeal from quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the Ombudsman, was formulated precisely to provide for a uniform rule of
appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal
under Rule 43 is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioner failed to file an appeal with the CA within fifteen days from notice of the assailed
decision. As noted by the CA, she filed her petition for certiorari only after 52 days from receiving
the denial of her motion for reconsideration by the Ombudsman. Such remedy cannot prosper as
certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In this
case, the remedy of an appeal via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was available to respondent;
however, he still opted to file a petition for certiorari in complete disregard of the rules. The rules
and jurisprudence necessitated the dismissal of the petition before the Court of Appeals.
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ATTY. ANACLETO B. BUENA, JR. vs. DR. SANGCAD D. BENITO
G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014
The Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao has the power to appoint officers in
the region's civil service. However, if there is no regional law providing for the qualifications for the position
at the time of appointment, the appointee must satisfy the civil service eligibilities required for the position in
the national government to be appointed in a permanent capacity.
Facts:
On August 27, 2004, Dr. Parouk S. Hussin (Regional Governor Hussin), then Regional
Governor of the ARMM, appointed Dr. Sangcad D. Benito (Dr. Benito) as Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent of the Department of Education, Division of Lanao del Sur-I, in a temporary
capacity. He was later reappointed in a permanent capacity. To change the status of Dr. Benito’s
appointment from temporary to permanent, Regional Governor Hussin requested the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office for the ARMM to attest to Dr. Benito’s permanent appointment.
However, the Regional Office, through Regional Director Anacleto B. Buena, Jr. (Regional Director
Buena), returned the appointment to the Regional Governor. According to the Regional Office, Dr.
Benito did not possess the career executive service eligibility required for the position.
Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court to compel the Regional Office
to attest to his permanent appointment. He argued that the position does not belong to the Career
Executive Service under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
Regional Director Buena claimed that the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent
meets the following criteria for positions in the Career Executive Service: The position is career,
ranks higher than Division Chief, has a salary grade of 25, and entails performance of executive and
managerial functions and supervisory responsibility over a division. The permanent appointee to
the position must, therefore, have career executive service eligibility. According to Regional Director
Buena, the Regional Office recognizes the autonomy of the ARMM. However, until the region enacts
its own regional civil service law, the Regional Office shall carry on with the Civil Service
Commission’s mandate under the Constitution to promote and enforce civil service laws and rules.
For Dr. Benito’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a petition for mandamus,
Regional Director Buena prayed that the trial court dismiss the petition for mandamus.
The trial court found that the petition for mandamus raised a purely legal question. The case,
therefore, falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. It ruled
that the position does not require career executive service eligibility, thus, the Regional Office “had
no choice but to attest to Dr. Benito’s appointment.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Court directed the parties to file their respective memoranda.
The 30th day within which to file a memorandum lapsed without the Regional Office filing the
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required memorandum. Thus, the CA declared the Regional Office’s appeal abandoned and
dismissed.
Issues:
1. Did the CA err in dismissing the appeal for its failure to file the required memorandum?
2. Did respondent Dr. Benito correctly avail himself of a petition for mandamus against the
Civil Service Commission’s refusal to attest to his appointment?
Ruling:
1. No. The CA did not err in dismissing the Civil Service Commission’s appeal for failure to file
the required memorandum. Failure to comply with the Rules or with any order of the court
is a ground to dismiss the action. Specifically, on the appellant’s failure to file a
memorandum with the Court of Appeals, Rule 44, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
“SEC. 10. Time for filing memoranda in special cases.— In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file, in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda
within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that,
all evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record.
The failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period therefor may be a ground for
dismissal of the appeal.”
Rule 50, Section 1 reiterates that the appellant’s failure to file the required memorandum within the
reglementary period is a ground for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal:
“SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.—An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: . . . . (e) Failure of the
appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the
time provided by these Rules.
In this case, the CA ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. Instead of filing the
memorandum, the Regional Office requested additional 30 days to file the pleading. The additional
period requested lapsed without the Regional Office filing the required memorandum. The CA,
therefore, correctly dismissed the appeal.
2. Yes. A petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the Civil Service Commission
to attest to the appointment of respondent. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is
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ministerial if the act should be performed “under a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of the tribunal or
corporation’s own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.” The tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically
enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act wherein the officer has the choice to decide
how or when to perform the duty.
In the context of attestation of appointments in the civil service, this court has ruled that the Civil
Service Commission’s attestation is a ministerial duty once it finds the appointee eligible for the
position. The Commission “is limited only to the nondiscretionary authority of determining whether
or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law.” If the
appointee possesses the required civil service eligibility, the Commission has “no choice but to attest
to the appointment.
In this case, respondent Dr. Benito availed himself of the correct remedy. Given his claim that he
possesses the required civil service eligibility for the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent, he correctly filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Civil Service Commission
to approve his appointment.
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SPOUSES BENEDICT AND SANDRA MANUEL vs. DR. SANGCAD D. BENITO
G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
A sheriffs return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of regularity and, hence, taken to
be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff.
Facts:
Respondent Ramon Ong (Ong) filed with the RTC, a complaint for accion reivindicatoria. Ong
charged the Spouses Manuel with having constructed improvements — through force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, and stealth — on a property he supposedly owned.
Ong filed an “amended complaint.” On February 3, 2010, summons was issued directed to the
Spouses Manuel. On April 23, 2010, Ong filed with the RTC a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel
in default. Per the sheriff’s return on summons, on February 12, 2010, Sheriff Joselito Sales, along
with Ong’s counsel, Atty. Christopher Donaal, and a certain Federico Laureano, attempted to
personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their address in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon,
Benguet. The Spouses Manuel, however, requested that service be made at another time considering
that petitioner Sandra Manuel’s mother was then critically ill. The sheriff’s return further indicates
that on March 16, 2010, another attempt at personal service was made. After Sheriff Joselito Sales
had personally explained to petitioner Sandra Manuel the content of the summons and the
complaint, the latter refused to sign and receive the summons and the complaint. Sheriff Joselito
Sales was thus prompted to merely tender the summons and complaint to petitioner Sandra Manuel
and to advise her to file their answer within fifteen (15) days. As the Spouses Manuel failed to file
their answer within this period, Ong asked that they be declared in default.
The RTC issued an order granting Ong’s motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default. Following
this, Ong moved for the ex parte presentation of evidence, which the Regional Trial Court granted.
The RTC denied the Spouses Manuel’s motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the Spouses Manuel
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, however, dismissed the Spouses Manuel’s Rule
65 petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
1. Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person of the spouses?
2. Are the spouses entitled to relief from the order of default?
Ruling:
1. Yes. Jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants Spouses was validly acquired. This is
so because personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made
by Sheriff Joselito Sales on March 16, 2010.
Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule 14, Section 6.
Personal service, as provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is distinguished from its alternative —
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substituted service — as provided by Rule 14, Section 7.
The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of
summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant’s address is
inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires:
personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant
refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the
person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
2. No. This court noted that the three (3) requisites that must be satisfied by a motion in order
to warrant the setting aside of an order of default for failure to file answer, are:
(1) it must be made by motion under oath by one that has knowledge of the facts;
(2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence; and
(3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of a meritorious defense.
Consistent with Rule 9, Section 3(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, “the remedy against an
order of default is a motion to set it aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence.”29 However, it is not only the motion to lift order of default which a defendant must
file. As this court emphasized in Agravante v. Patriarca (262 Phil. 127), to the motion to lift order of
default must “be appended an affidavit showing the invoked ground, and another, denominated
affidavit of merit, setting forth facts constituting the party’s meritorious defense or defenses.
In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default was
not made under oath. We add that this motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit
specifying the facts which would show that their non-filing of an answer within fifteen (15) days
from March 16, 2010 was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Failing both in
making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of merits, the Spouses Manuel’s
motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro
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CARLOS A. LORIA vs. LUDOLFO P. MUNOZ
G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014
In a Rule 45 petition, we do not address questions of fact, questions which require us to rule on "the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts." Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we only entertain questions of law
— questions as to the applicable law given a set of facts — in a petition for review on certiorari.
Facts:
Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. (Muñoz) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with an application
for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Carlos A. Loria (Loria) with the RTC.
Muñoz alleged that he has been engaged in construction. Loria visited Muñoz in his office and
invited Muñoz to advance P2M for a subcontract of a P50M river-dredging project in Guinobatan.
Loria represented that he would make arrangements such that Elizaldy Co, owner of Sunwest
Construction and Development Corporation, would turn out to be the lowest bidder for the project.
Elizaldy Co would pay P8M to ensure the project’s award to Sunwest. Muñoz requested Allied Bank
to release P3M from his joint account with his business partner, Christopher Co, to a certain Grace
delos Santos. Four days later, P1.8M of the P3,000,000.00 was returned to Muñoz.
Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers without
subcontracting Muñoz. With the project allegedly finished, Muñoz demanded Loria to return his
P2M Loria, however, did not return the money. Muñoz first charged Loria and Elizaldy Co with
estafa. This criminal case was dismissed by the MTC for lack of probable cause. Muñoz then filed the
complaint for sum of money.
According to the trial court, Muñoz established with preponderant evidence that Loria received
P2M from Muñoz for a subcontract of the river-dredging project. Since no part of the project was
subcontracted to Muñoz, Loria must return the P2M he received, or he would be “unduly enriching
himself at the expense of Muñoz.
Loria appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Muñoz failed to establish his receipt of the
P2M. Specifically, Muñoz failed to establish that he obtained P3M from a certain Grace delos Santos.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s factual findings. In ruling that Loria received the net
amount of P2M from Muñoz, the Court of Appeals referred to Muñoz’s testimony that he ordered
Allied Bank to release P3M from his joint account with Christopher Co to a certain Grace delos
Santos. Loria then obtained the money from delos Santos and confirmed with Muñoz his receipt of
the money.
Loria filed a petition for review on certiorari with this court, arguing that the principle of unjust
enrichment does not apply in this case. Loria maintains that Muñoz failed to prove his receipt of
P3M through a certain Grace delos Santos.
Issue:
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Whether Loria initially received P3M is a question of fact not proper in a petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling:
No. In a Rule 45 petition, the SC does not address questions of fact, questions which require
it to rule on “the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.”48 Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the SC only entertain questions of law — questions as to the applicable law given a set of
facts in a petition for review on certiorari:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
We may review questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition:(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (10) the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Loria failed to convince the Court why it should make an exception in this case. During trial, Muñoz
testified that he ordered Allied Bank to release P3M from his joint account with Christopher Co to a
certain Grace delos Santos. Loria then obtained the money from delos Santos and confirmed with
Muñoz his receipt of the amount. P1.8M was subsequently returned to Muñoz, leaving a P1.2M
balance with Loria. This testimony was supported by Exhibit “C,” the check voucher where Loria
acknowledged receiving P1.2M from Muñoz.
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REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU vs. LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 204964, October 15, 2014
Lands classified as non-agricultural in zoning ordinances approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board or its predecessors prior to June 15, 1998 are outside the coverage of the compulsory acquisition
program of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, there has to be substantial evidence to prove
that lands sought to be exempted fall within the non-agricultural classification.
Facts:
In 1978, the City Council of Angeles City, Pampanga, enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 13, classifying
areas in Barangay Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City, as agricultural land. Pursuant to
this ordinance, Lutgarda Torres del Rosario (del Rosario) requested the City Zoning Administrator
to exempt from the zoning classification Lot Nos. 854 and 855 located in Barangay Margot and
Barangay Sapang Bato. On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act
No. 6657) was enacted. On October 10, 2000, del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia R.
Asperilla (Asperilla), filed an application for exemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and 855 from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage. On February 19, 2004, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan
(Secretary Pagdanganan) issued an order granting the application for exemption. Citing Department
of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, Secretary Pagdanganan stated that lands classified as
nonagricultural before the enactment of CARP are beyond its coverage.
On March 26, 2004, farmers in del Rosario’s landholdings, led by Remigio Espiritu (Espiritu), filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order. They argued that under Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board Resolution No. 705, Series of 2001, and Angeles City Council
Resolution No. 3300, Series of 2001, the landholdings were classified as agricultural, not industrial.
The motion was given due course by the Department of Agrarian Reform, this time headed by
Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman (Secretary Pangandaman). Hence, on June 15, 2006, then
Secretary Pangandaman issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration and revoking the
earlier order of then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Pagdanganan.
Del Rosario contended that this order was sent to her through Clarita Montgomery in Barangays
Margot, Sapang Bato, Angeles City, and not at Asperilla’s address in Cubao, Quezon City, which
was her address on record. Del Rosario alleged that she only came to know of the order on January
26, 2007, when the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Pampanga handed her a copy of the order.
She then filed her motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 15, 2006. The motion was dated
February 9, 2007. Acting on del Rosario’s motion for reconsideration, Secretary Pangandaman found
that the certifications issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board classified the
landholdings as agricultural before June 15, 1988. Based on the ocular inspections conducted by the
Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI), the land remained agricultural
and was planted with sugar cane and corn.18 Accordingly, Secretary Pangandaman denied del
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Rosario’s motion in the order dated March 3, 2008. Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal 20 before the
Office of the President on March 27, 2008, but it was dismissed for lack of merit. Aggrieved, del
Rosario filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals arguing (1) that she was denied due
process when the order of Secretary Pangandaman was “erroneously sent to another address” and
(2) that the decision of then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void since he had been appointed
to the Securities and Exchange Commission two months prior to the rendering of the decision.
On September 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition. The Court of
Appeals stated that del Rosario was indeed prevented from participating in the proceedings that led
to the issuance of Secretary Pangandaman’s order when the notices were sent to her other address
on record. It also found that the decision issued by then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void
since it violated Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Is the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the order of Secretary Pangandaman and the decision of
Deputy Secretary Gaite and reinstated the order of Secretary Pagdanganan.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals, however, did not take into consideration that respondent was
still able to file a motion for reconsideration of Secretary Pangandaman’s order, albeit beyond the
allowable period to file. In Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 06, Series of
2000. When respondent filed her motion for reconsideration assailing Secretary Pangandaman’s
order, she was able to completely and exhaustively present her arguments. The denial of her motion
was on the basis of the merits of her arguments and any other evidence she was able to present. She
was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to present her side; hence, there was no deprivation of
due process. It was also erroneous to conclude that respondent was “denied her day in the
administrative proceedings below.” Respondent was able to actively participate not only in the
proceedings before the Department of Agrarian Reform, but also on appeal to the Office of the
President and the Court of Appeals. The factual findings of administrative agencies are generally
given great respect and finality by the courts as it is presumed that these agencies have the
knowledge and expertise over matters under their jurisdiction.54 Both the Department of Agrarian
Reform and the Office of the President found respondent’s lands to be agricultural. We see no
reason to disturb these findings.
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ROSARIO MATA CASTRO vs. JOSE MARIE JED LEMEUEL GREGORIO
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice and consent.
This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to
adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified through
personal service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
Facts:
The case stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata
Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by
her baptismal name, “Maria Socorro M. Castro” and her nickname, “Jayrose”.
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, having ruled that no opposition had
been received by this Court from any person including the government which was represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General. A certificate of finality was issued on February 9, 2006.
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000
decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina’s adoption. In their petition, Rosario and Joanne
allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in 2005. They allege that Rosario’s affidavit of
consent, marked by the trial court as “Exh. K,” was fraudulent. The also alleged that Jed and
Regina’s birth certificates showed different sets of information, such as the age of their mother,
Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth.
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. While admittedly, no notice was given
by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is “no
explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter should be
personally notified of the hearing. The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent
information contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the
identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for
annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be
classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.
Issue:
Did the CA err in denying the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with
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the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if “the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner”.
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 161122), A petition for annulment of
judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled
was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being
exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by
the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the
grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1
of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards
cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final
resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability
and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts.
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by
the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies
cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice
demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time.
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which annulment of
judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery, and
lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches.
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject
matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is “that which
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or that which
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured.
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
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ONOFRE ANDRES vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 173548, October 15, 2014
A bank that accepts a mortgage based upon a title which appears valid on its face and after exercising the
requisite care, prudence, and diligence appropriate to the public interest character of its business can be deemed
a mortgagee in good faith. The subsequent consolidation of title in its name after a valid foreclosure shall be
respected notwithstanding later proof showing that the title was based upon a void transaction.
Facts:
This case involves a 4,634-square-meter parcel of land in Nueva Ecija mortgaged to

respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB). PNB later foreclosed the property and consolidated
title in its name. Petitioner Onofre Andres, the uncle of mortgagors Reynaldo Andres and his wife,
Janette de Leon, filed a complaint for cancellation of title and reconveyance of the property alleging
that title in mortgagor’s name was based on a falsified document denominated as “Self-Adjudication
of Sole Heir.
The complaint alleged that on November 8, 1994, Onofre Andres’ nephew Reynaldo Andres was in
collusion with his mother, Lydia Echaus-Andres, in executing a falsified document denominated as
“Self-Adjudication of Sole Heir.” This stated that Reynaldo Andres was the sole heir of his father,
Roman Andres, who died on October 12, 1968, and his mother who died on December 15, 1969.21
However, his mother was then still alive and his father, Roman Andres, died only on May 29, 1990
The trial court ruled in favor of Onofre Andres by voiding all derivative titles from TCT No. NT-
7267. The CA modified this decision by declaring as valid and existing TCT No. N-24660 in PNB’s
name.
Onofre Andres filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA’s decision and
resolution. Petitioner heirs pray that the assailed Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution be set
aside, and the trial court’s November 7, 2003 decision be reinstated. It argues that there is no legal
basis to uphold the validity of PNB’s title as it was derived from a void title and that PNB is “not a
mortgagee in good faith”.
PNB argues that the issue of whether it is a mortgagee in good faith involves a factual issue not
within this court’s power of review. The issue on the validity of the foreclosure proceedings and sale
was not raised in the complaint, thus, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Lastly, PNB
contends that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are deemed final and conclusive by this
court.
Issue:
Is the petition for review on certiorari the proper remedy?
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Ruling:
No. A petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law. The core of the
issues presented requires a determination of whether PNB was in good faith and exercised due
diligence in accepting the property mortgaged by Spouses Reynaldo Andres and Janette de Leon.
These are questions of fact that fall outside the ambit of this court’s power of review.
This court is not a trier of facts that routinely reexamines evidence presented. Factual findings by the
Court of Appeals are, thus, generally considered binding and conclusive upon this court.
The rule against entertaining factual questions admits of exceptions, but none are present in this
case. This court finds no reason to overturn the findings of the Court of Appeals.
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RAMON CHING AND POWING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, vs. JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME
CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE1 AND LUCINA SANTOS, Respondents. [G.R. No. 175507. October
8, 2014]
Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the plaintiff. Hence, the
"two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply if the prior
dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
Facts:
Antonio Ching owned several businesses and properties, among which was Po Wing Properties,
Incorporated (Po Wing Properties). His total assets are alleged to have been worth more than 380
million.
On July 18, 1996, Antonio Ching was murdered. Ramon Ching allegedly induced Mercedes Igne and
her children, Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, to sign an agreement and waiver to Antonio Ching’s
estate in consideration of ₱22.5 million. Mercedes Igne’s children alleged that Ramon Ching never
paid them.19 On October 29, 1996, Ramon Ching allegedly executed an affidavit of settlement of
estate, naming himself as the sole heir and adjudicating upon himself the entirety of Antonio
Ching’s estate.
Ramon Ching denied these allegations and insisted that when Antonio Ching died, the Ching family
association, headed by Vicente Cheng, unduly influenced him to give Mercedes Igne and her
children financial aid considering that they served Antonio Ching for years. It was for this reason
that an agreement and waiver in consideration of 22.5 million was made. He also alleged that hewas
summoned by the family association to execute an affidavit of settlement of estate declaring him to
be Antonio Ching’s sole heir.
On October 7, 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and Mercedes Igne (the Chengs) filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before RTC (the first case).
After the responsive pleadings had been filed, Po Wing Properties filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter which was granted by RTC Manila.
On April 19, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Annulment of Agreement,
Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said
Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties (the second case)
On November 11, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a motion to dismiss their complaint in
the second case, praying that it be dismissed without prejudice. RTC granted the dismissal without
prejudice.
On December 9, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order dated November 22, 2002. They argue that the dismissal should have been with prejudice
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under the "two dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of
the previous dismissal of the first case.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a
complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of
Extra judicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties (the third
case).
On December 10, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata, litis pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action.
Issues:
1. Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to the filing of a third
case, asper the "two-dismissal rule"; and
2. Whether respondents committed forum shopping when they filed the third case while the
motion for reconsideration of the second case was still pending.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
1. The "two-dismissal rule" vis-à-vis the Rules of Civil Procedure

Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of the
case before any responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done through notice by
the plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise
declared by the court.
The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a counterclaim has been pleaded by
the defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. It requires leave of
court, and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to
prosecute. The case is dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the court motu propio.
Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant.
Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers
motions to dismiss.
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the
second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an
adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following
requisites must be present:
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1. There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;

2. Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
3. Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
4. When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the
ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation." When a complaint is
dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.
Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to include not only
new defendants but new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special proceeding.
A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The trial court dismissed the first case by granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants.
When it allowed Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias a period of fifteen (15) days to file an appropriate
pleading, it was merely acquiescing to a request made by the plaintiff’s counsel that had no bearing
on the dismissal of the case.
Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults; it does
not contemplate a situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since there was
already a dismissal prior to plaintiff’s default, the trial court’s instruction to file the appropriate
pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate pleading, the trial
court does not dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing the case still stands.
The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant under Rule 16, Section 1(b)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Section 5 of the same rule,75 a party may re-file the same
action or claim subject to certain exceptions.
Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely refiling the same claim that had
been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to dismiss the
second case, the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiff’s instance.
Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by respondents before the service of
any responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of right that is not
subject to the trial court’s discretion.
When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already one prior
dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the defendants.
While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does not necessarily
follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be examined to determine before the rule
may apply, as in this case.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the failure of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file the
appropriate pleading in the first case came under the purview of Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of
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Civil Procedure, the dismissal in the second case is still considered as one without prejudice.
In granting the dismissal of the second case, the trial court specifically orders the dismissal to be
without prejudice. It is only when the trial court’s order either is silent on the matter, or states
otherwise, that the dismissal will be considered an adjudication on the merits.
2. However, while the dismissal of the second case was without prejudice, respondents’ act of
filing the third case while petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was still pending
constituted forum shopping.
There is no question that there was an identity of parties, rights, and reliefs in the second and third
cases. While it may be true that the trial court already dismissed the second case when the third case
was filed, it failed to take into account that a motion for reconsideration was filed in the second case
and, thus, was still pending. Considering that the dismissal of the second case was the subject of the
first certiorari case and this present petition for review, it can be reasonably concluded that the
second case, to this day, remains pending.
Hence, when respondents filed the third case, they engaged in forum shopping. Any judgment by
this court on the propriety of the dismissal of the second case will inevitably affect the disposition of
the third case.
The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by dismissing all pending actions on the same
claim filed in any court. Accordingly, the grant of this petition would inevitably result in the
summary dismissal of the third case. Any action, therefore, which originates from the third case
pending with any court would be barred by res judicata.
Because of the severity of the penalty of the rule, an examination must first be made on the purpose
of the rule. Parties resort to forum shopping when they file several actions of the same claim in
different forums in the hope of obtaining a favorable result. It is prohibited by the courts as it
"trifle[s] with the orderly administration of justice.”
In this case, however, the dismissal of the first case became final and executory upon the failure of
respondents’ counsel to file the appropriate pleading. They filed the correct pleading the second
time around but eventually sought its dismissal as they"[suspected] that their counsel is not amply
protecting their interests as the case is not moving for almost three (3) years."91 The filing of the
third case, therefore, was not precisely for the purpose of obtaining a favorable result butonly to get
the case moving, in an attempt to protect their rights.
It appears that the resolution on the merits of the original controversy between the parties has long
been mired in numerous procedural entanglements. While it might be more judicially expedient to
apply the "twin-dismissal rule" and disallow the proceedings in the third case to continue, it would
not serve the ends of substantial justice.
The rule on forum shopping will not strictly apply when it can be shown that (1) the original case
has been dismissed upon request of the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons; (2) the only pending
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matter is a motion for reconsideration; and (3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the goal
of substantial justice for the fresh new• case to proceed.
The motion for reconsideration filed in the second case has since been dismissed and is now the
subject of a petition for certiorari. The third case filed apparently contains the better cause of action
for the plaintiffs and is now being prosecuted by a counsel they are more comfortable with.
Substantial justice will be better served if respondents do not fall victim to the labyrinth in the
procedures that their travails led them. It is for this reason that we deny the petition.
95
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. GARRY DELA CRUZ y DE GUZMAN,

Accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 205821. October 1, 2014]
"Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of custody of seized
dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is especially true when only a miniscule amount of dangerous
drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused.”
Facts:
This resolves an appeal from a conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
On September 15, 2004, accused-appellant Garry dela Cruz (dela Cruz) was charged with illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs in two separate informations
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses PO1 Bobon, SPO1 Roca, and forensic chemist
Police Inspector Melvin L. Manuel. The sole witness presented for the defense was dela Cruz
himself.
RTC: convicted dela Cruz for violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of 500,000.00. He was also convicted
for violating Article II, Section 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and sentenced
to 12 years and one day up to 14 years imprisonment and a fine of 300,000.00.
CA: affirmed dela Cruz’ conviction in toto. Thereafter, dela Cruz filed his notice of appeal
Issue:
Whether the prosecution was able to establish compliance with the chain of custody requirements
under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Ruling:
The elements that must be established to sustain convictions for illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs are settled:
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that
(1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti
must be established beyond reasonable doubt.21
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With respect to the element of corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640 provides for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Particularly on the
matter of custody before a criminal case is filed, Section 21, as amended, provides:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided,
That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a
partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of
dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification;
The significance of complying with Section 21’s requirements cannot be overemphasized. Non-
compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of
the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an
element of these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused. In every
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criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of
the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is
offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough that the evidence
offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and
tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has
an actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason
why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are important.
In this case, the Regional Trial Court acknowledged that no physical inventory of the seized items
was conducted. Similarly, there is nothing in the records to show that the seized items were
photographed in the manner required by Section 21. Likewise, none of the persons required by
Section 21 to be present (or their possible substitutes) have been shown to be present.
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals assert that dela Cruz must nevertheless be
convicted as "it had been clearly established that the identity of the items were [sic] properly
preserved."41 They anchor this conclusion on PO1 Bobon’s having supposedly kept the seized
sachets in his own pockets: one (1) sachet in his right pocket and six (6) sachets in his left pocket.
Even without referring to the strict requirements of Section 21, common sense dictates that a single
police officer’s act of bodily-keeping the item(s) which is at the crux of offenses penalized under the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is fraught with dangers. Apart from the blatantly
irregular handling by PO1 Bobon of the seven (7) sachets, it is also admitted that no physical
inventory and taking of photographs in the presence of dela Cruz or of any of the other persons
specified by Section 21 were conducted.
As the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crimes for which dela Cruz is charged has not been
established, it follows that there is no basis for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It is
proper that dela Cruz be acquitted.
98
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. CITY OF CABANATUAN, REPRESENTED

BY ITS CITY MAYOR, HON. HONORATO PEREZ, Respondents. [G.R. No. 177332, October 01,
2014]
It is the final judgment that determines and stands as the source of the rights and obligations of the parties —
It is a fundamental rule that the execution cannot be wider in scope or exceed the judgment or decision on
which it is based; otherwise, it has no validity. “It is the final judgment that determines and stands as the
source of the rights and obligations of the parties.” In Collector of Internal Revenue v. Gutierrez, 108 Phil. 215
(1960), this court did not allow the collection of the 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest because the
decision sought to be executed did not expressly provide for the payment of the same.
Facts:
The City of Cabanatuan (the City) assessed the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) a
franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41, representing 75% of 1% of its gross receipts for 1992.
NAPOCOR refused to pay, arguing that it is exempt from paying the franchise tax. Consequently,
on November 9, 1993, the City filed a complaint6 before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City, demanding NAPOCOR to pay the assessed tax due plus 25% surcharge and interest of 2% per
month of the unpaid tax, and costs of suit.
sIn its April 9, 2003 decision,10 this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' March 12, 2001 decision
and July 10, 2001 resolution. In its August 27, 2003 resolution,11 this court denied with finality
NAPOCOR's motion for reconsideration.
After the court's decision had become final, the City filed with the trial court a motion for execution
to collect the sum of P24,030,565.261 (inclusive of the 25% surcharge of P13,744,096.69).
TRIAL COURT: agreed with NAPOCOR that "the tenor of the decision [sought to be executed]
limits the franchise tax payable on gross receipts from sales to [the City's] electric cooperative.”
However, the trial court sustained the City's computation of the surcharge totalling P13,744,096.69
over NAPOCOR's claim of P2,571,617.14 only.
CA: Affrimed the trial court's order. It held that since the franchise tax due was computed yearly,
the 25% surcharge should also be computed yearly based on the total unpaid tax for each particular
year. The appellate court agreed with the City's reasoning that non-imposition of the surcharge on a
cumulative basis would encourage rather than discourage non-payment of taxes.
Hence, the present petition for review was filed.
Issue:
What is the proper interpretation for purposes of execution of the dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals' decision? The dispositive portion reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and REVERSED.
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Defendant-appellee National Power Corporation is hereby ordered to pay the City of Cabanatuan, to
wit:
1. The sum of P808,606.41 representing business tax based on gross receipts for the year 1992, and
2. The tax due every year thereafter based [o]n the gross receipts earned by NPC,
3. In all cases, to pay a surcharge of 25% of the tax due and unpaid, and
4. The sum of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses.32 (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the crucial point to be resolved is what the Court of Appeals meant by "[i]n all cases,
to pay a surcharge of 25% of the tax due and unpaid" in the dispositive portion.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The trial court's order of execution, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
exceeded the judgment sought to be executed.
Respondent computed the surcharge based on the total unpaid tax for each particular year. For
example, in 1993, the proper tax due (P821,401.17) was added the unpaid tax due in year 1992
(P808,606.41), obtaining the sum of Pl,630,007.58 as total unpaid tax. To this amount of P1,630,007.58
was applied the 25% surcharge, giving the amount of P407,501.89. In 1994, the proper tax due
(P1,075,855.62) was added the unpaid taxes for 1992 and 1993 (P1,630,007.58), yielding a total unpaid
tax of P2,705,863.20. To this sum of P2,705,863.20 was applied the 25% surcharge, obtaining the
amount of P676,465.80. The same computation was made on the succeeding years up to the year
2002. The surcharges from 1992 to 2002 were added, giving the total amount of P13,744,096.69.
In effect, respondent's computation resulted in the imposition of the 25% surcharge for every year of
default in the payment of a franchise tax.
There is nothing in the Court of Appeals' decision that would justify the interpretation that the
statutory penalty of 25% surcharge should be charged yearly from due date until full payment. If
that was the intention of the Court of Appeals, it should have so expressly stated in the dispositive
portion of its decision.
For clarity, we reiterate the pertinent portion of the dispositive:
1. The sum of P808,606.41 representing business tax based on gross receipts for the year 1992, and
2. The tax due every year thereafter based [o]n the gross receipts earned by NPC,
3. In all cases, to pay a surcharge of 25% of the tax due and unpaid, and… (Emphasis supplied)
The fallo says "tax due and unpaid," which simply means tax owing or owed or "tax due that was
not paid." The "and" is "a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union, 'binding together,' 'relating
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the one to the other.'" In the context of the decision rendered, there is no ambiguity.
As understood from the common and usual meaning of the conjunction "and," the words "tax due"
and "unpaid" are inseparable. Hence, when the taxpayer does not pay its tax due for a particular
year, then a surcharge is applied on the full amount of the tax due. However, when the taxpayer
makes a partial payment of the tax due, the surcharge is applied only on the balance or the part of
the tax due that remains unpaid. It is in this sense that the fallo of the Court of Appeals decision
should be read, i.e., a 25% surcharge is to be added to the proper franchise tax so due and unpaid for
each year.
Since the franchise tax due was not paid on time, a surcharge of 25% is imposed as an addition to the
main tax required to be paid. This is the proper meaning of paragraph 3 oí the fallo.
It is a fundamental rule that the execution cannot be wider in scope or exceed the judgment or
decision on which it is based; otherwise, it has no validity. "It is the final judgment that determines
and stands as the source of the rights and obligations of the parties.”
It is the final judgment that determines and stands as the source of the rights and obligations of the
parties. The judgment in this case made no pronouncement as to the payment of surcharge and
interest, but specifically stated the amount for the payment of which respondents were liable. The
Collector by virtue of the writ of execution, may not vary the terms of the judgment by including in
his motion for execution the payment of surcharge and interest.
"The writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to
be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and
exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity."
Respondent should have filed an appeal from the judgment or at the least sought clarification
insofar as it failed to provide for the payment of the 2% monthly interest. Instead, it erroneously
presumed that the surcharge was to be applied yearly with the omission of the payment for monthly
interest in the judgment. Hence, respondent alone is to blame and should suffer the consequences of
its neglect. With the finality of the Court of Appeals' judgment, all the issues between the parties are
deemed resolved and laid to rest. Neither the trial court nor even this court can amend or add to the
dispositive portion of a decision that has attained finality.
101
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent. [G.R. No. 187061,

October 08, 2014]
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the RTC’s judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and
the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
Facts:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed
a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15,
2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since
Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived
her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the
court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's
conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.
CA: Issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy
was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with
Article 42 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for
being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Ruling: The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”
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The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo
deliberately made false allegations in the court with respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely
claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of
Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these,
she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her
presumptively dead.
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death
were false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's
petition.
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with
the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than
two years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from
her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year
period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is
the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the
fraud perpetrated on her.
103
STANLEY FINE FURNITURE, ELENAAND CARLOS WANG, Petitioners, vs. VICTOR T.

GALLANO AND ENRIQUITO SIAREZ, Respondents
G.R. No.190486 November 26, 2014
In reviewing a CA labor ruling under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court’s review is limited to:
ascertaining the correctness of the CA’s decision in finding the presence or absence of a grave abuse of
discretion. This is done by examining, on the basis of the parties’ presentations, whether the CA correctly
determined that at the NLRC level, all the adduced pieces of evidence were considered; no evidence which
should not have been considered was considered; and the evidence presented supports the NLRC findings; and
deciding any other jurisdictional error that attended the CA’s interpretation or application of the law.
Facts:
Stanley Fine Furniture (Stanley Fine), through its owners Elena and Carlos Wang, hired respondents
Victor T. Gallano and Enriquito Siarez in 1995 as painters/carpenters. Victor and Enriquito each
received 215.00 basic salary per day.
On May 26, 2005, Victor and Enriquito filed a labor complaint6 for underpayment/non-payment of
salaries, wages, Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (ECOLA), and 13th month pay. They indicated
in the complaint form that they were "still working"7 for Stanley Fine.
Victor and Enriquito filed an amended complaint8 on May 31, 2005, for actual illegal dismissal,
underpayment/non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium for holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, and Social Security System (SSS) benefit. In the
amended complaint, Victor and Enriquito claimed that they were dismissed on May 26, 2005.9
Victor and Enriquito were allegedly scolded for filing a complaint for money claims. Later on, they
were not allowed to work.
LA: found that Victor and Enriqui to were illegally dismissed.
NLRC: Reversed16 the Labor Arbiter’s decision, ruling that the Labor Arbiter erred in considering
the statement, "due to the filing of an unmeritorious labor case," as an admission against interest.
Thus, Victor and Enriquito filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Generally, petitions for certiorari are limited to the determination and correction of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, the Court of Appeals reviewed the
findings of facts and of law of the labor tribunals, considering that the Labor Arbiter and the
National Labor Relations Commission had different findings.
CA found that Stanley Fine failed to show any valid cause for Victor and Enriquito’s termination
and to comply with the two notice rule.22 Also, the Court of Appeals noted that Stanley Fine’s
statements — that it was "forced to declare them dismissed"23 due to their absences and "due to the
filing of an unmeritorious labor case against it by the two complainants"24 — were admissions
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against interest and binding upon Stanley Fine.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner has standing to file the case

2. Whether CA correctly determined the presence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the National Labor Relations Commission.
Ruling:
1. Petitioner Elena Briones has standing to file this case

On this issue, petitioners claimed that Elena Briones is not the real party-in-interest; hence, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is final and executory since the petition for review was not properly
filed.
In her reply, Elena argued that she is the sole proprietor of Stanley Fine, a fact known to
respondents. As the sole proprietor, she has standing to file this petition.
Respondents cannot deny Elena Briones’ standing to file this petition considering that in their
amended complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter, they wrote "Stanley Fine Furniture, Elina [sic]
Briones Wang as owner and Carlos Wang" as their employers.53
Also, respondents did not refute Elena’s allegation that Stanley Fine is a sole proprietorship. In
Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. v. Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc. this court stated that:
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
personality of the owner of the enterprise.
Thus, Stanley Fine, being a sole proprietorship, does not have a personality separate and distinct
from its owner, Elena Briones. Elena, being the proprietress of Stanley Fine, can be considered as a
real party-in-interest and has standing to file this petition for review.
2. Review of procedural parameters

In her petition for review, Elena raised the following issues: (a) whether "the filing of an
Establishment Termination Report"56 is an act of dismissal; (b) whether counsel’s allegation that an
employee was dismissed due to the filing of an "unmeritorious" case against the employer is
binding;57 (c) whether a Labor Arbiter can award monetary claims based on the allegations in the
complaint form;58 and (d) whether the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
is proper even without supporting evidence.59
In a Rule 45 petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision rendered under Rule 65, this court is
guided by the following rules:
[I]n a Rule 45 review (of the CA decision rendered under Rule 65), the question of law that confronts
the Court is the legal correctness of the CA decision – i.e., whether the CA correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, and not on the basis
105
of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. Specifically, in reviewing a CA
labor ruling under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court’s review is limited to:
(1) Ascertaining the correctness of the CA’s decision in finding the presence or absence of a grave
abuse of discretion. This is done by examining, on the basis of the parties’ presentations, whether the
CA correctly determined that at the NLRC level, all the adduced pieces of evidence were considered;
no evidence which should not have been considered was considered; and the evidence presented
supports the NLRC findings; and
(2) Deciding any other jurisdictional error that attended the CA’s interpretation or application of the
law.
Nevertheless, in this case, Elena failed to pinpoint the overt acts of respondents that show they had
abandoned their work. There was a mere allegation that she was "forced to declare them dismissed
due to their failure to report back to work for a considerable length of time" but no evidence to prove
the intent to abandon work. It is the burden of the employer to prove that the employee was not
dismissed or, if dismissed, that such dismissal was not illegal. Unfortunately for Elena, she failed to
do so.
106
AURORA N. DE PEDRO vs. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 194751. November 26, 2014
Regardless of the type of action - whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem - the preferred mode of
service of summons is personal service. To avail themselves of substituted service, courts must rely on a
detailed enumeration of the sheriff's actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be served despite diligent
and reasonable efforts. The sheriff's return, which contains these details, is entitled to a presumption of
regularity, and on this basis, the court may allow substituted service. Should the sheriff's return be wanting of
these details, substituted service will be irregular if no other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was
presented. Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary
appearance.
Facts:
Respondent Romasan Development Corporation alleged in its complaints that it was the owner and
possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City.4 The land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 236044.
Respondent further alleged in its separate complaints that the government could not legally issue
the free patents because at the time of their issuance, the land was already released for disposition to
private individuals.12 OCT No. 438, from which respondent’s TCT No. 236044 originated, was
already issued as early as August 30, 1937.
Respondent also prayed for the payment of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages.
Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed.The officer’s return, dated February 22,
1999 reads in part:
OFFICER’S RETURN
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a copy of the
summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional Trial Court,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above-entitled case on the
following, to wit;
1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of Post Office
of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.16
Respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication.
RTC: Granted the motion. The summons and the complaint were published in People’s Balita on its
April 24, May 1, and May 8, 1998 issues.
RESPONDENT moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De Pedro, in default for
107
failure to file their answers. Respondent also moved to be allowed to present evidence ex parte.
RTC: granted the motions on August 19, 1999.
RTC: Issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents issued to all defendants in
respondent’s complaint, including the free patent issued to De Pedro.
CA: Denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and affirmed the denial of De Pedro’s motion
for new trial.
PETITIONER argues that respondent’s prayer for attorney’s fees, appearance fees, exemplary
damages, and costs of suit sought to establish personal obligations upon petitioner in favor of
respondent. Hence, an action in personam, which required personal service upon her for the court’s
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person.
Improper service of summons rendered the trial court decision null and void.58 It means that the
court could not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
complaints were dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia, pointing to the alleged pending case
between the same parties and involving same subject matter at the time when respondent filed its
complaint before the Regional Trial Court in 1998.60 The alleged pending case was filed in 1997 by
petitioner and her spouse against respondent, seeking "enforce[ment] of their rights as owners, and
claim[ing] damages for the unlawful and illegal acts of dispossession, terrorism and violence which
they, their family and their close relatives were subjected to by [respondent]."
RESPONDENT argues that the process server tried other forms of substituted service, including
service by registered mail.
Issues:
1. Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro; and
2. Whether filing a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari is a bar from filing a petition
for annulment of judgment.
Ruling:
1. The sheriff’s return must show the details of the efforts exerted to personally serve summons
upon defendants or respondents, before substituted service or service by publication is
availed.
Courts may exercise their powers validly and with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over: (a)
the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the parties; and (d) the
remedy.
108
Jurisdiction over the subject matter refers to the power or authority of courts to hear and decide
cases of a general class.73 It is conferred by the Constitution or by law.74 It is not acquired through
administrative issuances or court orders. It is not acquired by agreement, stipulation, waiver,75 or
silence.76 Any decision by a court, without a law vesting jurisdiction upon such court, is void.
Jurisdiction over the thing or res is the power of the court over an object or thing being litigated. The
court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or constructively seizing or placing it under
the court’s custody.
Jurisdiction over the parties refers to the power of the court to make decisions that are binding on
persons. The courts acquire jurisdiction over complainants or petitioners as soon as they file their
complaints or petitions. Over the persons of defendants or respondents, courts acquire jurisdiction
by a valid service of summons or through their voluntary submission. Generally, a person
voluntarily submits tothe court’s jurisdiction when he or she participates in the trial despite
improper service of summons. Courts and litigants must be aware of the limits and the requirements
for the acquisition of court jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued by courts outside their
jurisdiction are void. Complaints or petitions filed before the wrong court or without acquiring
jurisdiction over the parties may be dismissed.
Petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because she was
not properly served with summons. After the summons had returned unserved to petitioner because
"there [was] no person in the said given address,"81 the trial court allowed the publication of the
summons to petitioner. Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of the type of action —
whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly. Jurisdiction over the parties
is required in actions in personam because they seek to impose personal responsibility or liability
upon a person. Courts need not acquire jurisdiction over parties on this basis in in rem and quasi in
rem actions. Actions in rem or quasi in rem are not directed against the person based on his or her
personal liability.
Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole world. Quasi in
rem actions are actions involving the status of a property over which a party has interest. Quasi in
rem actions are not binding upon the whole world. They affect only the interests of the particular
parties. However, to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem
and quasi in rem actions is required.
The phrase, "against the thing," to describe in rem actions is a metaphor. It is not the "thing" that is
the party to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties even in in rem actions.
"Against the thing" means that resolution of the case affects interests of others whether direct or
indirect. It also assumes that the interests — in the form of rights or duties — attach to the thing
which is the subject matter of litigation. In actions in rem, our procedure assumes an active
vinculum over those with interests to the thing subject of litigation.
109
Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an
opportunity to defend those interests. Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be
expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting
within their jurisdiction.
Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect. This court recognized this principle in
Aducayen v. Flores. In the same case, this court further ruled that this jurisdictional defect is
remedied by a petition for certiorari.
An action for annulment of certificate of title is quasi in rem. It is not an action "against a person on
the basis of his personal liability," but an action that subjects a person’s interest over a property to a
burden. The action for annulment of a certificate of title threatens petitioner’s interest in the
property. Petitioner is entitled to due process with respect to that interest. The court does not have
competence or authority to proceed with an action for annulment of certificate of title without giving
the person, in whose name the certificate was issuedall the opportunities to be heard.
Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative. A decision
rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction. Respondent’s
institution of a proceeding for annulment of petitioner’s certificate of title is sufficient to vest the
court with jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case with
authority and competence. Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of
summons. Thus, as a rule, summons must be served personally upon the defendant or respondent
wherever he or she may be found. If the defendant or respondent refuses to receive the summons, it
shall be tendered to him or her.
If the defendant or respondent is a domestic juridical person, personal service of summons shall be
effected upon its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or
in-house counsel wherever he or she may be found. Other modes of serving summons may be done
when justified. Service of summons through other modes will not be effective without showing
serious attempts to serve summons through personal service. Thus, the rules allow summons to be
served by substituted service only for justifiable causes and if the defendant or respondent cannot be
served within reasonable time.98 Substituted service is effected "(a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein,or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof."
Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed when the:

defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner or if his or her whereabouts are
"unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.”
It may only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons personally, and after
diligent inquiry as to the defendant’s or respondent’s whereabouts.
Service of summons by extra territorial service is allowed after leave of court when the defendant or
110
respondent does not reside or is not found in the country or is temporarily out of the country.
If a defendant or respondent voluntarily appears in trial or participates in the proceedings, it is

generally construed as sufficient service of summons.102
In this case, summons was served by publication.
A look into the content of the sheriff’s return will determine if the circumstances warranted the
deviation from the rule preferring personal service of summons over other modes of service. The
sheriff’s return must contain a narration of the circumstances showing efforts to personally serve
summons to the defendants or respondents and the impossibility of personal service of summons.
A sheriff’s return enjoys the presumption of regularity in its issuance if it contains
the details of the circumstances surrounding the sheriff’s attempt to serve the summons personally
upon the defendants or respondents; and
the particulars showing the impossibility of serving the summons within reasonable time.107 It does
not enjoy the presumption of regularity if the return was merely pro forma.
Failure to state the facts and circumstances that rendered service of summons impossible renders
service of summons and the return ineffective. In that case, no substituted service or service by
publication can be valid.
In this case, the sheriff’s return states:
OFFICER’S RETURN
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a copy of the
summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional Trial Court,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above-entitled case on the
following, to wit;
1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of Post Office
of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.109
This return shows no detail of the sheriff’s efforts to serve the summons personally upon petitioner.
The summons was unserved only because the post office messenger stated that there was no
"Aurora N. De Pedro" in the service address. The return did not show that the sheriff attempted to
locate petitioner’s whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded based on the return that personal
service was rendered impossible under the circumstances or that service could no longer be made
within reasonable time.
The lack of any demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the summons personally
upon petitioner is a deviation from this court’s previous rulings that personal service is the preferred
mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or her return the efforts made to effect
111
personal service. Thus, the sheriff’s return in this case was defective. No substituted service or
service by publication will be allowed based on such defective return.
The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process rights.
The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would have been dismissible had
petitioner learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a motion to dismiss would
have been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject of an action for
annulment of judgment.
Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of title only after trial. Instead of filing an action
for annulment of judgment, however, she filed a motion for new trial without alleging any proper
ground. Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may move and the court may grant a
new trial based on the following causes:
Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.110
Petitioner insisted in her motion for new trial that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person. She did not allege that fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence impaired her rights.
Neither did she allege that she found newly discovered evidence that could have altered the trial
court decision. When her motion for new trial was denied, she filed a petition for certiorari, insisting
that her motion for new trial should have been granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her
person.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for her failure to allege any ground for new trial. We
cannot attribute error on the part of the Court of Appeals for this denial because, indeed, lack of
jurisdiction is not a ground for granting a new trial.
What cannot be denied is the fact that petitioner was already notified of respondent’s action for
annulment of petitioner’s title when she filed a motion for new trial and, later, a petition for
certiorari. At that time, petitioner was deemed, for purposes of due process, to have been properly
notified of the action involving her title tothe property. Lack of jurisdiction could have already been
raised in an action for annulment of judgment.
Thus, when petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari instead of
an action for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily participated in the
proceedings against her title. The actions and remedies she chose to avail bound her. Petitioner’s
failure to file an action for annulment of judgment at this time was fatal to her cause. We cannot
conclude now that she was denied due process.
2. Petitioner is already barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment

A petition for annulment of judgment is a recourse that is equitable in character. It is independent of
112
the case112and is "allowed only in exceptional cases as where there isno available or other adequate
remedy." An action for annulment of judgment may be filed to assail Regional Trial Court
judgments when resort to other remedies can no longer be had through no fault of petitioner.
However, this court had an occasion to say that an action for annulment of judgment may not be
invoked: where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief,
or other appropriate remedy and lost; or where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies
through his own fault or negligence."115 Thus, an action for annulment of judgment is not always
readily available even if there are causes for annulling a judgment.
In this case, petitioner’s main grounds for filing the action for annulment are lack of jurisdiction over
her person, and litis pendentia. These are the same grounds that were raised in the motion for new
trial filed before and denied by the Regional Trial Court.
Applying the above rules, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioner’s
petition for annulment of the Regional Trial Court’s judgment. Petitioner had already filed a motion
for new trial and petition for certiorari invoking lack of jurisdiction as ground. Petitioner’s filing of
the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for new trial and lost, with both
actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her favor by abusing and
making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law.
This kind of abuse is what this court tries to guard against when it limited its application, and stated
in some of the cases that an action for annulment of judgment cannot be invoked when other
remedies had already been availed. Thus, an action for annulment of judgment "will not so easily
and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments."120 Petitioner cannot abuse
the court’s processes to revive a case that has already been rendered final against her favor, for the
purpose of securing a favorable judgment. An action for annulment of judgment cannot be used by
petitioner who has lost her case through fault of her own, to make "a complete farce of a duly
promulgated decision that has long become final and executory."121
III. The requisites of litis pendentia are not satisfied when respondent filed its action for annulment
of title
Petitioner argued that the case for annulment of title was dismissible on the ground of litis
pendentia because there was a pending civil case filed by her against respondent.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: identity of parties, or interests in both actions; identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Although both cases involve the same parcel of land, petitioner was not able to show that there was
identity of the relief prayed for. A review of the complaint in the said civil case shows that it was a
case for damages, for alleged improper conduct of respondent relating the property. The action filed
113
by respondent was an action for annulment of petitioner’s title.
Petitioner was also not able to show that the relief prayed for in both cases were founded on the
same facts. Petitioner’s complaint for damages was founded on the alleged misconduct of
respondent. Respondent’s action for annulment of title was founded on the alleged irregularity in
the issuance of petitioner’s title.
Hence, the petitioner was not able to show that all the requisites for litis pendentia are present.
Respondent’s action for annulment of title cannot be dismissed on this ground.
IV. A certificate of title does not vest ownership
Petitioner argues that her certificate of title was erroneously declared null and void because based
on OCT No. P-691, she is the real owner of the property.
It is true that certificates of title are indefeasible and binding upon the whole world. However,
certificates of title do not vest ownership.129 They merely evidence title or ownership of the
property.130 Courts may, therefore, cancel or declare a certificate of title null and void when it finds
that it was issued irregularly. In this case, the trial court ruled based on the committee report that the
free patents and original certificate of title issued to petitioner were irregularly issued, and,
therefore, invalid.
The principle of "bar by prior judgment" is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Court.
In this case, the trial court, by annulling petitioner’s certificate of title and declaring its issuance
irregular, directly adjudged petitioner’s certificate of title as void. Because petitioner failed to appeal
and cause the annulment of the trial court’s judgment as to her title’s validity, this question is
already barred. This judgment has already attained finality and can no longer be litigated. In any
case, even if petitioner’s original certificate of title was not irregularly issued as she claims, her
original certificate of title was issued later than the title from which respondent’s title originated. As
a rule, original titles issued earlier prevail over another original title issued later.
114
LG ELECTRONICS PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 165451. December 3, 2014.
The Supreme Court has said that, from the historical and statutory perspectives, the Solicitor General is the
"principal law officer and legal defender of the government." The Legal Division of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue should be mindful of this procedural lapse in the future.
Facts:
LG filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of Court of Tax Appeals in
ruling that LG was liable for deficiency income tax. On its Manifestation, LG stated that it availed
itself of the tax amnesty provided under RA No. 9480. In addition, the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
through Assistant Commissioner James Roldan, issued a ruling on January 25, 2008, which held that
petitioner complied with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9480. Petitioner is, thus, entitled to the
immunities and privileges provided for under the law including "civil, criminal or administrative
penalties under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 xxxx arising from the failure to pay any
and all internal revenue taxes for taxable year 2005 and prior years."
Respondent’s counsel from BIR Revenue Region No. 7 Legal Division argued that petitioner cannot
avail itself of the tax amnesty program under Republic Act No. 9480.
Issue:
Whether the Legal Division of Bureau of Internal Revenue is the proper representative of
respondent.
Ruling:
No. Bureau of Internal Revenue Legal Division is not the proper representative of respondent.
We observe that respondent is represented by a lawyer from the Legal Division of Revenue Region
No. 7 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and not by the Office of the Solicitor General. We are
mindful of Section 220 of Republic Act No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997, which provides that
legal officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue are the ones tasked to institute the necessary civil or
criminal proceedings on behalf of the government:
Section 220. Form and Mode of Proceeding in Actions Arising under this Code. – Civil and
criminal actions and proceedings instituted in behalf of the Government under the authority
of this Code or other law enforced by the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall be brought in the name
of the Government of the Philippines and shall be conducted by legal officers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue but no civil or criminal action for the recovery of taxes or the enforcement of
any fine, penalty or forfeiture under this Code shall be filed in court without the approval of the
Commissioner.
115
Nonetheless, this court has previously ruled on the issue of the Bureau of Internal Revenue’s
representation in appellate proceedings, particularly before this court:
The institution or commencement before a proper court of civil and criminal actions and
proceedings arising under the Tax Reform Act which "shall be conducted by legal officers of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue" is not in dispute. An appeal from such court, however, is not a matter
of right. Section 220 of the Tax Reform Act must not be understood as overturning the long
established procedure before this Court in requiring the Solicitor General to represent the interest of
the Republic. This Court continues to maintain that it is the Solicitor General who has the primary
responsibility to appear for the government in appellate proceedings. This pronouncement finds
justification in the various laws defining the Office of the Solicitor General, beginning with Act No.
135, which took effect on 16 June 1901, up to the present Administrative Code of 1987. Section 35,
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, of the said Code outlines the powers and functions of the Office of the
Solicitor General which includes, but not limited to, its duty to —
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(3) Appear in any court in any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, executive order or
proclamation, rule or regulation when in his judgment his intervention is necessary or when
requested by the Court.
In Gonzales vs. Chavez, the Supreme Court has said that, from the historical and statutory
perspectives, the Solicitor General is the "principal law officer and legal defender of the
government." From the foregoing, we find that the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party
to represent the interests of the government through the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The Legal
Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue should be mindful of this procedural lapse in the future.
However, records show that the Office of the Solicitor General has been apprised of developments in
the case since the beginning of the proceedings. We, thus, rule that the interests of the government
have been duly protected.
116
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU vs. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY
PROVINCE OF BATAAN, represented by GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., and

EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, in her capacity as Provincial Treasurer of Bataan, Petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187583 & G.R. No. 184203
Under the Rules of Court, there are three modes of appeal from Regional Trial Court decisions. The first mode
is through an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals where the decision assailed was rendered in the
exercise of the Regional Trial Court’s original jurisdiction. Ordinary appeals are governed by Rule 41,
Sections 3 to 13 of the Rules of Court. In ordinary appeals, questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law
may be raised. The second mode is through a petition for review before the Court of Appeals where the decision
assailed was rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court governs petitions for review before the Court of Appeals. In petitions for review under Rule 42,
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law may be raised. The third mode is through an appeal
by certiorari before this court under Rule 45 where only questions of law shall be raised.
Facts:
G.R. No. 184203
City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA P33 million in
real property taxes for the period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan
Economic Zone. The City reiterated its demand in the letter, citing that Sections 193 and 234 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 that withdrew the real property tax exemptions previously granted
to or presently enjoyed by all persons. The City pointed out that no provision in the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted the PEZA from payment of real property taxes,
unlike Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66 that explicitly provided for EPZA’s exemption. Since
no legal provision explicitly exempted the PEZA from payment of real property taxes, the City
argued that it can tax the PEZA.
The City made subsequent demands on the PEZA. In its last reminder in 2002, the City assessed the
PEZA 86,843,503.48 as real property taxes for the period, prompting PEZA to filed a petition for
declaratory Relief with the RTC Pasay, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment
of real property taxes. It granted the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief and declared it exempt
from payment of real property taxes.
The City then appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the Court dismissed it outright, since the City
availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal.
In its petition for review on certiorari with this court,41 the City argues that the Court of Appeals
"hid under the skirts of technical rules"42 in resolving its appeal. The City maintains that its appeal
involved mixed questions of fact and law.
117
PEZA argues that the Court of Appeals’ decision had become final and executory. After the Court of
Appeals had denied the City’s appeal, the City filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration. Arguing that the time to file a motion for reconsideration is not extendible, the
PEZA filed its motion for reconsideration out of time. The City has no more right to appeal to this
court.
The PEZA maintains that the City availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal before the Court of
Appeals. Since the City raised pure questions of law in its appeal, the PEZA argues that the proper
remedy is a petition for review on certiorari with this court, not an ordinary appeal before the
appellate court. The Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly dismissed outright the City’s appeal
under Rule 50, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.
As to the jurisdiction issue, the PEZA counters that the Regional Trial Court of Pasay had
jurisdiction to hear its petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. It
also argued that it need not implead the Province of Bataan, the City of Baguio, and the Province of
Cavite as respondents considering that their demands came after the PEZA had already filed the
petition in court.
G.R. No. 187583
After the City of Lapu-Lapu had demanded payment of real property taxes from the PEZA, the
Province of Bataan followed suit. Province, through the Office of the Provincial Treasurer, informed
the PEZA that it would be sending a real property tax billing to the PEZA. Arguing that the PEZA is
a developer of economic zones, the Province claimed that the PEZA is liable for real property taxes
under Section 24 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. PEZA requested the Province to suspend
the service of the real property tax billing. It cited its petition for declaratory relief against the City of
Lapu-Lapu pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City as basis. The Province
argued that serving a real property tax billing on the PEZA "would not in any way affect [its]
petition for declaratory relief. Then, the Province notified the PEZA of its real property tax liabilities
for 1995 to 2002 totalling ₱110,549,032.55. The Province ignored the PEZA’s request and served on
the PEZA a statement of unpaid real property tax for the period from 1995 to 2004. The PEZA again
requested the Province to suspend collecting its alleged real property taxes. The Province denied the
request in its letter, then served on the PEZA a warrant of levy covering the PEZA’s real properties
located in Bataan. PEZA filed a petition for injunction before the RTC Pasay, arguing that it is
exempt from payment of real property taxes.
The trial court denied the PEZA’s petition for injunction. The trial court ruled that the PEZA is not
exempt from payment of real property taxes. The PEZA filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals issued
a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Province and its Provincial Treasurer from selling
PEZA's properties at public auction. The PEZA then filed a supplemental petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus81 against the Province, arguing that the Provincial Treasurer of Bataan
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the notice of delinquency and notice of sale. It
118
maintained that it is exempt from payment of real property taxes because it is a government
instrumentality. It added that its lands are property of public dominion which cannot be sold at
public auction.
According to the Province, the PEZA erred in filing a petition for certiorari. Arguing that the PEZA
sought to reverse a Regional Trial Court decision in a local tax case, the Province claimed that the
court with appellate jurisdiction over the action is the Court of Tax Appeals. The PEZA then prayed
that the Court of Appeals dismiss the petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
PEZA’s petition for prohibition. Court of Appeals granted the PEZA’s petition for certiorari. It set
aside the trial court’s decision and nullified all the Province’s proceedings with respect to the
collection of real property taxes from the PEZA. The Province filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the City of Lapu-Lapu’s appeal for raising
pure questions of law; NO.
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City had jurisdiction to hear, try, and
decide the City of Lapu-Lapu’s petition for declaratory relief; NO.
3. Whether the petition for injunction filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay
City, is a local tax case appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals; NO.
Ruling:
1. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the City of Lapu-Lapu’s appeal for raising
pure questions of law. Under the Rules of Court, there are three modes of appeal from
Regional Trial Court decisions. The first mode is through an ordinary appeal before the
Court of Appeals where the decision assailed was rendered in the exercise of the Regional
Trial Court’s original jurisdiction. Ordinary appeals are governed by Rule 41, Sections 3 to 13
of the Rules of Court. In ordinary appeals, questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law may be raised. The second mode is through a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals where the decision assailed was rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Rule 42 of the Rules of Court governs petitions for
review before the Court of Appeals. In petitions for review under Rule 42, questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law may be raised. The third mode is through an
appeal by certiorari before this court under Rule 45 where only questions of law shall be
raised.
A question of fact exists when there is doubt as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. On the
other hand, there is a question of law if the appeal raises doubt as to the applicable law on a certain
set of facts. Under Rule 50, Section 2, an improper appeal before the Court of Appeals is dismissed
outright and shall not be referred to the proper court.
119
With respect to appeals by certiorari directly filed before this court but which raise questions of fact,
paragraph 4(b) of Circular No. 2-90 dated March 9, 1990 states that this court "retains the option, in
the exercise of its sound discretion and considering the attendant circumstances, either itself to take
cognizance of and decide such issues or to refer them to the Court of Appeals for determination." In
Indoyon, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we said that this court "cannot tolerate ignorance of the law on
appeals." It is not this court’s task to determine for litigants their proper remedies under the Rules.
We agree that the City availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal before the Court of Appeals. The
City raised pure questions of law in its appeal. The issue of whether the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay had jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief is a question of law,
jurisdiction being a matter of law.114 The issue of whether the PEZA is a government
instrumentality exempt from payment of real property taxes is likewise a question of law since this
question is resolved by examining the provisions of the PEZA’s charter as well as other laws relating
to the PEZA.
Nevertheless, considering the important questions involved in this case, we take cognizance of the
City’s petition for review on certiorari in the interest of justice. We opt to relax the rules in this case.
The PEZA operates or otherwise administers special economic zones all over the country. Resolving
the substantive issue of whether the PEZA is taxable for real property taxes will clarify the taxing
powers of all local government units where special economic zones are operated. This case,
therefore, should be decided on the merits.
2. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the PEZA’s
petition for declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu. The court with jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief is the Regional Trial Court, the subject matter of litigation in
an action for declaratory relief being incapable of pecuniary estimation. Consistent with the
law, the Rules state that a petition for declaratory relief is filed "in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court." A special civil action for declaratory relief is filed for a judicial determination of
any question of construction or validity arising from, and for a declaration of rights and
duties, under any of the following subject matters: a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation.
However, a declaratory judgment may issue only if there has been "no breach of the documents in
question." If the contract or statute subject matter of the action has already been breached, the
appropriate ordinary civil action must be filed. If adequate relief is available through another form
of action or proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an action for declaratory relief. It is
also required that the parties to the action for declaratory relief be those whose rights or interests are
affected by the contract or statute in question. "There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the
‘ripening seeds’ of one" between the parties. The issue between the parties "must be ripe for judicial
determination." An action for declaratory relief based on theoretical or hypothetical questions
cannot be filed for our courts are not advisory courts.
We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief against the City. The
City had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment against the PEZA, in
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violation of the PEZA’s alleged tax-exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic Zone Act
of 1995, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, had already been breached. The
trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief. There are several
aspects of jurisdiction.143 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine
cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." It is conferred by law, which
may either be the Constitution or a statute.145 Jurisdiction over the subject matter means "the nature
of the cause of action and the relief sought."146 Thus, the cause of action and character of the relief
sought as alleged in the complaint are examined to determine whether a court had jurisdiction over
the subject matter.147 Any decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action is void.
In the present case, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action,
specifically, over the remedy sought. An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been
no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an
action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers.
Instead of a petition for declaratory relief, the PEZA should have directly resorted to a judicial
action. The PEZA should have filed a complaint for injunction, the "appropriate ordinary civil
action"to enjoin the City from enforcing its demand and collecting the assessed taxes from the PEZA.
After all, a declaratory judgment as to the PEZA’s tax-exempt status is useless unless the City
isenjoined from enforcing its demand.
3. The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for certiorari against the
Province of Bataan. Appeal is the remedy "to obtain a reversal or modification of a judgment
on the merits."182 A judgment on the merits is one which "determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of the formal, technical or
dilatory objections." It is not even necessary that the case proceeded to trial. So long as the
"judgment is general" and "the parties had a full legal opportunity to be heard on their
respective claims and contentions," the judgment is on the merits.
On the other hand, certiorari is a special civil action filed to annul or modify a proceeding of a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certiorari, which in Latin
means "to be more fully informed," was originally a remedy in the common law. In this case, the trial
court’s decision is a judgment on the merits. Based on the facts disclosed by the parties, the trial
court declared the PEZA liable to the Province of Bataan for real property taxes. The PEZA’s proper
remedy against the trial court’s decision, therefore, is appeal.
Since the PEZA filed a petition for certiorari against the trial court’s decision, it availed itself of the
wrong remedy. As the Province of Bataan contended, the trial court’s decision dated January 31,
2007 "is only an error of judgment appealable to the higher level court and may not be corrected by
filing a petition for certiorari."198 That the trial court judge allegedly committed grave abuse of
discretion does not make the petition for certiorari the correct remedy. The PEZA should haveraised
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this ground in an appeal filed within 15 days from notice of the assailed resolution.
This court, "in the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial
justice,"199 has treated petitions for certiorari as an appeal: "(1) if the petition for certiorari was filed
within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when
errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules."200 Considering that "the nature of an action is determined by the allegationsof the complaint
or the petition and the character of the relief sought,"201 a petition which "actually avers errors of
judgment rather than errors than that of jurisdiction"202 may be considered a petition for review.
However, the PEZA’s petition for certiorari was filed before the wrong court. The PEZA should
have filed its petition before the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court of Tax Appeals has the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over local tax cases decided by Regional Trial Courts. We have also ruled that
the Court of Tax Appeals, not the Court of Appeals, has the exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by Regional Trial Courts in a local tax
case. Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence
to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax
case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from
the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal
soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and
decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of
such appellate jurisdiction. In this case, the petition for injunction filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay was a local tax case originally decided by the trial court in its original jurisdiction.
Since the PEZA assailed a judgment, not an interlocutory order, of the Regional Trial Court, the
PEZA’s proper remedy was an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.
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EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I.

OBEN, Petitioners, vs. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 204700 November 24, 2014
The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial stage.
Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of production or inspection of
documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court "upon due application and a showing of due
cause."
Facts:
Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and sureties Marcelo N. Naval (Naval) and
Crispin I. Oben (Oben) are the defendants in a collection suit initiated by Export and Industry Bank
(EIB) through a Complaint and currently pending proceedings before the RTC Makati. By virtue of a
Deed of Assignment, EIB transferred EDC's outstanding loan obligations of ₱10,232,998.00 to
respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron), a special purpose vehicle.
Thereafter, Cameron filed its Motion to Substitute/Join EIB, which was granted by the trial court.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement
(LSPA) referred to in the Deed of Assignment. Respondent Cameron filed its Comment alleging that
petitioners have not shown "good cause" for the production of the LSPA and that the same is
allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo.
In response, petitioners filed their Reply explaining that the production of the LSPA was for "good
cause". They pointed out that the claim of Cameron is based on an obligation purchased after
litigation had already been instituted in relation to it. When a credit or other incorporeal right in
litigation is sold, the debtor shall have a right to extinguish it by reimbursing the assignee for the
price the latter paid therefor, the judicial costs incurred by him, and the interest on the price from
the day on which the same was paid. The trial court denied petitioners' motion for production for
being utterly devoid of merit. It ruled that there was failure to show "good cause" for the production
of the LSPA and failure to show that the LSPA is material or contains evidence relevant to an issue
involved in the action. It denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. On Petition for Certiorari
with the CA, the same was dismissed the petition for lack of petitioner Oben's verification and
certification against forum shopping and failure to attach a copy of the complaint. The SC eventually
ruled. Consequently, this Court finds and so holds that the denial of the Motion for Production
despite the existence of "good cause," relevancy and materiality for the production of the LSPA was
unreasonable and arbitrary constituting grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The
parties moved to reconsider the SC decision.
Issues:
(1) The motion for production was filed out of time;

(2) The LSPA is a privileged and confidential document.
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Ruling:
1. We deny the motion for reconsideration. Discovery mode of production/inspection of

document may be availed of even beyond pre-trial upon a showing of good cause. The
availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the
pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery
mode of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave
of court "upon due application and a showing of due cause." "The modes of discovery are
accorded a broad and liberal treatment." The evident purpose of discovery procedures is "to
enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials" and, thus, facilitating an amicable
settlement or expediting the trial of the case.
Technicalities in pleading should be avoided in order to obtain substantial justice. We have
determined that the LSPA is relevant and material to the issue on the validity of the deed of
assignment raised by petitioners in the court a quo, and allowing its production and inspection by
petitioners would be more in keeping with the objectives of the discovery rules. We find no great
practical difficulty, and respondent continuously fails to allege any, in presenting the document for
inspection and copying of petitioners. On the other hand, to deny petitioners the opportunity to
inquire into the LSPA would bar their access to relevant evidence and impair their fundamental
right to due process.
2. The LSPA is not privileged and confidential in nature. Indeed, Rule 27 contains the proviso
that the documents sought to be produced and inspected must not be privileged against
disclosure. Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged communication. These are
communication between or involving the following: (a) between husband and wife; (b)
between attorney and client; (c) between physician and patient; (d) between priest and
penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. Privileged communications under the
rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to protect a trust relationship. It has not
been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any of the foregoing
categories.
This court has previously cited other privileged matters such as the following: "(a) editors may not
be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose
for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; . . . (d) bank
deposits" (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act); (e) national security matters and
intelligence information;63 and (f) criminal matters.64 Nonetheless, the LSPA does not fall within
any of these classes of information. Moreover, the privilegeis not absolute, and the court may
compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice.
At any rate, respondent failed to discharge the burden of showing that the LSPA is a privileged
document. Respondent did not present any law or regulation that considers bank documents such as
the LSPA as classified information.
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JUAN P. CABRERA, Petitioner, vs. HENRY YSAAC, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166790 November 19, 2014
This court "is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case."
Facts:
The heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac co-owned a parcel of land located in Sabang, Naga City. One of
the co-owners is respondent, Henry Ysaac who leased out portions of the property to several lessees.
Juan Cabrera, one of the lessees, leased a portion of the land. Henry Ysaac needed money and
offered to sell the piece of land to Juan Cabrera. He told Henry Ysaac that the land was too small for
his needs because there was no parking space for his vehicle. In order to address Juan Cabrera’s
concerns, Henry Ysaac expanded his offer to include the two adjoining lands that Henry Ysaac was
then leasing to the Borbe family and the Espiritu family. The sale eventually pushed through, and
Juan Cabrera tried to pay the balance of the purchase price to Henry Ysaac. However, at that time,
Henry Ysaac was in the United States. The only person in Henry Ysaac’s residence was his wife who
refused to accept Juan Cabrera’s payment. Cabrera then requested to reduce the area of the land
subject of their transaction. Part of the 439-square-meter land was going to be made into a barangay
walkway, and another part was being occupied by a family that was difficult to eject. Juan Cabrera
agreed to the proposal. The land was surveyed again. According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac
agreed to shoulder the costs of the resurvey, which Juan Cabrera advanced in the amount of
₱3,000.00.
The resurvey shows that the area now covered by the transaction was 321 square meters. Juan
Cabrera intended to show the sketch plan and pay the amount due for the payment of the lot. Then,
Henry Ysaac’s counsel, Atty. Luis Ruben General, wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Leoncio
Clemente, Juan Cabrera’s counsel informing the latter his client is formally rescinding the contract of
sale because Juan Cabrera failed to pay the balance of the purchase price of the land. A civil case for
specific performance was lodged. Before the Regional Trial Court decided the case, the heirs of Luis
and Matilde Ysaac, under the administration of Franklin Ysaac, sold their property to the local
government of Naga City. The property was turned into a project for the urban poor of the city. RTC
Naga ruled that the contract of sale between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was duly rescinded
when the former failed to pay the balance of the purchase price in the period agreed upon, and
dismissed Juan Cabrera’s complaint.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Regional Trial Court that there was a perfected contract of
sale between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac. In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, petitioner
argued that it would be unfair to him if a clerical error would deprive his petition from being judged
on the merits.
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Issue:
Whether this court could take cognizance of issues not raised by petitioner but by respondent in his
comment to the petition for review; YES.
Ruling:
We can consider errors not raised by the parties, more so if these errors were raised by respondent.
Respondent raised different issues compared with those raised by petitioner. However, the
assignment of error of respondent was still responsive to the main argument of petitioner.
Petitioner’s argument works on the premise that there was a valid contract. By attacking the validity
of the contract, respondent was merely responding to the premise of petitioner’s main argument.
The issue is relevant to the final disposition of this case; hence, it should be considered by this court
in arriving at a decision. We also find that there was no contract of sale. It was null ab initio.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ENRIQUE QUINTOS y BADILLA, Accused-

appellant.
G.R. No. 199402 November 12, 2014
Trial provides judges with the opportunity to detect, consciously or unconsciously, observable cues and micro
expressions that could, more than the words said and taken as a whole, suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill
will. These important aspects can never be reflected or reproduced in documents and objects used as evidence.
Facts:
Enrique Quintos y Badilla who was charged with rape allegedly committed against AAA, a mental
retardate. She was 21 years old with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months. She had an IQ of 38.8
This was based on the testimony of National Bureau of Investigation clinical psychologist Accused,
who was her neighbor, went to her house to watch television. Accused followed her when she went
to the bathroom. In the bathroom, accused removed his shorts and underwear, and inserted his
penis into her vagina. AAA did not want to have intercourse with the accused, but she did not tell
the accused to stop. A similar incident happened the nex tday. While AAA was sleeping, accused
removed her undergarments, as well as his own undergarments. Accused then laid on top of her
and, again, inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA also recalled that on a different day, accused
kissed her and held her breasts. There was also one Thursday night when accused forced AAA to
take his penis inside her mouth despite her protests. Accused claimed that he did not rape AAA. He
was in a romantic and sexual relationship with AAA. However, he ended this relationship when he
got his now common-law wife pregnant. He insisted that AAA’s charges were fabricated because of
AAA’s inability to accept that he ended their relationship.
The trial court issued a judgment finding accused guilty of two counts of rape. The Court of Appeals
issued a decision affirming with modification the trial court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Accused was properly found guilty on the basis of the testimonies presented.
Ruling:
YES. Trial courts are in the best position to evaluate witnesses’ credibility. Both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals found AAA’s testimony to be credible and convincing. There is no reason to
disturb this finding. The observance of the witnesses’ demeanor during an oral direct examination,
cross-examination, and during the entire period that he or she is present during trial is indispensable
especially in rape cases because it helps establish the moral conviction that an accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Hence, "the evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility is
a matter best left to the trial court because it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor during the trial. Thus, the Court accords great respect to the trial court’s findings," more
so when the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings.The exception is when the trial court and/or
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the Court of Appeals "overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts that could have affected the
outcome of the case." No such facts were overlooked or misconstrued in this case.
Competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this
Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capable and consistently. Rather
than undermine the gravity of the complainant's accusations, it even lends greater credence to her
testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly
on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused.
AAA’s testimony was corroborated by the medical findings, which showed that there were
lacerations in her hymen that were produced by a blunt object. The testimonial evidence is bolstered
by the presence of these lacerations. Together, they produce a moral conviction that accused
committed the crimes charged.
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SMI-ED PHILIPPINES TECHNOLOGY, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175410 November 12, 2014
In reviewing the BIR’s assessment and decision, the Court of Tax Appeals had to make its own determination
of the taxpayer’s tax liabilities. The Court of Tax Appeals may not make such determination before the BIR
makes its assessment and before a dispute involving such assessment is brought to the Court of Tax Appeals on
appeal.
Facts:
SMI-Ed Philippines is a PEZA-registered corporation authorized "to engage in the business of

manufacturing ultra-high-density microprocessor unit package."After its registration it constructed
buildings and purchased machineries and equipment. SMI-Ed Philippines "failed to commence
operations."9Its factory was temporarily closed. On August 1, 2000, it sold its buildings and some of
its installed machineries and equipment to Ibiden Philippines, Inc., another PEZA-registered
enterprise, for ¥2,100,000,000.00 (₱893,550,000.00). SMI-Ed Philippines was dissolved on November
30, 2000. In its quarterly income tax return for year 2000, SMI-Ed Philippines subjected the entire
gross sales of its properties to 5% final tax on PEZA registered corporations. SMI-Ed Philippines
paid taxes amounting to ₱44,677,500.00. After requesting the cancellation of its PEZA registration
and amending its articles of incorporation to shorten its corporate term, SMI-Ed Philippines filed an
administrative claim for the refund of ₱44,677,500.00 with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
SMIEd Philippines alleged that the amount was erroneously paid. It also alleged that it incurred a
net loss of ₱2,233,464,538. The BIR did not act on SMI-Ed Philippines’ claim, which prompted the
latter to file a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals on September 9, 2002. The Court of
Tax Appeals Second Division denied SMI-Ed Philippines’ claim for refund in the decision, as the
same were filed within the two-year prescriptive period. However, fiscal incentives given to PEZA-
registered enterprises may be availed only by PEZA-registered enterprises that had already
commenced operations.
SMI-Ed Philippines filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc which
affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division’s decision and resolution. SMI-Ed Philippines
filed a petition for review before the SC.
Issue:
The honorable CTA En Banc grievously erred and acted beyond its jurisdiction when it assessed for
deficiency tax in the first instance.
Ruling:
The term "assessment" refers to the determination of amounts due from a person obligated to make
payments. In the context of national internal revenue collection, it refers the determination of the
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taxes due from a taxpayer under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997. The power and duty
to assess national internal revenue taxes are lodged with the BIR. The BIR is not mandated to make
an assessment relative to every return filed with it. Tax returns filed with the BIR enjoy the
presumption that these are in accordance with the law. Tax returns are also presumed correct since
these are filed under the penalty of perjury. Generally, however, the BIR assesses taxes when it
appears, after a return had been filed, that the taxes paid were incorrect, false, or fraudulent. The BIR
also assesses taxes when taxes are due but no return is filed. The Court of Tax Appeals has no power
to make an assessment at the first instance. On matters such as tax collection, tax refund, and others
related to the national internal revenue taxes, the Court of Tax Appeals’ jurisdiction is appellate in
nature.
Thus, the BIR first has to make an assessment of the taxpayer’s liabilities. When the BIR makes the
assessment, the taxpayer is allowed to dispute that assessment before the BIR. If the BIR issues a
decision that is unfavorable to the taxpayer or if the BIR fails to act on a dispute brought by the
taxpayer, the BIR’s decision or inaction may be brought on appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. The
Court of Tax Appeals then acquires jurisdiction over the case. When the BIR’s unfavorable decision
is brought on appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals reviews the correctness
of the BIR’s assessment and decision.
The Court of Tax Appeals’ jurisdiction is not limited to cases when the BIR makes an assessment or a
decision unfavorable to the taxpayer. Because Republic Act No. 112553 also vests the Court of Tax
Appeals with jurisdiction over the BIR’s inaction on a taxpayer’s refund claim, there may be
instances when the Court of Tax Appeals has to take cognizance of cases that have nothing to do
with the BIR’s assessments or decisions. When the BIR fails to act on a claim for refund of
voluntarily but mistakenly paid taxes, for example, there is no decision or assessment involved.
130
AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ALFREDO AND THE HEIRS

REVILLA OF PAZ REVILLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 190901 November 12, 2014
It is true that "it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action."
Facts:
The Revilla spouses are the owners in fee simple of an unregistered parcel of land in Silang, Cavite
and faced financial difficulties in raising funds for Alfredo Revilla’s travel to Saudi Arabia. Paz
Castillo-Revilla borrowed money from Amada Cotoner-Zacarias (Amada). By way of security, the
parties verbally agreed that Amada would take physical possession of the property, cultivate it, then
use the earnings from the cultivation to pay the loan and realty taxes. Upon full payment of the loan,
Amada would return the property to the Revilla spouses. Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada
presented a fictitious document entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihanng Lupa" before the Provincial
Assessor of Cavite. This document was executed with the Revilla spouses as sellers and Amada as
buyer of the property. Amada sold the property to the spouses Casorla by "Deed of Absolute Sale
Unregistered Land." a Tax Declaration was later issued in the name of the Casorla spouses, who in
turn, sold the same to Sun spouses. Alfredo Revilla returned from Saudi Arabia. He asked Amada
why she had not returned their tax declaration considering their full payment of the loan. He then
discovered that the property’s tax declaration was already in the name of the Sun spouses.
A land registration case filed by the Sun spouses for the property. The Revilla spouses then saw a
copy of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" and noticed that their signatures as sellers were forged.
Regional Trial Court found the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" to be a fictitious document, and
ruled in favor of the Revilla spouses. Amada appealed the trial court’s decision, to which the Court
of Appeals dismissed and partially granted the appeal of the Sun spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not the proper docket fees, were paid docket fees by the Revilla spouses based on their
prayer for actual damages of ₱50,000.00, moral damages of ₱50,000.00, and attorney’s fee of
₱80,000.00, when they should have based it on ₱12,000,000.00, the value of the property.
Ruling:
This court finds that respondents Revilla spouses paid the proper docket fees, thus, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction. The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of
this unethical practice. To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions,
answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
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assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement
shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The
ruling in the Magaspi case in sofar as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and
reversed.
In the case at bench, the complaint filed by the Spouses Revilla only asked for actual damages in the
amount of ₱50,000.00. While the Spouses Revilla mentioned the amount of ₱12,000,000.00 as actual
damages in the pre-trial, said amount was not stated in the complaint and neither was it awarded by
the lower court in its judgment. Hence, said amount was not even considered by the court a quo
when it awarded damages in favor of the Spouses Revilla. Considering that the complaint was not
formally amended by the spouses to increase the amount of actual damages being sought, the trial
court was not stripped of its jurisdiction to try the case since the Spouses Revilla correctly paid the
docket fees based merely on what was prayed for in the complaint. Indeed, the mere mentioning by
the Spouses Revilla of the amount of ₱12,000,000.00 during the pre-trial is inconsequential, as the
trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over the action when the Spouses Revilla filed the
complaint and paid the requisite filing fees based on the amount as prayed for in the complaint.
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PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION (PHILEC), , vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL

CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION BOARD (NCMB),
G.R. No. 168612 December 10, 2014
A Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has the exclusive original jurisdiction over
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Should the
parties agree, a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall also resolve the parties’ other
labor disputes, including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. The proper remedy against the
award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is an appeal before the Court of Appeals. This court first
characterized the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is not strictly a quasi-
judicial agency, may be considered an instrumentality.
Facts:
PHILEC is a domestic corporation "engaged in the manufacture and repairs of high voltage
transformers and among its rank-and-file employees were former members of the PHILEC Workers’
Union. PWU is a legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining representative of
PHILEC’s rank-and-file employees. PHILEC and its rank-and-file employees were governed by
collective bargaining agreements providing for the increases in an employee’s basic salary in case of
promotion. When the previous collective bargaining agreements already expired, PHILEC selected
Lipio for promotion from Machinist to Foreman. PHILEC served Lipio a memorandum, instructing
him to undergo training for the position of Foreman. PHILEC undertook to pay Lipio training
allowance as provided in the memorandum. Ignacio, Sr., then Assembler was likewise selected for
training for the position of Foreman.
PHILEC and PWU entered into a new collective bargaining agreement. Claiming that the schedule
of training allowance stated in the memoranda served on Lipio and Ignacio,Sr. did not conform to
Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 of the new collective bargaining agreement, PWU submitted
the grievance to the grievance machinery. PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably settle their
grievance. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez held that PHILEC violated its collective bargaining
agreement with PWU but dismissed PWU’s claim of unfair labor practice.
PHILEC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenez gravely abused his discretion in rendering his decision. PHILEC maintained that it did not
violate the new collective bargaining agreement. It applied the "Modified SGV" pay grade rates to
avoid salary distortion within its enterprise. The Court of Appeals affirmed Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenez’s decision. It agreed that PHILEC was bound to apply the new collective bargaining
agreement with PWU in computing Lipio’s and Ignacio, Sr.’s training allowance. PHILEC filed its
petition for review on certiorari before this court, insisting that it did not violate its collective
bargaining agreement with PWU.
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Issue:
Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against a decision of a
Voluntary Arbitrator before the Court of Appeals was proper.
Ruling:
PHILEC filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court against Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision.
This was not the proper remedy. Instead, the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary
Arbitrator’s or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators’ decision or award is to appeal the award or decision
before the Court of Appeals, under Rule 43, Sections 1 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 9
of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of Appeals has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over decisions or awards of quasi-judicial agencies and instrumentalities. Despite Rule
43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule that the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision must be
appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as
provided in the Labor Code. Appeal is a "statutory privilege," which may be exercised "only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law." "Perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so rendered
the decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment much less to entertain the appeal."
There being no appeal seasonably filed in this case, Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision became
final and executory after 10 calendar days from PHILEC’s receipt of the resolution denying its
motion for partial reconsideration. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision is already "beyond the
purview of this Court to act upon."
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THE LAW FIRM OF LAGUESMA MAGSALIN CONSULTA AND GASTARDO, Petitioner,  vs. 
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or REYNALDO A. VILLAR and JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.
in their capacities as Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185544 January 13, 2015, LEONEN, J.
Rule 64, Sec. 3. Time to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the
Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of denial.
Under this rule, a party may file a petition for review on certiorari within 30 days from notice of the
judgment being assailed. The reglementary period includes the time taken to file the motion for reconsideration
and is only interrupted once the motion is filed. If the motion is denied, the party may file the petition only
within the period remaining from the notice of judgment.
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Rule XI, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. The petition seeks to annul the decision dated September
27, 2007 and resolution dated November 5, 2008 of the Commission on Audit (COA), which
disallowed the payment of retainer fees to the law firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and
Gastardo (Laguesma Law) for legal services rendered to Clark Development Corporation.
Sometime in 2001, officers of Clark Development Corporation approached the law firm of
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo for its possible assistance in handling the corporation's
labor cases. Clark Development Corporation, through its legal officers and after the law firm's
acquiescence, "sought from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel ['OGCC'] its approval
for the engagement of [Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo] as external counsel." The Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel denied the request. Clark Development Corporation then
filed a request for reconsideration. On May 20, 2002, the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel, reconsidered the request and approved the engagement of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta
and Gastardo. In the meantime, the firm commenced rendering legal services to Clark Development
Corporation. At this point, Clark Development Corporation had yet to secure the authorization and
clearance from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel or the concurrence of the
Commission on Audit of the retainership contract. According to the law firm, Clark Development
Corporation's officers assured the law firm that it was in the process of securing the approval of the
Commission on Audit.
On June 28, 2002, Clark Development Corporation, through its Board of Directors, approved
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo's engagement as private counsel. In 2003, it also
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approved the assignment of additional labor cases to the law firm. On July 13, 2005, Clark
Development Corporation requested the Commission on Audit for concurrence of the retainership
contract it executed with Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo. According to the law firm, it
was only at this point when Clark Development Corporation informed them that the Commission
on Audit required the clearance and approval of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
before it could approve the release of Clark Development Corporation's funds to settle the legal fees
due to the law firm.
On August 5, 2005, State Auditor IV Elvira G. Punzalan informed Clark Development

Corporation that its request for clearance could not be acted upon until the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel approves the retainership contract with finality. On August 10, 2005, Clark
Development Corporation sent a letter-request to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
for the final approval of the retainership contract, in compliance with the Commission on Audit's
requirements.
On December 22, 2005, Government Corporate Counsel Agnes VST Devanadera denied
Clark Development Corporation's request for approval on the ground that the pro-forma
retainership contract given to them was not "based on the premise that the monthly retainer's fee
and concomitant charges are reasonable and could pass in audit by COA." She found that Clark
Development Corporation adopted instead the law firm's proposals concerning the payment of a
retainer's fee on a per case basis without informing the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel.
She, however, ruled that the law firm was entitled to payment under the principle of quantum
meruit and subject to Clark Development Corporation Board's approval and the usual government
auditing rules and regulations. On December 27, 2005, Clark Development Corporation relayed
Government Corporate Counsel Devanadera's letter to the Commission's Audit Team Leader,
highlighting the portion on the approval of payment to Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo
on the basis of quantum meruit.
On November 9, 2006, the Commission on Audit's Office of the General Counsel, Legal and
Adjudication Sector issued a "Third Indorsement" denying Clark Development Corporation's
request for clearance, citing its failure to secure a prior written concurrence of the Commission on
Audit and the approval with finality of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. It also
stated that its request for concurrence was made three (3) years after engaging the legal services of
the law firm. On December 4, 2006, Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo appealed the "Third
Indorsement" to the Commission on Audit. On December 12, 2006, Clark Development Corporation
also filed a motion for reconsideration. On September 27, 2007, the Commission on Audit rendered
the assailed decision denying the appeal and motion for reconsideration. It ruled that Clark
Development Corporation violated Commission on Audit Circular No. 98-002 dated June 9, 1998
and Office of the President Memorandum Circular No. 9 dated August 27, 1998 when it engaged the
legal services of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo without the final approval and written
concurrence of the Commission on Audit. It also ruled that it was not the government's
responsibility to pay the legal fees already incurred by Clark Development Corporation, but rather
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by the government officials who violated the regulations on the matter. Clark Development
Corporation and Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo separately filed motions for
reconsideration, which the Commission on Audit denied in the assailed resolution dated November
5, 2008. The resolution also disallowed the payment of legal fees to the law firm on the basis of
quantum meruit since the Commission on Audit Circular No. 86-255 mandates that the engagement
of private counsel without prior approval "shall be a personal liability of the officials concerned."
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo filed this petition for certiorari on December 19, 2008.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their comment dated May 7, 2009. The
Reply was filed on September 1, 2009.
Issues:
1. Whether the petition was filed on time
2. Whether the petitioner is the real party-in-interest
Ruling:
The petition was filed out of time.
Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has a reglementary
period of 60 days from receipt of denial of the motion for reconsideration. The Constitution,
however, specifies that the reglementary period for assailing the decisions, orders, or rulings of the
constitutional commissions is thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision, order, or ruling. For this
reason, a separate rule was enacted in the Rules of Court. Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides the guidelines for filing a petition for certiorari under this rule. Section 2 of said rule
specifies that " a judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari
under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided."
The phrase, "except as hereinafter provided," specifies that any petition for certiorari filed
under this rule follows the same requisites as those of Rule 65 except for certain provisions found
only in Rule 64. One of these provisions concerns the time given to file the petition. Section 3 of Rule
64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under
the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If
the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Under this rule, a party may file a petition for review on certiorari within 30 days from notice of the
judgment being assailed. The reglementary period includes the time taken to file the motion for
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reconsideration and is only interrupted once the motion is filed. If the motion is denied, the party
may file the petition only within the period remaining from the notice of judgment.
In this case, petitioner received the decision of the Commission on Audit on October 16,
2007. It filed a motion for reconsideration on November 6, 2007, or after 21 days. It received notice of
the denial of its motion on November 20, 2008. The receipt of this notice gave petitioner nine (9)
days, or until November 29, 2008, to file a petition for certiorari. Since November 29, 2008 fell on a
Saturday, petitioner could still have filed on the next working day, or on December 1, 2008. It,
however, filed the petition on December 19, 2008, which was well beyond the reglementary period.
This petition could have been dismissed outright for being filed out of time.
This court, however, recognizes that there are certain exceptions that allow a relaxation of
the procedural rules. In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons which may
provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters
of life, liberty, honor or property[,] (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the
merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Considering that the issues in this case involve the right of petitioner to receive due
compensation on the one hand and respondents' duty to prevent the unauthorized disbursement of
public funds on the other, a relaxation of the technical rules is in order.
As to the second issue, the court ruled that petitioner is a real party-in-interest, as defined in
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.
The net effect of upholding or setting aside the assailed Commission on Audit rulings would
be to either disallow or allow the payment of legal fees to petitioner. Petitioner, therefore, stands to
either be benefited or injured by the suit, or entitled to its avails. It is a real party-in-interest. Clark
Development Corporation's Board of Directors, on the other hand, should have been impleaded in
this case as a necessary party.
A necessary party is defined as "one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as
a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action."
138
MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY, Petitioner, vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 185812 JANUARY 13, 2015, LEONEN, J.
A petition under Rule 64 may prosper only after a finding that the administrative agency committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
A Rule 65 petition is a unique and special rule because it commands limited review of the question
raised. As an extraordinary remedy, its purpose is simply to keep the public respondent within the bounds of
its jurisdiction or to relieve the petitioner from the public respondent’s arbitrary acts. In this review, the Court
is confined solely to questions of jurisdiction whenever a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function acts without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Facts:
This case involves the validity of the grant of allowance and incentives to the officers and
employees of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority. The Resident Auditor issued notices of
disallowance on the allowances and incentives received by the officers and employees of Maritime
Industry Authority. The Legal and Adjudication Office of the Commission on Audit upheld the
notices of disallowance issued. The Commission on Audit affirmed the notices of
disallowance. Thus, this petition for certiorari was filed by Maritime Industry Authority.
Maritime Industry Authority is an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and
Communication and created under Presidential Decree No. 474.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as “An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes” took
effect. The law standardizes the salary rates of government officials and employees.
Issue:
Whether the allowance or incentives granted to the officers and employees of Maritime Industry
Authority have legal basis.
Ruling:
Commission on Audit did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The aggrieved party can
assail the decision of the Commission on Audit through a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 before
this court. A petition under Rule 64 may prosper only after a finding that the administrative agency
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Not all errors of the
Commission on Audit is reviewable by this court. Thus, A Rule 65 petition is a unique and special
rule because it commands limited review of the question raised. As an extraordinary remedy, its
purpose is simply to keep the public respondent within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to relieve
139
the petitioner from the public respondent’s arbitrary acts. In this review, the Court is
confined solely to questions of jurisdiction whenever a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial function acts without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The limitation of the Court’s power of review over COA rulings merely complements its
nature as an independent constitutional body that is tasked to safeguard the proper use of the
government and, ultimately, the people’s property by vesting it with power to (i) determine whether
the government entities comply with the law and the rules in disbursing public funds; and (ii)
disallow legal disbursements of these funds.
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BANCO DE ORO, BANK OF COMMERCE, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK AND PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioners,
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION AND RCBC CAPITAL

CORPORATION, Petitioners-Intervenors,
CAUCUS OF DEVELOPMENT NGO NETWORKS, Petitioner-Intervenor,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, THE NATIONAL TREASURER AND BUREAU OF TREASURY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198756 January 13, 2015
The Court of Tax Appeals has undoubted jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of
a tax law or regulation when raised by the taxpayer as a defense in disputing or contesting an assessment or
claiming a refund. It is only in the lawful exercise of its power to pass upon all matters brought before it, as
sanctioned by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended. Republic Act No. 9282, a special and later law
than Batas Pambansa Blg. 12968 provides an exception to the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts over actions questioning the constitutionality or validity of tax laws or regulations. Except for local tax
cases, actions directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative
issuance may be filed directly before the Court of Tax Appeals
Facts
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus filed by petitioners under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The case involves the proper tax treatment of the discount or interest income arising from
the P35 billion worth of 10-year zero-coupon treasury bonds issued by the Bureau of Treasury. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued BIR Ruling No. 370-2011 (2011 BIR Ruling), declaring that
the PEACe Bonds being deposit substitutes are subject to the 20% final withholding tax. Pursuant to
this ruling, the Secretary of Finance directed the Bureau of Treasury to withhold a 20% final tax from
the face value of the PEACe Bonds upon their payment at maturity on October 18, 2011.
Petitioners contend that the retroactive application of the 2011 BIR Ruling without prior
notice to them was in violation of their property rights, right to due process, as well as Sec 246 of the
197 NIRC. And that Commissioner of Internal Revenue gravely and seriously abused her discretion
in the exercise of her rule making power. Respondents argue that petitioners' direct resort to this
court to challenge the 2011 BIR Ruling violates the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
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remedies and hierarchy of courts, resulting in a lack of cause of action that justifies the dismissal of
the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not doctrine of hierarchy of courts was violated by the BIR and acted outside its
jurisdiction in connection with the 2011 BIR
Ruling:
Yes. The Court agreed with the respondents that the jurisdiction to review the rulings of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue pertains to the Court of Tax Appeals. In exceptional cases,
however, this court entertained direct recourse to it when "dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy." Non-compliance with the rules on exhaustion of administrative remedies
and hierarchy of courts had been rendered moot by this court's issuance of the temporary
restraining order enjoining the implementation of the 2011 BIR Ruling. The temporary restraining
order effectively recognized the urgency and necessity of direct resort to this court.
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MARIA THERESA G. GUTIERREZ, Petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND AUDITOR

NARCISA DJ JOAQUIN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 200628, January 13, 2015, LEONEN, J.
The right to counsel under Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution applies in criminal
proceedings, but not in administrative proceedings. It is a right given to persons accused of an offense during
criminal investigation. Any proceeding conducted by an administrative body is not part of the criminal
investigation or prosecution
Facts:
Gutierrez is a Cash Collecting Officer, with the designation of Cashier III at National Food
Authority-National Capital Region, National District Office (NFA-NCR, NDO). On May 30, 2008,
she had collections amounting to F9,390,834.00, covered by Official Receipt Nos. 0420975 to 0421246.
On that day, she placed the collections in a wooden cabinet. The next day, Gutierrez's collections
amounted to P1,505,625.00. Of that amount, P714,852.75 and an undeposited amount of P0.50 from
March 2008 were placed in a wooden cabinet. The rest was placed in the safety vault. The total
undeposited collection as of March 31, 2008 was P10,896,459.50. Of that amount, P10,105,687.25 was
placed in the "pearless" boxes in a wooden cabinet and P790,772.25 was placed in the safety vault.
On June 1, 2008, at about 1:35 a.m., armed men in military uniforms with Philippine National
Police-Security Agencies and Guards Supervision Division (PNP-SAGSD) identifications entered the
NFA-NCR, NDO The armed men disarmed NFA-NCR, NDO's security guards and took Gutierrez's
undeposited collections. Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. was NFA-NCR, NDO's
contracted security agency. The security guards on duty executed their respective affidavits. Based
on their affidavits, armed men entered the NFA-NCR, NDO compound after they had been
disarmed, threatened, and tied up. The security guards immediately reported the incident to the
Valenzuela Police Station, where an investigation report was issued consistent with the security
guards' narrations in their affidavits.
On June 3, 2008, the Commission on Audit, National Food Authority-NCR, North District
Office, Malanday, Valenzuela City, through State Auditor Narcisa DJ Joaquin (State Auditor
Joaquin), issued a demand letter to Gutierrez. Gutierrez was informed that she must immediately
produce the missing funds amounting to P10,105,686.75. She was also ordered to submit within 72
hours a written explanation why such shortage occurred. On June 5, 2008, the Commission on Audit,
through State Auditor Joaquin, issued a withholding order, addressed to Roberto S. Musngi
(Musngi), Manager of National Food Authority, North District Office. Musngi was informed that
upon examination of Gutierrez's account on June 1, 2008, it was established that there was a
P10,105,686.75 shortage in Gutierrez's accountabilities. Pursuant to Section 37 of Presidential Decree
No. 1445, Musngi was directed to withhold Gutierrez's salaries and other emoluments so these could
be applied to the satisfaction of the shortage.
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In response to the June 3, 2008 demand letter of the Commission on Audit, Gutierrez
executed an affidavit dated June 6, 2008 wherein she narrated that she had been serving as National
Food Authority's Cash Collecting Officer since 1985. Her office was located at the far end of the
National Food Authority building. That was where the "pearless" boxes and the cabinet where she
kept her collections could be found. Quoted below is her explanation for using "pearless" boxes to
keep her collections:
“6. That because of the volume of money I accept every day, which averages from 4 to 6
million pesos every day depending on the seasons, most of my time inside the office is spent
to counting, bundling by different denominations the money. To emphasize the point, the
money that I am accepting from remittances and payments are of different denominations,
from twenty five centavo (Php0.25) coins to one thousand peso (Php1,000.00) bills. The coins
alone would amount in the average of Twelve thousand pesos (Php12,000.00). I could
literally say that from the time I timed in the office at about 6:30 a.m. up to the time I timed
out at about 6:30 p.m., my only rest from my work is to [be] going to the ladies room and the
break during lunch time.
xxx
8. That when the rice crises came up on April 2008, volume of work including the amount of
money that comes into my office almost doubled. That because of the heavy operations in
our office I had an average collection starting April 2008 of 6 to 9 Million Pesos every day of
every denomination, with coins averaging from 12 to 16 thousand pesos that needs to be
counted, receipted, bundled, balanced, reported and kept.
9. That it is almost automatic that when I enter my office what comes to my mind is to count
the money and bundle them by the hundreds and prepare receipts for the payments and
remittances until the time to leave at about 6:30 p.m. I would also cause the deposit of the
money collected the day before to Land Bank. But there were even times that because of the
volume of the money, bank representatives could not sort out all the smaller bills (P20s and
P50s) being picked up from our office as the Armor van should be in the bank at 3:00 p.m.
Thus, there would be arrangements in the bank that the counting would continue inside
their office, which oftentimes lasts until late night.
10. That since April 2008 or the start of the heavy operations, I have been putting some of the
money in the "pearless" box, because of the volume, which I have to carry and keep safe at
the cabinet inside. I have six (6) pearless boxes in the office.
xxx
13. That since May 30, 2008 is a Friday, banks are closed the following day and the money
collected on said date would have remained in my office until the next banking day.
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xxx
18. It was very unfortunate that the money accepted on May 30, 2008 and the collection in
the night before the robbery were left in the pearless box inside the cabinet and not inside
the vault. But with the volume of money, the vault has not enough space to accommodate all
of it.
19. And with the amount of work that I am doing every day from 6:30 in the morning up to
6:30 p.m., more or less, where my only rest is literally going to the ladies room, and with the
safe location of my office, it did not come to my mind that this incident would come.
20. That I have nothing to do with what happened in the incident of June 1, 2008 at 1:30 in
the morning and I am not in control now to produce those missing funds taken by the
robbers.”
On June 10, 2008, Gutierrez requested relief from money accountability for the loss of the
collections. The letter was addressed to State Auditor Joaquin. In the letter dated June 26, 2008
addressed to State Auditor Joaquin, Gutierrez appealed the withholding order issued on June 5,
2008. She prayed that her salaries and emoluments be given to her while the robbery incident was
still under investigation. She was a widow who had three (3) dependents and an 85-year-old mother
residing with her in need of medical attention. She had no other source of income to support herself,
her dependents, and her mother.
On June 26, 2008, State Auditor Joaquin denied Gutierrez's appeal of the withholding
order. State Auditor Joaquin informed Gutierrez that there was already a prima facie case for
malversation against her under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. On July 11, 2008, Gutierrez
filed a notice of appeal of State Auditor Joaquin's withholding order dated June 5, 2008.
On September 11, 2008, Commission on Audit Director IV Tito S. Nabua (Director Nabua)
issued a decision denying Gutierrez's appeal and expressing his agreement with the issuance of the
withholding order. The robbery incident was acknowledged in the decision. However, Gutierrez's
alleged act of negligence in the performance of her duties could not be set aside. Her failure to
follow safekeeping procedures showed lack of due care on her part. Aside from Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, the liabilities of an accountable officer are found in Section 105 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445.Gutierrez filed a motion for reconsideration of the September 11, 2008 decision of
Director Nabua on the ground that he did not give her a chance to file a memorandum of appeal
before submission of the case for resolution. According to Gutierrez, this was a violation of the rules
and of her right to due process. She also cited reversible error in upholding State Auditor Joaquin's
order despite lack of factual and legal bases as ground for her motion.
145
On January 31, 2012, the Commission on Audit denied her request for relief from money
accountability.
Accordingly, Ms. Gutierrez shall be liable to pay to the NFA the missing amount of
P10,105,687.25. She emphasizes that she was first assisted by counsel only when she filed a notice of
appeal. Respondent auditor had already issued the withholding order dated June 5, 2008 and letter
dated June 26, 2008 before petitioner was assisted by counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s due process rights were violated
Ruling:
The right to counsel under Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution applies in criminal
proceedings, but not in administrative proceedings. It is a right given to persons accused of an
offense during criminal investigation. Any proceeding conducted by an administrative body is not
part of the criminal investigation or prosecution. Thus, this court said in Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission:
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal

proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry
may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the
person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has
the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of
Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act)
and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987).
Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because
such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measure against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing conducted by the
investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.
While the purpose of criminal proceedings is to determine if a person suspected of

committing an offense has indeed committed an offense, the purpose of an administrative
proceeding is to determine if a person in public office has violated the trust reposed in him or her by
the public. In a criminal proceeding, if a person is found guilty of an offense, the corresponding
punishment is imposed primarily to protect the public from being exposed to and correct his or her
deviant behavior. In an administrative proceeding, if a person is found administratively liable, the
corresponding penalty is imposed primarily to preserve public trust and protect the integrity of
public service. Petitioner is not being accused of or investigated for a crime. The Commission on
146
Audit's withholding order and its denial of petitioner's request for relief from shortage were issued
after it had made a finding that the money entrusted to petitioner was lost. A finding of criminal
liability was not the reason for the Commission on Audit's issuances. The Commission on Audit has
no jurisdiction to investigate a crime or to make a finding of criminal liability. Any proceeding
conducted prior to these issuances was for the purpose of determining if petitioner's salaries should
be withheld or if petitioner should be relieved from her liability as a cashier.
147
CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON, Petitioners, vs. BENJAMIN
BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG, JOEL CALIDA, JOHNNY ARINTO, CARLITO PRESENTACION,
and ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
A second motion for reconsideration is forbidden except for extraordinarily persuasive reasons, and
only upon express leave first obtained. The propriety or acceptability of such a second motion for
reconsideration is not contingent upon the averment of "new" grounds to assail the judgment, i.e., grounds
other than those theretofore presented and rejected. Otherwise, attainment of finality of a judgment might be
staved off indefinitely, depending on the party's ingeniousness or cleverness in conceiving and formulating
"additional flaws" or "newly discovered errors" therein, or thinking up some injury or prejudice to the rights
of the movant for reconsideration. "Piece-meal" impugnation of a judgment by successive motions for
reconsideration is anathema, being precluded by the salutary axiom that a party seeking the setting aside of a
judgment, act or proceeding must set out in his motion all the grounds therefor, and those not so included are
deemed waived and cease to be available for subsequent motions.
Facts:
Club Filipino Employees Association (CLUFEA) is a union representing the employees of

Club Filipino, Inc. Before CLUFEA and Club Filipino, Inc.’s last collective bargaining agreement
expired and within the 60-day freedom period,2 CLUFEA had made several demands on Club
Filipino, Inc. to negotiate a new agreement. Club Filipino, Inc., however, replied that its Board of
Directors could not muster a quorum to negotiate with CLUFEA.
CLUFEA then formally submitted its proposals to Club Filipino Inc.’s negotiating panel
sometime in June 2000. Still, Club Filipino, Inc. failed to negotiate. Petitioner filed with the NCMB a
Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. On May 26, 2001, it staged a strike on the
ground of bargaining deadlock.
Club Filipino, Inc. filed before the National Capital Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a Petition to Declare [CLUFEA’s] Strike
Illegal. According to Club Filipino, Inc., CLUFEA failed to file a Notice of Strike and to conduct a
strike vote, in violation of the legal requirements for staging a strike. Worse, CLUFEA’s members
allegedly committed illegal acts while on strike, preventing their co-workers from entering and
leaving Club Filipino, Inc.’s premises and even cutting off Club Filipino, Inc.’s electricity and water
supply on the first day of the strike. Club Filipino, Inc. prayed that all of CLUFEA’s officers who
participated in the strike be declared to have lost their employment pursuant to Article 264(a) of the
Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal and considered "all the officers of the union . . .
terminated from service. CLUFEA appealed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) with Bautista, Caluag, Sualog, and Calida verifying the
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Memorandum of Appeal on CLUFEA’s behalf. However, the NLRC denied the Appeal filed for lack
of merit.
Bautista, Sualog, Calida, Arinto, de Guzman, and Fegalquin filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held that the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in declaring
CLUFEA’s strike illegal. According to the Court of Appeals, the Labor Arbiter erred in ordering all
the officers of CLUFEA dismissed from the service without even naming these officers and
specifying the acts these officers committed that rendered the strike illegal.
Club Filipino, Inc. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this court. However, this
court sustained the Court of Appeals’ finding that the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in
ordering the "wholesale dismissal" of CLUFEA’s officers. According to this court, the law requires
"‘knowledge’ [of the illegality of the strike] as a condition sine qua non before a union officer can be
dismissed . . . for participating in an illegal strike." However, "[n]owhere in the ruling of the labor
arbiter can [there be found] any discussion of how respondents, as union officers, knowingly
participated in the alleged illegal strike.
Club Filipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which this court denied with finality
in the Resolution dated September 9, 2009. This court declared that it shall not entertain any further
pleadings or motions and ordered that Entry of Judgment in this case be made in due course. On
September 14, 2009, Solis Medina Limpingco and Fajardo entered its appearance for Club Filipino,
Inc. and simultaneously filed a Motion for Leave to file and admit the attached Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration. On November 3, 2009, Club Filipino, Inc. filed its Motion for Leave to
File and Admit further Pleading/Motion, alleging that this court failed to consider its Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration in issuing its September 9, 2009 Resolution denying Club Filipino, Inc.’s
first Motion for Reconsideration. However, because of this court’s Resolution dated September 9,
2009, an Entry of Judgment was issued on October 26, 2010, declaring that this case had become final
and executory as of October 26, 2009.
Club Filipino, Inc. received the Entry of Judgment on November 10, 2010. Club Filipino, Inc.
filed a Manifestation and Motion, arguing that the court prematurely issued the Entry of Judgment
because it still had to resolve the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether Club Filipino, Inc.’s filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prevented our
Resolution dated July 13, 2009 from becoming final and executory
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Ruling:
The filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration did not prevent this court’s
Resolution dated July 13, 2009 from becoming final and executory. Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 13, 2009 is in the nature of a
second Motion for Reconsideration.
As a general rule, the filing of second Motions for Reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution is prohibited. Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No second motion for reconsideration of a

judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
This prohibition is reiterated in Rule 15, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court:
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by
the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is
reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally
erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the
Court’s declaration.
For this court to entertain second Motions for Reconsideration, the second Motions must
present "extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first obtained." Once leave
to file is granted, the second Motion for Reconsideration is no longer prohibited.
This court explained the rationale for the rule in Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Judge
Velasco, thus:
A second motion for reconsideration is forbidden except for extraordinarily persuasive

reasons, and only upon express leave first obtained. The propriety or acceptability of such a
second motion for reconsideration is not contingent upon the averment of "new" grounds to
assail the judgment, i.e., grounds other than those theretofore presented and rejected.
Otherwise, attainment of finality of a judgment might be staved off indefinitely, depending
on the party's ingeniousness or cleverness in conceiving and formulating "additional flaws"
or "newly discovered errors" therein, or thinking up some injury or prejudice to the rights of
the movant for reconsideration. "Piece-meal" impugnation of a judgment by successive
motions for reconsideration is anathema, being precluded by the salutary axiom that a party
seeking the setting aside of a judgment, act or proceeding must set out in his motion all the
grounds therefor, and those not so included are deemed waived and cease to be available for
subsequent motions.
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For all litigation must come to an end at some point, in accordance with established rules of
procedure and jurisprudence. As a matter of practice and policy, courts must dispose of
every case as promptly as possible; and in fulfillment of their role in the administration of
justice, they should brook no delay in the termination of cases by stratagems or
maneuverings of parties or their lawyers.
In the present case, this court granted leave to petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. to file the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration in the Resolution dated January 11, 2010. The Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, therefore, is no longer prohibited.
The grant of leave to file the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, however, did not
prevent this court’s July 13, 2009 Resolution from becoming final and executory. A decision or
resolution of this court is deemed final and executory after the lapse of 15 days from the parties’
receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution. The grant of leave to file the second Motion for
Reconsideration does not toll this 15-day period. It only means that the Entry of Judgment first
issued may be lifted should the second Motion for Reconsideration be granted.
This case became final and executory on October 26, 2009, after the lapse of the 15th day
from petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s receipt of the Resolution denying its first Motion for
Reconsideration. Entry of Judgment, therefore, was in order. The filing by P&G of several pleadings
after receipt of the resolution denying its first motion for reconsideration does not in any way bar
the finality or entry of judgment. Besides, to reckon the finality of a judgment from receipt of the
denial of the second motion for reconsideration would be absurd. First, the Rules of Court and the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court prohibit the filing of a second motion for reconsideration.
Second, some crafty litigants may resort to filing prohibited pleadings just to delay entry of
judgment.
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SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J. BETIA, Petitioners, v. MA. JOPETTE
M. REBESENCIO, MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH A. CRISTOBAL AND
LORAINE S. SCHNEIDER-CRUZ, Respondents.
The phrase "doing business" shall include opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches, and
any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that
extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization
Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of governing law.
Facts:
All Filipinos are entitled to the protection of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution.
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing
under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia but it has a Philippine office located in Makati
City. On the other hand, Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight
Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. After undergoing several seminars and training, respondents became Permanent
Flight Attendants. Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated
from service on various dates in 2006. Respondents contended that the termination of their
employment was illegal because it was grounded solely on their pregnancy. As respondents alleged,
they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary
procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later on
informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their
maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters. Respondents
were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. Saudia anchored its
disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on its "Unified
Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract). Under the Unified Contract,
the employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void.
Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits, respondents executed
handwritten resignation letters. On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia
and its officers for illegal dismissal and money claims to the labor arbiter. Saudia assailed the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as it claimed that all the determining points of contact referred to
foreign law and insisted that the Complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens. It added that respondents had no cause of action as they resigned voluntarily. The
Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction but this was reversed by the NLRC.
NLRC explained that considering that complainants-appellants are OFWs, the Labor Arbiters and
the NLRC have jurisdiction to hear and decide their complaint for illegal termination. On the matter
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of forum non conveniens, it noted that there were no special circumstances that warranted its
abstention from exercising jurisdiction. Petition to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 was dismissed
hence this case.
Issue:
Whether the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission may exercise jurisdiction
over Saudi Arabian Airlines
Ruling:
As to separate personality of Saudia Jeddah and Saudia Manila
There is no doubt that the pleadings and summons were served on Saudia through its
counsel. Saudia, however, claims that the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission had no jurisdiction over it because summons were never served on it but on "Saudia
Manila." Referring to itself as "Saudia Jeddah," it claims that "Saudia Jeddah" and not "Saudia
Manila" was the employer of respondents. Saudia posits that respondents' Complaint was brought
against the wrong party because "Saudia Manila," upon which summons was served, was never the
employer of respondents. Saudia is vainly splitting hairs in its effort to absolve itself of liability.
Other than its bare allegation, there is no basis for concluding that "Saudia Jeddah" is distinct from
"Saudia Manila."
The phrase "doing business" shall include opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or
branches, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements
and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the
functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the purpose
and object of the business organization. Given the foregoing, Saudia is a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines. As such, Saudia may be sued in the Philippines and is subject to the
jurisdiction of Philippine tribunals. Moreover, since there is no real distinction between "Saudia
Jeddah" and "Saudia Manila" — the latter being nothing more than Saudia's local office — service of
summons to Saudia's office in Manila sufficed to vest jurisdiction over Saudia's person in Philippine
tribunals.
As to the applicability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
Saudia asserts that Philippine courts and/or tribunals are not in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts. This is because respondents' Cabin Attendant
contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia, rather than those of the Philippines
A choice of law governing the validity of contracts or the interpretation of its provisions dees
not necessarily imply forum non conveniens. Choice of law and forum non conveniens are entirely
different matters. Choice of law under Article 1306 of the Civil Code states that “the contracting
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parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” In
contrast, forum non conveniens is a device akin to the rule against forum shopping. It is designed to
frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible
if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.
Contractual choice of law provisions factor into transnational litigation and dispute
resolution in one of or in a combination of four ways: (1) procedures for settling disputes, e.g.,
arbitration; (2) forum, i.e., venue; (3) governing law; and (4) basis for interpretation. Forum non
conveniens relates to, but is not subsumed by, the second of these. Likewise, contractual choice of
law is not determinative of jurisdiction. Stipulating on the laws of a given jurisdiction as the
governing law of a contract does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by tribunals elsewhere. The
reverse is equally true: The assumption of jurisdiction by tribunals does not ipso facto mean that it
cannot apply and rule on the basis of the parties' stipulation.
Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal's desistance in exercising jurisdiction on

account of forum non conveniens is a deferential gesture to the tribunals of another sovereign. It is a
measure that prevents the former's having to interfere in affairs which are better and more
competently addressed by the latter. Further, forum non conveniens entails a recognition not only
that tribunals elsewhere are better suited to rule on and resolve a controversy, but also, that these
tribunals are better positioned to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to dispense justice. Under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, "a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most 'convenient' or available forum and the parties are not precluded
from seeking remedies elsewhere.
On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non
conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at
the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived. We deem it more
appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence that a defendant not only allege supposed
dangerous tendencies in litigating in this jurisdiction; the defendant must also show that such
danger is real and present in that litigation or dispute resolution has commenced in another
jurisdiction and that a foreign tribunal has chosen to exercise jurisdiction.
Here, Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the
application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations
calls into operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for
Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens finds no
application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the
application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the
stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi
Arabia, however, forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of governing law. As the
present dispute relates to the illegal termination of respondents' employment, this case is immutably
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a matter of public interest and public policy. Consistent with clear pronouncements in law and
jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly find application in and govern this case. 'Moreover, as this
premise for Saudia's insistence on the application forum non conveniens has been shattered, it
follows that Philippine tribunals may properly assume jurisdiction over the present controversy.
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IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT vs. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND
(JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015, LEONEN J. [EN BANC]
The writ of mandamus will issue when the act sought to be performed is ministerial. An act is
ministerial when it does not require the exercise of judgment and the act is performed in compliance with a
legal mandate. In a petition for mandamus, the burden of proof is on petitioner to show that one is entitled to
the performance of a legal right and that respondent has a corresponding duty to perform the act. Mandamus
will not lie "to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or
to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law."
In this case, petitioner has not shown how he is entitled to the relief prayed for. Hence, this court
cannot be compelled to exercise its power of judicial review since there is no actual case or controversy.
Facts:
This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and
replacing it with the "Judiciary Support Fund." Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support
Fund shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be
used.
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to
compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived
hostility of Congress. This matter was raised to this court through the letter dated August 27, 2014,
signed by Mijares and addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court. The letter is captioned “Petition for Mandamus with Manifestation to invoke the Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy as mandated under the Constitution.”
The letter was referred to the Clerk of Court En Banc for appropriate action. It was then
docketed as UDK-15143. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino citizen, and a
concerned taxpayer. He filed this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to defend and uphold
the Constitution" because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the threats against the
judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund case on November 19,
2013 and Disbursement Acceleration Program case on July 1, 2014. The complaint implied that
certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the promulgation of these cases show a
threat to judicial independence.
In the first week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Fariñas filed House Bill
No. 4690, which would require this court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund collections to the
national treasury. A week later, or on July 14, 2014, Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas, Jr., filed House
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Bill No. 4738 entitled "The Act Creating the Judicial Support Fund (JSF) under the National
Treasury, repealing for the purpose Presidential Decree No. 1949."
On the same day, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III addressed the nation:
My message to the Supreme Court: We do not want two equal branches of government to go
head to head, needing a third branch to step in to intervene. We find it difficult to
understand your decision. You had done something similar in the past, and you tried to do it
again; there are even those of the opinion that what you attempted to commit was graver, if
we were to base it on your decision. Abiding by the principle of "presumption of regularity,"
we assumed that you did the right thing; after all, you are the ones who should ostensibly
have a better understanding of the law. And now, when we use the same mechanism —
which, you yourselves have admitted, benefit our countrymen — why is it then that we are
wrong?
We believe that the majority of you, like us, want only the best for the Filipino people. To the
honorable justices of the Supreme Court: Help us help our countrymen. We ask that you
review your decision, this time taking into consideration the points I have raised tonight.
The nation hopes for your careful deliberation and response. And I hope that once you've
examined the arguments I will submit, regarding the law and about our economy, solidarity
will ensue — thus strengthening the entire government's capability to push for the interests
of the nation.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner has sufficiently shown grounds to grant the petition and issue a writ of
mandamus.
Ruling:
Requisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus not shown. Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time
to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the respondent.
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The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
The writ of mandamus will issue when the act sought to be performed is ministerial. An act
is ministerial when it does not require the exercise of judgment and the act is performed in
compliance with a legal mandate. In a petition for mandamus, the burden of proof is on petitioner
to show that one is entitled to the performance of a legal right and that respondent has a
corresponding duty to perform the act. Mandamus will not lie "to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law." In this case, petitioner has not shown how he is entitled to the relief
prayed for. Hence, this court cannot be compelled to exercise its power of judicial review since there
is no actual case or controversy. For this reason, we appreciate petitioner's concern for the judiciary.
It is often only through the vigilance of private citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be
discussed in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this
court. But his crusade is not a lost cause. Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is a
proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying in Congress. There, he may
discover the representatives and senators who may have a similar enthusiastic response to truly
making the needed investments in the Rule of Law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
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STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, vs SPOUSES RUNE and LEA STROEM,

Respondent.
G.R. NO. 204689, January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J.
Parties may not raise issues for the first time on appeal. Such practice is violative of the rules and due
process and is frowned upon by the courts. However, it is also well-settled that jurisdiction can never be
waived or acquired by estoppel. Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. “Lack of jurisdiction of
the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, by acquiescence, or
even by express consent of the parties.”
Facts:
This case involves the proper invocation of the Construction Industry Arbitration
Committee’s (CIAC) jurisdiction through an arbitration clause in a construction contract. The main
issue here is whether the dispute — liability of a surety under a performance bond — is connected to
a construction contract and, therefore, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIAC. Spouses
Rune and Lea Stroem (Spouses Stroem) entered into an Owners-Contractor Agreement with Asis-
Leif & Company, Inc. (Asis-Leif) for the construction of a two-storey house on the lot owned by
Spouses Stroem. The lot was located at Lot 4A, Block 24, Don Celso Tuason Street, Valley Golf
Subdivision, Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal.
On November 15, 1999, pursuant to the agreement, Asis-Leif secured Performance Bond No.
LP/G(13)83056 in the amount of P4,500,000.00 from Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc.
(Stronghold). Stronghold and Asis-Leif, through Ms. Ma. Cynthia Asis-Leif, bound themselves
jointly and severally to pay the Spouses Stroem the agreed amount in the event that the construction
project is not completed. Asis-Leif failed to finish the project on time despite repeated demands of
the Spouses Stroem. wrSpouses Stroem subsequently rescinded the agreement. They then hired an
independent appraiser to evaluate the progress of the construction project.
Issue:
Whether the CIAC has exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties
Ruling:
Generally, parties may not raise issues for the first time on appeal. Such practice is violative
of the rules and due process and is frowned upon by the courts. However, it is also well-settled that
jurisdiction can never be waived or acquired by estoppel. Jurisdiction is conferred by the
Constitution or by law. “Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an
action cannot be cured by the silence, by acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties.”
This court has ruled that when a dispute arises from a construction contract, the CIAC has exclusive
and original jurisdiction. Construction has been defined as referring to “all on-site works on
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buildings or altering structures, from land clearance through completion including excavation,
erection and assembly and installation of components and equipment.”
In this case, there is no dispute as to whether the Owners-Contractor Agreement between

Asis-Leif and respondents is a construction contract. Petitioner and respondents recognize that
CIAC has jurisdiction over disputes arising from the agreement.
Petitioner is also guilty of forum shopping. There is forum shopping when: as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari)
in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in
connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending.
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THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.
MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to
take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in
the petition.
Facts:
Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is represented in this petition
by its Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is also filing this petition
in his individual and personal capacity as the questioned orders are personally directed at him and
also as a concerned citizen, as the issues raised herein are matters of paramount and transcendental
importance to the public which must be settled early given the far-reaching implications of the
unconstitutional acts of the respondents. Named as respondents are the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and its Election Officer of Bacolod City Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon.
On 21 February 2013, the petitioners have caused to be placed on the front wall of the
Bacolod Cathedral two sets of Tarpaulin, each sized 6×10 feet, with the message Conscience Vote
(Team Buhay/Team Patay (Team Patay Tarpaulin). The Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the names
of both Anti- and Pro-Reproductive Health Law senatorial candidates. In their special civil action for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners sought the nullification of
the 22 February 2013 order issued by respondent Atty. Majarucon, which orders them to remove the
supposed oversized Team Patay Tarpaulin of the Diocese of Bacolod. They also sought to nullify the
27 February 2013 order issued by the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which orders the
immediate removal of the Team Patay Tarpaulin and threatening the petitioner Bishop of Bacolod
with the filing of an election offense if he fails to cause its immediate removal.
On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from removing the Team Patay
Tarpaulin.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine and jurisprudential rules
governing appeals from COMELEC decisions;
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(b) Assuming arguendo that the aforementioned Orders are not considered judgments/final
orders/resolutions of the COMELEC, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would
allow this Court to take cognizance of the case.
Ruling:
No. The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now
affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy
is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental
and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or
when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.64
In Bañez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, citing Vergara v. Suelto:
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance.
Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefore. Hence,
that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the
Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts
for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance
of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement
must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that
courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that
every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial
courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them.
They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution.67 To effectively
perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their
writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-
important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them.
In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the
‘actual case’ that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to
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courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before
the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the
determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures
more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has
original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a
nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues
that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further
reiterating — in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar —
existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court
of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role. In
other words, the Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in
respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for
certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of
the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we
have provided exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality
that must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of
the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative
and executive branches of the government.
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to
freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The case before
this court involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This
has become a rare occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse. To
quote an eminent political theorist:
The theory of freedom of expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better
social judgments through democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a
whole way of life. The theory grew out of an age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of
new society in which man's mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason, and his
prospects of creating a rational and enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as
a prescription for attaining a creative, progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It
contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative,
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will allow man to realize his full potentialities.It spurns the alternative of a society that is tyrannical,
conformist, irrational and stagnant.
In a democracy, the citizen’s right to freely participate in the exchange of ideas in

furtherance of political decision-making is recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts
may provide, as public participation in nation-building is a fundamental principle in our
Constitution. As such, their right to engage in free expression of ideas must be given immediate
protection by this court.
A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance.74 In these
cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the
necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance
prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for
substantial protection.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of
speech and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles
laid down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future,
especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for
one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope
of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily
includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental constitutional
rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first
impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In
Government of the United States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of
first impression that may guide the lower courts:
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of
whether the right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which
this court has yet to provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this
court is allowed.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court in Drilon v. Lim, to
wit;
. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the
higher judgmentof this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined
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after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority
of those who participated in its discussion.
In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule
with finality on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary
to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during
the 2013 election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be
filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an
exception for direct resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a
constitutional body. In Albano v. Arranz, cited by petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to
realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to
arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on
Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence. In this case, if
petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower
courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents
may place in the same situation. Besides, this court affords great respect to the Constitution and the
powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best
interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression. In this case, the repercussions of the assailed
issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally compelling reason to justify the direct resort
to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to
allow direct resort to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy." In the past, questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately
despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens’ right to bear arms, government
contracts involving modernization of voters’ registration lists, and the status and existence of a
public office.This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to
this court is permitted.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to
justify a direct resort to this court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present
case falls under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.
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FLOR G. DAYO, Petitioner, VS. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR NAFTO

TRADE SHIPPING COMMERCIAL S.A., Respondents.
G.R. No. 210660, January 21, 2015, LEONEN J.
In deciding a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Court of Appeals Decision in a Rule 65
Petition for Certiorari, this court is limited to determining whether the Court of Appeals was correct in
establishing the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion.
Facts:
Eduardo P. Dayo (Eduardo) was hired by Status Maritime Corporation for and on behalf of
Nafto Trade Shipping Commercial S.A. He was hired as a bosun on board the “MV Naftocement 1”
for a period of 10 months, with a monthly salary of US$500.00. Prior to embarkation, he underwent
a pre-employment medical examination and was declared fit to work. Eduardo embarked on June 8,
2008. On September 5, 2008, he “experienced severe pain on his hips and both knees, and total body
weakness.” He was given medical attention in Bridgetown, Barbados, where he was diagnosed with
hypertension. He was repatriated on September 7, 2008.
The next day, Eduardo went to Status Maritime Corporation’s office, but he was informed
that it was waiting for Nafto Trade Shipping Commercial S.A.’s notification. He was also told that
he could seek medical attention and that his expenses would be reimbursed. On September 9, 2008,
he went to the Lucena United Doctors Hospital. Dr. Olitoquit, Eduardo’s private physician, found
the results of his 2D echocardiogram as normal. Eduardo repeatedly requested for medical
assistance, but it was only in November 2008 when he was referred to a company-designated
physician. Dr. Bolanos of the Metropolitan Hospital diagnosed him with diabetes mellitus. Status
Maritime Corporation stopped giving Eduardo medical assistance in February 2009. He died on
June 11, 2009 due to cardiopulmonary arrest. Flor G. Dayo (Flor), Eduardo’s wife, requested for
death benefits to no avail. Thus, she filed a complaint.
On the other hand, Status Maritime Corporation alleges that Eduardo was examined by the
company-designated physician on September 24, 2008. His medical history showed that he had
been suffering from diabetes mellitus and hypertension since the 1990s. He underwent an
electromyography and nerve conduction velocity (EMG-NCV) testing, and the results showed that
he had diffused “sensimotor polyneuropathy as seen in diabetes mellitus. He was also examined by
a neurologist and an orthopedic surgeon. The company-designated physician noted that the illness
was pre-existing.
In January 2009, the company-designated physician assessed that Eduardo’s polyneuropathy

secondary to diabetes mellitus was not work-related.
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The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Flor and awarded death benefits, burial expenses, and
attorney’s fees.
Status Maritime Corporation appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. In the
Decision dated September 30, 2010, the National Labor Relations Commission First Division
reversed the Labor Arbiter’s. Flor filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the
National Labor Relations Commission in the Resolution dated December 30, 2010. She then filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, arguing that her husband died from a work-
related illness, thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the National Labor Relations Commission to
reverse the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, ruling that since
Eduardo died after the term of his contract with Status Maritime Corporation, “his beneficiaries are
not entitled to the death benefits[.]”
Eduardo died after the term of his contract with Status Maritime Corporation. It was clear
then that his beneficiaries were not entitled to death benefits. In addition, the Court of Appeals held
that Flor failed to substantiate her allegation that Eduardo’s illness and cause of death were work-
related. Flor moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision that was denied in the
Resolution.
Petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, arguing that the Court of Appeals
erred in denying her Petition, considering that Eduardo’s death was brought about by a work-
related illness. In deciding a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Court of Appeals Decision
in a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, this court is limited to determining whether the Court of Appeals
was correct in establishing the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the National Labor Relations Commission when it denied petitioner Flor G. Dayo’s claim
for death benefits.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals found that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
National Labor Relations Commission when it denied the claim for death benefits since Eduardo
died after the term of his contract.
While this may be the theory pursued in practice, substantive law still allows recovery of
damages for injuries suffered by the seafarer as a result of a tortious violation on the part of the
employer. This may be on the basis of the provisions of the Civil Code as well as special
laws. These special laws may relate, among others, to environmental regulations and requirements
to ensure the reduction of risks to occupational hazards both for the seafarer and the public in
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general. In such cases, the process for recovery should not be constrained by contract. However,
petitioner did not allege facts that would sway this court to grant the Petition. She did not present
evidence to show how Eduardo’s diabetes mellitus was aggravated by his work and how his illness
caused his death. On the contrary, petitioner’s allegations further convinced this court that the
Court of Appeals did not err in its Decision.
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RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015, LEONEN J.
The variance doctrine cannot be applied in this case. No variance exists between what was charged
and what was proven during trial since the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the
crime of rape through sexual assault.
Facts
The Provincial Prosecutor of Biñan, Laguna filed an Information charging Ricalde of rape
through sexual assault. The attending facts are herein narrated:
XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00
p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years old,is a distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old. After
dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late. He slept on the
sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor. It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt
pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus." He saw that Ricalde "fondled his
penis." When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what
happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.
XXX’s mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to
report the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station. The police referred them to the municipal health
center for medical examination. Dr. Roy Camarillo examined XXX and found no signs of recent
trauma in his anal orifice23 that was also "NEGATIVE for [s]permatozoa. Thereafter, XXX and his
mother executed their sworn statements at the Sta. Rosa police station, leading to the criminal
complaint filed against Ricalde. Ricalde denied the accusations.
The Regional Trial Court found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through
sexual assault. This decision was affirmed by the CA.
Ricalde filed this Petition praying for his acquittal.
Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the medico-legal
testified that he found "no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma [in XXX’s] anus," or any
trace of spermatozoa. He contends that physical evidence "ranks high in [the court’s] hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence." Second, XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal
orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice. XXX was also able to
immediately push him away.41 Thus, no push and pull movement happened that would explain
XXX’s alleged stomach ache.
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Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should have applied
the "variance doctrine" in People v. Sumingwa, and the court would have found him guilty for the
lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue
Whether the variance doctrine can be applied in this case
Ruling
No. Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
for the "variance doctrine":
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with qualified
rape but was convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness committed against a child
under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 since "there was no penetration, or even an
attempt to insert [the accused’s] penis into [the victim’s] vagina."
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven
during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape
through sexual assault. XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus."The
slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of
rape.
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HENRY ONG LAY HIN, Petitioner,  vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2nd Division), HON. GABRIEL
T. INGLES, as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 58, Cebu City, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is the “arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.”
The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even mistakes in the application of
procedural rules. The exception to the rule is “when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the
client of due process of law.”
Facts
Petitioner was convicted of Estafa by the RTC of Cebu City. Upon denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration, he filed a Notice of Appeal and the records of the case was transmitted to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals (hereinafter CA) affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. CA
likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for
raising mere rehashed arguments. CA then issued an Entry of Judgment, declaring that the case
became final and executory on May 15, 2003. The CA based the date of finality on the date of receipt
indicated in the registry return card corresponding to the mail sent to Ong’s former counsel, Zosa &
Quijano Law Offices.
Based on the registry return card, Zosa & Quijano Law Offices received on April 29, 2003 a
copy of the CA Resolution denying Ong’s Motion for Reconsideration. On March 22, 2004, the trial
court received the original records of the case, and in view thereof, then Presiding Judge Gabriel T.
Ingles ordered the arrest of Ong. On February 12, 2010, Ong was arrested in Pasay City. He was
initially ordered committed to the Cebu City Jail but is currently serving his sentence at the New
Bilibid Prison.
Ong filed before this court a Petition for Certiorari alleging that his counsel never received a
copy of the CA Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration hence, it never became final and
executory and the said court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment. Ong
likewise alleged that the trial court judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing a warrant for his
arrest and ordering his commitment to jail. Assuming that his former counsel received a copy of the
CA Resolution, Ong argues that his counsel was grossly negligent in failing to appeal said
resolution. This gross negligence allegedly deprived him of due process and, therefore, should not
bind him. Considering the alleged grave abuse of discretion of CA and the trial court, Ong prays
that this court issue an injunction for him to be freed from jail. In the alternative, he prays that this
court allow him to post bail for his provisional liberty while this court decides the Certiorari.
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In its Comment, the People of the Philippines argues that the registry return card “carries the
presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly performed
[and must be] presumed to be accurate unless proven otherwise.” Even assuming that his former
counsel did not receive a copy of the Resolution, the People argues that this negligence bound Ong
under the rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client. With respect to Ong’s prayer for
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, the People contends that he failed to point
out the specific instances where the lower courts committed grave abuse of discretion. On Ong’s
prayer to be allowed to post bail, the People argues that the grant of bail is premised on the
uncertainty of whether an accused is guilty or innocent. Considering that Ong’s conviction had
already removed this uncertainty, it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit him to bail.
Issues
Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest and
commitment order against Ong
Whether petitioner Ong’s former counsel was grossly negligent
Ruling
There is no grave abuse of discretion in this case
Grave abuse of discretion is the “arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion,
prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law.” The registry return card is the official record evidencing service by mail. It
carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly
performed and that it is presumed to be accurate, unless proven otherwise.
With petitioner failing to rebut this presumption, it must be presumed that his former counsel
received a copy of the Resolution on April 29, 2003 as indicated in the registry return card. The 15-
day period to appeal commenced from this date. Since petitioner did not file an Appeal within 15
days from April 29, 2003, the Decision became final and executory on May 15, 2003. Consequently,
CA did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment, which declared petitioner’s
conviction final and executory on said date.
Under Rule 51, Section 10 of the Rules of Court on Judgment, “if no appeal or motion for
new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final
resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when
the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry.” As for
the trial court, it likewise did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the arrest warrant against
petitioner and ordering his commitment to the Cebu City Jail. Since the CA had already issued the
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Entry of Judgment and had remanded to the trial court the original records of the case, it became the
trial court’s duty to execute the judgment.
The negligence of petitioner’s former counsel bound him
The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even mistakes in the
application of procedural rules. The exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of
the counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply the gross negligence
should not be accompanied by the client’s own negligence or malice, considering that the client has
the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the
case. Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against
him. The agency created between a counsel and a client is a highly fiduciary relationship. A counsel
becomes the eyes and ears in the prosecution or defense of his or her client’s case. Through this
court, we set the standard on competence and integrity through the application requirements and
our disciplinary powers.
In the present case, petitioner took almost seven years from the CA’s issuance of the
Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration to file a Petition before this court. Worse, he was
arrested in Pasay City, not in Cebu where he resides. His failure to know or to find out the real
status of his appeal rendered him undeserving of any sympathy from this Court regarding the
negligence of his former counsel. Wherefore, Petition for Certiorari is dismissed.
173
PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, vs. CELSO E. FUENTES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 169303. February 11, 2015, LEONEN, J
There are exceptions to the general rule that the findings of fact of labor tribunals, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this court. In labor cases, if the petitioner before the Supreme Court can
show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, the assailed Court of
Appeals ruling (in the Rule 65 proceedings) will be reversed.
"Labor officials commit grave abuse of discretion when their factual findings are arrived at arbitrarily
or in disregard of the evidence." If the petitioner can show that "the labor tribunal acted capriciously and
whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy," the factual findings of the National
Labor Relations Commission may be subjected to review and ultimately rejected.
In addition, if the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are in direct conflict with the National Labor
Relations Commission, this court may examine the records of the case and the questioned findings in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction. It is the petitioner's burden to justify the existence of one of the exceptions to
the general rule for this court to conduct a factual review. In this case, we find that petitioner has failed to
discharge this burden.
Facts
Celso E. Fuentes (Fuentes) was hired as a security guard by Protective sometime in

November 1999. At the time of Fuentes' employment, Protective assigned him to Picop Resources,
Inc. He was posted to a security checkpoint designated as Post 33 in Upper New Visayas, Agusan
del Sur.
On July 20, 2000, a group of armed persons ransacked Post 33 and took five (5) M-16 rifles,
three (3) carbine rifles, and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, all with live ammunition and
magazines. Agency-issued uniforms and personal items were also taken. These armed persons
inflicted violence upon Fuentes and the other security guards present at Post 33. On the same day of
the incident, Fuentes and his fellow security guards reported the raid to the Philippine National
Police in Trento, Agusan del Sur. When asked by the police, Fuentes reported that he and the other
security guards assigned to Post 33 were accosted at gunpoint by the New People's Army. After its
initial investigation, the Philippine National Police found reason to believe that Fuentes conspired
and acted in consort with the New People's Army.
On July 24, 2000, the Philippine National Police filed the Complaint for robbery committed
by a band against Fuentes. Immediately upon the filing of the Complaint, Fuentes was detained at
the Mangagoy Police Sub-Station.
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On August 15, 2001, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Sur issued the
Resolution dismissing the Complaint against Fuentes. It found during preliminary investigation that
there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of an Information against Fuentes.
On March 14, 2002, Fuentes filed the Complaint "for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
salaries, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month pay, service incentive
leave and damages against Protective in the National Labor Relations Commission Regional
Arbitration Branch XIII in Butuan City. In his Position Paper, Fuentes claimed that "right after the
criminal complaint for robbery against him was dismissed he demanded to return to work but he
was refused entry by a certain Mr.Espinosa on the ground that Fuentes was a member of the NPA.
On the other hand, Protective claims that as was usual and routine, Fuentes should have
reported to his Team Leader since the incident of July 20, 2000, private respondent has not yet
reported to his Team Leader or to any of the officers of Protective. Executive Labor Arbiter Legaspi
rendered his Decision in favor of Protective.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Decision of Labor Arbiter
Legaspi and found that Fuentes was illegally dismissed. Protective filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor
Relations Commission. Protective asserted that the evidence and the records showed that Fuentes
was never dismissed because he had been missing until the day he filed the Complaint with the
Labor Arbiter.
Hence, it was physically and legally impossible for petitioner to terminate, constructive,
illegal or otherwise, the services of private respondent since the procedure for such an action have
not been initiated. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition. It held that Protective failed to
discharge its burden to prove a just cause for dismissal.
Petitioner stated that, by analogy, the Labor Arbiter's findings are akin to those of a trial
judge. Thus, pursuant to this court's ratio decidendi in People v. Valla, "the trial judge's evaluation
of the testimony of a witness is generally accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality,
unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood but which could change the
result." Further, petitioner contended that contrary to the findings of the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Court of Appeals, there was no specific last known address where petitioner
could have provided a written notice to respondent. Petitioner argues that the purported last
address of respondent is "in Sta. Josefa, Trento, Agusan del Sur." The insufficiency of the address
rendered it impossible for petitioner to provide notice to respondent. Thus, respondent's right to
procedural due process was not violated.
For respondent, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the National Labor Relations
Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Respondent asserts that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in affirming the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission.
He raises that the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals correctly found
175
that he did not abandon his job. For respondent, the twin requirements of substantive and
procedural due process were not observed by petitioner. He asserts that the National Labor
Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals correctly found that mere allegations of "simply
disappearing" and failure to report to the team leader cannot justify the violation of his substantive
and procedural due process rights. Respondent asserts that his, dismissal from service was clearly
illegal.
Issues
I. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the findings of Labor Arbiter Legaspi;
II. Whether respondent's right to substantive and procedural due process was violated.
Ruling
I.
This Petition must be denied. The National Labor Relations Commission has the power to
overturn the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter. The National Labor Relations Commission is not
bound by the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Article 223 of the Labor Code reads:
Article 223. Appeal. — Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only
on any of the following grounds:
1. If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
2. If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
3. If made purely on questions of law; and
4. If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable
damage or injury to the appellant.
Article 223 provides that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is final and executory, unless
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission within ten (10) calendar days by any or both
of the parties. The Labor Code vests in the National Labor Relations Commission the authority to
reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter, provided that the appellant can prove the existence of one
of the grounds in Article 223. The errors in the findings of fact that will justify a modification or
reversal of the Labor Arbiter's decision must be "serious" and, if left uncorrected, would lead to
"grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant."
176
Serious errors refer to inferences of facts without evidence, or mistakes in the interpretation
of the evidence that border on arbitrariness or similar circumstances. Not only must the error be
palpable, but there must also be a showing that such error would cause grave and irreparable injury
to the appellant. It should affect the disposition of the cause of the appellant. The error must impact
on the main issues and not some tangential matter. Evidently, a showing of bias on the part of the
Labor Arbiter or a lack of due regard for the procedural rights of the parties are indicia that serious
errors may be present.
In this case, the National Labor Relations Commission decided that there was a serious error in the
factual findings of Labor Arbiter Legaspi. The National Labor Relations Commission found that
petitioner's claims that respondent consorted with the New People's Army and committed robbery
on July 20, 2000 "were never substantiated at all[.]" In fact, the Complaint for robbery against
respondent was dismissed after preliminary investigation. Thus, the National Labor Relations
Commission found that the refusal to admit respondent to work based on the latter's alleged
conspiracy with the New People's Army during the July 20, 2000 incident had no basis.
II
This court's power to decide a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, particularly in labor
cases, has its limits. Petitioner prays that this court reverse the findings of fact of the National Labor
Relations Commission, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, this court established
the proper mode of appeal in labor cases:
[O]n this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases
being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to
remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that
the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased
number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for
expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from
the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in
the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
In Bani Rural Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman, this court discussed the primary issues to be
addressed in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari in labor cases. In question form, the question
177
to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling on the case?
This manner of review was reiterated in Holy Child Catholic School v. Hon. Patricia Sto.
Tomas, etc., et al., where the Court limited its review under Rule 45 of the CA's decision in a labor
case to the determination of whether the CA correctly resolved the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion in the decision of the Secretary of Labor, and not on the basis of whether the
latter's decision on the merits of the case was strictly correct.
Grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, has been defined as
the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to or equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
There is grave abuse of discretion when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of "passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law." Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that
has expertise in its specialized field. Nor do we substitute our "own judgment for that of the tribunal
in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible." The factual findings
of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.
Applying these cases, the general rule is that in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari,
this court will not review the factual determination of the administrative bodies governing labor, as
well as the findings of fact by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals can conduct its own
factual determination to ascertain whether the National Labor Relations Commission has committed
grave abuse of discretion. "In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again."
There are exceptions to the general rule that the findings of fact of labor tribunals, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this court.
In labor cases, if the petitioner before this court can show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the National Labor Relations Commission, the assailed Court of Appeals ruling (in the Rule
65 proceedings) will be reversed. "Labor officials commit grave abuse of discretion when their
factual findings are arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence." If the petitioner can show
that "the [labor] tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence
material to the controversy," the factual findings of the National Labor Relations Commission may
be subjected to review and ultimately rejected.
In addition, if the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are in direct conflict with the National
Labor Relations Commission, this court may examine the records of the case and the questioned
findings in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
178
It is the petitioner's burden to justify the existence of one of the exceptions to the general rule
for this court to conduct a factual review. In this case, we find that petitioner has failed to discharge
this burden.
Respondent's right to procedural due process was not observed. In this case, petitioner
violated respondent's right to procedural due process. The two-notice requirement was not
followed. Petitioner sought to excuse itself by claiming that there was no address where the proper
notice could have been served. However, petitioner admitted before the Court of Appeals that
"respondent's last known address was given to the investigating court by Police Inspector Escartin.
There was no attempt from petitioner to serve the proper notice on respondent at the
address contained in its employment records. Respondent was replaced without being given an
opportunity to explain his absence. Petitioner has violated respondent's right to security of tenure, as
well as his right to procedural due process. For these violations, petitioner must be held accountable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
179
ANGELITA CRUZ BENITO, Petitioner, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 204644, February 11, 2015, LEONEN, J.
Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for
Review on Certiorari:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for
a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Facts
In the Information dated October 28, 1994, Rebecca Agbulos (Agbulos) and Angelita Cruz
Benito (Benito) were charged with estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised
Penal Code.
That in or about the period comprised from June 8, 1994 up to August 3, 1994, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud DORIE CRUZ-
ABADILLA in the following manner, to wit:
Assorted pieces of jewelry in the amount of P2,070,300.00, Philippine Currency, for the
purpose of selling the same on commission basis, under the express obligation on the part of
said accused of turning over the proceeds of the sale to said DORIS CRUZ-ABADILLA if
sold, or of returning the same if unsold to said complainant, but the said accused, once in
possession of the said items, far from complying with their obligation as aforesaid, with
intent to defraud, unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence, failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to fulfill their aforesaid obligation despite repeated demands made upon
them to do so and instead misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same or the value
thereof, to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said DORIE
CRUZ-ABADILLA in the aforesaid amount of P2,070,300.00, Philippine Currency.
Issue
Whether or not the court should deny Benito's Petition for Review on Certiorari.
180
Ruling
The judgments of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are based on a
misapprehension of facts.
Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies
and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may
seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding
at any time during its pendency.
Despite Benito raising questions of fact in her Petition for Review on Certiorari, the court
nevertheless take cognizance of her Petition. The trial court and Court of Appeals misapprehended
the facts of this case.
181
ZENAIDA PAZ, Petitioner vs. NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING CO., INC., AND/OR
ANGELO ANG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 199554, February 18, 2015, LEONEN, J.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court can raise only questions of law. Generally, this court accords great
respect for factual findings by quasi-judicial bodies, even according such findings with finality when supported
by substantial evidence.
Facts
Zenaida Paz filed this Petition[1] praying that "the computation of Petitioner's Retirement
Pay as determined by the National Labor Relations Commission in its Decision dated 08 December
2008 be reinstated." On May 18, 2003, Paz was 63 years old when NTRCI informed her that she was
considered retired under company policy. A year later, NTRCI told her she would receive P12,000.00
as retirement pay.
Paz, with two other complainants, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against NTRCI on
March 4, 2004. She amended her Complaint on April 27, 2004 into a Complaint for payment of
retirement benefits, damages, and attorney's fees[10] as P12,000.00 seemed inadequate for her 29
years of service. NTRCI countered that no Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existed between
NTRCI and its workers. Thus, it computed the retirement pay of its seasonal workers based on
Article 287 of the Labor Code. NTRCI raised the requirement of at least six months of service a year
for that year to be considered in the retirement pay computation.
The Labor Arbiter in his Decision dated July 26, 2005 confirmed that the correct retirement
pay of Zenaida M. Paz. The National Labor Relations Commission in its Decision dated December 8,
2008 modified the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It likewise denied reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated May 25, 2011 dismissed the Petition and modified the National Labor
Relations Commission's Decision in that "financial assistance is awarded to Zenaida Paz in the
amount of P60,356.25"
Since the exact number of days petitioner Paz would have worked between May 18, 2003
until she would turn 65 in 2005 could not be determined with specificity, this court thus awards full
backwages in the amount of P22,200.00 computed by multiplying P185.00 by 20 days, then by... three
months, then by two years.
There was no showing that respondent NTRCI complied with these due process
requisites. Thus, consistent with jurisprudence, petitioner Paz should be awarded P30,000.00 as
nominal damages.
182
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct
Ruling
Yes. Petitions for review pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court can raise only questions of
law. Generally, this court accords great respect for factual findings by quasi-judicial bodies, even
according such findings with finality when supported by substantial evidence.
The Court of Appeals found "no positive proof of the total number of months [petitioner
Paz] actually rendered work [for respondent NTRCI]." On the other hand, both the Labor Arbiter
and the Court of Appeals established from the records that she rendered at least six months of
service for 1995, 1999, and 2000 only. Based on these factual findings, retirement pay pursuant to
Article 287 of the Labor Code was correctly computed at 12,487.50 and was awarded to petitioner
Paz.
183
NILO MACAYAN, JR. Y MALANA, Petitioner, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.
G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015, LEONEN, J.:
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the requisite quantum of evidence in
criminal cases:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such
a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
In criminal cases, the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused. Ei
incumbit probatio non qui negat. He who asserts — not he who denies — must prove. The burden must be
discharged by the prosecution on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of that for the defense.
Hence, circumstantial evidence that has not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot be the
basis of conviction. Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Indeed, "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without
rudder or compass."
It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the
court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Where
there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even though their innocence may be
questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts
In the Information dated February 20, 2001, Macayan was charged with robbery as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of February 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to gain and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob / divest one ANNIE UY JAO of the amount of
P4,000.00 in cash in the manner as follows: on the date and in the place afore-mentioned,
said accused threatened complainant that he would destroy her and her entire family and
that he will have her and members of her family kidnapped unless she gives to him the
amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency and thereafter negotiated with said Annie Uy
Jao at McDonald's located at Quezon Avenue, this City, thus creating fear in the mind of said
complainant who was compelled to give as in fact she gave and delivered to the accused the
amount of P4,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Annie Uy Jao
in the amount aforementioned.
184
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-98670 and raffled to Branch 101 of the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City. During trial, the prosecution presented as it witnesses: Annie Uy
Jao, the private complainant; Rodrigo Mapoy, team leader of the NBI operatives who conducted the
supposed entrapment operation that led to Macayan's arrest; and Resurreccion R. Bajado, a forensic
chemist. Macayan was the sole witness for the defense. Annie Uy Jao (Jao) is the owner of Lanero
Garments Ext (Lanero). In 1995, she hired Macayan as a sample cutter and to undertake materials
purchasing for her garments business.
In her testimony, Jao acknowledged that in 2000, when her business was doing poorly, she
allowed her employees to accept engagements elsewhere to augment their income, provided they
prioritize their work at Lanero. It came to her attention that Macayan and his wife (also an employee
at Lanero) accepted work for a rival company. Thus, Jao confronted Macayan to impress upon him
the need to prioritize work at Lanero. Macayan still took his work at Lanero for granted, so Jao
confronted him again. In this confrontation, Macayan allegedly responded, "Kung gusto mo,
bayaran mo na long ako at aalis ako." Macayan then stopped reporting for work.
Following this, Jao was surprised to find out that Macayan had filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal against her (docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-09-05057-00). Several conferences were
set for this illegal dismissal case. Immediately after the postponement of the conference on February
12, 2001, Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that her family would be harmed and/or kidnapped if
she did not give him P200,000.00. Marjorie Angel (Angel), Jao's secretary, was supposedly present
when she was threatened. The following day, Macayan allegedly called Jao to reiterate his threat and
to specify the time and place — February 16, 2001, sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. at
McDonald's Banawe Branch — in which the P200,000.00 should be handed to him. Jao claimed that
she was sure it was Macayan speaking to her, as the person on the phone addressed her as
"Madam," which was how he customarily called her.
Fearing for her family's safety, Jao sought assistance from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). She asked that an entrapment operation be set up. The NBI operatives asked her
to prepare bills totalling P4,000.00 to be marked and used in the operation. On February 16, 2001,
Jao, Angel, and the NBI operatives arrived at McDonald's Banawe. They stayed there for about 30
minutes before Macayan called Angel and told her that they were to meet at McDonald's Quezon
Avenue instead. They arrived there at about 7:30 p.m. Macayan called Angel again and told her that
he was moving the venue to McDonald's EDS A. They then proceeded to McDonald's EDS A and
waited for Macayan, while the NBI operatives waited outside. Macayan arrived and proceeded to
where Jao and Angel were seated. Jao handed him an envelope containing the marked
bills. Macayan pulled the bills halfway out of the envelope, and the NBI operatives accosted him.
185
Prosecution witness Rodrigo Mapoy, team leader of the NBI operatives who
arrested Macayan, testified to the circumstances before and the conduct of the entrapment operation.
The testimony of forensic chemist Resurreccion R. Bajado regarding the marked bills handed
to Macayan was subject of a joint stipulation by the prosecution and the defense.
Macayan, testifying for himself, emphasized that he enjoyed a relatively trouble-free

employment with Lanero. However, sometime in 1999, after his wife gave birth to their first child,
he discovered that Jao had not been remitting required premiums to the Social Security System. On
August 18, 2000, as his child was confined in a hospital, Macayan inquired with Jao regarding his
Medicare benefits. This displeased Jao. The following day, she prevented him from performing his
tasks at work. Construing this as harassment, he stopped reporting for work.
Thereafter, Macayan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Jao. In the course of the
proceedings for this illegal dismissal case, no less than 11 conferences/hearings were set. As
evidenced by these conferences' minutes or constancias, at no instance did Jao ever attend, as it was
either her legal counsel or Angel who did so. Macayan recalled that in one of these conferences, he
expressed to Angel his willingness to settle the case for P40,000.00.
On February 16, 2001, at about 9:00 a.m., Angel called Macayan. She told him that Jao was
ready to settle the illegal dismissal case. She added that Jao wanted to pay him already, as Jao was
leaving for Hong Kong. Angel set a rendezvous later in the day at McDonald's Banawe. At about
11:00 a.m., Angel called him again, resetting the rendezvous to McDonald's EDSA. She even
reasoned that this venue was more convenient for her since she was going home to Zambales.
Macayan arrived at the agreed venue at about 9:00 p.m. He saw Angel standing outside
McDonald's. He approached Angel, who then accompanied him inside and led him to a four-seat
corner table. He was surprised to see Jao present. Jao then brought out of her bag a piece of paper
indicating that Macayan received the settlement amount for the illegal dismissal
case. Macayan signed this as he was of the understanding that this was necessary to the settlement.
Jao then pulled out a white envelope, handed it to Macayan, and told him to count its contents.
While counting the contents, a flash bulb went on somewhere to his right. Then, a man who claimed
to be an NBI operative struck a blow on the right side of Macayan's face and told him, "Tatanga-
tanga ka. Pupunta ka rito ng walang kasama, ikaw ngayon ang me[sic] kaso."
Handcuffed, he was taken aboard a minivan and physically abused. He was taken to several
police stations in the hope that an inquest fiscal was available. It was only at 10:00 a.m. of the
following day that an inquest fiscal, Prosecutor Hilda Ibuyan, became available. The Information
charging him with robbery dated February 20, 2001 was then prepared, and the criminal case was
filed in RTC of Quezon City.
In the meantime, on October 31, 2001, the illegal dismissal case was decided in Macayan's
favor by Labor Arbiter Daisy G. Cauton-Barcelona. A total of P186,632.00 was awarded to him. On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission would find that Macayan was entitled to unpaid
186
benefits though he was legally dismissed. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals with modification as to the applicable rate of
interest. After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City rendered the
Decision convicting Macayan of robbery. The trial court found the prosecution's version of events
"from the time of the telephone overtures of the Accused which is consistent with the elements of
intimidation and/or extortion, up to complainant Annie Uy Jao's reporting the matter to the NBI, to
the time of the NBI entrapment" as "ring[ing] a loud bell of truth and consistency, not to say
credibility." It accorded the presumption of regularity to the entrapment operation and held that the
forensic findings connecting the marked money to Macayan militated against his defense.
Macayan then appealed to the Court of Appeals. He filed his Appellant's Brief on August 25, 2004.
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines at the appellate
stage, did not file an appellee's brief. Instead, it filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Appellee's Brief recommending that Macayan be acquitted. It asserted that his guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Noting that Jao was never present in any of the conferences for the illegal dismissal case and
that the sole witness who could confirm if she was indeed threatened or intimidated on or
immediately after such an occasion (i.e., Angel) was never presented, the Office of the Solicitor
General asserted that the fourth requisite of the offense of robbery (i.e., violence against or
intimidation of a person) could not have been made by Macayan on the occasion of a conference for
the illegal dismissal case. It added that the other occasion when Macayan was supposed to have
threatened Jao was equally dubious since Jao's sole reason for claiming that it
was Macayan speaking to her (i.e., her having been addressed as "Madam") was insufficient to
ascertain that person's identity.
On July 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division rendered the assailed Decision
affirming Macayan's conviction and increasing the duration of the penalty imposed. It reasoned that
Jao's sole, uncorroborated testimony was nevertheless positive and credible. As regards Jao's having
been threatened after the postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal
case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that constancias are "not the best evidence of attendance" and
that, in any case, Jao was threatened after and not during the conference.
On December 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division rendered the
Resolution denying Macayan's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition was filed.
Asked by this court to file a Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General instead filed a
Manifestation and Motion to adopt as its Comment the same Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Appellee's Brief that it filed with the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General
reiterated its position that Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt has not been established and
that he must be acquitted.
187
Issue
Whether Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been established.
Ruling
The Court reversed the Decision of the Court of Appeals and acquit
petitioner Nilo Macayan, Jr. of the charge of robbery.
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the requisite quantum of
evidence in criminal cases:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind.
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying
on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused.
Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause[of the
Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden
upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of
course, that an accused must be acquitted. As explained in People v. Ganguso:
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This
reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which
protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence
in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is
responsible for the offense charged.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not
on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the
prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence. The
188
determination of the guilt of an accused hinges on how a court appreciates evidentiary matters in
relation to the requisites of an offense. Determination of guilt is, thus, a fundamentally factual issue.
Here, Macayan asserts that the lower courts committed a serious misapprehension of facts,
thereby wrongly concluding that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution falls seriously short of the quantum of evidence required to convict him.
He specifically draws attention to the following:
First, Jao's claim that, immediately after the postponement of the February 12, 2001
conference in the illegal dismissal case and in the presence of Angel, Macayan threatened to harm
and/or kidnap the members of her family, despite the records in the same case showing that Jao
never attended any of the 11 conferences that were set or conducted;
Second, the prosecution's unjustified failure to present Angel as a witness and its sole
reliance on Jao's testimony, considering that it was Angel who can confirm if,
indeed, Macayan threatened Jao's family immediately after the postponement of the February 12,
2001 conference;
Third, Jao's reliance on nothing more than how she was addressed as "Madam" by the
person speaking to her on the phone as basis for concluding that it must have been Macayan who
was supposedly calling and threatening her and her family;
Fourth, the inconsistency and absurdity of Jao's conduct in considering Macayan's threats of
such serious nature that she needed to report it to the National Bureau of Investigation for the
prospective conduct of an entrapment operation, and yet not telling her husband about the threats
simply because he would easily get annoyed; and
Lastly, the inconsistent claims of Jao and prosecution witness Rodrigo Mapoy, the NBI
operations team leader, as to who Macayan called on the evening of February 16, 2001 to reset the
rendezvous to McDonald's EDS A. Jao claimed that Macayan called Angel, while Rodrigo Mapoy
claimed that Macayan called Jao herself.
Macayan's position is buttressed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the public institution
otherwise charged with the task of pursuing the prosecution's case on appeal. As the Office of the
Solicitor General stated:
In the instant case, however, clues of untruthfulness in the testimony of Annie Uy Jao are
abundant while incentives for fabrication of a story [are] not wanting. The only way to
eliminate any doubt in Annie Uy Jao's assertions would have been to find independent
confirmation from the other sources, as by way of unambiguous testimony of a competent
and credible witness. Sadly, no such confirmation could be had as the prosecution's evidence
on the most crucial elements of the crime was limited to that testified on by Annie Uy Jao.
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It is respectfully submitted that had the trial court seen and understood these realities laid
on clearly in the records of this case, it would have concluded reasonable doubt as to acquit
appellant.
The position taken by the Office of the Solicitor General has resulted in the peculiar situation
where it is not the prosecution but, effectively, the trial court and the Court of Appeals arguing
for Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
With the backdrop of these assertions, we deem it proper to reevaluate the factual findings
and the conclusions reached by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Consistent with the rule on burden of proof, the requisite quantum of evidence in criminal
cases, and in light of the points highlighted by both Macayan and the Office of the Solicitor General,
we find that the prosecution failed to establish Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, a
reversal of the rulings of the trial court and Court of Appeals is in order. Macayan must be
acquitted.
As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the resolution of this case
hinges on whether Jao was indeed threatened and/or intimidated by Macayan into giving him
money, that is, whether he extorted money from Jao. Per Jao's own testimony, there were two (2)
instances in which she was threatened and/or intimidated: first, immediately after the
postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal case; and second,
when Macayan called her on February 13, 2001 and set a rendezvous for handing over the extorted
money.
Contrary to the conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we find Jao's
testimony regarding these occasions (and ultimately, the presence of the requisite of violence against
or intimidation of a person) dubious and unreliable.
Macayan and the Office of the Solicitor General are one in pointing out that the records of
NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-09-05057-00 are bereft of any indication that Jao was present in any of the
11 conferences held or set (only to be postponed even if both parties were represented). The defense
introduced as its Exhibits "2" to "12" the minutes and/or constancias of these conferences. Exhibit "2"
was the minutes/constancia of the February 12, 2001 conference. During his
testimony, Macayan specifically referred to this document as proof that he never saw, met, or spoke
to Jao on the occasion of or immediately after the conference set on that date
Jao's absence in the intended conference (though subsequently postponed despite both parties to the
illegal dismissal case being represented) places serious doubt on the occurrence of the supposed first
instance of intimidation on February 12, 2001.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that a constancia "would not be the best evidence of
attendance in any of the National Labor Relations Commission hearings." It added that, in any case,
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the act of intimidation happened after, and not during, the conference. This is a strained £
consideration of the facts of this case.
First, consistent with the presumption "[t]hat official duty has been regularly performed"and
"[t]hat a person takes ordinary care of his concerns," both the personnel of the Labor Arbiter's office
who prepared the minutes of the February 12, 2001 conference and the persons who signed it must
be considered as having taken the necessary care to make it a faithful and accurate record of what
transpired and of who were present in the conference. Thus, the minutes' indication that only Angel
was present should be taken as accurate and reliable absent any proof to the contrary. If the
principal, Jao, were present, there would not have been a need for Angel, her representative, to sign
in such capacity.
Second, much is made of how the threats were delivered after and not during the
conference. To recall the prosecution's allegation, the intimidation took place immediately after the
conference, outside the Labor Arbiter's office, along the corridor of the National Labor Relations
Commission Building.[52] As there was neither an appreciable duration of time between the
conference and the subsequent threatening exchange nor a significant distance between where the
conference was held and where the subsequent threatening exchange took place, it may be deduced
that whatever exchange, if any, that transpired must have been between those who were present at
the conference. Conversely, those who were absent from the conference must have been equally
unavailable to engage in an exchange with Macayan.
Apart from these, that the rest of the minutes of the illegal dismissal case shows that Jao
never attended any conference gives rise to the question of why she chose to be personally present
in, of all conferences, the postponed February 12 conference. If, indeed, she was present in this
despite her absence in all others, some particular significance must have characterized this
conference, something that Jao has not accounted for. In any case, if there was any particular
significance to this February 12 conference, then, all the more, her presence or attendance should
have been indicated in the records.
Of course, many explanations — well within the realm of possibility — could be offered for
why Jao's attendance was not indicated in the minutes. For instance, Jao could have simply chosen
to wait outside the Labor Arbiter's office, or she could have declined from having her attendance
specified in the minutes. What is crucial, however, this being a criminal case, is for the prosecution
to establish the guilt of an accused on the strength of its own evidence. Its case must rise on its own
merits. The prosecution carries the burden of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt; it cannot
merely rest on the relative likelihood of its claims. Any lacunae in its case gives rise to doubt as
regards the "fact[s] necessary to constitute the crime with which [an accused] is charged."
Here, there is serious doubt on whether Jao was actually threatened or intimidated at the
time she specified. Thus, there is serious doubt on the existence of the fourth requisite for robbery —
violence against or intimidation of a person — in relation to the alleged February 12, 2001 incident.
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The prosecution could have addressed the deficiency in Jao's allegation that she was
threatened on February 12, 2001 by presenting as witness the other person who was supposedly
present in the incident: Angel, Jao's secretary. However, she was never presented as a witness.
The Court of Appeals noted that corroborative testimony is dispensable; "the lack of it does
not necessarily condemn a lone witness' recital of the crime for as long as that single witness'
testimony is credible."
People of the Philippines v. Cleopas, which the Court of Appeals cited, states that the
testimony of a lone witness "may suffice for conviction if found trustworthy and reliable."
Precisely, conviction resting on a singular testimony is warranted if this is, in the words
of Cleopas, "trustworthy and reliable," or, in the words of the Court of Appeals, "credible." This
could not be said of Jao's testimony. As previously discussed, her very presence in the February 12,
2001 conference that she claimed to have been immediately followed by Macayan's threats, is in
serious doubt. Nothing casts greater doubt on the reliability of Jao's claim than her having not been
at the time and place of the supposed intimidation.
With the first alleged instance of intimidation being discredited, the prosecution is left to rely
on the second supposed instance of intimidation: the phone call made by Macayan to Jao on
February 13, 2001, during which he not only reiterated his threats but also set a rendezvous for the
handover of the extorted money. Even this, however, is doubtful.
The prosecution itself acknowledged that there is no basis for ascertaining the identity
of Macayan as the caller other than the caller's use of "Madam" in addressing Jao
The prosecution should have offered more convincing proof of the identity of the supposed caller.
Even if it were true that Macayancustomarily addressed Jao as "Madam," merely being called this
way by a caller does not ascertain that he is the alleged caller. The prosecution never made an effort
to establish how addressing Jao as "Madam" is a unique trait of Macayan's and Jao's relationship.
Other persons may be equally accustomed to calling her as such; for instance, "Madam" may be Jao's
preferred manner of being addressed by her subordinates or employees. Likewise, it was established
that Macayan and Jao have known each other since 1995. Their relation was more than that of
employer and employee, as Jao was Macayan's godmother in his wedding.
Certainly, Jao could have offered other, more reliable means of ascertaining that it was,
indeed, Macayan with whom she was conversing. The second alleged instance of intimidation is
likewise cast in serious doubt. Left with no other act of intimidation to rely on, the prosecution fails
in establishing the fourth requisite of the crime of robbery.
Apart from these, another point underscores the unreliability of Jao's allegations. As pointed
out by Macayan and acknowledged by the prosecution, Jao never saw it proper to warn her family,
more specifically, her husband, of the threat of being kidnapped. Nevertheless, she supposedly
perceived Macayan's alleged threat as being of such a serious nature that she must not only report
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the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation, but also entreat its officers to conduct an
entrapment operation.
Jurisprudence has established the standard for appreciating the credibility of a witness'
claim:
“[F]or evidence to be believed, however, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve under the circumstances. The test to determine the value of the testimony of a
witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of
mankind. Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial
cognizance.”
Jao's inconsistent conduct, coupled with flimsy justifications for acting as she did, betrays the
absurdity and unreliability of her claims and ultimately, of her as a witness.
The Court of Appeals stated that "the subsequent and contemporaneous actions of the
private complainant from the time the threat was made bolsters the veracity of her story." This
cannot be farther from the truth. On the contrary, inconsistencies and absurdities in Jao's actions cast
serious doubt on the veracity of her claims.
Finally, the trial court made much of how Macayan is supposedly estopped by the joint
stipulation that the prosecution and the defense made as regards the "existence, authenticity, due
execution and contents of [the] NBI Physics Report on the powder dusting/ positive results."
The defense's accession to these is inconsequential. These only prove that Macayan handled
the bills used in the alleged entrapment operation, a fact that he does not dispute. It remains,
however, that they do not establish any certainty as to the circumstances surrounding his handling
of the bills, among these: whether there was, indeed, unlawful taking by Macayan, and whether Jao
did hand him the bills because he extorted them from her.
In sum, the prosecution failed to establish the elements of unlawful taking and of violence
against or intimidation of a person. Reasonable doubt persists. As is settled in jurisprudence, where
the basis of conviction is flawed, this court must acquit an accused:
In criminal cases, the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of
the accused. Ei incumbit probatio non qui negat. He who asserts — not he who denies —
must prove. The burden must be discharged by the prosecution on the strength of its own
evidence, not on the weakness of that for the defense. Hence, circumstantial evidence that
has not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot be the basis of
conviction. Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that
embarks upon it is without rudder or compass."
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It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt
as to their guilt. Where there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even
though their innocence may be questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
With the prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of establishing Macayan's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, this court is constrained, as is its bounden duty when reasonable doubt
persists, to acquit him.
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SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS, Petitioners, vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015, LEONEN, J.
“In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence
of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the
adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the
conclusion proposed by the presenting party.”
Facts
Lucia Paras (Lucia) was a "concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at Kabulihan, Toledo
City[.]" Kimwa is a "construction firm that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers in
Cebu. Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract denominated "Agreement for Supply of Aggregates"
(Agreement) where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa.
Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s permitted area in Toledo City at ₱240.00 per
truckload. Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime
after this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates.
Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia, joined by her husband,
Bonifacio, filed the Complaint for breach of contract with damages that is now subject of this
Petition. Lucia alleged that she emphasized that she would be willing to enter into a contract with
Kimwa "provided the forty thousand cubic meter[s] w[ould] be withdrawn or completely extracted
and hauled before 15 May 1995[.]" Kimwa then assured Lucia that it would take only two to three
months for it to completely haul the 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates.
In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates from Lucia. It argued that the controversial quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented
only an upper limit or the maximum quantity that it could haul. Kimwa asserted that the Agreement
articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15,
1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras
were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.
The Regional Trial Court rendered the Decision in favor of Spouses Paras. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision. It faulted the trial court for basing its
findings on evidence presented which were supposedly in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. It
noted that the Agreement was clear that Kimwa was under no obligation to haul 40,000 cubic meters
of aggregates by May 15, 1995.
Issue
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Whether respondent Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation is liable to

petitioners Spouses Paras for (admittedly) failing to haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates from
petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area by May 15, 1995.
Ruling
We reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate that of the Regional Trial
Court. Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was
obliged to acquire from petitioner Lucia Paras. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the
terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after
the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities observed,"forbids any
addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence
purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the
written contract." This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its
pleading any of the four items enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, "a party
may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement” Moreover, as with all
possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party’s failure to timely object is deemed a
waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained.
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence sought
to be introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be
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relevant, tending to "induce belief in [the] existence" of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent
extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to introduce parol evidence.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the
existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been
objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves
to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded in the
Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the
Agreement’s failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through its
Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an
exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence.
Paragraphs 6 to 10 of petitioners’ Complaint read:
6. Sensing that the buyers-contractors and haulers alike could easily consumed [sic] the
deposits defendant proposed to the plaintiff-wife that it be assured of a forty thousand
(40,000) cubic meter [sic];
7. Plaintiff countered that the area is scheduled to be rechanneled on 15 May 1995 and by
that time she will be prohibited to sell the aggregates;
8. She further told the defendant that she would be willing to enter into a contract provided
the forty thousand cubic meter [sic] will be withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled
before 15 May 1995, the scheduled rechanneling;
9. Defendant assured her that it will take them only two to three months to haul completely
the desired volume as defendant has all the trucks needed;
10. Convinced of the assurances, plaintiff-wife and the defendant entered into a contract for
the supply of the aggregates sometime on 6 December 1994 or thereabouts, at a cost of Two
Hundred Forty (₱240.00) Pesos per truckload.
It is true that petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint does not specifically state words and
phrases such as "mistake," "imperfection," or "failure to express the true intent of the parties."
Nevertheless, it is evident that the crux of petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint is their assertion
that the Agreement "entered into . . . on 6 December 1994 or thereabouts" was founded on the
parties’ supposed understanding that the quantity of aggregates allotted in favor of respondent
Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995, lest such hauling be rendered impossible by the
rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area. This assertion is the very foundation of
petitioners’ having come to court for relief.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG

SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL
ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER
PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015, LEONEN, J.
The writ of habeas corpus is also called the “great writ of liberty.” It was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraints, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent
with the law’s “zealous regard to personal liberty”
Facts
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) together with
other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. He returned to the
Philippines on December 20, 2009. On August 3, 2010, Salibo found out that the police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspect him to be Butukan S. Malang who is one of the
197 suspects of 57 counts of murder in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. Malang has a
pending warrant by the trial court. Salibo presented himself to the police officers to clear his name
saying that he is not Malang and that he could not have participated in the massacre as he was in
Saudi Arabia at that time- as evidence, he presented the pertinent portions of his passport, boarding
pass, and other documents to that effect. The police initially assured Salibo that he will not be
arrested but he was apprehended afterwards by the police who also tore the pages in his passport
evidencing his departure for Saudi Arabia. He was detained at the police station for 3 days. On
August 20, 2010 he was transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex.
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed a petition for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of
his detention while maintaining that he is not Malang. CA issued the writ and ordered the warden
of QCJA to bring Salibo to court on the hearing scheduled on September 27, 2010 before the RTC. On
October 1, 2010 the return on the writ was heard and Solicitors Salo and Pepito, appearing in behalf
of the warden who issued the return, alleged that the Petition for Habeas Corpus must be dismissed
because Salibo was charged under a valid Information and was detained under warrant. RTC held
that Salibo was not charged under a valid resolution nor was he validly arrested and detained as
there is no Information or Warrant of Arrest under the name Datukan Malang Salibo. His absence in
the country was further established by the Certification issued by the Saudi Arabian Airlines
regarding his departure from and arrival in Manila conforming to his initial statements. RTC issued
the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of Salibo.
On appeal by the Jail Warden, CA reversed the ruling and instead held that Salibo was
detained under a valid Information and warrant. CA further ruled that even assuming that Salibo
was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that
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the orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be
invoked. According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
In his appeal before the Supreme Court, in addition to his foregoing claims, Salibo contend
that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the RTC before the CA. Although the CA
delegated to the trial court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court's
Decision should be deemed a Decision of the said appellate court. Therefore, respondent Warden
should have directly filed his appeal before this court.
Issues
Is Decision of the RTC on Salibo’s petition for habeas corpus appealable to CA?
Is it the proper remedy for Salibo to file a petition for habeas corpus?
Ruling
Respondent correctly appealed to CA. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be
made through a petition filed before this court or any of its members, the Court of Appeals or any of
its members in instances authorized by law, or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding
judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is
then conducted. The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the
writ. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable,
the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation,
the lower court acquires the power and authority to determine the merits of the petition. Therefore,
the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of the lower court.
Here, the trial court acquired power and authority to determine the merits of the petition,
and the decision thereafter rendered was the decision of the trial court not that of the Court of
Appeals. Since CA is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the trial court,
respondent warden correctly appealed in the Court of Appeals.
As to the second issue, the writ of habeas corpus is also called the “great writ of liberty.” It
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraints,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The remedy of habeas corpus is
extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law’s “zealous regard to personal liberty”
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which rightful;
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The primary purpose of the writ
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is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve
a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a
person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or
when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode. In other words, habeas corpus effectively
substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right,
courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to
liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes. The Supreme Court in the
case of Gumabon, et al versus Director of the Bureau of Prisons ruled “that the writ of habeas corpus
is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless
state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ- its ability to cut through barriers of form or
procedural mazes- have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers.”
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance
of the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly
restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines
the legality of the restraint. Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for
its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the
speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty. although the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when public safety
requires it, the writ itself may not be suspended.
The writ cannot be issued when the person allegedly deprived of his liberty s restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court. the restraint then becomes legal and the remedy of
habeas corpus has become moot and academic.
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed. In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary
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remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the
court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy
is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest. A motion to quash under Rule
117, Section 3 has the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information.
Here, Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense.
He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his
liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. The Information
and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People
of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not
Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5
provides for the instances where a warrantless arrest may be lawful; (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of these instances is present
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in this case. It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner
Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of
any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. The
police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They
deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas
corpus may be issued.
People of the Philippines vs. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex
case pending in our courts. The case involves 57 victims and 197 accused, two (2) of which have
become state witnesses. As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been arraigned, and 70
have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved. To require petitioner Salibo to
undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates that we
resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not Butukan S. Malang. In
ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence. However,
between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without due process of
law and the government that has all the "manpower and the resources at [its] command" to properly
indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the citizen. Should the government choose
to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper remedies against him as provided in our
Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for
Habeas Corpus must be granted.
202
Sunrise Garden Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc., Respondent.
G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015, LEONEN, J.
VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE
While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of
summons, the same rule also provides that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Facts
In 1998, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City passed City Ordinance No. 08-98
entitled "An Ordinance Creating a Technical Committee to Conduct a Feasibility Study, Preliminary
and Parcellary Survey for the Proposed Construction of a City Road Connecting Four (4) Barangays
in Antipolo City.
In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Antipolo City to construct a city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway. The
request was approved through the enactment of Resolusyon Blg. 027-99.
Sunrise Garden Corporation was an affected landowner. Its property was located in
Barangay Cupang, which Sunrise Garden Corporation planned to develop into a memorial park.
Sunrise Garden Corporation, through Cesar T. Guy, Chair of the Board of Directors, executed an
Undertaking where Sunrise Garden Corporation would construct the city road at its own expense,
subject to reimbursement through tax credits. The city road project, thus, became a joint project of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo, Barangay Cupang, Barangay Mayamot, and Sunrise
Garden Corporation.
Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor began to position its construction equipment.

However, armed guards, allegedly hired by Hardrock Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden
Corporation's contractor from using an access road to move the construction equipment. On January
24, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint for damages with prayer for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on February 15, 2002, "directing
Hardrock to cease and desist from preventing/blocking the contractor in moving its equipment to
the site of the proposed city road." Since Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. was undaunted by the by the
temporary restraining order, the trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
subject to the posting of a bond by Sunrise Garden Corporation thereafter a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was issued.
203
Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Motion to cite in contempt K-9 Security Agency
allegedly hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., blocked Sunrise Garden
Corporation's contractor's employees and prevented them from proceeding with the construction,
and afterwards same motion was filed against the Forefront Security Agency and First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. Sunrise Garden Corporation alleged that First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. was notified and voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
K-9 Security Agency filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the November 22, 2002 Order.
Allegedly attached to the Motion were photocopies of TCT Nos. 342073-76 and 337784 to show that
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was the registered owner of the parcel of land where the
pieces of construction equipment were being placed.
The trial court issued an Order stating that since First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
could not prove ownership over the properties, then First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. or
any of its hired security agencies must comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals.
Sunrise Garden Corporation argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the
Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction and enforce it against First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. Assuming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the person of First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., this was cured when the latter voluntarily appeared in court.
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. even filed pleadings such as an Opposition and a
Motion for Reconsideration. Other than filing pleadings, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
argued that its properties will be affected by the city road project. This issue was then submitted for
resolution before the trial court.
On the other hand, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. counters that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over its person as it was not impleaded as a party-litigant in the
Complaint for damages filed by Sunrise Garden Corporation against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.
Sunrise Garden Corporation does not deny that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was not
included in the Complaint. Nonetheless, Sunrise Garden Corporation sought to enforce the
Amended Writ of Injunction against it even though the Amended Writ was addressed to Hardrock
Aggregates, Inc..
Issue
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. and can be cited for contempt for refusal to obey or comply with the amended
writ of preliminary injunction.
204
Ruling
While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is
equivalent to service of summons, the same rule also provides that "the inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance."
The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security
Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this case show that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and repeatedly argued by K-9 Security Agency and
respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. in their pleadings.
It may be argued that respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. should have
intervened in the case filed before the trial court. However, respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc.'s interests, or its properties, were not part of the issues raised in petitioner Sunrise
Garden Corporation's Complaint. That Complaint was against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. and not
respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. or its properties.
Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires that the party to be enjoined must be
notified and heard.Considering that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it sought to
enforce the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction against respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc., the Court of Appeals did not err in granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by
respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development Inc.
205
ALEJANDRO CEPRADO JR., Petitioner, vs NATIONWIDE SECURITY AND ALLIED

SERVICES INC./ROMEO T. NOLASCO, Respondents.
Motions for reconsideration not served on the adverse party do not toll the running of the
reglementary period for filing an appeal. Upon lapse of the reglementary period, the judgment sought to be
reconsidered becomes immutable.
Facts
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision] remanding the
case to the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment - Region IV for further
proceedings. The Court of Appeals found that the Regional Director resolved respondent
Nationwide Security and Allied Services' Motion for Reconsideration without giving the adverse
parties, petitioners Alejandro Ceprado, Jr., Ronilo Sebial, Nicanor Olivar, Alvin Villegas, and Edgar
Manato (Ceprado, et. al), their opportunity to be heard.
Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. (Nationwide Security) is a security agency
with Romeo T. Nolasco as its president and general manager. It provided security guard services to
Uniden Philippines (Uniden), whose plant is located in Cabuyao, Laguna.
On November 16, 2000, the Office of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
Employment - Region IV (Regional Office) conducted a regular inspection of Uniden's Cabuyao
plant pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.
Issue
Whether the Department of Labor and Employment's Orders dated March 12, 2003, March 23, 2004,
and July 19, 2004 are void.
Ruling
Motions for reconsideration not served on the adverse party do not toll the running of the
reglementary period for filing an appeal. Upon lapse of the reglementary period, the judgment
sought to be reconsidered becomes immutable.
The Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in labor standards cases, requires a written
notice of every motion for reconsideration to be served on the adverse party as compliance with the
requirement of due process. Motions for reconsideration not served on the other party
are pro forma and are "mere scrap[s] of paper" not to be acted upon by the court. Motions for
reconsideration not served on the other party do not toll the running of the reglementary period for
filing an appeal, and the judgment sought to be reconsidered becomes final and executory upon
lapse of the reglementary period.
206
ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO

BORROMEO, Respondents.
The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a free patent during the five-year prohibitory period
under the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of the parcel of land is proper. However, reversion under Section
101 of the Public Land Act is not automatic. The Office of the Solicitor General must first file an action for
reversion.
Facts
On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo (Borromeo) was issued Free Patent over a piece of
agricultural land located in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. On June 15, 1983, well within the five-
year prohibitory period, Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos (Maltos). Borromeo died on
January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he allegedly told his wife, Norberta and
his children to nullify the sale made to Maltos because the sale was within the five-year prohibitory
period. On June 23, 1993, Norberta and her children (heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for
Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title against Maltos.
Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer, arguing that the sale
was made in good faith and that in purchasing the property, they relied on Eusebio Borromeo's title.
Further, the parties were in pari delicto. Since the sale was made during the five-year prohibitory
period, the land would revert to the public domain and the proper party to institute reversion
proceedings was the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer, arguing that the deed of sale
was presented for Registration after the five-year prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial on its
part to register the deed. The heirs of Borromeo countered that good faith was not a valid defense
because the prohibitory period appeared on the face of the title of the property.
The trial court dismissed the Complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Also, the heirs of Borromeo did not have a right of action because they were unable to establish their
status as heirs of the late Eusebio Borromeo. They may have declared themselves the legal heirs of
Eusebio Borromeo, but they did not present evidence to prove their allegation. Further, the
determination of their rights to succession must be established in special proceedings.
The trial court also ruled that "[t]he sale was null and void because it was within the five (5)
year prohibitionary [sic] period" under the Public Land Act. The defense of indefeasibility of title
was unavailing because the title to the property stated that it was "subject to the provisions of
Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124" of the Public Land Act. Since the property was sold within the
five-year prohibitory period, such transfer "result[ed] in the cancellation of the grant and the
reversion of the land to the public domain."
207
The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the trial court and held that since Eusebio
Borromeo sold his property within the five-year prohibitory period, the property should revert to
the state. However, the government has to file an action for reversion because "reversion is not
automatic." While there is yet no action for reversion instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General,
the property should be returned to the heirs of Borromeo.
On May 10, 2006, the Maltos Spouses filed a Petition for Review before this court,
questioning the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Decision of the trial court and ordering the
reconveyance of the property from petitioners Spouses Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos to
respondents heirs of Eusebio Borromeo.
Ruling
No, the CA did not err in rendering the subject Decision. The main purpose in the grant of a
free patent of homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of
public land which the State has given to him so he may have a place to live with his family and
become a happy citizen and a useful member of the society. In Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the
conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster,
families as the foundation of society, and thus promote general welfare.
The effect of violating the five-year prohibitory period is provided under Section 124 of the
Public Land Act, which provides:
SECTION 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract

made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen,
one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and
one hundred and twenty-three of this. Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or
permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the
reversion of the property and its improvements to the State.
In this case, Section 10187 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title already vested in
Eusebio Borromeo's name. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the sale was
made within the five-year prohibitory period. Thus, there is sufficient cause to revert the property in
favor of the state. However, this court cannot declare reversion of the property in favor of the state
in view of the limitation imposed by Section 101 that an action for reversion must first be filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General. Moreover, the court held that “Section 124 of the Public Land Act
indeed provides that any acquisition, conveyance or transfer executed in violation of any of its
provisions shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant
208
or patent and cause the reversion of the property to the State, and the principle of pari delicto has
been applied by this Court in a number of cases wherein the parties to a transaction have proven to
be guilty of effected the transaction with knowledge of the cause of its invalidity. But we doubt if
these principles can now be invoked considering the philosophy and the policy behind the approval
of the Public Land Act.” The principle underlying pari delicto as known here and in the United
States is not absolute in its application. It recognizes certain exceptions one of them being when its
enforcement or application runs counter to an avowed fundamental policy or to public interest. As
stated by us in the Rellosa case, "This doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely,
[']whenever public policy is considered advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against
the transaction[']"
The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to. Here appellee
desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of
pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the
presumed knowledge of its illegality, but because the subject of the transaction is a piece of public
land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was
given by law to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead
law is predicated. This right cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of any citizen to
barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve." We are, therefore, constrained to hold that
appellee can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our
homestead law.
As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable, the question now arises as to who between the
parties have a better right to possess the subject parcel of land. This issue was addressed in Santos:
What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to the
possession of the land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to the
homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the purchase
price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled to
keep the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants. Their right to remain
in possession of the land is no better than that of appellee and, therefore, they should not be
allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of appellee during and until the government takes
steps toward its reversion to the State.
In Binayug v. Ugaddan, which involved the sale of two properties covered by a homestead
patent, this court cited jurisprudence showing that in cases involving the sale of a property covered
by the five-year prohibitory period, the property should be returned to the grantee. Applying the
ruling in Santos and Binayug, this court makes it clear that petitioners have no better right to remain
in possession of the property against respondents. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling
that while there is yet no action for reversion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the property
should be conveyed by petitioners to respondents.
209
PEDRO MENDOZA [DECEASED], SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS

FEDERICO MENDOZA AND DELFIN MENDOZA, AND JOSE GONZALES, Petitioners, VS.
REYNOSA VALTE, Respondent.
A petition for review filed under Rule 45 may raise only questions of law. The factual findings by the
Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are generally conclusive and binding on the parties
and are no longer reviewable unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions.
The existence or non-existence of fraud is a legal conclusion based on a finding that the evidence
presented is sufficient to establish facts constituting its elements. Questions of fact are generally not
entertained in a petition for review before this court In any event, petitions for a review or reopening of a
decree of registration based on actual fraud must be filed before the proper court within the one-year period
provided under the relevant laws. The party alleging fraud must overcome the burden of proving the fraud
with clear and convincing evidence. Section 101 of Commonwealth No. 141 allows actions for the reversion of
land fraudulently granted to private individuals filed even after the lapse of the one-year period, but this must
be initiated by the state.
Resolving questions of fact is a function of the lower courts. This court is a collegiate body. It does not
receive evidence nor conduct trial procedures that involve the marking of documentary evidence by the parties
and hearing the direct and cross-examination of each and every witness presented for testimonial evidence.
This court does not deal with matters such as whether evidence presented deserve probative weight or must be
rejected as spurious; whether the two sides presented evidence adequate to establish their proposition; whether
evidence presented by one party can be considered as strong, clear, and convincing when weighed and
analyzed against the other party's evidence; whether the documents presented by one party can be accorded
full faith and credit considering the other party's protests; or whether certain inconsistencies in the party's
body of proofs can justify not giving these evidence weight.
The doctrine on hierarchy of courts ensures that the different levels of the judiciary can perform its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. As the court of last resort, this court should not be
burdened with functions falling within the causes in the first instance so that it can focus on its fundamental
tasks under the Constitution. This court leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating
precedents in light of new circumstances or confusion in the bench and bar] Thus, "[r]ather than a court of
first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal
devices in order that it truly performs that role."
Facts
Sometime in 1978, Reynosa Valte (Valte) filed a free patent application dated July 6, 1978 for
a 7.2253-hectare parcel of landin San Isidro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. The application listed Procopio
Vallega and Pedro Mendoza (Mendoza) as witnesses who would testify to the truth of the
allegations in Valte's application.
210
The Director of Lands then issued the Notice of Application for Free Patent stating that "[a]ll
adverse claims to the tract of land above-described must [be] filed in the Bureau of Lands on or
before the 7th day of August 1978. Any claim not so filed will be forever barred."
On September 14, 1978, the Land Investigator certified that the land formed part of the old
cadastral lot subdivided in December 1975 and approved as Csd-03-000514-D on March 25, 1976.
Thus, Lot 1035-B was equivalent to Lot 2391, Cad. 144 of Lupao, Nueva Ecija. The land was first
occupied and cultivated by Francis Maglaya, Nemesio Jacala, and Laureano Pariñas, who sold all
their rights to the portions adjudicated to them to Spouses Policarpio Valte and Miguela dela Fuente
in May 1941. The spouses immediately took possession. Miguela dela Fuente assumed the
responsibilities over the land after her husband died. When she aged, she transferred all her rights to
their only daughter, Reynosa Valte, who was found in actual possession of the land. The Land
Investigator recommended the grant of Valte's application considering these findings.
On December 28, 1978, the Bureau of Lands approved Valte's application and issued Free
Patent No. 586435. On January 31, 1979, the Cabanatuan City Register of Deeds issued OCT No. P-
10119. On December 6, 1982,Mendoza and Jose Gonzales (Gonzales) filed a protest against Valte's
application, claiming to be "the lawful owner[s] and possessors] since 1930 thru predecessor-in-
interest [and who] had been in actual uninterrupted, open, peaceful, exclusive[,] and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner of the above-described property."
Mendoza and Gonzales alleged that Valte procured Free Patent No. 586435 by means of
fraud, misrepresentation, and connivance. Specifically:
In her application for Free Patent, applicant-respondent REYNOSA VALTE, willfully and
fraudulently suppressed and omitted to state the material fact that the said land was in
actual possession of the land claimants-protestants[,] and the improvements consisting of
rice paddies and pilapiles were existing long before the time Reynosa Valte filed her free
patent.
In view of the protest, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources notified the
parties on March 10, 1993 regarding an ocular investigation. Only Mendoza and Gonzales were
present despite notice on Valte.
On March 15, 1993, the Barangay Captain and other officials of San Isidro Lupao, Nueva
Ecija executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating that they have been residents of the barangay since
birth, that they know all the residents but do not know Valte, and that they are definite that there is
no barangay resident with that name.
Mendoza and Gonzales were mandated to present two (2) witnesses during the
investigation. They presented Eimirando Sabado, who testified that:
211
(1) he has been residing on the lot adjacent to the area in question since 1929; (2) he personally
knows Mendoza and Gonzales who are his neighbors; (3) both Mendoza and Gonzales filed FPAs
for the controverted land before 1982; (4) both Mendoza and Gonzales resided on the subject land on
or before 1929; (5) no one has claimed nor interrupted their said occupation since 1929; (6) he does
not know Valte who is claiming the lot and that no one had claimed the same; (7) Mendoza's father,
Juan Mendoza, was the one who planted the acacia trees on the land sometime in 1949 and that,
until now, there are still acacia and mango trees on the disputed lot aged twenty (20) years or more.
The second witness, Agapito Pagibitan, executed an Affidavit attesting to the following:
(1) he personally knows Mendoza and Gonzales; (2) he likewise knows that both Mendoza and
Gonzales have been working in said area; (3) they are the real occupants of the lot which they have
[been] tilling; (4) since 1929 no one came to the disputed area nor had claimed the same; (5) since
1929, Mendoza and Gonzales have been the ones who introduced improvements on the land such as
mango, tamarind, acacia and star apple trees; (6) Mendoza and Gonzales have built their respective
houses thereon which were made of cement-concrete materials with a pump to boot; (7) no one has
been residing on the controverted lot except Mendoza and Gonzales.
On March 30, 1993, Mendoza and Gonzales filed an amended protest alleging that Mendoza was in
actual possession and cultivation of four (4) hectares, more or less; that Gonzales was in actual
possession and cultivation of two (2) hectares, more or less; and that Procopio Vallega was in actual
possession and cultivation of the rest of the land.Also, the rice paddies and "pilapiles" had already
been existing in the land even before Valte filed her free patent application, and the District Land
Officer failed to exercise due diligence in its evaluation and mistakenly recommended the grant of
Valte's application that was based on fraud and misrepresentation.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary, in the Decision dated
January 20, 1994, ruled in favor of Mendoza and Gonzales. On March 20, 1994, Valte appealed before
the Office of the President, raising violation of due process since the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources' investigation was conducted ex parte without giving her the opportunity to
be heard.
The Office of the President, in its Decision dated February 10, 1997, set aside the January 20,
1994 Decision and ordered "the conduct of another formal hearing and thorough investigation of the
case."
Mendoza and Gonzales reiterated their claim of ownership and possession of the land since
1930 and the nullity of Valte's title for having been acquired through fraudulent means. Their
evidence was grounded mostly on the Department of Environment and Natural Resources'
investigation results consisting of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the Barangay Captain and officials
and the statements of their two (2) witnesses.
212
Valte countered that her father bought the land in 1941, and her mother ceded the land to
her in 1978. She then processed titling in her name. She, through her administrator, Pacifico M.
Vizmonte, maintained that Mendoza and Gonzales were tenants with no preferential right over the
land. She presented her free patent application and the Joint Affidavit of Procopio Vallega
and Mendoza where Mendozarecognized Valte's exclusive claim and possession over the land.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary, in the Decision dated March 11,
1999, found Mendoza and Gonzales to be mere tenants of the land and dismissed the protest.
The Office of the President, in its Decision dated April 26, 2000, reversed the March 11, 1999
Decision and reinstated the January 20, 1994. It denied reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals, in its September 8, 2000 Resolution, dismissed Valte's Petition for
Review due to several defects, such as incomplete certification of non-forum shopping, failure to
attach registry receipts in the affidavit of service, and lack of certified true copies of the material
portions of the record referred to in the Petition. It also denied reconsideration, which prompted
Valte to file a Petition for Certiorari before this court.
This court denied Valte's Petition due to late filing, lack of certification against forum
shopping, and failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
However, on reconsideration, this court reinstated Valte's Petition. Respondents filed their
Comment, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda. This court, in its Decision dated June
29, 2004, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for decision on the merits.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated December 28, 2005, reversed the Office of the
President Decision and reinstated the March 11, 1999 Decision. It also denied reconsideration.
Hence, Mendoza and Gonzales filed this Petition. Mendoza and Gonzales submit that Valte
employed fraud, misrepresentation, and connivance in her free patent application. Lot 1035-B only
has two (2) hectares, yet her application stated an area of 7.2255 hectares. The Technical Description
of Lot 1035-B in OCTNo. P-10119 shows that Lot 103 5-A covering three (3) hectares is under free
patent application by Gonzales. The Department of Agrarian Reform [Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office] Certification states that Mendoza and Gonzales are tenants of a combined area of 2.6367
hectares, yet this does not explain Valte's claim over the rest of the 7.2255 hectares. Valte does not
possess nor cultivate the land, and her employment of tenants over 2.6367 hectares violates
Presidential Decree No. 152.
In her Comment, Valte counters that Mendoza and Gonzales cannot raise for the first time
on appeal the issue arising from Gonzales' claim over Lot 1035-A with three (3) hectares.Valte
submits that "[i]f only petitioners raised this issue below, then respondent could have proven that
petitioner Jose Gonzales' [three-hectare] land known as Lot 1035-A is distinct and separate from
respondents' 7.2255 hectares land known as Lot 1035-B." If Gonzales indeed owns two (2) hectares of
Valte's land, then he should have included this in his free patent application for Lot 1035-A filed
213
even before Valte's application. Mendoza and Gonzales' tardiness in raising this issue and their
inconsistent claims regarding land area show bad faith. Valte claims that the argument that Lot
1035-B should be limited to two (2) hectares should be disallowed for being a change of theory on
appeal and for being belied by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources' factual
findings. Mendoza and Gonzales also amended their protest on March 30, 1993, which showed that
they reduced their claim from 7.335 hectares to six hectares, with Mendoza in possession of four (4)
hectares, Gonzales with possession of two (2) hectares, and Procopio Vallega with possession of the
remaining area. Valte adds the inapplicability of Presidential Decree No. 152 as this law applies only
to lands of public domain, while the land in question has already been privately owned as early as
1929.Valte's free patent application in 1978 was for the recognition of her vested title to the land.
In their Reply, Mendoza and Gonzales submit that Valte failed to present evidence of
ownership of the land now covered under OCT No. P-10119.Petitioners contend that they "have
consistently asserted that respondent has only an area of [one] hectare or two, and her FPANo.
12409 (E-590098) is tainted with misrepresentation by claiming that she owns all of [L]ots 1035-A,
1035-B, 1035-C, and 1035-D."They submit that Valte's free patent application was for Lot No. 1035-B
that has two (2) hectares, not 7.2255 hectares as Valte claimed, and she only presented a Deed of Sale
covering Lot No. 1035-C that has 1.2829 hectares. They reiterate that Gonzales owns the adjacent Lot
1035-A covered by OCT No. P-8211.
Issue
Whether this case falls within the exceptions that allow the examination of questions of fact
before this court.
Ruling
A petition for review filed under Rule 45 may raise only questions of law. The factual
findings by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are generally conclusive
and binding on the parties and are no longer reviewable unless the case falls under the recognized
exceptions. This court is not a trier of facts and we are not duty bound to re-examine evidence. The
existence or non-existence of fraud in an application for free patent depends on a finding of fact
insofar as the presence of its requirements. As observed by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner Mendoza admitted against his interest when he stated in his Joint Affidavit that
respondent "has continuously occupied and cultivated the land." Petitioners cannot also now raise
the factual issue on land identity since a change of theory on appeal offends due process and fair
play. Unless it can be shown that irregularity tainted the free patent proceedings conducted before
the Director of Lands, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stands.
In any event, petitions for a review or reopening of a decree of registration based on actual
fraud must be filed before the proper court within the one-year period provided under the relevant
laws. Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 allows actions for the reversion of land
fraudulently granted to private individuals filed even after the lapse of the one-year period, but this
214
must be initiated by the state. As regards Presidential Decree No. 152 that prohibits the employment
of share tenants for purposes of complying with the requirements under the Public Land Act on
entry, occupation, improvement, and cultivation of the land, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
Certification dated March 27, 1995 on petitioners' tillage for a combined area of 2.6367 hectares does
not disprove a finding of occupation and cultivation by respondent's parents over the land applied
for since 1941.
The identity of the land in controversy involves a factual question. This requires a
delineation of actual boundaries and a review of the admissibility and credibility of documents such
as deeds of sale and survey plans. The presence or absence of fraud also involves a factual question.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review before this court. This rule
admits of exceptions, and petitioners invoke these exceptions, in that the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and of the Office of the President are at variance with each other, the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the parties' evidence, and the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals were made with grave abuse of discretion.
Questions of fact challenge the lower court's appreciation of evidence and factual
conclusions, as opposed to questions of law that no longer deal with the probative value of evidence:
“A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of
law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or
when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.”
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary, the Office of the
President, and the Court of Appeals rendered their Decisions based on their own appreciation of the
evidence in determining whether respondent obtained the patent through fraudulent means.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary's Decision dated January 20, 1994
gave credence to petitioners' witnesses' positive testimony regarding petitioners' actual possession
of the land:
“After a thorough scrutiny of the entire records as well as an objective appraisal of the complete
facts of the present case, We find the protest of Mendoza and Gonzales to be highly meritorious and
the claim of Procopio Vallega, who is occupying one (1) hectare of the disputed premises, justifiable
as the same has even been respected and acknowledged by the claimants-protestants herein. The
witnesses of the claimants-protestants are both credible and hence, their positive testimony to the
effect that the claimants-protestants have been in actual possession of the land in question cannot be
simply disregarded and should be accorded great weight. WE hold that applicant-respondent Valte
215
has never been in open, continuous, exclusive, peaceful and notorious possession of the land in
dispute.”
After reinvestigation, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary's

Decision dated March 11, 1999 dismissed the protest for lack of merit, this time giving weight to the
Joint Affidavit executed by petitioner Mendoza and Procopio Vallega on respondent's occupation of
the land:
“The evidence on record preponderates to the fact that Reynosa Valte has preferential rights over the
controverted lot. In fact, as early as 1978, in the report of Land Investigator Celedonio P. Bacena, it
was found that the controverted land has been occupied and cultivated by Reynosa Valte, and
previously by her predecessor-in-interest since 1945. Herein protestants, Pedro Mendozaand
Procopio Vallega, thru an affidavit dated July 6, 1978 supported Reynosa Valte's application for free
patent over the controverted land, under oath, confirmed that the latter has continuously occupied
and cultivated the land since 1945 by herself and by her predecessors-in-interest. The aforestated
joint affidavit is a very convincing documents [sic] to strengthen Reynosa Valte's assertions that,
indeed, the protestants are tenants and that their rights on the controverted lot cannot rise higher
than its source, that of Reynosa Valte.”
The Office of the President Decision dated April 26, 2000, in reinstating the January 20, 1994
Decision, again accorded greater weight to petitioners' witnesses' positive testimony:
After going through the evidence presented by the parties, we find the protest of appellants to be
credible. The positive testimony of their witnesses, namely the barangay captain, the barangay
officials as well as neighbors, to the effect that appellee was hardly or never seen cultivating nor
possessing the subject premises cannot simply be disregarded. Rather, these testimonies should be
accorded great weight and respect, as they come from individuals who could very well attest to the
truth or falsity of appellee's claim that she was in "open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful"
possession of the property in dispute.
The declaration of appellee that she actually possessed the subject property and had
cultivated the same, despite her full knowledge that Mendoza and Gonzales were the actual
possessors and occupants, simply constitutes fraud as she failed to state this material fact in her
application for free patent. Hence, the cancellation of OCT No. P-10119 issued in her favor is in
order[.]
The Court of Appeals' December 28, 2005 Decision reversed and set aside the Office of the
President Decision and reinstated the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Secretary's Decision dated March 11, 1999. The Court of Appeals gave more weight to the Joint
Affidavit of petitioner Mendoza and Procopio Vallega and discussed the reasons why the statements
by petitioners' witnesses were not credible.
216
First, the statements of Elmirando Sabado and Agapito Pagibitan were taken during the ex
parte investigation where respondent had no opportunity to present contrary evidence. During the
formal hearing and reinvestigation ordered by the Office of the President, respondent presented the
Joint Affidavit where petitioner Mendoza admitted against his interest in the land by stating that
"[t]he said applicant has continuously occupied and cultivated the land [herself] and/or thru h[er]
predecessor-in-interest since July 4, 1945, or prior thereto and it is free from claims and conflicts." As
regards the land area, the Court of Appeals discussed that "a perusal of the records and again the
Joint Affidavit would reveal that they affirm that the property subject of the free patent application
has an area of '7 hectares, 22 ares and 55 centares.'"
Second, Elmirando Sabado and Agapito Pagibitan's statements that petitioners occupied the
property as early as 1929 or 1930 appeared doubtful and unreliable. The Certification dated
September 24, 1976 by Nueva Ecija Deputy Clerk of Court Prudencio P. Ciriaco states that other
persons had possession of the land during this time, and these persons sold the land to respondent's
father in 1941. Also, Elmirando Sabado was only four years old in 1929, and he could not have had
the comprehension to adequately inform himself on the concept of petitioners' alleged possession of
the land.
Third, even if petitioners' evidence were taken at face value, these would not sufficiently
establish their possession since 1929 or 1930 and the nature of this possession. On the other hand, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office Certification dated March 27, 1995 reveals that petitioners'
possession was merely that of tenants. Also, respondent's mother, Miguela dela Fuente, executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated September 12, 1978 stating that she and her husband bought the land
in 1941, and they cultivated it and paid the taxes until they transferred its care to their daughter,
Reynosa Valte, in 1964.
Lastly, petitioners failed to show any irregularity in the proceedings before the Director of
Lands for respondent's patent application.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners were "not only . . . burdened to prove the ...
fraudulent representations" that respondent allegedly committed in her application "by clear and
convincing evidence"; they were also "burdened to present sufficient evidence to overcome the
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed and that the public documents
which constitute [respondent's] evidence should not be given credence."Petitioners failed to
overcome this burden.
Resolving questions of fact is a function of the lower courts. This court is a collegiate body. It
does not receive evidence nor conduct trial procedures that involve the marking of documentary
evidence by the parties and hearing the direct and cross-examination of each and every witness
presented for testimonial evidence. This court does not deal with matters such as whether evidence
presented deserve probative weight or must be rejected as spurious; whether the two sides
presented evidence adequate to establish their proposition; whether evidence presented by one
217
party can be considered as strong, clear, and convincing when weighed and analyzed against the
other party's evidence; whether the documents presented by one party can be accorded full faith and
credit considering the other party's protests; or whether certain inconsistencies in the party's body of
proofs can justify not giving these evidence weight.
The doctrine on hierarchy of courts ensures that the different levels of the judiciary can
perform its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. As the court of last resort, this
court should not be burdened with functions falling within the causes in the first instance so that it
can focus on its fundamental tasks under the Constitution.This court leads the judiciary by breaking
new ground or further reiterating precedents in light of new circumstances or confusion in the bench
and bar. Thus, "[r]ather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role."
Since this court is not a trier of facts, we are not duty-bound to re-examine evidence already
considered by the lower courts. Factual findings by the Court of Appeals, when supported by
substantial evidence, are generally conclusive and binding on the parties and will no longer be
reviewed by this court.
218
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 181683, October 07, 2015
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LORENZO SHIPPING

CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184568, LEONEN, J.
It is basic that any material presented as evidence will not be considered unless duly admitted by the
court before which it is presented. Just as basic is that a private document offered as authentic evidence shall
not be admitted unless its due execution and authenticity are... established in the manner specified by Rule
132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
Facts
Lorenzo Shipping is the owner and operator of the commercial vessel MV Lorcon Luzon.
National Power Corporation is the owner of Power Barge 104, "a non-propelled power plant barge."
On March 20, 1993, Power Barge 104 was berthed and stationed at the Makar Wharf in General
Santos City when the MV Lorcon Luzon "hit and rammed Power Barge 104."
Following this incident, Nelson Homena, Plant Manager of Power Barge 104, filed a Marine
Protest before the Board of Marine Inquiry. Captain Villarias also filed his own Marine Protest. For
his part, Captain Yape filed a Marine Accident Report. The Board of Marine Inquiry... conducted
joint hearings on the Marine Protests and Captain Yape's report.
To forestall the prescription of its cause of action for damages, National Power Corporation
filed before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Damages against Lorenzo
Shipping. In this Complaint, National Power Corporation recalled the... damage resulting from the
ramming.
The Regional Trial Court issued the Decision absolving Lorenzo Shipping of liability. It
concluded that National Power Corporation failed to establish Lorenzo Shipping's negligence and
that Lorenzo Shipping supposedly exercised due diligence in its selection and supervision of
Captain Villarias, no liability could be attributed to it.
The Court of Appeals rendered the Decision reversing and setting aside the Regional Trial
Court and entering another judgment ordering Lorenzo Shipping to pay National Power
Corporation for the suffered losses.
Issues
As to claim of loss, can the bill of expenses of National Power Corporation be admitted in evidence?
219
Ruling
It is basic that any material presented as evidence will not be considered unless duly
admitted by the court before which it is presented. Just as basic is that a private document offered as
authentic evidence shall not be admitted unless its due execution and authenticity are... established
in the manner specified by Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence: Section 20. Proof
of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. A bill
of expenses, such as National Power Corporation's Exhibit "F", is considered a private document as
it does not fall under what the Revised Rules on Evidence defines to be public documents.
Accordingly, for it to have been admitted by the Regional Trial Court as authentic, Rule 132, Section
30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence must have been complied with. National Power Corporation
failed in this respect.
Exhibit "F" was ruled to have been inadmissible for failing to comply with Rule 132, Section
20 thus, it failed the standard of competency. Consistent with this, reliance on National Power
Corporation's Exhibit "F" and its contents, so as to establish the extent of National Power
Corporation's pecuniary loss, is misplaced. Not having been admitted, Exhibit "F" does not form part
of the body of evidence worthy of judicial consideration.
220
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 181683, October 07, 2015
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LORENZO SHIPPING

CORPORATION, Respondent.
Facts
Lorenzo Shipping is the owner and operator of the commercial vessel MV Lorcon
Luzon.National Power Corporation is the owner of Power Barge 104, "a non-propelled power plant
barge.” On March 20, 1993, Power Barge 104 was berthed and stationed at the Makar Wharf in
General Santos City when the MV Lorcon Luzon "hit and rammed Power Barge 104.”At the time of
the incident, Captain Mariano Villarias (Captain Villarias) served as the Master of the MV Lorcon
Luzon. However, the MV Lorcon Luzon was then being piloted by Captain Homer Yape (Captain
Yape), a Harbor Pilot from the General Santos City pilotage district. As underscored by Lorenzo
Shipping, the MV Lorcon Luzon was under Captain Yape's pilotage as it was mandatory to yield
navigational control to the Harbor Pilot while docking. As the MV Lorcon Luzon was docking,
Captain Yape ordered the vessel to proceed "slow ahead," making it move at the speed of about one
(1) knot. As it moved closer to dock, Captain Yape gave the order "dead slow ahead," making the
vessel move even slower. He then ordered the engine stopped. As the MV Lorcon Luzon moved
"precariously close" to the wharf, Captain Yape ordered the vessel to move backward. Despite his
orders, the engine failed to timely respond. Thus, Captain Yape ordered the dropping of the anchor.
Despite this, the MV Lorcon Luzon rammed into Power Barge 104. In view of the foregoing,
National Power Corporation filed before the RTC a Complaint for Damages against Lorenzo
Shipping.
The trial court issued the Decision dated February 18, 2002 absolving Lorenzo Shipping of
liability. It concluded that National Power Corporation failed to establish Lorenzo Shipping's
negligence. It underscored that while the ramming was found to have been the result of the engine's
stoppage, no malfunctioning was recorded before and after the incident. The trial court further
stated that Lorenzo Shipping was sued in its capacity as the employer of Captain Villarias and that
any liability it incurred would have been only subsidiary. Nevertheless, as Lorenzo Shipping
supposedly exercised due diligence in its selection and supervision of Captain Villarias, no liability
could be attributed to it. the Court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and awarded
the amount of P300,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, noting that the amount
of actual damages was not proven by National Power Corporation.
221
Issue
Whether or not National Power Corporation is entitled to actual damages
Ruling
We sustain the Court of Appeals' award to National Power Corporation of P300,000.00 as

temperate damages. Article 2199 of the Civil Code spells out the basic requirement that
compensation by way of actual damages is awarded only to the extent that pecuniary loss is proven.
Here, NAPOCOR alleged that it must be compensated for actual damages in the amount of
P876,826.00. It recalls these pieces of evidence:
1. Testimony of Mr. Nelson Homena, manager of Power Barge 104 [who] testified on the
damages [sic] sustained by said barge as a result of the ramming incident caused by the
negligence of M/V Lorcon Luzon.
2. The "Total Incidental Cost for Drydock and Repair" prepared by the Philippine Shipyard
and Engineering Corporation ("PHILSECO") dated 14 October 1993 was presented which
clearly enumerated and itemized the actual damages [sic] sustained by Power Barge 104
and repaired by PHILSECO.
3. NPC Disbursement Voucher No. 093-121304 in the amount of P6,775,839.02 covering a
period up to 14 January 1994 as proof of payment made by [National Power
Corporation] to PHILSECO for drydocking repairs of Power Barge 104
Regarding the "Total Incidental Cost for Drydock and Repair," which was National Power
Corporation's Exhibit "F", Lorenzo Shipping underscored that when the RTC ruled on National
Power Corporation's Formal Offer of Evidence, it denied the admission of Exhibit "F" for not having
been identified nor authenticated. It emphasized that no witness came forward to attest to its
authenticity and due execution, let alone allowed himself or herself to be cross-examined on these
points.
Nowhere in any of its submissions to this court did National Power Corporation rebut the
flaws noted by Lorenzo Shipping. Instead, it merely insisted on how actual damages are awarded on
the basis of the "best obtainable evidence," and how it has supposedly presented "competent
testimonial and documentary evidence" to prove its claims. National Power Corporation's posturing
fails to impress.
It is basic that any material presented as evidence will not be considered unless duly
admitted by the court before which it is presented. Just as basic is that a private document offered as
authentic evidence shall not be admitted unless its due execution and authenticity are established in
the manner specified by Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:
Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
222
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
A bill of expenses, such as National Power Corporation's Exhibit "F", is considered a private
document as it does not fall under what the Revised Rules on Evidence defines to be public
documents. Accordingly, for it to have been admitted by the Regional Trial Court as authentic, Rule
132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence must have been complied with. National Power
Corporation failed in this respect. Admissibility of evidence and weight accorded to evidence are
two distinct affairs. Rule 128, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Evidence governs admissibility and
provides that "[e]vidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
of these rules." When evidence has "such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence," it is said to be relevant. When evidence is not excluded by law or by the
Rules, it is said to be competent.
The weight accorded to evidence is properly considered only after evidence has been
admitted. To this end, courts evaluate evidence in accordance with the rules stipulated by Rule 133
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, consistent with basic precepts of rationality and guided by
judicially established standards. It is improper to even speak of evidentiary weight when the piece
of evidence in question has not even been admitted.
Exhibit "F" was ruled to have been inadmissible for failing to comply with Rule 132, Section
20 thus, it failed the standard of competency. Consistent with this, reliance on National Power
Corporation's Exhibit "F" and its contents, so as to establish the extent of National Power
Corporation's pecuniary loss, is misplaced. Not having been admitted, Exhibit "F" does not form part
of the body of evidence worthy of judicial consideration. Clearly, National Power Corporation failed
to establish the precise amount of pecuniary loss it suffered. Nevertheless, it remains that Power
Barge 104 sustained damage—which may be reckoned financially—as a result of the MV Lorcon
Luzon's ramming into it. National Power Corporation suffered pecuniary loss, albeit its precise
extent or amount had not been established. Accordingly, we sustain the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that National Power Corporation is entitled to temperate damages under Article 2224
which provides “temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty”. Temperate
damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.
The Decision of the Court of appeals is affirmed.
223
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. ASIAVEST

MERCHANT BANKERS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 172301. August 19, 2015, LEONEN, J.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 , SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where... the demand, exclusive of
the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000).
These jurisdictional amounts were adjusted to P300,000.00, and P400,000.00 in the case of Metro Manila.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over respondent's complaint for recovery of the sum of
Malaysian Ringgit (MYR)
"Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.'"This doctrine applies in
conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the
most convenient forum and the... parties may seek redress in another one. It is a device "designed to frustrate
illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of
litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim... of either party."
Facts
This case stemmed from an action for recovery of sum of money filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig by respondent Malaysian corporation against petitioner Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC) PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings)
caused the incorporation of an associate company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-
CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for the State
of Pahang,... Malaysia.
In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds
from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations.
The four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee
to the State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its construction contracts . . . and the
repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC." These contracts were understood to be
governed by the laws of Malaysia.
There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the
State of Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance
bonds.
224
It "entered into a compromise agreement with the State of Pahang by paying . . . the reduced
amount of [Malaysian Ringgit (MYR)] 3,915,053.54." Consequently, the corporation demanded
indemnity from PNCC by demanding the amount it paid to the State of Pahang.
On April 12, 1994, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint for recovery of
sum of money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.It based its action on
Malaysian laws. Specifically, it invoked Section 98 of the Malaysian Contracts Act of 1950 and
Section 11 of the Malaysian Civil Law Act of 1956.
PNCC filed Motions for extension of time to file its Answer on May 18, 1994, June 2, 1994,
and June 17, 1994.
The trial court granted these motions, with the last one set to expire on July 3, 1994. On July
4, 1994, PNCC filed a Motion for another five-day extension. The trial court denied this Motion on
July 13, 1994. On July 27, 1994, the trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any
responsive pleading, and allowed Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to present its evidence ex
parte.
The Regional Trial Court, in its Decision dated November 29, 1994, rendered judgment in
favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. The trial court found that Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the requisites for proof of written foreign laws. The Malaysian
laws invoked were found to be similar with Articles 2066 and 2067 of the Civil Code... the trial court
denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of Default... it also denied PNCC's Motion for Reconsideration
Ad Cautelam. PNCC brought its case before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law exclusively
cognizable by this court.It likewise denied reconsideration. Hence, PNCC filed this Petition.
Issues
Whether our courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for recovery of sum of money
filed by a Malaysian corporation against a Philippine corporation involving a contract executed and
performed in Malaysia.
Whether the forum non conveniens principle is applicable.
Ruling
On the jurisdiction issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is one such law
that provides for the jurisdiction of our courts. A plain reading... of Section 19 shows that civil
actions for payment of sum of money are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of trial courts:
225
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: x x x
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where... the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000).
These jurisdictional amounts were adjusted to P300,000.00, and P400,000.00 in the case of Metro
Manila. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over respondent's complaint for
recovery of the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 3,915,053.54.
"Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.'"This doctrine

applies in conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it
appears that it is not the most convenient forum and the... parties may seek redress in another one. It
is a device "designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that
would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the
whim... of either party." On the other hand, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the
following requisites: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently
resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law...
and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A mere invocation of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens or an easy averment... that foreign elements exist cannot operate
to automatically divest a court of its jurisdiction. It is crucial for courts to determine first if facts were
established such that special circumstances exist to warrant its desistance from assuming
jurisdiction.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11, 1995 that on
the contrary, to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient to defendant
corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its... records will be more accessible,
witnesses would be readily available and entail less expenses in terms of legal services.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to
assume that all of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available in its main
office. Most of petitioner's officers and employees who were involved in the... construction contract
in Malaysia could most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a
Philippine corporation would rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts. Our courts
would be "better positioned to enforce the judgment and, ultimately, to dispense in this case against
petitioner. Also, petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger that another jurisdiction
commenced litigation and the foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction.
226
JUN B LUNA, Petitioner, vs ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, Respondent.
A.C. NO. 10662 (763 PHIL 175-195) JULY 7, 2015
The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when entering
into a compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation:
SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in
any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their
client’s litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in cash.
Facts
A disbarment Complaint against Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita for his failure to deliver to his
client, complainant Jun B. Luna, the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds he received after entering into a
Compromise Agreement in the foreclosure case without his client's consent. On April 7, 2010, Jun B.
Luna (Luna) filed an Affidavit-Complaint against his lawyer, Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita (Atty.
Galarrita), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Luna alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita's legal services in filing a foreclosure Complaint
on October 14, 2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon. The Complaint against one
Jose Calvario (Calvario) alleged that Calvario borrowed P100,000.00 from Luna. This loan was
secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land in Quezon Province. Due to non-
payment of the loan, Luna filed the Complaint praying for payment of the obligation with interest,
and issuance of a foreclosure decree upon Calvario's failure to fully pay within the period.
Issue
Whether respondent Atty. Galarrita should be held administratively liable for entering into a
Compromise Agreement without his client complainant Luna's consent, then refusing to turn over
the settlement proceeds received
Ruling
There seems to be a compelling reason to believe that Complainant had not given any
authority for the Complainant to enter into Compromise Agreement at that precise stage of the
trial. Firstly, the Complainant was not made a party to the Compromise Agreement despite the fact
that he was not abroad when the agreement was executed. Secondly, there was no indication that he
had agreed to the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for his withdrawal of the complaint. Thirdly,
he was not seasonably informed of the execution of the Compromise Agreement/payment of the
P100,000.00 and came to know of the same only much later.
227
Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the authority given to Respondent can be
liberally interpreted and allowed to extend up to the time the Compromise had been executed, still
the Respondent may not have faithfully performed his sworn duty to his client. During the
mandatory conference, it was established that at the time the compromise was executed the
Complainant was not abroad and, therefore, given the current information technology it would have
been easy or convenient for Respondent to have informed his client about it. Admittedly, his failure
in this regard had only given Complainant the reason to cast doubt on his real intention in agreeing
to the compromise agreement for and in his behalf.
228
ISMAEL V. CRISOSTOMO, Petitioner, v. MARTIN P. VICTORIA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175098, August 26, 2015
Tenants are defined as persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latters consent,
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying
to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy
system
Facts
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure praying that the July 31, 2006 Decision and the October 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 94107 be reversed and set aside, and that the April 4,
2005 Decision and March 17, 2006 Resolution4 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board be reinstated.
The assailed July 31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the April
4, 2005 Decision and March 17, 2006 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board. It recognized respondent Martin P. Victoria (Victoria) as the bona fide tenant of a parcel of
riceland owned by petitioner Ismael V. Crisostomo (Crisostomo). The assailed October 20, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals denied Crisostomo's Motion for Reconsideration.
The April 4, 2005 Decision and March 17, 2006 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board sustained the April 7, 2003 Decision of the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan, which ruled in favor of Crisostomo in his action to eject
Victoria from the subject riceland.
In a Complaint for Ejectment filed before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Bulacan, Crisostomo alleged that he, along with his deceased brother Jose
Crisostomo, were the registered owners of a parcel of riceland with an area of 562,694 square meters.
This was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-68421 and located in Sta. Barbara, Baliuag,
Bulacan. On June 21, 1973, he and his brother allegedly entered into a lease contract with David
Hipolito (Hipolito) over a portion of the riceland (disputed portion). The contract was supposedly in
effect until Hipolito's death on December 2, 1999. As Hipolito died without any known heirs,
Crisostomo was set to reclaim possession and to take over cultivation of the disputed portion.
However, in January 2000, Victoria entered the disputed portion and began cultivating it without
the knowledge and consent of Crisostomo. Crisostomo confronted Victoria, who insisted that he had
tenancy rights over the disputed portion.
In his Answer, Victoria claimed that Hipolito was his uncle. He alleged that even during the
lifetime of Hipolito, it was he who was doing farmwork on the disputed portion and that he did so
229
with Crisostomo's knowledge. He added that from the time Hipolito became bedridden, it was he
who performed all duties pertaining to tenancy, including the delivery of lease rentals and
corresponding shares in the harvest to Crisostomo. He asserted that Crisostomo's act of receiving
lease rentals from him amounted to implied consent, which gave rise to a tenancy relationship
between them.
In its April 7, 2003 Decision, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
Bulacan ruled in favor of Crisostomo and ordered Victoria, together with all persons claiming rights
under him, to vacate the disputed portion and surrender its possession to Crisostomo.
The Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, noting that the essential element
of consent was absent, held that Victoria could not be deemed the tenant of the disputed portion. It
further held that implied tenancy could not arise in a situation where another person is validly
instituted as tenant and is enjoying recognition as such by the landowner.
In its April 4, 2005 Decision,11 the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
denied Victoria's Appeal. In its March 17, 2006 Resolution, it denied Victoria's Motion for
Reconsideration.
In its assailed July 31, 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals Eighth Division reversed the
rulings of the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan and of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. It recognized Victoria as bona fide tenant of
the disputed portion.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that "Hipolito, as the legal possessor, could legally allow
[Victoria] to work and till the landholding" and that Crisostomo was bound by Hipolito's act. It
added that Crisostomo "had been receiving his share of the harvest from [Victoria], as evidenced by
the numerous receipts indicating so." It emphasized that "[t]he receipts rendered beyond dispute
[Victoria's] status as the agricultural tenant on the landholding."16 It further noted that as an
agricultural tenant, Victoria was entitled to security of tenure who, absent any of the grounds for
extinguishing agricultural leasehold relationships, "should not be deprived of but should continue
his tenancy on the landholding."
In its assailed October 20, 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals Eighth Division denied
Crisostomo's Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Martin P. Victoria is a bona fide tenant of the disputed portion
230
Ruling
No. This court has settled the requisites for tenancy, the core of which is the element of
consent. All these requisites must be demonstrated by substantial evidence; otherwise, the person
claiming to be a tenant is not entitled to security of tenure.
Tenants are defined as persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the
latters consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or
both under the leasehold tenancy system.
Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched in jurisprudence are the following
essential elements of tenancy: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties
to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is
shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements must
be proved by substantial evidence. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he
is not entitled to security of tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that
one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure.
This court has previously recognized implied consent as sufficing to vest security of tenure
in a person claiming to be a tenant. In Ponce v. Guevarra and Joya v. Pareja, this court considered
the landowners' acts of personally negotiating for extensions and for better terms with the persons
purporting to be tenants as having placed them in estoppel or otherwise demonstrating their
ratification of tenancy.
Here, the Court of Appeals relied on petitioner's having supposedly received shares of the
harvest from respondent and his issuance of the corresponding receipts as demonstrating his
implied consent to respondent's tenancy.
To hold that respondent is the bona fide tenant of the disputed portion would be to extend
petitioner's dispossession for a period much longer that he had originally contemplated. It puts him
at the mercy of a person whom he recognized as a tenant. This is precisely the "economic
dislocation" that this court warned against in Calderon. To hold as such would be to permit agrarian
reform laws to be used as a convenient artifice for investing in a supposed tenant rights that far
exceed those of the owner.
231
JOVITA S. MANALO, Petitioner, VS. ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY, FR. JOEL TABORA
AND MR. EDWIN BERNAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 185058, November 09, 2015
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action. It is independent of the action that gave
rise to the assailed ruling. In contrast, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal.
Thus, it is a continuation of the case subject of the appeal. It follows then that it cannot go beyond the issues
that were properly the subject of the original action from which it arose.
Facts:
At the core of the issue of constructive dismissal is the matter of whether an

employer's action is warranted. Not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that
an employee must endure sustains a finding of constructive dismissal. When professionals and
educators violate the ethical standards of the profession to which they belong and for which they
train students, educational institutions employing them are justified in relieving them of their
teaching posts and in taking other appropriate precautionary or punitive measures.
In his December 13, 2000 Decision, Labor Arbiter Quiñones ruled that
petitioner Jovita S. Manalo (Manalo) was constructively dismissed. He ordered that Manalo be
reinstated to her former position, that the applicable increases to her salary and benefits be effected,
and that attorney's fees be paid to her. However, Labor Arbiter Quiñones denied Manalo's prayer
for moral and exemplary damages.
Labor Arbiter Quiñones' Decision was sustained by the National Labor Relations
Commission Second Division in its March 26, 2002 Resolution. In its August 30, 2002 Resolution, the
National Labor Relations Commission denied the Motion for Reconsideration of respondents Ateneo
de Naga University, Fr. Joel Tabora, S.J. (Fr. Tabora) and Edwin P. Bernal (Bernal).
In its assailed April 30, 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling
of Labor Arbiter Quiñones and of the National Labor Relations Commission and
dismissed Manalo's Complaint. In its assailed October 7, 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied Manalo's Motion for Reconsideration.
Manalo was a regular and permanent full-time faculty member of the Accountancy
Department of Ateneo de Naga University's College of Commerce. She was employed on June 3,
1993 and was granted permanent status in 1996. As recounted by Manalo in the Position Paper she
filed before the Labor Arbiter, she taught subjects such as "Auditing Theory, Auditing Practice,
Financial Accounting, [and] Elementary Accounting." In the Reply to respondents' Position Paper
which she, too, filed before the Labor Arbiter, Manalo similarly acknowledged that in 1994, she
taught subjects in Ateneo de Naga University's Economics Department (i.e., International Trade and
232
Philippine Economic Development), albeit insisting that she did not have the required aptitude and
competence.
Manalo was also a part-time Manager of the Ateneo de Naga Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(Cooperative) before it was evicted from holding office inside campus in 1999.
In her Position Paper, Manalo recounted that during her stint as Cooperative Manager, she came
into conflict with Bernal, Dean of Ateneo de Naga University's College of Commerce. Bernal
supposedly charged Manalo with various offenses as regards the management of the Cooperative
before the Cooperative's Board of Directors. The Board of Directors dismissed Manalo on the basis of
these charges. However, on November 30, 1999, Manalo's dismissal was recalled by the
Cooperative's General Assembly.
Manalo further recounted that on December 14, 1999, Bernal wrote to Fr. Tabora, Ateneo de
Naga University President, recommending the termination of her employment on the grounds of
serious business malpractice, palpable dishonesty, and questionable integrity.
Acting on the charges against Manalo, Fr. Tabora constituted a Grievance Committee. The
Grievance Committee later found Manalo guilty and recommended her dismissal. As recounted in
the Comment filed by respondents before this court, Manalo's offenses were: "fraud in issuance of
official receipts, collection of cash without documented remittance to the cooperative, use of
inappropriate forms of documents cash receipts, 16 instances of bouncing checks issued by the
cooperative . . . fraud in the issuance of an official receipt, unauthorized cash advances[.]"
Acting on the Grievance Committee's recommendation as the University President had the "final say
on the matter,"Fr. Tabora instead opted to transfer Manalo to teach Economics in the Department of
Social Sciences of Ateneo de Naga University's College of Arts and Science. Alleging that her
transfer constituted constructive dismissal, Manalo filed a Complaint on April 3, 2000.
On December 13, 2000, Labor Arbiter Quiñones rendered the Decision finding
that Manalo was constructively dismissed. He faulted the action taken on Manalo's case for being
anchored on "private affairs . . . which clearly has [sic] no bearing on the employment relationship
between [Ateneo de Naga University] and [Manalo]. He similarly faulted a Manalo's transfer to
teach Economics—a subject that she was supposedly not qualified to teach—as unduly burdensome,
inconvenient, and even embarrassing, and construed it as a badge of constructive dismissal.
Labor Arbiter Quiñones ordered that Manalo be reinstated to her former position in the
Accountancy Department, that the increases in salaries and benefits effected during the pendency of
the case be applied to Manalo, and that Ateneo de Naga University pay her attorney'sfees. However,
noting that Manalo failed to show that respondents acted out of manifest bad faith, he
denied Manalo's prayer for moral and exemplary damages.
233
Manalo and respondents appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission.
Labor Arbiter Quiñones' Decision was affirmed in toto by the National Labor Relations Commission
Second Division in its March 26, 2002 Resolution. In its August 30, 2002 Resolution, the National
Labor Relations Commission denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents then
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On April 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision. It reversed and set
aside the rulings of Labor Arbiter Quiñones and of the National Labor Relations Commission and
ordered Manalo's Complaint dismissed. The Court of Appeals noted that there was ample factual
basis for Manalo's transfer, and that such transfer was well within the scope of Ateneo de Naga
University's prerogatives as an employer and as an educational institution.In its assailed October 7,
2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Manalo's Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Manalo filed the present Petition. She assails the supposed impropriety of the
Court of Appeals' ruling that set aside the findings of Labor Arbiter Quiñones and of the National
Labor Relations Commission. She insists that their findings are conclusive and binding on the Court
of Appeals and that alternative findings could not have been the basis for reversing their rulings.She
insists that she was constructively dismissed and anchors this conclusion on how it was supposedly
improper for the Ateneo de Naga University to transfer her based on actions imputed to her in her
capacity as Cooperative Manager and not in her capacity as a member of the University's faculty.
Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals was in error for entertaining alternative findings to those made by
Labor Arbiter Quiñones and the National Labor Relations Commission.
Ruling
Petitioner's argument that the findings of a Labor Arbiter and of the National Labor
Relations Commission are so binding on the Court of Appeals that they are practically immutable
require a Clarification of the procedural parameters of judicial review of decisions of the National
Labor Relations Commission. As this court's resolution of the present Petition itself proceeds from
actions taken by the Court of Appeals, the same procedural parameters delineate what is permissible
in this review.
As clarified in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission,judicial

review of decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission is permitted. However, this review
is through a petition for certiorari (i.e., special civil action for certiorari) under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, rather than through an appeal. Moreover, although this court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals as regards petitions for certiorari, such petitions are filed before the Court of
Appeals (following, of course, the National Labor Relations Commission's denial of the appropriate
Motion for Reconsideration), rather than directly before this court. This is consistent with the
principle of hierarchy of courts. It is only from an adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party
234
may come to this court, which shall then be by way of a petition for review on certiorari (i.e., appeal
by certiorari) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In Odango v. National Labor Relations Commission this court explained that a special civil
action for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is allowed "only and restrictively in truly
exceptional cases."Consistent with this, the remedy of a writ of certiorari may be used only when
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Nevertheless, this requirement has been relaxed in cases where what is at stake is public welfare and
the advancement of public policy.
So too, parties who avail themselves of such a remedy are not at liberty to assail an adverse
ruling on grounds of their own choosing. Rather, a petition for certiorari is "confined to issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion." Its sole office is "the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action. It is independent of the action
that gave rise to the assailed ruling. In contrast, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a
mode of appeal. Thus, it is a continuation of the case subject of the appeal. It follows then that it
cannot go beyond the issues that were properly the subject of the original action from which it arose.
The nature, parameters, and framework of judicial review of decisions of the National Labor
Relations Commission both by this court and by the Court of Appeals were exhaustively and deftly
discussed in this court's Decision in Brown Madonna Press v. Casas:
Mode of review in illegal dismissal cases
The present petition involves mixed questions of fact and law, with the core issue being one
of fact. This issue — from which the other issues arise — relates to the nature of Casas' termination
of employment relationship with BMPI. Did she voluntarily resign from, or abandon her work at,
BMPI, or was she summarily dismissed by Cabangon?
This question of fact is an issue that we cannot resolved [sic] in a Rule 45 petition, except in
the course of determining whether the [Court of Appeals] correctly ruled in determining that the
[National Labor Relations Commission] did not commit grave abuse of discretion. In other words,
the question we ask in resolving the present case is not whether Casas abandoned her work or was
illegally dismissed; instead, we ask whether the [Court of Appeals] erred in not finding grave abuse
of discretion in the [National Labor Relations Commission's] decision finding that Casas was
dismissed from work.
Should we find that Casas had indeed been summarily dismissed, the next question involves
the nature of her dismissal — did it comply with the procedural and substantial requirements of the
law, or was it an illegal dismissal that should warrant the award to Casas of backwages and
separation pay?
235
Keen awareness of the lens used to review this question is critical, given the jurisdiction of
this Court and the nature of review employed in labor cases appealed to the Court under Rule 45.
The Court, save for exceptional cases, is not a trier of facts; as a general rule, it resolves only
questions of law. Additionally, the [National Labor Relations Commission's] decision is final and
executory, and can be reviewed by the [Court of Appeals] only when the [National Labor Relations
Commission] committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, the Court of Appeals, in a Rule 65 petition assailing the [National Labor Relations
Commission's] decision, examines whether the [National Labor Relations Commission] acted in such
a "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." This is in contrast with
appeals reaching the [Court of Appeals] . . . where it has more leeway in reviewing both questions of
fact and of law, and where the appealed decision may be reversed because of an error in judgment.
Once the [Court of Appeals] decision reaches the Court through a Rule 45 petition, the
question presented before us carries with it the mode of review applied when the case has been
appealed before the [Court of Appeals]. Although we are asked to determine whether the [Court of
Appeals] committed an error in judgment, we necessarily have to consider that the judgment made
by the [Court of Appeals] involves the question of determining grave abuse of discretion. Unlike
other petitions for review on certiorari where we determine errors of law (and in exceptional cases,
errors of fact), our appellate jurisdiction in labor cases involves the determination of whether there
had been an error in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [National Labor Relations
Commission].
With these considerations in mind, the onus probandi in assailing a question of fact as
determined by the [National Labor Relations Commission] and upheld by the [Court of Appeals]
becomes heavier. Not only must an exceptional circumstance allowing the Court to review a
question of fact exist; it must also be shown that the [National Labor Relations Commission's]
resolution of the factual issue must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion, such that the
[Court of Appeals] erred in affirming it.
From these, it is a clear error for petitioner to insist that the figurative hands of the Court of
Appeals were tied just because the findings of the Labor Arbiter and of the National Labor Relations
coincided with each other. Precisely because it was confronted with a Rule 65 Petition, it was the
Court of Appeals' business to determine whether there had been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Had it found that there was none, the proper course of
action would have been to dismiss respondents' Rule 65 Petition and to sustain the rulings of Labor
Arbiter Quiñones and of the National Labor Relations Commission. In the intervening period,
however, when the Court of Appeals was going about its task of arriving at a resolution, petitioner
should not fault the Court of Appeals both for examining the records and evidence at its disposal
and for embarking on its own analysis of whether Labor Arbiter Quiñones and the National Labor
Relations Commission properly performed their duties and were circumspect in concluding that
236
petitioner was constructively dismissed. A judicious resolution of the controversy confronting it

called for nothing less.
Going about its task, the Court of Appeals concluded that Labor Arbiter Quiñones' and the
National Labor Relations Commission's disposition of the case were attended with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. We sustain the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals.
Labor Arbiter Quiñones and the National Labor Relations Commission concluded that
petitioner was constructively dismissed because the action—that is, her transfer—taken on her
designation was supposedly not warranted by matters that seemed to have been extraneous to her
having been a faculty member teaching Accountancy subjects. Labor Arbiter Quiñones and the
National Labor Relations Commission are grossly mistaken. They divorced petitioner's manifest
breach of the ethical standards binding accountancy professionals from petitioner's role as an
educator of prospective accounting professionals. Petitioner's role as an educator made it imperative
for her to impart her profession'svalues and ideals to her students, not least of all by her own
example. Because she had failed in this, respondents were well in a position to seek to prevent one
whom they considered to have engaged in unethical and unprofessional behavior from pursuing her
didactic engagement with their students. As such, Labor Arbiter Quiñones and the National Labor
Relations Commission committed such gross errors as amounting to an evasion of their positive
duty to render judgment after only a meticulous consideration of the circumstances of a case.
237
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. G & P BUILDERS,

INCORPORATED, SPOUSES ELPIDIO AND ROSE VIOLET PARAS, SPOUSES JESUS AND
MA. CONSUELO PARAS AND VICTORIA PARAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015
The distinction is important because "the remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65."The reason behind the rule is to prevent
multiplicity of suits
Facts:
Respondent G & P Builders, Incorporated (G & P) filed a Petition for Rehabilitation. Among
the allegations in the Petition is that G & P "obtained a loan from Metrobank and mortgaged twelve
(12) parcels of land as collateral[.]"8 G & P's loan obligation amounted to P52,094,711.00 at the time
of the filing of the Petition before the trial court.9 The trial court issued a Stay Order. However,
while the rehabilitation proceedings were pending, Metrobank and G & P executed a Memorandum
of Agreement (first MOA) where the parties agreed that four (4) out of the 12 parcels of land
mortgaged would be released and sold. The sale of the parcels of land amounted to
P15,000,000.00.12 Pursuant to the first MOA, the amount was deposited with Metrobank "for
subsequent disposition and application [in conformity with] the Court approved Rehabilitation
Plan[.]"
The trial court approved the first MOA as a compromise agreement between parties.
Subsequently, Metrobank entered into a Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement18 with Elite Union
Investments Limited (Elite Union). Metrobank sold G & P's loan account for P10,419,000.00.
G & P, Elite Union, and Spouses Victor and Lani Paras executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (second MOA) on September 15, 2006. Elite Union sold all its rights, titles, and interests
over G & P's account to Spouses Victor and Lani Paras for the amount of P10,419,000.00.
Thereafter, G & P filed a Motion for the Release of Unapplied Deposit with Metrobank. It
cited the September 26, 2003 Order, which approved the first MOA between G & P and Metrobank
and provided that the P15,000,000.00 proceeds of the sale of real properties that secured the loan
obligation be deposited with Metrobank.
Metrobank opposed the Motion and claimed that the deposit was not covered by the
contract transferring G & P's loan obligation to Elite Union.32 According to Metrobank, the release
of titles was conditioned on the understanding that the proceeds would "be applied exclusively in
favor of Metrobank."
The rehabilitation court granted G & P's Motion and ordered the release of unapplied
deposit with Metrobank.35 It held that: the record shows that creditor Metropolitan Bank and Trust
238
Company sold the loan account of petitioners to Elite Union Investment Ltd.. Metrobank has
absolutely and irrevocably sold, assigned and conveyed all its rights, title and interests in and to the
loan, including all the security interest, mortgages, reimbursements rights, and similar rights and
privileges related to such loan.
Metrobank then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Order of the rehabilitation
court. According to the Court of Appeals, G & P has no interest nor personality in asking for the
release of the deposit since the loan account was finally sold to Spouses Victor and Lani Paras. The
Court of Appeals also observed that the Petition should have been dismissed outright since the
Order was a mere interlocutory order and could not be assailed through a Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals found that Metrobank sold the
entire obligation of G & P to Elite Union;46 hence, Metrobank was not entitled to the P15,000,000.00
deposit.
Petitioner argues that the trial court's Orders were properly challenged through an appeal
under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC in relation to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court such that they are not
interlocutory orders. The assailed orders in this case "finally dispose of a specific and distinct aspect
of a case - the issue on the propriety of Respondent G & P's Motion for the Release of Unapplied
Deposit with Petitioner and Petitioner's right to retain and consider the same deposit as already
applied to Respondent G & P's outstanding obligations."60 The trial court's Orders are conclusive as
to the release of the deposit to G & P until assailed and reversed on appeal.
Issue
Whether the Orders of the trial court are interlocutory orders and, thus, not appealable to the Court
of Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court;
Ruling
Yes. Petitioner's argument is devoid of merit. Under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC,82 which provides
for the mode of appeal in cases involving corporate rehabilitation, all decisions and final orders
rendered by the trial court shall be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court:
All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies
under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. x x x
This court has laid down the test to determine whether an order is final or merely interlocutory:
"Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does,
239
it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final." Interlocutory order refers to something between the
commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final
decision on the whole controversy." Conversely, a final order is one which leaves to the court
nothing more to do to resolve the case.
In this case, the assailed orders of the trial court are interlocutory in nature. The orders
pertained to an incidental matter: entitlement to the P15,000,000.00 deposit as proceeds of the sale of
properties that secured respondent G & P's loan obligation. In contrast, the main proceeding before
the commercial court concerns the approval of the rehabilitation plan under the Interim Rules. To
resolve the merits of the case, the trial court, sitting as commercial court, must either approve or
disapprove the rehabilitation plan, depending on the feasibility of the proposed plan to rehabilitate
the corporation.
Petitioner committed a procedural error when it filed a Petition for Review before the Court
of Appeals instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
distinction is important because "[t]he remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 [.]"The reason behind the rule is to
prevent multiplicity of suits:
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals
in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action
during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on
the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.
An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered,
with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment
itself. Moreover, in contrast to a final judgment or order, an interlocutory order "may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment rendered in the case."
240
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, NOW

PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO), Petitioner, v. VIRGILIO M.
TATLONGHARI, DOMINGO P. UY, GUILLERMO P. UY, HINOSAN MOTORS
CORPORATION, AND WESTERN GUARANTY CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170458, November 23, 2015
The notation "in trust for" or "for escrow" that comes with deposited funds indicates that the deposit
is for the benefit of a third party. In this case, Asset Privatization Trust deposited funds "in trust for"
Pantranco North Express, Inc., (Pantranco) a corporation under the management of Asset Privatization
Trust. These funds belong to Pantranco. Further, in the absence of evidence that Asset Privatization Trust is
authorized to collect Pantranco's indebtedness to Philippine National Bank, the subject funds can be garnished
to satisfy the claims of Pantranco's creditors
Facts
Pantranco was formerly a government-owned and controlled corporation without original

charter.4Sometime in 1972, Pantranco suffered financial losses. One of Pantranco's creditors was
Philippine National Bank. Pantranco's assets was foreclosed by Philippine National Bank, and in
1978, the ownership of Pantranco was transferred to the National Investment Development
Corporation, a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank. In 1985, National Investment
Development Corporation sold Pantranco to North Express Transport, Inc., which was owned by
Gregorio Araneta III, while Pantranco's assets were sold to Max B. Potenciano, Max Joseph A.
Potenciano, and Dolores A. Potenciano. The Potencianos thereafter incorporated Pantranco as a
private corporation. After the 1986 People Power Revolution, Pantranco was sequestered by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government. Pantranco was allegedly part of Ferdinand Marcos'
ill-gotten wealth and was acquired by using Gregorio Araneta III and the Potencianos as dummies.
The sequestration was lifted in 1988 "to give way to the sale of Pantranco North Express Inc." At that
time, Asset Privatization Trust took over Pantranco's management.
On 1988, a complaint was filed against Pantranco by Imexco Enterprise, Inc. (Imexco case).
In the Imexco case, the trial court allowed the sale of Pantranco's assets, "on the condition that the
buyer shall comply with the contractual commitments of PNEI-PNB-NIDC, wherein all receipts up
to the extent of P25 Million plus the accrued interest thereon shall be deposited with the Security
Bank and disbursement for operation to be taken therefrom." Pantranco, due to the TRO granted by
the trial court, posted a bond for 20 Million pesos, not being fully aware that only 1 million was
required by the court. Upon realizing its mistake, Pantranco requests from Asset Privatization Trust
the return of the overpayment, but the latter refused to do so. The Imexco case was subsequently
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
The P20 million deposit earned interest, and as of January 31, 1993, the deposit increased to
P29,533,072.69. Meanwhile, Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, and Hinosan Motors Corporation
241
(Hinosan Motors), as separate creditors of Pantranco, filed separate civil cases against Pantranco
which the trial court granted awarding damages collectively, and the total monetary award of these
Decisions amounted to P27,815,188.52. Acting on the decisions, sheriff Virgilio Tatlonghari informed
the creditors about the amount deposited in the name of Pantranco being held by Asset Privatization
Trust. Notice of Garnishments were issued to said funds and their immediate release was ordered.
However, Asset privatization Trust objected saying that the funds are owned by the Government
and not subject to execution.
In view of the recommendation of the Treasury Miscellaneous Accounting Division, Bureau

of Treasury, that the deposit was recorded as a trust liability account of the Bureau and not as
income of the National Government, and therefore, do not form part of the income in the General
Fund of the National Government" Tatlonghari wrote to the Asset Privatization Trust that the funds
would be released "unless restrained by a Temporary Restraining Order." Hence the funds were
released.
On August 20, 1993, Asset Privatization Trust, representing the Republic of the Philippines,
filed several cases under Rule 39, Section 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with claim for
damages. In these cases, the trial court ruled in favor of the Republic. The trial court explained that
since Section 33 of Proclamation No. 50 provides that proceeds from the sale of assets form part of
the general fund of national government, the assets in this case, which are in cash, should
automatically be considered as part of the general fund. Also, Section 29(1), Book IV, Title II,
Chapter 4 of the Administrative Code states that the Bureau of Treasury shall "act as the principal
custodian of all the national government funds." It does not state that the Bureau of Treasury is
allowed to take custody of private funds. The phrases "in trust for APT-Pantranco North Express,
Inc." and "for the account of Pantranco North Express, Inc." do not indicate that the funds belong to
Pantranco but merely point "to the account where such funds are to be applied and nothing more."
Hence, the funds deposited by Asset Privatization Trust are public funds that cannot be garnished.
This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals which held that the funds are not public.
The Court of Appeals held that Section 2 of Proclamation No. 50 must be read in conjunction with
Section 23. Under Section 23, the transfer of assets must be identified "in an appropriate instrument
describing such assets or identifying the loan or other transactions giving rise to the receivables,
obligations and other property constituting assets to be transferred." In this case, Asset Privatization
Trust did not present any Deed of Assignment to prove that Pantranco's loan with the Philippine
National Bank was assigned to it. Also, the terms of the loan agreement between Philippine National
Bank and Pantranco were not sufficient bases to rule that the subject funds are public funds. Hence
this petition.
Issue
Whether the subject funds can be garnished.
242
Ruling
The court ruled that the subject funds belong to Pantranco and are in the nature of private
funds. Hence, the subject funds can be garnished and be used to satisfy the claims of respondents
Tatlonghari, Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, Hinosan Motors, and Western Guaranty Corporation.
"Government funds" includes public moneys of every sort and other resources pertaining to any
agency of the Government. The phrase "pertaining to any agency of the Government" distinguishes
government funds from private funds. The definition of "government funds" indicates that for funds
to be considered government funds or public funds, it must be shown that the funds properly
belong to a government agency. The determination of the nature of funds is important especially in
cases where there are allegations that the funds involved are government funds. The general rule is
that government funds cannot be garnished. The functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
However, there are government entities whose funds may be garnished even without an
appropriation law. If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled
corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the
government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the
government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated
like any other corporation. In this case, petitioner has not shown that Pantranco is a government
entity. As the history of Pantranco shows, it was originally a government corporation, was
foreclosed by Philippine National Bank, and was later sold and incorporated as a private
corporation. Pantranco was sequestered, but the sequestration did not have the effect of transferring
ownership to the national government. Clearly, the court has recognized that the assets of
corporations placed under the management of petitioner should be subject to the claims of unpaid
creditors.
243
MELANIE E. DE OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs RPN-9/RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK INC.,

Respondent.
G.R. NO. 192947, December 9, 2015
A judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it becomes final and
executory; " nothing is more settled in law." Once a case is decided with finality, "the controversy is settled
and the matter is laid to rest." Accordingly, a final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect "even
if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court
of the land."
Facts
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, prays that the assailed March 5, 2010 Decision and July 8, 2010 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108457 be reversed and set aside. The Petition further prays that the
recomputation that petitioner Melanie De Ocampo (De Ocampo) sought in the monetary award she
had already received be permitted in order that she may receive additional backwages, separation
pay, and 13th month pay, as well as 12% interest per annum.
In its assailed March 5, 2010 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed De Ocampo's Petition
for Certiorari and affirmed the September 30, 2008 Decision and December 15, 2008 Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission. In its assailed July 8, 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied De Ocampo's Motion for Reconsideration.
For its part, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the December 13, 2007 Order
of Executive Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Manansala (Executive Labor Arbiter Manansala), which
denied De Ocampo's Motion to Recompute the Monetary Award with Motion to Issue Alias Writ of
Execution.
De Ocampo was the complainant in a case for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, damages,
and attorney's fees against respondent Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9) and several RPN-9
officers.
Issue
Whether petitioner Melanie De Ocampo may still seek a recomputation of and an increase in the
monetary award given her.
Ruling
It is basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it

becomes final and executory; " nothing is more settled in law." Once a case is decided with finality,
244
"the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest." Accordingly, a final judgment may no
longer be modified in any respect "even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land." Once a judgment becomes
final, the court or tribunal loses jurisdiction, and any modified judgment that it issues, as well as all
proceedings taken for this purpose, is null and void.
This elementary rule finds basis in "public policy and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final
at some definite date fixed by law." Basic rationality dictates that there must be an end to litigation.
Any contrary posturing renders justice inutile and reduces to futility the winning party's capacity to
benefit from a resolution of the case.
This rule, however, does admit of exceptions. As this court explained in Sacdalan v. Court of
Appeals:
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable. (Citations omitted)
Consistent with the principle of finality of judgments, it follows that no appeal may be taken from
orders of execution of judgments.
245
MELANIE E. DE OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs RPN-9/RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK INC.,

Respondent.
G.R. NO. 192947 December 9, 2015
A judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it becomes final and
executory; " nothing is more settled in law." Once a case is decided with finality, "the controversy is settled
and the matter is laid to rest." Accordingly, a final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect "even
if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court
of the land."
Facts
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, prays that the assailed March 5, 2010 Decision and July 8, 2010 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108457 be reversed and set aside. The Petition further prays that the
recomputation that petitioner Melanie De Ocampo (De Ocampo) sought in the monetary award she
had already received be permitted in order that she may receive additional backwages, separation
pay, and 13th month pay, as well as 12% interest per annum.
In its assailed March 5, 2010 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed De Ocampo's Petition
for Certiorari and affirmed the September 30, 2008 Decision and December 15, 2008 Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission. In its assailed July 8, 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied De Ocampo's Motion for Reconsideration.
For its part, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the December 13, 2007 Order
of Executive Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Manansala (Executive Labor Arbiter Manansala), which
denied De Ocampo's Motion to Recompute the Monetary Award with Motion to Issue Alias Writ of
Execution.
De Ocampo was the complainant in a case for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, damages,
and attorney's fees against respondent Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9) and several RPN-9
officers.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Melanie De Ocampo may still seek a recomputation of and an increase in
the monetary award given her.
RULING:
It is basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it

becomes final and executory; " nothing is more settled in law." Once a case is decided with finality,
"the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest." Accordingly, a final judgment may no
246
longer be modified in any respect "even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land." Once a judgment becomes
final, the court or tribunal loses jurisdiction, and any modified judgment that it issues, as well as all
proceedings taken for this purpose, is null and void.
This elementary rule finds basis in "public policy and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final
at some definite date fixed by law." Basic rationality dictates that there must be an end to litigation.
Any contrary posturing renders justice inutile and reduces to futility the winning party's capacity to
benefit from a resolution of the case.
This rule, however, does admit of exceptions. As this court explained in Sacdalan v. Court of
Appeals:
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.
Consistent with the principle of finality of judgments, it follows that no appeal may be taken from
orders of execution of judgments.
247
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS vs. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR

G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are to be considered ascendants for the purpose of
awarding moral damages. Persons exercising substitute parental authority are intended to stand in place of a
child's parents in order to ensure the well-being and welfare of a child. Like natural parents, persons exercising
substitute parental authority are required to, among others, keep their wards in their company, provide for
their upbringing, show them love and affection, give them advice and counsel, and provide them with
companionship and understanding.
Facts :
On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of
Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 van with
plate number PKM 195 was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an
incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to
the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the driver of the
van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared
to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the van. Fortunately for
Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital. Upon investigation, it
was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan. Caravan is a corporation engaged in
the business of organizing travels and tours. Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the
van as its service driver.
Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite medical attendance,

Reyes died two (2) days after the accident. Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal
aunt and the person who raised her since she was nine (9) years old, filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque a Complaint for damages against Bautista and Caravan. The RTC awarded
damages to Abejar due to Bautista’s gross negligence in driving the vehicle. Caravan filed a motion
for reconsideration hence this case.
Issue:
Whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring an action
for damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on account of
Jesmariane R. Reyes' death.
248
Ruling:
Yes, Abejar is a real party in interest. Section 2. Parties in Interest. — A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. "To qualify a person to be a
real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he [or she] must appear to be the
present real owner of the right sought to be enforced." Respondent's capacity to file a complaint
against petitioner stems from her having exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes.
Respondent's right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based on two grounds.
First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason
that when Reyes died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural parent would have felt
upon the loss of one's child. It is for this injury — as authentic and personal as that of a natural
parent — that respondent seeks to be indemnified. Second, respondent is capacitated to do what
Reyes' actual parents would have been capacitated to do.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Tapdasan, Jr. v. People, and Aguilar, Sr.
v. Commercial Savings Bank, this court allowed natural parents of victims to recover damages for the
death of their children. Inasmuch as persons exercising substitute parental authority have the full
range of competencies of a child's actual parents, nothing prevents persons exercising substitute
parental authority from similarly possessing the right to be indemnified for their ward's death.
We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having reached the age of
majority, she was already emancipated upon her death. While parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation, respondent continued to support and care for Reyes even after she turned 18. Except
for the legal technicality of Reyes' emancipation, her relationship with respondent remained the
same. The anguish and damage caused to respondent by Reyes' death was no different because of
Reyes' emancipation.
249
RE: DECISION DATED AUGUST 19, 2008, 3RD DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R.
SP NO. 79904 [HON. GARCIANO, ET AL. vs. HON. TIAMSON, ETC., ET AL.] vs. ATTY. JOSE
DE G. FERRER
A.C. No. 8037, February 17, 2016
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to anticipate the possibility of being held liable for forum
shopping. He is expected to be aware of actions constituting forum shopping. Respondent's defense of
substantial compliance and good faith cannot exonerate him. The elements of forum shopping are expected to
be fundamentally understood by members of the bar, and a defense of good faith cannot counter an abject
violation of the rule.
Facts:
On July 27, 2001, Dionisio Donato T. Garciano (Garciano), then Mayor of Baras, Rizal, sought
to appoint Rolando Pilapil Lacayan (Lacayan) as Sangguniang Bayan Secretary, replacing Nolasco
Vallestero (Vallestero). The appointment was opposed by Wilfredo Robles (Robles), then Vice Mayor
of Baras, Rizal. He said that the position is not vacant and that it is the vice mayor, not the mayor,
who has the authority to appoint the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary. Garciano insisted and removed
Vallestero's name from the payroll. Vallestero sued Garciano before the Sandiganbayan. Vallestero,
Robles, and other Sangguniang Bayan members also filed a complaint for mandamus and damages
with preliminary mandatory injunction against Garciano and other municipal officials (Garciano, et
al.) before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. RTC then ruled in favor of Vallestero and
Robles ordering the release of their respective salaries and other benefits. Garciano, et al. did not
heed the RTC’s order; hence, they were found liable for indirect contempt.
Garciano, et al., through their counsel, Atty. Ferrer, filed a Petition for Certiorari (First
Petition) on October 9, 2003 before the CA. On October 16, 2003, Garciano, et al., through Atty.
Ferrer, filed another Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (Second Petition) before the CA. On the same day,
Garciano, et al. filed before the CA Eleventh Division an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw
Petition under Rule 17 Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the Decision dated August 19, 2008, the Court of Appeals Third Division dismissed the
Second Petition with prejudice due to the deliberate violation of the rule against forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals found that Garciano, et al., through Atty. Ferrer, filed two (2)
Petitions for Certiorari successively. It also held that the withdrawal of the First Petition was
"intended to camouflage the glaring and blatant irregularity committed" by Garciano, et al. through
their counsel.
250
Issue:
Whether respondent Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer should be held administratively liable for
violating the rule against forum shopping.
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer is liable for violating the rule against forum shopping. In Asia
United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., this court enumerated the instances where forum
shopping takes place.
There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court." The different ways by which forum
shopping may be committed were explained in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company:
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause
of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the
ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal
is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
prayers (splitting causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata).
Respondent filed multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer.
All the elements necessary for the commission of forum shopping are present. Hence, Atty. Ferrer is
here suspended and sternly warned from the practice of law for six (6) months for engaging in
forum shopping and that a repetition of the same and similar acts will dealt with more severely.
251
VIVA SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs. KEPPEL PHILIPPINES MINING, INC.,

G.R. No. 177382, February 17, 2016
For the courts to exercise liberality, petitioner must show that it is suffering from an injustice not
commensurate to the thoughtlessness of its procedural mistakes. Not only did petitioner exercise injustice
towards its creditors, its Rule 43 Petition for Review did not show that the Regional Trial Court erred in
dismissing its Amended Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation.
Facts:
Viva Shipping Lines owned only two (2) maritime vessels and PI47,630,000.00 of real
property and its vessels were marked as “free assets.” According to Viva Shipping Lines, the
devaluation of the Philippine peso, increased competition, and mismanagement of its businesses
made it difficult to pay its debts as they became due. It also stated that "almost all [its] vessels were
rendered unserviceable either because of age and deterioration that [it] can no longer compete with
modern made vessels owned by other operators.” Luzviminda C. Cueto, a former employee of Viva
Shipping Lines, also filed a Manifestation and Registration of Monetary Claim stating that Viva
Shipping Lines owes her P232,000.00 as separation and 13th month pay. The Securities and
Exchange Commission filed a Comment informing the RTC that Viva Shipping Lines violated
certain laws and rules of the Commission.
Viva Shipping Lines' former employees Alejandro Olit, Nida Montilla, Pio Hernandez,
Eugenio Baculo, and Harlan Bacaltos (Alejandro Olit, et al.) filed their comment on the Amended
Petition, informing the Regional Trial Court of their pending complaint against Viva Shipping Lines
before the National Labor Relations Commission... the Regional Trial Court lifted the stay order and
dismissed Viva Shipping Lines' Amended Petition for failure to show the company's viability and
the feasibility of rehabilitation.
Aggrieved, Viva Shipping Lines filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court before the Court of Appeals. It only impleaded Hon. Adolfo V. Encomienda, the Presiding
Judge of the trial court that rendered the assailed decision. It did not implead any of its creditors, but
served copies of the Petition on counsels for Metrobank, Keppel Philippines Marine, Inc., Pilipinas
Shell, City of Batangas, Province of Quezon, and City of Lucena. Viva Shipping Lines neither
impleaded nor served a copy of the Petition on its former employees or their counsels.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Viva Shipping Lines' Petition for Review. It found that Viva
Shipping Lines failed to comply with procedural requirements under Rule 43, The Court of Appeals
ruled that due to the failure of Viva Shipping Lines to implead its creditors as respondents, "there
are no respondents who may be required to file a comment on the petition, pursuant to Section 8 of
Rule 43.
252
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner Viva Shipping Lines' Petition for Review on
procedural grounds
Ruling:
We deny the Petition. It is true that Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the
"rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." However, this provision does not negate
the entire Rules by providing a license to disregard all the other provisions. Resort to liberal
construction must be rational and well-grounded, and its factual bases must be so clear such that
they outweigh the intent or purpose of an apparent reading of the rules.
Rule 43 prescribes the mode of appeal for corporate rehabilitation cases: Petitioner did not
comply with some of these requirements. First, it did not implead its creditors as respondents.
Instead, petitioner only impleaded the Presiding Judge of the RTC, contrary to Section 6(a) of Rule
43. Second, it did not serve a copy of the Petition on some of its creditors, specifically, its former
employees. Finally, it did not serve a copy of the Petition on the RTC.
The RTC correctly dismissed the Amended Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation. The
dismissal of the Amended Petition did not emanate from petitioner's failure to provide complete
details on its assets and liabilities but on the trial court's finding that rehabilitation is no longer
viable for petitioner. Under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, a "petition
shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one hundred
eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing." The proceedings are also deemed terminated
upon the trial court's disapproval of a rehabilitation plan, "or a determination that the rehabilitation
plan may no longer be implemented in accordance with its terms, conditions, restrictions, or
assumptions.
253
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 222731, March 08, 2016
The credibility of the results of any election depends, to a large extent, on the confidence of each voter
that his or her individual choices have actually been counted. It is in that local precinct after the voter casts his
or her ballot that this confidence starts. It is there where it will be possible for the voter to believe that his or her
participation as sovereign truly counts.
Facts:
Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan-

VNP, Inc.) and Former Senator Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed this Petition for mandamus before
this court to compel respondent Commission on Elections to implement the Voter Verified Paper
Audit Trail security feature.
The Commission on Elections is a government entity "vested by law to enforce and

administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections in the country. Republic Act No. 8436
authorized the Commission on Elections to use an automated election system for electoral exercises.
Republic Act No. 9369 introduced significant changes to Republic Act No. 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, and other election-related statutes.
In 2010 and 2013, the Commission on Elections enforced a nationwide automated election
system using the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. For the 2016 National and Local
Elections, the Commission on Elections has opted to use the Vote-Counting Machine. The vote-
counting machine is a paper-based automated election system, which is reported to be seven times
faster and more powerful than the PCOS because of its updated processor. Likewise, it is reported to
have more memory and security features, and is capable of producing the Voter Verification Paper
Audit Trail (VVPAT). This VVPAT functionality is in the form of a printed receipt and a touch
screen reflecting the votes in the vote-counting machine.
Issue:
Whether the Commission on Elections may be compelled, through a writ of mandamus, to

enable the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail system capability feature for the 2016 Elections.
Ruling:
Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. One of the
laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated election system to have the capability of
providing a voter-verified paper audit trail. The current vote-counting machines should meet the
254
minimum system capability of generating a VVPAT. However, the Commission on Elections' act of
rendering inoperative this feature runs contrary to why the law required this feature in the first
place.
A “voter verified paper audit trail” requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify
whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum
should be paper-based.
255
DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 221849-50, April 4, 2016
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and
substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would
be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process.
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Matalam, Regional Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform-Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (DAR-ARMM), with the commission
of crimes under "Section 52 (g) of Republic Act No. 8921, otherwise known as the [Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS)] Act of 1997, and Section 1, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7742". According to the Prosecution, Matalam, Lawi, and Unte
were the officers involved in the collection and remittance of accounts to the GSIS and Pag-IBIG
Fund and, thus, were accountable for the non-remittance. Matalam and his co-accused failed and/or
refused to remit the required contributions without justifiable cause despite repeated demands.
The Sandiganbayan found Matalam guilty of non-remittance of the employer's share of Pag-
IBIG Fund premiums. According to the Sandiganbayan, under the pertinent rules and law, it is the
employer who is penalized for the non-remittance to Pag-IBIG Fund. Matalam comes before the
Court and assails the Sandiganbayan Decision. He argues that even if the offenses he allegedly
committed are mala prohibita, his guilt must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The pieces of
evidence presented in this case create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Thus, a re-evaluation of the
evidence is required.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Datu Guimid P. Matalam is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of non-
remittance of the employer's share of the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums.
Ruling:
When an act is malum prohibitum, “it is the commission of that act as defined by the law,
and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been
violated.” The non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is malum prohibitum. What
the relevant laws punish is the failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or justifiable cause in
remitting or paying the required contributions or accounts.
256
In this case, however, petitioner failed to prove a justifiable cause for his failure to remit the
premiums. We cannot subscribe to petitioner's defense that the funds for the remittances were not
directly credited to DAR-ARMM but to the account of the Office of the Regional Governor of the
ARMM, which had the obligation to remit to the various line agencies of the ARMM the specific
amounts provided to them. As head of the Regional Office, petitioner was a public officer who had
the obligation to ensure the proper remittance of the employer's share of the premiums to the GSIS
and Pag-IBIG Fund.
257
JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON vs. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, et. al.
GR. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the
policy.
Facts:
A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police-Olongapo City Police
Office and private respondent Laude against petitioner Pemberton. Pemberton received a Subpoena
issued by the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City giving him 10 days from receipt within which to file
a counter-affidavit. Laude filed an Omnibus Motion which Pemberton opposed.
During the preliminary investigation on October 27, 2014, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City
stated that Pemberton's right to file a counter-affidavit was deemed waived. The City Prosecutor of
Olongapo City continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted ocular inspections in connection
with the preliminary investigation. It "found probable cause against [Pemberton] for the crime of
murder."21 On the same day, an Information for murder was filed against Pemberton before the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest.
On December 18, 2014, Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. On
the same day, he filed a Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court. Secretary
De Lima denied Pemberton's Petition for Review and stated that based on the evidence on record,
there was “no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo
City.”
Aggrieved, Pemberton filed this Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Pemberton argues that in
sustaining a finding of probable cause, Secretary De Lima committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or absence of jurisdiction based on the following grounds: (a) Secretary De
Lima took into account additional evidence which the City Prosecutor allegedly had no authority to
receive and which Pemberton had no opportunity to address and rebut, thereby denying him due
process of law; (b) Secretary De Lima found probable cause to charge Pemberton with the crime of
murder when “the evidence on record does not support the existence of probable cause to indict
[him] . . . with either homicide or murder[;]” and (c) Secretary De Lima found that “the killing was
attended with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength[,] and cruelty
despite prevailing jurisprudence dictating that the elements of these qualifying circumstances be
established by direct evidence.”
258
Secretary De Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General, points out that this Petition is
procedurally infirm. The Petition assails the appreciation of evidence and law by Secretary De Lima,
which are “errors of judgment . . . [that] cannot be remedied by a writ of certiorari.” Further, by
filing this Petition before this court and not the Court of Appeals, Pemberton violated the principle
of hierarchy of courts.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his Petition before
this Court instead of the Court of Appeals
Ruling:
Yes. In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of
courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that
the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed
to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the
lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential
tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and
important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively
'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of
facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may
not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
259
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating — in
the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar — existing
precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.
A direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue the writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
In this case, petitioner alleges that the case against him has been scheduled for an expedited
trial. Thus, petitioner claims that it is necessary “to expeditiously arrive at a definitive ruling as to
respondent [De Lima] committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the [a]ssailed [r]esolutions.” In
his view, a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction is necessary. Petitioner argues that
without this Court's intervention, a situation may result where “the trial has already concluded[,]
while the issue on whether there exists probable cause to charge [petitioner] with the crime of
murder has not been settled with finality.”
This argument is completely bereft of merit. It is not clear why any action by the Court of Appeals,
which has concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be
considered as sufficient for review of petitioner's case.
Furthermore, the possibility of the conclusion of the trial of the case against petitioner is not a reason
that is special and important enough to successfully invoke this Court's original jurisdiction. Once
there has been a judicial finding of probable cause, an executive determination of probable cause is
irrelevant.
260
NAPOLEON S. RONQUILLO, JR., ET AL., vs. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION

ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 172593, April 20, 2016
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and
substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would
be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process.
Facts:
Petitioners Ronquillo, Jr., et al. are former employees of National Electrification Administration
(NEA). Before July 1, 1989, NEA paid its employees their COLA, which was equivalent to 40% of
their basic pay, in addition to their basic pay and other allowances.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, became the new salary standardization law applicable to all government
officials and employees. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 provides that, as a general rule, all
allowances are already included in the new standardized salary rates. Thus, NEA discontinued
paying the COLA of its employees from July 1, 1989.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758, the Department of Budget and Management issued Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10, otherwise known as Rules and Regulations for the Implementation
of the Revised Compensation and Position Classification Plan in Government-Owned and/or -
Controlled Corporations and Government Financial Institutions (GOCCs/GFIs). Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 states that allowances given on top of basic salary shall be
“discontinued] without qualification[.]” Otherwise, payment of these allowances constitutes an
“illegal disbursement of public funds.”
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, which took effect on November 1, 1989, was challenged
before the Supreme Court. After Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 was ruled as ineffective
and unenforceable, several government agencies began giving back pays to their employees. The
back pay consisted of the allowances that had been discontinued.
The Department of Budget and Management re-issued and published Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10, which became effective on March 16, 1999. NEA paid the COLA of its employees for
the period of July 1, 1989 until July 15, 1999.
On November 12, 2001, the Department of Budget and Management issued Budget Circular 2001-
03 stating that the COLA, among others, is already deemed integrated in the basic salary. Payment
of the COLA is, therefore, unauthorized.
In 2001, Congress passed Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which provides for a framework to restructure the power industry.
261
Under Section 63 of the EPIRA, national government employees who would be displaced or
separated from services due to the restructuring of the power industry are entitled to separation
pay. These affected employees would be considered legally terminated, pursuant to Rule 33, Section
3 (b)(ii) of the EPIRA Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The reorganization of NEA affected the employment of Ronquillo, Jr., et al. On November 7, 2003,
more than half of them chose early retirement, while the rest were dismissed from work on
December 31, 2003.
Ronquillo, Jr., et al. were given separation pay, the total amount of which excludes the balance of
their COLA, specifically for the period of July 16, 1999 until their separation from service on
November 7 or December 31, 2003. They demanded that NEA, et al. give back pay for their
COLA, but this was refused. NEA, et al. informed them that NEA needed the funds to cover the
separation pay of all the affected employees.
The RTC denied the Petition for lack of merit. Ronquillo, Jr., et al. moved for reconsideration, but the
Motion was likewise denied. Raising a question of law, they appealed directly before this Court
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether petitioners Ronquillo, Jr., et al. can appeal the RTC’s Decision directly before the SC.
Ruling:
Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue deals with
a question of law.
The case does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said question [of law] at
best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the
matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not
require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and
application of law.
Issues dealing with the interpretation of law solely involve a question of law. A question of law
exists when the law applicable to a particular set of facts is not settled, whereas a question of fact
arises when the truth or falsehood of alleged facts is in doubt.
The case involves a question of law, specifically, whether Republic Act No. 6758 and the re-issuance
and publication of the Department of Budget and Management's Corporate Compensation Circular
No. 10 entitle petitioners to the back pay of the COLA.
262
VIRGINIA DIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TIMOTHY DESMOND

G.R. No. 208146, June 08, 2016
When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that may be cured by amendment, courts
must provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend the information.
Facts:
Private respondent Desmond is the Chair and Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay Marine
Exploratorium, of which Dio is Treasurer and Member of the Board of Directors. Desmond filed a
complaint against Dio for libel. Two (2) separate Informations were filed.
Dio filed a Petition to suspend the criminal proceedings, but it was denied.
Dio moved for reconsideration and she also moved to quash the Informations, arguing that the "facts
charged do not constitute an offense.” The trial court denied both Motions.
Dio filed a Motion for leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration.She also filed an
Omnibus Motion to quash the Informations for failure to allege publication and lack of jurisdiction,
and for second reconsideration with leave of court.
The trial court denied both Motions and scheduled Dio's arraignment. Dio moved for partial
reconsideration which was granted by the trial court.
Desmund filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals sustained that
the Informations did not substantially constitute the offense charged. It found that the Informations
did not contain any allegation that the emails allegedly sent by Dio to Desmond had been
accessed. However, it found that the trial court erred in quashing the Informations without giving
the prosecution a chance to amend them pursuant to Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
Dio moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied. Hence, this Petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution must be given the opportunity to amend the information
Ruling:
If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order that an amendment be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged

defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that
an amendment be made.
263
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall
be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be
granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers
from the same defect despite the amendment.
This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an
arbitrary exercise of power. In People v. Sandiganbayan:
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the
defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the
prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an
Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In
such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should
grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment. This rule allows a
case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment,
unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings,
are avoided.
More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As
explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its
day in court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an
Information, where such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and
again in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.
In this case, petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned; thus, Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court applies. If the information is defective, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to
amend it before it may be quashed.
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to
entry of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for
quashal. An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise
impermissible.
264
INGRID SALA SANTAMARIA and ASTRID SALA BOZA, vs.

THOMAS CLEARY
G.R. No. 197122, June 15, 2016
Utmost freedom governs the taking of depositions to allow the widest scope in the gathering of
information by and for all parties in relation to their pending case.
Facts:
Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California, filed a Complaint for specific
performance and damages against Miranila Land Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Ingrid
Sala Santamaria (Santamaria), Astrid Sala Boza (Boza), and Kathryn Go-Perez (Go-Perez) before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
The Complaint involved shares of stock of Miranila Land Development Corporation, for which
Cleary paid US$191,250.00. Cleary sued in accordance with the Stock Purchase and Put Agreement
he entered into with Miranila Land Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Santamaria, Boza, and
Go-Perez. Paragraph 9.02 of the Agreement provides:
Any suit, action or proceeding with respect to this Agreement may be brought in (a) the
courts of the State of California, (b) the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, or (c) the courts of the country of Corporation’s incorporation, as Cleary may
elect in his sole discretion, and the Parties hereby submit to any such suit, action proceeding
or judgment and waives any other preferential jurisdiction by reason of domicile.
Cleary elected to file the case in Cebu.
Santamaria, Boza, and Go-Perez filed their respective Answers with Compulsory Counterclaims.
The trial court then issued a notice of pre-trial conference.
In his pre-trial brief, Cleary stipulated that he would testify "in support of the allegations of his
complaint, either on the witness stand or by oral deposition." Moreover, he expressed his intent in
availing himself "of the modes of discovery under the rules.
Cleary moved for court authorization to take deposition. He prayed that his deposition be taken
before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los Angeles and be used as his direct testimony.
Santamaria and Boza opposed the Motion and argued that the right to take deposition is not
absolute. They claimed that Cleary chose the Philippine system to file his suit, and yet he deprived
the court and the parties the opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly propound questions
on him.
Go-Perez filed a separate Opposition, arguing that the oral deposition was not intended for
discovery purposes if Cleary deposed himself as plaintiff. Since he elected to file suit in the
265
Philippines, he should submit himself to the procedures and testify before the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu. Moreover, Go-Perez argued that oral deposition in the United States would prejudice, vex,
and oppress her and her co-petitioners who would need to incur costs to attend.
The trial court denied Cleary’s Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition.
Cleary elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted Cleary’s Petition
for Certiorari and reversed the trial court’s ruling.
Hence, the present Petitions were filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court applies
to a non-resident foreigner plaintiff’s direct testimony.
Ruling:
YES. Utmost freedom governs the taking of depositions to allow the widest scope in the gathering of
information by and for all parties in relation to their pending case. The relevant section in Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 23: DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. – By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of
the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition
upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only
in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken
only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
As regards the taking of depositions, Rule 23, Section 1 is clear that the testimony of any person may
be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories at the instance of any party.
San Luis explained that this provision "does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can
avail of deposition." Thus, this Court found it immaterial that the plaintiff was a non-resident
foreign corporation and that all its witnesses were Americans residing in the United States.
On the use of depositions taken, we refer to Rule 23, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. This Court has
held that "depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand
by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes." These exceptional
cases are enumerated in Rule 23, Section 4(c) as follows:
266
SEC 4. Use of depositions. – At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be
used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had
due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out
of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that
such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and
with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open
court, to allow the deposition to be used[.]
The difference between the taking of depositions and the use of depositions taken is apparent in
Rule 23, which provides separate sections to govern them. Jurisprudence has also discussed the
importance of this distinction and its implications:
The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to
justify the court’s order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or
testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial.
But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The
utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a
result, there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties of all the
facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as may be appropriate for use as a substitute for viva
voce examination may be introduced at the trial; the remainder of the testimony, having served its
purpose in revealing the facts to the parties before trial, drops out of the judicial picture.
Under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method
of discovery —with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a method of presenting
testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the
taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use
of oral testimony wherever practicable.
The rules and jurisprudence support greater leeway in allowing the parties and their witnesses to be
deposed in the interest of collecting information for the speedy and complete disposition of cases.
267
ARIEL LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016
There is a question of law "when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" and
there is a question of fact "when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts."
Facts:
Petitioner Ariel Lopez (Lopez) was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 533. Lopez
pleaded not guilty during his arraignment.
During trial, Mario Perez (Perez) testified that he purchased the female carabao from a certain
Enrique Villanueva. The purchase was evidenced by a Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle.
Prosecution witness Felix Alderete (Alderete) testified that he worked as an errand boy for Lopez
from 2000 to 2002.
Alderete claimed that he slept at Lopez's house on July 17, 2002. Around 3:45 a.m. of the next day,
Alderete and Lopez went to Constancio Genosas' property. Lopez untied the carabao and allegedly
told Alderete that he would "bring the carabao to his boss named Boy Platan at Malagos." He
ordered Alderete to deliver the carabao to Malagos. Alderete, not knowing whether the carabao was
owned by Lopez, followed Lopez's instructions. Lopez and Boy Platan met Alderete in Malagos.
From there, the carabao was loaded on a vehicle headed to Davao City
The next day, Alderete learned that there was a commotion in Wines, Baguio District, regarding
Perez's lost carabao. Afraid of being accused for the loss of the carabao, Alderete sought help from
the barangay police.
Teresita Perez (Teresita) testified that Barangay Police Moralde informed her and Perez, her
husband, that Lopez stole their carabao. Subsequently, a confrontation took place at the barangay
police station. During the confrontation, Lopez admitted to taking the carabao and promised to pay
indemnification.
The defense presented Lopez as a witness during trial. Lopez denied stealing the carabao. He also
denied knowing Alderete. He stated that he was a farmer, and that at the time the offense was
committed, he was working at his home in Wines, Baguio District, Davao City.
The trial court found Lopez guilty of cattle-rustling. It gave credence to Alderete's testimony that
Lopez ordered him to bring the carabao to Malagos. The trial court also noted Alderete's statement
that "he knew Lopez was engaged in the buy and sell of large cattle.
Lopez filed before the Court of Appeals an appeal arguing that the prosecution was unable to prove
that the carabao allegedly stolen was the same carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez.
268
Lopez filed before the Court of Appeals an appeal arguing that the prosecution was unable to prove
that the carabao allegedly stolen was the same carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle and Alderete's testimony
were sufficient to prove the ownership of the lost carabao.
Lopez moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied.
Petitioner Ariel Lopez, through counsel, filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
In his Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner reiterates the arguments raised in his appeal
before the Court of Appeals. Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove Mario and
Teresita Perez's ownership of the lost carabao. Alderete had no personal knowledge of the lost
carabao's appearance, or where it grazed.
In addition, petitioner points out that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses. Alderete testified “that the carabao he and petitioner allegedly untied and
brought to Malagos was still pregnant[.] On the other hand, Perez testified “that the carabao had an
offspring, indicating that the carabao was not pregnant.”
Petitioner avers that the date when the carabao was allegedly stolen was not proven with certainty.
Teresita was unable to cite what year the carabao was stolen. She only testified that the carabao was
stolen at 5:00 a.m. of July 27. She explained that she learned of the loss from her husband.
Respondent avers that petitioner raises questions of fact, which are not allowed in a Rule 45 petition
for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petition should be denied for raising questions of fact
Ruling:
The general rule is that a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari should only raise questions of law.
As provided under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court:
RULE 45 APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by

certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or
other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the
same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
269
However, there are instances when this Court allows questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition for
review. These instances include the following:
(1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are ground&d on
speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its
findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals
overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and
(10) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record.
There is a question of law “when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts” and
there is a question of fact “when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.”
In this case, petitioner asks this Court to review the evidence and argues that the prosecution was
unable to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.Thus, petitioner raises a question of fact.
Nevertheless, this Court gives due course to the Petition because it falls under the exceptions as to
when this Court may entertain questions of fact. A review of the record shows that the trial court
and the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts, and their findings are contradicted by the
evidence presented.
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NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES POWER CORPORATION

G.R. No. 219627, July 04, 2016
It is a basic tenet that procedural rules are necessary to facilitate an orderly and speedy
adjudication of disputes. Thus, courts and litigants alike are enjoined to strictly abide by the rules.
Nonetheless, this Court has, in exceptionally meritorious cases, suspended the technical rules of procedure "in
order that litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of
substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided.
Facts:
There was an Energy Conversion Agreement. It provides that the consortium will design,
build, and operate a bunker-C fired diesel-generating power station (Power Station), which will
convert the fuel supplied by the National Power Corporation (petitioner) into electricity that will, in
turn, be delivered also to it.
Eventually, Southern Philippines Power Corporation (respondent) assumed the obligations

of the consortium to the Energy Conversion Agreement through the Accession Undertaking.
Later on, Southern Philippines Power Corporation requested payment attributable to the
additional engines it installed.
However, the National Power Corporation refused.
Hence, the dispute was submitted to the Energy Regulatory Commission which granted
Southern Philippines Power Corporation's prayer. It also denied the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner because it was filed through a private courier (LBC) and reached the Commission 4
days late.
Petitioner National Power Corporation argues that the Energy Regulatory Commission
should not have denied its Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner was under the honest impression
that filing its motion by private courier was sufficient compliance with Rule 23, Section 1 and Rule
10, Section 4 of Resolution No. 38. Unfortunately, the Energy Regulatory Commission received the
Motion four (4) days after its due date and considered it filed out of time.
Petitioner argued that courts should not be too strict with procedural technicalities when
these do not impair the proper administration of justice, and courts should rule on the merits as
much as possible. Petitioner quotes Rule 1, Sections 3 and 4 of the Energy Regulatory Commission
Rules, which provide for the Commission's power to issue procedural directions and the liberal
construction of the rules “consistent with the requirements of justice.”
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Moreover, petitioner explains that this case involves government funds amounting to not
less than P400,000,000.00, and the Energy Regulatory Commission's late receipt of its Motion for
Reconsideration should not have been sufficient reason to deny it.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the denial by the ERC motion for reconsideration
purely on technical grounds
Ruling:
YES. It is a basic tenet that procedural rules are necessary to facilitate an orderly and speedy
adjudication of disputes. Thus, courts and litigants alike are enjoined to strictly abide by the rules.
Nonetheless, this Court has, in exceptionally meritorious cases, suspended the technical rules of
procedure "in order that litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and
that a possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided.
Here, petitioner has shown a clear and persuasive reason for this Court to relax the rules. The
Energy Regulatory Commission previously allowed petitioner to file its other pleadings through a
private courier (such as LBC) despite its prescribed mode on the filing of pleadings being either
personally or by registered mail. This liberality extended by the Commission on petitioner's earlier
filings gave it a reasonable ground to believe that its filing of a motion for reconsideration through
the same private courier would be considered sufficient compliance with the Energy Regulatory
Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure. Unfortunately, the Motion for Reconsideration
reached the Commission four (4) days beyond the due date.
Petitioner's delay in filing the motion for reconsideration was far from being intentional and
dilatory. Petitioner simply followed its usual mode of filing its pleadings, which had been
previously acceptable to the Commission. The Energy Regulatory Commission itself adopts a liberal
policy in the construction of its Rules of Practice and Procedure “to secure the most expeditious and
least expensive determination of every proceeding . . . on its merits.” Hence, the Commission should
have given due course to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, given petitioner's satisfactory
explanation for missing the deadline.
272
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA AND THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON.
G.R. No. 205728, July 05, 2016
A breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion reviewable by the Court.
Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-
RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay”with an “X” mark.
Later on, COMELEC asked the petitioner to remove the tarpaulins. By request, it also issued
a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an
election offense against petitioners.
The petitioner then filed a certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 before the Supreme
Court questioning the notice and letter of COMELEC as unconstitutional and void for curtailing
their freedom of speech.
Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed since the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are not the proper remedies since the Court can only review final decisions, rulings and
orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercises of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power. Instead, the petitioner should be reviewed by the COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C,
Section 2(3) of the Constitution which provides that the Commission has the power to “decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of
the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters” It also cited different jurisprudence to support its contention.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari by the petitioner is correct
Ruling:
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YES. While it is true that the Court has earlier ruled that only decision en banc of the
COMELEC can only be reviewed, this Court, however, has ruled also in the past that this procedural
requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of
justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the
decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely
urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
Accordingly, the Court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral
contests — despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if:
1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;
2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;
3) The issue involves the protection of labor;
4) The decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity; or
5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.
In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is
filed to assert their fundamental right to expression.
COMELEC’s notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents’ acts are capable of
repetition. Under the conditions in which it was issued and in view of the novelty of this case, it
could result in a “chilling effect” that would affect other citizens who want their voices heard on
issues during the elections. Other citizens who wish to express their views regarding the election
and other related issues may choose not to, for fear of reprisal or sanction by the COMELEC. Direct
resort to this court is allowed to avoid such proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural
platform for raising grave abuse of discretion.
Secondly, free speech does not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The
use of the word “affecting” in this provision cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the
exclusive power to decide any and all questions that arise during elections. COMELEC’s
constitutional competencies during elections should not operate to divest this court of its own
jurisdiction.
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the
Constitution. This provision provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
and prohibition. This should be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution. Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by
COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming
from COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.
274
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. EDILBERTO PUSING Y TAMOR

G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016
It is settled that “factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the trial court is
shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance.”
Facts:
This resolves an appeal of a conviction for two (2) counts of qualified rape and one (1) count
of child abuse of a minor.
AAA, a minor, is accused-appellant's daughter. On or about April 5, 2004, while they were
at home, Pusing allegedly went on top of AAA, put his penis in her mouth, mashed her breasts,
kissed her on the lips, licked her vagina, and inserted his penis into her genital.
AAA revealed this incident to her cousin, BBB. Thereafter, they filed the complaint and AAA
was referred to a medical examination which revealed that “AAA had a deep healed laceration, with
"clear evidence of blunt force trauma or penetrating trauma.”
The RTC found Pusing guilty beyond reasonable doubt which was affirmed by the CA.
Pusing then appealed.
Issue:
Whether there is something that would warrant the reversal of the decision of the lower courts
Ruling:
NO. A careful examination of the records shows that there is nothing that would warrant a
reversal of the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. When a woman,
especially a minor, alleges rape, "she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been
raped."
It is settled that “factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal,
unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or
circumstance of weight and substance.”
The prosecution satisfactorily established the elements to prove that accused-appellant raped
and sexually abused AAA, a 12-year-old minor with the cognitive ability of a nine-year-old.
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, several circumstances, which have been duly
established from the evidence, point to the conclusion that accused-appellant is responsible for the
crimes charged against him.
275
JANET LIM NAPOLES v. HON. SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ET AL

G.R. No. 213529, July 13, 2016
A decision convicting an accused moots any proceeding that questions the determination of probable
cause, either in the filing of the information in court or in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Guilt beyond
reasonable doubt had then been established, and questioning whether a lower quantum of proof exists, i.e.,
probable cause, would be pointless.
Facts:
This case stems from a Joint Sworn Statement executed by Arturo Francisco Luy, Gertrudes
Luy, Arthur Luy, and Annabelle Luy on March 8, 2013. They alleged that a family member, Benhur
Luy, had been detained against his will since December 19, 2012, transferred from place to place in a
bid to cover up the JLN Group of Companies’ anomalous transactions involving the Priority
Development Assistance Fund. Napoles, owner of the JLN Group of Companies, and her brother,
Reynald Lim (Lim), allegedly masterminded the “pork barrel scam” and the detention of Benhur
Luy.
Acting on the Joint Sworn Statement, Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De
Lima) directed the National Bureau of Investigation Special Task Force to investigate the matter.
This led to a "rescue operation" on March 22, 2013 to release Benhur Luy who, at that time, was
reportedly detained in a condominium unit at Pacific Plaza Tower, Bonifacio Global City. Lim, who
was with Benhur Luy at the condominium unit, was arrested by operatives of the National Bureau
of Investigation.
In the March 23, 2013 Recommendation addressed to Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano
(Prosecutor General Arellano), National Bureau of Investigation Director Nonnatus Caesar R. Rojas
(Director Rojas) requested the prosecution of Lim and Napoles for serious illegal detention.
Napoles denied illegally detaining Benhur Luy.
Finding no probable cause against Lim and Napoles, Assistant State Prosecutor Juan Pedro
V. Navera (Prosecutor Navera) recommended the dismissal of the complaint for serious illegal
detention.
However, Senior Deputy State Prosecutor and Chair of the Task Force on Anti-Kidnapping
Theodore M. Villanueva (Prosecutor Villanueva) reversed it and recommended filing an information
for serious illegal detention. According to Prosecutor Villanueva, the alleged diversion of
government funds to the JLN Group of Company’s dummy foundations was necessary to “establish
the alleged motive of [Napoles and Lim] in detaining . . . Benhur Luy against his will.” Moreover,
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there was probable cause to believe that Benhur Luy was deprived of his liberty, given the
allegations in his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
This was approved by the Prosecutor General. Hence, a case for serious illegal detention was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati against Napoles and Lim.
The case was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda (Judge Alameda).29
Recommending no bail for Napoles and Lim, Judge Alameda issued a warrant for their arrest.
Napoles then filed a certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Secretary De Lima, Prosecutor General Arellano, Prosecutor Villanueva, Director Rojas,
and of Judge Alameda. She contended that there was no probable cause to charge her with serious
illegal detention, and that Judge Alameda erred in issuing the arrest warrant despite the pendency
of her Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.
In deciding Napoles’ Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals said that “full
discretionary authority in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation
has been delegated to the executive branch, particularly at the first instance to the public prosecutor,
and ultimately to the [Department of Justice].” Hence, absent any grave abuse of discretion, courts
will not disturb the public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion in first, filing an
information for serious illegal detention against Napoles and, second, in the issuance of a warrant
for Napoles
Ruling:
NO. This Petition must be denied for being moot and academic. In any case, the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. There was no grave abuse of discretion
either in the filing of information in court or in the issuance of the arrest warrant against Napoles.
A decision convicting an accused moots any proceeding that questions the determination of
probable cause, either in the filing of the information in court or in the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt had then been established, and questioning whether a lower
quantum of proof exists, i.e., probable cause, would be pointless.
Even before the filing of this Petition questioning the Review Resolution, an Information for
serious illegal detention has been filed against Napoles. Therefore, with the filing of the Information
before the trial court, this Petition has become moot and academic. The trial court has then acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case, and the determination of the accused’s guilt or innocence rests
within the sole and sound discretion of the trial court.
277
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA CAIZ Y TALVO

G.R. No. 215340, July 13, 2016
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they
are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close
its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same
there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases — by accident or
otherwise — in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory
testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving
objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody
of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with
Facts:
Failure to prove the preservation of the integrity of the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs
cases will lead to the acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
An information for violation of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, was filed against the accused. This was discovered upon a buy-bust
operation organized by the Special Operations Group.
The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.
On appeal, the accused argued that there were several procedural lapses committed by the
police officers. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the rules on the chain of custody of the corpus delicti were observed
Ruling:
NO. The elements of violation of Section 582 of Republic Act No. 9165 are: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the
presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.
Here, the lapses of the police officers in the procedure for handling seized sachets containing
dangerous drugs are numerous and unjustified such that there is reasonable doubt whether the
integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved.
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First, the place where the seized sachets were marked was not established with certainty.
Second, the police officers failed to have the confiscation receipts signed by accused-appellant, by
her representative or counsel, by a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, or by
an elected public official. The police officers likewise failed to give a copy of the confiscation receipts
to accused-appellant. The prosecution does not refute these procedural lapses but argues that
substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule is sufficient. Third, none of the witnesses
testified that the seized sachets were photographed. This leads us to believe that no photos of the
seized sachets were taken by the buy-bust team. Fourth, accused-appellant’s arrest was not
immediately entered in the booking sheet. SPO1 Patricio testified on cross-examination.
The totality of the procedural lapses committed by the police officers leads this Court to
doubt the integrity of the corpus delicti. Mallillin v. People emphasizes why proof of the chain of
custody in dangerous drugs cases must be strictly complied with:
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in
fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The
Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any
of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other cases — by accident or otherwise — in
which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for
laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that
applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more
exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if
only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or
been contaminated or tampered with.
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IN RE: RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 14, 2013 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN C.A. -
GR.CV NO. 94656 v. ATTY. GIDEON D.V. MORTEL
GR. No. 196735, August 03, 2016
An information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge against him to enable him
to prepare his defense.
Facts:
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7)
members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main
Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked
men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was filed against
several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity.
It is the arguments of the appellants that the information filed against them violated their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They
argue that the prosecution should not have included the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms
of disguise" in the information since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the
accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
Issue: Whether the information was proper.
Ruling:
YES. The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common

understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. The
purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated
in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not
be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all
the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In this case, what is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that

there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was,
therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were
being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
280
BANCO DE ORO, BANK OF COMMERCE, ET AL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, CIR,

BIR, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, DOF, ET AL.
G.R. No. 198756, August 16, 2016
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon
by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
This court entertained direct recourse to it when "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be
patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."
Facts:
The petitioners argued that a certain 2011 BIR Ruling is ultra vires because it is contrary to
the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code when it declared that all government debt instruments are
deposit substitutes regardless of the 20-lender rule. It also imposed 20% withholding tax on Bonds
upon maturity which is allegedly in violation of non-impairment of contracts and due process.
Respondents, on the other hand, countered that it did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the challenged 2011 BIR Ruling. More importantly, they questioned the remedy resorted
to by the petitioner because Rule 65 can only be resorted if there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It contended that this is a violation of doctrine
of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there is violation of exhaustion of administrative remedies
2. Whether or not there is a violation of principle of hierarchy of courts.
Ruling:
1) NO. Under Section 4 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code, interpretative rulings are
reviewable by the Secretary of Finance;. Thus, the ruling of the BIR Commissioner may be
reviewed by the Secretary of Finance.
Nonetheless, jurisprudence allows certain exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of

administrative remedies:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and its flexibility is
called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
281
Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction,(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned,(5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7)
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
The exceptions under (2) and (11) are present in this case. The question involved is purely
legal, namely: (a) the interpretation of the 20-lender rule in the definition of the terms public and
deposit substitutes under the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code; and (b) whether the imposition
of the 20% final withholding tax on the PEACe Bonds upon maturity violates the constitutional
provisions on non-impairment of contracts and due process. Judicial intervention is likewise urgent
with the impending maturity of the PEACe Bonds on October 18, 2011.
In this case, an appeal to the Secretary of Finance from the questioned 2011 BIR
Ruling would be a futile exercise because it was upon the request of the Secretary of Finance that the
2011 BIR Ruling was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It appears that the Secretary of
Finance adopted the Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s opinions as his own.
2) NO. While it is true that the appeal should be brought to the Court of Tax Appeals, in
exceptional cases, however, the Court entertained direct recourse to it when “dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was
considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.”
Here, the nature and importance of the issues raised to the investment and banking industry
with regard to a definitive declaration of whether government debt instruments are deposit
substitutes under existing laws, and the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling
circumstances to justify resort to this court in the first instance.
The tax provision on deposit substitutes affects not only the PEACe Bonds but also any other
financial instrument or product that may be issued and traded in the market. Due to the changing
positions of the Bureau of Internal Revenue on this issue, there is a need for a final ruling from this
court to stabilize the expectations in the financial market.
282
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CLARGES CORPORATION, REALTY

RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 170060, August 17, 2016
The admission of a third-party complaint lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. If leave to
file a third-party complaint is denied, then the proper remedy is to file a separate case, not to insist on the
admission of the third-party complaint all the way up to this Court.
Facts:
A property located somewhere in Makati was secured as a mortgage by Marinduque Mining

and Industrial Corporation to Development Bank of the Philippines (petitioner).
When Marinduque failed to pay its loan obligations, the petitioner instituted foreclosure. It
then offered the property for public sale which was awarded to Clarges Realty Corporation
(respondent) as the highest bidder.
However, the title of the property contained annotations of tax lien in favor of Asset
Privatization Trust after the latter acquired the assets of the petitioner. Clarges Realty then
demanded for a clean title but was not given. Respondent then filed a case in the RTC.
Later on, the petitioner moved for leave of court to file a third-party complaint. It sought to
implead the Asset Privatization Trust as a third-party defendant and maintained that the Asset
Privatization Trust had assumed the "direct and personal" obligation to pay for Marinduque's tax
liability and to have the partially reduced tax lien cancelled.
Respondent opposed the motion to leave because it will entail delay and unnecessary costs
especially that it has already rested its case.
Trial court denied the leave of court ratiocinating that the petitioner "should have impleaded
the Asset Privatization Trust during the preparation of its answer if indeed a third party is liable to it
for subrogation or other relief." The same was affirmed by the Court tof Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion for refusing to admit third-party complaint.
Ruling:
NO. Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court governs the filing of third-party complaints:
SEC. 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. - A third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint is a
claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the
283
action, called the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
Based on this provision, the Asset Privatization Trust would have been a valid third-party
defendant. As the trustee of the National Government to whom petitioner's assets were transferred
under Proclamation No. 50, the Asset Privatization Trust acquired the liabilities attached to those
assets.
The tax lien over the property here is one such liability, and petitioner may ask, as it did the
Asset Privatization Trust, for contribution for the payment of the unpaid tax and the tax lien's
consequent cancellation.
However, the admission of a third-party complaint requires leave of court; the discretion is
with the trial court. If leave is denied, the proper remedy is to file a complaint to be docketed as a
separate case.
Hence, there was no grave abuse of discretion in denying leave to admit the third-party
complaint against the Asset Privatization Trust. As the Court of Appeals observed, the trial court
would have wasted time and effort had it admitted the third-party complaint. Respondent, the
original plaintiff, had already rested its case when the Motion for Leave was filed. The original case
would have dragged on with the addition of a new party at a late stage of the trial.
284
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND CO. (ASSIGNEE OF INVENTORS CARINI, DUNCIA AND
WONG) vs. DIRECTOR EMMA C. FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016
If a petition fails to attach material portions of the record, it may still be given due course if it falls
under certain exceptions.
If an administrative agency's procedural rules expressly prohibit an intervention by third parties, the
prohibition is limited only to the proceedings before the administrative agency. Once the matter is brought
before the Court of Appeals in a petition for review, any prior prohibition on intervention does not apply since
the only question to be determined is whether the intervenor has established a right to intervene under the
Rules of Court.
Facts:
Petitioner, an American corporation, filed a patent application for a medicine (Losartan)

related to the treatment of hypertension and congestive heart failure.
However, it learned that its previous counsel has abandoned the application before the
Intellectual Property Office (IPO). It then executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing another
counsel to prosecute and handle its patent application.
The petitioner filed a Petition for Revival for the patent since it was not aware that the
previous counsel has already died. However, the same was denied by the Director of Patents for
being filed out of time. Upon appeal, the Director-General also affirmed the resolution of the
Director of Patents.
Therefore, petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside
the decision of the IPO. The Court of Appeals granted the petition for Revival.
In the interim, respondent moved for leave to intervene and argued that the Court of
Appeals directly affected its vested right to sell its own product by allowing a Petition for Revival.
The Court of Appeals then issued a resolution granting the Motion to Intervene of the
respondent it having an interest in the revival of the patent application of the petitioner. Later on,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the revival of the application prejudiced the respondent.
Petitioner filed a Certiorari in the Court. The respondent, however, argued that the petition
for certiorari was not proper because it failed to comply with Rule 45, section 4 of the Rules of Court
when petitioner failed to attach certain documents to support the allegations in the complaint.
On the other hand, the petitioner, argued that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the
intervention of the respondent on appeal since the revival of a patent application is ex parte and is
"strictly a contest between the examiner and the applicant"
285
Issues:
1. Whether or not the failure to attach certain documents in the petition warrants dismissal.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals may resolve a motion for intervention upon appeal
and that the disallowance of the same is consistent with the privacy of the patent.
Ruling:
1. NO. If a petition fails to attach material portions of the record, it may still be given due
course if it falls under certain exceptions. Although Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court requires
that the petition "be accompanied by ... such material portions of the record as would support the
petition," the failure to do so will not necessarily warrant the outright dismissal of the complaint.
In Galvez v. CA, the Court ruled that:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition.
Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the
document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document
will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due
course to the petition.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended
if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [sic] found in another document already attached to
the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given
due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the
documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the
merits.
In this case, petitioner attached the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 31, 2004, the
Resolution dated January 31, 2006, and the Amended Decision dated August 30, 2006. The Court of
Appeals Resolution and Amended Decision quoted extensive portions of its rollo in support of its
rulings. 86 These conclusions were sufficient to convince this Court not to outright dismiss the
Petition but to require respondents to first comment on the Petition, in satisfaction of the first and
second procedural guideposts in Magsino.
2. NO. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a court has the discretion to determine
whether to give due course to an intervention. Rule 19, Section 1 states:
RULE 19 INTERVENTION
286
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. -A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
If an administrative agency's procedural rules expressly prohibit an intervention by third

parties, the prohibition is limited only to the proceedings before the administrative agency. Once the
matter is brought before the Court of Appeals in a petition for review, any prior prohibition on
intervention does not apply since the only question to be determined is whether the intervenor has
established a right to intervene under the Rules of Court.
In this case, respondent Therapharma, Inc. was able to show that it had legal interest to
intervene in the appeal of petitioner's revival of its patent application. While its intervention may
have been premature as no patent has been granted yet, petitioner's own actions gave rise to
respondent Therapharma, Inc.' s right to protect its losartan product.
Moreover, it was inaccurate for petitioner to argue that secrecy in patent applications
prevents any intervention from interested parties. The confidentiality in patent applications under
the Intellectual Property Code is not absolute since a party may already intervene after the
publication of application.
287
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. HEIRS OF THE LATE IRENEO AND

CARIDAD ENTAPA
G.R. No. 215072, September 07, 2016
The Constitution requires that a court must state the factual and legal grounds on which its decisions
are based. Any decision that fails to adhere to this mandate is void.
Obiter dictum is "an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary
to the decision of the case before it.
Facts:
Caridad Entapa (respondent) owned a lot. It authorized Joseph Gonzaga to enter into legal
transactions in their behalf. Gonzage executed a real mortgage property over the lot to Philippine
National Bank (petitioner) to guarantee his loan. He defaulted that is why the petitioner foreclosed
and sold the property at a public auction.
Rosario Entapa Orpeza thereafter made a restructuring with the PNB to repurchase the
property. She paid the down payment only to found out that the property was occupied already and
was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Orpeza then demanded that her down payment be returned.
The Regional Trial Court then rendered a decision against the petitioner.
The petitioner appealed contending that the decision failed to state its legal basis.
The Court of Appeals nullified the Regional Trial Court decision and remanded the case for
rendition of judgment based on the Constitution and Rules of Court. However, the petitioner alleged
that despite the case being remanded, the Court of Appeals still ruled that it is still liable to
respondent.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the decision of the RTC has no legal basis.
2. Whether or not the CA ruled on the merits of the case.
Ruling:
1) YES. Court must state the factual and legal basis for its decisions; otherwise, its decisions are
void.
288
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Likewise, Rule 36, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final order

determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
The trial court failed to cite any legal basis for declaration of petitioner's liability. The
Decision merely contained a recitation of facts and a dispositive portion.
The constitutional requirement that the basis of the decision of our courts should be clearly
articulated and made legible to the parties does not merely assure fairness. It is likewise crucial to
assure the public that the judiciary arrives at its conclusions on the basis of reasonable inference
from credible and admissible evidence and the text of law and our jurisprudence. Decisions of all
courts should not be based on any other considerations. Not only will fully coherent and cogent
reasons have greater chances to convince the litigants of their chances on appeal; they also make
appeals possible. After all, appellate courts cannot be assumed to have so much omniscience that
they can read what the trial judge has not written.
2) NO. Nothing in the Court of Appeals Decision ordered petitioner to return to respondents
their down payment and pay them damages.
Strangely, petitioner now comes before this Court and argues that the Court of Appeals should not
have adjudicated on the arguments that it had raised before it.
Even if the Court of Appeals had adjudicated upon the merits of the case, any discussion would
have been considered obiter dictum since the entire case was remanded to the trial court.
Obiter dictum is “an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary
to the decision of the case before it.” It is a "a remark made, or opinion expressed upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or
analogy or argument.” It “lacks the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded
as such.”
289
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SPS. MARGARITO ASOQUE AND TARCINIA

ASOQUE
G.R. No. 172507, September 14, 2016
Article III, Section 91 of the Constitution provides a substantive guarantee that private property that is taken
by the state for public use should be paid for with just compensation. If the state does not agree with the
property owner on a price, the state, through the competent government agency, should file the proper
expropriation action under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In case of a taking without the proper expropriation action filed, the property owner may file its own action to
question the propriety of the taking or to compel the payment of just compensation. Among these inverse
condemnation actions is a complaint for payment of just compensation and damages.
When an inverse condemnation is filed, the provisions for the appointment of commissioners under Rule 32—
not Sections 5, 6, 7, or 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court—will be followed.
Facts:
Spouses Asoque are the registered owners of a parcel of coconut land located in Barangay
Bugtong, Calbayog City.
Sometime in November 1995, the National Power Corporation entered the Spouses Asoque's
land to install transmission lines.
In the process, there were damages incurred as a result of the National Power Corporation's
cutting off some coconut trees and other fruit- and non-fruit-bearing plants during the construction.
They were also prohibited from introducing on the 4,352-square-meter area any improvement that
could rise by a few meters from the ground.
Upon Spouses Asoque's demand for just compensation, the National Power Corporation
only paid for the improvements destroyed and refused to pay for the actual value of the 4,352-
square-meter area utilized for the project. The National Power Corporation claimed that it was only
liable to pay for right of way at 10% of the market value under Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395
On September 20, 1999, Spouses Asoque filed before the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog
City a Complaint for payment of just compensation and damages against the National Power
Corporation.
In its Answer dated February 7, 2000, the National Power Corporation denied Spouses
Asoque's claims that it had illegally utilized their property. It alleged that it entered the property
with Spouses Asoque's consent, as shown by the acknowledgment receipt for P9,897.00 as payment
for damaged improvements and waiver of claims to improvements damaged. By virtue of the
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acknowledgement receipt and the waiver, the National Power Corporation claimed that there was
no more need for it to institute an expropriation proceeding.
When Civil Case No. 737 was called for pre-trial on May 8, 2000, the case was ordered
dismissed by the trial court due to the non-appearance of both parties and their counsel. However,
the case was reinstated after Spouses Asoque's counsel explained to the trial court the reason why he
arrived late. The pre-trial of the case was reset to May 24, 2000.
On May 24, 2000, the trial court, noting the absence of the National Power Corporation and
its counsel, allowed Spouses Asoque to present their evidence ex parte before a court-appointed
Commissioner. It simultaneously dismissed the National Power Corporation's counterclaim.
On June 6, 2000, the trial court denied National Power Corporation's Urgent Manifestation
and Motion to Reset Pre-trial, finding it to have been filed out of time and also moot and academic.
Its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
On June 22, July 24 and August 28, 2000, Spouses Asoque presented evidence ex parte before
Atty. Ferdinand S. Arpon, Branch Clerk of Court, who was appointed Commissioner by the trial
court.
Eventually, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the spouses.
The respondent argued that the allowance to present evidence ex parte and appointment of the
Branch of Clek of Court as the Commissioner is an irregularity. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not presentation by the petitioner of evidence ex parte is proper.
2. Whether or not the appointment of clerk of court as commissioner is proper.
Ruling:
1) YES. The Regional Trial Court did not err in allowing respondents to present their evidence
ex parte. The action of the trial court is expressly allowed under Rule 18, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 provides that if it is the defendant who fails to
appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed "to present his evidence ex parte and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof." Petitioner's stance that it was deprived of due process
because it was not given the reasonable opportunity to attend the second pre-trial setting is
likewise untenable.
Petitioner and its counsel were absent during the first pre-trial setting on May 8, 2000.
Respondents' counsel attended, although he was late. Had petitioner and its counsel appeared on
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the first setting, they would have been reasonably notified then and there of the second pre-trial
resetting on May 24, 2000 and would have had the opportunity to ask for a later date.
Nonetheless, petitioner's counsel should have tried to inquire from the court the next
schedule of the pre-trial.
Attendance by the party and its counsel during a pre-trial conference is mandatory as
expressly stated under Rule 18, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.70 Petitioner alleges
that it filed a motion for postponement of the first pre-trial setting. This notwithstanding, it was still
its duty to appear at the pre-trial first set on May 8, 2000. A motion for postponement should never
be presumed to be grant
Under the circumstances, petitioner cannot claim that it was denied due process. “Parties are
presumed to have known the governing rules and the consequences for the violation of such rules.”
Moreover, the essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was given that
opportunity. Yet, it failed to appear at the two (2) pre-trial settings. A pre-trial cannot be taken for
granted for it serves a vital objective: the simplification and expedition of the trial, if not its
dispensation. Non-appearance of a party may only be excused for a valid cause. We see none in this
case.
2) YES. The procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive and report
evidence to the court is likewise sanctioned by Rule 32, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Section 3 of the same Rule, speaking of the authority that may be granted to
a Commissioner, provides:
RULE 32 Trial by Commissioner
SEC. 3. Order of reference; powers of the commissioner. — When a reference is made, the
clerk shall forthwith furnish the commissioner with a copy of the order of reference. The
order may specify or limit the powers of the commissioner, and may direct him to report
only upon particular issues, or to do or perform particular acts, or to receive and report
evidence only, and may fix the date for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing
of his report. Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the
commissioner has and shall exercise the power to regulate the proceedings in every hearing
before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient
performance of his duties under the order. He may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum, swear witnesses, and unless otherwise provided in the order of reference, he may
rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The trial or hearing before him shall proceed in all
respects as it would if held before the court.
Furthermore, after the hearing before the Commissioner, the Commissioner must file a written
report, which may contain his or her factual findings and conclusions of law
292
SEC. 9. Report of commissioner. - Upon the completion of the trial or hearing or proceeding
before the commissioner, he shall file with the court his report in writing upon the matters
submitted to him by the order of reference. When his powers are not specified or limited, he
shall set forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law in his report. He shall attach thereto
all exhibits, affidavits, depositions, papers and the transcript, if any, of the testimonial
evidence presented before him.
Hence, absent any express limitation in the order of reference, Branch Clerk of Court Arty.
Ferdinand S. Arpon, as the court-appointed Commissioner, may make factual findings and
recommendations on the valuation of the property. Indeed, the Commissioner's recommendation
could have been necessarily rejected had it been an ultra vires act.
293
RIZALITO Y. DAVID v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND

MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. [T]he abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave.
Facts:
Rizalito David (petitioner) filed a case for quo warranto. However, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David, which sought to unseat
private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold such office.
Issue:
Whether or not the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto
based on its finding that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a seat
as Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
NO. A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal invokes the
jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which
the appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution
and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action. The viability of
such a petition is premised on an allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.”
The term “grave abuse of discretion” has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary,
capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. [T]he abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough: it must be grave.
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral
Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such
294
that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or
admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a

misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of
discretion. The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
In this case, the Court, however, find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral
Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive
reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give life to all the aspirations of all
its provisions.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a reasonable
interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established personal circumstances of
private respondent. It could not have asked the impossible of private respondent, sending her on a
proverbial fool's errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose because
private respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her life.
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the misfortune of
having been abandoned by their biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior, second-class
citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and
defending the well-being of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws and equal access to opportunities for public service.
295
PABLO M. PADILLA, JR. AND MARIA LUISA P. PADILLA vs. LEOPOLDO MALICSI, LITO
CASINO, AND AGRIFINO GUANES
G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016
Parties must demonstrate by convincing evidence that the case clearly falls under the exceptions to the
rule. However, that the findings of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are opposite does not warrant
this Court's automatic review of factual findings. This only presents a prima facie basis for recourse to this
Court.
Facts:
Spouses Padilla (petitioners) bought a parcel of land in Cabanatuan City in 1988. However,
they discovered that the respondents constructed houses on their lot. They made repeated demands
for respondents to vacate but they latter refused.
Hence, the petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession against the respondents.
Respondents answered that they believed in all honesty and good faith that the lot belonged
to Toribia Vda. De Mossessgeld (De Mossessgeld). They claimed that they possessed the land and
built their houses on the lot only after receiving De Mossessgeld's permission.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the respondents are not builders in good faith. However,
the Court of Appeals set aside the Regional Trial Court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that
respondents were not builders in good faith
Ruling:
NO. The Rules of Court categorically states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is
"not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion."
The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under Rule 4533 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It
is not this Court's function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence that has already been
considered in the lower courts.
However, these rules admit exceptions. Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.35 lists down 10
recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures;
296
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
Pascual v. Burgos instructs that parties must demonstrate by convincing evidence that
the case clearly falls under the exceptions to the rule.
Parties praying that this court review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals must
demonstrate and prove that the case clearly falls under the exceptions to the rule. They have the
burden of proving to this court that a review of the factual findings is necessary. Mere assertion and
claim that the case falls under the exceptions do not suffice.
However, that the findings of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are opposite does
not warrant this Court's automatic review of factual findings. This only presents a prima facie basis
for recourse to this Court. Fernan v. Court of Appeals cautions that this Court's review of the factual
findings of the lower courts "must be invoked and applied only with great circumspection and upon
a clear showing that manifestly correct findings have been unwarrantedly rejected or reversed."
A careful study of the records leads this Court to conclude that this case falls under the
exceptions cited in Medina, particularly in that “the inference made is manifestly mistaken”; and
that “[t]he findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, necessitating a
review of the question of fact raised before this Court.”
297
RUEL TUANO Y HERNANDEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G. R. No. 205871, September 28, 2016
Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly applied more often in civil actions for the
substitution of the deceased party, the rule that the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the
death of his or her client also properly applies in criminal actions. .
Facts:
Accused Ruel Tuano y Hernandez was charged with violation of Article II, Section 11(3) of
Republic Act No. 9165 before Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for having in his
possession one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with 0.064 grams of shabu.
He was convicted by the Regional Trial Court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Likewise, the motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, the accused filed before the Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. However, the
Court also sustained his conviction. He again moved for reconsideration.
Accused was finally acquitted.
Thus, an Order of Release was issued and sent to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections.
However, the Court received from the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections a letter
informing it that accused died already, prior to its issuance of resolution. A certified machine copy
of accused's Death Certificate was attached to the letter.
Issue:
Whether or not the counsel for the accused should have informed the Court of the death of
their client notwithstanding it is a criminal case
Ruling:
YES. Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides that the counsel is duty-bound to
report the death of a party to the court, thus:
RULE 3 Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court
within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof and to give the name and address
298
of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty
shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so
named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing
party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator
for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs.
Although Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is directly applied more often in civil
actions for the substitution of the deceased party, the rule that the counsel of the deceased party
must inform the court of the death of his or her client also properly applies in criminal actions.
Regardless of the nature of the action, courts cannot be expected to assume the death of the party
without the counsel's proper manifestation. Furthermore, the rules presume that “the attorney for
the deceased party is in a better position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the
death of his [or her] client[.]”
As officers of the court and as protectors of the legal interests of their clients, counsels have a duty to
properly act in case of their clients' death by notifying the Court of this development.
Counsels for accused were grossly remiss in this duty. Accused died on March 1, 2015.
However, his counsels continued to file pleadings on his behalf, including a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Reply dated September 16, 2015 and a Reply dated September 22, 2015. It was only
through the July 15, 2016 letter of the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections did this Court
find out that accused had already died:—one (1) year, four (4) months, and 15 days after its
occurrence.
299
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R.

MARCOS, JR., et. al
G.R. No. 195295, October 05, 2016
Rule 10, Section 7 of the Rules of Court provides that amendments in a pleading be indicated by appropriate
marks. This procedural rule is for the purpose of convenience of the Court and the parties. However, failure to
use the appropriate markings for the deletions and intercalations will not affect any substantive right.
EO No. 14 specifically states that the technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to
the civil cases filed under it to achieve the purposes behind the PCGG's creation.
Given the peculiarities of the Marcos cases, the allegations of Former President Marcos taking advantage of his
powers as President, gravely abusing his powers under martial law, and embarking on a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth suffice to constitute the case as one under Section 1(b) and (c) of Rule 57
Facts:
Bongbong Marcos, Jr., Imee, and Irene appearred to be the registered owners of a parcel of land
located in Cabuyao, Laguna which was acquired between 1972 and 1986.
In July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting, and damages against Former President Marcos, Imelda, their children,
Marcos, Jr., Imee, and Irene, and their sons-in-law, Manotoc and Araneta III. It principally sought to
recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by the Marcoses during their incumbency as public officers.
In June 1994, the PCGG caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT of the Cabuyao
property in relation to the above-mentioned civil case. This was annotated by the RD of Cabuyao.
The Republic also moved for the entitlement to a writ of attachment over the Cabuyao property
because accordingly, sequestration is akin to preliminary attachment and this is among the other
provisional remedies available to the PCGG, which was essentially founded on urgency and
necessity to preserve ill-gotten wealth amassed during the Marcos regime.
However, Marcos, Jr. filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens and pointing out that the Cabuyao property was not specifically mentioned in the original
and amended complaints or their annexes.
In July 1997, the Republic filed its Fourth Amended Complaint which was substantially identical to
the admitted complaint and now specifically mentioned the Cabuyao property.
300
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, denied the Motion for failure of the Republic to comply with
the provision of Section 7, Rule 12 of ROC and ordered the cancellation of the annotation of lis
pendens and denied the writ for preliminary attachment. It directed the Republic to immediately
cease from further interfering with and exercising ownership over the Cabuyao property and to
return its possession and control to the Marcoses.
The Republic moved for Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
The SC issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from implementing the assailed Sandiganbayan
Resolutions.
Issues:
1) Was the Sandiganbayan correct in cancelling the lis pendens?

2) Are procedural technicalities on amending complaint must be strictly observed
3) Is the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the Writ for Preliminary Attachment?
Rulings:
1) NO. The Resolution is based on patent errors of both fact and law.
The Cabuyao property forms part of the assets alleged to have been unlawfully acquired by
Marcoses. It is sought to be reconveyed in favor of the Republic, thus, properly subject of the notice
of lis pendens. The list of assets and properties specified in complaint as forming part of the ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses is preceded by the words "include but are not limited" to those
already enumerated.
Rule 13, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that:
SEC. 14. Notice of Lis Pendens.
“Xxx The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may he cancelled only upon order of
the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse
party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded. (Emphasis supplied).”
The grounds for cancelling a notice of lis pendens are not present. The assailed Resolutions do not
suggest that the Cabuyao property is not part of the property illegally acquired by respondents.
Thus, the conclusion that the Civil Case does not affect the Cabuyao property is based solely on an
inference from a procedural detail.
2) NO. The Sandiganbayan should have been more liberal in resolving the motion to admit the
Fourth Amended Complaint. Additionally, the denial of a motion to admit an amended
complaint is an interlocutory one and cannot attain finality.
301
Executive Order No. 14 specifically states that the technical rules of procedure and evidence shall
not be strictly applied to the civil cases filed under it. Thus, this Court has emphasized this provision
and pointed out that strict adherence to technical rules will hamper the efforts of the PCGG. We note
that the law governing the issues raised in this petition calls for the setting aside of technical rules
when necessary to achieve the purposes behind the PCGG's creation.
A settled rule on construction is found in the case of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court “that
another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to
special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable, that a specific statute prevails over a general statute
and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefor specially should prevail.The Sandiganbayan's denial was primarily based on a purported
failure to comply with a requirement under Rule 10, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, that
amendments in a pleading be indicated by appropriate marks. This procedural rule is for the
purpose of convenience of the Court and the parties. It allows the reader to be able to immediately
see the modifications. However, failure to use the appropriate markings for the deletions and
intercalations will not affect any substantive right. Certainly, its absence cannot cause the denial of
any substantive right. The Sandiganbayan's view that a motion for leave to amend should be denied
on the basis of the rule on proper markings in an amended pleading displays an utter lack of
understanding of the function of this procedural rule.
Procedural rules are not mere technicalities that can be disregarded at whim by the parties or by our
courts. Neither should they be applied so mechanically without any appreciation of their purpose
and object.
3) Yes. Rule 57, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows for the attachment of the property of the
adverse party as security for any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases,
among others:
“(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted

to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor,
broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a
fiduciary capacity, or for a wilful violation of duty;
(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained
or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or
disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person[.]”
The Sandiganbayan held that “the allegations in support of the grounds for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment were couched in general terms and devoid of particulars upon which it
discern whether or not to issue a writ.” In relation to Rule 57, Section l(b) of the Rules of Court, the
302
Sandiganbayan required specific allegations of circumstances as to how the money or property was
allegedly embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to their own use by the Marcoses.
As regards Section 1(c), it held that the Cabuyao property was never concealed, removed, or
disposed of by respondents since it remains registered in their names up to the present. and the
Republic “was easily able to identify and locate the property by the mere checking of its title with
the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Laguna.”
The Sandiganbayan is mistaken. The allegations in the admitted Complaint fall within Section 1(b)
and (c) of Rule 57. Given the peculiarities of the Marcos cases, the allegations of Former President
Marcos taking advantage of his powers as President, gravely abusing his powers under martial law,
and embarking on a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth suffice to constitute the case as
one under Rule 57. The allegation that the Cabuyao property was registered under the names of
respondents—minors at the time of registration—is sufficient to allege that the Cabuyao property
was concealed, thus satisfying Rule 57, Section 1(c) of the Rules of Court.
The Sandiganbayan should have issued an order of preliminary attachment considering that the
requisites of the law—including that of Executive Order No. 14—have been substantially met, and
that there is factual basis for the issuance of the preliminary attachment. The Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion for issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment.
303
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND REFINING CORPORATION vs. PABLITO O.

LIM, et al
G.R. No. 172948, October 05, 2016
The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is
material and substantial; (b) the right of the plaintiff is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are
the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.
Facts:
Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) is a corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine laws and is engaged in copper smelting and refining.
On the other hand, petitioners were former senior officers and presently shareholders of PASAR
holding 500 shares each.
In February 2004, an Amended Petition for Injunction and Damages with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order was filed by PASAR seeking to restrain petitioners
from demanding inspection of its confidential and inexistent records. The petitioners moved for the
dismissal of the petition.
The RTC issued an Order granting PASAR's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC
held that the right to inspect book should not be denied to the stockholders, however, the same may
be restricted. The right to inspect should be limited to the ordinary records as identified and
classified by PASAR.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction on the ground
that the petition is insufficient. They claim that the enforcement of the right to inspect book should
be on the stockholders and not on PASAR.
The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioners on the ground that it is
a prohibited pleading under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate
Controversies under the Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). The Motion for Dissolution of the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise denied on the ground that the writ does not completely
result in unjust denial of petitioners' right to inspect the books of the corporation. The RTC further
stated that if no preliminary injunction is issued, petitioners may, before final judgment, do the act
which PASAR is seeking the Court to restrain which will make ineffectual the final judgment that it
may afterward render.
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The CA cancelled the injunction and held that there was no basis to issue such writ. Accordingly, the
petition is a pre-emptive action unjustly intended to impede and restrain the stockholders' rights.
Issue:
Did the CA commit an error of law in disregarding the procedure on dissolution of injunctive writs?
Ruling:
NO. The CA correctly lifted and cancelled the injunction via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court based on the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the writ
of preliminary injunction. The RTC did not specify the particular acts it enjoined respondents from
doing.
For an action for injunction to prosper, the applicant must show the existence of a right, as well as
the actual or threatened violation of this right. Specifically, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be
issued, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be

granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non- performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the plaintiff is clear and unmistakable; and (c)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The twin
requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.
Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right
must be shown.
In Almeida v. Court of Appeals, the Court stressed how important it is for the applicant for an
injunctive writ to establish his right thereto by competent evidence. Thus, the petitioner, as plaintiff,
was burdened to adduce testimonial and/or documentary evidence to establish her right to the
injunctive writs. A clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be
established. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it
305
will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an action which
did not give rise to a cause of action.
The act of PASAR in filing a petition for injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction is
uncalled for. The petition is a pre-emptive action unjustly intended to impede and restrain the
stockholders’ rights. If a stockholder demands the inspection of corporate books, the corporation
could refuse to heed to such demand. When the corporation, through its officers, denies the
stockholders of such right, the latter could then go to court and enforce their rights. It is then that the
corporation could set up its defenses and the reasons for the denial of such right. Thus, the proper
remedy available for the enforcement of the right of inspection is undoubtedly the writ of
mandamus to be filed by the stockholders and not a petition for injunction filed by the corporation
The clear provision in Section 74 of the Corporation Code is sufficient authority to conclude that an
action for injunction and, consequently, a writ of preliminary injunction filed by a corporation is
generally unavailable to prevent stockholders from exercising their right to inspection. Specifically,
stockholders cannot be prevented from gaining access to the (a) records of all business transactions
of the corporation; and (b) minutes of any meeting of stockholders or the board of directors,
including their various committees and subcommittees.
Furthermore, the discomfort caused to the management of a corporation when a request for
inspection is claimed is part of the regular matters that a business wanting to ensure good
governance must endure. The range between discomfort and vexation is a broad one, which may
tend to be located in the personalities of those involved. Certainly, by themselves, these are not
sufficient factual basis to conclude bad faith on the part of the requesting stockholder.
306
CRISANTO M. AALA v. REY T. UY

G.R. No. 202781 : Jan 10, 2017
“The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from
directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this
policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the
Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter," it must remain as a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the Court of
the "task of dealing with causes in the first instance."
Facts:
July 12, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City's Committee on Finance conducted a
public hearing for the approval of a proposed ordinance. The proposed ordinance sought to adopt a
new schedule of market values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum City. It then
passed City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011, entitled An Ordinance Approving the New Schedule of
Market Values, its Classification, and Assessment Level of Real Properties in the City of Tagum. The
ordinance was approved by Mayor Rey T. Uy (Mayor Uy) on November 11, 2011 and was
immediately forwarded to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte for review.
On February 7, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte's Committee on Ways and
Means/Games and Amusement issued a report dated February 1, 2012 declaring City Ordinance
No. 516, s-2011 valid. It also directed the respondents to revise the ordinance based on the
recommendations of the Provincial Assessor's Office. Consequently, petitioners returned it to the
respondents for modification. As a result of the amendments introduced to City Ordinance No. 516,
s-2011, on March 19, 2012, the respondents passed City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 and was approved
by Mayor Uy on April 10, 2012. It was then transmitted for review to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Davao del Norte. The petitioners received the proposed ordinance on April 12, 2012.
On April 30, 2012, Engineer Crisanto M. Aala (Aala) and Colonel Jorge P. Ferido (Ferido), both
residents of Tagum City, filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte an
Opposition/Objection to City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. It was referred to the Committee on Ways
and Means/Games and Amusement. The Committee conducted a hearing to tackle the matters
raised in the Opposition.
In their Opposition/Objection, Aala and Ferido asserted that City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012
violated Sections 130(a), 198(a) and (b), 199(b), and 201 of the Local Government Code of 1991. They
alleged that Sections III C 1, 2, and 3 as well as Sections III G 1(b) and 4(g) of the proposed ordinance
divided Tagum City into different zones, classified real properties per zone, and fixed its market
values depending on where they were situated without taking into account the "distinct and
fundamental differences ... and elements of value" of each property.
307
Aala and Ferido asserted that the proposed ordinance classified and valued those properties located
in a predominantly commercial area as commercial, regardless of the purpose to which they were
devoted. According to them, this was erroneous because real property should be classified, valued,
and assessed not according to its location but on the basis of actual use. Moreover, they pointed out
that the proposed ordinance imposed exorbitant real estate taxes, which the residents of Tagum City
could not afford to pay.
After the hearing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte's Committee on Ways and
Means/Games and Amusement issued Committee Report No.5 dated May 4, 2012, which returned
City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 to the respondents. The petitioners also directed the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Tagum City to give attention and due course to the oppositors' concerns.
On May 22, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City issued Resolution No. 808, s-2012
dated May 14, 2012, requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte to reconsider its
position on City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte
issued Resolution No. 428 declaring as invalid Sections III C 1, 2, and 3, Sections III D (1) and (2), and
Sections G 1(b) and 4(g) of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. However, on July 9, 2012, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City passed Resolution No. 874, s-2012 declaring City
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 as valid. It argued that te Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte
failed to take action on City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 within 30 days from its receipt on April 12,
2012. Hence, under Section 56(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, City Ordinance No. 558, s-
2012 enjoys the presumption of validity.
On July 13, 2012, City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 was published in the July 13-19, 2012 issue of
Trends and Time, a newspaper of general circulation in Tagum City.
Alarmed by the impending implementation of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012, petitioners filed
before this Court an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus on August 13,
2012. The Petition included a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction.
In their Petition, petitioners seek to nullify the ordinance on the ground that respondents enacted it
with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners invoke this Court's original jurisdiction under Article
VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution in view of the need to immediately resolve the issues they have
raised.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners comply with the doctrine on hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of
administrative remedy?
308
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court denies the Petition for serious procedural errors. The doctrine on hierarchy
of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court
when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the
need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's
dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter," it must remain as a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the
Court of the "task of dealing with causes in the first instance."
As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction "over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus."However, this Court has
emphasized that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus does not
exclusively pertain to this Court. Rather, it is shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts. Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not give parties unfettered
discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is determinative of the
appropriate venue where petitions for extraordinary writs should be filed. Parties cannot randomly
select the court or forum to which their actions will be directed. There is another reason why this
Court enjoins strict adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. The doctrine that requires
respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner." Consequently, this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts. This holds especially true
when questions of fact are raised. Unlike this Court, trial courts and the Court of Appeals are better
equipped to resolve questions of fact. They are in the best position to deal with causes in the first
instance.
Given the serious procedural errors committed by petitioners, we find no genuine reason to dwell
on and resolve the other issues presented in this case. The factual issues raised by petitioners could
have been properly addressed by the lower courts had they adhered to the doctrines of hierarchy of
courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies. These rules were established for a reason. While
petitioners' enthusiasm in their advocacy may be admirable, their overzealousness has further
delayed their cause.
309
HEIRS OF LOYOLA, presented herein by Zosimo L. Mendoza VS CA

G.R. No. 188658 : January 11, 2017
“A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. For an
abuse to be grave the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of
discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”
Facts:
This case involves a 4,419-square-meter parcel of land located in Lingatin, Morong, Bataan, known
as Lot No. 780, Cad. 262 of the Morong Cadastre.7 The land is formerly a public agricultural land
planted with nipa and coconut.
Sometime on May 2003, the Heirs of Teodora Loyola (Heirs ), represented by Zosimo Mendoza, Sr.
(Zosimo ), filed a Complaint for annulment of free patent and original certificate of title,
reconveyance of ownership and possession, and damages against respondent Alicia Loyola
(Alicia). They claimed that the property belonged to the parents of their mother, Teodora Loyola
(Teodora), who had been in possession of the property since time immemorial. Teodora inherited
the property from her parents upon their demise. In tum, when Teodora died in 1939, the Heirs
inherited it from her.
The Heirs insisted that they since maintained open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
until the present. However, Alicia was allegedly able to obtain Free Patent No. (III-14) 001627 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 1784 over the property through fraud and misrepresentation. Alicia
was the wife of their deceased cousin Gabriel Loyola (Gabriel), who was given permission to use
part of Teodora's property.
In her Answer, Alicia denied the allegations of fraud and illegality on the registration of the free
patent and issuance of the original certificate of title. She countered that the Complaint was barred
by laches and prescription as the free patent was registered as early as December 1985.
The case proceeded to trial.
RTC: dismissed the case based on failure to implead an indispensable party, Guillermo Mendoza as
party-plaintiff. MR was filed but was denied. The case was appealed to the CA.
CA: Dismissed the case. The RTC erred in finding that there was a failure to implead an
indispensable party as the heirs of Guillermo Mendoza were not indispensable parties and judgment
could be rendered without impleading them as party-plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the CA found that the
evidence presented by the Heirs was insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the
310
free patent and original certificate of title issued to Alicia. 41 It found that the Heirs failed to submit
evidence showing that Teodora alone inherited the property when testimonies revealed that she had
a brother. Likewise, they failed to prove that they were legally related to or were the only heirs of
Teodora.
Thus, petition for Certiorari under R65 RC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it went beyond the
issue of dismissal and ruled on the sufficiency of petitioners’ evidence before the Regional
Trial Court?
Ruling:
NO. Petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy. They should have filed a petition for
review under Rule 45 instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In Microsoft Corp. V. Best Deal Computer Center Corp.:
A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested.
For an abuse to be grave the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in
contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or
whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner asserts that respondent trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying its application
for the issuance of an ex parte order. However, other than this bare allegation, petitioner failed to
point out specific instances where grave abuse of discretion was allegedly committed ....
Significantly, even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be deemed
as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the respondent acted
with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. The distinction
is clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to correct of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to
correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure
or mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and subject
matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction.
Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. (Citations omitted)
311
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it went
beyond the issue of dismissal of the Complaint and / touched on the factual findings of the Regional
Trial Court. They allege that respondent did not contest the trial court's factual findings as she did
not file an appellee's brief. They posit that the Court of Appeals should have just ruled on the issue
of dismissal alone.
The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in - dismissing petitioners'
Complaint. It had jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the case, and there is no
showing that it whimsically or capriciously exercised this jurisdiction. At most, it may have
committed an error of procedure, as petitioners question its ruling on the merits of the case and
not just on the issue of dismissal for failure to implead indispensable parties.
As petitioners fail to avail themselves of the proper remedy, the Petition ought to be dismissed.
Nonetheless, so as not to further delay the disposition of this case, this Court resolves the issue of
whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling on the merits of the case and not just on the issue of
dismissal for failure to implead indispensable parties.
As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved. Rule 51, Section
8 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 8. Questions that May Be Decided - No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and
clerical errors.
This provision likewise states that the Court of Appeals may review errors that are not assigned but
are closely related to or dependent on an assigned error. The CAis allowed discretion if it "finds that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case.
As sucuch, we have ruled in a number of cases that the appellate court is accorded a broad
discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not
assigned. It is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors
in the appeal. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals may consider grounds other than those touched
upon in the decision of the trial court and uphold the same on the basis of such other grounds, the
CA may, with no less authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds other
than those raised as errors on appeal. We have applied this rule, as a matter of exception, in the
following instances:
(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
312
(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;
(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a
just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice;
(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters
of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the
lower court ignored;
(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent.
Thus, the Court of Appeals has the discretion to consider the issue and address the matter where its
n1ling is necessary (a) to arrive at a just and complete resolution of the case; (b) to serve the interest
of justice; or (c) to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. This is consistent with its authority to review
the totality of the controversy brought on appeal.
Petitioners' appeal primarily focused on the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint for
failure to implead an indispensable party. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on
whether petitioners were able to prove their claim. It had the discretion to properly consider this
separate issue in order to arrive at a complete resolution of the case.
Ordinarily, this case should have been remanded to the Regional Trial Court to make the proper
factual determination. However, due to judicial economy, or "the goal to have cases prosecuted
with the least cost to the parties," the Court of Appeals correctly reviewed the case in its entire
context.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to DISMISS the Petition. The December 22,
2008 Decision and May 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88655 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
313
CRISTINA BARSOLO VS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

G.R. No. 187950 : Jan 11, 2017
“It is worthy to note that this Court has already ruled on the compensability of Myocardial Infarction
as an occupational disease. Rañises v. Employees Compensation Commission, is instructive:
Section l(h), Rule III of the ECC Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, now considers cardio-vascular
disease as compensable occupational disease. Included in Annex "A" is cardio-vascular disease, which cover
myocardial infarction. However, it may be considered as compensable occupational disease only when
substantial evidence is adduced to prove any of the following conditions:
a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an acute
exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work;
b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed
within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship.
c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain of work showed signs and
symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is
reasonable to claim a causal relationship.”
Facts:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Cristina Barsolo, assailing the Decision
dated November 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated May 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 102469.
Cristina Barsolo's (Cristina) deceased husband, Manuel M. Barsolo (Manuel), "was employed as a
seaman by various companies from 1988 to 2002." From July 2, 2002 to December 6, 2002, Manuel
served as a Riding Gang/ Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star with Vela International Marine
Ltd., (Vela). Vela was his last employer before he died in 2006. After his separation from
employment with Vela, Manuel was diagnosed with hypertensive cardiovascular disease, coronary
artery disease, and osteoarthritis. He was examined and treated at the Philippine Heart Center as an
outpatient from April 2, 2003 to October 22, 2004. When he died on September 24, 2006, the autopsy
report listed myocardial infarction as his cause of death. Believing that the cause of Manuel's death
was work-related, Cristina filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, with the Social Security System.
SSS: denied her claim on the ground that there was no longer an employer-employee relationship at
the time of Manuel's death and that "[h]is being a smoker increased his risk of contracting the
illness." Appealed to Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC).
314
ECC: denied the appeal for lack of merit. It reasoned that, since Myocardial Infarction
(Cardiovascular Disease) is listed as an occupational disease under P.D. 626 as amended, [Cristina]
is bound to comply with all the conditions required [under Annex A of the Amended Rules on
Employee's Compensation] to warrant the grant of benefits. It held that Cristina was unable to
establish that her husband's case fell under any of the above circumstances. Moreover, since
Manuel was a smoker, the Commission believed that Manuel's "smoking habits precipitated the
manifestation of his Myocardial Infarction." The ECC added that "the System correctly ruled that
the development of the Myocardial Infarction could not be categorically attributed to the occupation
of [Manuel] as Seaman because of the presence of major causative factor which is not work-related."
Thereafter, petition for review to CA.
CA: It ruled that while there was no doubt that myocardial infarction was a compensable disease,
Cristina failed to prove a causal relationship between Manuel's work and the illness that brought
about his death. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission that Manuel's habit of smoking,
which dates as far back as 1973, may have contributed to the development of his heart ailment.
MR denied. Hence, this Petition to SC was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is substantial evidence that the death was due to myocardial infarcation is
work-related?
Ruling:
No. It held citing the case of Rañises, we held that for myocardial infarction to be considered a
compensable occupational disease, any of the three conditions must be proven by substantial
evidence. Petitioner failed in this regard. On petitioner's insistence that Manuel's case falls under the
third condition, this Court disagrees. For a claim under this condition to prosper, there must be
proof that: first, the person was asymptomatic before beginning employment and second, he had
displayed symptoms during the performance of his duties. Such symptoms should have persisted
long enough to establish that his work caused his heart problem. However, petitioner offered no
proof that her husband suffered any of the symptoms during his employment. All she managed to
prove was that her husband went to the Philippine Heart Center and was treated for Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease from April 2, 2003 to January 9, 2004, four months after his contract with
Vela ended on December 6, 2002.
The Medical Certificate did not help petitioner's cause, as this only shows that Manuel was already
suffering from hypertension even before his pre-employment examination, and that he did not
contract it during his employment with Vela. Having had a pre-existing cardio vascular disease
classifies him under the first condition.
315
However, for a claim under the first category to prosper, petitioner must show that there was an
acute exacerbation of the heart disease caused by the unusual strain of work. Petitioner failed to
adduce any proof that her husband experienced any symptom of a heart ailment while employed
with Vela, much less any sign that his heart condition was aggravated by his job.
Since there was no showing that her husband showed any sign or symptom of cardiac injury during
the performance of his functions, petitioner clearly failed to show that her husband's employment
caused the disease or that his working conditions aggravated his existing heart ailment.
Moreover, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Manuel died on September 24, 2006, four
years after he disembarked from MV Polaris Star. Other factors have already played a role in
aggravating his illness. Due to the considerable lapse of time, more convincing evidence must be
presented in order to attribute the cause of death to Manuel's work. In the absence of such evidence
and under the circumstances of this case, this Court cannot assume that the illness that caused
Manuel's death was acquired during his employment with Vela.
To emphasize, it is not refuted that myocardial infarction is a compensable occupational illness.

However, it becomes compensable only when it falls under any of the three conditions, which
should be proven by substantial evidence.
Furthermore, Manuel was a smoker. The presence of a different major causative factor, which could
explain his illness and eventual death, defeats petitioner's claim. Thusm Petitioner's claim for death
benefits was correctly denied by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 19, 2008
and Resolution dated May 19, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102469 are hereby AFFIRMED.
316
PALAO VS FLORENTINO INTERNATIONAL, INC.

G.R. No. 186967 : January 18, 2017
“The rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provision regarding the certificate of non-forum
shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded. It does not, however, prohibit substantial compliance therewith under
justifiable circumstances, considering especially that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.”
Facts:
On July 30, 2008, Florentino appealed to the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual
Property Office. This appeal's Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by
Atty. John Labsky P. Maximo (Atty. Maximo) of the firm Balgos and Perez. However, Florentino
failed to attach to its appeal a secretary's certificate or board resolution authorizing Balgos and Perez
to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Thus, on August 14, 2008, the
Office of the Director General issued the Order requiring Florentino to submit proof that Atty.
Maximo or Balgos and Perez was authorized to sign the Verification and Certification ofNon-Forum
Shopping.
In his Order dated September 22, 2008, Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian S.
Cristobal, Jr. (Director General Cristobal) dismissed Florentino's appeal He noted that the Secretary's
Certificate pertained to an August 14, 2008 Resolution issued by Florentino' s Board of Directors, and
reasoned that the same Certificate failed to establish the authority of Florentino's counsel to sign the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping as of the date of the filing of Florentino's
appeal (i.e., on July 30, 2008).
Florentino then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. In its assailed January 8, 2009 Decision,22 the Court of Appeals faulted
Director General Cristobal for an overly strict application of procedural rules. Thus, it reversed
Director General Cristobal's September 22, 2008 Order and reinstated Florentino' s appeal.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the September 22, 2008 Order of Intellectual
Property Office Director General Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr., and in reinstating respondent Florentino III
International, Inc.'s appeal.
317
Ruling:
The need for a certification of non-forum shopping to be attached to respondent's appeal before the
Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office is established. Section 3 of the
Intellectual Property Office's Uniform Rules on Appeal specifies the form through which appeals
may be taken to the Director General.
These requirements notwithstanding, the Intellectual Property Office's own Regulations on Inter
Partes Proceedings (which governs petitions for cancellations of a mark, patent, utility model,
industrial design, opposition to registration of a mark and compulsory licensing, and which were in
effect when respondent filed its appeal) specify that the Intellectual Property Office "shall not be
bound by the strict technical rules of procedure and evidence.
In Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc.:
[T]he rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provision regarding the certificate
of non-forum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not, however, prohibit
substantial compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances, considering especially that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
Thus, in Pacquing, this Court held that while, as a rule, "the certificate of non-forum shopping must
be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient,"36 still,
"when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense,
the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies
with the rules."
Given these premises, it was an error for the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office to
have been so rigid in applying a procedural rule and dismissing respondent's appeal. It is
reasonable, therefore-consistent with the precept of liberally applying procedural rules in
administrative proceedings, and with the room allowed by jurisprudence for substantial compliance
with respect to the rule on certifications of non-forum shopping-to construe the error committed by
respondent as a venial lapse that should not be fatal to its cause.
In any case, even in judicial proceedings, this Court has rebuked an overly strict application of the
rules pertaining to certifications of non-forum shopping.
318
Van Clifford Torres Salera vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 206627 : January 18, 2017
“It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
generally binding and conclusive on this Court. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not duty-bound to
analyze, review, and weigh the evidence all over again in the absence of any showing of any arbitrariness,
capriciousness, or palpable error.47 A departure from the general rule may only be warranted in cases where
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the trial court or when these are
unsupported by the evidence on record.”
Facts:
On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol waiting for the
conciliation proceedings to begin when they chanced upon Torres who had just arrived from fishing.
CCC's wife, who was also with them at the barangay hall, persuaded Torres to attend the
conciliation proceedings to answer for his liability. Torres vehemently denied damaging CCC's
multicab. In the middle of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres damaged
CCC's multicab and accused him of stealing CCC's fish nets. Torres told AAA not to pry in the
affairs of adults. He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did not stop. However, AAA
refused to keep silent and continued to accuse Torres of damaging his uncle's multicab. Infuriated
with AAA's meddling, Torres whipped AAA on the neck using a wet t-shirt. Torres continued to hit
AAA causing the latter to fall down from the stairs. CCC came to his nephew's defense and punched
Torres. They engaged in a fistfight until they were separated by Barangay Captain Hermilando
Miano. Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three (3) times. Based on the physical examination
conducted by Dr. Vicente Manalo, Jr., AAA sustain a contusion.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented the following version of the incident:
Torres testified that he had just arrived tired from fishing when CCC badgered him to answer for
the damage he had allegedly caused to CCC's multicab. AAA abruptly interrupted the heated
discussion between the two men. Angered by what AAA had done, Torres told AAA to stop making
unfounded accusations or he would be forced to whip him. AAA called Torres' bluff, which further
provoked Torres. Torres attempted to hit AAA but was thwarted by the timely intervention of CCC,
who suddenly attacked. Torres claimed that CCC filed this case to preempt him from filing a
complaint for physical injuries against CCC. He also claimed that he tried to settle the matter with
CCC and CCC's wife. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement due to the unreasonable
demands of the spouses.
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Issues:
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining his conviction on a judgment premised on
a misapprehension of facts; and
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
1) NO. We affirm petitioner's conviction. The act of whipping a child three (3) times in the
neck with a wet t-shirt constitutes child abuse.
It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive on this Court. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not
duty-bound to analyze, review, and weigh the evidence all over again in the absence of any showing
of any arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error. A departure from the general rule may only
be warranted in cases where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings
of the trial court or when these are unsupported by the evidence on record.
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function properly within the office of the trial
courts. It is a question of fact not reviewable by this Court. The trial court's findings on the matter
are entitled to great weight and given great respect and "may only be disregarded . . . if there are
facts and circumstances which were overlooked by the trial court and which would substantially
alter the results of the case.
This Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. The trial court neither
disregarded nor overlooked any material fact or circumstance that would substantially alter the case.
The presence or absence of one person during the incident is not substantial enough to overturn the
finding that petitioner whipped AAA three (3) times with a wet t-shirt. Assuming, without
admitting, that petitioner did whip AAA, petitioner argues that it should not be considered as child
abuse because the law requires intent to abuse. Petitioner maintains that he whipped AAA merely to
discipline and restrain the child "from further intensifying the situation." He also maintains that his
act was justified because AAA harassed and vexed him. Thus, petitioner claims that there could not
have been any intent to abuse on his part. Petitioner contends that the injuries sustained by AAA
will not affect the latter's physical growth or development and mental capacity. He argues that he
could not be convicted of child abuse without proof that the victim's development had been
prejudiced.
He begs the indulgence of this Court and claims that his conviction would only serve as a "precedent
to all children to act recklessly, errantly and disobediently" and would then create a society ruled by
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juvenile delinquency and errant behavior. If at all, petitioner claims that he could only be convicted
of slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code for the contusion sustained by AAA.
Respondent maintains that the act of whipping AAA is an act of child abuse. Respondent argues
that the act complained of need not be prejudicial to the development of the child for it to constitute
a violation of Republic Act No. 7610. Respondent, citing Sanchez v. People, argues that Section 10(a)
of Republic Act No. 7610 defines and punishes four distinct acts. We reject petitioner's contention
that his act of whipping AAA is not child abuse but merely slight physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code. The victim, AAA, was a child when the incident occurred. Therefore, AAA is
entitled to protection under Republic Act No. 7610, the primary purpose of which has been defined
in Araneta v. People thus:
Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive
program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in
keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State
shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development."
321
PEOPLE VS MONIR JAAFAR TAMBUYONG

G.R. No. 219829 : January 18, 2017
“While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal to
the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground that
justifies departure from the general rule.”
Facts:
On September 10, 2009, at around 8 PM, a male civilian informant reported to Chief of Police, Police
Superintendent Alberto Capacio Larubis (Chief Larubis) that a certain "Mana" was selling shabu at
the port area barangay located just beside the police station.[ Mana was later identified as Jaafar,
who sold shabu between 12:00 m.n. and 4:00a.m. to facilitate the sale of the drug and evade
arrest. Jaafar allegedly peddled shabu in his house.
A buy-bust operation headed by Chief Larubis was conducted. PO1 Look was designated as the
poseur-buyer while PO2 Bucoy and PDEA Agent Mark Dela Cruz were designated as the arresting
officers. On September 11, 2009, the buy-bust team left the police station at 1:45 a.m. and went to
Jaafar's house. Jaafar met PO1 Look and the informant at the door of his house and asked them if
they were buying shabu. PO1 Look answered in the affirmative and gave Jaafar a marked P500.00
bill. Jaafar called for Gani inside the house. Gani came out and handed Jaafar a sachet containing
shabu. Jaafar gave the sachet to PO1 Look, who immediately lit a cigarette—the pre-arranged signal
agreed upon by the buy-bust team. The police officers rushed to arrest Jaafar, but he managed to
escape. Jaafar threw away the marked P500.00 bill as he ran. Eventually, the arresting officers caught
up with him 30 meters away from his house.
Immediately after the arrest, PO1 Look marked the confiscated sachet of shabu with his initials. He
then turned over the sachet and the marked P500.00 bill to their team leader, SPO4 Morales. The
buy-bust team brought Jaafar and Gani to the police station for investigation.
Chief Larubis prepared a letter-request addressed to forensic chemist Melvin Manuel for the
examination of the contents of the sachet. Upon examination, the contents tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
RTC: convicted Jaafar for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. However, it
acquitted Gani for insufficiency of evidence. Case was appealed to CA.
CA: The Court of Appeals ruled that although the sachet of shabu was not formally offered in
evidence during trial, it was nevertheless identified by PO1 Look and the forensic chemist. Being
part of their direct testimonies, the shabu formed part of the records of the case. Hence, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court did not err in considering the shabu as evidence. The
322
Court of Appeals also agreed with the Regional Trial Court with regard to the alleged violation of
the chain of custody rule. Although there was a departure in the procedure mandated under Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9165, the Court of Appeals ruled that it did not automatically render the
confiscated drugs inadmissible since the integrity of the seized shabu had been kept intact.
Issue:
Whether the guilt of accused appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-
observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Ruling:
No. This Court grants the appeal and acquits accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong.
In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug
itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity of the dangerous drug
must be clearly established. While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165 is not fatal to the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be
triggered by the existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule. This Court finds
that the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant non-compliance with
the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Although the buy-bust team
marked[63] and conducted a physical inventory of the seized sachet of shabu, the records do not
show that the seized sachet had been photographed. Non-observance of the mandatory
requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 casts doubt on the integrity of the shabu
supposedly seized from accused-appellant. This creates reasonable doubt in the conviction of
accused-appellant for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
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REPUBLIC v. SPS LLAMAS

G.R. No. 194190 : January 25, 2017
“In White Plains Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, which pertained to "the widening of the Katipunan
Road in the White Plains Subdivision in Quezon City.”More specifically, in the 1991 White Plains Decision
that shows a compulsion for subdivision owners to set aside open spaces for public use, such as roads, and for
which they need not be compensated by Subdivision owners are mandated to set aside such open spaces before
their proposed subdivision plans may be approved by the government authorities, and that such open spaces
shall be devćted exclusively for the use of the general public and the subdivision owner need not be
compensated for the same. A subdivision owner must comply with such requirement before the subdivision
plan is approved and the authority to sell is issued. “
Facts:
On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an action for
expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave, which also known as Sucat Road. This action
was brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in this case. On November 2,
1993, the Commissioners appointed by the Regional Trial Court in the expropriation case submitted
a resolution recommending that just compensation for the expropriated areas be set to P12, 000.00
per square meter. Llamas spouses filed "Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to be
Allowed Intervention as Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors" on January 27, 1994. They also filed
their Answer-in-Intervention on March 21, 1994. After which, on August 2, 1994, they filed a "Most
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Order Directing the Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value
of Expropriated Land and Improvements."
After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion for Issuance of an
Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution dated May 14, 2002. In this Motion, the Llamas Spouses
faulted the Department of Public Works and Highways for what was supposedly its deliberate
failure to comply with the Regional Trial Court's previous Orders and even with its own
undertaking to facilitate the payment of just compensation to the Llamas Spouses.
Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses had an understanding that the
resolution of the latter's claims required the submission of: (1) certified true copies of the TCTs
covering the lots; and (2) certified true copies of the tax declarations, tax clearances, and tax receipts
over the lots. But, due to their continued failure to comply with their undertaking, the Department
of Public Works and Highways did not pay them.
On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment to the Llamas
Spouses of just compensation at P12,000.00 per square meter for 41 square meters for the lot covered
by TCT No. 217267. It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. 179165 and noted that these
were subdivision road lots, which the Llamas Spouses "no longer owned" and which "belonged to
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the community for whom they were made." In the Order dated May 19, 2008, the Regional Trial
Court denied the Llamas Spouses' Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and Carmelita Llamas for the
subdivision road lots covered by TCT No. 179165.
Ruling:
YES. The Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the road lots are not compensable
since they have "already been withdrawn from the commerce of man." It relies chiefly on this Court's
1991 Decision in White Plains Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, which pertained to "the widening of the
Katipunan Road in the White Plains Subdivision in Quezon City.”More specifically, in the 1991
White Plains Decision that shows a compulsion for subdivision owners to set aside open spaces for
public use, such as roads, and for which they need not be compensated by Subdivision owners are
mandated to set aside such open spaces before their proposed subdivision plans may be approved
by the government authorities, and that such open spaces shall be devoted exclusively for the use of
the general public and the subdivision owner need not be compensated for the same. A subdivision
owner must comply with such requirement before the subdivision plan is approved and the
authority to sell is issued. On the other hand, in its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside
the Regional Trial Court's Orders and required the Department of Public Works and Highways to
similarly compensate the Llamas Spouses for the two (2) road lots at P12, 000.00 per square meter.
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act" must first be made by the "owner-
developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the subdivision roads." As
there is no such thing as an automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an actual
transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the owner
until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation." Stated
otherwise, "the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation,
if they are to be utilized as a public road."
Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public use, remain
private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by donation or through
expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be forced to donate his or her property even if it has
been delineated as road lots because that would partake of an illegal taking. He or she may even
choose to retain said properties. Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City
Government of Parañaque to acquire dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain
their private character. Accordingly, just compensation must be paid to respondents as the
government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.
325
METROBANK v. LIBERTY CORRUGATED

G.R. No. 184317 : January 25, 2017
“A petition for rehabilitation, the procedure for which is provided in the Interim Rules of Procedure
on Corporate Recovery, should be considered as a special proceeding. It is one that seeks to establish the status
of a party or a particular fact. As provided in section 1, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Recovery, the
status or fact sought to be established is the inability of the corporate debtor to pay its debts when they fall due
so that a rehabilitation plan, containing the formula for the successful recovery of the corporation, may be
approved in the end. It does not seek a relief from an injury caused by another party.”
Facts:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's December 21, 2007 Order approving
Liberty Corrugated Boxes Manufacturing Corp.'s rehabilitation plan.
Respondent Liberty Corrugated Boxes Manufacturing Corp. is a domestic corporation that produces
corrugated packaging boxes. It obtained various credit accommodations and loan facilities from
petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) amounting to Pl 9,940,000.00. To
secure its loans, Liberty mortgaged to Metrobank 12 lots in Valenzuela City.
On June 21, 2007, Liberty filed a Petition8 for corporate rehabilitation before Branch 7 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon City. Liberty claimed that it could not meet its obligations to
Metrobank because of the Asian Financial Crisis, which resulted in a drastic decline in demand for
its goods, and the serious sickness of its Founder and President, Ki Kiao Koc. Liberty's rehabilitation
plan consisted of: (a) a debt moratorium; (b) renewal of marketing efforts; (c) resumption of
operations; and ( d) entry into condominium development, a new business.
On August 6, 2007, Metro bank filed its comment/opposition. It argued that Liberty was not
qualified for corporate rehabilitation; that Liberty's Petition for rehabilitation and rehabilitation plan
were defective; and that rehabilitation was not feasible. It also claimed that Liberty filed the Petition
solely to avoid its obligations to the bank. Rehabilitation Receiver Rafael Chris F. Teston
recommended the approval of the plan, provided that Liberty would initiate construction on the
property in Valenzuela within 12 months from approval.
In its December 21, 2007 Order, the Regional Trial Court approved the rehabilitation plan.
Metrobank appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 13, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued the
Decision16 denying the Petition and affirming the Regional Trial Court's December 21, 2007 Order.
The Court of Appeals also found that the trial court correctly approved the rehabilitation plan over
Metrobank's Opposition upon the recommendation of the Rehabilitation Receiver, who had
carefully considered and addressed Metrobank's criticism on the plan's viability.
326
The Court of Appeals stressed that the purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is to enable the
distressed company to gain a new lease on life and to allow the creditors to be paid their claims. It
held that the approval of the Regional Trial Court was precisely "'to effect a feasible and viable
rehabilitation' of ailing corporations” as required by Presidential Decree No. 902-A.
Issues:
1) Whether the respondent, as a debtor in default, is qualified to file a petition for rehabilitation
under Presidential Decree No. 902-A and Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules; and
2) Whether the respondent's Petition for rehabilitation is sufficient in form and substance and
respondent's rehabilitation plan, feasible.
Ruling:
1) Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules provides: Debtor-Initiated Rehabilitation

SECTION 1. Who May Petition. - Any debtor who foresees the impossibility of meeting its
debts when they respectively fall due, or any creditor or creditors holding at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of the debtor's total liabilities, may petition the proper Regional Trial Court to
• have the debtor placed under rehabilitation.
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Basic Polyprinters and Packaging Corporation reiterates the purpose
of rehabilitation, which is to provide meritorious corporations an opportunity for recovery: Under
the Interim Rules, rehabilitation is the process of restoring "the debtor to a position of successful
operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and
its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan more if the
corporation continues as a going concern that if it is immediately liquidated." It contemplates a
continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its
former position of successful operation and solvency.
2) The Interim Rules provide for a liberal construction of its provisions:
SECTION 2. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of
Sections 5(d), 6(c) and 6(d) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, and to assist the parties
in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of cases. Where applicable, the
Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily to proceedings under these Rules.
To adopt petitioner's interpretation would undermine the purpose of the Interim Rules. There is no
reason why corporations with debts that may have already matured should not be given the
opportunity to recover and pay their debtors in an orderly fashion. The opportunity to rehabilitate
the affairs of an economic entity, regardless of the status of its debts, redounds to the benefit of its
327
creditors, owners, and to the economy in general. Rehabilitation, rather than collection of debts from
a company already near bankruptcy, is a better use of judicial rewards.
A.M. No. 08-8-1 O-SC further describes the remedy initiated by a petition for rehabilitation: A
petition for rehabilitation, the procedure for which is provided in the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Recovery, should be considered as a special proceeding. It is one that seeks to establish
the status of a party or a particular fact. As provided in section 1, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules on
Corporate Recovery, the status or fact sought to be established is the inability of the corporate debtor
to pay its debts when they fall due so that a rehabilitation plan, containing the formula for the
successful recovery of the corporation, may be approved in the end. It does not seek a relief from an
injury caused by another party.
328
SHELL v. ROYAL FERRY PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, vs. ROYAL

FERRY SERVICES, INC.,
G.R. No. 188146 : February 1, 2017
“To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a corporation should be the
actual place where its principal office has been located for six (6) months before the filing of the petition. If
there is a conflict between the place stated in the articles of incorporation and the physical location of the
corporation's main office, the actual place of business should control.
Requiring a corporation to go back to a place it has abandoned just to file a case is the very definition of
inconvenience. There is no reason why an insolvent corporation should be forced to exert whatever meager
resources it has to litigate in a city it has already left.
JUDGEMENT ON THE MERTS; It is judicial policy to determine a case based on the merits so that the
parties have full opportunity to ventilate their cause and defenses.75 The Court of Appeals did not err in taking
cognizance of the appeal.“
Facts:
On August 28, 2005, Royal Ferry Services Inc. filed a petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. In its Petition stated therein , in the year 2000, the company suffered
business losses. Efforts were made to revive its financial condition but failed. The business ceased its
operations. A special board meeting was held and was approved and authorized by the members of
the board to allow the company to file a Petition for insolvency. In retrospect of the company, it is a
corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine Laws and was holding its principal
business office address in Bangkal Street, Makati City but holds its Office at Room 203 at Bf
condominium Building , Intramuros , Manila at the time the Petition was filed.
On December 19, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued an order, granting the petition
declaring the Royal Ferry Services insolvent.
The Court orders:

The Branch Sheriff to take possession of, and safely keep until the appointment, of an Assignee all
the deeds, vouchers, books of accounts, papers, notes, bills and securities of the petitioner and all its
real and personal properties, estates and effects not exempt from execution;
All persons and entities owing money to petitioner are hereby forbidden to make payment for its
accounts or to deliver or transfer any property to petitioner except to the duly elected Assignee;
All civil proceedings against petitioner are deemed stayed;
329
For purposes of electing an Assignee, a meeting of all creditors of the petitioner is hereby set on
February 24, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. before this Court, at Room 435, Fourth Floor, Manila City Hall
Building.
The said order was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks
furnishing copies to all creditors of the company in the schedule of creditors.
On December 23, 2005, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
Formal Notice of Claim and a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the respondent Royal Ferry Services
Inc owes them the amount of P 2,769,387.67 and the Petition for Insolvency was filed erroneously
filed in a wrong venue. The petitioners argued that in Insolvency Law, a petition for Insolvency
should be filed before he Court with territorial jurisdiction over the company's residence. In its
Article of Incorporation, respondent's principal business address is situated in Makati City would it
be the Petition for Insolvency should be filed before the Court of Makati.
The petitioners Motion was denied by the Court on January 30, 2006 for lack of merit. Thereafter,
Pilipinas Shell moved for a reconsideration on February 24, 2006.
On June 15, 2006, Regional Trial Court reconsidered the denial of Pilipinas Shell Motion to Dismiss
and reconsider its order dated January 30, 2006. The Petition for Voluntary Insolvency was ordered
DISMISSED.
The respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2006 and the records was forwarded to the
Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court ruled reinstating the Insolvency proceedings setting aside
the Trial Court order dated June 15, 2006.
Issues:
1) Whether the Petition for Voluntary Insolvency was filed in a proper venue where the
company's residence is situated.
2) Whether the CA erred in deciding to rule on the Merits.
RULING:
1) NO. To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a corporation
should be the actual place where its principal office has been located for six (6) months
before the filing of the petition. If there is a conflict between the place stated in the articles of
incorporation and the physical location of the corporation's main office, the actual place of
business should control.
Requiring a corporation to go back to a place it has abandoned just to file a case is the very definition
of inconvenience. There is no reason why an insolvent corporation should be forced to exert
whatever meager resources it has to litigate in a city it has already left. The Supreme Court ruled,
AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating the Petition for Voluntary Insolvency
filed by the respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Petition for certiorari filed by
330
Pilipinas Shell was ordered Denied. The respondent Royal Ferry Services is a resident of Manila in
its actual operations of its business when the Petition for Insolvency was filed. It was not opposed as
stated in the Articles of Incorporation of the respondent that its principal business address is
situated in Makati is no longer accurate and existing. Facts has been proven that the actual use and
venue of the respondent's business operations is in Manila when the Court Sheriff implemented the
order of the Court dated December 19, 2005. Court should have been more prudent in granting the
immediate execution, considering that the execution of the judgment award involves the payment of
almost ₱8.5 billion in public funds. As previously discussed, there was no legal basis to grant the
back payment of additional COLA and AA to NAPOCOR personnel from July 1, 1989 to March 16,
1999.
2) NO. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in deciding to rule on the merits.
The term "may" in Rule 50, Section 173 of the Rules of Court means that the Court of Appeals
has discretion to dismiss an appeal based on the enumerated grounds. The Court of Appeals
exercised its discretion when it decided that the interest of justice would be better served by
overlooking the pleading's technical defects. Time and again, this Court has declared that
dismissal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon.74 It is judicial policy to determine a
case based on the merits so that the parties have full opportunity to ventilate their cause and
defenses. The Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the appeal.
331
LIZA L. MAZA v. HON. EVELYN A. TURLA

G.R. No. 187094 : February 15, 2017
“In First United Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point Management Corp. (PPMC), et al., this Court
reiterated that it "will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to
the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari."
In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction. At the
time the petition was filed, petitioners were incumbent party-list representatives. The possibility of their arrest
and incarceration should the assailed Orders be affirmed, would affect their representation of their constituents
in Congress.
Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the merits of this case necessitate this Court's
exercise of jurisdiction.”
Facts:
Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo Deputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal
Investigation and Detection Team, referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija, three (3) cases of murder against petitioners and 15 other persons. Inspector Palomo named 19
individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly responsible for the death of Carlito
Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe. That the named individuals conspired, planned, and
implemented the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List. Carlito Bayudang and Danilo
Felipe were AKBAYAN community organizers, whereas Jimmy Peralta was mistaken for a certain
Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter. On July 18, 2008, Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-
Turla issued an Order37 on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla held that the proper procedure in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed in the Palayan cases and remanded the
case back to the prosecutor’s office for another preliminary investigation.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Doctrine of Heirarchy Courts is violated?
2. Whether or not the trial court judge erred in returning the case to the prosecutor in order to
conduct a complete preliminary investigation?
Ruling:
1. NO. This case is an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy if courts. This Court thoroughly
explained the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections:
332
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively
'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of
facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may
not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating - in
the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar - existing
precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in
respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have
provided exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and
executive branches of the government.
A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
333
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents
courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial
protection.
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United
States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may
guide the lower courts.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court
held that:
... it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher
judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who
participated in its discussion.
Fifth, ... Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ...
Seventh, [there is] no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]
... The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct
resort to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to
be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past,
questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts included citizens' right to bear arms, government contracts involving modernization of
voters' registration lists, and the status and existence of a public office.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a
direct resort to this court.
In First United Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point Management Corp. (PPMC), et al.,71 this Court reiterated
that it "will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be
334
obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari."
In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's
jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners were incumbent party-list representatives.
The possibility of their arrest and incarceration should the assailed Orders be affirmed, would affect
their representation of their constituents in Congress.
Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the merits of this case necessitate this
Court's exercise of jurisdiction.
2. YES.. Thus, he trial court judge erred in returning the case to the prosecutor.
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of
this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the
court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge has
the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable
cause. Upon filing of an information in court, trial court judges must determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation of the prosecutor's report and its
supporting documents. They may dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant, or require the
submission of additional evidence. However, they cannot remand the case for another conduct of
preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier preliminary investigation was improperly
conducted. Hence, the trial court judge erred in remanding the case back to the prosecutor’s office
for another preliminary investigation.
335
MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN vs. FRANCISCO DOLOR (Substituted by his heirs), and

HERMOGENA DOLOR.
G.R. No. 198120: February 20, 2017
“Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest.
Accordingly, [a final judgment] may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. “
Facts:
In a Complaint for Reconveyance of Property and Damages filed with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, the Dolor Spouses alleged that on February 17, 1984, they, as buyers, and Manuel
Cammayo (Cammayo), as seller, executed a Deed of Sale over a 300 square meter parcel of land
located in Novaliches, Quezon City.5 This 300 square meter parcel was to be segregated from a
larger landholding.
On March 27, 2006, the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 223 rendered a Decision ordering
Gatmaytan to convey the lot to the Dolor Spouses. On June 16, 2006, Gatmaytan filed her Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court on August 28, 2006. Gatmaytan then filed an
Appeal with the Court of Appeals.
In its assailed March 24, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, dismissed Gatmaytan's
Appeal. It ruled that the Regional Trial Court's March 27, 2006 Decision had already attained finality
as Gatmaytan filed her Motion for Reconsideration beyond the requisite 15-day period.
Issue:
Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the requisite 15-day period.
Ruling:
It is elementary that “appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege.” As such, one
who wishes to file an appeal “must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the
right to appeal is lost.” It is just as basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or
modified as soon as it becomes final and executory; “nothing is more settled in law.” Once a case is
decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. Accordingly, [a final
judgment] may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.
Once a judgment becomes final, the court or tribunal loses jurisdiction, and any modified judgment
that it issues, as well as all proceedings taken for this purpose are null and void. This elementary
336
rule finds basis in “public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment
of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by
law.” Basic rationality dictates that there must be an end to litigation. Any contrary posturing
renders justice inutile, reducing to futility the winning party’s capacity to benefit from the resolution
of a case. In accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, unless a Motion
for Reconsideration is timely filed, the judgment or final order from which it arose shall become
final.
Reckoning the date when a party is deemed to have been given notice of the judgment or final order
subject of his or her Motion for Reconsideration depends on the manner by which the judgment of
final order was served upon the party himself or herself. When, however, a party is represented and
has appeared by counsel, service shall, as a rule, be made upon his or her counsel.
337
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LORENZO MUSNI, EDUARDO SONZA and
SPOUSES IRENEO and NENITA SANTOS
G.R. No. 206343: February 22, 2017.
“The determination of whether petitioner acted in good faith is a factual matter, which cannot be
raised before this Court in a Rule 45 petition. To emphasize, “this Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally embark on a reexamination of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial.”
Facts:
Musni filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City a complaint for reconveyance of land and
cancellation of TCT No. 333352 against Spouses Nenita Sonza Santos and Ireneo Santos (Spouses
Santos), Eduardo Sonza (Eduardo), and Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank).
Musni alleged that Nenita Sonza Santos (Nenita) falsified a Deed of Sale, and caused the transfer of
title of the lot in her and her brother Eduardo's names. He claimed that the Spouses Santos and
Eduardo mortgaged the lot to land Bank as security for their loan of ₱1,400,000.00. Petitioner
contends that the mortgage was executed before the institution of the criminal case against one of
the mortgagors. It insists that the "filing of the [criminal] complaint could not operate as a notice to
the whole world." Since the bank "was not a party to the case [,] it could not have been notified of the
existence of the [criminal] complaint."
On May 6, 2013, Land Bank filed a Petition for Review before this Court against Musni, Eduardo,
and the Spouses Santos.32 Petitioner reiterates that it observed good faith in both the mortgage
transaction, and the foreclosure sale. From the time the property was mortgaged to it until the title
was consolidated in its name, no one filed an adverse claim or notice of lis pendens with the Registry
of Deeds. Petitioner argues that it has complied with all the requirements of foreclosure, including
the required publication and posting.
Musni said that he was dispossessed of the lot when Land Bank foreclosed the property upon
Nenita and Eduardo's failure to pay their loan. Later, the titles of the lot and another foreclosed land
were consolidated in TCT No. 333352, under the name of Land Bank.
Issue:
Whether or not petition for certiorari under rule 45 is the proper remedy.
Ruling:
The determination of whether petitioner acted in good faith is a factual matter, which cannot be
raised before this Court in a Rule 45 petition. To emphasize, “this Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally embark on a reexamination of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial.”
338
The Court of Appeals misconstrued the award given by the trial court. When the trial court awarded
the amount of ₱448,000.00, it did so in representation of the damages that petitioner suffered "by
reason of the mortgage, foreclosure [,] and consolidation of the land in its name."71 The award was
meant to compensate petitioner for the loss it suffered in transacting with respondents Spouses
Santos and Eduardo.
Nonetheless, this Court affirms the removal of the damages since petitioner did not seek relief from
the Court with clean hands. Petitioner may have incurred losses when it entered into the mortgage
transaction with respondents Spouses Santos and Eduardo, and the corresponding foreclosure sale.
However, the losses could have been avoided if only petitioner exercised the required due diligence.
This Court notes that both lower courts erroneously reconveyed TCT No. 333352 to respondent
Musni, despite finding that only one of the properties covered by the title was in question. Thus, the
consolidated title should be cancelled before the reconveyance of the subject property.
339
SUSANA B. CABAHUG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
While procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect since they serve to facilitate the
adjudication of cases in support of the speedy disposition of cases mandated by the Constitution, “[a] liberal
interpretation . . . of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances.”
Facts:
This resolves the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari, which
assail the Decision3 dated August 1, 2008 and the Resolution dated January 12, 2009 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23459, finding petitioners Venancio R. Nava (Nava), Susana B.
Cabahug (Cabahug), Aquilina B. Granada (Granada), Carlos Bautista (Bautista), Felipe Pancho
(Pancho), and Jesusa Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On November 5, 1993, Teresita C. Lagmay (Lagmay), Eden Jane R. Intencion, and Mabini S. Reyes of
the Commission on Audit, Region XI, Davao City, submitted a Joint-Affidavit6 with an attached
Special Audit Report7 to the Commission on Audit Director, Region XI, Davao City.
The Special Audit Report disclosed that the various school forms and construction materials
purchased by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, now Department of Education,
Division Office of Davao for the Elementary School Building Program were priced above the
prevailing market prices, leading to a loss of P613,755.36 due to overpricing. The auditors
recommended the refund of the excess amount, and the filing of a criminal or administrative action
against the public officials who participated in the transactions.
Issue:
Whether or not Petition was filed within the 15-day period.
Ruling:
Inasmuch as Nava’s provided under Section 2 of Rule 45, this Court treated it as an appeal and did
not dismiss it outright. While procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect since they
serve to facilitate the adjudication of cases in support of the speedy disposition of cases mandated by
the Constitution, “[a] liberal interpretation . . . of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.”
340
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF BATAAN,

SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN, PASTOR B. VICHUACO (in his official
capacity as Provincial Treasurer of Bataan) and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE
OF BATAAN
G.R. No. 180654 : March 6, 2017
Court of Tax Appeals is vested with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, among others, appeals
from the “decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.”
Facts:
National Power Corporation (NPC) received a notice of franchise tax delinquency from the
respondent Provincial Government of Bataan (the Province) for ₱45.9 million covering the years
2001, 2002, and 2003. The Province based its assessment on the NPC’s sale of electricity that it
generated from two power plants in Bataan.
Rather than pay the tax or reject it, the NPC chose to reserve its right to contest the computation
pending the decision of the Supreme Court in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan,1 a
case where the issue of the NPC’s exemption from the payment of local franchise tax was then
pending.
On May 12 and 14, 2003 the Province again sent notices of tax due to the NPC, calling its attention to
the Court’s Decision in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan that held the NPC liable
for the payment of local franchise tax. The NPC replied, however, that it had ceased to be liable for
the payment of that tax after Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 9136, also known as the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) that took effect on June 26, 2001. The new law relieved the NPC
of the function of generating and supplying electricity beginning that year. Consequently, the
Province has no right to further assess it for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 local franchise tax.
Ignoring the NPC’s view, the Province issued a "Warrant of Levy" on 14 real properties that it used
to own in Limay, Bataan. In March 2004 the Province caused their sale at public auction with itself as
the winning bidder. Shortly after, the NPC received a copy of the Certificate of Sale of Real Property
covering the auctioned properties for ₱60,477,285.22, the amount of its franchise tax delinquency.
On July 7, 2004 the NPC filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mariveles, Bataan, a petition
for declaration of nullity of the foreclosure sale with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
against the Province, the provincial treasurer, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The NPC alleged that the foreclosure had no legal basis since R.A. 7160.
341
Issue:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Under Section 7, paragraph (a)(3), the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) is vested with the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over, among others, appeals from the “decisions, orders or resolutions of the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise
of their original or appellate jurisdiction.”—Republic Act No. 9282, which amended Republic Act
No. 1125, took effect on April 23, 2004, and significantly expanded the extent and scope of the cases
that the Court of Tax Appeals was tasked to hear and adjudicate. Under Section 7, paragraph (a)(3),
the Court of Tax Appeals is vested with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, among others,
appeals from the “decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.”
A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” In the instant case, petitioner’s complaint has sought
not only the nullification of the foreclosure sale but also a declaration from the trial court that it is
exempt from the local franchise tax. The action began when respondent ignored petitioner’s claim
for exemption from franchise tax, and pursued its collection of the franchise tax delinquency by
issuing the warrant of levy and conducting the sale at public auction — where the Provincial
Government of Bataan was declared as purchaser — of the transmission assets, despite the
purported prior mutual agreement to suspend administrative remedies for the collection of taxes.
The assets were sold to enforce collection of a franchise tax delinquency against the petitioner.
Petitioner thus had to assail the correctness of the local franchise tax assessments made against it by
instituting the complaint with the Regional Trial Court; otherwise, the assessment would become
conclusive and unappealable. Certainly, petitioner is a real party-in-interest, which stands to gain or
lose from the judgment that the trial court may render.
342
CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALISI, and BREGIDO MALACAT, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 205745 : March 8, 2017
“It is basic that Rule 45 petitions may only raise pure questions of law, and that the factual findings of
lower courts are generally binding and conclusive on this Court. Still, there are recognized exceptions
permitting this Court to overturn the factual findings with which it is confronted.”
Facts:
On December 17, 1995, Rolando O. Bahian alleged that Capistano Daataya et al, conspiring
mutually, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, assaulted, box, kick and struck Bahian. This
incident happen a day after a commotion incident between the parties in the basketball court. Bahian
Farther alleged that a stone was thrown to his head by petitioners that causes depress frontal
fracture, open frontal bone, left, and advice for surgery. The petitioners pleaded not guilty.
Specifically concerning criminal cases, this Court has stated that "in exceptional circumstances, such
as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters this Court will re-calibrate and
evaluate the factual findings of the [lower courts]."
A careful review of this case and of the body of evidence that was available for the Regional Trial
Court's perusal reveals that there has been a gross misapprehension of facts on the part of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Thus, we reverse and acquit petitioners Capistrano
Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido Malacat, Jr.
Issue: Whether or not rule 45 is the proper remedy.
Ruling:
It is basic that Rule 45 petitions may only raise pure questions of law, and that the factual findings of
lower courts are generally binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court (SC); Exceptions.—It is
basic that Rule 45 petitions may only raise pure questions of law, and that the factual findings of
lower courts are generally binding and conclusive on this Court. Still, there are recognized
exceptions permitting this Court to overturn the factual findings with which it is confronted. These
exceptions are: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
343
MIGUEL “LUCKY” GUILLERMO and AV MANILA CREATIVE PRODUCTION CO. vs.

PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY and DPWH
G.R. No. 223751: March 15, 2017.
“To determine the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the
complaint should be considered, in relation to whether its prayer may be granted.”
Facts:
In determining the sufficiency of a cause of action for resolving a motion to dismiss, a court must
determine, hypothetically admitting the factual allegations in a complaint, whether it can grant the
prayer in the complaint.
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari praying that respondents Philippine Information
Agency and Department of Public Works and Highways be ordered to pay the money claims of
petitioners Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo and AV Manila Creative Production, Co.
On December 10, 2010, Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo (Guillermo) and AV Manila Creative Production,
Co. (AV Manila) filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Marikina City, Branch 263.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the Regional Trial Court of Marikina denied in the
Order dated February 7, 2013.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. In the Decision dated December 18, 2015, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Order dismissing petitioners' Complaint. The Court of
Appeals found that the Complaint sought to enforce a legal right based on a contract. However,
petitioners failed to prove the existence of a contract, considering that the elements of a contract
were absent. The Court of Appeals also found the doctrine of quantum meruit inapplicable because
of absence of any contract or legal right in favor of petitioners, and lack of evidence of public benefit
derived from the "Joyride" project
Issue: Whether the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
Ruling:
To determine the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the
complaint should be considered, in relation to whether its prayer may be granted.—To determine
the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint
should be considered, in relation to whether its prayer may be granted. In Heirs of Maramag v.
Maramag, When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based
only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such
allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether,
hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule.
344
EDWIN GRANADA REYES vs. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THE

SANDIGANBAYAN, and PAUL JOCSON ARCHES
G.R. No. 208243 : June 5, 2017
“An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people, and is the preserver of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the sole power
to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused.”
Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur passed Municipal Ordinance No. 357,
prohibiting the "storing, displaying, selling, and blowing up ('pagpabuto') of those pyrotechnics
products allowed by law, commonly called 'firecrackers' or 'pabuto' within the premises of buildings
1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public Market."
Then Bansalan Mayor Reyes approved a permit allowing vendors to sell firecrackers at the Bansalan
Public Market.
A fire befell the Bansalan Public Market. It caused extensive damage and destroyed fire hydrants of
the Bansalan Water District. Subsequently, private respondent Paul Jocson Arches filed a complaint
against Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao. questioning the approval and
issuance of a mayor's permit agreeing to sell firecrackers, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
357. He claimed that this permit caused the fire the previous year.
After the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution and found that
probable cause existed to charge Reyes with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The
Ombudsman held that Reyes and his co-respondents were public officers during the questioned
acts. Both the government and private stall owners suffered undue injury due to the fire at the
Bansalan Public Market. While the mayor's permit was not the proximate cause of the fire, it
nonetheless, "gave unwarranted benefit and advantage to the fire cracker vendors ... to sell
firecrackers in the public market despite existing prohibition." The issuance of the mayor's permit
was "patently tainted with bad faith and partiality or, at the very least, gross inexcusable
negligence."
Petitioner filed this petition, arguing that public respondent Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion considering there was no legal basis to support the finding of probable cause against
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in determining that probable
cause against petitioner exists.
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Ruling:
No. As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of
its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act
of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials
and government employees.
The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman[.]" An independent constitutional
body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people[,] and
[is] the preserver of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the sole power to determine
whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused.
This function is executive in nature. The executive determination of probable cause is a highly
factual matter. It requires probing into the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [or she] was prosecuted." The Office of the
Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the
strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As
this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman. Disagreement
with the Ombudsman's findings is not enough to constitute grave abuse of discretion. It is settled:
An act of a court or tribunal may constitute grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in
a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or personal hostility.
Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman's Resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
346
SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ AND MARIA CRISTINA CABARRUS vs. SPS. PETER L. PO AND
VICTORIA L. PO/SPS. PETER L. PO AND VICTORIA L. PO vs. SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ, ET
AL.
G.R. No. 208450/G.R. No. 208497 : June 5, 2017
“Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either
as plaintiffs or defendants. An indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding is so
necessary that "the action cannot be finally determined" without him or her because his or her interest in the
matter and in the relief "are so bound up with that of the other parties.”
Facts:
This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City, initially registered under
the name of Roberto Aboitiz. This parcel of land originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno. On
July 31, 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno. On May 5,
1978, Ciriaco sold the two (2) lots to Victoria Po (Victoria). The parties executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale. On July 15, 1982, Mariano died and was survived by his five (5) children.
In 1990, Peter Po discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a quitclaim dated August 7, 1989 renouncing
his interest in favor of Roberto. In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was “the declared owner of
Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807.
The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference
between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration for the entire property and the value of
the land the Spouses Po were left with after the quitclaim. However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was
also sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of absolute sale
in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of a subdivision
called North Town Homes. On April 19, 1993, Roberto filed an application for original registration of
Lot No. 2835, the trial court granted the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the
name of Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.
On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of
title with damages.
The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated
October 31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful
owner of the land. However, it ruled that the titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel
should be respected.
The Court of Appeals discussed the inapplicability of the rules on double sale and the doctrine of
buyer in good faith since the land was not yet registered when it was sold to the Spouses Po.
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However, it ruled in favor of the Spouses Po on the premise that registered property may be
reconveyed to the “rightful or legal owner or to the one with a better right if the title was wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another person’s name.” The Court of Appeals held that the Mariano
Heirs were no longer the owners of the lot at the time they sold it to Roberto in 1990 because
Mariano, during his lifetime, already sold this to Ciriaco in 1973.
It found that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was duly notarized and
was thus presumed regular on its face. Their Memorandum of Agreement did not cancel or rescind
the Deed of Absolute Sale but rather strengthened their claim that they “entered into a contract of
sale. “It likewise ruled that, contrary to the assertion of the Spouses Aboitiz, there was no showing
that Ciriaco merely held the property in trust for the Mariano Heirs.
It held that the action of the Spouses Po had not yet prescribed because their complaint in 1996 was
within the 10-year prescriptive period as the title in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz was issued in 1994.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the certificates of title of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel were
valid as they were innocent buyers in good faith.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po's
complaint;
2) Whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply;
3) Whether the land registration court's finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the property in trust for
the Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case;
4) Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are indispensable parties
Ruling:
1) Except for actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial
Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving "title to, or possession of, real
property." Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. -
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (2) In all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The Spouses Aboitiz claim that it is the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction over the annulment of
Regional Trial Court judgments. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is provided in Section 9 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129: Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
348
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts.
While the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the Regional Trial Courts, the
case at bar is not for the annulment of a judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is for reconveyance
and the annulment of title.
Considering the Spouses Aboitiz's fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po's knowledge and
the latter's assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the property and to cancel
the Spouses Aboitiz's title, the action is for reconveyance and annulment of title and not for
annulment of judgment. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.
2) There is laches when a party was negligent or has failed "to assert a right within a reasonable
time," thus giving rise to the presumption that he or she has abandoned it. Laches has set in when it
is already inequitable or unfair to allow the party to assert the right. The elements of laches were
enumerated in Ignacio v. Basilio: There is laches when: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under
whom he claims, gave rise to the situation complained of; (2) there was delay in asserting a right
after knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant had no
knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4) there is injury or prejudice to
the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. "Laches is different from
prescription." Prescription deals with delay itself and thus is an issue of how much time has passed.
The time period when prescription is deemed to have set in is fixed by law. Laches, on the other
hand, concerns itself with the effect of delay and not the period of time that has lapsed.
When they discovered that the property was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz in 1993,
the Spouses Po then filed the instant complaint to recover the property sold to them by Ciriaco,
alleging that it was done without their knowledge, through evident bad faith and fraud. The
Spouses Po filed this case in less than three (3) years from the time of registration. Based on these
circumstances, the elements of laches are clearly lacking in this case. There was no delay in asserting
their right over the property, and the Spouses Aboitiz had knowledge that the Spouses Po would
assert their right. Thus, it cannot be said that they are barred by laches.
3) This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance. Res judicata embraces
two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness of judgment, respectively covered
under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (b) and (c):
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows: (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
349
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
Thereto.
An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had the opportunity to prove
his or her claim in the land registration case. In such a case, res judicata will then apply. When an
issue of ownership has been raised in the land registration proceedings where the adverse party was
given full opportunity to present his or her claim, the findings in the land registration case will
constitute a bar from any other claim of the adverse party on the property.
However, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not able to prove their
claim in the registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot apply to their action for
reconveyance.
4) The Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Section 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. An
indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary that "the
action cannot be finally determined" without him or her because his or her interest in the matter and
in the relief "are so bound up with that of the other parties. The Mariano Heirs, as the alleged sellers
of the property, are not indispensable parties. They are at best necessary parties, which are covered
by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:
Section 8. Necessary Party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already sold all their
interests in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected, benefited, or injured
by any ruling of this Court on the matter, whether it grants or denies the complaint for
reconveyance. The ruling of this Court as to whether the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance
will not affect their rights. Their interest has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and
Isabel. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable
parties.
Court of Appeals' Decision is AFFIRMED.
350
CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC. AND CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC., vs. HON.
GEORGE E. OMELIO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 14, SHERIFF
ROBERTO C. ESGUERRA, CECILIO G. ABENION, AND 1,842 OTHER PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 95-45
G.R. No. 189102 : June 07, 2017
“Courts can neither amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a compromise validly entered into
by the parties. A writ of execution that varies the respective obligations of the parties under a judicially
approved compromise agreement is void.”
Facts:
Thousands of banana plantation workers instituted a class suit in US for damages against 11 foreign
corporations, Chiquita brands being one of those 11 companies. The claimants claimed to have been
exposed to dibromochloropropane (DBCP) while working in the plantation. As a result, these
workers suffered serious and permanent injuries to their reproductive system.
However US courts dismissed the complaint based on forum non conveniens.

The claimants filed a complaint on the same 11 corporations in the RTC of Panabo City, Davao.
Before pre-trial the petitioner and the claimants entered into a compromise agreement with the
claimants. The agreement states that; the petitioner shall be release from all or their obligation after
they deposited an escrow amount in favor of the claimant which would be administered by a third
person/ mediator.
The RTC of Panabo approved the compromised agreement and dismissed the petition of the
claimant. After dismissal of the civil claim the claimants moved for the execution of the compromise
agreement.
The petitioner opposed the execution on the ground of mootness; they argued that they had already
complied with their obligation by depositing the settlement amount into an escrow account. Hence,
there was nothing left for the court to execute.
However, RTC of Panabo granted the motion for execution because there was no proof that the
settlement amounts had been withdrawn and delivered to each individual claimant. It held that
there was no proof that they have fulfilled their obligation.
Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the execution and be allowed to present evidence on their
behalf.
During the hearing of the case, the claimants picketed outside the court room and accused the RTC
judge of Panabo as a corrupt official who delayed the execution. Petitioner requested for change of
venue and was granted.
351
The case was transferred and now under the jurisdiction of the RTC of Davao city. The RTC of
Davao city through Judge Omelio ordered the execution of the compromised agreement. Judge
Omelio reasoned that Chiquita never filed its formal offer of evidence. Hence, the trial court had no
other choice but to issue another writ of execution.
Aggrieved by the RTC’s decision, the petitioner filed for a petition for certiorari even without a prior
appeal to the CA.
Petitioner allege that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ
of execution and ordering them to directly pay each of the claimant contrary to the compromise
agreement between petitioner and claimant.
Issues:
1) Whether or not this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts?
2) Whether or not respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders and writs?
Ruling:
1) Yes, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts prohibits "parties from directly resorting to this Court
when relief may be obtained before the lower courts." Although this Court has the power to Issue
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, it is by no means an exclusive power.
"It is shared concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. However, parties
cannot randomly select the forum to which their petitions will be directed. The doctrine on hierarchy
of courts determines the proper venue or choice of forum where petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus should be filed.
Generally, this Court will dismiss petitions that are directly filed before it if relief can be obtained
from the lower courts. Trial courts and the Court of Appeals are "in the best position to deal with
causes in the first instance." They not only resolve questions of law but also determine facts based on
the evidence presented before them.
Nevertheless, a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be justified "when there are
compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition."
We may take cognizance of this case "in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency." The records
of this case are sufficient for this Court to decide on the issues raised by the parties. Any further
delay would unduly prejudice the parties.
352
2) Yes, the writ of execution derives its validity from the judgment it seeks to enforce and must
essentially conform to the judgment's terms. It can neither be wider in scope nor exceed the
judgment that gives it life. Otherwise, it has no validity. Thus, in issuing writs of execution, courts
must look at the terms of the judgment sought to be enforced.
The Writ of Execution ordering the collection of the settlement amount directly from petitioners and
its co-defendants in Civil Case No. 95-45 is void.
Under the judicially approved Compromise Agreement, petitioners are obliged to deposit the
settlement amount in escrow within 10 business days after they receive a signed Compromise
Agreement from the counsel of the claimants.
A writ of execution may be stayed or quashed when "facts and circumstances transpire" after
judgment has been rendered that would make "execution impossible or unjust."
Another exception is when the writ of execution alters or varies the judgment. A writ of execution
derives its validity from the judgment it seeks to enforce. Hence, it should not "vary terms of the
judgment ... [or] go beyond its terms." Otherwise, the writ of execution is void. Courts can neither
modify nor "impose terms different from the terms of a compromise agreement" that parties have
entered in good faith. To do so would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
Payment or satisfaction of the judgment debt also constitutes as a ground for the quashal of a writ of
execution. In Sandico, Sr. v. Piguing, although the sum given by the debtors was less than the
amount of the judgment debt, the creditors accepted the reduced amount as "full satisfaction of the
money judgment." This justified the issuance of an order recalling the writ of execution.
A writ of execution may also be set aside or quashed when it appears from the circumstances of the
case that the writ "is defective in substance," "has been improvidently issued," issued without
authority, or was "issued against the wrong party."
The party assailing the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution must adduce sufficient
evidence to support his or her motion. This may consist of affidavits and other documents.
On the other hand, in resolving whether execution should be suspended or whether a writ of
execution should be quashed, courts should be guided by the same principle in the execution of final
judgments. Certainly, they may require parties to present evidence.
In this case, petitioners cannot rely on the five (5) quitclaims for the trial court to quash or recall the
writ of execution. The quitclaims are insufficient to establish that petitioners complied with their
obligation under the Compromise Agreement. They only prove that five (5) claimants received their
respective share in the settlement amount but do not establish that petitioners deposited the entire
settlement amount in escrow. At the very least, petitioners should have attached proof of actual
deposit in their Opposition to the Motion for Execution.
353
Neither can petitioners rely on the evidence presented during the proceedings conducted at the
Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, California, United States. This Court takes judicial notice of
the administrative case filed against Judge Grageda for his act of receiving evidence abroad without
proper authority.
Given the circumstances of this case, petitioners cannot be faulted for failing to make a formal offer
of evidence because they were denied the opportunity to do so. Respondent court should have given
petitioners the chance to offer the deposition of Mr. Stubbs in evidence before acting on the pending
incidents of the case. Thus, respondent court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Order dated
July 10, 2009, which affirmed execution against petitioners.
Respondent court also erred in issuing the Order dated July 10, 2009. Petitioners' subsidiaries and
affiliates cannot be adjudged solidarily liable. Solidary liability under Philippine law is not to be
inferred lightly but must be clearly expressed.
Under the Compromise Agreement, the law that shall govern its interpretation is the law of Texas,
United States. In this jurisdiction, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of foreign laws."
The laws of a foreign country must "be properly pleaded and proved" as facts. Otherwise, under the
doctrine of processual presumption, foreign law shall be presumed to be the same as domestic law.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Texan law has been proven as a fact. Hence, this Court is
constrained to apply Philippine law.
Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed orders and writs are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
354
MARIO VERIDIANO Y SAPI VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200370 : June 7, 2017
“A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal
knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a
crime.”
Facts:
In the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being permitted or authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1) small heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2.72 grams of dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
During trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Cabello and PO1 Solano to testify.
According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a
certain PO3 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a
certain alias "Baho," who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to
obtain illegal drugs.
PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO2 Alvin Vergara (PO2
Vergara) who were both on duty.
Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at
Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.
At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San
Pablo, Laguna.
The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets. They recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag
containing what appeared to be marijuana." POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with
his initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. He was then brought to
the police station.
Before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna, Veridiano was charged with the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
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The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in
his possession.
Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest that would vest the court with jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.
Ruling:
No, Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and
(c) any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as
constitutionally inadmissible.
Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised
through a motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived and an accused is "estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest."
The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active
participation during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. The
reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused."
Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from
questioning the admissibility of evidence seized. The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected
when an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are
separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.
As to the legality of the search and seizure made:
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search
is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed."
For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an
arrest may also be effected without a warrant.
356
There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest.
For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer."
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers
that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the
tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent
any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was
being committed, or is about to be committed.
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal
knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just
committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search
under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
357
The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and
frisk" searches. Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk"
searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the
basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their
experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot.
Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.
Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give
police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable
persons will act in a nervous manner in any checkpoint. There was no evidence to show that the
police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything
suspicious.
Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be
surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with
clear and convincing evidence. Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal,
specific, intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress or coercion."
The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the circumstances.
This may involve an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was given such as "the
presence of coercive police procedures."
The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner consented to the
warrantless search.
Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. Checkpoints per se
are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives of individuals and
ensure their safety. They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's survival is in danger.
Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist's right to 'free passage'" to a certain
extent, they must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." The extent of routine
inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte
blanche to perform warrantless searches.
In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable
limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any
law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that
may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception.
The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.
Decision of the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
358
LOLITA BAS CAPABLANCA vs. HEIRS OF PERDO BAS, REPRESENTED BY JOSEFINA BAS
ESPINOSA AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU
G.R. No. 224144 : June 28, 2017
“There is no legal precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal
declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity,
consider themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right
which belonged to their ancestor.”
Facts:
The subject matter of this case is Lot 2535 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Land's Estate located in
"Biasong, Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu".
Andres Bas and Pedro Bas acquired Lot 2535, "and Patent No. 1724 was issued in their names.
Pedro sold to Faustina Manreal, married to Juan Balorio, his portion of Lot. The sale was evidenced
by a notarized Deed of Sale.
After the death of Faustina and her husband, their heirs executed a notarized Extra-Judicial
Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Absolute Sale. Lot 2535 consisting of "1,000 square meters, more or
less," was conveyed to one (1) of their heirs, Alejandra Balorio.
Alejandra sold the land through a Deed of Absolute Sale to Edith N. Deen, who in turn sold it to
Atty. Eddy A. Deen.
Upon Atty. Deen's death, an extra-judicial settlement of estate, which did not include Lot 2535, was
executed by his heirs. Later, they executed an Additional Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute
Deed of Sale, which sold the land for ₱l0,000.00 to Norberto B. Bas, who took possession of and built
a house on it.
Norberto died without a will and was succeeded by his niece and only heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca.
Subsequently, Lolita learned that a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in the names of
Andres and Pedro on the basis of a reconstituted Deed of Conveyance.
Josefina Bas Espinosa represented the Heirs of Pedro Bas to file a complaint for Clarification of
Ownership of Lot against Lolita before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. The conflict between the parties
was not resolved and resulted to the issuance of a Certification to file Action.
A notarized Partition Agreement of Real Property, Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights was executed
between the heirs of Andres and Lolita, representing Norberto, whereby they partitioned Lot 2535
among themselves.
359
Lolita sought to register her portion in Lot 2535 but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Cebu,
citing the need for a court order. Lolita then learned that TCT No. T-96676 had been partially
cancelled and TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183, and T-100185 had been issued in the name of
the Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina, on May 29, 1997.
Lolita filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for the cancellation of the titles.
Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of Lolita. The trial court held that there was
substantial evidence to prove that Lolita had been in long possession of the lot under a claim of
ownership as the heir of Norberto and that it was not necessary for her to be first declared as his heir
before filing the complaint. It further ruled that to dismiss the case on the ground that Lolita should
first be declared an heir would be too late as the Heirs of Pedro Bas did not raise the issue in a
motion to dismiss or as an affirmative defense in their complaint.
The Heirs of Pedro Bas appealed to the Court of Appeals, making the following lone assignment of
error:
The trial court seriously erred in not dismissing the case for plaintiffs lack of cause of action
considering that plaintiff in her complaint alleged, she is the sole heir of Norberto Bas.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court Decision and dismissed the complaint.
According to the Court of Appeals, Lolita must first be declared as the sole heir to the estate of
Norberto in a proper special proceeding.
Hence, Lolita filed this Petition principally contending that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in reversing the Regional Trial Court Decision and dismissing the complaint.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not the CA dismissal of the complaint is proper?
2.) Whether or not a separate special proceeding is required to establish filiation and heirship?
Ruling:
1) Yes, This Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir
may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased.
The Court of Appeals' reliance on the ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v.Del Rosario was misplaced. In
that case, the motion to dismiss was filed immediately after the second Amended Complaint was
filed. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the Heirs of Yaptinchay "have not
360
shown any proof or even a semblance of it - except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
above-named Yaptinchays- that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple.
Here, respondents never raised their objection to petitioner's capacity to sue either as an affirmative
defense or in a motion to dismiss. Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states, "[ d]efenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." Thus, it
was erroneous for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no
prior judicial declaration of petitioner's heirship to Norberto.
2) Yes, Contrary to the erroneous conclusion of the Court of Appeals, this Court finds no need for a
separate proceeding for a declaration of heirship in order to resolve petitioner's action for
cancellation of titles of the property.
This case has gone a long way since the complaint was filed in 1997. A full-blown trial had taken
place and judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court where it thoroughly discussed,
evaluated, and weighed all the pieces of documentary evidence and testimonies of the witnesses of
both parties. At this point, to dismiss the case and require petitioner to institute a special proceeding
to determine her status as heir of the late Norberto would hamper, instead of serve, justice.
In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where the contending parties insisted to be the legal heirs of the
decedent, this Court dispensed with the need to institute a separate special proceeding to determine
their heirship since the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence. It held:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is
the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case -
subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugal's estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs
could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon[.] In this case, there
is no necessity for a separate special proceeding and to require it would be superfluous considering
that petitioner had already presented evidence to establish her filiation and heirship to Norberto,
which respondents never disputed.
Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision are VACATED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City is REINSTATED.
361
MARLON BACERRA Y TABONES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 204544 : July 3, 2017
“The identity of the perpetrator of a crime and a finding of guilt may rest solely on the strength of
circumstantial evidence.”
Facts:
Alfredo and his family were sound asleep in their home. At about 1:00 a.m., he was roused from
sleep by the sound of stones hitting his house. Alfredo went to the living room and peered through
the jalousie window. The terrace light allowed him to recognize his neighbor and co-worker,
Bacerra.
Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo's house while saying, "Vulva of your mother." Just as he was about
to leave, Bacerra exclaimed, "[V]ulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum you now." Bacerra then left.
Alfredo's son, Edgar, also witnessed the incident through a window in his room.
Troubled by Bacerra's threat, Alfredo waited for him to return. Alfredo sat down beside the
window. At around 4:00a.m., he heard dogs barking outside. Alfredo looked out the window and
saw Bacerra walking towards their nipa hut, which was located around 10 meters from their house.
Bacerra paced in front of the nipa hut and shook it. Moments later, Alfredo saw the nipa hut
burning.
Alfredo sought help from his neighbors to smother the fire. Edgar contacted the authorities for
assistance but it was too late. The nipa hut and its contents were completely destroyed. The local
authorities conducted an investigation on the incident.
Bacerra was charged with violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613. Regional Trial
Court found Bacerra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson.
Bacerra appealed and argued that none of the prosecution's witnesses had positively identified him
as the person who burned the nipa hut.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Bacerra moved for
reconsideration but was denied. Bacerra filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding his conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, which, being merely based on conjecture, falls short of proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. No direct evidence was presented to prove that petitioner actually set fire
to private complainant's nipa hut.
362
Issue:
Whether or not circumstantial evidence is sufficient to uphold conviction.
Ruling:
Yes, in this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the prosecution
has established multiple circumstances, which, after being considered in their entirety, support the
conclusion that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson.
First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner stoned private complainant's
house and threatened to bum him. Private complainant testified that he saw petitioner throwing
stones at his house and heard petitioner say, "okinam nga Lakay Fred, puuran kayo tad ta!" (Vulva of
your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum you now.) Petitioner's threats were also heard by private
complainant's son and grandchildren.
Second, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner returned a few hours later
and made his way to private complainant's nipa hut. Private complainant testified that at 4:00 a.m.,
he saw petitioner pass by their house and walk towards their nipa hut. This was corroborated by
private complainant's son who testified that he saw petitioner standing in front of the nipa hut
moments before it was burned.
Third, the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner was in close proximity to
the nipa hut before it caught fire. Private complainant testified that he saw petitioner walk to and
from in front of the nipa hut and shake its posts just before it caught fire. Private complainant's son
likewise saw petitioner standing at the side of the nipa hut before it was burned.
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be
inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its
perpetrator. There is no requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. After
all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the
prosecution provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.
The crime of simple arson was proven solely through circumstantial evidence in People v. Abayon.
None of the prosecution's witnesses actually saw the accused start the fire. Nevertheless, the
circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution, taken in its entirety, all pointed to the accused's
guilt.
Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
363
CHINATRUST COMMERCIAL BANK VS. PHILIP TURNER

G.R. No. 191458 : July 3, 2017
“Issues that were not alleged or proved before the lower court cannot be decided for the first time on
appeal. This rule ensures fairness in proceedings.”
Facts:
British national Turner initiated via Chinatrust-Ayala Branch the telegraphic transfer of US$430.00 to
the account of "MIN TRAVEL/ESMAT AZMY, Citibank, Heliopolis Branch" in Cairo, Egypt. The
amount was partial payment to Turner's travel agent for his and his wife's 11-day tour in Egypt.
Turner paid a service fee of US$30.00. Both amounts were debited from his dollar savings account
with Chinatrust.
Chinatrust received Citibank-Cairo's telexnotice about the latter's inability to credit the funds it
received because the "the beneficiary's name "Min Travel/Esmat Azmy" given by Turner did not
match the account name on file of Citibank-Cairo.”
Turner allegedly informed Chinatrust that he was able to contact Esmat Azmy, who acknowledged
receipt of the transferred funds. Turner, however, had to cancel his travel-tour because his wife got
ill and requested from Chinatrust the refund of his money.
According to Chinatrust, it explained to Turner that since the funds were already remitted to his
beneficiary's account, they could no longer be withdrawn or retrieved without Citibank-Cairo's
consent. Turner was, thus, advised to seek the refund of his payment directly from his travel agency.
Turner allegedly insisted on withdrawing the funds from Chinatrust explaining that the travel
agency would forfeit fifty percent (50%) as penalty for the cancellation of the booking. Hence,
Chinatrust required Turner to secure, at least, his travel agency's written certification denying
receipt of the funds so that it could act on his request. However, Turner purportedly failed to submit
the required certification despite repeated reminders.
Chinatrust received Citibank-Cairo's Swift telex reply, which confirmed receipt of Chinatrust's
telegraphic funds transfer and its credit to the bank account of Min Travel, not "Min Travel/Esmat
Azmy" as indicated by the respondent. This information was relayed to Turner.
Despite this official confirmation, Turner allegedly continued to insist on his demand for a refund.
Turner filed a Complaint against Chinatrust before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
demanding the refund of his telegraphic transfer.
The Metropolitan Trial Court found sufficient evidence to prove that Chinatrust complied with its
364
contractual obligation to transmit the funds to Citibank-Cairo and that these funds were actually
credited to the intended beneficiary's account.
Turner filed an appeal. On the substantive matters, Turner argued that the Metropolitan Trial Court
erred in ruling that he had no basis in claiming a refund from Chinatrust and in not awarding him
damages and attorney's fees.
Regional Trial Court of Makati City rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court. While it agreed with the Metropolitan Trial Court's findings that the
funds had been deposited to the account of the beneficiary, the Regional Trial Court ruled that this
was not sufficient basis to absolve Chinatrust of any responsibility.
Chinatrust filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Chinatrust filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and upheld the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Chinatrust's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals adjudged petitioner liable for negligence: (1) when it did
not immediately refund the telexed funds to respondent upon receipt of the discrepancy notice from
Citibank-Cairo; and (2) when it did not immediately relay to Citibank-Cairo respondent's demand
for the cancellation of the transaction.
According to petitioner, this was erroneous because the Court of Appeals ruled upon matters not
alleged in the complaint or raised as an issue and awarded damages not prayed for in the complaint.
Respondent counters that the issues raised by petitioner are factual, which are not reviewable by this
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not issues may raised for the first time on appeal?
Ruling:
No, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure calls for the submission of witnesses'
affidavits together with a party's position paper after the conduct of a preliminary conference:
Section 9. Submission of Affidavits and Position Papers. - Within ten (10) days from receipt of
the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of
their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with
their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
365
The determination of issues at the preliminary conference bars the consideration of other questions
on appeal. This is because under Section 9 above, the parties were required to submit their affidavits
and other evidence on the factual issues as defined in the preliminary conference order. Thus, either of the
parties cannot raise a new factual issue on appeal, otherwise it would be unfair to the adverse party,
who had no opportunity to present evidence against it.
Basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process require that arguments or issues not raised in the
trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
In Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo:
As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided
by the lower court will not be permitted to change theory on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues
and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not
be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage.
Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who
would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could
have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. To permit
petitioner in this case to change its theory on appeal would thus be unfair to respondent, and offend
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
There is more reason for a reviewing court to refrain from resolving motu proprio an issue that was
not even raised by a party. This Court has previously declared that:
"Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue" and that a
judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the parties
were not heard is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid.
As pointed out earlier, respondent's cause of action was anchored on the alleged non-remittance of
the funds to his travel agency's account or based on a breach of contract.
Petitioner bank's supposed negligence in the handling of respondent's concerns was not among
respondent's causes of action and was never raised in the Metropolitan Trial Court. Respondent's
cause of action was based on the theory that the telexed funds transfer did not materialize, and the
relief sought was limited to the refund of his money and damages as a result of the purported non-
remittance of the funds to the correct beneficiary account.
Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision is set aside and the Decision dated of the
Metropolitan Trial Court is reinstated.
366
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH SAN JOSE Y GREGORIO AND JONATHAN SAN
JOSE Y GREGORIO
G.R. NO. 206916 : July 3, 2017
“The prosecution has the burden to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If it fails to
discharge this burden, courts have the duty to render a judgment of acquittal.”
Facts:
The San Jose brothers were considered at large despite the warrants of arrest issued on October 30,
2002. The case against them was considered archived. Sometime in 2005, they were arrested.
Jonathan San Josey Gregorio and Joseph San Jose y Gregorio pleaded not guilty.Trial on the merits
ensued.
Jilito O. Espino testified that on June 2, 2002, around 6:30 p.m., there was a baptismal celebration
held on a vacant lot beside their residence in Riverside, Manggahan, Rodriguez, Rizal. His brother
Carlito and his friends were drinking when Jilito saw the San Jose brothers enter the house. The San
Jose brothers then started punching Carlito, who tried to run to a nearby store. However, his
assailants caught up with him.
The prosecution presented Jilito's testimony that Jonathan embraced Carlito from behind and while
punching him, stabbed him on the side of his body while Joseph stabbed Carlito in the front.
Thereafter, the San Jose brothers ran away. Carlito's friends also ran away out of fear. Jilito ran after
the San Jose brothers for about 100 meters but failed to catch up to them. When he returned to the
vacant lot, he was told that Carli to had already been brought to the hospital, where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Jilito likewise attested that this was not the first incident between Carlito and the San Jose brothers.
He recalled that on New Year's Day, the San Jose brothers used a lead pipe to hit Carlito.
The autopsy revealed that the victim sustained "one fatal injury at the abdomen, at the right
hypochondriac and multiple abrasions at the lower extremities."13 The examination also showed that
"the stab wound located at the right hypochondriac or in the abdomen caused an injury lacerating
the pericardial sac, the right ventricle of the heart and the lower lobe of the right lung." Dr. Pierre
Paul Carpio (Dr. Carpio), the Chief of Forensic Autopsy of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, further testified that it was possible for the assailant to have been at the victim's back.
He stated that the stab wound at the right hypochondriac (tagiliran) was fatal and that there were no
defense wounds on the victim.
For their defense, Joseph testified that on June 2, 2002, he and his brother Jonathan were at home
eating with a childhood friend, Leo Narito, when a commotion occurred outside the house. People
367
were shouting and when he went outside, he saw a person running away. He asked that person
what was going on and was told that someone had been stabbed. Joseph returned to his house and
continued eating. Sometime in 2005, while he was at work at a hardware store, police officers
arrested him for the killing of a certain Joselito. He denied the charges against him.
Jonathan asserted that he was 16 years old in 2002, having been born on September 2, 1985. His
testimony corroborated that of his brother Joseph. Sometime in 2005, he was about to go to work
when some barangay tanods came to arrest him for the killing of Carlito.
Jocelyn Espino (Jocelyn) also testified on the San Jose brothers' behalf, claiming that she was Jilito
and Carlito's sister. She stated that at the time of the incident, Carlito was outside the house. Their
neighbors later informed them of the commotion outside their house involving Carlito. She claimed
that Jilito only learned of the incident when he went outside of their house. When cross-examined,
Jocelyn failed to present evidence to show that she was Jilito and Carlito's sister.
Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, rendered a Decision finding the San Jose brothers guilty as
charged.
Joseph and Jonathan appealed to the Court of Appeals, but it affirmed the trial court's Decision. The
Court of Appeals relied heavily on Jilito's positive identification of the San Jose brothers as the
perpetrators of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution proved the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
No, It is a basic right of the accused under our Constitution to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven. Thus, the quantum of evidence required to overcome this presumption is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind.
The burden of proving the accused's guilt rests with the prosecution. A guilty verdict relies on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution's
evidence produces even an iota of reasonable doubt, courts would have no choice but to rule for the
accused's acquittal.
368
Considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, factual findings of the trial court are usually
accorded great respect "because of the opportunity enjoyed by the [trial court] to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and assess their testimony." Nevertheless, this Court is not
precluded from reviewing these findings or even arriving at a different conclusion "if it is not
convinced that [the findings] are conformable to the evidence of record and to its own impressions
of the credibility of the witnesses." The factual findings of the trial court will not bind this Court if
"significant facts and circumstances were overlooked and disregarded . . . which if properly
considered affect the result of the case."
This is also an appeal under Rule 122, Section 2(c) of the Rules of Court, where the entire records of
the case are thrown open for review. In Ferrer v. People:
It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for
review and that it becomes the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in
the judgment appealed from, whether they are assigned as errors or not.
In this case, the Trial court and the Court of Appeals placed heavy reliance on the testimony of the
prosecution's lone eyewitness, Jilito Espino, and his positive identification of the accused-appellants
as the assailants who murdered his brother. Thus, the review of finding of guilt necessarily involves
a re-evaluation of Jilito's testimony.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals likewise failed to note that the victim's sister was a witness
for the defense and the victim's late father signed an affidavit of desistance. in the accused-
appellants' favor. It is consistent with the human experience for the victim's relatives to seek justice.
An unusual detail, such as two (2) immediate family members of the victim testifying on behalf of
the accused-appellants, forces this Court to take a second hard look at the prosecution's evidence.
The delayed arrests of the accused-appellants likewise cast doubt on their guilt. The crime occurred
on June 2, 2002. Accused-appellant Jonathan was arrested on April 1, 2005 and accused-appellant
Joseph was arrested on August 3, 2005, or about three (3) years after the crime was committed.
The prosecution has an eyewitness account in the victim's brother Jilito. The victim's family
remained in the same barangay. The accused-appellants did not live anywhere else but were
arrested in the same barangay they had been residing. It is highly unusual for the victim's family to
have taken three (3) years to have the alleged perpetrators arrested.
While delay per se may not impair a witness's credibility, doubt arises when the delay remains
unexplained. The delay in this case becomes significant when pitted against Jilito's Kusang-loob na
Salaysay, where he admits that he merely heard about the incident from other people.
The unexplained delay and the Kusang-loob na Salaysay lead this Court to the possibility that Jilito's
supposedly positive identification of the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime was a
mere afterthought.
369
Here, both the victim's father and sister are convinced that accused-appellants are not guilty of the
crime. The prosecution's lone eyewitness could not even give a clear and categorical narrative of the
events. There were several unusual circumstances during the prosecution of the case that he has not
adequately explained. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court is constrained to acquit accused-appellants.
370
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGAR ALLAN CORPUZ Y FLORES

G.R. No. 208013 : July 3, 2017
“An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court.1
"He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows."2 If an
intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court.”
Facts:
BBB testified that her sister-in law, DDD, told her that AAA was raped. BBB found out from a
psychiatrist that it was Allan who raped her daughter. She revealed that Allan had also raped CCC.
However, that case was settled since Allan was her brother-in-law.
CCC affirmed that sometime in 2002, AAA allegedly informed her that she was not having her
period. She advised AAA to "drink something bitter" and to ask their aunt EEE about her condition.
At that time, CCC found out that AAA was pregnant.
EEE who lived near AAA's house, averred that in the morning of February 14, 2003, AAA entered
her house while drinking from a cup. EEE asked what AAA was consuming. AAA responded that it
"was something to induce menstruation.
AAA then asked EEE to massage her aching stomach. When EEE was about to do so, she observed
that it was noticeably bulging. AAA began to cry, confessing that she thought she was pregnant.
At that time, AAA's parents were in Baguio City, so EEE called AAA's uncle GGG instead. When
GGG arrived, AAA was still crying when she told them, "Jnkastanak ni Allan, " pertaining to Allan.
GGG brought AAA to Asingan Community Hospitai and to the police station to enter the incident in
the police blotter.
GGG attested that his sister-in-law EEE called him on February 14, 2003. When he arrived at EEE's
house, he saw AAA crying. He found out that AAA was pregnant.
When he confirmed AAA's pregnancy through a medical examination, EEE told him that AAA was
raped by Allan.
After entering the incident in the police blotter, he also reported it to the National Bureau of
Investigation, Dagupan City.
Brenda Tablizo, a Psychologist II of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, testified that she
conducted AAA's neuropsychiatric examination and evaluation on February 26, 2003 upon the
request of Agent Gerald Geralde (Agent Geralde) of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dagupan
City. Which stated that:
371
AAA had a mental age of five (5) years and eight (8) months and an IQ of 42. Her intelligence level
was equivalent to Moderate Mental Retardation.
She also found AAA to be an egocentric and self-centered individual and had difficulty in her
interpersonal relations. Poor impulse control was likewise evident in her.
AAA underwent another neuropsychiatric examination before taking the witness stand. Dr. Rachel
Acosta testified that she found that AAA had a "mild degree of mental retardation" and an
Intelligence Quotient of 70.
Although AAA was already 19 years old at the time of examination, her mental age was that of a
child aged five (5) to seven (7) years. That AAA's "manner of speech is quite incomprehensible in
some words only but most of the simple words are well spoken but some words that are being
spoken with slur and slang manner and defective phonation. It seems that there is an air coming out
from the nose when she talks."
She concluded that AAA was fit to testify as a witness depending on her emotional condition when
she testifies although she was "not oriented to time, date and place."
Her degree of honesty was great because, with mental age of 5 to 7 years old, she does not know
what is right or wrong.
AAA was already 20 years old when she testified. She confirmed that XXX was her four (4)-year-old
child. She identified Allan as XXX's father.
AAA was asked how Allan became XXX's father. She responded, "Iniyot nak, sir." (He had sex with me,
sir.) She attested that when she was 13 years old, Allan had sex with her on four (4) occasions, each
of which he gave her money.
On the other hand, Allan and his daughter, Almeda, testified for the defense. The testimony of
Almeda was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed to accept her proposed testimony. She
testified that when she asked AAA about her pregnancy, AAA failed to disclose who impregnated
her.
Allan denied the accusations and insisted that all the charges against him were merely fabricated by
AAA's father, FFF.
Upon motion before the trial court, the defense applied for (DNA) paternity test, which was granted.
Forensic Biologist III Dela Cruz affirmed that the comparison of their DNA profiles revealed a "100%
proof that the accused is the biological father of XXX." Forensic Chemist Mary Ann Aranas
372
conducted a confirmatory test, which affirmed the test result of the DNA paternity test.
Regional Trial Court convicted Allan of four (4) counts of Simple Rape.
In his appeal, Allan insisted that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the
records were bereft of any credible proof indicating that he raped AAA four (4) times. AAA failed to
testify when and where she was raped as she was not oriented with place, date, and time.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Allan's conviction and held that carnal knowledge of an intellectually
disabled person is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 8353.
Hence, an appeal before this Court was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not an intellectually disabled person is disqualified to testify as witness?
Ruling:
No, To qualify as a witness, the basic test is "whether he [or she] can perceive and, perceiving, can
make known his [or her] perception to others."
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
Therefore, an intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in
court. "He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows." If
an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court.
Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A person
with low Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her
perception to others.
373
Given that AAA's qualification as a witness is already settled, AAA's mental state also does not
prevent her from being a credible witness.
The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person is upheld provided that she is
capable and consistent in narrating her experience.
Furthermore, Dr. Acosta explicitly stated that "[AAA's] degree of honesty is great" despite her
condition.
[AAA's] degree of honesty is "great" because, with her mental age, she does not know what is right
or wrong. Indeed, in light of her mental state, [AAA's] simple narration of what happened to her is
indicative of her honesty and naivet[e]. (Citation omitted)
Moreover, it would be unlikely for AAA to fabricate charges against Allan. When there is no proof
showing that the witness was moved by any improper motive, his or her identification of the
offender as the perpetrator of the crime shall be upheld.
In affirming the finding of the accused's guilt, this Court is aware that "when a woman says that she
has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to show that she had indeed been raped." If
her testimony withstands the test of credibility, like in this case, "the rapist may be adjudged guilty
solely on that basis."
Therefore, Allan cannot exculpate himself, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt since AAA was allegedly not oriented to date, time, and place. AANs failure to offer any
testimony as to when and where she was raped does not matter. This Court underscores that the
date, place, and time of the incidents need not be accurately established since these are not elements
of rape.
Edgar Allan Corpuz y Flores is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape
under Article 266-A 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
374
HEIRS OF CAYETANO CASCAYAN, REPRESENTED BY LA PAZ MARTINEZ vs. SPS. OLIVER

AND EVELYN GUMALLAOI, AND THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER OF BANGUI, ILOCOS
NORTE
G.R. No. 211947 : July 3, 2017
“This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the
appellate courts are "final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this court." when supported by
substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to
this court. Petitions filed "will be granted only when there are special and important reasons.”
Facts:
The Spouses Gumallaoi built a residential house on Lot No. 20029 which the Cascayan Heirs alleged
encroached on Lot No. 20028 after renovations and improvements. The Spouses Gumallaoi ignored
the notifications that they had encroached into Lot No. 20028. The Spouses Gumallaoi applied for a
Building Permit. Due to renovations on their residential house, they further encroached on Lot No.
20028. Thus, the Cascayan Heirs prayed that the Spouses Gumallaoi be directed to vacate Lot No.
20028 and to restore it to their possession. They likewise prayed that the municipal engineer of
Bangui issue the necessary demolition permit as well as cause the demolition of the portion of the
housethat encroached on Lot No. 20028.
In response, and by way of counterclaim, the Spouses Gumallaoi maintained that they were the true
owners of both Lot Nos. 20029 and 20028. They claimed that the Cascayan Heirs secured a free
patent to Lot No. 20028 through manipulation. They asserted that the supporting affidavits for the
Cascayan Heirs' free patent application were obtained through fraud and deception. They attached
in their Amended Answer the affidavits by the same affiants disowning the latter's previous
affidavits. Thus, the Spouses Gumallaoi prayed that they be declared the legal owners of Lot No.
20028, that OCT No. P-78399 be annulled, and that they be paid damages.
By agreement of the parties, Engr. Malacas was appointed to determine whether Lot No. 20028 was
included in the lot claimed by the Spouses Gumallaoi. In his report, he said:
From the verification survey that was executed over the premises of the subject, it appears that a two
(2)storey residential building owned by the defendants was erected partly on Lot 20028 and partly
on Lot 20029.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision declaring the Spouses Gumallaoi the legal owners of
Lot No. 20028. It ruled that petitioners did not prove that they or their predecessor-in-interest had
been in possession of it.
The Cascayan Heirs filed a Motion for New Trial, citing mistake as a ground. However, the trial
court denied the motion.
375
The Cascayan Heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. They argued that the Regional Trial Court
could not order the cancellation of the patent because they had already been issued a certificate of
title pursuant to a public land patent. Petitioners also insisted that their Motion for New Trial should
have been granted because of their mistake in believing that the position paper would be the basis of
the Regional Trial Court's decision and because respondents committed fraud in submitting
irrelevant documents.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision. Quoting
the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals found that the evidence proved that the Cascayan
Heirs obtained their title through fraud and misrepresentation. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals properly appreciated the evidence presented by the parties?
Ruling:
Yes. The petition is denied. Petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall pertain only to
questions of law. In Pascal v. Burgos:
Review of appeals filed before this court is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion." This court's action is discretionary. Petitions filed "will be granted only when
there are special and important reasons."
This is especially applicable in this case, where the issues have been fully ventilated before the lower
courts in a number of related cases.
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule
45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the
appellate courts are "final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this court." when
supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor
disturbed on appeal to this court.
Thus, as a general rule, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court.
Quoting the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals determined, based on the evidence
presented, that petitioners obtained their title to Lot No. 20028 through fraud and misrepresentation.
In this case, Spouses Gumallaoi presented sufficient evidence to show that the Heirs of Cascayan
obtained their title through fraud and misrepresentation.
Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED.
376
MARVIN CRUZ AND FRANCISCO CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 224974 : July 3, 2017
“The trial court's failure to comply with procedural rules constitutes grave abuse of discretion and
may be the subject of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.”
Facts:
In an Information, Cruz, along with seven (7) others, was charged with Robbery in an Uninhabited
Place and by a Band for unlawfully taking four (4) sacks filled with scraps of bronze metal and a
copper pipe worth ₱72,000.00 collectively. Cruz posted bail through a cash bond in the amount of
₱12,000.00.
The private complainant in the criminal case subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance stating
that he was no longer interested in pursuing his complaint against Cruz. Assistant City Prosecutor
filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was granted by Regional Trial Court, City of Malabon.
Cruz, through his bondsman Francisco, filed a Motion to Release Cash Bond. The Regional Trial
Court denied the Motion on the ground that the case was dismissed through desistance and not
through acquittal. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Francisco was likewise denied.
Cruz and Francisco filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion to Release Cash
Bond.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition.
The Court of Appeals anchored its dismissal on the ground that Cruz and Francisco should have
filed an appeal, instead of a petition for certiorari, to question the denial of their Motion to Release
Cash Bond. The Court of Appeals further stated that it could not treat the Petition for Certiorari as an
appeal since the period for appeal had lapsed before its filing.
Cruz and Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, this Petition was
filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was proper
Ruling:
No. An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation that the judicial tribunal
377
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion has been defined as a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law." In order to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari for being the wrong remedy, it is necessary to find out whether the Regional Trial Court
acted with grave abuse of discretion as to warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari against it.
The trial court denied the motion to release cash bond on the ground that the dismissal was only due
to the desistance of the complainant and not because the accused was acquitted or that the crime
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Such ruling, however, has no legal basis. In fact, the provision of Section 22, Rule 114 is clear: the
dismissal of the criminal case results to the automatic cancellation of the bail bond.
There was no fine imposed on Cruz. The Order does not specify any costs of court that he must
answer for. There was, thus, no lien on the bond that could prevent its immediate release.
Considering these circumstances, petitioners could not have been faulted for filing a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals since there was no legal basis for the Regional Trial Court to
deny their Motion to Release Cash Bond.
Considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners' remedy was the filing of a petition for certiorari with the proper court.
Instead of addressing the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals instead chose to focus on
procedural technicalities, dismissing the petition for certiorari based on cases that did not actually
prohibit the filing of a petition for certiorari. While procedural rules are necessary for the speedy
disposition of justice, its indiscriminate application should never be used to defeat the substantial
rights of litigants.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for a resolution on the merits of the case.
378
CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC. vs. CIR

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the BIR, vs.
CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 197526/ G.R. No. 199676-77, July 26, 2017
“The 120-day and 30-day reglementary periods under Section 112(C) of the National Internal
Revenue Code are both mandatory and jurisdictional. Non-compliance with these periods renders a judicial
claim for refund of creditable input tax premature.”
Facts:
CE Luzon is a domestic corporation engaged in the energy industry. It owns and operates the CE
Luzon Geothermal Power Plant, which generates power for sale to the Philippine National Oil
Company-Energy Development Corporation by virtue of an energy conversion agreement. CE
Luzon is a VAT-registered taxpayer with Tax Identification Number 003- 924-356-000. In the course
of its operations, CE Luzon incurred unutilized creditable input tax amounting to ₱26,574,388.99 for
taxable year 2003. This amount was duly reflected in its amended quarterly VAT returns. CE Luzon
then filed before the Bureau of Internal Revenue an administrative claim for refund of its unutilized
creditable input tax.
Meanwhile, on June 24, 2005, CE Luzon received the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's decision
denying its claim for refund of creditable input tax for the second quarter of 2003.
In the Decision dated April 21, 2009, the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division partially granted CE
Luzon's claim for unutilized creditable input tax. It ruled that both the administrative and judicial
claims of CE Luzon were brought within the two (2)-year prescriptive period. However, the Court of
Tax Appeals Second Division disallowed the amount of ₱3,084,874.35 to be refunded.
CE Luzon and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue both moved for reconsideration.
The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to issue a tax
credit certificate or to refund CE Luzon the amount of ₱23,489,514.64, representing CE Luzon's duly
substantiated creditable input tax for taxable year 2003.
However, on November 22, 2010, the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc rendered an Amended
Decision,setting aside its Decision dated July 20, 2010.30 The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc ruled
that CE Luzon failed to observe the 120-day period under Section 112(C) of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Hence, it was barred from claiming a refund of its input VAT for taxable year 2003.
The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc held that CE Luzon's judicial claims were prematurely filed. CE
Luzon should have waited either for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to render a decision or
for the 120-day period to expire before instituting its judicial claim for refund.
379
Both parties filed their petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
In its Petition docketed as G.R. No. 197526, CE Luzon asserts that its judicial claims for refund of
input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales were timely filed. Relying on Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CE Luzon argues that
the two (2)-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code60
governs both the administrative and judicial claims for refund of creditable input tax. CE Luzon
contends that creditable input tax attributable to zero-rated sales is excessively collected tax.
CE Luzon asserts that since the prescriptive periods in Section 112(C) of the National Internal
Revenue Code are merely permissive, it should yield to Section 229.Moreover, Section 112(C) does
not state that a taxpayer is barred from filing a judicial claim for non-compliance with the 120-day
period.
On the other hand, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue argues that Sections 112(C) and 229 of the
National Internal Revenue Code need not be harmonized because they are clear and explicit. Laws
should only be construed if they are "ambiguous or doubtful in meaning. Section 112(C) clearly
provides that in claims for refund of creditable input tax, taxpayers can only elevate their judicial
claim upon receipt of the decision denying their administrative claim or upon the lapse of 120 days.
Moreover, the tax covered in Section 112 is different from the tax in Section 229. Section 112(C)
covers unutilized input tax. In contrast, Section 229 pertains to national internal revenue tax that is
erroneously or illegally collected.
Issue:
Whether or not compliance 120-day and 30-day reglementary periods under Section 112(C) of the
National Internal Revenue Code are both mandatory.
Ruling:
Excess input tax or creditable input tax is not an erroneously, excessively, or illegally collected tax.
Hence, it is Section 112(C) and not Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code that governs
claims for refund of creditable input tax.
If the excess input tax is attributable to zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions, the excess
input tax can only be refunded to the taxpayer or credited against the taxpayer's other national
internal revenue tax. Availing any of the two (2) options entail compliance with the procedure
outlined in Section 112,100 not under Section 229, of the National Internal Revenue Code.
The procedure outlined above provides that a claim for refund of excessively or erroneously
collected taxes should be made within two (2) years from the date the taxes are paid. Both the
administrative and judicial claims should be brought within the two (2)-year prescriptive period.
380
Otherwise, they shall forever be barred.101 However, Section 229 presupposes that the taxes sought
to be refunded were wrongfully paid.
It is unnecessary to construe and harmonize Sections 112(C) and 229 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Excess input tax or creditable input tax is not an excessively, erroneously, or illegally
collected tax because the taxpayer pays the proper amount of input tax at the time it is collected.
That a VAT-registered taxpayer incurs excess input tax does not mean that it was wrongfully or
erroneously paid. It simply means that the input tax is greater than the output tax, entitling the
taxpayer to carry over the excess input tax to the succeeding taxable quarters.104 If the excess input
tax is derived from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions, the taxpayer may either seek a
refund of the excess or apply the excess against its other internal revenue tax.
381
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABENIR BRUSOLA y BARAGWA

G.R. No. 210615 : July 26, 2017
“It is hornbook doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. Having seen and heard the witnesses and observed their
behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court is deemed to have been in a better position to weigh the
evidence. The reason for this is that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand
and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.”
Facts:
This resolves the appeal of the Court of Appeals' July 17, 2013 Decision, affirming the February 4,
2010 Decision of Branch 206, Regional Trial Court, Muntinlupa City, which found Abenir Brusola
(Abenir) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the children of the
deceased the amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
Accordingly, Joanne was eating with her back turned to her father, who was preparing for work.
Jessica, Abegail, and Delia were watching the television, with Delia seated on the floor near the
toilet. Joanne would occasionally glance at her father and noticed that he seemed restless. Suddenly,
Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. A second blow hit the cement wall and
eventually died.
In his defense, while inside their house, he heard people talking outside and looked out through a
crack in the plywood wall. He saw a man and a woman kiss and identified the woman as Delia, who
told the man, "Huwag muna ngayon, nandiyan pa siya." The man embraced her, and groped her
breast and private parts. Abenir picked up the maso, went outside, and approached them, who were
surprised to see him. Abenir attacked the man who used Delia as a shield and pushed her toward
Abenir, causing them to stumble on the ground. Delia went inside while Abenir chased the man.
After a failed pursuit, he returned to the house where Joanne hugged him and inquired what
happened. Abenir answered that Delia was having an affair. He noticed that Kristofer was carrying
Delia whose head was bleeding. He instructed his children to take her to the hospital. He informed
Joanne that he would surrender and asked his children to call the barangay officials and the police.
The trial court found Abenir guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. During trial abnir
stated that there is inconsistency in Joanne’s testimony, and that it is insufficient to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not Joanne’s testimony is sufficient as evidence.
382
Ruling:
It is hornbook doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. Having seen and heard the witnesses and
observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court is deemed to have been in a better
position to weigh the evidence. The reason for this is that trial courts have the unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. Thus, the trial court's evaluation shall be binding on the appellate court unless it is
shown that certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied. There is no reason to deviate from the rule.
The alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of Joanne and Abigail does not affect the credibility of
either witness. What Abigail [and] Joanne were actually doing at the precise moment that appellant
struck his wife with a maso is absolutely insignificant and unsubstantial to merit consideration .
Inconsistencies that refer only to minor details do not weaken the credibility of witnesses but are
rather signs that the witnesses were not rehearsed.
What is important is that the prosecution witnesses were consistent on the principal occurrence and
the identity of the accused. Thus, Joanne narrated in a direct and forthright manner how she saw
appellant hit her mother with a maso on the head and her testimony is supported by the physical
evidence of the injury sustained by the victim. While Abigail and Kristofer did not actually see
appellant in the act of hitting their mother, nevertheless, they saw appellant holding the murder
weapon and their mother fallen on the floor with a bloodied head immediately after the criminal act
was committed.
The alleged ill motive of Joanne is hardly worthy of consideration and belief. Joanne and her siblings
had lost their mother and they also stood to lose their father to prison, leaving them virtual orphans.
Assuming that appellant had previously disapproved of Joanne's early marriage, such would not
have been a sufficient motive for her to wrongly accuse her own father of a heinous crime.
383
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. PRICE RICHARDSON CORPORATION,

CONSUELO VELARDE-ALBERT, and GORDON RESNICK
G.R. No. 197032 : July 26, 2017
“The general rule is that the determination of probable cause is an executive function which courts
cannot pass upon. As an exception, courts may interfere with the prosecutor's determination of probable cause
only when there is grave abuse of discretion.106 Grave abuse of discretion constitutes "a refusal to act in
contemplation of law or a gross disregard of the Constitution, law, or existing jurisprudence, [accompanied by]
a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.”
Facts:
Respondent Price Richardson Corporation (Price Richardson) is a Philippine corporation duly

incorporated under Philippine laws on December 7, 2000.8 Its primary purpose is "[t]o provide
administrative services which includes but is not limited to furnishing all necessary and incidental,
bookkeeping, mailing and billing services.
On October 17, 2001, its former employee, Michelle S. Avelino, (Avelino) executed a sworn affidavit
at the National Bureau of Investigation's Interpol Division,10 alleging that Price Richardson was
"engaged in boiler room operations, wherein the company sells non [-] existent stocks to investors
using high pressure sales tactics.
Upon Application by NBI and SEC of a warrant of arrest, RTC Branch 143 issued the said warrant of
arrest and was served to them.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed before the Department of Justice its complaint against
respondents. Also, they were charge Estafa, under the revised penal code.
In defense, the incorporators and directors denied knowing or agreeing to the offenses charged.
They countered that they already transferred their respective shares to various individuals in
December 2000, as shown by their registered Deeds of Absolute Sale of Shares of Stock.35 Velarde-
Albert denied the Securities and Exchange Commission's allegations against her while Resnick did
not submit any evidence refuting the charges.
State prosecutors absolved the respondents stating that there is no probable cause. A motion for
reconsideration were filed but denied. Hence this petion.
Issue:
Whether or not determination of probable cause could be passed upon the court.
384
Ruling:
Courts may pass upon the prosecutor's determination of probable cause only upon a showing of
grave abuse of discretion.
RULE 112 Preliminary Investigation

Section 1. Preliminary Investigation Defined; When Required. - Preliminary investigation is
an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.
Under Rule 112, preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine the existence of probable
cause. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, this Court stressed that:
[Preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of their
evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is
a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
In fine, the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.
It has long been established that the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is
an executive function, which pertains to and lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor and
the justice secretary.
If the public prosecutor finds probable cause to charge a person with a crime, he or she causes the
filing of an information before the court. The court may not pass upon or interfere with the
prosecutor's determination of the existence of probable cause to file an information regardless of its
correctness. It does not review the determination of probable cause made by the prosecutor. It does
not function as the prosecutor's appellate court. Thus, it is also the public prosecutor who decides
"what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.
However, if the public prosecutor erred in its determination of probable cause, an appeal can be
made before the Department of Justice Secretary. Simultaneously, the accused may move for the
suspension of proceedings until resolution of the appeal.
Upon filing of the information before the court, judicial determination of probable cause is initiated.
The court shall make a personal evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting
evidence. Unlike the executive determination of probable cause, the purpose of judicial
determination of probable cause is "to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. This determination is independent of the prosecutor's determination of probable cause
and is a function of courts for purposes of issuance of a warrant of arrest.
385
Thus, the general rule is that the determination of probable cause is an executive function which
courts cannot pass upon. As an exception, courts may interfere with the prosecutor's determination
of probable cause only when there is grave abuse of discretion.106 Grave abuse of discretion
constitutes "a refusal to act in contemplation of law or a gross disregard of the Constitution, law, or
existing jurisprudence, [accompanied by] a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction."
A prosecutor gravely abuses his or her discretion in not finding probable cause by disregarding or
overlooking evidence that "are sufficient to form a reasonable ground to believe that the crime ... was
committed and that the respondent was its author."108 Further, "what is material to a finding of
probable cause is the commission of acts constituting [the offense], the presence of all its elements
and the reasonable belief, based on evidence, that the respondent had committed it.
In this case, grave abuse of discretion exists, which warrants this Court's interference in the conduct
of the executive determination of probable cause.
386
GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC., vs. SOLID BANK CORPORATION (NOW METROPOLITAN

BANK AND TRUST COMPANY)
G.R. No. 209452 : July 26, 2017
“Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for
the refusal to issue a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for the annulment
of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of
course, to the eventual outcome of the pending annulment case. As the winning bidder, respondent is entitled
to the Writ of Possession.”
Facts:
In 1995, Gotesco obtained from Solidbank a term loan of ₱300 million through its President, Mr. Jose
Go (Mr. Go). To secure the loan, Gotesco was required to execute a Mortgage Trust Indenture
(Indenture) naming Solidbank-Trust Division as Trustee.
The Indenture, dated August 9, 1995, obliged Gotesco to mortgage several parcels of land in favor of
Solidbank.5 One (1) of the lots mortgaged and used as a collateral was a property located in San
Fernando, Pampanga. A stipulation in the Indenture also irrevocably appointed Solidbank-Trust
Division as Gotesco's attomey-in-fact.7 Under the Indenture, Gotesco also agreed to "at all times
maintain the Sound Value of the Collateral.
Due to financial crisis in 1997 Gotesco ask to re calibrate the loan terms. The Gotesco made
assessment of the collateral given due to this Gotesco assume that the respondent accepted their
proposal of re calibration. However, such calibration did not happen and the assessment made by
Gotesco stated that the price of the collateral property is not enough to cover the loan. Gotesco
refused to give other collateral and pay the respondent which prompted them to file a foreclosure
suit against Gotesco.
Gotesco questioned the proceeding as they stated it is premature as the obligation were not yet
demandable. The RTC granted the foreclosure, Gotesco appealed but denied, hence this petition.
Gotesco contested the proceeding on the auction sale of the foreclosed property.
Issue:
Whether or not the auction sale was valid.
Ruling:
Generally, the purchaser in a public auction sale of a foreclosed property is entitled to a writ
of possession during the redemption period. Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118,
provides:
387
Section 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the
Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is
situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an
amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without
complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and
filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property
is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage
Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any
other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register
of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall,
upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one
hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act
Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the
bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which
the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
It is ministerial upon the trial court to issue such writ upon an ex parte petition of the purchaser.
However, this rule admits an exception.
The last sentence of Rule 39, Section 33 of the Rules of Court is instructive:
Section 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom
executed or given. - If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession
of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other
redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has
expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases
the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer
making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same
validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted
to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the
time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner
by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor.
This is in line with this Court's pronouncement in Saavedra v. Siari Valley Estates, Inc.143that:
Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the
procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession.
388
This Court in China Banking Corp. v. Spouses Lozada discussed that when the foreclosed property
is in the possession of a third party, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser
ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte. However, for this exception to apply,
the property must be held by the third party adversely to the mortgagor. The Court of Appeals
correctly held that this case does not fall under the exception. Since it is the petitioner, and not a
third party, who is occupying the property, the issuance of the Writ of Possession is ministerial.
There is also no merit to petitioner's argument that the Writ of Possession should not be issued while
the complaint for the annulment of the foreclosure proceeding is still pending. Fernandez v. Spouses
Espinoza149already ruled that a pending case assailing the validity of the foreclosure proceeding is
immaterial:
Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for
the refusal to issue a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for the
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession,
without prejudice, of course, to the eventual outcome of the pending annulment case. As the
winning bidder, respondent is entitled to the Writ of Possession.
389
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL ESCOBAR

G.R. No. 214300 : July 26, 2017
“An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does
not give rise to res judicata.”
Facts:
Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition), which was denied
by the Regional Trial Court in the Order dated October 6, 2008 and by the Court of Appeals in the
Decision dated March 8, 2011. A subsequent development in the accused's case6 compelled him to
file a second petition for bail (Second Bail Petition). On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court
denied this on the ground of res judicata. In the Decision dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals
overturned the Regional Trial Court Order and granted the Second Bail Petition.
Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary Grace Cheng-Rosagas (Mary
Grace), daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2) other
victims. Robert was the owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines, a manufacturing company of foams and
mattresses.
Due to case development, Escobar filed another petition for bail, the RTC denied the request on the
ground of res judicata, in appeal the CA granted the petition for bail. Prosecutor motion for
reconsideration and appeal to CA was denied, hence this petition under rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a res judicata.
Ruling:
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense
charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court. However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment-"regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution"-
and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the
discretion of the trial court.
In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death,96 reduced to reclusion
perpetua.Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt
is not strong.
390
The Regional Trial Court denied scobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata. The
Court of Appeals overtumed this and correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred by
res judicata.
In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged. This doctrine bars the re-litigation of
the same claim between the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment. It
likewise bars the re-litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same parties, also
known as issue preclusion or conclusiveness of judgement. It "exists as an obvious rule of reason,
justice, fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity.
Escobar' s Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in
criminal proceedings. Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute
between the parties or their successors-in-interest. Trinidad v. Marcelo declares that res judicata, as
found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on
criminal proceedings. Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. - The provisions of Rules
42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in
original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Trinidad
Petitioner's arguments - that res judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman twice found no
sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot
be a supervening event or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the same set of facts and
circumstances - do not lie.
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings. But even if
petitioner's argument[s] were to be expanded to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or the
criminal law concept of double jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the
reinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does not
give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in
this case to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same will still not
apply. Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or acquitted or that the case
against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his express consent. Here, while there
was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been convicted, acquitted, or
has had his case dismissed or terminated.
391
VELIA J. CRUZ, vs. SPOUSES MAXIMO and SUSAN CHRISTENSEN

G.R. No. 205539 : October 4, 2017
“Procedural rules of even the most mandatory character may be suspended upon a showing of
circumstances warranting the exercise of liberality in its strict application.
Facts:
Cruz alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land located at A. Santos Street, Balong Bato, San
Juan City, which she acquired through inheritance from her late mother, Ruperta D. Javier (Javier).
She further alleged that Susan Christensen (Susan) had been occupying the property during Javier's
lifetime, as they had a verbal lease agreement.
Cruz claimed that ever since she inherited the property.
Three (3) years later, or on August 5, 2008, Cruz, through counsel, sent Susan a final demand
letter,10 demanding that she pay the unpaid rentals and vacate the property within 15 days from
receipt.
Cruz alleged that despite receipt of the demand letter, Susan refused to vacate and pay the accrued
rentals from June 1989 to Febn1ary 2009 in the amount of ₱237,000.00.
On June 3, 2010, Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court, San Juan City rendered a Decision17
dismissing Cruz's Complaint.
Petitioner appealed, however, it was submitted to court more than 15 days from the period of giving
memorandum of appeal but the RTC still decided the case, petitioner appealed to CA and reversed
the decision of RTC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC should have dismissed the case considering appeal was not filed in time.
Ruling:
Procedural rules of even the most mandatory character may be suspended upon a showing of
circumstances warranting the exercise of liberality in its strict application.
Rule 40, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states the procedure of appeal before the Regional Trial
Court. It provides:
Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.—
392
(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional
Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which
shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
appellant's memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum.
Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so, the
case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are
filed.
The rule requiring the filing of the memorandum within the period provided is mandatory. Failure
to comply will result in the dismissal of the appeal. Enriquez v. Court of Appeals explained:
Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a new provision. Said section is based on
Section 21 (c) and (d) of the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129) with modifications. These include the following changes:
(a) the appellant is required to submit a memorandum discussing the errors imputed to the lower
court within fifteen (15) days from notice, and the appellee is given the same period counted from
receipt of the appellant's memorandum to file his memorandum; (b) the failure of the appellant to
file a memorandum is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.
Rule 40, Section 7 (b) provides that, "it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum"
and failure to do so "shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal." The use of the word "shall" in a
statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory. Further, the Rule imposes upon an
appellant the "duty" to submit his memorandum. A duty is a "legal or moral obligation, mandatory
act, responsibility, charge, requirement, trust, chore, function, commission, debt, liability,
assignment, role, pledge, dictate, office, (and) engagement." Thus, under the express mandate of said
Rule, the appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a
matter of discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform said duty will
compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.
Rule 40, Section 7 is likewise jurisdictional since the Regional Trial Court can only resolve errors that
are specifically assigned and properly argued in the memorandum. Thus, dismissals based on this
rule are premised on the non-filing of the memorandum. A trial court does not acquire jurisdiction
over an appeal where the errors have not been specifically assigned.
393
In this instance, a Memorandum of Appeal was filed late but was nonetheless given due course by
the Regional Trial Court. Thus, the jurisdictional defect was cured since petitioner was able to
specifically assign the Municipal Trial Court's errors, which the Regional Trial Court was able to
address and resolve. This Court also notes that all substantial issues have already been fully litigated
before the Municipal Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals.
Procedural defects should not be relied on to defeat the substantive rights of litigants. Even
procedural rules of the most mandatory character may be suspended where "matters of life, liberty,
honor or property warrant its liberal application. Ginete v. Court of Appeals added that courts may
also consider:
1. the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4)
a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory[, and that] (5) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Liberality in the application of Rule 40, Section 7 is warranted in this case in view of the potential
inequity that may result if the rule is strictly applied. As will be discussed later, petitioner's
meritorious cause would be unduly prejudiced if this case were to be dismissed on technicalities.
394
BICOL MEDICAL CENTER, represented by Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva, and the DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, represented by HEALTH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA vs. NOE B. BOTOR,
CELJUN F. YAP, ISMAEL A. ALBAO, AUGUSTO S. QUILON, EDGAR F. ESPLANA II, and
JOSEFINA F. ESPLANA
G.R. No. 214073, October 4, 2017
“The applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or her claim with complete and conclusive
evidence since only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required "to give the court an idea of the justification
for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.
Facts:
Sometime in 1982, the Camarines Sur Provincial Government donated about five (5) hectares of land
to the Ministry of Health, now the Department of Health.
Sometime in 2009, BMC constructed a steel gate along J. Miranda Avenue to control the flow of
vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering the hospital premises.
The LGU opposed, the Mayor of Naga got an authority from Sangunian Panglungsod to dismantle
the gate. However, instead of dismantling it the Mayor of the City file a Preliminary Injunction in
court. Petitioners opposed stating that there is no need to issue preliminary injunction and that there
is no sufficient caused for such issuance.
RTC denied the petition, CA on appeal granted the petition. Hence this case.
Issue: Whether or not preliminary injunction must be issued.
Ruling:
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to [P]reserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's
showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima
facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the
violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.
Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a writ of preliminary injunction
may be issued:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:
a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of: or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
395
c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is

procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be proven first before a
writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) No
other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or her claim with
complete and conclusive evidence since only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required "to give
the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case
on the merits.
A careful reading of the records convinces this Court that respondents failed to establish prima facie
proof of their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever right they sought to establish by
proving the public nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the Department of Health's certificate
of title and the City Engineer's categorical statement that "the road from Panganiban Drive up to the
entrance and exit gate of [BJ\1C] was not included in the list" of city roads under Naga City's
control.
Instead of merely relying on a tax map and claims of customary use, Naga City or respondents
should have presented a clear legal right to support their claim over Road Lot No. 3. Executive
Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. explained that a clear legal right which would entitle the
applicant to an injunctive writ "contemplates a right 'clearly founded in or granted by law.' Any hint
of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief.
Absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga City's ownership or control over Road Lot No.
3, the Department of Health's title over the BMC compound must prevail over the unsubstantiated
claims of Naga City and respondents. Department of Health's ownership over Road Lot No. 3, with
the concomitant right to use and enjoy this property, must be respected.
Respondents likewise cannot rely on the supposed customary use of Road Lot No. 3 by the public to
support their claimed right of unfettered access to the road because customary use is not one (1) of
the sources of legal obligation; hence, it does not ripen into a right.
396
EVY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. VALIANT ROLL

FORMING SALES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 207938 : October 11, 2017
“Injunction is defined as “a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or

refrain from doing a certain act.” It may be filed as a main action before the trial court or as a provisional
remedy in the main action. An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with “actual and existing
substantial rights” or rights in esse; Thus, the writ will not issue to applicants whose rights are merely
contingent or to compel or restrain acts that do not give rise to a cause of action.”
Facts:
Evy Construction purchased a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 134890 in Lipa, Batangas
from Linda N. Ang (Ang) and Senen T. Uyan (Uyan). They executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, which
was notarized on September 11, 2007. At the time of the sale, no lien or encumbrance was annotated
on the title, except for a notice of adverse claim filed by Ang. Then on September 18, 2007, the
Register of Deeds annotated a Notice of Levy on Attachment on TCT No. 134890. This annotation
was by virtue of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by Branch 46, Regional Trial Court, San
Fernando, Pampanga in Civil Case No. 13442 entitled Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation v. Angeli
Lumber and Hardware, Inc. and Linda Ngo Ang. Two (2) other encumbrances were also annotated on
the title. Thereafter, Evy Construction registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of
Deeds on November 20, 2007. TCT No. 168590 was issued in its name; however, it contained the
annotation of the prior Notice of Levy on Attachment, as well as a Notice of Attachment/Levy upon
Realty dated October 2, 2007 and a Notice of Levy on Preliminary Attachment dated November 8,
2007.
Subsequently, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 13442 in favor
of Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation (Valiant). A Writ of Execution and a Notice of Levy were
issued against the property covered by TCT No. 134890. Evy Construction filed a Notice of Third-
Party Claim in Civil Case No. 13442, informing the court that it had already filed with the sheriff an
Affidavit of Title/Ownership on May 20, 2008, in accordance with Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court. However, a Certificate of Sale was eventually issued to Valiant as the winning bidder of the
property covered by TCT No. 134890. Evy Construction then filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Lipa City, Batangas its Complaint for Quieting of Title/Removal of Cloud, Annulment of Execution
Sale and Certificate of Sale, and Damages, with application for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Register of Deeds from compelling it to surrender its copy of
TCT No. 168590 and from annotating any further transactions relating to Civil Case No. 13442.
During the hearing for its application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO), Evy Construction claimed that it would suffer great and irreparable injury if the Register of
Deeds were restrained from compelling it to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
397
168590. It claimed that potential investors interested in developing the property “[would] back out
of their investment plans if there [was a] cloud of doubt hovering over the title on the property.” But
said TRO was denied and Evy’s Construction’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in
an Order dated December 11, 2009. Hence, it filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
On October 22, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision. It held that Evy
Construction failed to sufficiently establish its right to the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
And that it failed to sufficiently establish that it would suffer grave and irreparable injury if
additional recording and annotation of further transactions, orders, or processes relating to the sale
of the property to Valiant were made on the title. Evy Construction filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated June 25, 2013.
Issue:
1. Whether Evy Construction and Development Corporation was denied of due process
when its application for writ of preliminary injunction was denied in the same
proceeding as its application for a temporary restraining order; and
2. Whether the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
application for injunctive relief.
Ruling:
1. No, the Petitioner cannot insist on a separate hearing for the application for preliminary
injunction, considering that it accepted that its application would be submitted for decision
without the presentation of its witness. The trial court did not find any need to conduct a
further hearing on the application for preliminary injunction since petitioner was unable to
substantiate its entitlement to a temporary restraining order. In any case, even if a separate
hearing was granted, petitioner would have presented the same arguments and evidence in
the November 9, 2009 hearing.
Under Rule 58, Section 4(d)requires that the trial court conduct a summary hearing in every
application for temporary restraining order regardless of a grant or denial, Rule 58, Section 5
requires a hearing only if an application for preliminary injunction is granted. Thus, Section 5
states that “[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to
the party or person sought to be enjoined.” Inversely stated, an application for preliminary
injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a hearing separate from that of the
summary hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Thus,
there can be no denial of due process if the party alleging it has already been granted an
opportunity to be heard.
398
2. No, The Regional Trial Court could not have been faulted for ordering the annotation of the
notice of levy on attachment on TCT No. 134890 considering that when the September 18,
2007 Order was issued, the property was still in Uyan’s and Ang’s names. Since, the sale
between petitioner Evy Construction, Uyan, and Ang was not annotated on TCT No. 134890
at the time of its sale. And a sale of property that is not registered under the Torrens system
is binding only between the buyer and the seller and does not affect innocent third persons.
Petitioner prays for the issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent grave and irreparable
damage to its reputation as a real estate developer. Indeed, injunctive relief could be granted
to prevent grave and irreparable damage to a business entity’s goodwill and business
reputation. Injury is considered irreparable if “there is no standard by which [its] amount
can be measured with reasonable accuracy.” The injury must be such that its pecuniary
value cannot be estimated, and thus, cannot fairly compensate for the loss. For this reason,
the loss of goodwill and business reputation, being unquantifiable would be considered as
grave and irreparable damage. Petitioner alleges that the execution sale and the prior
annotations on its title caused ‘‘crucial investors and buyers” to withdraw, “notwithstanding
the considerable costs and expenses [it] already incurred.” This is the grave and irreparable
damage it sought to be protected from. However, the feared “damage” was caused by the
execution sale and the annotations already made on the title. It even admits that the
annotations were “impairing the progress of [its] housing development.”79 In other words,
petitioner failed to establish the urgent and paramount necessity of
preventing further annotations on the title.
Thus, what petitioner actually seeks is the removal of the annotations on its title, which is
precisely what it asked for in its Complaint for Quieting of Title/Removal of Cloud,
Annulment of Execution Sale and Certificate of Sale, and Damages before the trial court.
Injunctive relief would have no practical effect considering that the purported damage it
seeks to be protected from has already been done. Therefore, its proper remedy is not the
issuance of an injunctive writ but to thresh out the merits of its Complaint before the trial
court.
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, denied petitioner’s application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction on the ground
that petitioner would still have sufficient relief in its prayer for damages in its Complaint. In
the event that the annotations on petitioner’s title are found by the trial court to be invalid,
petitioner would have adequate relief in the removal of the annotations and in the award of
damages. Therefore, the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion.
399
ORIENTAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. MANUEL ONG, doing business under the
business name of WESTERN PACIFIC TRANSPORT SERVICES and/or ASIAN TERMINALS,
INC.
G.R. No. 189524 : October 11, 2017
“Section 8, Rule 51 provides that only errors which have been stated in the assignment of errors and
properly argued in the brief will be considered by the appellate court. The exceptions to this rule are errors
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors.”
Facts:
JEA Steel Industries, Inc. (JEA Steel) imported from South Korea 72 aluminum-zinc-alloy-
coated steel sheets in coils. These steel sheets were transported to Manila onboard the vessel M/V
Dooyang Glory as evidenced by a bill of lading. Upon arrival of the vessel at the Manila South
Harbor on June 10, 2002, the 72 coils were discharged and stored in Pier 9 under the custody of
the arrastre contractor, Asian Terminals, Inc. (Asian Terminals). From the storage compound of
Asian Terminals, the coils were loaded on the trucks of Manuel Ong (Ong) and delivered to JEA
Steel’s plant in Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martirez, Cavite on June 14, 2002 and June 17, 2002. Eleven
of these coils ‘‘were found to be in damaged condition, dented or their normal round shape
deformed.” JEA Steel filed a claim with Oriental for the value of the 11 damaged coils, pursuant to
Marine Insurance Policy No. OAC/M-12292. Oriental paid JEA Steel the sum of P521,530.16 and
subsequently demanded indemnity from Ong and Asian Terminals (respondents), but they refused
to pay.
The consignee’s claim letter that was received by the arrastre operator two (2) days after
complete delivery of the cargo constitutes substantial compliance with the time limitation for filing
claims under the Gate Pass and the Management Contract. However, the arrastre operator’s liability
for damage to the cargo is limited to P5,000.00 per package in accordance with the Management
Contract.
On May 19, 2003, Oriental filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
sum of money against respondents. Asian Terminals argued that Oriental’s claim was barred for the
latter’s failure to file a notice of claim within the 15-day period provided in the Gate Pass and in
Article VII, Section 7.01 of the Contract for Cargo Handling Services (Management Contract)
between the Philippine Ports Authority and Asian Terminals.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered its Decision on August 9, 2006 dismissing the
complaint. It found no preponderance of evidence to establish that respondents were the ones
responsible for the damage to the 11 coils. Oriental’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied by the same. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Oriental’s appeal on the ground that its
claim had already prescribed. According to the CA, it can resolve the issue of prescription despite
not being assigned as an error on appeal as it was already raised, although not tackled, in the lower
400
court. It also denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was
filed before this Court. Respondents filed their respective Comments, and Oriental filed its Motion
to Admit Consolidated Reply together with its Consolidated Reply.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in passing upon the issue of prescription
even though it was not an assigned error in the appeal.
Ruling:
No. As provided in Rule 51, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides that no error which
does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from
or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely
related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may
pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
An assignment of error is generally required for appellate review. Section 8 provides that
only errors which have been stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief will
be considered by the appellate court. The exceptions to this rule are errors affecting jurisdiction over
the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly passed
upon the issue of prescription.
401
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN AUSTRIA

G.R. No. 210568 : November 8, 2017
“The rule is settled that the trial court’s factual findings and evaluation of witnesses’ credibility and
testimony should be entitled to great respect, unless it is shown that the trial court may have “overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance.”
Facts:
On July 11, 2003, two (2) informations for rape were filed against Austria before the Regional
Trial Court, Calauag, Quezon. The first information stated that on or about the year 1997, and
sometime subsequent thereto, at Barangay Villa Hermosa, Municipality of Lopez, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
with lewd design, by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lay with and have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], then a minor, 10
years of age, against her will. That the accused is the stepfather of the victim. And the second
information stated that on or about the month of January 2003, and sometime prior thereto,
at Barangay Villa Hermosa, Municipality of Lopez, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd design, by means of force,
threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and have
carnal knowledge of one [AAA], then a minor, 16 years of age, against her will. That the accused is
the stepfather of the victim.
Austria pleaded not guilty to the charges of rape against him. Trial on the merits ensued.
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Calauag, Quezon found Austria guilty of the multiple charges of rape
against him and that AAA was steadfast in her testimony that Austria repeatedly raped her. It also
took note that AAA referred to Austria as “Papa” during the trial, out of respect to her stepfather
and benefactor. It opined that “it [was] improbable that [she] would [falsely] impute so grave a
wrong to [Austria]. Further, it found that Austria’s testimony to be uncorroborated and unbelievable
because he was unable to support his claim that AAA’s relatives pushed her to file the false rape
complaint against him so that he would lose custody over AAA. It als did not give due weight to the
defense’s claim that AAA’s intact hymen belied her claims of repeated rape. And emphasized that
jurisprudence has consistently held that an intact hymen does not mean that rape did not take place,
since consummated rape does not require that the hymen be penetrated or ruptured. Furthermore, it
asserted that a young girl would not subject herself to the rigors of a public trial unless she was
seeking justice for the abuse inflicted on her.
The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove three (3) separate incidents of rape. It
also held that the offenses charged against Austria were qualified because of AAA’s minority and
his relationship with her as her stepfather. On March 20, 2009, the Regional Trial Court directed the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals upon Austria’s timely filing of his
Notice of Appeal.
402
On February 6, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision. It
gave great weight to the latter’s assessment of the credibility, or lack thereof, of the witnesses and
confirmed the finding that AAA testified in a straightforward and candid manner. Austria filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but was later on denied.
Austria, subsequently, filed his Notice of Appeal, which the CA gave due course and
directed the elevation of the records of his case to this Court.
Issue:
Whether the trial court’s finding should be given merit in the review of its findings by the
Supreme Court.
Ruling:
Yes. The rule is settled that the trial court’s factual findings and evaluation of witnesses’
credibility and testimony should be entitled to great respect, unless it is shown that the trial court
may have “overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and
substance.”
403
PERSONAL COLLECTION DIRECT SELLING, INC. vs. TERESITA L. CARANDANG

G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017
“The order granting the withdrawal of an information must state the judge’s assessment of the
evidence and reasons in resolving the motion. It must clearly show why the court’s earlier assessment of
probable cause was erroneous.
An order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final, and
the remedy to question this final order is an appeal.”
Facts:
On March 30, 2007, Personal Collection filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa with
unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence against Carandang before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. After the preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Job M.
Mangente filed an Information against Carandang before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, which issued an arrest warrant against the same. On July 10, 2009, Carandang filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation, alleging that she did not appear during the preliminary investigation because
she did not receive any subpoena from the Office of the City Prosecutor. She moved for the
reinvestigation of Personal Collection’s complaint to not deprive her of due process. Personal
Collection filed its Opposition, arguing that she was not deprived of due process during the
preliminary investigation and that the Regional Trial Court found that there was prima facie evidence
to support the case. She filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit Reply arguing that her motion
was meritorious and not filed to delay the case. The RTC granted Carandang’s Motion for
Reinvestigation in its Order dated August 14, 2009. She then filed her Counter-Affidavit before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, claiming that her failure to completely liquidate the cash advances was
due to the sudden termination of her employment by Personal Collection.
On January 29, 2010, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through State Prosecutor Aquiatan-
Morales, issued a Resolution recommending that the complaint against Carandang be dismissed.
After reinvestigation, it found that Personal Collection’s cause of action is anchored primarily on
Carandang’s failure to liquidate her remaining cash advances. However, the Office of the City
Prosecutor was unconvinced that Carandang’s failure to return the cash advances would be
sufficient to hold her liable for estafa. There would be no estafa to speak of so long as there is no
demand to return the money under obligation to be returned. The element of demand not being
present, the earlier finding that there was probable cause to charge Carandang with estafa was
overturned. Her acts could only be a subject of a civil action for sum of money.
On June 15, 2010, Prosecutor Aquiatan-Morales filed a Motion to Withdraw Information with
the Regional Trial Court, stating that the Office of the City Prosecutor found that there was lack of
probable cause to hold Carandang liable for estafa. Personal Collection filed its Opposition arguing
that demand is not an element of estafa, such that its lack would warrant the withdrawal of the
404
Information. She filed her Reply arguing that the Office of the City Prosecutor his control of the
proceedings in a criminal case and that the private offended party or private prosecutor has no right
to question its actions and authority.
Consequently, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information. It
found that Carandang used the cash advances to pay for the operational expenses of Personal
Collection Iloilo City branch and that her unceremonious termination from employment prevented
her from fully liquidating these cash advances. Thus, she was able to explain her failure to account
for the cash advances she had received in trust. The trial court also noted the general policy of the
courts to not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to give the investigating
officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause. It found that no exception existed in the
case that would require the court to intervene in the findings of the preliminary investigation.
Personal Collection’s Motion for Reconsideration which was thendenied by the same in its Order
dated October 12, 2011. Upon Carandang’s motion, the Regional Trial Court, in its Order dated
November 16, 2011, released the cash bond posted for Carandang’s bail.
Personal Collection filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the Orders granting the
Motion to Withdraw Information and the Motion to Release Bond. It argued that the trial court
failed to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case and only relied on Prosecutor Aquiatan-
Morales’ recommendation that there was no probable cause to charge Carandang with estafa. It
alleged that the trial court had already found that there was probable cause to sustain the complaint
in its Order dated September 20, 2007, in which a warrant of arrest was issued against Carandang.
Moreover, Carandang already admitted in her reply-affidavit that she had received the funds in
trust but still had not liquidated the balance. Contrary to the public prosecutor’s resolution, all of the
elements of estafa were present. Personal Collection also alleged that it was deprived of due process
when the Regional Trial Court granted Carandang’s Motion to Release Cash Bond, even though
Personal Collection did not receive a copy of this motion.
On November 7, 2012, the Court of Appeals (CA) issued its Decision, dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari for lack of merit. It found that the Regional Trial Court conducted an independent
assessment of the facts of the case, basing its order to withdraw the Information on the pleadings
filed by the parties. Further, the trial court’s determination of probable cause for purposes of
preliminary investigation was separate from the probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant.
In issuing the warrant of arrest against Carandang, the trial court only evaluated the evidence
furnished by Personal Collection. In contrast, by the time the trial court was deciding whether to
permit the withdrawal of the Information or not, Carandang had filed her counter-affidavit and
subsequent pleadings. The CA also found that Personal Collection was not deprived of the
opportunity to oppose Carandang’s Motion to Release Cash Bond. The CA denied Personal
Collection’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review before this court.
405
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court correctly allowed the withdrawal of the Information
against Teresita L. Carandang upon a finding that there was a lack of probable cause.
Ruling:
Yes. In her Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, petitioner claims that it
resorted to a special civil action for certiorari as it had “no recourse to an appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” against the trial court’s orders to
withdraw the Information and release respondent’s bail bond. Petitioner is incorrect. Appeal was
available and was the proper remedy.
As provided in Rule 122, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, Any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. Hence, an order
granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final, and the
remedy to question this final order is an appeal. Further, appealing the withdrawal of an
information does not violate the right of the accused against being placed in double jeopardy.
406
DEMEX RATTANCRAFT, INC. and NARCISO T. DELA MERCED vs. ROSALIO A. LERON
G.R. No. 204288 : November 8, 2017
“Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.”
Facts:
In 1980, Leron was hired as a weaver by Demex Rattancraft, Inc. (Demex), a domestic
corporation engaged in manufacturing handcrafted rattan products for local sale and
export. Narciso T. Dela Merced was Demex’s president. Leron was paid on a piece-rate basis and his
services were contracted through job orders. He worked from Monday to Saturday. However, there
were times when he was required to work on Sundays.8 Leron received his wages at the end of
every week but he never received standard benefits such as 13th month pay, service incentive leave,
rest day pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay. He was then dismissed by Demex’s foreman, Marcelo
Viray (Viray), and Demex’s personnel manager, Nora Francisco (Francisco). Both accused him of
instigating a campaign to remove Viray as the company’s foreman. Before Leron was dismissed
from service, he was given a memorandum stating that the dining chair he had previously weaved
for export to Japan was rejected. For this reason, Demex expressed that it would no longer avail of
his services. And later on, did not report for work. he next day, he filed a complaint against Demex
for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of Quezon City.
On August 3, 2006, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the illegal dismissal case without prejudice
on the ground of improper venue. Leron refiled his complaint before the Labor Arbiter of San
Fernando City, Pampanga. He then appealed Labor Arbiter Jose’s July 30, 2007 Decision before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but
awarded Leron P5,000.00 as nominal damages for Demex’s noncompliance with procedural due
process. Leron moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in the Resolution Leron filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals assailing the
Resolutions of the NLRC. The CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it
declared that Leron abandoned his work and accordingly, the assailed Resolutions of the National
Labor Relations Commission were reversed and set aside. Demex moved for reconsideration but its
motion was denied in the Resolution. Demex filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
Court assailing the February 9, 2012 Decision and October 25, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Rosalio A. Leron was validly dismissed from employment by
petitioners Demex Rattancraft, Inc. and Narciso T. Dela Merced on the ground of abandonment of
work.
407
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court, not being a trier of facts, would no longer
disturb the lower court’s factual findings when supported by substantial evidence. The
determination of whether or not an employee is guilty of abandonment is a factual matter. It
involves a review on the probative value of the evidence presented by each party and the
correctness of the lower courts’ assessments. The Court of Appeals’ finding that respondent did not
abandon his work would generally be binding upon the parties and this Court.
408
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORIANO TAYABAN

G.R. No. 207666 : November 22, 2017
“Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given
the highest respect.”
Facts:
In an Information dated August 20, 2008, accused-appellant Tayaban was charged with the crime
of rape. It was stated that sometime in May 2008, at Rock Quarry, Poblacion North, Lagawe, Ifugao,
hence, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused DID then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one AAA, a sixteen (16)[-]year[-]old
mentally retardate. Upon arraignment on October 8, 2008, accused-appellant entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial on the merits then ensued after the requisite pretrial. The prosecution had a version
which states that AAA had been previously assessed to have moderate mental retardation, an
intellectual disability. Sometime in May 2008, AAA went to the house of her uncle, accused-
appellant Tayaban, at Rock Quarry, Poblacion North, Lagawe, Ifugao. While she was there, accused-
appellant undressed her and removed his pants. He then inserted his penis in her vagina many
times and bit her breast. Around three (3) months later, Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz (Dr. Diaz)
physically examined AAA and found a healed laceration on her hymen, which she said could have
occurred more than two (2) weeks earlier. The version of the defense was that the Accused-appellant
was a farmer. In the first week of May 2008, he brought a carabao to Baguio for the last novena of his
brother-in-law’s father. He returned to Ifugao after six (6) to seven (7) days. He went to Lagawe to
get his tools then proceeded to Sanafe, Lamut, which was about an hour away, to fix a house where
he could stay and work. He returned to Lagawe sometime around the end of May 2008 or the
beginning of June 2008.
In its July 12, 2010 Decision, the Regional Trial Court found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It noted that although it was proven that accused-appellant
was AAA’s uncle, this aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the Information and could not
be considered. Similarly, it could not consider the minority of the victim, as her age was not properly
established during trial. The Regional Trial Court found AAA’s testimony credible. It rejected
accused-appellant’s defense as a self-serving fabrication and noted that his defense was
corroborated only by his wife. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the Regional Trial
Court but modified the penalty. Thus, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of
Appeals.
In compliance with its January 11, 2013 Resolution, which gave due course to accused-
appellant’s notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals elevated the records of the case to this Court. In its
September 2, 2013 Resolution, the Court of Appeals notified the parties that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs. Both parties filed their respective manifestations in lieu of
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supplemental briefs on November 6, 2013. After carefully considering the parties’ arguments and the
records of this case, this Court resolves to dismiss accused-appellant’s appeal for failing to show
reversible error in the assailed decision warranting this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme can still re-examine the credibility of witnesses and the
probative weight of their testimonies which has been done by the trial court.
Ruling:
No. Factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the
probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be
given the highest respect. When these have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, this Court will
generally not reexamine them. Both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court examined
the evidence presented by both parties and found AAA’s testimony to be credible, clear,
straightforward, and convincing. Accused-appellant has failed to present any cogent reason to
reverse the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court.
410
MACARIO S. PADILLA vs. AIRBORNE SECURITY SERVICE, INC.

and/or CATALINA SOLIS
G.R. No. 210080. November 22, 2017
“Rule 45 petitions, such as the one brought by petitioner, may only raise questions of law.”
Facts:
On September 1, 1986, Padilla was hired by respondent Airborne Security Service, Inc.
(Airborne) as a security guard. He was first assigned at an outlet of Trebel Piano along Ortigas
Avenue Extension, Pasig City. Padilla allegedly rendered continuous service until June 15, 2009,
when he was relieved from his post at City Advertising Ventures Corporation and was advised to
wait for his reassignment order. On July 27, 2009, he allegedly received a letter from Airborne
directing him to report for assignment and deployment. He called Airborne’s office but was told that
he had no assignment yet. On September 9, 2009, he received another letter from Airborne asking
him to report to its office. He sent his reply letter on September 22, 2009 and personally reported to
the office to inquire on the status of his deployment with a person identified as Mr. Dagang,
Airborne’s Director for Operations. He was told that Airborne was having a hard time finding an
assignment for him since he was already over 38 years old. Padilla added that he was advised by
Airborne’s personnel to resign, but he refused. In December 2009, when he reported to the office to
collect his 13th month pay, he was again persuaded to hand in his resignation letter. Still not having
been deployed or reassigned, on February 23, 2010, Padilla filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal,
impleading Airborne and its president, respondent Catalina Solis (Solis).
Respondents countered that Padilla was relieved from his post on account of a client’s
request. Thereafter, Padilla was directed to report to Airborne’s office in accordance with a
Disposition/Relieve Order dated June 15, 2009. However, he failed to comply and went on absence
without leave instead. Respondents added that more letters — dated July 27, 2009; September 9,
2009, which both directed Padilla to submit a written explanation of his alleged unauthorized
absences; January 12, 2010; and May 27, 2010 — instructed Padilla to report to Airborne’s office, to
no avail. Respondents further denied receiving Padilla’s September 22, 2009 letter of explanation.
In his September 10, 2010 Decision, Labor Arbiter Panganiban dismissed Padilla’s Complaint. He
lent credence to respondents’ claim that Padilla failed to report for work despite the letters sent to
him. In its August 3, 2011 Decision, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed in toto Labor
Arbiter Panganiban’s Decision. The assailed Court of Appeals April 18, 2013 Decision sustained the
rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission and of Labor Arbiter Panganiban. Following
the Court of Appeals’ denial of his Motion for Reconsideration Padilla filed the present Petition
before this Court.
411
Issue:
Whether Petitioner Padilla’s constructive dismissal from his employment is a question of law
and therefore may be subject for petition under Rule 45.
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 45 petitions, such as the one brought by petitioner, may only raise questions of
law. Equally settled however, is that this rule admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the [Court of Appeals] went beyond the issues of the case, or
its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs,
are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the [Court of Appeals] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
The Court of Appeals made a gross misapprehension of facts and overlooked other material
details. The facts of this case, when more appropriately considered, sustain a conclusion different
from that of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner was constructively dismissed from employment owing
to his inordinately long floating status.
412
DR. JOSEPH L. MALIXI, DR. EMELITA Q. FIRMACION, MARIETTA MENDOZA, AURORA

AGUSTIN, NORA AGUILAR, MA. THERESA M. BEFETEL, and
MYRNA NISAY vs. DR. GLORY V. BALTAZAR
G.R. No. 208224 : November 22, 2017
“Procedural rules are essential in the administration of justice. The importance of procedural rules in the
adjudication of disputes has been reiterated in numerous cases. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 806
(1991): Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the
convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in insuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights
through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or
complicate litigation but, indeed, to provide for a system under which suitors may be heard in the correct form and
manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. The
other alternative is the settlement of their conflict through the barrel of a gun.”
Facts:
Petitioners were employees of Bataan General Hospital holding the following positions: Dr.
Malixi was the Vice President of the Samahan ng Manggagawa ng Bataan General Hospital, Dr.
Firmacion was a Medical Specialist II, Mendoza and Agustin were both Nurse III, Aguilar and
Befetel were both Nurse II, and Nisay was a Nursing Attendant II. Meanwhile, Dr. Baltazar was the
Officer-in-Charge Chief of Bataan General Hospital. Petitioners alleged that sometime in May 2008,
the Department of Health (DOH) and the Province of Bataan entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement regarding the construction of Bataan General Hospital’s three (3)-storey building. While
this Memorandum was in effect, the DOH, through then Secretary Francisco T. Duque (Duque),
issued Department Personnel Order No. 2008-1452, appointing Dr. Baltazar as the hospital’s Officer-
in-Charge.
According to petitioners, the DOH and the Province of Bataan entered into a Supplemental
Memorandum. One (1) of the provisions stated that the parties agreed to give the supervision of the
hospital to the Secretary of Health or “his duly authorized representative with a minimum rank of
Assistant Secretary.” A third Memorandum of Agreement was executed by the parties on June 16,
2009, but the DOH refused to renew the agreement “due to a complaint already filed before the
Honorable Congresswoman Herminia Roman, and before the DOH.” In their Complaint, petitioners
questioned the validity of Dr. Baltazar’s appointment and qualifications. They alleged that her
appointment was “without any basis, experience, or expertise.” They claimed that she was
appointed only by virtue of an endorsement of the Bataan Governor and without the prescribed
Career Service Executive Board qualifications. Petitioners pointed out that Dr. Baltazar’s
appointment was by virtue of a secondment pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement. Her third
year as Officer-in-Charge via secondment already violated the law for failing to comply with the
required qualification standards. Granting that there was compliance, secondment that exceeds one
(1) year is subject to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)’s approval under Section 9(a), Rule VII of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and DOH Administrative
Order No. 46, Series of 2001. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1999 likewise provides
413
that the contract of secondment should be submitted to the Commission within 30 days from its
execution. A year after Dr. Baltazar’s secondment, the Commission did not issue any authority for
her to continue to hold office as Officer-in-Charge of the hospital. Hence, her assumption without
the required authority was deemed illegal.
Petitioners averred that the nonrenewal of the Memorandum of Agreement by the DOH
rendered her appointment ineffective. Her holding of the position after this nonrenewal was already
illegal. In addition to Dr. Baltazar’s alleged invalid appointment and lack of qualifications,
petitioners contended that she committed several abusive and malevolent acts detrimental to Bataan
General Hospital’s officers and employees. She authorized the collection of fees for the insertion and
removal of intravenous fluids and fees for the Nurse Station without any legal basis. She also caused
the removal from payroll of an employee, who, up to the filing of the Complaint, had yet to receive
remuneration, hazard pay, subsistence, and other allowances. Petitioners likewise alleged that Dr.
Baltazar manipulated the creation of the Selection and Promotion Board to give her control over the
personnel’s employment and promotion. She also disregarded the next-in-line rule when it comes to
appointment and promotion of employees.
Furthermore, Dr. Baltazar allegedly employed two (2) doctors as contractual employees who
were paid P20,000.00 but worked only half the time rendered by an employee-doctor of Bataan
General Hospital. Lastly, petitioners claimed that Dr. Baltazar allowed her doctor siblings to
accommodate private patients while expressly prohibiting other doctors to do the same. On October
17, 2011, the CSC rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint on the ground of forum shopping.
The CSC found that all elements of forum shopping were present in the case and that petitioners’
letter dated September 7, 2010 filed with the DOH contained the same allegations against Dr.
Baltazar and sought for the same relief. Finally, the judgment by the DOH would result to res
judicata in the case before the CSC. It also noted that another case was pending before the Office of
the Ombudsman in relation to the alleged removal of an employee in the hospital’s payroll.
Nevertheless, the CSC resolved the issue of Dr. Baltazar’s appointment for clarificatory
purposes. It held that Dr. Baltazar was not appointed as Officer-in-Charge of Bataan General
Hospital but was merely seconded to the position. The CSC added that the approval requirement for
secondments that exceed one (1) year was already amended by CSC Circular No. 06-1165. The new
circular merely required that the Memorandum of Agreement or the secondment contract be
submitted to the Commission for records purposes. Failure to submit within 30 days from the
execution of the agreement or contract will only make the secondment in effect 30 days before the
submission date. On the alleged violation of the next-in-line rule, the CSC held that employees
holding positions next-in-rank to the vacated position do not enjoy any vested right thereto for
purposes of promotion. Seniority will only be considered if the candidates possess the same
qualifications.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration and argued that the letter before the DOH was simply
a request to meet the Secretary, and not a Complaint. Furthermore, the letter before the DOH and
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the Complaint before the CSC did not contain the same parties or seek the same relief. The CSC
promulgated a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration. It held that it was the DOH that
considered petitioners’ letter as their complaint, and not the CSC. Moreover, the DOH already
exercised jurisdiction over the case when it required Dr. Baltazar to comment on the letter-
complaint. They elevated the case before the Court of Appeals, which subsequently issued a Minute
Resolution, dismissing the appeal. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its July 16, 2013 Minute Resolution. They then filed a Petition for
Review against Dr. Baltazar before this Court. They pray for the reversal of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals and of the Decision and Resolution of the CSC. And maintain
that they indicated the important dates in their appeal before the Court of Appeals and that they
attached certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution. However, they admit that they
failed to indicate the date of their counsel’s Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
compliance and to provide proof of “competent evidence of identities.” They also deny that they
committed forum shopping. The alleged Complaint sent to the DOH was a mere letter stating the
employees’ grievances and objections to the illegalities and violations committed by respondent. It
was a mere request for the DOH Secretary to tackle the issues and investigate the concerns in the
hospital’s management. This letter was not intended to serve as a formal Complaint. They request
that this Court set aside the issue on forum shopping and that the case be resolved on its merits.
Respondent filed her Comment and prayed for the dismissal of the petition. She argues that
the procedural infirmities of petitioners’ appeal are fatal to their case. While, the petitioners filed
their Reply which they reiterated their request for the relaxation of procedural rules and the
resolution of the case based on its merits. They also disclosed that CSC Chairman Duque, who
signed the October 17, 2011 Decision, was formerly the DOH Secretary who seconded respondent as
Bataan General Hospital’s Officer-in-Charge. Lastly, petitioners added that their letter to the DOH
was not a Complaint since it was not assigned a case number.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition based on procedural grounds.
2. Whether forum shopping was committed by the petitioner.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Due to compelling circumstances in this case, this Court opts for a liberal application of
procedural rules. And in in the interest of judicial economy, the Court of Appeals should
avoid dismissal of cases based merely on technical grounds. Judicial economy requires the
prosecution of cases with the least cost to the parties and to the courts’ time, effort, and
resources.
2. Yes. However, it was committed in the concept of res judicata, is applicable to judgments or
decisions of administrative agencies performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. To
determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important
factor to ask is whether the clement of litis pendentia is present, or whether a final judgment
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in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Otherwise stated, the test for determining
forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res
judicata arises by virtue of a party’s commencement of a judicial remedy identical to one
which already exists (either pending or already resolved), then a forum shopping infraction
is committed.
416
SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD (deceased), survived and assumed by his heirs, namely: ELISEO
PIEDAD (deceased),** JOEL PIEDAD, PUBLIO PIEDAD, JR., GLORIA PIEDAD, LOT PIEDAD,
ABEL PIEDAD, ALI PIEDAD, and LEE PIEDAD vs. CANDELARIA LINEHAN BOBILLES and
MARIANO BOBILLES
G.R. No. 208614 : November 27, 2017
“Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the process of substitution of parties
when the original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish the claim.
The prevailing party may move for the execution of a final and executory judgment as a matter of right within
five (5) years from the entry of judgment. If no motion is filed within this period, the judgment is converted to
a mere right of action and can only be enforced by instituting a complaint for the revival of judgment in a
regular court within ten (10) years from finality of judgment.”
Facts:
Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an absolute deed of
sale against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria) and Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 435-T and raffled to Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided
over by Judge Benigno Gaviola (Judge Gaviola). On March 19, 1992, the trial court ruled in Piedad’s
favor and declared the deed of sale as null and void for being a forgery. Candelaria and Mariano
appealed the trial court’s Decision, but on September 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals’ Decision became final and
executory on November 1, 1998. Judge Gaviola issued an order for the issuance of a writ of
demolition and later on, denied Candelaria’s Motion for Reconsideration. Judge Gaviola then issued
a Writ of Demolition against Candelaria and Mariano and referred it to Sheriff Antonio A. Bellones
(Sheriff Bellones) for its implementation. That same day, in the same case, Candelaria filed a Petition
for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad. Judge Gaviola ordered that the
petition be heard independently and that it be raffled to another branch.
Candelaria’s Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad was
eventually docketed and raffled to Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, presided over by
Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin (Villarin). On May 16, 2002, Candelaria also filed a verified petition for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against Sheriff Bellones
to restrain him from enforcing the writ of demolition. Judge Cesar O. Estrera (Judge Estrera),
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City and Presiding Judge of Branch 29,
ordered the raffle of the petition against Sheriff Bellones. A few days later, after summarily hearing
the case, Judge Estrera issued a restraining order against Sheriff Bellones. Upon Candelaria’s
motion, he consolidated the cases before Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City. On May 27,
2002, again upon Candelaria’s motion, Judge Villarin of Branch 59 extended the temporary
restraining order against Sheriff Bellones for 17 days.
417
The following motions were eventually filed before Judge Villarin, but he never resolved
them: (1) a motion to dismiss, as amended; (2) a motion requesting the issuance of an order lifting
the injunction order; and (3) a joint motion to resolve the motions. On February 28, 2007, the Heirs of
Piedad filed an administrative complaint against Judges Estrera and Villarin. The administrative
complaint charged them with Issuing an Unlawful Order Against a Co-Equal Court and
Unreasonable Delay in Resolving Motions. On December 16, 2009, this Court found both Judges
Estrera and Villarin administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, and Judge Villarin liable
for undue delay in rendering an order. Civil Case No. 435-T before Branch 9, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City was eventually transferred to Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, where the
Heirs of Piedad likewise filed their Motion Praying that an Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio
Bellones to Resume the Unfinished Writ of Execution and/or Writ of Demolition.
In his Order dated May 15, 2012, Presiding Judge Ruben F. Altubar (Judge Altubar) of
Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City denied the motion. Judge Altubar opined that since
more than 12 years had passed since the Court of Appeals’ September 15, 1998 Decision became final
and executory, the execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival of judgment,
not a mere motion. Judge Altubar then denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Heirs of
Piedad. They the appealed the denial of their motions with a petition under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for being the wrong remedy and also
denied the Heirs of Piedad’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Consequently, petitioners Heirs of Piedad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
Court, where they adopted the findings of fact in the administrative case against Judges Estrera and
Villarin. As they assert that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied their motion for the resumption of the writ of demolition and their motion for
reconsideration. And chide Judge Altubar for being equally ignorant of the law as Judges Estrera
and Villarin.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners have duly established their personality to file the petition as
heirs of Simeon Piedad; and
2. Whether or not the motion to revive judgment was timely filed.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the process of substitution of
parties when the original party to a pending action dies and death does not extinguish
the claim. And the petitioners claim to be Piedad’s children; thus, they assert that they
are the real parties-in-interest to the action begun by their father. On the other hand,
respondents claim that petitioners did not properly substitute Piedad upon his death;
hence, they failed to substantiate their personality to move for the revival of judgment.
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However, Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad’s rightful heirs not only
by the Court of Appeals but also by this Court. This Court upheld petitioners’
personality to sue in Heirs of Simeon Piedad and sees no reason to deny them the same
recognition in the case at bar when the current case is merely an offshoot of their father’s
original complaint for nullity of deed of sale.
2. Yes, Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides the two (2) ways of
executing a final and executory judgment where the prevailing party may move for the
execution of a final and executory judgment as a matter of right within five (5) years
from the entry of judgment. And if no motion is filed within this period, the judgment is
converted to a mere right of action and can only be enforced by instituting a complaint
for the revival of judgment in a regular court within 10 years from finality of judgment.
However, in the instant case, reckoned from November 1, 1998, the date when the
Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory, 12 years and 1 day had
already elapsed when the instant motion was filed on November 2, 2010. There may be
instances that execution may still pursue despite the lapse of ten years from finality of
judgment but it should be a result of a well-justified action for revival of judgment, not a
mere motion, as can be found in the cited Supreme Court’s Decision.
The Regional Trial Court likewise referred to Bausa v. Heirs of Dino to support its denial
of petitioners’ motion, claiming that the case at bar is very similar with Bausa. However,
a careful reading of Bausa shows that while it contains similarities with the case at bar,
the factual circumstances and ruling in Bausa tend to support petitioners’ motion for
revival, not its denial.
419
VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. vs EMILIO G. ALFECHE, GILBERT ALFECHE,

EMMANUEL MANUGAS, and M. LHUILLIER PAWNSHOP AND JEWELRY
G.R. No. 209910 : November 29, 2017
“Ordinarily, it is not for the Supreme Court (SC) to review factual issues in petitions such as the
present Rule 45 Petition which may only raise questions of law. This rule, however, admits certain exceptions:
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the
Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes
beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) when the Court
of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.”
Facts:
On the night of January 6, 1998, a fire broke out at 11th Street, South Poblacion, San
Fernando, Cebu, which burned down the house and store of respondent Emilio and his son,
respondent Gilbert (the Alfeches), and the adjacent watch repair shop owned by respondent
Manugas. It was alleged that the cause of the fire was the constant abrasion of VECO’s electric wire
with M. Lhuillier’s signboard. The next day, the Alfeches and Manugas reported the incident to the
police and to the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando. Upon Emilio, Gilbert, and Manugas’ request
for site inspection, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando eventually passed Resolution No. 12
requesting VECO to inspect the area and to repair faulty wires. The Alfeches and Manugas sent a
letter to the management of VECO asking for financial assistance, which VECO denied. VECO
asserted that the fire was due, not to its fault, but to that of M. Lhuillier. As their initial claim for
financial assistance was not satisfied, the Alfeches and Manugas filed a Complaint for Damages
against VECO and M. Lhuillier before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
During pretrial, M. Lhuillier admitted that it was the owner of the signboard at its branch in
San Fernando, Cebu. M. Lhuillier and VECO admitted that a fire destroyed the Alfeches’ and
Manugas’ properties on January 6, 1998. The Alfeches and Manugas presented testimonial,
documentary, and object evidence. They presented as witnesses Emilio, Manugas, Mignonette
Alfeche (Mignonette), and Rodolfo Rabor (Rabor). Emilio testified that between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00
p.m. of January 6, 1998, he was awakened as their house was burning. He went out and saw a cut
wire swinging and burning at the top of his roof, about three (3) to four (4) meters away. The
Municipal Engineer of San Fernando, Cebu, Engr. Lauronal, averred that there was a road-widening
project, he then asked the mayor to seek the relocation of VECO’s posts as these would be affected
by the drainage construction. VECO relocated its posts and consequently, its wires moved closer to
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the signage of M. Lhuillier with a distance of only eight (8) inches between them. He also mentioned
that the old location of VECO posts left a hole in the middle of the drainage. Melencion, an
employee of VECO for 41 years, attested that he knew of the installation of the electric wires in the
area. Engr. Constantino, also a VECO employee, testified that sometime in the last week of
December, there was a complaint that the voltage in 11th Street, South Poblacion, San Fernando,
Cebu was low. Upon inspection, he noticed that VECO’s wires near the signage of M. Lhuillier were
newly installed. He noted that the wire used in the area was “a No. 4 aluminum standard, secondary
system.” Respondent M. Lhuiller has a branch in San Fernando, Pampanga and had installed its
signage free from any obstacle. On the other hand, petitioner Visayan Electric Company is the only
electric distribution company in San Fernando, Pampanga. When the Municipality of San Fernando,
Pampanga commenced its road widening project, the Municipal engineer asked the petitioner to
relocate its post as this will be affected by the said project. Petitioner relocated its post closer to the
signage of M.Lhuiller with a distance of only inches between them. Because of the constant rubbing
of the sagging wires of the petitioner with M. Lhuiller signage a fire broke out. As a result, the fire
destroyed the properties of respondents Emilio Alfeche, Gilbert Alfeche, Emmanuel Manugas. When
the respondents demands payment of indemnity for damages, the petitioner refused to pay. It
denied its liability, arguing that the cause of fire was attributable to respondent M.Lhuiller, because
by placing their signage near their pole, it caused abrasion and the fire.
Issue:
Whether determining as to VECO’s negligence is the proximate cause of the fire is a question
of law that can be further reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
Ordinarily, it is not for this Court to review factual issues in petitions such as the present
Rule 45 Petition which may only raise questions of law. This rule, however, admits certain
exceptions:
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of
facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
421
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence
on which they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.
The findings of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals differ in this case. The
Regional Trial Court found that “had not defendant [M.] Lhuillier installed its signage in such a
manner that it will come in contact with the secondary lines of defendant VECO, there could have
been no short-circuit which caused the fire.” On the other hand, the Court of Appeals found that
“one VECO post was affected by the road widening work. Due to the transfer, the VECO wire
already touched the signboard of M. Lhuillier pawnshop.” In the interest of arriving at a definite
determination of the attendant liabilities, this Court exercises its power of review. VECO’s position
is negated not only by the entire corpus of evidence but, more basically, by common sense.
To reiterate, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are consistent in holding that
proximity, abrasion, and short-circuiting led to the fire. Common sense dictates that the wires and
signage could never have rubbed against each other, or the wires abraded and short-circuited, had
they not been in close proximity. Common sense also shows that they could not have been in close
proximity had not either the wires or the signage moved closer to the other. The testimonies of Solon
and Camuta were definite that when M. Lhuillier’s signage was installed in 1995, it was free from
any obstacle. No allegation was made, let alone proof presented, that the signage had been relocated
in the interim. In contrast, a plethora of evidence attests to the relocation of VECO’s posts and wires.
Heeding VECO’s position demands not only this Court’s disregard of the preponderant evidence
against VECO but also this Court’s acceptance of the absurdity and the impossibility that VECO’s
posts and wires must have moved closer to M. Lhuillier’s signage by some unseen, even
supernatural, force.
It was VECO that was negligent. It is apparent that it transferred its posts and wires without
regard for the hazards that the transfer entailed, particularly with respect to the installations which
had previously been distant from the wires and posts but which had since come into close
proximity. VECO would have this Court sustain a flimsy excuse for evading liability. Attempting to
break the all too apparent causal connection between its negligence and the injury suffered by the
plaintiffs, it would insist on absurdities that strain common sense and vainly attempt to discredit
even its own witness.
422
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs EMMA BOFILL PANGAN

G.R. No. 206965 : November 29, 2017
“It is settled that in proceedings involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the testimonies of
police officers as prosecution witnesses are given weight for it is assumed that they have performed their
functions in a regular manner.”
Facts:
On April 11, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City filed an
Information against Pangan for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. That on or about
the 10th day of April, 2003, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her
possession and control 14.16 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug,
without being authorized by law to possess the same. However, the accused pleaded not guilty and
the rial on the merits commenced.
The prosecution presented several witnesses among them is PO1 Carillo, who
was Intelligence Operative of the Capiz Police Provincial Office in Camp Teodoro Apil, Roxas City.
At around 8:00 a.m. of April 10, 2003, he conducted a test-buy operation on Pangan at B&T
Merchandising on Asis Street, Roxas City. A police asset had reported that the shop was owned by
Pangan and her live-in partner, Mario Tupaz (Tupaz). He applied for search warrant and requested
for a team to conduct buy-bust operation. They were able to confiscate drug paraphernalia and
were marked accordingly. The arresting team brought Pangan to the police station. The confiscated
articles were recorded in the police blotter. P/S Insp. Batiles prepared and signed the return of
service to be presented to the trial court which issued the search war rant. The arresting team then
brought the return of service of the search warrant and the seized items to the court.
P/S Insp. Batiles wrote a letter to Judge Fantilanan, requesting to withdraw the four (4)
sachets of suspected shabu for laboratory examination. The trial court granted the request causing
the items to be forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Camp Delgado, Iloilo
City. P/C Insp. Baldevieso issued Chemistry Report No. D-145, which verified that the seized items
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
On the other hand, the defense’s witnesses were Pangan; her live-in partner, Tupaz; her 17-
year-old nephew, Ronel Compa (Compa); a tricycle driver, Wilson Villareal (Villareal); and Radio
Mindanao Network reporter, Bulana. The defense have a different version of their narrative, where
Pangan only received a package under the name of Gemma and it is where two police men
approached her. One (1) of them struggled to possess the package while the other poked a gun at
Compa, instructing him to stay still. Pangan claimed that the package was sealed when it was
delivered. She asserted that she was already inside the vehicle when the search warrant was shown
423
to her. The Regional Trial Court found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of 14.16
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Pangan appealed the conviction, attesting that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of
the confiscated drugs. Allegedly, the police officers failed to observe the guidelines provided for
under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Neither the marking of the confiscated drugs or the
signing of the inventory receipt was made in her presence. The Court of Appeals ruled against the
accused and further denied their appeal. Hence, this appeal was filed before this Court.
Issue:
Whether the testimony of Culili can prove her guilt considering that the delivery man has no
personal knowledge of the package’s contents.
Ruling:
Yes. It is settled that in proceedings involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the
testimonies of police officers as prosecution witnesses are given weight for it is assumed that they
have performed their functions in a regular manner. Thus, this presumption stands except in cases
when there is evidence to the contrary or proof imputing ill motive on their part, which is wanting
in this case. Pangan failed to adduce any evidence which could overturn the well-entrenched
presumption in favor of the police officers.
424
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SEGFRED L. OROZCO, et. Al.

G.R. No. 211053 : November 29, 2017
“The trial court’s factual findings, assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of
their testimonies, and conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect.”
Facts:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1998, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, taking advantage of superior strength and by means of treachery and
armed with pointed weapons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab Julius Joshua Mata with the use of said pointed weapons hitting the latter on the vital parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which caused the death of said Julius
Joshua Mata, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased in such amount as may be allowed
by law.
Orozco and Osir were arraigned on January 25, 1999 and pled not guilty, while Castro and
Maturan were still at-large. Trial for Orozco and Osir ensued. On March 9, 2002, Maturan was arrested
and pled not guilty upon arraignment on July 3, 2002. Castro was arrested on November 23, 2006 and
arraigned on December 22, 2006. He offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide; but this was
rejected, and a plea of “not guilty” was entered for him. Osir passed away during the course of trial, and
the case against him was dismissed in an Order dated February 20, 2008.
The prosecution had Susan Lalona testified and was able to provide details on the night of the
incident and Dr. Milagros Regaña also testified that the size and nature of Mata’s wounds could indicate
the use of at least two (2) separate weapons. While, the defense likewise presented another version of the
incident.
In its October 7, 2010 Decision, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Maturan, Orozco, and
accused-appellant Castro guilty of the crime of murder. Maturan and Castro appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA). But the same affirmed the findings of the RTC. Thus, Castro filed a Notice of Appeal with
the CA. In compliance with its Resolution, which gave due course to accused-appellant Castro’s notice of
appeal, the Court of Appeals elevated the records of the case to this Court.
Issue:
Whether Lalona’s testimony is sufficient to establish treachery and conspiracy on the part of the
accused.
Ruling:
Yes. The trial court’s factual findings, assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative
weight of their testimonies, and conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest
respect. When these have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, this Court will generally not reexamine
them. Here, the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court found Lalona’s testimony to be credible,
considering that it was candid, categorical, and straightforward. And the accused-appellant has failed to
425
present any cogent reason to reverse the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial
Court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BIENVINIDO UDANG, SR. y SEVILLA
G.R. No. 210161 January 10, 2018
A minor’s testimony is credible not because of the generalization that she was a child of tender years
incapable of fabricating a story of defloration but because of her categorical narration of her experience and her
straightforward explanation of the facts.
Ideally, the same trial judge should preside over all the stages of the proceedings, especially in cases where
the conviction or acquittal of the accused mainly relies on the credibility of the witnesses. The trial judge enjoys the
opportunity to observe, first hand, the aids for an accurate determination" of the credibility of a witness. However,
inevitable circumstances-the judge's death, retirement, resignation, transfer, or removal from office-may intervene
during the pendency of the case, still all cases and judicial proceedings pending decision or sentence under the
jurisdiction of the old courts shall be continued until their final decision.
Facts:
AAA, then 12 years old, drank alcoholic beverages with Udang's children, her neighbors:
Betty Udang and Bienvinido Udang, Jr., at their house in Lumbia, Cagayan de Oro City. After
drinking AAA became intoxicated. She later realized that she was being carried by Udang into a
dark room and inserted his penis into her vagina. One (1) year and three (3) months after, AAA, who
by then was already 13 years old, same scenario happened again. She had drinks with Udang, and
Bienvinido Udang, Jr. and when intoxicated, Udang inserted his penis into her vagina.
AAA had herself physically examined by Dr. Revelo and found that AAA had hymenal
lacerations as well as excoriations which could have been caused by trauma, frictions, infections, and
also sexual intercourse. The defense presented as witnesses Udang and his daughter, Betty. Monera
Gandawali and Emirald Orcales, fellow inmates of AAA at the Cagayan de Oro City Jail, also
testified in Udang's defense.
Betty, denied drinking with AAA and belied the claim that her father, Udang, and her
brother, Bienvinido, Jr., had drinks with AAA. However, she alleged that AAA once went to their
house to invite her to sniff some rugby, an offer which she refused and maintained that AAA only
wanted to get back at her father for having AAA arrested after she was caught grappling with
Betty's grandmother because the latter tried to stop AAA from sniffing rugby inside Udang's house.
After Udang caused the arrest of AAA for sniffing rugby, AAA was detained at the Cagayan de Oro
City Jail where she, Gandawali, and Orcales, became fellow inmates.
Gandawali testified that during their conversation, AAA disclosed that she was never
actually raped by Udang and that it was actually her stepfather who wanted to implicate him.
Orcales testified that AAA disclosed to Orcales that it was not Udang but a security guard who had
raped her and that it was AAA's mother who had forced her to testify against Udang in retaliation
for her arrest for sniffing rugby. Also, Udang denied ever raping AAA.
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The Regional Trial Court found for the prosecution and convicted Udang of rape. and found
that the prosecution "indubitably established” Udang's act of raping AAA since she "categorically
narrated" how he took advantage of her while she was intoxicated and that had she resisted his
advances, she would be mauled by Betty. That AAA was raped was also supported by Dr. Revelo's
finding of hymenal lacerations and excoriations on AAA's thighs and genitalia.
The trial court did not give credence to Udang's defense of denial and alibi, stating that he
could have requested his family members and fellow barangay tanods, who were allegedly with him
at the time of the incidents, to corroborate his testimony but that he failed to do so. Without the
corroborating testimony of these alleged companions, his testimony was, for the trial court, "self-
serving and unworthy to be believed." And it likewise discounted Gandawali's and Orcales'
testimonies for being hearsay. As for Betty, the trial court found her testimony "bare" and
"unsupported by evidence."
Udang appealed before the Court of Appeals. He also claimed that the judge who penned
the Decision, Judge Richard D. Mordeno was not the judge who personally heard the witnesses
testify and was not able to observe their demeanor during trial. Udang argued that Judge Mordeno,
therefore, was not in the position to rule on the credibility of AAA, given her "unbelievable story” of
rape.
Udang emphasized that AAA's testimony was not credible for if she was allegedly raped in
his house in September 2002, she would not have gone to the same house to have drinks with her
supposed rapist a year after, in December 2003, on the risk of being raped again. He highlighted
AAA's ill motive against him for having caused her detention in the Cagayan de Oro City Jail for
sniffing rugby in his house. Finally, he emphasized that Dr. Revelo's testimony established that the
lacerations found in AAA' s genitalia could have been caused by trauma other than rape.
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals still found Udang's guilt was proven beyond reasonable
doubt based on the records of the case and AAA's "categorical, convincing and consistent"
testimony. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court Decision in toto and dismissed
Udang's appeal.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not AAA, a child of tender years was a credible witness
(2) Whether or not Judge Mordeno, not the judge who heard the parties and their witnesses
during trial was in no position to rule on the credibility of the witnesses validly rule on the said
case
427
Ruling:
(1) Yes. All the elements of sexual abuse are present in this case. As an adult and the father of
AAA's friend, Betty, Udang had influence over AAA, which induced the latter to have drinks and
later on have sexual intercourse with him. AAA, born on May 20, 1990, was 12 and 13 years old
when the incidents happened. The transcript of stenographic notes shows AAA's "categorical,
convincing and consistent” testimony as to how Udang sexually abused her in September 2002.
Hence, this Court finds AAA credible not because of the generalization that she was a child of
tender years incapable of fabricating a story of defloration but because of her categorical narration of
her experience and her straightforward explanation that she was intimidated by Betty to have drinks
with her father. Further, Betty's threat of violence was enough to induce fear in AAA. AAA's delay
in reporting the incidents did not affect her credibility. Delay is not and should not be an indication
of a fabricated charge because, more often than not, victims of rape and sexual abuse choose to
suffer alone and "bear the ignominy and pain" of their experience. Here, AAA would not have
revealed the incidents had she not been interviewed by the police when she was arrested for sniffing
rugby.
Furthermore, Udang failed to present evidence sufficient to counter the prosecution's prima
facie case against him. To destroy AAA's credibility, Udang capitalizes on the fact that he was
charged only after he had AAA arrested for sniffing rugby. However, given AAA's affirmative and
credible testimony, Udang's allegation of ill motive is deemed inconsequential.While prosecution
witness Dr. Revelo testified that the lacerations found in AAA's genitalia could have been
"introduced by other operation” aside from sexual intercourse, Udang had nothing but denials and
alibis as defenses. If, as Udang testified, he was with his mother, siblings, and some barangay tanods
during the alleged incidents, he could have presented them as witnesses to corroborate his
testimony, but he did not. Neither is Betty's testimony that Udang never had drinks with AAA
sufficient to acquit her father. Udang's and Betty's testimonies are “self-serving" and were correctly
disregarded by the trial court.
The testimonies of Gandawali and Orcales, AAA's fellow inmates at the Cagayan de Oro
City Jail, were hearsay, hence, inadmissible in evidence. This is because Gandawali and Orcales had
no personal knowledge of the incidents as they were not there when the incidents happened.
(2) Yes. Ideally, the same trial judge should preside over all the stages of the proceedings,
especially in cases where the conviction or acquittal of the accused mainly relies on the credibility of
the witnesses. The trial judge enjoys the opportunity to observe, first hand, "the aids for an accurate
determination" of the credibility of a witness "such as the witness' deportment and manner of
testifying, the witness' furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or thescant or full realization of an oath. " However, inevitable circumstances-the
judge's death, retirement, resignation, transfer, or removal from office-may intervene during the
pendency of the case. An example is the present case, where the trial judge who heard the witnesses,
Judge Francisco D. Calingin, compulsorily retired pending trial. Judge Calingin was then replaced
428
by Judge Mordeno, who proceeded with hearing the other witnesses and writing the decision.
Udang's argument cannot be accepted as this would mean that every case where the judge had to be
replaced pending decision would have to be refiled and retried so that the judge who hears the
witnesses testify and the judge who writes the decision would be the same.62 What Udang proposes
is impracticable.
According to Act No. 2347's purpose was "simply to change the personnel of the judges" and
that it specifically provided that all cases and judicial proceedings pending decision or sentence
under the jurisdiction of the old courts shall be continued until their final decision.
Further, this Court explained that with the existence of the transcript of records, which are
presumed to be a "complete, authentic record of everything that transpires during the trial,” there is
"little reason for asserting that one qualified person may not be able to reach a just and fair
conclusion from [the] record as well as another." Thus, it compelled Judge Abreu to proceed with
deciding the cases where evidence was already taken by the former presiding judge.
Applying the foregoing, the trial court decision convicting Udang is valid, regardless of the
fact that the judge who heard the witnesses and the judge who wrote the decision are different. With
no showing of any irregularity in the transcript of records, it is presumed to be a "complete,
authentic record of everything that transpired during the trial," sufficient for Judge Mordeno to have
evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, specifically, of AAA.
429
CHARLIE HUBILLA, et al. vs. HSY MARKETING LTD., CO., et al.

G.R. No. 207354 January 10, 2018, LEONEN, J.
Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their
jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial
evidence. Nonetheless, these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily
or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts.
All petitions for certiorari are required to be verified upon filing. For a pleading to be verified, the affiant
must attest that he or she has read the pleading and that the allegations are true and correct based on his or her
personal knowledge or on authentic records. Otherwise, the pleading is treated as an unsigned pleading.
The certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the litigant, not his or her counsel. The litigant
may, for justifiable reasons, execute a special power of attorney to authorize his or her counsel to sign on his or her
behalf.
When the evidence of the employer and the employee are in equipoise, doubts are resolved in favor of labor.
Facts:
HSY Marketing Ltd., et. al are engaged in manufacturing and selling goods under the brand
Novo Jeans & Shirt & General Merchandise (Novo Jeans). Several Novo Jeans employees went to
Raffy Tulfo's radio program to air their grievances against their employers for alleged labor
violations and were referred to the Department of Labor and Employment. They claimed they were
not allowed to enter the Novo Jeans branches they were employed in and that while Novo Jeans sent
them a show cause letter the next day, they were in truth already dismissed from employment. They
sent a demand letter to amicably settle the case before the Department of Labor and Employment
but no settlement was reached.
They alleged that upon learning that the Department of Labor and Employment was not the
proper forum to address their grievances, they decided to file a notice of withdrawal and file their
complaint with the Labor Arbiter. On the other hand, Novo Jeans claimed that these employees
voluntarily severed their employment but that they filed complaints later with the Department of
Labor and Employment. They alleged that the employees' notice of withdrawal was not actually
granted by the Department of Labor and Employment but that the employees nonetheless filed their
complaints before the Labor Arbiter.
Labor Arbiter ruled that other than the employees' bare allegations that they were dismissed
from June 6 to 9, 2010, they did not present any other evidence showing that their employment was
terminated or that they were prevented from reporting for work and likewise ruled that the
employees voluntarily severed their employment since the airing of their grievances on Raffy Tulfo's
radio program "was enough reason for them not to report for work, simply because of a possible
disciplinary action by Novo Jeans." Hence, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated cases for
utter lack of merit and for forum-shopping.
430
The employees appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission and then rendered
that the employees were illegally dismissed. It ruled that the allegations of both parties "were
unsubstantiated and thus were equipoised" and that "if doubt exists between the evidence presented
by the employer and that by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.
Novo Jeans moved for partial reconsideration but was denied by the National Labor
Relations Commission. Thus, it filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and found
that Novo Jeans' counsel, as the affiant, substantially complied with the verification requirement
even if his personal knowledge was based on facts relayed to him by his clients and on authentic
records since he was not privy to the antecedents of the case.
The Court of Appeals stated that while the employees merely alleged that they were no
longer allowed to report to work on a particular day, Novo Jeans was able to present the First Notice
of Termination of Employment sent to them, asking them to explain their sudden absence from
work without proper authorization. It likewise found that the Notices of Termination of
Employment (Notices) did not indicate that the employees were dismissed or that they were
prevented from entering the stores. According to the Court of Appeals, the equipoise rule was
inapplicable in this case since it only applied when the evidence between the parties was equally
balanced. Considering that only Novo Jeans was able to present proof of its claims, the Court of
Appeals was inclined to rule in its favor. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the case
involved voluntary termination of employment, not illegal dismissal.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals may, in a petition for certiorari, review and re-assess the
factual findings of the National Labor Relations Commission
(2) Whether or not verification based on facts relayed to the affiant by his clients is valid
(3) Whether respondents’ certification of non-forum shopping as being signed by their counsel is
valid
(4) Whether or not equipoise rule applies
Ruling:
1. Yes. Factual findings of labor officials exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded great
respect and even finality by the courts when the findings are supported by substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence is "the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. " Thus, in labor cases, the issues in
petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals are limited only to whether the National
Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion. However, this does not
mean that the Court of Appeals is conclusively bound by the findings of the National Labor
431
Relations Commission. If the findings are arrived at arbitrarily, without resort to any
substantial evidence, the National Labor Relations Commission is deemed to have gravely
abused its discretion.
The settled rule is that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence. Nonetheless, these findings are not
infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the
evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts. The Court of Appeals can then grant a
petition for certiorari if it finds that the National Labor Relations Commission, in its assailed decision,
has made a factual finding that is not supported by substantial evidence. It is within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals, whose jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the
findings of the National Labor Relations Commission. The Court of Appeals may also review factual
findings if quasi-judicial agencies' findings are contradictory to its own findings. Thus, it must re-
examine the records to determine which tribunal's findings were supported by the evidence.
In this instance, the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission made
contradictory factual findings. Thus, it was incumbent on the Court of Appeals to re-examine their
findings to resolve the issues before it. The Court of Appeals also found that the findings of the
National Labor Relations Commission were not supported by substantial evidence, and therefore,
were rendered in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, in the determination of whether the National
Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals may re-
examine facts and re-assess the evidence. However, its findings may still be subject to review by this
Court.
This Court notes that in cases when the Court of Appeals acts as an appellate court, it is still
a trier of facts. Questions of fact may still be raised by the parties. If the parties raise pure questions
of law, they may directly file with this Court. Moreover, contradictory factual findings between the
National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals do not automatically justify this
Court's review of the factual findings. They merely present a prima facie basis to pursue the action
before this Court. The need to review the Court of Appeals' factual findings must still be pleaded,
proved, and substantiated by the party alleging their inaccuracy. This Court likewise retains its full
discretion to review the factual findings.
2. No. All petitions for certiorari are required to be verified upon filing. The contents of
verification are stated under Rule 7, Section 4 of the Rules of Court: Section 4. Verification.
Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A
pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief'', or
432
upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
Thus, for a pleading to be verified, the affiant must attest that he or she has read the pleading
and that the allegations are true and correct based on his or her personal knowledge or on authentic
records. Otherwise, the pleading is treated as an unsigned pleading. However, verification is merely
a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement. It will not result in the outright dismissal of the case since
courts may simply order the correction of a defective verification.
A reading of Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be verified under either of the
two given modes or under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based
on either one's own personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of
the conjunction "or" connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and,
needless to state, the concurrence of both sources is more than sufficient. Bearing both a disjunctive
and conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a construction that will exclude the
combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone.
Authentic records may be the basis of verification if a substantial portion of the allegations in
the pleading is based on prior court proceedings. Here, the annexes that respondents allegedly failed
to attach are employee information, supporting documents, and work-related documents proving
that petitioners were employed by respondents. The fact of petitioners' employment, however, has
not been disputed by respondents. These documents would not have been the "relevant and
pertinent” documents contemplated by the rules. Petitioners likewise contend that respondents'
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals should not have been given due course since the
verification signed by respondents' counsel, Atty. Eller Roel I. Daclan attested that:
2. I caused the preparation of the foregoing petition and attest that, based upon facts relayed
to me by my clients and upon authentic records made available, all the allegations contained
therein are true and correct.
To resolve this, this Court must first address whether respondents' counsel may sign the
verification on their behalf. For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form
the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the
requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily

render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act
on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
433
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge
to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,

unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons”.
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners
in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader,
not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf.
Facts relayed to the counsel by the client would be insufficient for counsel to swear to the
truth of the allegations in a pleading. Otherwise, counsel would be able to disclaim liability for any
misrepresentation by the simple expediency of stating that he or she was merely relaying facts with
which he or she had no competency to attest to. For this reason, the Rules of Court require no less
than personal knowledge of the facts to sufficiently verify a pleading.
Respondents' counsel, not having sufficient personal knowledge to attest to the allegations of
the pleading, was not able to validly verify the facts as stated. Therefore, respondents' Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals should have been considered as an unsigned pleading.
3. No. Respondents’ certification of non-forum shopping is likewise defective. The certification

of non-forum shopping must be signed by the litigant, not his or her counsel. The litigant
may, for justifiable reasons, execute a special power of attorney to authorize his or her
counsel to sign on his or her behalf.
In this instance, the verification and certification against forum shopping was contained in
one (1) document and was signed by respondents' counsel, Atty. Daclan. Corporations, not being
natural persons, may authorize their lawyers through a Secretary's Certificate to execute physical
acts. Among these acts is the signing of documents, such as the certification against forum shopping.
A corporation's inability to perform physical acts is considered as a justifiable reason to allow a
person other than the litigant to sign the certification against forum shopping.64 By the same
434
reasoning, partnerships, being artificial entities, may also authorize an agent to sign the certification
on their behalf. However, sole proprietorships, unlike corporations, have no separate legal
personality from their proprietors. They cannot claim the inability to do physical acts as a justifiable
circumstance to authorize their counsel to sign on their behalf. Since there was no other reason given
for authorizing their counsel to sign on their behalf, respondents Arqueza, Co, and Yeung's
certification against forum shopping is invalid.
While courts may simply order the resubmission of the verification or its subsequent
correction, a defect in the certification of non-forum shopping is not curable unless there are
substantial merits to the case. However, respondents' Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals was unmeritorious. Thus, its defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping
should have merited its outright dismissal.
4. Yes. When the evidence of the employer and the employee are in equipoise, doubts are
resolved in favor of labor. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer
to prove that the employee was dismissed for a valid cause and that the employee was
afforded due process prior to the dismissal. Respondents allege that there was no dismissal
since they sent petitioners a First Notice of Termination of Employment, asking them to
show cause why they should not be dismissed for their continued absence from work.
However, petitioners argue that this evidence should not be given weight since there is no
proof that they received this Notice.
Indeed, no evidence has been presented proving that each and every petitioner received a
copy of the First Notice of Termination of Employment. There are no receiving copies or
acknowledgement receipts. What respondents presented were not the actual Notices that were
allegedly sent out. While petitioners admitted that the Notices may have been sent, they have never
actually admitted to receiving any of them. There is likewise no proof that petitioners abandoned
their employment. Respondents have not presented any proof that petitioners intended to abandon
their employment. They merely alleged that petitioners have already voluntarily terminated their
employment due to their continued refusal to report for work. However, this is insufficient to prove
abandonment.
Where both parties in a labor case have not presented substantial evidence to prove their
allegations, the evidence is considered to be in equipoise. In such a case, the scales of justice are
tilted in favor of labor. Thus, petitioners are hereby considered to have been illegally dismissed.
435
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO

G.R. No. 207074 January 17, 2018
Where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from
these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to
each other, the issue is factual.
A clerical or typographical error pertains to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work
in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records. However, corrections which involve a change in nationality, age, or status are
not considered clerical or typographical.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all
administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. However, failure to observe the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine
may be waived. The only effect of noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a
cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss.
Facts:
Michelle Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan City, Isabela in Special
Proceeding for the correction of her name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological sex
from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and asked for the inclusion of her
middle name, "Soriano"·' her mother's middle name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name,
"Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these
were not recorded. As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification,
official transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage
certificate.
The Regional Trial Court ordered the publication of the Notice of Hearing and during trial,
Gallo testified on her allegations and showed that her college diploma, voter's certification, and
transcript indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The doctor who examined her also
certified that she was female. Gallo explained that she never undertook any gender-reassignment
surgery and that she filed the petition not to evade any civil or criminal liability, but to obtain a
passport. Thus,the Trial Court granted the petition. It lent credence to the documents Gallo
presented and found that the corrections she sought were "harmless and innocuous.” It concluded
that there was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate of Live Birth and applied Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule
103 of the Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name. It argued that Gallo did not comply with
the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published
436
Order did not state her official name, "Michael Gallo.”. Furthermore, the published Order was also
defective for not stating the cause of the change of name.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. However, the Republic believes that only clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised in petitions for
correction under Rule 108. Thus, the correction must only be for a patently misspelled name. As
"Michael" could not have been the result of misspelling "Michelle," petitioner contends that the case
should fall under Rule 103 for it contemplates a substantial change.
Petitioner holds that since the applicable rule is Rule 103, Gallo was not able to comply with
the jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Section 2 of this Rule. It also argues that
the use of a different name is not a reasonable ground to change name under Rule 103. Further,
petitioner insists that Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly now governs the change of first name,
superseding the civil registrar's jurisdiction over the matter.
On the other hand, Gallo counters that the issue of whether or not the petitioned corrections
are innocuous or clerical is a factual issue, which is improper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45. In any case, she argues that the corrections are clerical; hence, the applicable rule is
Rule 108 and not Rule 103, with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly satisfied.
Lastly, she contends that petitioner has waived its right to invoke the doctrines of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction when it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the
Regional Trial Court and only raised these issues before this Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that the
change sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of error
(2) Whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors
(3) Whether or not petitioner has waived its right to invoke the doctrines of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction
Ruling:
1. No. In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a mere
correction of error, petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45 Petition,
which should only raise questions of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, its functions
do not include weighing and analyzing evidence adduced from the lower courts all over
again.
437
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of
fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for
determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by
the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised
without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In the
case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence as determining
whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change requires looking
into the party's records, supporting documents, testimonies, and other evidence.
Republic Act No. 10172 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake,
"which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding." Thus: Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As
used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in
the entry of day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, or status of the petitioner.
Likewise, Republic Act No. 9048 states: Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act,
the following terms shall mean:
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed
only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after
reference to and evaluation of existing documents presented. Thus, corrections may be made even
though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof
that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used.
This Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the Court
of Appeals, that this case involves the correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact, this
Court is bound by the lower courts' findings.
2. No. Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors. A clerical or typographical error
pertains to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous which is
438
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records. However, corrections which involve a change
in nationality, age, or status are not considered clerical or typographical.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the change sought by Gallo is substantial, covered by
Rule 103 because the two (2) names are allegedly entirely different from each other. It argues that
"Michael" could not have been the result of a misspelling of "Michelle."
On the other hand, Gallo argues that the corrections are clerical which fall under Rule 108,
with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly complied. Considering that Gallo had
shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by which she is commonly
known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo is not filing the petition to
change her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her name. Gallo is not
attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her given
name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael," especially since the first four (4) letters of
these two (2) names are exactly the same. The differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in
"Michael," and "le" at the end of "Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be vocalized
similarly, considering the possibility of different accents or intonations of different people. In any
case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a different appellation. The lower courts have determined
that she has been known as "Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her
records to conform to her true given name. However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.
As stated, Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. The current law,
Republic Act No. 10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012.
The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048 which
was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the correction of clerical or typographical errors from
the scope of Rule 108. It also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical
or typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes of first name or nickname. Thus: Section 1.
Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. - No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by
the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the
Regional Trial Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can
the Regional Trial Court take cognizance of her case.
Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her
parents as Angangan for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents'
439
marriage as May 23, 1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in Republic Act
No. 9048.
Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048: (3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a
mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil register. None of it
involves any change in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex. Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding" fall within the coverage of clerical mistakes not deemed substantial. If
it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the
birth certificate was ever used, the correction may be made. Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo
should have sought to correct them administratively before filing a petition under Rule 108.
However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this was
a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act
No. 9048.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15,
2012 that errors in entries as to biological sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they
involve a typographical or clerical error. However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in
entries of biological sex may still be considered a substantive matter.
3. Yes. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of
all administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The
administrative officer concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter
within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's
cause of action as these remedies refer to a precedent condition which must be complied
with prior to filing a case in court. However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not affect the court's jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine may be
waived. The only effect of noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the
complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at
the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the
case and try it.
Meanwhile, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative

tribunal has jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be
within its proper jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its sound discretion
440
requiring special knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court
to take cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it cannot be waived.
However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled
that failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that
ground by way of laches in which a party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppels in pais, of estoppel by deed or
by record, and of estoppel by laches. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as
an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated- obviously for reasons of public
policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court. Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue of non-compliance was
raised only as an afterthought at the final stage of appeal, the party invoking it may be estopped
from doing so.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary

doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; ( d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as
to make the rule impractical and oppressive; ( e) where the question involved is purely legal and
will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
441
rendered moot; G) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong
public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2) doctrines was
only raised in this Court. Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions before the Regional Trial Court,
it is estopped from invoking these doctrines as grounds for dismissal.
The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo
is granted and directs that the Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo be corrected.

442
ARIEL A. EBUENGA v. SOUTHFIELD AGENCIES, INC., WILHEMSEN SHIP MANAGEMENT

HOLDING LTD., AND CAPT. SONNY VALENCIA.
G.R. No. 208396, MARCH 14, 2018
This Court is duty-bound to respect the consistent prior findings of the Labor Arbiter, of the National
Labor Relations Commission, and of the Court of Appeals. It must be cautious not to substitute its own
appreciation of the facts to those of the tribunals which have previously weighed the parties' claims and
personally perused the evidence. It will not discard consistent prior findings and award disability benefits to a
seafarer who fails to adduce even an iota of evidence, let alone substantial evidence, and fails to draw a causal
connection between his or her alleged ailment and working conditions.
Facts:
Petitioner Ariel Ebuanga was hired as a chief cook by respondent Southfield Agencies
onboard the MTV Super Adventure owned by co-respondent Wilhemsen Ship Management
Holdings. Ebuenga boarded the vessel on December 19, 2010. Two months later he wrote
respondents requesting to be repatriated as soon as possible in order to attend to a “family concern”,
which the latter allowed. Without consulting respondent’s own physicians, Ebuenga had himself
examined at St. Luke’s Hospital wherein it was found that he was afflicted with "Multilevel Disk
Dessication” and was advised to undergo physical therapy. Ebuenga took physical therapy sessions
at his hometown in Legazpi City, and thereafter sought the help of a physician who issued a
Disability Report finding him unfit for work as a seafarer. He then claimed Permanent Disability
Benefits before the Labor Arbiter.
In his position paper, Ebuenga disavowed a “family concern” as his reason for repatriation
and claimed that after they embarked a crew member died of over-fatigue, which he reported to the
International Transport Workers' Federation. The latter took no action, and Ebuenga claims that he
was coerced to sign the letter asking for repatriation by Capt. Lecias.
In their defense, respondents aver that Ebuenga never had a medical problem onboard their
vessel, and that he was a delinquent crew member who complained about the lack of a washing
machine. Moreover, Ebuenga’s claim for disability benefits was flawed for failure to undergo a post-
employment medical examination from a company-designated physician.
The LA dismissed Ebuenga’s claim for permanent disability benefits for failure to prove that
he did indeed suffer an illness while onboard the vessel, as well as failing to undergo a post-
employment medical examination with a company-designated physician. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission affirmed the LA’s dismissal of Ebuanga’s claim. Ebuenga appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the latter found no grave abuse of discretion from the LA and the NLRC,
hence his Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme
Court. Ebuenga contends that he could not have forfeited his claims as respondents refused to have
the company-designated physician examine him. He also insists that he came in conflict with Capt.
443
Lecias over the death of a co-worker, was forced to sign a letter recounting a family emergency, and
was denied assistance by Capt. Lecias when he fell ill while on board the M/V Super Adventure.
Issue: Whether or not the SC should overturn the factual findings of the LA, NLRC, and CA in his
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Ruling:
No. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition. In a Rule 45 review,
the SC considers the correctness of the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, the SC
has to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
presented to it. The SC has to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not
on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. The SC has to be
keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision
challenged before it.
As a consequence, findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise in
its specialized field are conclusive upon the SC. The SC does not substitute its own judgment for that
of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible. The
factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on the Supreme
Court.
In this case, the LA, NLRC, and the CA are unanimous in finding that Ebuenga’s failure to
adduce additional evidence was fatal to his claim for permanent disability. He failed to present
important evidence such as when he intended to be examined, and how Southfield actually rebuffed
him. His claim for Southfield’s failure to examine him; that of animosity, was left unsubstantiated
and lacking narratives of related incidents leading up to the former’s refusal to have him medically
examined. Ebuenga even failed to adduce supporting proof for the alleged death of a fellow crew
member, as well as securing the testimonies of other crewmen regarding the captain’s refusal to
have the crew undergo a medical examination. Most telling is Ebuenga’s claim that he filed a
complaint before the International Transport Worker’s Federation mid-voyage, yet failed to adduce
supporting evidence to corroborate his claim that a crewman did indeed die onboard the ship.
A party who files a Rule 45 Petition and asserts that his or her case warrants the SC's review
of factual questions bears the burden of proving two (2) things.
1) First is the basic exceptionality of his or her case such that the Court must go out of its way
to revisit the evidence.
2) Second is the specific factual conclusion that he or she wants the Court to adopt in place of
that which was made by the lower tribunals.
This dual burden requires a party to not merely plead or aver. He or she must demonstrate and
prove. His or her evidentiary task persists before the Court precisely because he or she pleads to
sustain different factual conclusions. In both requirements, petitioner Ebuenga was found lacking
and presented bare allegations to support his claim. With the utter dearth of proof advancing
petitioner's cause, the Court is constrained to sustain the consonant findings of Labor Arbiter Savari,
of the National Labor Relations Commission, and of the Court of Appeals.
444
EVERSLEY CHILDS SANITARIUM, REPRESENTED BY DR. GERARDO M. AQUINO, JR.

(NOW DR. PRIMO JOEL S. ALVEZ) CHIEF OF SANITARIUM v. SPOUSES ANASTACIO
AND PERLA BARBARONA.
G.R. No. 195814 APRIL 04, 2018
There is forum shopping when a party files different pleadings in different tribunals, despite having
the same "identit[ies] of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought." Consistent with the principle of
fair play, parties are prohibited from seeking the same relief in multiple forums in the hope of obtaining a
favorable judgment. The rule against forum shopping likewise fulfills an administrative purpose as it prevents
conflicting decisions by different tribunals on the same issue.
Facts:
Petitioner Eversley Childs Sanitarium (Petitioner) operates a medical facility under the
Department of Health for the treatment of leprosy. It occupies a parcel of land in Jagobiao, Mandaue
City, Cebu and has been in operation since 1930. On May 6, 2005, respondents Spouses Barbarona
(Respondent) filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Petitioner for them to vacate the parcel of land
where their Sanitarium stood. Respondents alleged that they had sent demand letters and that the
occupants were given until April 15, 2005 to vacate the premises. They further claimed that despite
the lapse of the period, the occupants refused to vacate; hence, they were constrained to file the
Complaint.
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordered the occupants to vacate the property,
finding that the action was one for unlawful detainer, and thus, within its jurisdiction. It likewise
found that the respondents were the lawful owners of Lot No. 1936 and that the occupants were
occupying the property by mere tolerance. The occupants appealed to the RTC and such court
approved the MTCC decision in toto. One of the occupants, petitioner, filed a motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court but was denied.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA, arguing that the MTC had no jurisdiction
over the action and that the RTC erred in not recognizing that the subsequent invalidation of the
respondent's certificate of title was prejudicial to their cause of action. The CA rendered its Decision
denying the Petition. According to the CA , the allegations in the Complaint were for the recovery of
the physical possession of the property and not a determination of the property's ownership. The
action, thus, was one for unlawful detainer and was properly filed with the MTC.
Petitioner, represented by the OSG, filed a Petition for Review before the Court assailing the
February 17, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals. It likewise prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to restrain the immediate
execution of the assailed judgment and to prevent impairing the operations of the government
hospital, which had been serving the public for more than 80 years. This the Supreme Court granted.
445
While the Petition was pending before the Supreme Court, respondent raised a few
procedural concerns and informed the Court that Eversley still had a pending and unresolved
Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, in violation of the rule against forum
shopping. Respondent, nonetheless, filed their Comment/Manifestation, to which the SC ordered
petitioner to reply.
Petitioner filed its Reply and submitted a Manifestation, explaining that the CA had issued a
Resolution on August 31, 2011, denying its Motion for Reconsideration despite its earlier filing on
April 14, 2011 of a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, it
manifested its intention to likewise question the CA August 31, 2011 Resolution with the SC.
Respondents assert that while petitioner submitted a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw
its Motion for Reconsideration, the CA did not issue any order considering petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration to have been abandoned. The CA instead proceeded to resolve it in its August 31,
2011 Resolution; hence, respondents submit that petitioner violated the rule on non-forum shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not Eversley Childs Sanitarium violated the rule on non-forum shopping.
Ruling:
No. Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different
courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related
causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable
decision or action. There is forum shopping when a party files different pleadings in different
tribunals, despite having the same identities of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs
sought. Consistent with the principle of fair play, parties are prohibited from seeking the same relief
in multiple forums in the hope of obtaining a favorable judgment. The rule against forum shopping
likewise fulfills an administrative purpose as it prevents conflicting decisions by different tribunals
on the same issue.
Thus, Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Xxx
446
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have committed forum
shopping when it filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, despite a
pending Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.
According to the Solicitor General, it filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court on March 10, 2011 but that another set of solicitors
erroneously filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals on March 11, 2011. Thus, it was
constrained to file a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Reconsideration on April 14,
2011, the same date as its Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, mistakenly presumed that the mere filing of a
motion to withdraw has the effect of withdrawing the motion for reconsideration without having to
await the action of the Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General's basis is its reading of
Rule VI, Section 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals:
Section 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. – No motion for reconsideration or
rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition
for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or
motion is subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed
abandoned.
This would have been true had the Office of the Solicitor General merely manifested that it
had already considered its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals as abandoned,
pursuant to its Internal Rules. However, it filed a Motion to Withdraw, effectively submitting the
withdrawal of its Motion for Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals' sound discretion. A motion is not
presumed to have already been acted upon by its mere filing. Prudence dictated that the Office of the Solicitor
General await the Court of Appeals' action on its Motion to Withdraw before considering its Motion for
Reconsideration as withdrawn.
When the Court of Appeals denied the Office of the Solicitor General's Motion for
Reconsideration without acting on its Motion to Withdraw, the latter was effectively denied.
Petitioner, thus, committed forum shopping when it filed its Petition before the Supreme Court
despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.
To rule in this manner, however, is to unnecessarily deprive petitioner of its day in court
despite the Court of Appeals' failure to apply its own Internal Rules. The Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals clearly provide that a subsequent motion for reconsideration shall be deemed abandoned
if the movant filed a petition for review or motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
before the Supreme Court. While the Office of the Solicitor General can be faulted for filing a motion
instead of a mere manifestation, it cannot be faulted for presuming that the Court of Appeals would
follow its Internal Rules as a matter of course.
447
Moreover, unlike the Supreme Court, which can suspend the effectivity of its own rules when
the ends of justice require it, the Court of Appeals cannot exercise a similar power. Only the SC may
suspend the effectivity of any provision in its Internal Rules. Thus, it would be reasonable for
litigants to expect that the Court of Appeals would comply with its own Internal Rules.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been deemed abandoned with its filing of a
Motion for Extension of Time before this Court, the Court of Appeals' August 31, 2011 Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, thus, has no legal effect. It is as if no motion for
reconsideration was filed at all. In this particular instance, petitioner did not commit a fatal
procedural error.
448
PERFECTO M. PASCUA, Petitioner, v. BANK WISE, INC. AND PHILIPPINE VETERANS

BANK, Respondent.
G.R. No. 191460, January 31, 2018, LEONEN,J.
What may have been an unfortunate typographical error in the March 14, 2008 Resolution gave the
impression that Bankwise's Motion for Reconsideration remained unacted upon. Under the 2005 NLRC
Revised Rules of Procedure,63 execution proceedings only commence upon the finality of the National Labor
Relations Commission's judgment.
Facts:
Pascua was employed by Bankwise as its Executive Vice President for Marketing. Philippine
Veterans Bank and Bankwise entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the purchase of
Bankwise's entire outstanding capital stock. Philippine Veterans Bank allegedly assumed full control
and management of Bankwise. Philippine Veterans Bank allegedly elected new members of the
Board of Directors and appointed a new set of officers, including the President and Chief Operating
Officer.
Pascua was reassigned to a Special Accounts Unit but his duties, functions, and
responsibilities were not clearly delineated or defined. However, Pascua was informed by Roberto
A. Buhain (Buhain), President of Bankwise, that as part of the merger or trade-off agreement with
Philippine Veterans Bank, he should tender his resignation. Buhain assured Pascua that he would be
paid all his money claims during this transition. Instead of tendering his resignation, Pascua wrote a
letter wherein he pleaded, among others, that he stay in office until the end of the year.
Seeing as Pascua had yet to submit his resignation, Vicente Campa (Campa), a director of
Bankwise, told him that it was imperative that he submit his resignation and assured his continued
service with Philippine Veterans Bank. Based on Campa's assurance, Pascua tendered his
resignation.
On March 6, 2005, Pascua wrote a letter to Campa reminding him of his money claims due to
his resignation. Due to the inaction of Philippine Veterans Bank and Bankwise, Pascua sent Buhain a
letter dated April 13, 2005, demanding the early settlement of his money claims. The demand was
not heeded.
Thus, Pascua filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary, overtime pay,
holiday pay, premium pay for holiday, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay,
retirement benefits, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees
against Bankwise and Philippine Veterans Bank.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the Complaint on the ground that Pascua had voluntarily
resigned. Pascua appealed to the NLRC and the NLRC reversed the LA’s findings and held that
Pascua was constructively dismissed.
449
Philippine Veterans Bank and Bankwise filed separate MR before the NLRC where the
NLRC denied the MR filed "by the respondents" even though it only mentioned the December 14,
2007 Motion for Reconsideration.
Bankwise claims that they are not liable since the National Labor Relations Commission
never resolved its Motion for Reconsideration. Considering that its Motion for Reconsideration was
still pending, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission against it has not yet become
final.
Issue:
Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission March 14, 2008 Resolution also
resolved Bankwise, Inc.'s Motion for Reconsideration dated December 17, 2007
Ruling:
Yes. The National Labor Relations Commission October 31, 2007 Decision already attained
finality when the records of the case were remanded to the Labor Arbiter and a writ of execution
was issued in Pascua's favor.
Philippine Veterans Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 14, 2007 while
Bankwise filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 17, 2007. On March 14, 2008, the
National Labor Relations Commission resolved both motions in a Resolution which read:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated December 14, 2007 filed by the
respondents relative to the Decision promulgated by this Commission on October 31, 2007,
We resolve to DENY the same as the motion raised no new matters of substance which
would warrant reconsideration of the Decision of this Commission.
The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, on behalf of Bankwise, entered its

appearance before the National Labor Relations Commission during the pendency of the Motions
for Reconsideration. In a Comment dated August 27, 2008, it argued that the National Labor
Relations Commission October 31, 2008 Decision could not have attained finality as to Bankwise
since its Motion for Reconsideration was still pending. What may have been an unfortunate
typographical error in the March 14, 2008 Resolution gave the impression that Bankwise's Motion
for Reconsideration remained unacted upon.
Under the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, execution proceedings only commence
upon the finality of the National Labor Relations Commission's judgment. Rule XI, Section 1 states:
RULE XI
EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS
Section 1. Execution Upon Finality of Decision or Order. - a) A writ of execution may be issued motu
proprio or on motion, upon a decision or order that finally disposes of the action or proceedings after
the parties and their counsels or authorized representatives are furnished with copies of the decision
450
or order in accordance with these Rules, but only after the expiration of the period to appeal if no
appeal has been filed, as shown by the certificate of finality. If an appeal has been filed, a writ of
execution may be issued when there is an entry of judgment as provided for in Section 14 of Rule
VII.
By August 7, 2008, the records of the case were remanded to the Labor Arbiter for
execution. Thus, the NLRC already considered its March 14, 2008 Resolution as final and executory
to all parties, including Bankwise. Bankwise was also given notice of the March 14, 2008
Resolution, so it cannot claim that the Resolution only resolved Philippine Veterans Bank's MR.
The Order was a definitive notice to Bankwise that the National Labor Relations
Commission considered its judgment final and executory against Bankwise. Thus, Bankwise is
bound by the finality of the National Labor Relations Commission October 31, 2007 Decision.
451
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.JOSHUA QUE Y UTUANIS

The following links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.
Facts:
In two (2) separate Informations, both dated July 27, 2003, accused-appellant Que was
charged with violating Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On July 30,
2003, Que filed a Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest and Admission to Bail. He
pleaded not guilty to both charges when he was arraigned on June 7, 2004.
During the hearings for the bail petition, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: the
poseur-buyer, PO3 Sammy Romina Lim (PO3 Lim); the arresting officer, SPO1 Samuel Tan Jacinto
(SPO1 Jacinto); and forensic chemist Police Chief Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro (P/C Insp. Diestro).
PO3 Lim of the Philippine National Police Zamboanga City Mobile Group recounted that in
the morning of July 26, 2003, an informant reported that a person identified as "Joshua," later
identified as Que, was selling shabu. Acting on this report, P/C Insp. Nickson Babul Muksan (P/C
Insp. Muksan) organized a buy-bust operation with PO3 Lim as poseur-buyer. PO3 Lim and the
informant then left for the area of Fort Pilar. There, the informant introduced PO3 Lim to Que. PO3
Lim then told Que that he intended to purchase ₱100.00 worth of shabu. Que then handed
him shabu inside a plastic cellophane. In turn, PO3 Lim handed Que the marked ₱100.00 bill and
gave the pre-arranged signal to have Que arrested.
After the arrest, the marked bill and another sachet of shabu were recovered from Que. Que
was then brought to the police station where the sachets of shabu and the marked bill were turned
over to the investigator, SPO4 Eulogio Tubo (SPO4 Tubo), who then marked these items with his
initials. He also prepared the letter request for laboratory examination of the sachets'
contents. Arresting officer SPO1 Jacinto also testified to the same circumstances recounted by PO3
Lim.
P/C Insp. Diestro recounted their office's receipt of a request for laboratory examination of
the contents of two (2) plastic sachets. She noted that these contents tested positive for shabu.
On January 24, 2007, the RTC denied Que's plea for bail. Trial on the merits followed. In lieu
of presenting evidence, the prosecution manifested that it was adopting the testimonies of the
witnesses presented in the hearings for bail. In its assailed August 12, 2013 Decision, the Court of
452
Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's ruling in toto. 17Thereafter, Que filed his Notice of
Appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody was established to as to warrant the conviction
of the accused
Ruling:
No. The requisites that must be satisfied to sustain convictions for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section
11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act are settled.
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be
shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of
the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
On the element of corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended by Republic Act No. 10640, spells out the requirements for the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Section 21(1) to (3)
stipulate the requirements concerning custody prior to the filing of a criminal caseIn People v.
Nandi, the four (4) links in the chain of custody are established
Thus, the following links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated
item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
People v. Morales explained that "failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 implie[s] a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of
the corpus delicti."29 It "produce[s] doubts as to the origins of the [seized paraphernalia]."
Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the
seized items. Non-compliance with them tarnishes the credibility of the corpus delicti around which
prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act revolve. Consequently, they also
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tarnish the very claim that an offense against the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was
committed. In People v. Belocura:
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act requires nothing less than strict
compliance. Otherwise, the raison d'etre of the chain of custody requirement is compromised.
Precisely, deviations from it leave the door open for tampering, substitution, and planting of
evidence.
This case is tainted with grave, gratuitous violations of Section 21 (1). There is no showing
that a proper inventory and taking of pictures was done by the apprehending officers. The marking
of the sachets of shabu supposedly obtained from accused-appellant was conducted at a police
station without accused-appellant, or any person representing him, around. There was not even a
third person, whose presence was required by Section 21 (1) prior to its amendment-"a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official."
This Court is left with absolutely no guarantee of the integrity of the sachets other than the
self-serving assurances of PO3 Lim and SPO1 Jacinto. This is precisely the situation that the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act seeks to prevent. The very process that Section 21 requires is
supposed to be a plain, standardized, even run-of-the-mill, guarantee that the integrity of the seized
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia is preserved. All that law enforcers have to do is follow Section
21's instructions. They do not even have to profoundly intellectualize their actions.
An admitted deviation from Section 21's prescribed process admission that statutory
requirements have not been observed. admitted disobedience can only work against the
prosecution's cause.
The buy-bust team's failures bring into question the integrity of the corpus delicti of
the charge of sale of illegal drugs against accused-appellant. This leaves reasonable doubt on
the guilt of accused-appellant Joshua Que. Necessarily, he must be acquitted.
454
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS, SSGT. EDGARDO L. OSORIO,
Petitioner, v. ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR JUAN PEDRO C. NAVERA; et.al. AND/OR
ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF
SSGT. EDGARDO L. OSORIO
G.R. No. 223272, February 26, 2018
Kidnapping should never be part of the functions of a soldier. It cannot be done in a soldier's official capacity.
If a soldier nonetheless proceeds allegedly on the orders of a superior officer, the soldier shall be tried before the
civil courts. The remedy of habeas corpus, on the argument that only courts-martial have jurisdiction over
members of the Armed Forces, will not lie.
Facts:
Staff Sergeant Edgardo L. Osorio (SSgt. Osorio) with his superior officer, Major General
Jovito Palparan (Major General Palparan) were charged with two (2) Informations for allegedly
kidnapping University of the Philippines students Karen E. Empeño (Empeño) and Sherlyn T.
Cadapan (Cadapan).
Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio and he was thereafter arrested and
detained. Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition
for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals (CA) against the judge who issued the warrants of
arrest, and the persons who filed the Informations for kidnapping and illegal detention, and his
superiors.
SSgt. Osorio mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil court such as the RTC, had
jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active duty and that the
offense charged was allegedly "service-connected." SSgt. Osorio added that he could not be charged
with the felony of kidnapping and serious illegal detention because under Article 267 of the RPC,
the felony may only be committed by a private individual, not a ranking officer of the AFP. Lastly,
he claimed deprivation of due process because he was allegedly charged without undergoing proper
preliminary investigation.
The CA held that SSgt. Osorio's confinement was "by virtue of a valid judgment or a judicial
process." Under RA No. 7055, Section 1, a crime penalized under the RPC, even if committed by a
member of the AFP, is to be tried "by the proper civil court." The only exception to this rule is when
the crime is "service-connected". Since the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is
punished under the RTC and is not "service-connected," the RTC properly took cognizance of the
case and, consequently, the warrants of arrest against SSgt. Osorio were issued under a valid judicial
process.
Issues and Ruling:
1. Is the Writ of Habeas Corpus a proper remedy for SSgt. Osorio to resort to?
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No. Habeas corpus is an extraordinary, summary, and equitable writ, consistent with the law's
"zealous regard for personal liberty." Its primary purpose "is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."
Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
The restraint of liberty need not be confined to any offense so as to entitle a person to the writ.
Habeas corpus may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged violation
of the liberty of abode.
Habeas corpus, therefore, effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens

constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. With
liberty being a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny
so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other
processes.
However, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of
liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become
legal. Therefore, the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic as provided for in
Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court, the proper remedy is to
pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a
motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest based on one or more of the grounds
enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
With a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information
... for insufficiency on its face in [a] point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information." An accused filing a motion to quash "hypothetically admits the facts alleged in the
information" and cannot present evidence aliunde or those extrinsic from the Information.
The effect of the grant of the motion to quash depends on the grounds availed of. When the
defect in the complaint or information can be cured by amendment, the grant of the motion to quash
will result in an order directing the amendment. If the ground is that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect
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by amendment." If, despite amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the same
defect, the complaint or information shall be quashed.
As an exception, the Court said in In re: Salibo that a motion to quash would be ineffectual
because none of the grounds would have applied under the circumstances of that case. The
information and warrant of arrest were issued on the premise that the accused named Butukan S.
Malang and the person named Datukan Malang Salibo were the same person, a premise proven as
false. An amendment from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" in the information will
not cure this defect.
2. May the RTC (a civil court) take cognizance of a criminal case against a soldier on duty?
Yes. Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1 provides that if the accused is a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the crime involved is one punished under the Revised Penal Code,
civil courts shall have the authority to hear, try, and decide the case. As used in this Section, service-
connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92,
and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the RPC, other special laws, or local government
ordinances. Under this Section, the only time courts-martial may assume jurisdiction is if, before
arraignment, the civil court determines that the offense is "service-connected." SSgt. Osorio was
charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Applying Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, the case shall be tried by a civil court, specifically by the
RTC, which has jurisdiction over the crime of kidnapping.
3. May a public officer be charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the RPC considering that the provision speaks of "any private individual"?
Yes. It is not impossible for a public officer to be charged with and be convicted of kidnapping as
per jurisprudence. SSgt. Osorio's claim that he was charged with an "inexistent crime" because he is
a public officer is, therefore, incorrect.
All told, the arrest warrants against SSgt. Osorio were issued by the court that has jurisdiction
over the offense charged. SSgt. Osorio's restraint has become legal; hence, the remedy of habeas
corpus is already moot and academic. SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is to pursue the orderly course
of trial and exhaust the usual remedies, the first of which would be a motion to quash, filed before
arraignment, on the following grounds: the facts charged do not constitute an offense; the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and the officer who filed the information
had no authority to do so.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Resolutions dated July 27, 2015
and February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 141332 are AFFIRMED.
457
INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner vs.

OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Respondent
March 7, 2018 G.R. No. 196795
The sole issue in ejectment proceedings is determining which of the parties has the better right to
physical possession of a piece of property. The defendant's claims and allegations in its answer or motion to
dismiss do not oust a trial court's jurisdiction to resolve this issue.
Facts:
In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government, which it
administered to Offshore Construction. Three properties were subjects of Contracts of Lease for 5
years: Baluarte De San Andres, Baluarte De San Francisco De Dilao, and Revellin De Recoletos. All
their lease contracts also made reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of stipulations, which
included a provision for lease renewals every five years upon the parties' mutual agreement.
Offshore Construction occupied and introduced improvements in the leased premises.

However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism (DOT) halted the projects due to Offshore
Construction's non-conformity with PD No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th centuries' Philippine-
Spanish architecture in the area. Consequently, Offshore Construction filed a complaint with prayer
for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against Intramuros and the DOT.
Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where parties affirmed the
validity of the two lease contracts but terminated the one over Revellin de Recoletos. The
Compromise Agreement retained the five (5)-year period of the existing lease contracts and stated
the areas that may be occupied by Offshore Construction.
During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees,
despite several demand letters. Intramuros tolerated the continuing occupation, hoping that
Offshore Construction would pay its arrears which as of July 31, 2004, totaled P6.7M. To settle its
arrears, Offshore Construction proposed to pay the DOT’s monthly operational expenses for lights
and sound equipment, electricity, and performers at the Baluarte Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel but
Offshore Construction continued to fail to pay its arrears, which amounted to ₱13.4M as of
December 31, 2009. On March 26, 2010, Offshore Construction received Intramuros' latest demand
letter.
Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the MeTC and Offshore Construction filed
its Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim.
Offshore Construction filed a Very Urgent Motion, praying that Intramuros' complaint be dismissed
on the grounds of violation of the rule on non-forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction over the case, and
litis pendentia.
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In its October 19, 2010 Order, The MeTC granted the motion and dismissed the case.
Preliminarily, it found that while a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, Offshore Construction's motion was grounded on the lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. It also found that Intramuros committed forum shopping and that it had no
jurisdiction over the case.
Intramuros appealed the October 19, 2010 Order with the Regional Trial Court where the
RTC affirmed the MeTC Order in toto. Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.
Issues and Ruling:
1. Was the direct resort to the Supreme Court proper?
Yes, it was proper and warranted under the circumstances. At the outset, petitioner should have
filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to assail the RTC’s ruling upholding
the MeTC Order instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.
Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy from an adverse decision rendered by
a RTC exercising its appellate jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the findings of the MeTC that it has no
jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and that petitioner committed forum shopping when it
failed to disclose two pending cases, one filed by respondent Offshore Construction and the other
filed by respondent's group of tenants, 4H Intramuros. Both of these cases raise questions of law,
which are cognizable by the Court of Appeals in a petition for review under Rule 42.
"A question of law exists when the law applicable to a particular set of facts is not settled,
whereas a question of fact arises when the truth or falsehood of alleged facts is in doubt." This Court
has ruled that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a complaint and the existence of
forum shopping are questions of law.
A petition for review under Rule 42 may include questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. This Court has recognized that the power to hear cases on appeal in which only
questions of law are raised is not vested exclusively in this Court. As provided in Rule 42, Section 2,
errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the RTC in its decision must be specified in the
petition for review.
Petitioner's direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review
as sanctioned by the rules, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine.
One of these exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated. Here, the controversy
between the parties has been dragging on since 2010, which should not be the case when the initial
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dispute on ejectment case is, by nature and design, a summary procedure and should have been
resolved with expediency.
2. Did the MeTC have jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint filed by Intramuros?
Yes. It is settled that the only issue that must be settled in an ejectment proceeding is physical
possession of the property involved. Specifically, action for unlawful detainer is brought against a
possessor who unlawfully withholds possession after the termination and expiration of the right to
hold possession.
To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the
complaint must be examined. The jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the complaint.
There is a case for unlawful detainer if the complaint states the following:
1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
A review of petitioner's Complaint for Ejectment shows that all of these allegations were made.
First, petitioner alleges that respondent is its lessee by virtue of three (3) Contracts of Lease.
The validity of these contracts was later affirmed in a Compromise Agreement, which modified
certain provisions of the previous leases but retained the original lease period. Respondent does not
dispute these contracts' existence or their validity.
Second, following respondent's failure to pay rentals, petitioner alleges that it has demanded
that respondent vacate the leased premises.
Third, respondent continues to occupy and possess the leased premises despite petitioner's
demand. This is admitted by respondent, which seeks to retain possession and use of the properties
to "recoup its multimillion pesos worth of investment."
Fourth, petitioner filed its Complaint for Ejectment within one year from its last written
demand to respondent. Contrary to respondent's claim, the one-year period to file the complaint
must be reckoned from the date of last demand, in instances when there has been more than one
demand to vacate.
The MeTC seriously erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction over petitioner's
complaint because the parties' situation has allegedly become "more complicated" than one of lease.
Respondent's defense that its relationship with petitioner is one of concession rather than lease does
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not determine whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The pleas or
theories set up by a defendant in its answer or motion to dismiss do not affect the court’s
jurisdiction.
Not even the claim that there is an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will remove the
Metropolitan Trial Court's jurisdiction over the complaint. To emphasize, physical possession, or de
facto possession, is the sole issue to be resolved in ejectment proceedings. Regardless of the claims or
defenses raised by a defendant, a Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over an ejectment
complaint once it has been shown that the requisite jurisdictional facts have been alleged, such as in
this case. Courts are reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical
possession, as there is a public need to prevent a breach of the peace by requiring parties to resort to
legal means to recover possession of real property.
3. Did Intramuros Administration commit forum shopping when it filed its ejectment
complaint despite the pending cases for specific performance and interpleader?
No. As observed by the MeTC, there is an identity of parties in the specific performance and
interpleader cases, and the Complaint for Ejectment. However, there is no identity of asserted rights
or reliefs prayed for, and a judgment in any of the three cases will not amount to res judicata in the
two others.
A final judgment in the specific performance case will not affect the outcome of the ejectment
case. As pointed out by petitioner, respondent's right to possess the leased premises is founded
initially on the Contracts of Lease and, upon their expiration, on petitioner's tolerance in hopes of
payment of outstanding arrears. The July 27, 2004 Memorandum of Agreement subject of the
specific performance case cannot be the source of respondent's continuing right of possession, as it
expressly stated there that the offsetting was only for respondent's outstanding arrears as of July 31,
2004. Any favorable judgment compelling petitioner to comply with its obligation under this
agreement will not give new life to the expired Contracts of Lease, such as would repel petitioner's
unlawful detainer complaint.
In its Amended Answer in the specific performance case, petitioner sets up the counterclaim that
"[respondent] be ordered to pay its arrears of (₱13,448,867.45) as of December 31, 2009 plus such rent
and surcharges as may be incurred until [respondent] has completely vacated the [leased] premises."
This counterclaim is exactly the same as one of petitioner's prayers in its ejectment complaint.
Clearly, petitioner's counterclaim is compulsory, arising as it did out of, and being necessarily
connected with, the parties' respective obligations under the July 27, 2004 Memorandum of
Agreement. Petitioner cannot be faulted for raising the issue of unpaid rentals in the specific
performance case or for raising the same issue in the present ejectment case, since it appears that
respondent's alleged failure to pay the rent led to the nonrenewal of the Contracts of Lease.
However, it must be emphasized that any recovery made by petitioner of unpaid rentals in either its
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ejectment case or in the specific performance case must bar recovery in the other, pursuant to the
principle of unjust enrichment.
A judgment in the Complaint for Interpleader will likewise not be res judicata against the
ejectment complaint. The plaintiff in the interpleader case, 4H Intramuros, allegedly representing the
tenants occupying Puerta de Isabel II, does not expressly disclose in its Complaint for Interpleader
the source of its right to occupy those premises. However, it can be determined from petitioner's
Answer and from respondent's Memorandum that the members of 4H Intramuros are respondent's
sublessees.
Since neither the specific performance case nor the interpleader case constituted forum shopping
by petitioner, the MeTC erred in dismissing its Complaint for Ejectment.
4. Is Intramuros Administration entitled to possess the leased premises and to collect

unpaid rentals?
Petitioner's tolerance of respondent's occupation and use of the leased premises after the end of
the lease contracts does not give the latter a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in its
favor. When a demand to vacate has been made, as what petitioner had done, respondent’s
possession became illegal and it should have left the leased premises.
The subsequent contracts, namely, the July 26, 1999 Compromise Agreement and the July 27,
2004 Memorandum of Agreement, also do not point to any creation of a "concession" in favor of
respondent. The Compromise Agreement affirms the validity of the lease contracts, while the
Memorandum of Agreement was for the payment of respondent's arrears until July 2004.
However, this Court cannot award unpaid rentals to petitioner pursuant to the ejectment
proceeding, since the issue of rentals in Civil Case No. 08-119138 is currently pending with Branch
37, Regional Trial Court, Manila, by virtue of petitioner's counterclaim. As the parties dispute the
amounts to be offset under the July 27, 2004 Memorandum of Agreement and respondent’s actual
back and current rentals due, 130 the resolution of that case is better left to the Regional Trial Court
for trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The April 14, 2011 Decision
of Branch 173, Regional Trial Court, Manila in Civil Case No. 10-124740 is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE, and a new decision is hereby rendered ordering respondent Offshore Construction and
Development Company and any and all its sublessees and successors-in-interest to vacate the leased
premises immediately.
Branch 37, Regional Trial Court, Manila is DIRECTED to resolve Civil Case No. 08-119138 with
dispatch.
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TORTONA et al vs GREGORIO et al
G.R. No.202612 January 17, 2018, LEONEN, J
Factual issues are normally improper in Rule 45 petitions as, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of
exceptions. (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for
review filed before this court involving civil, labor, tax, or criminal cases.
Through notarization, the public and the courts may rely on the face of the instrument, without need of further
examining its authenticity and due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of
regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more
than merely preponderant.
Facts:
A Deed of Absolute Sale was allegedly entered into by sisters Rufina Casimiro (Rufina), the
purported seller, and Rafaela Casimiro (Rafaela), the purported buyer. Petitioners are the heirs of
Rufina, while respondents are the heirs of Rafaela.
During their lifetime, Rufina and Rafaela co-owned with their other siblings a parcel of land
which they shared in equal, undivided 1/10 shares of a parcel located in Longos, Bacoor, Cavite.
They also shared in equal, undivided 1/5 shares of a second parcel in Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite. When
Rufina was still alive, she regularly collected her respective shares in the income of the 2 properties.
After her death, petitioners continued to collect and receive their mother’s share.
Sometime in 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of real property with damages.
They alleged that their cousin Emilio Casimiro (Emilio) offered them a balato
of P50,000.00 for the sale of the first parcel to the DPWH. Surprised, they asked why they were not
given their 1/10 share in the proceeds of the sale instead. Emilio allegedly replied that according to
respondents, the two (2) properties had already been sold by Rufina to Rafaela during their lifetime.
Petitioners proceeded to the Office of the Registry of Deeds to verify the supposed sale. They
learned that OCT No. O-923, covering the first parcel, had already been cancelled on account of a
Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Rufina and Rafaela on February 14, 1974. It appeared
that Rufina also sold her 1/5 share over the second parcel covered by TCT No. T-10058. It also
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became apparent that sometime after the sales of the 2 parcels, respondents executed a Declaration
of Heirship and Extrajudicial Partition. Consequently, Rufina’s 1/10 and 1/5 shares in the first and
second parcels were added to the shares of the respondents, as Rafaela’s heirs, thereby increasing
their shares to 2/10 and 2/5, respectively.
Petitioners underscored that their mother was illiterate, not even knowing how to write her
own name. They alleged that she only affixed her thumbmark on documents, and whenever she did
so, she was always assisted by at least 1 of her children. Thus, they asserted that if the sales to
Rafaela were genuine, they should have known about them. In support of their allegations, they
presented during trial some documents, collectively identified as the standard documents,
supposedly bearing the authentic thumbmarks of their mother. These standard documents also
showed that at least 1 of them assisted her in executing each document. Petitioners likewise
presented as witness National Bureau of Investigation fingerprint examiner Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr.
(Gomez), who conducted an examination to determine the genuineness of the questioned
thumbmarks in the Deed of Absolute Sale. He noted that he compared the questioned thumbmarks
with the genuine thumbmarks of Rufina in the standard documents. In his Report, Gomez noted
that “the purported thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale were not
identical with her standard thumbmarks in the standard documents” and in another report, Gomez
observed that the thumbmarks on the standard documents appeared to be “faint, blurred and
lacking the necessary ridge characteristics to warrant positive identification.” During a subsequent
hearing, however, he clarified that “while the standard thumbmarks lack the necessary ridge
characteristics to warrant positive identification all the standard are all in the same finger print
pattern’ and ‘they are also in agreement of the flow of ridges of all the standard.
The Regional Trial Court concluded that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery and ruled
in favor of the petitioners. It found as credible the First Report, which positively showed that the
questioned thumbmarks in the Deed of Absolute Sale were not Rufina’s.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. It found
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a notarized document and had in its favour the presumption of
regularity. It also emphasized Gomez’s second examination, which appeared to indicate that the
thumbmarks in the standard documents prevent positive
identification. According to the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to prove “by clear and
convincing evidence” that the thumbmarks found on the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged hence
this present petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Rufina Casimiro, as seller,
and Rafaela Casimiro, as buyer, is void, on account of forgery of Rufina’a thumbmarks.
2. Whether the presumption of regularity of a notarized Deed of Sale is conclusive as to its due
execution?
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Ruling:
1. The matter of the authenticity of Rufina Casimiro’s thumbmarks is a factual issue resting on the
evidence presented during trial. Factual issues are normally improper in Rule 45 petitions as,
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of exceptions. Most evident is how the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals conflict with those of the Regional Trial Court.
More significant than these conflicting findings, the Supreme Court finds the Court of Appeals’
appreciation of evidence to be grossly misguided. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ findings, a
more circumspect consideration of the evidence sustains the conclusion that Rufina’s purported
thumbmarks were false and merely simulated to make it appear that she had consented to the
alleged sale to her sister, Rafaela.
2. Notarization enables a notary public to ascertain the voluntariness of the party’s act and to
verify the genuineness of his or her signature. Through notarization, the public and the courts
may rely on the face of the instrument, without need of further examining its authenticity and
due execution. It is an act that is imbued with public interest. Notarized documents enjoy the
presumption of regularity. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight
as regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption
of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
The contentious Deed of Absolute Sale in this case is a notarized document. Thus, it benefits
from the presumption of regularity. The burden of proving that thumbmarks affixed on it is false
and simulated lies on the party assailing its execution. It is then incumbent upon petitioners to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the seller’s thumbmarks, as appearing on the Deed
of Absolute Sale, are forged and are not their mother’s. Petitioners successfully discharged this
burden with the aid of an expert witness, they contrasted Rufina’s apparent thumbmarks on the
Deed of Absolute Sale with specimen thumbmarks on authentic documents. They demonstrated
disparities that lead to no other conclusion than that the thumbmarks on the contentious Deed of
Absolute Sale are forged. In contrast, respondents merely harped on a disputable presumption,
and sought to affirm this presumption through the self-serving testimony of the notary public,
whose very act of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale is the bone of contention, whose
credibility was shown to be wanting, and who is himself potentially liable for notarizing a
simulated document.
Despite the flaws in the thumbmarks appearing in the standard documents, the inherent
deficiencies of the thumbmarks affixed in the Deed of Absolute Sale remain. No amount of
testimonial evidence could ever alter or detract from the cold physical fact that the questioned
thumbmarks are not identical with the standard thumbmarks. Testimonial evidence cannot
prevail over physical facts.
465
Petitioners were able to discharge their burden of proving forgery by clear and convincing
evidence. Petitioners themselves recounted in a straightforward manner that their mother, being
illiterate, never dealt with her properties without the assistance of any of her children. To attest
to this, they presented documents bearing the thumbmarks of their mother, where it appeared
that at least one of them was present to assist her. These same documents, when compared with
the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale, demonstrated the falsity of the thumbmarks appearing
on the latter. Respondents’ cause may have been supported by the general presumption that
notarized documents were duly executed; however, this presumption must crumble in light of
the significantly more compelling evidence presented by petitioners. As against petitioners’
evidence, all that respondents presented was the testimony of the notarizing lawyer, whose own
acts are clouded with suspicion.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, is
REINSTATED.
466
METRO RAIL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. GAMMON PHILIPPINES, INC.

G.R. No. 200401. January 17, 2018, Leonen, J
The doctrine of the law of the case applies when in a particular case, an appeal to a court of last
resort has resulted in a determination of a question of law. The determined issue will be deemed to be the law of
the case such that it will govern a case through all its subsequent stages.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) Decision denied Metro Rail Transit
Development Corporation's (MRT) Motion for Reconsideration. This case involves MRT's MRT-3
North Triangle Description Project (Project), covering 54 hectares of land, out of which 16 hectares
were allotted for a commercial center. Half of the commercial center would be used for a podium
structure (Podium), which was meant to provide the structure for the Project's Leasable Retail
Development and to serve as the maintenance depot of the rail transit system.
Gammon won the bid. On August 27, 1997, Parsons issued a Letter of Award and Notice to
Proceed (First Notice to Proceed) to Gammon. On September 8, 1997, MRT wrote Gammon that it
would need one (1) or two (2) weeks before it could issue the latter the Formal Notice to Proceed.
Gammon presented to MRT the sequencing and phasing of the work and demands to be
reimbursed based on actual cost plus a negotiated fee. Gammon had already started its engineering
services pursuant to the Second Notice to Proceed. The Fourth Notice to Proceed also expressly
cancelled the First and Third Notices to Proceed. MRT treated Gammon's qualified acceptance as a
new offer.
MRT informed that the contract would be awarded to Filsystems instead if Gammon would
not accept the Fourth Notice to Proceed within five (5) days. MRT informed Gammon that it was
willing to reimburse Gammon for its cost in participating in the bid amounting to about 5% of
Gammon's total claim of more or less P121,000,000.00
CIAC ruled that P58,642,969.62 shall be the total due the claimant.CIAC was created under
Executive Order No. 100892 to establish an arbitral machinery that will settle expeditiously
problems arising from, or connected with, contracts in the construction industry.
A quasi-judicial agency is a government body, not part of the judiciary or the legislative
branch, which adjudicates disputes and creates rules which affect private parties' rights... under the
Construction Industry Arbitration Law, arbitral awards are binding and shall be final and
unappealable, except on pure questions of law.
467
Voluntary arbitration involves the reference of a dispute to an impartial body, the members
of which are chosen by the parties themselves, which parties freely consent in advance to abide by
the arbitral award issued after proceedings where both parties had the opportunity to be heard.
There is a perfected contract between MRT and Gammon. Gammon only accepted MRT's
offer after MRT had already revoked it. The contract was not cancelled and was only temporarily
and partially suspended. The award of a contract to a bidder perfects the contract. Failure to sign the
physical contract does not affect the contract's existence or the obligations arising from it.
MRT has already awarded the contract to Gammon, and Gammon's acceptance of the award
was communicated to MRT before MRT rescinded the contract. Letter dated July 14, 1997, Gammon
submitted another offer to MRT in response to the latter's invitation to submit a final offer
considering the fluctuation in foreign exchange rates and an odd-and-even vehicle restriction plan.
In the Second Letter, Gammon transmitted to Parsons the signed Letter of Comfort to guarantee its
obligations in the Project.
September 9, 1997, Gammon returned to Parsons the contract documents. MRT had already
accepted the offered bid of Gammon and had made known to Gammon its acceptance when it
awarded the contract and issued it the First Notice to Proceed on August 27, 1997.
Gammon's receipt of the First Notice to Proceed constitutes the acceptance that is necessary
to perfect the contract. Gammon's acceptance is also manifested in its undertakings to mobilize
resources, to prepare the Performance and Advance Payment Bonds, and to procure materials
necessary for the Project.
MRT claims that this Court's ruling in Gammon v. Metro Rail Transit Development
Corporation did not determine that a contract was perfected as to warrant the application of the
doctrine of the law of the case. Gammon must first present proof of its claims for the cost of
engineering and design services, and of de-watering and clean-up works nor amended the Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim to either correct this allegation or to qualify that Gammon must first
present official receipts.
Issues:
1. Whether the Doctrine of the law of the case in Gammon v. Metro Rail Transit Development
Corporation applies?
2. Whether or not petitioner Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation is bound by its allegation
in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim that it was "willing to pay GAMMON the total
amount of P5,493,639.27 representing GAMMON's claim for cost of the engineering and design
services and site de-watering and clean-up works?
468
Ruling:
This Court denies the Petition. CIAC was created under Executive Order No. 1008 to
establish arbitral machinery that will settle expeditiously problems arising from, or connected with,
contracts in the construction industry. Its jurisdiction includes construction disputes between or
among parties to an arbitration agreement, or those who are otherwise bound by the latter, directly
or by reference. Thus, any project owner, contractor, subcontractor, fabricator, or project manager of
a construction project who is bound by an arbitration agreement in a construction contract is under
CIAC's jurisdiction in case of any dispute.
However, commercial arbitration is conducted by ad-hoc bodies created by stipulation of

parties for the purpose of settling disputes concerning their private or proprietary interests. In
general, the findings in commercial arbitration are respected to uphold the autonomy of arbitral
awards.
Under the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, arbitral awards are binding and shall be
final and unappealable, except on pure questions of law. Initially, CIAC decisions are appealable
only to this Court. However, when the Rules of Court were enacted, appeals from CIAC decisions
became appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. While Rule 43 petitions may pertain to
questions of fact, questions of law, or both questions of law and fact, it has been established that
factual findings of CIAC may not be reviewed on appeal. In keeping with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Law, any appeal from CIAC Arbitral Tribunals must remain limited to questions of law.
Voluntary arbitration involves the reference of a dispute to an impartial body, the members
of which are chosen by the parties themselves, which parties freely consent in advance to abide by
the arbitral award issued after proceedings where both parties had the opportunity to be heard. The
basic objective is to provide a speedy and inexpensive method of settling disputes by allowing the
parties to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and aggravation which commonly accompany
ordinary litigation, especially litigation which goes through the entire hierarchy of courts.
1. MRT argues that the issue in Gammon was CIAC's jurisdiction over the Notice of Claim, not the
existence of the contract. MRT insists that the ruling was limited only to the preliminary
question of whether or not there is an arbitration agreement between the parties to give CIAC
jurisdiction over the dispute. Gammon claims that Gammon already determined that there is a
perfected contract, and thus, the doctrine of the law of the case applies. It insists that without the
perfected contract, which contains the provision for arbitration, CIAC would not have acquired
jurisdiction over the case. This is shown in that the existence of a contract between the parties
was not an issue submitted by the parties in the arbitration proceedings. Thus, CIAC could not
have ruled on it.
This Court rules that the doctrine of the law of the case applies in this case. There is a distinction
between the agreement to arbitrate and the contract which may be the subject matter of the dispute
469
between the parties. While the agreement to arbitrate may be in the same subject matter contract, it
is a separate agreement in itself.
Under the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, CIAC acquires jurisdiction when the parties
agree to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration. The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is
not limited to violation of specifications for materials and workmanship; violation of the terms of
agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual time and delays; maintenance and
defects; payment, default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost. Excluded from the
coverage of this law are disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which shall
continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines. Thus, in Gammon v. Metro Rail Transit
Development Corporation, this Court ruled that CIAC does not have jurisdiction over
construction contracts. Rather, it has jurisdiction over the dispute arising from or connected to
construction contracts, such that it still acquires jurisdiction even if the contract has been breached,
abandoned, terminated, or rescinded.
On the basis of this ruling, this Court concluded that CIAC has jurisdiction over the dispute between
MRT and Gammon. Their contract need not be valid or in force before CIAC may arbitrate the
matter, so long as there is an agreement to arbitrate.
Thus, the agreement to arbitrate is separate from the construction contract entered into by parties.
The doctrine of the law of the case applies in the case at bar. While Gammon did not expressly state
that the contract was perfected, it concluded that both the construction contract and the arbitration
contract existed between the parties.
The doctrine of the law of the case applies when in a particular case, an appeal to a court of last
resort has resulted in a determination of a question of law. The determined issue will be deemed to
be the law of the case such that it will govern a case through all its subsequent stages. Thus, after
ruling on the legal issue and remanding the case to a lower court for further proceedings, the
determined legal issue can no longer be passed upon and determined differently in another appeal
in the same case.
Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts
of the case before the court.
As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case
whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party being to seek a rehearing.
The legal issue determined in Gammon is the jurisdiction of CIAC. However, this determination was
arrived at after this Court found that the parties entered into a construction contract with an
agreement to arbitrate. The current appeal can no longer bring the existence of the contract into
issue.
470
2. MRT seeks to question the award of lost profits and reimbursements in favor of Gammon.
As to the reimbursement award for engineering services, design work, site de-watering, and
clean-up, CIAC awarded the reimbursement claims on account of MRT's allegation in paragraph
77 of its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. MRT avers that judicial admissions cannot
supplant the requirement that actual damages must be duly proven. It further asserts that an
offer to pay is not an admission of liability under Rule 130, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. The
admission was made only as an attempt to settle the issue and to avoid litigation. It explains that
the exact amount of P5,493,639.27 was mentioned in the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim
because it was the amount Gammon was claiming and which MRT offered to pay, if proven.
On the other hand, Gammon claims that MRT is bound by its allegation in its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim. It argues that MRT failed to show that its admission was made by
palpable mistake. MRT even mentioned the exact amount it was willing to pay. It did not state that it
would pay only the amount proved or present any evidence to contradict its admission.
This Court rules that MRT is bound by its judicial admission. Judicial admissions may be
made by a party in his or her pleadings, during the trial, through verbal or written manifestations, or
in other stages of the judicial proceeding. They are binding such that no matter how much the party
rationalizes it, the party making the admission cannot contradict himself or herself unless it is shown
that the admission was made through a palpable mistake. In this case, MRT alleges that it is willing
to pay Gammon the total amount of P5,493,639.27, which comprises the latter's claim for cost of
engineering and design services, and de-watering and clean-up works. MRT's allegation was not
qualified. It neither stated that Gammon must first present proof of its claims for the cost of
engineering and design services, and of de-watering and clean-up works nor amended the Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim to either correct this allegation or to qualify that Gammon must first
present official receipts. Thus, CIAC correctly held that MRT is bound by this admission and is
estopped from denying its representation.
Thus, the findings of fact of CIAC are binding, respected, and final. They are not reviewable
by this Court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This rule, however admits of
certain exceptions, factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when
the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3)
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of
Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made. Other recognized exceptions are as
follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss
of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the
Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2)
471
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is
deprived of administrative due process.
However, petitioner failed to prove that any of these exceptions are present in the case at bar. Thus,
this Court will no longer disturb CIAC's factual findings, which were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
472
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MANZANO et al.

G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018. LEONEN, J
The final determination of just compensation is strictly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Special Agrarian Court.
A judgment may be executed pending appeal for good reasons, such as where the government belatedly pays
the just compensation for properties taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
The power of the State to expropriate property for public use is without question. In eminent domain
proceedings, courts have the power to decide on the final amount of just compensation.
Facts:
This resolves a Petition for Review of the Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank) seeking
to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals Decision which affirmed the Regional Trial Court
Order uphelding the Special Agrarian Court's determination of the just compensation to be paid.
Landbank is a government financial institution created by Republic Act No. 3844. It is one of
the implementing agencies and the duly designated financial intermediary of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, and the custodian of the Agrarian Reform Fund.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is the lead agency that implements the government's
agrarian reform program.
The Heirs of Pilar T. Manzano (Heirs of Pilar), Raul T. Manzano (Raul), Ramon H. Manzano
(Ramon), and Jose R. Jugo (Jugo) (collectively, respondents) were the owners of four (4) parcels of
agricultural land planted with rubber trees.
Respondents voluntarily offered their landholdings for agrarian reform, proposing the
selling price of P100,000.00 per hectare to the government. They later lowered their offer to
P83,346.76 per hectare.
DAR issued Administrative Order No. 05-98 to implement and fill in the details of Republic
Act No. 6657. Administrative Order No. 05-98 provides for the formula in computing just
compensation for rubber lands under Republic Act No. 6657, taking into consideration the factors
laid down in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657.
DAR endorsed the matter of land valuation to Landbank. According to Landbank,

respondents' lands were planted with more than 30-year-old rubber trees that were no longer
productive. Thus, Landbank gave a lower counteroffer to respondents. As follows, Respondents
refused to accept Landbank's counteroffer. The matter of land valuation was referred to the
473
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board for preliminary determination of just

compensation.
DAR and Landbank issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 07-99 (Revised Valuation
Guidelines for Rubber Plantations) for all concerned officials and personnel of these two (2)
agencies. Joint Memorandum Circular No. 07-99 provides for different valuation procedures for
lands planted with rubber trees.
In view of the deadlock on the purchase price, administrative cases for land valuation were
filed by respondents against Landbank and DAR. During the summary administrative proceedings,
respondents moved for the revaluation of their properties. Respondents rejected the new valuation
for being "too low and unreasonable. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board adopted
Landbank and DAR's revaluation, stating that this was done in accordance with the relevant
administrative issuances on land valuations. According to the Board, respondents did not present
contrary evidence to reject the revaluation.
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ruled that should respondents disagree
with its findings, they may bring the matter to the Regional Trial Court designated as he Special
Agrarian Court.
The Regional Trial Court consolidated the complaints and, pursuant to Republic Act No.
6657, Section 58, appointed 3 commissioners to examine and ascertain the valuation of the
properties. Meanwhile, Landbank deposited the judgment award, through cash and Landbank
bonds, as provisional compensation for the acquired properties. Respondents later withdrew these
amounts.
Several ocular inspections and investigations were done due to varying data. Finally,
commissioners recommended that the amount of just compensation be reckoned from the date the
properties were transferred to the Republic of the Philippines, until fully paid, and that DAR and
Landbank pay all legal fees and costs of the case.
Opposing the recommendations, Landbank argued that the just compensation should not be
more than respondents’ sworn valuation, as shown in their tax declarations.
During the hearing, Landbank admitted that it intended to present all documentary evidence which
it had already incorporated in its Comment to the Consolidated Commissioners' Report.
The Regional Trial Court substantially adopted the Consolidated Commissioners' Report.
Landbank filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, seeking for the reversal of the
Regional Trial Court. Meanwhile, respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal,
pursuant to Rule 39, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court.
While the petition was pending before the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court issued
an Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal.The Regional Trial granted the motion
as borne out from the records that the ownership and possession of respondents properties subject
474
of these cases were already transferred to the government in 1999. Subsequently, the government
thru respondent Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) distributed and awarded the land to the
tenant-beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
This court likewise takes judicial notice that payment of just compensation of properties
acquired under CARP is not wholly payable in cash compared to other expropriation cases. In this
case, petitioners are to be paid partly in cash and in Landbank bonds The bond has a maturity
period of ten (10) years which matures annually until the tenth (10th) year.
The Court of Appeals denied Landbank's appeal and affirmed the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court. It held that Landbank was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Moreover, the
Consolidated Commissioners' Report was a mere recommendation, which the trial court may adopt,
modify, or disregard. Thus, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Regional Trial Court that there
was no need to conduct further hearing.
For the Court of Appeals, the factual findings of the commissioners, having specialized skills
and knowledge, as well as those of the Regional Trial Court, having conducted its own investigation,
must not be disturbed as Landbank failed to effectively rebut their findings.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Commissioner's Report was representative of the true value
of just compensation thus Landbank elevated the case before this Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can simply adopt the Consolidated Commissioners'
Report in determining just compensation
2. Whether or not there may be execution pending appeal
Ruling:
1. The Regional Trial Court has the full discretion to make a binding decision on the value of the
properties. Under Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, the Regional Trial Court may accept
the Consolidated Commissioners' Report, recommit it to the same commissioners for further
report, set it aside and appoint new commissioners, or accept only a part of it and reject the other
parts. The final determination of the Regional Trial Court sitting as a Special Agrarian Court
must be respected.
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be curtailed or

limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party
475
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken
for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that
its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
Republic Act No. 6657, Section 57 gives to the Special Agrarian Courts the "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners."
There is no need to exhaust administrative remedies through the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator, Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, or the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board before a party can go to the Special Agrarian Court for determination of just
compensation.
The final decision on the value of just compensation lies solely on the Special Agrarian Court.
Any attempt to convert its original jurisdiction into an appellate jurisdiction is contrary to the
explicit provisions of the law.
The Special Agrarian Court must ensure that the amount determined at the end of the
proceedings is equivalent to the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking, and
not based on a strict adherence to a particular set or series of rules imposed by agricultural
reform laws or administrative orders.
2. The Court of Appeals properly upheld the Regional Trial Court's issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal.
Under Rule 39, Section 2(a), a judgment appealed before the Court of Appeals may still be
executed by the Regional Trial Court, provided there are good reasons for the judgment's
execution.
The Regional Trial Court found that respondents have been deprived of their land since 1999.
Respondents were dispossessed of the beneficial use, fruits, and income of their properties,
which were taken from them 19 years ago without compensation. Thus, the denial of the
execution pending appeal will infringe on their constitutional right against taking of private
property without compensation.
Moreover, the just compensation for respondents' properties is not wholly payable in cash.
Sixty-five percent (65%) of the payment is in bonds, which will mature only after 10 years. By
then, the monetary value of the properties would no longer be the same. Denying the execution
pending appeal can also stall the payment of respondents' properties through the filing of
frivolous motions and appeals.
476
In their motion for execution pending appeal, respondents "indicated their willingness to return
any amount in the event that the just compensation fixed by the Regional Trial Court is modified
by the appellate court."
The expropriation of private property under R.A. 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation,
being a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the farmers, envisioning freedom
from the bondage to the land they actually till. As an exercise of police power, it puts the
landowner, not the government, in a situation where the odds are practically against him. He
cannot resist it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to
be paid for the property taken by the government. As expected, the landowner will exercise this
right to the hilt, subject to the limitation that he can only be entitled to "just compensation".
Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.
Thus, the Supreme Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court that "for reasons of equity, justice
and fair play, respondents should be paid to enable them to cope up with the loss they sustained
as a result of the taking and for their economic survival."
In sum, the power of the State to expropriate property for public use is without question. In eminent
domain proceedings, courts have the power to decide on the final amount of just compensation. This
is especially true in cases of agrarian reform.
Since the determination of just compensation is an inherently judicial function, it cannot be curtailed
or limited by legislation. The various agrarian reform laws and the other administrative issuances
are merely recommendatory to the trial court in determining just compensation.190 Thus, there is a
need for each case to be approached by the trial court with particular sensitivity to the local market
where the subject is to be found.
This Court, as the final arbiter of law and justice, has the power to rule and provide a definitive legal
standard by which a court that is acting as a Special Agrarian Court may rely upon to arrive at an
amount that will compensate landowners and fulfill the intention of agrarian reform.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
477
STEAG STATE POWER, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 205282. January 14, 2019
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is fundamental for a court to act on a given controversy." Moreover, it
"cannot be waived and is not dependent on the consent or objection or the acts or omissions" of any or both parties.
Contrary to petitioner's stance, the Court of Tax Appeals is not precluded to pass on this issue motu proprio,
regardless of any purported stipulation made by the parties.
Facts:
Steag State Power is a VAT registered domestic corporation primarily engaged in power
generation and sale of electricity to the National Power Corporation under a Build, Operate,
Transfer Scheme.
In 2003, it started building its power plant inside the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate-Misamis
Oriental. After filing its quarterly value-added tax returns, and filing its amended value-added tax
returns, it filed before the BIR administrative claims for refund of its allegedly
unutilized input value-added tax payments on capital goods.
Due to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's (Commissioner) inaction on its

administrative claims, Steag State Power filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA).
CTA denied the petition for insufficiency of evidence and held that the appeals for the
administrative claims for refund of input taxes for January 2004 to May 2005, or the first judicial
claim, were filed late. Meanwhile, the appeal of the refund claim of input taxes for June 2005 to
October 2005, or the second judicial claim, was prematurely filed.
Steag State Power filed its Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion to Submit Supplemental
Evidence) which was partially granted by the Court of Tax Appeals.
Commissioner, dissatisfied with the January 5, 2010 Resolution, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. CTA dismissed the consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction.
On Steag State Power's appeal, the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc affirmed the dismissal of
the cases in its July 19, 2012 Decision. Relying upon Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc., it denied the appeal for having been filed late. Steag State Power filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Tax Appeals.
Steag State Power filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari which was
denied. Hence, petitioner filed this Motion for Reconsideration in which Petitioner avers that
noncompliance with the 120+30-day periods is not a jurisdictional defect, but only a case of a "lack of
cause of action," which may be subject to the equitable principle of waiver.
478
Issue:
Whether or not the noncompliance with the 120+30-day periods is not a jurisdictional defect,
but only a case of a "lack of cause of action," which may be subject to the equitable principle of
waiver.
Ruling:
Under the Court of Tax Appeals Charter, the Commissioner's inaction on a claim for refund
is considered a "denial" of the claim, which may be appealed before the Court of Tax Appeals within
30 days from the expiration of the period fixed by law for action.
Here, since petitioner filed its judicial claims way beyond the 30-day period to appeal, the
Court of Tax Appeals lost its jurisdiction over the Petitions. This Court has held that "[j]urisdiction
over the subject matter is fundamental for a court to act on a given controversy." Moreover, it
"cannot be waived ... and is not dependent on the consent or objection or the acts or
omissions" of any or both parties. Contrary to petitioner's stance, the Court of Tax Appeals is not
precluded to pass on this issue motu proprio, regardless of any purported stipulation made by the
parties.
479
RE: COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF ELVIRA N. ENALBES, REBECCA H. ANGELES, AND

ES TE LITA B. OCAMPO AGAINST FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO [RET.], RELATIVE TO GR. NOS. 203063 AND 204743.
A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC; JANUARY 22, 2019
While the 24-month period provided under the 1987 Constitution is persuasive, it does not summarily
bind this Court to the disposition of cases brought before it. It is a mere directive to ensure this Court's prompt
resolution of cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule.
Facts:
Mallari Spouses filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court against the
Philippine National Bank and the Court of Appeals Special Former Fourth Division of Five. Both
Petitions were assigned to this Court's First Division and were raffled to then Chief Justice De
Castro.
Complainants aver that despite the lapse of more than five (5) years, respondent failed to
decide on both Petitions of Spouses Mallari, and that respondent's failure to promptly act on the
Petitions resulted in a violation of the spouses' constitutional right to speedy disposition of their
cases. They rely on the constitutional provision requiring this Court to decide on cases within 24
months from their submission
Issue:
Whether or not there was respondent’s failure to promptly act on the Petition based on the
constitutional provision requiring this Court to decide on cases within 24 months from their
submission
Ruling:
Both the 1987 Constitution and the Internal Rules state that the 24-month period for deciding
on or resolving a case is reckoned from the date of its submission for resolution. The 24-month
period does not run immediately upon the filing of a petition before this Court, but only when the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum has been submitted.
Being the court of last resort, this Court should be given an ample amount of time to
deliberate on cases pending before it. This Court notes that all matters brought before it involves
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. It would be at the height of injustice if cases
were hastily decided on at the risk of erroneously dispensing justice.
While the 24-month period provided under the 1987 Constitution is persuasive, it does not
summarily bind this Court to the disposition of cases brought before it. It is a mere directive to
ensure this Court's prompt resolution of cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule.
480
EVELYN T. VILLANUEVA, PROVINCIAL ACCOUNTANT (LAGUNA) , ET AL.VS. COA,

G.R. No. 213323/G.R. No. 213324, January 22, 2019
Public officers should not be held liable for disallowed transactions in which they did not participate.
Holding them liable without any proof of their participation in the transaction is grave abuse of discretion.
Facts:
Regional Director of the Regional Office created an audit team to conduct a preliminary fact-
finding audit and investigation of irregularities in the purchase of medical items. The team issued
two (2) Audit Observation Memoranda, which revealed that in the 2004 and 2005 procurement of
medical items: (1) no public bidding had been conducted; (2) purchase requests had made reference
to brand names; and (3) there had been splitting of purchase requests and purchase orders.
Regional Cluster Director issued a Notice of Disallowance, which held Respondents liable
for the 2004 and 2005 procurement of medical items. Governor Lazaro filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Notice of Disallowance. However, it was denied.
Governor Lazaro and the rest of the persons held liable filed an Appeal Memorandum to the
Notice of Disallowance which was granted.
Commission on Audit, upon automatic review, disapproved the Regional Office grant of the
Appeal Memorandum to the Notice of Disallowance.
Petitioners filed Petition for Certiorari- Rule 64 before the SC. Petitioner Villanueva points
out that she did not participate in the transactions prior to July 5, 2005, and should not be held liable
for them.
Issue:
Whether or not there was great abuse of discretion on the COA in holding Villanueva liable
for the disallowed transaction
Ruling:
Since petitioner Villanueva's liability for the disallowed transactions is anchored on her
position as Provincial Accountant, she should only be liable for the transactions that occurred after
she was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Accountant. Finding her liable
for reimbursements of transactions prior to this constitutes grave abuse of discretion. However,
which of the disallowed transactions occurred before her designation is a question of fact that this
Court has no evidentiary basis to determine.
481
HYGIENIC PACKAGING CORPORATION VS. NUTRI-ASIA, INC. DOING BUSINESS

UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF UFC PHILIPPINES
G.R. 201302, January 23, 2019 , LEONEN, J:
Parties are allowed to constitute any stipulation on the venue or mode of dispute resolution as part of
their freedom to contract under Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Here, however, the records
lack any written contract of sale containing the specific terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. The
parties failed to provide evidence of any contract, which could have contained stipulations on the venue of
dispute resolution.
Facts:
Petitioner (Hygienic) is a domestic corporation that manufactures, markets, and sells
packaging materials such as plastic bottles and ratchet caps. While, Nutri-Asia is a domestic
corporation that manufactures, sells, and distributes food products such as banana-based and
tomato-based condiments, fish sauce, vinegar, soy sauce, and other sauces. From 1998 to 2009,
Hygienic supplied Nutri-Asia with KG Orange and Ratchet Caps with Liners (plastic containers) for
its banana catsup products.
Hygienic filed a Complaint for sum of money against Nutri-Asia. It instituted the case before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila "pursuant to the stipulation of the parties as stated in the Sales
Invoices submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the City of Manila in any legal
action arising out of their transaction”.
Hygienic alleged that based on the Purchase Orders and Sales Invoices, Nutri-Asia agreed to
pay Hygienic 30 days after every delivery of plastic containers. However, Nutri-Asia refused to pay
for the goods delivered from December 29, 2007 to January 22, 2009 after their payment became due,
despite oral and written demands from Hygienic.
Nutri-Asia argued that the case should be dismissed as Hygienic failed to comply with a
condition precedent prior to its filing of the Complaint. It claimed that under the Terms and
Conditions of the Purchase Orders, Hygienic should have first referred the matter to the Arbitration
Committee and that the venue was also improperly laid since the Regional Trial Court of Manila
was not the proper venue for the institution of Hygienic' s personal action. The Complaint should
have been filed either before the trial courts of San Pedro, Laguna or Pasig City, where the principal
places of business of Hygienic and Nutri-Asia are located, respectively. The venue of actions as
stated in the Sales Invoices could not bind Nutri-Asia since it did not give its express conformity to
that stipulation.
After Hygienic filed its Reply, Nutri-Asia filed an Omnibus Motion. Nutri-Asia reiterated its
arguments in its Answer, adding that its affirmative defenses could "be resolved on the basis of the
pleadings and the documents attached to the complaint without the need of further hearing."
482
RTC denied the Omnibus Motion held that venue was properly laid. It considered the
signatures of Nutri-Asia's representatives in the Sales Invoices as the company's concurrence that
any dispute would be raised before the courts of Manila. MR was denied. Nutri-Asia filed Petition
for Certiorari with the CA.
CA reversed holding that the trial courts committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing
the complaint to stand and stay in Manila. It held that since the signature of Nutri-Asia's employee
in the Sales Invoices was only for the receipt of goods, Nutri-Asia did not agree to be bound by the
venue stipulation in the Sales Invoices.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for collection of sum of money was properly filed.
Ruling:
Parties are allowed to constitute any stipulation on the venue or mode of dispute resolution
as part of their freedom to contract under Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Here,
however, the records lack any written contract of sale containing the specific terms and conditions
agreed upon by the parties. The parties failed to provide evidence of any contract, which could have
contained stipulations on the venue of dispute resolution. Nonetheless, petitioner and respondent
both claim that the Sales Invoices and the purchase Orders, respectively, contained a stipulation on
where to raise issues on any conflict regarding the sale of plastic containers. Each party also insists
that the other party accepted the venue stipulation in the Sales Invoices or the Purchase Orders
when its representative signed them.
Upon examination of the Sales Invoices and the Purchase Orders, this Court cannot consider
the documents as contracts that would bind the parties as to the venue of dispute resolution.
A closer look at the Sales Invoices issued by petitioner reveals that above the signature of
respondent's representative is the phrase, "Received the above goods in good order and condition.”
Clearly, the purpose respondent's representative in signing the Sales Invoices is merely to
acknowledge that he or she has received the plastic containers in good ·condition.
A scrutiny of the Purchase Orders issued by respondent also reveals that above the signature
of petitioner's representative is the phrase "Acknowledged By (Supplier)."Since the Purchase Orders
indicated how many pieces of plastic containers respondent wanted to order from petitioner, the
signatory merely affixed his or her signature to acknowledge respondent's order. Moreover, the
Purchase Orders included a note stating that the "[Purchase Order] must be DULY acknowledged to
facilitate payment.” Thus, it was necessary for petitioner's representative to sign the document for
the processing of payment. The act of signing the Purchase Orders, then, was limited to
acknowledging respondent's order and facilitating the payment of the goods to be delivered. It did
not bind petitioner to the terms and conditions in the Purchase Orders, which included the
arbitration clause.
483
Petitioner and respondent may have entered into a contract of sale with respect to
petitioner's merchandise. However, the case records do not show that they have a contract in
relation to the venue of any civil action arising from their business transaction Since there is no
contractual stipulation that can be enforced on the venue of dispute resolution, the venue of
petitioner's personal action will be governed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
It has been consistently held that an action for collection of sum of money is a personal
action. Taking into account that no exception can be applied in this case, the venue, then, is "where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principaldefendants resides, ... at the election of the plaintiff." For a corporation, its residence is
considered "the place where its principal office is located as stated in its Articles of Incorporation."
In its Complaint, petitioner stated that its principal place of business is on San Vicente Road
beside South Superhighway, San Pedro, Laguna.
Meanwhile, respondent admitted in its Answer that its principal office is at 12/F
Centerpoint Building, Gamet Road comer Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. 124
Considering that the amount petitioner claims falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, petitioner may file its Complaint for sum of money either in the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna or in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
Petitioner's erroneous belief on the applicability of the venue · stipulation in the Sales
Invoices led it to file an action before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. This error is fatal to
petitioner's case.
One (1) of the grounds for dismissal of an action under Rule 16, Section 1126 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is when the venue is improperly laid. Although respondent did not
file a Motion to Dismiss on this ground, it cited the improper venue as one ( 1) of the affirmative
defenses in its Answer This Court finds that the Court of Appeals is partly correct in ruling that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent's Omnibus Motion. This
Court reminds litigants that while the rules on venue are for the convenience of plaintiffs, these rules
do not give them unbounded freedom to file their cases wherever they may please.
484
GSIS FAMILY BANK EMPLOYEES UNION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MS. JUDITH
JOCELYN MARTINEZ VS. SEC. CESAR L. VILLANUEVA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 210773, January 23, 2019, LEONEN, J:
The Governance Commission possesses neither judicial nor quasi-judicial powers; thus, it cannot
review or settle actual controversies or conflicting rights between dueling parties and enforce legally
demandable rights. It is not a tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that may
properly be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
Facts:
Royal Savings Bank filed an application with the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central
Bank) for the appointment of a conservator. Central Bank denied Royal Savings Bank's application
for conservatorship, prohibited it from doing business, and placed it under receivership.
Royal Savings Bank filed several complaints against the Central Bank for grave abuse of
discretion. To amicably settle the cases, then Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez, Jr. offered to
reopen and rehabilitate Royal Savings Bank if it would drop all its complaints against the Central
Bank and transfer all its shares of stock to Commercial Bank of Manila, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of the Government Service Insurance System(GSIS).
Royal Savings Bank and Commercial Bank of Manila entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement to rehabilitate and infuse capital into Royal Savings Bank. Royal Savings Bank was
renamed Comsavings Bank.
Comsavings Bank and the Government Service Insurance System executed a Memorandum
of Agreement where the latter committed to infuse an additional capital of P2.5 billion into
Comsavings Bank. After the infusion of funds, the Government Service Insurance System effectively
owned 99.55% of Comsavings Bank's outstanding shares of stock.
Comsavings Bank changed its name to GSIS Family Bank.. On June 6, 2011, President
Aquino signed into law Republic Act No. 10149, or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011 which created
the Governance Commission for Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations (Governance
Commission), defined as "a central advisory, monitoring, and oversight body with authority to
formulate, implement and coordinate policies" in its governed sector.
Emmanuel L. Benitez (Benitez), GSIS Family Bank's president, sought opinion from the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas as to whether GSIS Family Bank may be considered as a government-
owned or controlled corporation or government bank under Republic Act No. 10149. GSIS Family
Bank met with representatives of the Governance Commission, which clarified that GSIS Family
Bank was classified as a government financial institution under Republic Act No. 10149.
485
On February 11, 2013, Benitez wrote the Governance Commission to seek further
clarification on several issues, namely: (1) GSIS Family Bank's impending collective bargaining
negotiations with its employees; (2) its authority to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with
the GSIS Union; and (3) its employees' right to strike.
Governance Commission replied that as a government financial institution, GSIS Family

Bank was unauthorized to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees "based on
the principle that the compensation and position classification system is provided for by law and not
subject to private bargaining.
Counsel for the GSIS Union sent GSIS Family Bank a demand letter for the payment of
Christmas bonus to its members, as stipulated in their Collective Bargaining Agreement. GSIS Union
accused GSIS Family Bank of evading its contractual obligation to its employees by invoking the
Governance Commission's opinion that it was no longer authorized to grant incentives and other
benefits to its employees, unless authorized by the President of the Philippines
GSIS Union alleged that Republic Act No. 10149 does not apply to GSIS Family Bank, as it
was a private bank created and established under the Corporation Code. It asserted that even if the
Government Service Insurance System owned a majority of GSIS Family Bank's outstanding Capital
stock, the change in ownership of shares did not automatically place the bank under the operation of
Republic Act No. 10149.
For GSIS Family Bank's refusal to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement, the GSIS
Union filed a Complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, and later, a Notice
of Strike. Some bank employees also filed their own Complaints before the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. They aimed to compel GSIS Family
Bank to abide by the provisions of their existing Collective Bargaining Agreement. GSIS Union filed
before this Court a Petition for Certiorari
Issue:
Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari is the correct remedy
Ruling:
A writ of certiorari may only be issued when the following are alleged in the petition and
proven:( 1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board,or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy[,] and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The Governance Commission was created under Republic Act No. l0149 and is the "central
advisory, monitoring, and oversight body with authority to formulate, implement and coordinate
policies" relative to government-owned and controlled corporations. It has no judicial or quasi-
486
judicial authority, as evidenced by its powers and functions under the law. Thus, it cannot review or
settle actual controversies or conflicting rights between dueling parties and enforce legally
demandable rights. It is not a tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that
may properly be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
487
POLO PLANTATION AGRARIAN REFORM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE

(POPARMUCO), REPRESENTED BY SILANDO GOMEZ AND ELIAS RAMOS VS. RODOLFO
T. INSON, CESO III, AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, REGION VII – CEBU CITY
G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019, LEONEN, J:

The court's contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for a preservative, and not
vindictive, purpose. "Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised.
Respondent's erroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed as grave abuse
of discretion, which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition for contempt.
Facts:
A 394.9020-hectare portion of the landholding owned by Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc. (Polo
Coconut) in Polo, Tanjay, Negros Oriental was placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Department of Agrarian Reform received from the Land Bank of the Philippines a
Memorandum of Valuation, indicating the amount of P85,491,784.60 as just compensation for
393.1327 hectares6 of Polo Coconut property. A Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition was then
sent to Polo Coconut. On January 16, 2004, a Certificate of Deposit was issued to Polo Coconut for
the said amount.
After Polo Coconut failed to reply to the Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition, the
Department of Agrarian Reform conducted summary administrative proceedings to determine just
compensation. Meanwhile, Polo Coconut's title was cancelled in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines. TCT were transferred in favor of POPARMUCO members whom the Department of
Agrarian Reform identified as agrarian reform beneficiaries.
Subsequently, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Negros Oriental, Stephen Leonidas,
sent Espina a letter, informing him of the Department of Agrarian Reform's intention to proceed
with the relocation survey of the property. Polo Coconut moved for the suspension of the survey,
but Regional Adjudicator Arrieta denied the Motion for lack of jurisdiction.
Polo Coconut filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari questioning the propriety of
subjecting its property to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. CA found that the Polo
Coconut property was no longer an agricultural land when the Department of Agrarian Reform
placed it under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
SC reversed CA and ruled that Polo Coconut did not exhaust its administrative remedies
when it directly filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals instead of first filing a
protest or opposition before the Department Secretary. Furthermore, it held that the property was
never placed beyond the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, as the Department
Secretary never approved the land's conversion and recognized the Department of Agrarian Reform
488
as the proper authority to identify and select agrarian reform beneficiaries. Courts, it ruled, cannot
substitute their judgment unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This Court
further held that the Department of Agrarian Reform could not be deemed to have gravely abused
its discretion just because its chosen beneficiaries were not tenants of Polo Coconut. Section 22 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, it ruled, "does not limit qualified beneficiaries to tenants of
the landowners."
The September 3, 2008 Decision became final and executory on November 26, 2008. On June
30, 2009, alleged regular farmworkers of Polo Coconut (Alcantara, et al.) filed a Petition for Inclusion
as qualified beneficiaries and Exclusion of those named as beneficiaries therein. They were allegedly
not informed when the Department of Agrarian Reform conducted
the identification and screening process for potential beneficiaries.
Acting on the Petition, Regional Director Inson issued a Cease and Order On July 23, 2009.
POPARMUCO members, who are Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders, filed a
Motion to Quash the Cease and Desist Order with Motion for Reconsideration.. They alleged that
they were not given prior notice of the filing of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion,35 and that the
Cease and Desist Order defied this Court's September 3, 2008 Decision.
On July 30, 2009,40 POPARMUCO members filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Regional Adjudication Board a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, seeking to enforce the
September 3, 2008 Decision. Thereafter, POPARMUCO filed before this Court a Petition for
Contempt.
Issue: Whether or not the Petition for Contempt was proper
Ruling:
No. petitioner's assertion that respondent's cognizance of the Petition for
Inclusion/Exclusion constituted defiance of the September 3, 2008 Decision does not lie. The court's
contempt power should be exercised with restraint and for a preservative, and not vindictive,
purpose. "Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised
Here, respondent justified his cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion based on
the Department's exclusive prerogative in the identification, selection, and subsequent re-·evaluation
of agrarian reform beneficiaries. However, as earlier stated, the issue on the qualification of the
existing Certificate of Land Ownership A ward holders had long been laid to rest in this Court's final
and executory September 3, 2008 Decision. Some of the petitioners in the inclusion/exclusion
proceedings were even respondents in that case. Still, respondent's erroneous cognizance of the
Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed as grave abuse of discretion, which is more
properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition for contempt. "No one who is called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment."
489
SIMEON LAPI V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 210731 FEBRUARY 13, 2019
As with certain constitutional rights, the right to question the validity of a warrantless arrest can be
waived. This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence seized
during the illegal arrest
Facts:
Simeon Lapi, Allen Sacare, and Kenneth Lim were charged with violation of Article II,
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165. On arraignment, Lapi, Sacare, and Lim pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. At pre-trial, Sacare and Lim changed their pleas to guilty, and were sentenced to
rehabilitation for six (6) months at a government-recognized center. Only Lapi was subjected to trial
on the merits.
According to the prosecution, operatives of the Bacolod City Anti-Illegal Drug Special
Operation Task Group conducted a stake-out operation in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City.
During the operation, Police Officer 2 Ronald Villeran heard noises from one of the houses. He
"peeped through its window" and saw Lapi, Sacare, and Lim "having a pot session." P02 Villeran
tried to enter the house through the main door, but the door was locked. He then tried to enter
through the kitchen door. Upon entry, he met someone trying to flee, but P02 Villeran restrained the
person. Then, P02 Villeran "peeked into the adjacent room" and saw that the pot session was
ongoing. He entered the room and introduced himself as a police officer. Lapi, Sacare, and Lim tried
to escape, but were caught by P02 Villeran's team members, who were waiting by the main door.
Having been arrested and their paraphernalia seized, the men were then brought to the City
Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group Office, where a police blotter was filed. They were
later brought to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to undergo drug tests. The initial
laboratory report found that Lapi, Sacare, and Lim tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), while their companions, Noel Canlas and Carmelo Limbaco, tested negative.
The Regional Trial Court found Lapi guilty. It ruled that the warrantless arrest against him
was legal since he was caught in flagrante delicto. Lapi appealed to the Court of Appeals which
denied the Appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Lapi may assail the validity of his arrest even after arraignment
Ruling:
No, he may not assail the validity of his arrest after arraignment.
490
Here, however, petitioner admits that he failed to question the validity of his arrest before
arraignment. He did not move to quash the Information against him before entering his plea. He
was assisted by counsel when he entered his plea. Likewise, he was able to present his evidence.
Petitioner argues that his warrantless arrest was illegal since P02 Villeran had to peep through the
window to ascertain that something illegal was occurring. Petitioner, however, has already waived
the right to question the validity of his arrest. No items were seized from him during his arrest as he
was not charged with possession or sale of illegal drugs. Thus, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals did not err in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Article II, Section
15 of Republic Act No. 9165.
491
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EDGARDO ROYOL

G.R. NO. 224297. FEBRUARY 13, 2019
Since compliance with the chain of custody requirements under Section 21 ensures the integrity of the
seized items, it follows that noncompliance with these requirements tarnishes the credibility of the corpus
delicti. Furthermore, noncompliance with Section 21 means that critical elements of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs remain wanting. Such noncompliance justifies an accused's acquittal
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Edgardo A. Royol (Royol), a garbage collector, was charged with violating
Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
According to the prosecution, at around 9:00 a.m. on November 27, 2007, a confidential informant
went to the Tarlac Provincial Police Office in Camp Makabulos, Tarlac City and reported that Royol
had been selling illegal drugs in Barangay Lourdes, Bamban, Tarlac. The informant allegedly told
P02 Baquiran that he was due to meet Royol that morning.
A buy-bust team was formed. P02 Baquiran was provided with two (2) marked P500.00 bills. The
buy-bust team proceeded to the bridge in Barangay Lourdes, the informant's supposed meeting
place with Royol. Royol arrived some 20 minutes after P02 Baquiran positioned himself in the area.
Upon meeting Royol, P02 Baquiran showed him the two marked P500.00 bills and told him that he
intended to purchase half a kilogram of marijuana. Royol exchanged half a brick of marijuana with
P02 Baquiran 's marked bills. Upon seeing P02 Baquiran make the pre-arranged signal, the other
members of the buy-bust team rushed to arrest Royol. Royol gave chase but was shortly
apprehended by Inspector Silva and P02 Soriano. He was then brought to the Tarlac Provincial
Police Office, where the brick of marijuana was supposedly marked. P02 Baquiran then personally
brought the marijuana to the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, where, upon examination
by Police Inspector Jebie C. Timario, it tested positive for marijuana.
The Regional Trial Court found Royol guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the
Regional Trial Court's ruling in toto.
ISSUE:
W/N the prosecution established Royol 's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
RULING:
No. Royol must be acquitted.
492
The case of People v. Holgado explained that compliance with the chain of custody requirements
protects the integrity of the confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia in four aspects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity
(e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to
the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized
to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this
requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any
manner.
Since compliance with the chain of custody requirements under Section 21 ensures the integrity of
the seized items, it follows that noncompliance with these requirements tarnishes the credibility of
the corpus delicti. Furthermore, noncompliance with Section 21 means that critical elements of the
offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs remain wanting. Such noncompliance justifies an accused's
acquittal.
Here, the case against accused-appellant is woefully lacking in satisfying these requirements. There
is no semblance of compliance with Section 21(1). All the prosecution has to support its assertions on
the integrity of the marijuana that was allegedly obtained from accused-appellant is its bare claim
that it was marked at the Tarlac Provincial Police Office. Neither P02 Baquiran nor Inspector Silva
testified on the conduct of a proper inventory and photographing. The prosecution's claims are
sorely lacking in accounting how the marijuana was actually marked, including the safety measures
undertaken by police officers. Worse, the prosecution failed to account for the presence of even just
one of the persons required by Section 21(1) to be present during the inventory and photographing.
The prosecution did not even maintain that accused-appellant himself was present. Jurisprudence
has been definite on the consequence of noncompliance. This Court has categorically stated that
noncompliance negates whatever presumption there is on the regularity of the manner by which
officers gained and maintained custody of the seized items.
Thus, failing compliance with the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, acquittal of Royol must
ensue.
493
METRO BOTTLED WATER G.R. No. 202430 CORPORATION, Petitioner vs ANDRADA

CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC
G.R. No. 202430 March 6, 2019
Generally, judicial review of arbitral awards is permitted only on very narrow grounds. Republic Act
No. 876, or the Arbitration Law, does not allow an arbitral award to be revisited without a showing of specified
conditions, which must be proven affirmatively by the party seeking its review.
The Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution, implementing the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004, mandate that arbitral awards will not be vacated "merely on the ground that the
arbitral tribunal committed errors of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, as the court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the arbitral tribunal." Parties are even "precluded from filing an appeal or a petition for
certiorari questioning the merits of an arbitral award."
On the other hand, arbitral awards by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission may only
be appealed on pure questions of law, though not all will justify an appeal. Consistent with the strict standards
for judicial review of arbitral awards, only those appeals which involve egregious errors of law may be
entertained.
Given its technical expertise, the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission is given a wide
latitude of discretion so that it may resolve all issues before it in a fair and expeditious manner. Included
within the bounds of its discretion are situations where it resolves, on the basis of equity, to order a party to
compensate a contractor for any unpaid work done.
FACTS:
On April 28, 1995, Metro Bottled Water and Andrada Construction entered into a
Construction Agreement for the construction of a reinforced concrete manufacturing plant to be
completed within 150 calendar days or by October 10, 1995, to be reckoned from Andrada
Construction's posting of a Performance Bond to answer for liquidated damages, costs to complete
the project, and third party claims. The Performance Bond was issued by Intra Strata Assurance
Corporation (Intra Strata).
On May 10, 1995, Metro Bottled Water extended the period of completion to November 30, 1995
upon Andrada Construction's request, due to the movement of one (1) bay of the plant building,
weather conditions, and change orders.
On November 14, 1995, E.S. De Castro and Associates, Metro Bottled Water's consultant for the
project, recommended the forfeiture of the Performance Bond to answer for the completion and
correction of the project, as well as liquidated damages for delay.
On May 2, 1996, Metro Bottled Water filed a claim against the Performance Bond issued by Intra
Strata. Andrada Construction opposed the claim for lack of legal and factual basis.
494
Andrada Construction sent letters to Metro Bottled Water requesting for payment of unpaid work
accomplishments. Metro Bottled Water refused to pay.
On August 6, 2001, Andrada Construction filed a Request for Arbitration before the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission.
In its April 24, 2002 Decision, the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) found that
Andrada Construction was entitled to unpaid work accomplishment with legal interest.
Metro Bottled Water filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review assailing the Arbitral
Award.
CA: dismissed the Petition for lack of merit and upheld the factual findings of CIAC
Petitioner argues that it indeed raised questions of law when it questioned respondent's entitlement
to recover its claims despite its admission that there was no written approval by petitioner, as
required by the Construction Agreement and the Civil Code. It also points out that while the arbitral
tribunal's factual findings are entitled to great respect, they may still be reviewed by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court when there is a conflict in the application of law, jurisprudence, or
the contract between the parties. It reiterates its arguments in the Petition and asserts that
respondent "erroneously raised arguments on equity" when the provisions of law are clear.
Issue:
Whether or not arbitral award is appealable to the CA and to the Supreme Court
Ruling:
Only as to question of law. Due to the highly technical nature of proceedings before the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, as well as its emphasis on the parties' willingness to
submit to the proceedings, the Construction Industry Arbitration Law provides for a narrow ground
by which the arbitral award can be questioned in a higher tribunal.
SECTION 19. Finality of Awards. -The arbitral award shall be binding upon the parties. It
shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the
Supreme Court.
The CIAC has since been categorized as a quasi-judicial agency. To standardize appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that appeals "may be taken
to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The CIAC is among the quasi-
judicial agencies explicitly listed in the rule.
In CE Construction v. Araneta Center, however, this Court emphasized that Rule 43 must be read
together with the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, which provides that appeals of arbitral
495
awards must only raise questions of law. Thus, even if Rule 43 now provides that appeals may be
brought before the Court of Appeals, these appeals must still be confined to questions of law.
CE Construction further provides that even exceptions that may be allowed in the review of Rule 45
petitions, such as the lower court's misapprehension of facts or a conflict in the factual findings, will
not apply to reviews of the arbitral tribunal's decisions. Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. sufficiently
explains the rationale of why courts are duty bound to uphold the factual findings of the tribunal.
Notably, these exceptions refer to the conduct of the arbitral tribunal and the qualifications of the
arbitrator. They do not refer to the arbitral tribunal's errors of fact and law, misappreciation of
evidence, or conflicting findings of fact. Hence, CE Construction, in recognizing the nature of these
exceptions, held that questions of law may be allowed "only in instances when the integrity of the
arbitral tribunal itself has been put in jeopardy. This Court further mandated that "factual findings
may be reviewed only in cases where the CIAC arbitral tribunals conducted their affairs in a
haphazard, immodest manner that the most basic integrity of the arbitral process was imperiled.
Thus, parties seeking to appeal an arbitral award of a construction tribunal must raise an egregious
error of law to warrant the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction. Absent any allegation and
proof of these exceptions, the factual findings of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
will be treated by the courts with great respect and even finality.
496
MARIA TUPAZ, SHIELA HUBAHIB vs THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR
THE VISAYAS; ATTY. FERNANDO ABELLA, REGISTER OF DEEDS; and MACRINA ESPINA.
G.R. Nos. 212491-92 March 6, 2019
Public prosecutors must address the different dimensions of complaints raised before them. When they
provide well-reasoned resolutions on one (1) dimension, but overlook palpable indications that another crime
has been committed, they fail to responsibly discharge the functions entrusted to them. This amounts to an
evasion of positive duty, an act of grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
Facts:
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas dismissed the Criminal Complaint for
falsification and violation of Section 3( e ) 5 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed by
petitioner Maria Shiela Hubahib Tupaz against private respondents Atty. Fernando M. Abella,
Registrar of Deeds of Catarman, Northern Samar, and Macrina Espifia, a private individual and the
person at whose urging Abella allegedly acted.
In her Complaint-Affidavit Tupaz stated that her mother, Sol Espina Hubahib was the
registered owner of a property but Atty. Abella canceled the Original Certificate of Title in its stead,
issued a new TCT in favor of Genaro Espina, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Macrina.
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas dismissed Tupaz's Complaint for being "premature and
declined to file criminal informations-both for falsification and graft and corrupt practices-against
Atty. Abella and Macrina. It reasoned: Upon scrutiny of the present complaint, it is found that the
issue on the possible criminal liability of the respondents and the administrative liability of
respondent ABELLA is closely intertwined with the issue on ownership of the subject property. It
hinges on which party has the better right over the lot in question.
If the transfer of the title of the property in favor of respondent ESPINA is upheld as valid,
the present charges for falsification and dishonesty, etc. against the respondents would have no leg
to stand on. Hence, the issue presented before this Office cannot be resolved without first touching
on the overarching issue on ownership which is not within our jurisdiction to determine. This matter
should be brought before the proper forum wherein questions regarding the transfer of title can be
adjudicated.
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas further denied Tupaz's MR.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondent Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding probable
cause to charge private respondent Fernando M. Abella, along with private respondent Macrina
Espifia, with violation of Section 3( e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
497
Ruling:
Yes. Probable cause for the filing of an information is "a matter which rests on likelihood
rather than on certainty. It relies on common sense rather than on 'clear and convincing evidence."
We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for a
crime. As the term itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not
absolute or even moral certainty; it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is sufficient
that based on the preliminary investigation conducted, it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.
The determination of probable cause is an executive, not a judicial, function. It is generally not for a
court to disturb the conclusion made by a public prosecutor. This is grounded on the basic principle
of separation of powers. However, "grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutor's resolution
if he or she arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause. In such cases,
consistent with the principle of checks and balances among the three (3) branches of government, a
writ of certiorari may be issued to undo the prosecutor's iniquitous determination.
Assessing the evidence before them, public prosecutors are vested "with a wide range of discretion,
the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge. As such, "[t]he prosecuting attorney cannot be
compelled to file a particular criminal information. Public prosecutors are not bound to adhere to a
party's apparent determination of the specific crime for which a person shall stand trial. Their
discretion "includes the right to determine under which laws prosecution will be pursued.
When, however, "there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor in declining to prosecute specific persons for specific offenses, a writ of certiorari may be
issued to set aside the prosecutor's initial determination.
Accordingly, this Court concluded that "certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman made no
finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019. From the evidence adduced by petitioner, there is basis to maintain a reasonable belief
that private respondent Abella enabled the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title and
issuance of new transfer certificates of title. This was despite manifest and unequivocal deficiencies,
most notably in the owner's duplicate copy, the Certificate Authorizing Registration, and the Deed
of Conveyance that had been presented to him. Private respondent Abella admitted canceling
Original Certificate of Title after he was presented an owner's duplicate that "consists of only two
pages which is somewhat defaced.
498
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs- LINA ACHIENG NOAH,

G.R. No. 228880, March 6, 2019
Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized items at each stage,
from seizure to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized items shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
Facts:
On April 16, 2012, an Information was filed charging Noah with violation of Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 for transporting and bringing to the Philippines a total of 5,941.9
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Noah pleaded not guilty. Customs Examiner Marius Landicho testified that at NAIA, Noah,
a Kenyan national who arrived and she was asked by Landicho to open her luggage and upon
inspection, it revealed seven (7) rectangular packages, wrapped in vacuum-sealed aluminum foil, on
which Landicho affixed his initials and signature.
Landicho then prepared an Inventory Report, in the presence of required officers and then
turned over it to PDEA. Special Agent I Alejandro R. Noble corroborated the testimony of Landicho.
Upon testing samples, the white crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Special Agent I Noble added that before Noah's arrest, he asked her if she
could understand English. When she said yes, he apprised her of her Miranda rights.
Agent Adrian Fajardo PDEA, testified that he brought the seized items to Forensic Chemist
Ariane Arcos for proper documentation and laboratory examinations. The test results showed that
the seized items contained shabu, with a confirmatory test yielding the same outcome.
In her defense, Noah denied transporting the illegal drugs.
RTC: found Noah guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. It held that the warrantless
search and arrest of Noah was "lawful, valid, and effective because searches done in airport
premises fell under consented searches. It found that Noah had known she was in possession of
illegal drugs considering that animus possidendi is presumed.
Moreover, the trial court ruled that the presumption of regularity of duty on the airline personnel's
placing of the bag tags at the airport of origin established that Noah was the real owner of the
luggage. It ruled that there was compliance with Article II, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
CA: affirmed Noah's conviction
499
Accused stresses that the chain of custody in handling the evidence against her had gaps, which
raise serious doubts on the authenticity of the seized shabu. She argues that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the packages recovered from her were not preserved. While Landicho testified
to marking the seized items, she points out that the records show that the marking was neither
immediately made upon seizure nor was it made in her presence.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution established the unbroken chain of custody of the drug seized
from accused-appellant.
Ruling:
Yes. To sustain a conviction for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs, the
transportation and the identity and integrity of the seized drugs must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. This is because the confiscated drug is the corpus delicti of the crime. Since it is not readily
identifiable by sight or touch and may be easily tampered with, its preservation is paramount. The
chain of custody ensures that there would be no unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence. Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized items
at each stage, from seizure to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized items shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and
time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
The chain of custody was also established by the prosecution. The four links of chain of
custody of evidence were proven: (1) Landicho seized and marked the shabu obtained from
accused-appellant; (2) he turned them over to Agent Fajardo; (3) Agent Fajardo delivered them to
Forensic Chemist Arcos; and ( 4) from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the drugs were
presented in court. The Court of Appeals summarized the sequence of events showing that the
shabu seized from accused-appellant was the very same shabu tested and later identified in court.
This Court is convinced that the apprehending officers have complied with the requirements under
Section 21. Based on the records, there was an unbroken chain of custody of the seized shabu from
the time of its discovery up to its presentation in court.
The prosecution established that in the exclusion room, Landicho continued inspecting the
luggage before airport officers, government agents, and accused-appellant herself. There were even
pictures showing that accused-appellant was present during the field test, marking, and inventory of
the seized items. Contrary to accused-appellant's claim, Landicho properly marked the seized shabu.
Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found that the Inventory Report had confirmed that
members of the Customs Task Force, Anti-Narcotics Group, Fabroa, Barangay Councilor Bajada,
and Prosecutor Rillera witnessed the marking and inventory proceedings. The testimonies of
Landicho, Special Agent I Noble, and Agent Fajardo corroborated the contents of the Inventory
Report. Against all these, accused-appellant cannot possibly claim the opposite.
500
Clearly, there were no lapses in the disposition and handling of the seized shabu to even
prompt the relaxation of the procedure under Section 21. The prosecution complied with the
standard in handling the evidence and in establishing the chain of custody. Indeed, it proved
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of illegally transporting 5,941.9 grams of
shabu as penalized under Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
501
POLICE SUPERINTENDENT HANSEL M. MARANTAN VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET

AL. G.R. NO. 206354. MARCH 13, 2019
A petition for certiorari, pertaining to the regularity of a preliminary investigation, becomes moot
after an information is filed and a trial court issues an arrest warrant upon finding probable cause against the
accused.
Facts:
A shootout occurred in Atimonan, Quezon between the combined forces of the PNP and
AFP and 13 fully armed men riding a convoy of vehicles. DOJ Secretary Leila De Lima made public
pronouncements on the Atimonan Encounter, reportedly mentioning Marantan's name.
Alarmed, Marantan, together with a number of soldiers represented by their respective

counsel, wrote the head of the NBI and requested that, upon the investigation's conclusion, any
action against those allegedly responsible for the shooting incident be referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman instead of the Department of Justice.
De Lima submitted to the President Aquino a report stating that the NBI would file criminal
charges against the involved police and armed forces personnel.
DOJ , through Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano of the National Prosecution Service,
issued Department of Justice Office Order, convening a Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
On March 12, 2013, Marantan filed a Letter-Motion to De Lima, through Prosecutor General
Arellano, and copy furnished Senior Deputy State Prosecutor Theodore M. Villanueva praying that
the Department of Justice inhibit from conducting the preliminary investigation, and instead
forward its records to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action. On March 19, 2013,
Marantan and his co-respondents were directed through a Subpoena to appear before the Panel on
April 8, 2013 for a preliminary investigation hearing.
As alleged by Marantan, on March 26, 2013, a copy of the Subpoena, along with its
attachments, was delivered to the PNP, the method by which the Subpoena was served upon him
and his co-respondents.
On April 4, 2013, the counsel of Marantan and SPO1 Arturo C. Sarmiento received a letter
from Prosecutor Villanueva, denying the Letter-Motion. Thus, on April 8, 2013, Marantan filed this
Petition.
Two (2) days later, he filed an Urgent Manifestation stating that on April 8, 2013, after he had
filed the Petition, the Panel had conducted the preliminary investigation. He alleged that during the
preliminary investigation, the Panel furnished him, through counsel, copies of the attachments to the
502
Subpoena earlier served upon them. Petitioner asked that the Petition be raffled immediately so that
his prayer for injunctive relief could be resolved.
In its Omnibus Resolution, the Panel found probable cause to charge petitioner, along with
his co-respondent police officers, with the crime of multiple murder. It found evidence that they had
killed the victims in conspiracy, enumerating the reasons and factual basis for such conclusion. It
found that the checkpoint itself was highly suspicious and irregular. Moreover, the physical
evidence did not support the claim that there was a shootout-it belied the possibility that the victims
fired at the officers from within their vehicles, or that there was a legitimate firefight.
Petitioner filed his Reply.
Petitioner insists that he has compelling reasons to justify the non-application of the
principles of hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies due to respondent
Department of Justice Secretary De Lima's alleged prejudgment of the case.
Moreover, he claims that it would have been futile to file a motion for reconsideration
because his Letter-Motion for inhibition was denied by respondent Senior Deputy State Prosecutor
Villanueva "acting for and on behalf of respondent Sec. De Lima. He maintains that respondent
Department of Justice Secretary De Lima's public pronouncements showed prejudgment of the case.
This, he claims, tainted his constitutional right to due process to stand before an impartial tribunal.
Petitioner prays that this Court issue an injunctive relief to restrain the continuation of
proceedings and to annul and set aside Office Order No. 208, its corresponding Subpoena, and the
April 3, 2013 Letter-Denial.
He also prays that respondent Department of Justice Secretary De Lima be prohibited from
proceeding with the preliminary investigation, and be directed to forward the case records to the
Office of the Ombudsman. However, the act sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished
with the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, the issuance of the August 30, 2013 Omnibus
Resolution, and the filing of the Information against petitioner. Thus, petitioner prayed in his
Memorandum that this Court annul and set aside the preliminary investigation and Omnibus
Resolution, along with the Department of Justice Office Order No. 208, Subpoena, and Letter-Denial.
Respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed outright as petitioner disregarded the
hierarchy of courtand failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
They point out that his claims of prejudgment are highly speculative considering that there
is no showing that the Panel had prejudged the case or that respondent Department of Justice
Secretary De Lima had exerted any pressure on the Panel to rule a certain way. They maintain that
jurisdiction over the preliminary investigation lies with respondent Department of Justice, not the
Office of the Ombudsman.
503
Lastly, as to petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief, respondents point out that a writ of
preliminary injunction is not issued when the act sought to be enjoined has already been
consummated; in this case, with the issuance of the Omnibus Resolution on August 30, 2013.
Issues:
1. First, whether or not this case constitutes an exception to the rule on judicial hierarchy; -NO;
and whether or not this case constitutes an exception to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies; NO
2. Whether or not respondent Department of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner Hansel M. Marantan's letter-request for inhibition; NO
3. Whether or not the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion during the
preliminary investigation; NO
4. Whether or not the case became moot when an Information was filed before the trial court
against petitioner. YES
Ruling:
1. Direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is allowed only
for special and important reasons that must be clearly and specifically set out in the Petition.
Court provided circumstances of when it might take cognizance of a case, despite a failure to
exhaust remedies before the lower courts. For this Court to take cognizance of original actions,
parties must clearly and specifically allege in their petitions the special and important reasons for
such direct invocation. One such special reason is that the case requires "the proper legal
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions." Cases of national interest and of serious
implications, and those of transcendental importance and of first impression have likewise been
resolved by this Court on the first instance.
In exceptional cases, this Court has also overlooked the rule to decide cases that have been pending
for a sufficient period of time. This Court has resolved original actions which could have been
resolved by the lower courts in the interest of speedy justice and avoidance of delay. Generally, the
rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed when "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." For
all other cases, the parties must have exhausted the remedies available before the lower courts. A
petition filed in violation of the doctrine shall be dismissed.
In this case petitioner claims exemption from the rule on judicial hierarchy simply because this case
involves respondents' grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This
argument fails to convince. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
precisely the scope of a petition for certiorari. This case is no such exception that it would merit a
direct resort to this Court. This Court fails to see how public welfare, public policy, or the broader
interest of justice demands the exercise of our jurisdiction here. In the same vein, this Court does not
504
see why petitioner's prayer could not have been granted by the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, this case is dismissible due to petitioner's failure to adhere to the rule on judicial hierarchy.
Similarly, petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration before filing his petition for certiorari.
This case is dismissible for petitioner's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner
claims that this case constitutes an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative reliefs
because: (1) the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the Letter-Denial would be useless; (2) he
ran the risk of having the motion for reconsideration being treated as his counter-affidavit and the
case being submitted for resolution; and (3) the prayer for relief was urgent because of the proximity
of the date of the preliminary investigation. These circumstances do not constitute any of the
recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative reliefs.
2. Without legal basis for its inhibition from the preliminary investigation, respondent Department
of Justice's refusal to inhibit was not grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner's reliance on Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government44 is
misplaced. It is true that in Cojuangco, Jr., the impartiality of a person who presides over a
preliminary investigation is a requisite of due process. However, this Court held that the PCGG
could not be deemed impartial in its preliminary investigation because, prior to the preliminary
investigation, it had already sequestered petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. 's properties.
Respondent Department of Justice and the National Bureau of Investigation were not created with
any interests against petitioner. Accordingly, Cojuangco, Jr. is not squarely applicable here.
Moreover, the National Bureau of Investigation and respondent Department of Justice do not, by
virtue of having conducted an earlier investigation, become interested parties so as to preclude the
latter from conducting an ensuing preliminary investigation.
The National Bureau of Investigation, which is under the Department of Justice, was specifically
empowered to investigate crimes and offenses as public interest may require.47 Accordingly, a
checkpoint operation jointly conducted by the police and armed forces personnel, which results in as
many deaths as the Atimonan Encounter, is a matter of public interest proper for investigation by
the National Bureau of Investigation.
Moreover, respondent Department of Justice Secretary De Lima's assailed statements, as submitted

by petitioner, do not appear to show her bias against petitioner, or that she conducted the
investigation aiming to persecute him. Rather, they reflect an evolving opinion based on the
National Bureau of Investigation's investigation.
From these statements, this Court cannot conclude that respondent Department of Justice Secretary
De Lima's public reaction to an ongoing investigation is tantamount to bias against petitioner.
505
3. The Panel's conclusions appear to have been well-reasoned and evidence-based. It listed the
evidence and circumstances it relied on to conclude that the police personnel had, in conspiracy,
killed the victims.
The Panel also found that the checkpoint itself was highly suspicious and irregular. The Panel found
that the killing was attended by evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength,
treachery, and with the aid of armed men. This was because: (1) the police personnel put up a
suspicious three (3)-layered checkpoint, which ensured that the subjects would not be missed, and
that no outsiders would witness the incident; (2) petitioner had been monitoring the movements of
the convoy the day prior to the incident; (3) the police personnel ensured the presence of the armed
forces personnel at the checkpoint operation and capitalized on the soldiers' capabilities and
resources; and ( 4) the sheer number of bullets fired at the victims indicated that the police had taken
advantage of superior strength of firearms and manpower.
The Panel found no probable cause to charge the armed forces personnel because they themselves
were surprised by what the police personnel did. They even revealed Carracedo's irregular actions
at the crime scene, although they could have kept those to themselves.63 Petitioner has not shown
how any of these conclusions were erroneous. There was also no proof that respondent Department
of Justice Secretary De Lima exerted any pressure on the Panel to align its findings with her public
declarations or to adhere to any pre-determined result.
4. A case is rendered moot when, because of supervening events, this Court is left with no
justiciable controversy to resolve, and a declaration on it would be of no practical use or value.
In Secretary De Lima v. Reyes this Court reiterated its ruling in Crespo v. Mogul that once an
information is filed before a court, that court acquires jurisdiction over the case. Notably, a petition
questioning the preliminary investigation of an accused becomes moot once an information based
on the preliminary investigation is filed before a trial court, which, in tum, would complete its own
determination of probable cause. After this judicial detention, the question of an accused's guilt or
innocence would rest with the trial court's own sound discretion.
Here, an information against petitioner has already been filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Consequently, whether the case should be dismissed, or whether petitioner should be acquitted or
convicted, is for the trial court to detennine. Resolving whether public respondent Department of
Justice should have inhibited from conducting the preliminary investigation and forwarded the case
records to the Office of the Ombudsman would be of no practical use and value here.
506
AUGUSTO REGALADO Y LAYLAY VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 216632. MARCH 13, 2019
Chain of Custody was relaxed with respect to the persons required to be present during the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items. Originally under Republic Act No. 9165, the use of the
conjunctive "and" indicated that Section 21 required the presence of all of the following, in addition to "the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel.
Facts:
On January 31, 2003, two (2) informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court,
charging Regalado with two (2) counts of violating Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 for
possessing Cannabis Sativa (Marijuana) weighing not more than 300 grams.On arraignment,
Regalado pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
Trial then ensued.
Prosecution: 5 police officers led by SP02 Pefiascosas arranged an entrapment operation. There, PO
1 Pedrigal asqked Regalado's wife, Marilyn, "Meron kayo ngayon, bibili ako? Marilyn informed him
that her husband was not in the house and that she would ask her daughter to fetch him. POI
Pedrigal signified to Regalado his intention to buy and the latter went into his house, returning with
a plastic sachet suspected to contain marijuana, which he then exchanged with PO I Pedrigal's
marked bills amounting to P200.00. Regalado took the money and put it in his pocket.
At this point, PO 1 Pedrigal scratched his head-the pre-arranged signal signifying to the team that
the transaction had been consummated.
The rest of the team rushed to Regalado's house and identified themselves as police officers. They
arrested Regalado after PO 1 Pedrigal retrieved the marked money from his pocket.
POI Pedrigal kept all the confiscated pieces of evidence. The police officers informed Regalado of his
constitutional rights in Tagalog. Then, after informing Barangay Captain Isidro Palomares of what
had transpired, they brought Regalado to the police station. 14 At the police station, PO 1 Pedrigal
marked with initials "AR" the three (3) plastic sachets and four (4) sticks of suspected marijuana. He
later turned them over, along with the marked money, to the investigator, P02 Llante. P02 Llante
then brought the seized evidence, along with a Request for Laboratory Examination, to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Canlubang, Laguna to have them tested for the
presence of illegal drugs.
Police Chief Inspector Loma Tria (Chief Inspector Tria), the forensic chemist, confirmed upon a
laboratory examination that the confiscated items were indeed marijuana. The seven (7) specimens
with the "AR" markings.
507
In his defense, Regalado alleged that on December 1 7, 2002, he was ploughing the field in his farm
located about 100 meters from his house when his son, Alvin, told him to come home. There, he was
met by a teenager who gave him P200.00, wanting to purchase marijuana.
As soon as Regalado gave the teenager marijuana, he stated that five (5) police officers arrived and
arrested him. POI Pedrigal recovered from him the P200.00, which the teenager had handed him..
When asked about the rest of his stash, Regalado immediately divulged its hiding place and
surrendered the marijuana "because he was scared."
Regalado denied handing the marijuana to PO 1 Pedri gal and maintained that the latter took it from
the teenager. He claimed that he signed the confiscation receipt despite not understanding it as he
did not know how to read. He likewise testified that he was not informed of his constitutional rights.
RTC: found Regalado guilty. On appeal, Regalado argued that the trial court erred when it I
appreciated the evidence despite the apprehending team's failure to prove the integrity and identity
of the seized items under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. He contended that
the trial court erred in deviating from the established rule that by itself, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty should not prevail over his presumed innocence.
CA: denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court's Decision.
Petitioner maintains that there was no elected official, media representative, or Department of
Justice representative present during the physical inventory of the seized items. Moreover, no
photographs of the seized items were presented in court.
Petitioner further claims that the seized items were not immediately marked after his arrest, casting
doubt on their origin. He insists that there was no sufficient evidence to establish the chain of
custody.
Respondent argues that noncompliance with Section 21 per se will not render the arrest illegal or the
seized marijuana inadmissible, as the law itself provides an exception. It points out that the
"immediate confiscation" has no exact definition, and that marking in the nearest police station has
been previously allowed by this Court.
Finally, respondent claims that petitioner's admission of possessing the seized marijuana rendered
the issue of noncompliance with the chain of custody rule as moot.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of an elective official, a representative from the media, and a
representative from the Department of Justice during the buy-bust operation, as well as the
nonpresentation of the photographs of the seized marijuana before the trial court warrants petitioner
Augusto L. Regalado's acquittal.
508
Ruling: NO.
In People v. Que, this Court explained how Republic Act No. 10640 relaxed the requirements
under Section 21(1 ):
It was relaxed with respect to the persons required to be present during the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items. Originally under Republic Act No. 9165,
the use of the conjunctive "and" indicated that Section 21 required the presence of all of the
following, in addition to "the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel":
First, a representative from the media;

Second, a representative from the Department of Justice; and
Third, any elected public official..
As amended by Republic Act No. 10640, Section 21 (1) uses the disjunctive "or," i.e., "with an elected
public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media." Thus, a
representative from the media and a representative from the National Prosecution Service are now
alternatives to each other. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Here, none of the three (3) people required by Section 21 ( 1 ), as originally worded, was present
during the physical inventory of the seized items.
Moreover, this Court has held that the prosecution has "the positive duty to establish that earnest
efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21 ( 1) of
[Republic Act No.] 9165, or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so." Yet, not only did
the prosecution fail to establish that earnest efforts were employed in securing the presence of the
three (3) witnesses; it did not even bother to offer any justification for the law enforcers' deviation
from the law's requirements. Since preliminaries do not appear on record, this Court cannot
speculate why the law enforcers neglected the simple rules in the conduct of a buy-bust operation.
Nonetheless, police officers are reminded that lapses like this-absent any justifiable ground--cast
doubt on the integrity of the seized items and can be fatal to the prosecution's cause.
509
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs LAHMODIN AMERIL Y ABDUL @ AMOR/ MHONG

G.R. No. 222192 March 13, 2019
LEONEN, J;
At the core of every prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs is the constitutional mandate of the State
to adduce proof on the identity and integrity of the seized illegal drugs. The wisdom behind this burden is to
ensure that the items seized were neither tampered nor contaminated. Failure to overcome such burden calls
for the acquittal of the accused.
Facts:
In an Information, dated April 24, 2006 Ameril was charged with violation of Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
The prosecution presented as its witness Special Investigator Rolan Fernandez of the NBI and
testified that on April 10, 2006, a confidential informant came told that one (1) alias "Amor," later
identified as Ameril, was selling prohibited drugs in Metro Manila.
The informant called Ameril introduced Fernandez as a prospective buyer. In the morning, the
informant confirmed to Fernandez that Ameril would deliver the shabu. Fernandez then prepared
the money. Fernandez placed his initials on the bills, but forgot where he actually marked them.
The buy-bust operation team, arrived at the meeting place where the informant introduced him to
Fernandez. After a few minutes of conversation, Ameril asked Fernandez if he had the money, to
which Fernandez replied that Ameril should first show the shabu. Ameril showed him a black paper
bag, inside of which were three (3) small transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance. Convinced that the sachets contained shabu, Fernandez gave the boodle money to
Ameril. Ameril gave the paper bag to the latter made the pre-arranged signal.
After the arrest, SI Fernandez marked the three (3) plastic sachets with Ameril's initials: marking
was made in the presence of Kagawad, took photos and inventory of the seized items. Both the
witness signed the inventory.
Fernandez submitted the seized items to the Forensic Chemistry. Felicisima Francisco (PSI Francisco)
conducted a qualitative examination on the seized items, which tested positive for shabu.
Ameril denied the allegations against him.
RTC: Convicted him

CA: Affirmed
Ameril argued that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti, as the documents and
testimonies revealed flaws in the prosecution's handling of illegal drugs allegedly seized from him.
He emphasized that the details of where the seized items' markings took place were not on record.
Ameril further argued that the inconsistencies in the markings of the seized illegal drugs
"compromised the integrity of the seized items.
510
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Ruling:
In sustaining a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, "the following elements must
first be established:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place[;] and
(2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
The illegal drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Its existence must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. "Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be
observed in establishing the corpus delicti. The chain of custody rule performs this function as it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, outlines the procedure
that police officers must follow in handling seized illegal drugs.
In Mallillin v. People, this Court emphasized the importance of the chain of custody:
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest
when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and
similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Where a substance later
analyzed as heroin - was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however
did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in
their possession - was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that
the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or
baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession
of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony
of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they
are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot
reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the
chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other cases – by accident or otherwise - in which similar evidence was seized or in
which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable
must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
511
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.
Failing to comply with Article II, Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165 implies "a
concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti and
"produces doubts as to the origins of the [seized illegal drugs]." The Information filed against
accused-appellant provided that he was caught selling three (3) transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance known as shabu, marked "LAA," ''LAA-2," and" LAA."
However, the evidence presented during trial showed that accused appellant sold three (3) plastic
sachets with the markings "LLA-1," "LLA-2," and "LLA.
Contrary to the Regional Trial Court's findings, the integrity of the seized illegal drugs was not
preserved.
Again, it must be emphasized that the seized illegal drugs constitute the corpus delicti of the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. Its identity must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is doubt
on its identity, conviction cannot be sustained. In People v. Garcia, this Court acquitted the accused.
It held that the discrepancy in the markings of the seized items raised doubts if the items presented
in court were the same ones taken from the accused upon arrest: Here, like in Garcia, there is a
discrepancy in the markings of the illegal drugs seized from accused-appellant. This raises doubts if
the items presented in court were the exact ones taken from accused-appellant.
During examination, Special Investigator Fernandez testified that he marked the seized illegal drugs
with the initials LLA-1 and LLA-3. However, on cross-examination, Special Investigator Fernandez
stated that he marked the seized illegal drugs with initials LAA-1, LAA-2, and LAA-3.
That the integrity of the corpus delicti had been compromised was further magnified by the gap in
the chain of custody. Special Investigator Fernandez merely testified that he submitted the seized
illegal drugs to the Forensic Chemistry Division for examination and safekeeping. He did not
identify the person to whom he gave the seized illegal drugs upon delivery.
While the prosecution stipulated that PSI Francisco received three (3) plastic sachets with markings
"LAA-I," "LAA-2," and "LAA-3, the evidence presented showed that accused-appellant sold three
(3) plastic sachets with the markings "LLA-1," "LLA-2," and "LLA." Moreover, Special Investigator
Fernandez testified that he used the markings "LAA-I," "LAA-2," and "LAA-3." Thus, the seized
illegal drugs were referred to using three (3) sets of markings. The Regional Trial Court, having
evaluated the evidence presented firsthand, should have been more cautious in convicting accused
appellant despite the obvious discrepancy in the markings of the seized drugs and procedural lapses
committed by the arresting officers in handling the same. The glaring inconsistency in the markings
of the seized illegal drugs should have warned the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
something was amiss. This Court has stressed that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty, which the Court of Appeals relied on in its Decision, "stands only when no reason
exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even
in that instance the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of
512
innocence in favor of the accused. The totality of the evidence presented shows that the arresting
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation were remiss in the performance of their official
functions. They made discrepancies in the markings of the seized illegal drugs, and failed to comply
with the chain of custody. Consequently, the presumption of regularity in favor of arresting officers
is negated.
513
HA DATU TAWAHIG (RODERICK D. SUMATRA), TRIBAL CHIEFTAIN, HIGAONON TRIBE

VS. THE HONORABLE CEBU
G.R. NO. 221139. MARCH 20, 2019
The Philippine legal system's framework for the protection of indigenous peoples was never intended
and will not operate to deprive courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses. Individuals belonging to
indigenous cultural communities who are charged with criminal offenses cannot invoke Republic Act No.
8371, or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, to evade prosecution and liability under courts of law.
FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Roderick D. Sumatra also known as Ha Datu Tawahig, praying that respondent Judge
Estela Alma Singco her co-respondents, all public prosecutors from Cebu City, be compelled to
honor a Resolution issued by a body known as the "Dadantulan Tribal Court," and be required to
put an end to Sumatra's criminal prosecution.
The Dadantulan Tribal Court absolved Sumatra, a tribal leader of the Higaonon Tribe, of liability for
charges of rape and discharged him from criminal, civil, and administrative liability.
In her September 13, 2007 Order, Judge Singco directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Sumatra. Following his arrest, Sumatra filed a Motion to Quash and Supplemental Motion to
Quash. These motions cited as bases Sections 159 and 6510 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act,
and were:
predicated on the ground that the [Regional Trial Court] ha[d] no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, ... Accused through counsel asserts that the present controversy is purely a dispute
involving indigenous cultural communities over which customary laws must apply in accordance
with their tribal justice system and under the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples.
In her August 29, 2013 Order, 12 Judge Singco denied the Motion to Quash and Supplemental
Motion to Quash. She reasoned that the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not apply [to] the
prosecution of a "dispute" such as this case as it does not involve claims over ancestral domain nor it
relates (sic) to the rights of indigenous communities/people which would require the application of
customary laws and practices to resolve the "dispute" between the parties herein.
Relying on the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and "other related laws concerning cases involving
indigenous peoples," petitioner maintains that a writ of mandamus must be issued to compel
respondents to "uphold and respect" the Dadantulan Tribal Court Resolution, and "[t]hereby
releas[e] [Sumatra] from jail to stop [his] continued arbitrary detention."
Issue:
Whether or not this Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondents Judge Estela
Alma Singco, to desist from proceeding with the rape case against petitioner Roderick D. Sumatra.
514
RULING:
NO.
Petitioner is well-served to disabuse himself of the notion that the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act will shield him from prosecution and prospective liability for crimes.
The 1987 Constitution vests this Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. However, it is not only this Court that has the
competence to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The Court of Appeals and
regional trial courts are equally capable of taking cognizance of petitions for such writs.
Nonetheless, the original jurisdiction this Court shares with the Court of Appeals and regional trial
courts is not a license to immediately seek relief from this Court. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus must be filed in keeping with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is grounded on considerations of judicial economy. In Aala v.

Mayor Uy:
The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties
from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts.
The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon
the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. Hence, for this
Court to be able to "satisfactorily, perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental
charter, " it must remain as a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the court
of the "task of dealing with causes in the first instance.
Applying this doctrine is not merely for practicality; it also ensures that courts at varying levels act
in accord with their respective competencies.
The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections noted that "the doctrine that requires respect for the
hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.”
However, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not an inflexible rule. In Spouses Chua v. Ang, this
Court held that "[a] strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is
not present in a case. This Court has recognized that a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction
may be warranted in exceptional cases as when there are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the
petition, or when what is raised is a pure question of law. In a fairly recent case, we summarized
other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court
may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of
constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves
transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are
better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves
acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the
515
ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare,
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was
a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
It does not escape this Court's attention that an equally effective avenue for relief was available to
petitioner through recourse to the Court of Appeals. This Court, however, takes cognizance of the
Petition, in the interest of addressing the novel issue of whether the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act
works to remove from courts of law jurisdiction over criminal cases involving indigenous peoples.
It does not.
Rule 65, Section 3 indicates that a writ of mandamus is available in two (2) alternative situations:
A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, "when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station"; second,
"when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person . . . unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. "
Petitioner asserts that, in light of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, it was respondents' duty to
desist from proceeding with the case against him. His plea for relief, therefore, falls under the first
situation. For a writ of mandamus to be issued in such a situation, there must be a concurrence
between: (1) a clear, duly established legal right pertaining to petitioner; and (2) a correlative,
ministerial duty imposed by law upon respondent, which that respondent unlawfully neglects.
Additionally, a writ of mandamus, as with certiorari and prohibition, shall be issued only upon a
showing that "there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist from taking cognizance
of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative rights and duties in
support of petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued. A crime is "an offense
against society. It "is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large.
A criminal action, where "the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law, is
thus pursued "to maintain social order." It "punishes the offender in order to deter him [or her] and
others from committing the same or similar offense, ... isolate[s] him [or her] from society, reform[s]
and rehabilitate[s] him [or her]. One who commits a crime commits an offense against all the citizens
of the state penalizing a given act or omission: a criminal offense is an outrage to the very
sovereignty of the State[.] Accordingly, a criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the "People" as
plaintiff. Likewise, a representative of the State, the public prosecutor, "direct[s] and control[s] the
prosecution of [an] offense. The capacity to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of the State's
police power. It inheres in "the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of the
members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual
and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
The basic precepts underlying crimes and criminal actions make it improper for the State to yield
"disputes" involving criminal offenses to indigenous peoples' customary laws and practices.
516
To yield criminal prosecution would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people as the objects
of criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may enable a measure of reparation for
private injuries engendered by criminal offenses, but it will never enable the consummate
recompense owed to the State and the Filipino people. Ultimately then, yielding prosecution would
mean sanctioning a miscan-iage of justice. It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to
facilitate such miscan-iage of justice. Its view of self-governance and empowerment is not myopic,
but is one that balances. Preservation is pursued in the context of national unity and is impelled by
harmony with the national legal system. Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal statutes
designed to address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty.
Viewed through the lens of the requisites for issuing a writ of mandamus, there is no right or duty to
even speak of here. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does it state that courts of law
are to abandon jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of mechanisms applying customary
laws. Petitioner derives no right from the Dadantulan Tribal Court to be spared from criminal
liability. The Regional Trial Court is under no obligation to defer to the exculpatory pronouncements
made by the Dadantulan Tribal Court. Instead, it must proceed to rule on petitioner's alleged
liability with all prudence and erudition.
517
LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 211214. MARCH 20, 2019
For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as personally
observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is committing an illicit
act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right
to privacy.
FACTS:
On March 17, 2010, Manibog was charged with violation of the Omnibus Election Code
(Gun Ban). During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that on March 17, 2010, police officers arrested
Manibog and seized his firearm for not having a permit from the COMELEC. The issue was later
narrowed down to whether an illegal search and seizure attended Manibog's apprehension and
confiscation of his gun.
In the morning of March 17, 2010, Chief Inspector Beniat received information from a police asset
that Manibog was standing outside the Municipal Tourism Office of Dingras, !locos Norte with a
gun tucked in his waistband.
Chief Inspector Beniat saw a bulge on Manibog's waist, which the police officer deduced to be a gun
due to its distinct contour. Chief Inspector Beniat went up to Mani bog, patted the bulging object on
his waist, and confirmed that there was a gun tucked in Manibog's waistband. He disarmed
Manibog of the .45 caliber handgun inside a holster, after which he arrested him for violating the
election gun ban and brought him to the police station for an inquest proceeding.
For the defense, Manibog did not deny that he was carrying a gun when the police officers arrested
him. However, he claimed that while Chief Inspector Beniat was frisking him, the police officer
whispered an apology, explaining that he had to do it or he would get in trouble with the police
provincial director. Manibog further testified that at the police station, Chief Inspector Beniat asked
him to relay his apologies to Dingras Mayor Marinette Gamboa (Mayor Gamboa) since Manibog had
worked closely with her. He also stated that he did not hold a grudge against Chief Inspector Beniat.
RTC: Found Manibog guilty beyond reasonable doubt .

It ruled that the warrantless search on Manibog was incidental to a lawful arrest because there was
probable cause for the police officers to frisk and arrest him. The Regional Trial Court likewise
brushed off the defense's assertions that the police officers' failure to obtain a warrant invalidated
Manibog's search and arrest. It declared that the police officers merely acted befitting the urgency of
the situation; they would have been remiss in their duty if they did not immediately act on the
information they had received.
CA: AFFIRMED and ruled that warrantless search made on Manibog was incidental to a lawful
arrest, since the police officers had probable cause to believe that he was committing a crime when
518
he was arrested. It noted that Manibog had been caught in flagrante delicto and failed to show a
permit allowing him to carry his firearm.
Petitioner claims that he was not arrested in flagrante delicto because he was only standing in front
of the Municipal Tourism Office when the police officers descended upon and searched him. He
maintains that the search came prior to his arrest, rendering any evidence obtained from him tainted
and inadmissible. Petitioner asserts that at the time of his arrest, the police officers could not have
seen the contour or bulge of his gun, as it was tucked in his waistband below his navel and could not
be seen from a distance. He emphasizes that the police officer who frisked him first patted his back
before finding the gun in his waist. This indicates that the police officer was unsure if he actually
had a gun on him. Petitioner also imputes malice on the police officers, who had earlier received
orders to dismantle Mayor Gamboa's private army. As part of her security, he claims that he was
singled out and illegally searched and arrested despite merely standing outside a building at that
time.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search made upon petitioner Larry Sabuco Manibog was
unlawful, and, consequently, whether the gun confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling:
NO. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the inviolability of a person's right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be
carried out through a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure violates the Constitution.
Any evidence resulting from it "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
However, the constitutional proscription only covers unreasonable searches and seizures.
Jurisprudence has recognized instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures, which are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
519
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
Two (2) of these exceptions to a search warrant-a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest and
"stop and frisk"-are often confused with each other. Malacat v. Court of Appeals explained that they
"differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their
allowable scope.”
For an arrest to be lawful, a warrant of arrest must have been judicially issued or there was a lawful
warrantless arrest as provided for in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
( c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b ), the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the arresting officer must
have personally witnessed the crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b ), the arresting officer must
have had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed an offense.
Nonetheless, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest generally precedes, or is
substantially contemporaneous with the search.
In direct contrast with warrantless searches incidental to a lawful arrest, stop and frisk searches are
conducted to deter crime. People v. Cogaed underscored that they are necessary for law enforcement,
though never at the expense of violating a citizen's right to privacy. "Stop and frisk" searches
(sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers
should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern – based on facts that they themselves observe -
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of
an illicit act. Posadas v. Court of Appeals saw this Court uphold the warrantless search and seizure
done as a valid stop and frisk search. There, the accused's suspicious actions, coupled with his
520
attempt to flee when the police officers introduced themselves to him, amounted to a reasonable
suspicion that he was concealing something illegal in his buri bag.
However, Posadas failed to elaborate on or describe what the police officers observed as the
suspicious act that led them to search the accused's buri bag. In comparison, the police officers in
Manalili v. Court of Appeals56 responded to a report that drug addicts were roaming in front of the
Kalookan City Cemetery. There, they saw a man with bloodshot eyes who had trouble walking
straight. This Court upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest as a stop and frisk search, since the
police officers' observation and assessment led them to believe that the man was high on drugs and
compelled them to investigate and search him. Similarly, in People v. Solayao, police officers were
investigating reports that a group of armed men was roaming the barangay at night. As they
patrolled the streets, they saw seemingly drunk men, among them Solayao in a camouflage uniform.
The men fled upon seeing the police, but Solayao was caught and found with an unlicensed firearm.
This Court upheld the validity of the warrantless search and seizure conducted as a stop and frisk
search, since the unfolding events did not leave the police officers enough time to procure a search
warrant. Manalili and Solayao upheld the warrantless searches conducted because "the police
officers[,] using their senses[,] observed facts that led to the suspicion." Furthermore, the totality of
the circumstances in each case provided sufficient and genuine reason for them to suspect that
something illicit was afoot. For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must have had
personal knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit act.
Cogaed emphasized that anything less than the arresting officer's personal observation of a
suspicious circumstance as basis for the search is an infringement of the "basic right to security of
one's person and effects."
Malacat instructed that for a stop and frisk search to be valid, mere suspicion is not enough; there
should be a genuine reason, as determined by the police officer, to warrant a belief that the person
searched was carrying a weapon. In short, the totality of circumstances should result in a genuine
reason to justify a stop and frisk search.
In Esquillo v. People, the police officer approached and searched the accused after seeing her put a
clear plastic sachet in her cigarette case and try to flee from him. This Court upheld the validity of
the stop and frisk search conducted, since the police officer's experience led him to reasonably
suspect that the plastic sachet with white crystalline substance in the cigarette case was a dangerous
drug.
In his dissent in Esquillo, however, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Lucas Bersamin (Chief
Justice Bersamin) pointe:d out how the police officer admitted that only his curiosity upon seeing the
accused put a plastic sachet in her cigarette case prompted him to approach her. This was despite
not seeing what was in it, as he was standing three (3) meters away from her at that time.
For purposes of a valid Terry stop-and-frisk search, the test for the existence of reasonable suspicion
that a person is engaged in criminal activity is the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the
521
eyes of a reasonable, prudent police officer. Yet, the totality of the circumstances described by PO 1
Cruzin did not suffice to engender any reasonable suspicion in his mind. The petitioner's act,
without more, was an innocuous movement, absolutely not one to give rise in the mind of
anexperienced officer to any belief that she had any weapon concealed about her, or that she was
probably committing a crime in the: presence of the officer. Neither should her act and the
surrounding circumstances engender any reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer that a
criminal activity was afoot. We should bear in mind that the Court has frequently struck down the
arrest of individuals whose overt acts did not transgress the penal laws, or were wholly innocent.
Chief Justice Bersamin cautioned against warrantless searches based on just one ( 1) suspicious
circumstance. There should have been "more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity to uphold the validity of a stop and
frisk search. Accordingly, to sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer
should have personally observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which
would then create a reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer to
investigate further.
Here, while the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search was conducted on
petitioner, the facts on record do not point to a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rather, what transpired was a stop and frisk search.
Chief Inspector Beniat received information that petitioner, whom he knew as a kagawad and
security aide of Mayor Gamboa, was carrying a gun outside the Municipal Tourism Office during an
election gun ban. With a few other police officers, he went there and spotted petitioner right in front
of the building with a suspicious-looking bulge protruding under his shirt, around his waist. The
police officer deduced this to be a firearm based on the object's size and contour. He testified Even
on cross-examination, Chief Inspector Beniat did not waver from his testimony that petitioner had a
gun tucked in his waistband. His testimony was corroborated by P02 Caraballa, who was part of the
team that investigated the report on petitioner: The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police
officers' visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband, led to a
reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban. However, a reasonable
suspicion is not synonymous with the personal knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to
effect a valid warrantless arrest. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the search
conducted on petitioner fell under the established exception of a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest. Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting officers'
observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for
the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner. Hence, the trial court correctly
upheld the reasonableness of the warrantless search on petitioner:
522
JAKA V. URDANETA
APRIL 1, 2019
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not determine a
controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, expertise, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.
Facts:
Ayala Land, Inc., the successor-in-interest of Makati Development Corporation, is the
developer and seller of lots in Urdaneta, Makati.
All parcels of land sold by Ayala Land in Urdaneta village are subject to uniform
restrictions, which are annotated on the transfer certificates of title covering the lots.
Jaka Investments bought three lots in Urdaneta village. On September 6, 2007, the
association held a general membership meeting to vote on the changes. On April 8, 2008, the HLURB
issued a certificate of association’s amended Articles of Incorporation.
On July 30, 2008, Jaka Investments filed before RTC a petition for cancellation of restrictions.
Jaka Investments claimed that upon the expiration of the term of restrictions on June 1, 2008, the
legal or contractual basis for restrictions ceased.
The trial court ruled that the term of restrictions in Jaka case expired. Thus, the matter will
fall under the jurisdiction of RTC, which may act as land registration court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction (No.)
2. Whether or not certiorari will prosper (No.)
Ruling:
Petition denied. Court of Appeals affirmed. There is lack of jurisdiction on the part of
Regional Trial Court. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot and
will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, expertise, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
Cases involving intra-association controversies fall under the jurisdiction of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board which is the government agency with technical expertise on the matter.
523
BERNARDO CONSTANTINO V. PEOPLE

APRIL 8, 2019
Rule 45 mandates that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, save
for certain exceptions.
Facts:
For a notary public to be found guilty of falsification of a notarial will, prosecution must
prove that he has falsified or simulated the signatures of the testator or the instrumental witnesses to
make it appear that they participated in the execution of the document when they did not.
In this case, Atty. Constantino was charged with falsification since it was discovered that Dr.
Asuncion signed the will after it had been notarized, even if joint acknowledgment indicated that
Balintona, spouses Cu, and Dr. Asuncion were all present as witnesses.
In his defense, Atty. Constantino alleged that Severino had been of sound mind and could walk with
a cane when he started visiting Atty. Constantino to prepare his last will and testament. Court of
Appeals affirmed RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not petition presents questions of fact not cognizable in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of Rules of Court
Held:
Rule 45 mandates that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari, save for certain exceptions. Thus, factual findings of the trial court would be respected,
since facts were not disputed.
Meanwhile, petitioner Constantino was acquitted. It was not petitioner who made it appear
that Dr. Asuncion participated in the execution of joint acknowledgment, but Ferrer and Dr.
Asuncion himself.
524
PEOPLE V. COMOSO (APRIL 10, 2019)
The burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and failure to discharge the burden warrants an
accused’s acquittal.
Facts:
Comoso was charged with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act,
particularly illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Upon arraignment, Comoso pleaded not guilty. In this
case, the police officers through an asset organized an entrapment operation, in which Comoso
allegedly arrived and handed a plastic sachet of marijuana in exchange of money.
However, chain of custody was not established, pointing out that there was no transfer of
seized items from arresting officer to investigating officer. He further notes that it was not explained
how seized items were handled from the crime laboratory to forensic chemist, the transfer of which
took 11 days from March 28 to April 8, 2005. He argues that the facts put a cloud of doubt and
suspicion as to the supposed preservation of integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution proved Comoso’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Article 2, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, despite not strictly
complying with the requisites for preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti.
Ruling:
No. Failure to comply with chain of custody requirements in drugs shall result in an
accused’s acquittal. In this case, evidentiary photographs are also absent. The burden of proof lies
with the prosecution, and failure to discharge the burden warrants an accused’s acquittal.
To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the following elements: 1. Proof that the
sale took place; 2. Presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. Evidence proving that a
transaction took place must be credible and complete. In buy-bust operation, this is usually proven
by the testimony of the poseur-buyer.
In this case, it remained unclear from PO2 Aquino’s testimony if he conducted the inventory
for accused-appellant; if the inventory was signed, and if PO2 Aquino turned the items over to the
investigating officer.
525
CORDILLERA GLOBAL NETWORK REP. BY ITS PRESIDENT GLORIA ABAO, ET.AL. AND
JUDY-LYN ADAJAR, ET.AL. V. RAMON PAJE IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (APRIL 10, 2019)
Rule 45, Section 1 requires a verified petition raising only questions of law. Rule 45, Section 4
provides that petition must contain a sworn certification against forum shopping. Rule 45, Section 5, sets forth
that petitioner’s failure to comply with any of the enumerated formal requirements is sufficient ground for
petition’s dismissal.
Facts:
Construction of SM Baguio located within SM Pines Resort Complex, was completed in
November 2003. A few years later, SM City Baguio undertook to expand its existing mall on Luneta
Hill to increase parking and commercial spaces.
The first civil case prayed that a temporary environmental protection order be immediately
issued to Benguet Pine and Alnus trees on Luneta hill.
Cordillera Global Network then filed a petition to cite SM Investments Corp. in contempt for
violating TEPO. Cases have been consolidated.
RTC held that Cordillera Global Network, et.al. possessed locus standi under the principle of
transcendental importance. However, the cases did not fall under any of the exceptions to the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies (DEAR). Thus, cases were dismissible on procedural
grounds. Court of Appeals affirmed RTC since there was no patent illegality.
Cordillera filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petition should be dismissed for having a defective verification and
certification against forum shopping
2. Whether or not petitioner should be dismissed for raising questions of fact, which are not
allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of Rules of Court
3. Whether or not petitioner should be dismissed for failure to observe DEAR and doctrine of
primary jurisdiction
4. Whether assailed permits issued in favor of private respondent have been validly and
regularly issued
Ruling:
The petition is partially granted. It does not escape the Court’s attention that RTC and CA
missed private respondent’s application for the cutting of 182 trees, in addition to 112 already
allowed in the earlier Environmental Compliance Certificate – merely through an amended
526
Environmental Compliance Cert. and 9 years after he original has been used. Maximum effort shall
be made to preserve or protect existing vegetation.
Meanwhile, appeal is applicable only if the person or entity charged with a duty to exhaust
administrative remedy to appropriate government agency, has been a party in the proceedings
wherein decision appealed has been rendered. It is not disputed that petitioners are never a party to
the application of environmental compliance certificates. Thus, they are never furnished a copy of
the decision which is supposed to trigger the start of 15-day period.
Rule 45, Section 1 requires a verified petition raising only questions of law. Rule 45, Section 4
provides that petition must contain a sworn certification against forum shopping. Rule 45, Section 5,
sets forth that petitioner’s failure to comply with any of the enumerated formal requirements is
sufficient ground for petition’s dismissal.
In the present case, the signing of verification by only 11 out of 59 petitioners already
sufficiently assures the court that allegations in the pleading are true and correct. With respect to
certification against forum shopping, the non-signing of petitioners, shall drop them as parties to the
case.
527
MICHAEL C. GUY V. RAFFY TULFO, ET.AL.

APRIL 20, 2019
In cause of action for sum of money, the amount of damages shall not be included in determining
jurisdiction. However, when the main cause of action is damages, the amount of damages is jurisdictional.
Actual damages would mean compensation for an injury that would put the injured party in the position
where it was before the injury. Not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable. Moral damages were
compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong.
Facts:
On March 24, 2004, an article entitled “Malinis ba talaga o nalilinis-linisan lang (Sino si
Finance Sec. Juanita Amatong?)” was published in Abante Tonite, allegedly referring to Michael
Guy who was then being investigated for tax fraud, and went to Secretary Juanita Amatong’s house
to ask for help.
Claiming that it tainted his reputation, Guy filed with the Office of City Prosecutor an
amended information charging Tulfo and Macasaet, et.al. with libel. RTC held the defendants liable
for libel. C.A. affirmed. RTC awarded petitioner actual damages in the amount of 5M based on his
testimony that he could earn 50M in 10 years.
Issues:
1. Whether Tulfo et.al. were guilty of libel
2. Whether there was sufficient factual basis for an award of damages
Ruling:
The respondents were guilty of libel. Journalists should observe high standards expected
from their profession. The practice of journalism should be accurate and fair, and mandates
accountability and transparency.
Actual damages would mean compensation for an injury that would put the injured party in
the position where it was before the injury. Not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it
must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof or best
evidence obtainable.
Meanwhile, moral damages were compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and
suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong. Moral damages were not punitive in nature, but
were instead a type of award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered. Factual
foundation of award as well as causal connection of petitoner’s suffering to respondent’s act should
be taken into consideration. Wherefore, petition was partially granted. Tulfo, et.al. were ordered to
pay Guy 500k for moral damages; 1M as exemplary damages; and 211,200.00 pesos as attorney’s
fees, with 6% interest per annum from finality of decision.
528
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. v. ZZZ

G.R. No. 229862
June 19, 2019
Recantations are viewed unfavorably especially in rape cases. Circumstances in which the recantation was
made are thoroughly examined before the evidence of retraction can be given any weight; Affidavit of
Recantation and Desistance.
Facts:
An information as filed against ZZZ charging him with the crime of rape. ZZZ pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged during his arraignment. During the trial, defense presented the AAA's
affidavit of Recantation and Desistance. However, RTC and the CA did not give credence to the
affidavit of AAA and instead, the RTC and the CA convicted the accused for the crime of statutory
rape ruled by the former but modified by the crime of simple rape by the latter. It further held that
instead of discrediting the prosecution's evidence, AAA's Affidavit of Recantation and Desistance
bolstered her earlier statements by reaffirming that: (1) ZZZ sexually molested her; (2) the
prosecutor did not force her to testify; and (3) she was not put under duress.
Issue:
Whether or not AAA's affidavit of Recantation and Desistance can be give weight to the case.
Ruling:
NO. As a rule, affidavits of desistance are viewed with skepticism and reservation because
they can be "easily obtained for monetary consideration or through intimidation. If the crime did not
really happen, AAA would have made the Affidavit at the earliest instance-but she did not. Instead,
she executed it more than two (2) years after the crime had been committed. If the crime did not
really happen, she would not have submitted herself to physical examination or hours of
questioning-but she did. Moreover, her recollection on how accused-appellant committed the crime
was detailed; her testimony, consistent. There was no evidence that AAA was forced or pressured
by the prosecutor to take the witness stand, as manifested by her answer during the cross-
examination.
529
RICARDO VERINO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 225710
June 19, 2019
State agents are expected to strictly comply with the legal safeguards under Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165, as amended. Should there be noncompliance, the prosecution must prove that a
justifiable cause existed and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were
preserved for the saving clause in Section 21 to be appreciated in favor of State agents.
Facts:
The accused was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 for illegal possession of
drugs. The prosecution contended that the accused, based on the tip that was received by the police
officers, come out of his store, in Marulas Public Market, and meet a man whom he showed a plastic
of sachet. In his defense, Verino stated that he was closing his store at the market when he was
suddenly arrested by police officers, who then planted sachets of shabu in his pocket. Verino also
claimed that the police officers had originally intended to arrest a different person, but arrested him
instead after that person escaped.
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged against him. The RTC also noted the
police officers' compliance with the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA affirmed the
findings of the RTC. Verino moved for reconsideration, but his Motion was denied by the CA.
Hence, Verino filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner claims that the police officers failed to comply with Article II, Section 21 of RA
9165. He pointed out that he did not sign the inventory, and no representative from the DOJ or the
media was present when the inventory was conducted. Furthermore, the prosecution allegedly
failed to present as evidence the photographs that were allegedly taken when the seized sachets
were being inventoried. Petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to proffer any justifiable
ground for the procedural lapses.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution proved petitioner Ricardo Verifio y Pingol @ "Ricky"' is guilt
beyond reasonable doubt despite its failure to show strict compliance with the required procedure
under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended.
Ruling:
Accused must be acquitted. Here, an inventory of the items seized from petitioner was
prepared by SPO3 Sanchez, the investigating officer. However, despite the clear requirements
under Section 21, the inventory was only witnessed by an elected public official. The prosecution
530
failed to explain why the inventory was not signed by petitioner or his representative and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media, as mandated by law. When the
RTC asked why only the elected public official signed the inventory, PO 1 Verde explained that he
did not prepare the inventory and was in no position to know the protocol behind the inventory of
items seized from operations. He added that SPO3 Sanchez should know the protocol for inventory-
taking since he prepared the inventory. Another lapse was the prosecution's failure to present a
photograph of the inventory, despite POI Verde's testimony that at least two (2) people took photos
during the inventory. Again, the prosecution failed to explain this blatant noncompliance with
Section 21.
Moreover, with respect to the discrepancies between the prosecution witnesses' testimonies
and the prosecution's documentary evidence, the Coordination Form filled out by PO3 Fabreag for
the surveillance on petitioner was prepared at 3 :20 p.m. that same day, a good two (2) hours before
PO 1 Verde supposedly received the information on petitioner. PO3 Fabreag was not presented to
explain this discrepancy.
Similarly, the April 4, 2014 Pre-Operation Report signed by Chief Inspector Ruba had
Prudencio Jun Cuabo alias Madonna or Bunso as its target. The prosecution, likewise, failed to
explain why petitioner was not indicated as the target in the Pre-Operation Report. despite PO 1
Verde's statement that only Chief Inspector Ruba could explain why petitioner's name was not
indicated as a target in the Pre-Operation Report, the prosecution did not present him as its witness.
These discrepancies, coupled with the flagrant noncompliance with Section 21, create reasonable
doubt as to whether PO I Verde received a tip regarding petitioner, whether a surveillance was
conducted on him, and ultimately, whether he was caught possessing dangerous drugs.
A conviction in criminal proceedings requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, as defined

under Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The quantum of proof beyond
reasonable doubt springs from no less than the Bill of Rights, which recognizes every person's right
to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require
absolute certainty; rather, it calls for moral certainty since "[t]he conscience must be satisfied that the
accused is responsible for the offense charged."
531
REYNALDO SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 213760
July 1, 2019
Confidential asset or the informant's testimony is not indispensable. it is enough that there is proof that "the
accused has lured, enticed[,] or engaged its victims or transported them for the established purpose of
exploitation.
Facts:
The accused was charged for violation of RA 9208 (Anti-trafficking in Persons Act of 2003).
The petitoners questions the credibility of the informant alias Romeo David and points out that the
lack of testimony from the confidential infqrmant, David, raises doubts on whether "petitioner truly
offered AAA to him[. ]"43 He adds that the witnesses were allegedly inconsistent on David's
identity.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the informant is indispensable for the establishment of the
gulit of the accused.
Ruling:
NO. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the testimony of the confidential informant is not
indispensable in the crime of trafficking in persons. Neither is his identity relevant. "It is sufficient
that the accused has lured, enticed[,] or engaged its victims or transported them for the established
purpose of exploitation,"67 which was sufficiently shown by the trafficked person's testimony alone.
532
GENEVIEVE ROSAL ARREZA A.K.A. GENEVIEVE ARREZA TOYO V. TETSUSHI TOYO ET.
AL G.R. No. 213198
July 1, 2019
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. They must be proven as
fact under our rules on evidence. A divorce decree obtained abroad is deemed a foreign judgment, hence the
indispensable need to have it pleaded and proved before its legal effects may be extended to the Filipino spouse.
Facts:
On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese
citizen, were married in Quezon City. They bore a child whom they named Keiichi Toyo. After 19
years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of
Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi's
family register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu. On May 24, 2012, Genevieve
filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry.
In support of her Petition, Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate,

Tetsushi's Family Register, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce, and an
English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, among others. The RTC set the case for hearing and
on the day of hearing, no one appeared to oppose the Petition. The RTC rendered judgment denying
Genevieve's Petition. It decreed that while the pieces of evidence presented by Genevieve proved
that their divorce agreement was accepted by the local government of Japan, she nevertheless failed
to prove the copy of Japan's law.
The RTC noted that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation submitted
by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in
Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Genevieve filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it
was denied.
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not treating the English translation of the Civil
Code of Japan as an official publication in accordance with Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of
Court. That it is an official publication, she points out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence of
Japan's law under Rule 132, Section 25 of the Rules of Court. The respondents, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, maintain that the Regional Trial Court was correct in denying the I petition for
petitioner's failure to prove respondent Tetsushi's national law. They stress that 1 in proving a
foreign country's law, one must comply with the requirements wider Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of
the Rules of Court.2
533
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry filed by petitioner Genevieve Rosal (}
Arreza a.k.a. Genevieve Arreza Toyo.
Ruling:
Actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, it is indispensable that the
petitioner prove not only the foreign judgment granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse's
national law. This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws. Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's
national law, purported to be official acts of a sovereign authority, can be established by complying
with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections 2445 and 2546 of the Rules of Court.
Here, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the documents petitioner submitted to prove the
divorce decree have complied with the demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25. However, it found
the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation insufficient to prove Japan's law on
divorce. It noted that these documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in
Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The SC referred the case before the CA for appropriate action and to determine and
resolve the pertinent factual issues because as a general rule, the SC is not a trier of facts. Finally,
settled is the rule that, generally, this Court only entertains questions of law in a Rule 45 petition.6
Questions of fact, like the existence of Japan's law on divorce, are not within this Court's ambit to
resolve.
534
RONALD LIM AND PEOPLE V. EDWIN LIM

G.R. No. 214163
July 1, 2019
Non-compliance with procedural rules constitutes grave abuse of discretion, belated submission of
Judicial Affidavit.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for grave threats against his brother which is the respondent.
Later, upon acting in favor on the complaint, an information was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Iloilo. the case was set for pre-trial. The pre-trial was reset for three times. The
prosecution again moved to allow them to submit the Judicial Affidavits (JA) of the Ronald and
explained that it had completed the JA earlier but 'for whatever reason' was not able to submit them.
The defense opposed such motion by the prosecution and despite the defense counsel's opposition,
the MTCC granted the motion and gave the prosecution to submit the JA. Edwin moved for
reconsideration on the ground that the prosecution already waived its right to submit JA when it
failed to submit them at least 5 days before pre-trial, however, is was denied by the court contending
that it was already received the JA in the' interest of justice.' Edwin filed before the RTC a petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 contending that the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
allowed the belated filing of the JA. The CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the belated
submission of the Judicial Affidavits.
Ruling:
YES. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities committed grave abuse of discretion in blatantly
disregarding the clear wording of A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, or the Judicial Affidavit Rule. The Rule is
explicit: the prosecution is mandated to submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than
five (5) days before pre-trial. Should they fail to submit them within the time prescribed, they shall
be deemed to have waived their submission under Section 9 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule.
Nevertheless, if the belated submission of judicial affidavits has a valid reason, the court may allow
the delay once as long as it "would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting
party pays a fine of not less than Pl ,000.00 nor more than PS,000.00, at the discretion of the court."
Here, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities allowed the prosecution's belated submission of
their Judicial Affidavits despite the repeated postponements of the scheduled pre-trial. To recall, the
pre-trial was reset thrice: from August 12, 2013 to September 5, 2013, then to October 17, 2013, and
finally, to November 21, 2013. In spite of that, the prosecution failed to submit their Judicial
Affidavits within the time prescribed by the Rule. Its excuse-"for whatever reason"-cannot be
considered sufficient to allow the belated submission of the Judicial Affidavits
535
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V JORDAN CASACLANG DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 229053
July 17, 2019
Noncompliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act "negates the presumption of regularity accorded to acts undertaken by police officers in the pursuit of their
official duties. " In cases of Illegal drugs, there is a procedure under the chain of custody rules that is not
difficult for law enforcers to follow, especially since a person's liberty is at stake. Chain of Custody under
Section 21 of RA 9165
Facts:
Two (2) informations were filed against the accused (20 year-old high school student) for
violation of RA 9165, illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drug. The police officers
conducted a buy-bust operation against him and found 2 plastic sachets of marijuana. The police
officers take the accused to the station and prepared a request for Forensic Laboratory Examination,
Request for Drug test and Confiscation receipt of the seized items. Dela Cruz disclaimed any
knowledge of the illegal sale and possession of drugs. The accused alleges that the confiscation
receipt was improper as he did not sign it, and no elected official, DOJ representative or media
representative was present during the trial. The RTC upheld the testimony of PO1 Santillan that
there is an unbroken chain of custody, preserving the seized items' integrity and evidentiary value,
therefore the accused is guilty for vioaltion of RA 9165. the CA affirmed and modify the RTC
decision.
For the Court of Appeals, the arresting officers' alleged lapses-that the Confiscation Receipt
could not be a proper inventory as it did not have Dela Cruz's signature and there were no proper
witnesses in the inventory-did not render the arrest illegal or make the seized items inadmissible. It
stated that the lack of signature was due to Dela Cruz's own refusal to sign it and receive his copy.
As to the third-party witnesses' absence, it gave credence to POI Santillan's testimony that time
constraints and the uncertainty that Dela Cruz would be in the meeting place prevented the buy-
bust team from securing their presence.
Issue:
Is the absence of an elective official, a representative from the media, and a representative
from the Department of Justice during the buy-bust operation warrants accused-appellant Jordan
CasaclangDela Cruz's acquittal.
536
Ruling:
YES. People v. Que demonstrated how the requirements under Section 21 (1) were relaxed by
RA 10640, which respect to the persons required to be present during the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized items namely: 1. a representative from the media; 2. a representative
from the DOJ and; 3. any elected official. However, none of the persons mentioned and required
under Section 21(1) was present during the physical inventory of the seized items.
The prosecution failed to allege, let alone prove, that earnest efforts were exerted to secure the
attendance of third-party witnesses, as required by Section 21 ( 1 ). Consequently, the prosecution
cannot claim that the deviation from the strict requirements of the law was justified.
537
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GAJIR ACUB T ARAKANI A.K.A. "ASAW"

G.R. NO. 220456; JUNE 10, 2019
The saving clause, as an exception to the rule on strict compliance, is not a talisman that the prosecution may
invoke at will. It may only be appreciated in the prosecution's favor if the latter shows a valid reason for not
observing the procedure laid out in Section 21.
Facts:
Information was filed charging the accused with selling a dangerous drug to an undercover
police officer during a buy-bust operation. Acub pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. The
accused alleges that the prosecution failed to show strict compliance with Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The police officers have not marked, inventoried, and
photographed the sachet of shabu upon seizure and in the presence of the required representatives.
It also noted that the prosecution failed to offer a justifiable ground for the officers' noncompliance
with Section 21.
The accused also claims that the prosecution failed to substantiate its allegation of a planned
buy-bust operation. He points out that the lack of a pre-operation report or blotter in the records
raises doubt on whether the buy-bust money was marked, and whether the police officers
participated in the supposed operation. it contended that the forensic chemist (Inspector Manuel)
after the cross-examination that was conducted to him, admitted that he did not personally receive
the laboratory request with the specimen. He points out that the Chemistry Report Inspector Manuel
identified did not bear his name, but that of a certain Nur-in Moderika y Sawadjaan therefore
concluding that the accused must be acquitted on the ground of the doubt on the integrity and
identity of the sachet of shabu that he supposedly sold to P02 Cordero.
On the other hand, the prosecution denies that noncompliance with Section 21 was fatal to
its case since the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized sachet were preserved by the
apprehending officers, as shown by the unbroken chain of custody. It maintains that the accused
failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity in the
arresting officers' performance of their duties.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused must be acquitted on the basis of non-compliance to the chain of
custody rule.
Ruling:
The accused was acquitted for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. This noncompliance created a huge gap in the chain of custody that not even the
538
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties may remedy, as the lapses
themselves are undeniable evidence of irregularity. The RTC and the Court of the Appeals
acknowledged that the prosecution failed to prove strict compliance with Section 21. However, they
both brushed this failure aside by reasoning that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
shabu were nevertheless preserved.
The prosecution failed to prove that an inventory of the seized sachet was prepared and that
it was photographed in the presence of accusedappellant, an elected public official, and
representatives from the National Prosecution Service or the media. Despite the blatant lapses, the
prosecution did not explain the arresting officers' failure to comply with the requirements in Section
21. Nonetheless, despite the prosecution's indifference to the established legal safeguards, both the
lower courts still found accusedappellant guilty of the charge against him.
Contrary to what the lower courts may believe, the saving clause, as an exception to the rule
of strict compliance, is not a talisman that the prosecution may invoke at will. Instead, it may only be
appreciated in the prosecution's favor if the latter shows a valid reason for not observing the
procedure laid out in Section 21. The prosecution utterly failed to provide any justifiable ground for
the arresting officers' failure to inventory and photograph the seized sachet in the presence of
accused-appellant, an elected public official, and representatives from the National Prosecution
Service or the media. Worse, the prosecution remained silent as to the noncompliance with Section
21.
539
ADELAIDO ORI ONDO, TEODORO M. HERNANDEZ, RENATO L. BASCO, CARMEN

MERINO, and REYNALDO SALVADOR V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 211293
June 4, 2019
A corporation, whether with or without an original charter, is under the audit jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit so long as the government owns or has controlling interest in it.
Facts:
The petitioners in the case at bar were former officers of the Philippine Tourism Authority
who had received honoraria and cash gifts for concurrently rendering services to Corregidor
Foundation, Inc. The Commission on Audit (COA), by virtue of a resolution, disallowed he payment
of the honoraria and cash gifts to them for being contrary to Department of Budget and
Management Budget Circular No. 2003-5 on the payment of honoraria and Article IX-B, Section 8 of
the Constitution prohibiting the payment of additional or double compensation. The Commission on
Audit, through its Audit Team, noted that the following personnel of the Philippine Tourism
Authority who were concurrently rendering services in Corregidor Foundation, Inc. received
honoraria and cash gifts in 2003. The Audit Team was of the opinion that the grant of honoraria to
Oriondo, Hernandez, Basco, Merino, and Salvador were contrary to Department of Budget and
Management Circular No. 2003-5. This budget circular, applicable to all national government
agencies, government-owned and/or controlled corporations, and government financial institutions,
enumerated in item 4 those exclusively entitled to honoraria
According to the Audit Team, the cash gifts given to Oriondo, Hernandez, Basco, Merino,
and Salvador, as officers of the Corregidor Foundation, Inc., constituted double compensation
prohibited in Article IXB, Section 8 16 of the Constitution because they had already received
honoraria and cash gifts as employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority. The Audit Team thus
recommended that Corregidor Foundation, Inc. comply with Budget Circular No. 2003-5; otherwise,
it would be constrained to recommend the disallowance of the amounts paid as honoraria and cash
gift.
The Commision on Audit, through the Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate, issued
Notice of Disallowance. disallowing in audit the honoraria and cash gift paid to Oriondo,
Hernandez, Basco, Merino, and Salvador. Aside from the payees, the persons made liable for the
amount were Corregidor Foundation, Inc. 's Chief Accountant Noria Jane Perez, Finance Office
Lauro Legazpi, and Executive Director Artemio G. Matibag.
Oriondo, Hernandez, Basco, Merino, and Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Notice of Disallowance, arguing that Corregidor Foundation, Inc. is a private corporation created
under the Corporation Code and, therefore, cannot be audited by the Commission on Audit. This
540
was denied by the Legal Adjudication Office-Corporate in its Decision No. 2007- 037, where it held
that Corregidor Foundation, Inc. is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
The appeal filed was likewise denied by the Adjudication and Settlement Board of the
Commission on Audit. The Adjudication and Settlement Board held that Corregidor Foundation,
Inc. is a government-owned or controlled corporation under the audit powers of the Commission on
Audit. Corregidor Foundation, Inc., according to the Adjudication and Settlement Board, is a non-
stock corporation which receives funds from the government, through the Philippine Tourism
Authority. The Adjudication and Settlement Board highlighted that Memorandum of Agreement
dated September 3, 1996 provided that the funds received and disbursed by the Corregidor
Foundation, Inc. is subject to the audit of the Internal Auditor of the Philippine Tourism Authority
and the Commission on Audit. Considering that Corregidor Foundation, Inc. is a government-
owned or controlled corporation, the Adjudication and Settlement Board held the foundation is
subject to Budget Circular No. 2003-5 and 2003-02, limiting the grant of honoraria to specific
government personnel, and Article IX-B, Section 8 of the Constitution prohibiting double
compensation.
On the other hand the respondent Commission argues that it has the competence to
determine whether an entity is a government-owned or controlled corporation. Pursuant to its
constitutional duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
expenditures of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
respondent Commission maintains that the determination of the status of an entity as a
governmentowned or controlled corporation is but a "necessary incident to [the] performance of its
duties and the discharge of its functions." Respondent Commission asserts its competency to
determine the status of Corregidor Foundation, Inc. as a government-owned or controlled
corporation, arguing that it only applied the law on the matter.
Issues:
A. Whether or not the Commission on Audit has jurisdiction to determine whether a

corporation such as Corregidor Foundation, Inc. is a government-owned or
controlled corporation;
B. Whether or not Corregidor Foundation, Inc. is a government-owned or controlled

corporation under the audit jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit and;
C. Whether or not the respondent Commission's contention that petitioners erroneously

referred to their Petition as a "Petition for Review on Certiorari" under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court is correct.
541
Ruling:
A. YES. It has the competency to determine the status of corporations such as Corregidor
Foundation, Inc. as government-owned or controlled, and correctly found that Corregidor
Foundation, Inc. is, indeed, a government-owned or controlled corporation under its audit
jurisdiction.
Under Article IX-D, Section 2 of the Constitution, Book V, Title I, Subtitle B, Chapter 4,
Section 11 of the Administrative Code and the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, the
Commission on Audit generally has audit jurisdiction over public entities. In the Administrative
Code's Introductory Provisions, the Commission on Audit is even allowed to categorize
government-owned or controlled corporations for purposes of the exercise and discharge of its
powers, functions, and responsibilities with respect to such corporations. The extent of the
Commission on Audit's audit authority even extends to non-governmental entities that receive
subsidy or equity from or through the government.
Therefore, it is absurd for petitioners to challenge the competency of the Commission on

Audit to determine whether or not an entity is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
The court enunciated the criteria for determining the status of a corporation as government-
owned or controlled. Respondent Commission thereafter noted the circumstances demonstrating
that all these criteria are present in this case.
First, Corregidor Foundation, Inc. is under the Department of Tourism, created to develop
the tourism in the island of Corregidor. Second, the incorporators of Corregidor Foundation, Inc. are
all government officials and all of its trustees are public officials sitting in an ex officio capacity.
B. YES. An entity is considered a government- owned or controlled corporation if all three (3)
attributes are present: ( l) the entity is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; (2) its
functions are public in character; and (3) it is owned or, at the very least, controlled68 by the
government. Corregidor Foundation, Inc. was organized as a non-stock corporation under
the Corporation Code. It was issued a certificate of registration the Securities and Exchange
Commission on October 28, 1987 and, according to its Articles of Incorporation. Corregidor
Foundation, Inc. was organized and to be operated in the public interest. Corregidor
Foundation, Inc. was organized primarily to maintain and preserve the war relics in
Corregidor and develop the area's potential as an international and local tourist destination.
As stated in their Articles of Incorporation, The Corregidor Foundation, Inc. 's purposes are
related to the promotion and development of tourism in the country, a declared state policy and,
therefore, a function public in character. Corregidor Foundation, Inc.'s Articles of Incorporation also
require that the members of its Board of Trustees be all government officials and shall so hold their
position as members of the Board by reason of their office. As the foregoing established, the
542
government has substantial participation in the selection of Corregidor Foundation, Inc.'s governing
board.
Therefore, The government controls Corregidor Foundation, Inc. making it a government-

owned or controlled corporation.
C. YES. The foregoing provisions readily reveal that a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 is an appeal and a true review that involves "digging into the merits and unearthing
errors of judgment. That the remedy against an adverse decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission on Audit is a petition for certiorari, not review or appeal, is based on Article IX-
A, Section 7 of the Constitution. be raised in a petition for certiorari, under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court. The office of the petition for certiorari is not to correct simple errors of
judgment; any resort to the said petition under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues.
The petitioners erroneously denominated their Petition as a "Petition for Review on

Certiorari." Except for the designation, however, we find that the Petition was filed under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court given that the Petition refers to Rule 64 and was filed within 30 days from notice
of the Resolution dated December 6, 2013 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration before the
Commission on Audit. Therefore, we shall resolve the Petition in the exercise of our certiorari
jurisdiction under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution.
543

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Remedial Law Review: Justice Leonen cases

IN RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY. LYNDA CHAGUILE, IBP IFUGAO PRESIDENT, AS

A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC; December 10, 2013.

In support of this second ground, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws provides:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officer-in-Charge,

On April 1, 2005, a Memorandum by the Department of Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary for

(1) In 2004, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a pronouncement during

On March 8, 2005, their Petition was endorsed by Department of Agriculture Employees

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and

G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013,

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS

G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013

With Divisor of total

Votes garnered over

None. The petitioner is not considered as a real party-in-interest.

The rationale for retirement benefits

In government, lucrative retirement benefits are used as an incentive mechanism to encourage

The rationale for death benefits

Republic Act No. 9946 applies to Judge Gruba.

ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH, Petitioner, vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 171428; November 11, 2013

Hence, this Petition was filed.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. RETIRED JUDGE GUILLERMO

PRYCE CORPORATION vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 172302. February 18, 2014

G.R. No. 171496. MARCH 3, 2014

prevent "undue burden upon the courts."

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION

and the PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS

G.R. No. 193494. March 12, 2014.

Section 3. Default; declaration of. –

VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA vs. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E.MALA

G.R. No. 188832. April 23. 2014.

ART 143. Original jurisdiction. -

G.R. NO. 197293. April 21, 2014.

In People v. Castillo and Mejia, this court has stated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO FELICIANO, JR. et al.,

G.R. No. 196735. May 5, 2014

Gr. No. 194560 June 11, 2014

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The petition is meritorious.

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A.

G.R. No. 192074 June 10, 2014

In the meantime, the investigation against Salvaña continued.

Hence, LRTA filed this present petition.

Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.

Section 4. Definition of Terms

JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented by his attorneys-in-fact

G.R. No. 199283 June 9, 2014

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.

OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION and DR. PABLO R. OLIVAREZ, Petitioner, vs.

G.R. No. 196251 July 9, 2014

Although we discussed that there is no rescission of contract to speak of in contracts of conditional

G.R. No. 174411 July 2, 2014

filed for reconsideration.

4.. Whether actual damages must be substantiated in order to be awarded?

city’s petition for relief from judgment.

CATHAY METAL CORPORATION vs. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE,

G.R. No. 172204 July 2, 2014

Respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a cooperative recognized under Republic

VIII, Section 5(5) provides: