G.R. No.
42037 March 21, 1990 Alleging that the trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, or acted in excess of his
DOMINGO V. LUGTU, DEMETRIO SANCHEZ, as Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSA L. CANCIO, respondents.
Calixto 0. Zaldivar for private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 17 September 1975, granting private respondent's petition for certiorari in CA-
G.R. No. 04122-SP, entitled "Rosa L. Cancio vs. Hon. Abraham P. Vera, etc., et al.," and setting
aside the orders of the trial court dated 19 June 1974, 11 January 1975 and 15 February 1975
which authorized the discharge of petitioner Domingo V. Lugtu from the information so that he
could be utilized as witness for the government.
Petitioner Domingo V. Lugtu, together with private respondent Rosa L. Cancio and Clodualdo F.
Vitug were charged in an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan in the Court of First
Instance of said province, with the crime of estafa committed as follows:
. . . accused Domingo V. Lugtu, Clodualdo F. Vitug and Rosa L. Cancio, with intent to cause damage
and to defraud another with deceit, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
said accused Clodualdo Vitug and Rosa L. Cancio induced and succeeded to make their co-accused
Domingo V. Lugtu to open a checking account with Continental Bank, Guagua Branch, and after
which made and caused him to purchase Check Boks [sic] and thereafter Domingo Lugtu signed
said checks in blank and delivered same to his co-accused Clodualdo Vitug, an Acting Paying Teller
of the Philippine National Bank, who knowing fully well that accused Domingo Lugtu had no
sufficient funds in the bank, accused Clodualdo Vitug, with grave abuse of confidence and in
excess of his authority, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fill out the following
checks payable to "CASH" . . . drawn against the Continental Bank, after which, said accused
Clodualdo Vitug taking undue advantage of the position as such Acting Paying Teller of the
Philippine National Bank at Balanga, Bataan, endorse, encash and pay the above-mentioned
checks to himself in the aggregate amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND AND
FOUR HUNDRED (P172,400.00) PESOS, but upon presentation of said checks to the drawee bank
for payment, the aforementioned checks were dishonored and returned unpaid because of
insufficiency of funds and/or "no arrangement" and despite repeated demands made to the
accused to remit, pay or deposit the corresponding amounts of said checks, accused failed and
refused to remit, pay or deposit the corresponding amount of the checks to the damage and
prejudice of the Philippine National Bank . . . 1
At the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. After presenting three (3) witnesses, the
Provincial Fiscal filed with the trial court a motion to discharge the accused Domingo V. Lugtu for
the purpose of utilizing him as state witness against his co-accused. The motion was denied by
Judge Abraham P. Vera. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Provincial Fiscal and the
private prosecutor, attaching thereto an affidavit dated 8 February 1974 of Lugtu, to which
motion accused Rosa L. Cancio filed an opposition. The parties submitted their respective reply,
rejoinder and comment. Thereafter, in an Order dated 19 June 1974, Judge Vera reconsidered his
earlier order, after finding that "the prosecution has fully complied with the requirements
outlined by Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court," and authorized the discharge of Lugtu from the
information so that he could be utilized as government witness. Accused Cancio filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said Order of 19 June 1974, wherein she called the attention of the trial
judge to an earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated 10 March 1973, executed by the same Lugtu
before the PC of Bataan. In an Order dated 11 January 1975, the court a quo denied Cancio's
motion. Her second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on 15 February 1975.
jurisdiction in issuing the three (3) orders abovementioned, accused Cancio filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, praying that the three (3) orders adverted to be reversed. On 17
September 1975, respondent appellate court promulgated the now questioned decision, setting
aside the three (3) assailed orders of the court a quo and ordering the reinstatement of Lugtu to
the information. 2 Herein, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by
respondent court on 24 November 1975 for lack of merit. 3 Hence, this petition.
The principal issue to be resolved in this recourse is whether or not respondent appellate court
erred in finding that the conditions required under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court were
not present when the trial court approved the discharge of accused Lugtu from the information.
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules reads as follows:
Sec. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the prosecution. — When two or
more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense, the competent court, at any
time before they have entered upon their defense, may direct one or more of them to be
discharged with the latter's consent that he or they may be witnesses for the government when in
the judgment of the court:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said defendant;
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
In ruling that the first and second conditions required in the above-quoted section are not
present, respondent appellate court considered the sworn statement (Sinumpaang Salaysay)
dated 10 March 1973 executed by accused Lugtu wherein he admitted his responsibility in the
commission of the offense. Another factor that persuaded the respondent court to take its
position, is the testimony of the three (3) prosecution witnesses who had already testified on the
modus operandi of the swindle, by which Lugtu opened a checking account with the Continental
Bank in Guagua, Pampanga, issued checks that were cashed by accused Vitug with the PNB
Branch in Balanga, Bataan, and thereafter it was found that the checks were not covered by
sufficient funds. These circumstances, according to respondent appellate court, constitute direct
evidence, available to the prosecution, of the offense committed, such that the testimony of
Lugtu is not absolutely necessary.
Petitioners contend, on the other hand, that Lugtu's Sinumpaang Salaysay of 10 March 1973 was
not yet presented or before the trial court at the time it resolved their (petitioners) motion for
reconsideration of its first order denying their motion for discharge of Lugtu. It was only brought
to the attention of the trial judge after private respondent Cancio filed her motion for
reconsideration of the 19 June 1974 order authorizing the discharge of Lugtu. However, according
to the petitioners, the said sworn statement (10 March 1973) was in fact passed upon by the trial
judge in his order dated 15 February 1975, to writ:
. . . After considering the arguments of opposing counsels and carefully scrutinizing the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Accused Lugtu before the PC C2C Marino Ravelo at the Bataan
Constabulary Command in Camp Tolentino at Balanga, Bataan on March 10, 1973, the Court is of
1
the opinion that there is no reasonable ground to set aside its previous order discharging the
accused Domingo Lugtu from the information so that he could be utilized as State witness . . . 4
Page
As for the testimony of the three (3) prosecution witnesses, petitioners assert that, as correctly
ruled by the trial court, the said testimony can substantially corroborate the testimony of Lugtu in
its material points. The testimony of the three (3) witnesses centered on the modus operandi of Lugtu in the presence or with the aid of counsel in compliance with Article IV, Section 20, of the
the swindle perpetrated by the three (3) accused. (1973) Constitution, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
According to petitioners, the trial court after thoroughly and exhaustively examining and The finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu is just as guilty as the accused Vitug and
evaluating the facts and evidence on record, found Lugtu not to be the most guilty. Being a poor should not be discharged as he does not appear to be not the most guilty, is untenable.
and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by Vitug and Cancio (his employer) to open the "The Rules do not disqualify an accused sought to be discharged as witness for the state merely
account with the Continental Bank in Guagua, which led to the commission of the offense. on the ground that he has committed a falsification himself, or that he had actually committed the
In the words of the trial judge: crime charged. The Rules say that it is necessary that the said defendant does not appear to be
A perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Affidavit of accused Lugtu attached thereto the 'most guilty,' from which the conclusion follows that the guilt of an accused of the crime
explicitly show that the said accused, who the records show is unable to post a bond, was charged is no reason why he may not be excluded as witness for the State. As a matter of fact, the
introduced by his employer, accused Rosa L. Cancio, to Clodualdo Vitug, then working as a teller candid admission of an accused, of his participation in a crime, is a guaranty that if he will testify
of the Balanga, Bataan branch of the Philippine National Bank. After the introduction, accused in court he will testify truthfully; so that even if an accused actually participated in the offense
Lugtu, upon prodding of accused Vitug and Cancio, was made to open a current account with the charged in the information, he may still be made a witness." 9
Continental Bank at Guagua, Pampanga. Thereafter, accused Lugtu was told by his co-accused, The facts of record show that the trial judge who was in a position to evaluate the evidence
Vitug and Cancio, to buy a checkbook and then was made to sign all the checks therein in blank. available so far, did not abuse his discretion. It is settled that the discharge of an accused lies
The accused Lugtu protested to accused Cancio why he was the one being made to open the within the sound discretion of the trial court which has the exclusive responsibility to see that the
account and to sign the blank checks and he received the answer that if the accused [sic] were conditions prescribed by the Rule (for discharge of an accused) exist. 10
opened in the name of accused Vitug, the bank might learn about it and he (Vitug) might lose his WHEREFORE, respondent court's Decision dated 17 September 1975 and its Resolution dated 24
job. 5 November 1975 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Orders of the trial court dated 19 June 1974, 11
Finally, petitioners state that both the court a quo and the respondent appellate court found that January 1975 and 15 February 1975 in Criminal Case No. 390 are hereby REINSTATED. The
Lugtu has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Regional Trial Court of Bataan corresponding to the former Court of First Instance of Bataan is
The petition is impressed with merit. directed to proceed with the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 390.
From the records and evidence thus far adduced, it appears that there is absolute necessity for This decision is immediately executory.
the testimony of petitioner Lugtu. It should be noted that in the information, the three (3) SO ORDERED.
accused were charged with conspiring and confederating with one another in the commission of Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.
the crime charged (estafa).
Respondent appellate court erred when it considered the testimony of the three (3) prosecution
witnesses and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 10 March 1973 executed by Lugtu admitting his
responsibility, as direct evidence, available to the prosecution, of the crime charged. For,
respondent court itself acknowledged that "the three prosecution witnesses that were presented
by the prosecution only mentioned the accused Vitug and the respondent Lugtu. The petitioner
(Cancio) has never been brought into the picture." 6 Respondent court was likewise aware that
"(u)nder the information there is only one conspiracy alleged which is among the three accused
and not only between the petitioner and accused Vitug. The prosecution has adduced evidence as
to the conspiracy between respondent Lugtu and the accused Vitug. What apparently has not
been clearly established is the involvement of the petitioner (Cancio) in the conspiracy." 7 Such
being the case, we agree with the finding of the trial court that the testimony of Lugtu would be
the direct evidence to link the events starting from the opening of the checking account up to the
time the checkbook in question found its way to the Philippine National Bank branch in Balanga.
The discharge of an accused should be availed of only when there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of said accused whose discharge is requested, as when he alone has knowledge of the
crime, and not when his testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the
evidence in the hands of the prosecution. 8
As to Lugtu's Sinumpaang Salaysay of 10 March 1973 to which respondent court gave much
weight, in the words of the Solicitor General, the statement merely complements and

2
supplements the 8 February 1974 affidavit of Lugtu and that the first sworn statement (10 March

Page
1973), which was executed before a constabulary soldier who asked the questions of Lugtu, does
not contain all the details as compared to the second statement of 8 February 1974. Moreover,
since there is no showing that the said Sinumpaang Salaysay of 10 March 1973 was executed by
G.R. No. 143093             May 21, 2007
RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCITA PARANE, Respondents.
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal are the Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dated September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945. The Court of Appeals
discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information in Criminal Case
No. TM-1730 for Murder, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, to
become state witnesses. The appellate court likewise cancelled the bail bond of petitioner
Rimberto Salvanera.
First, the facts:
In an Information1 dated November 30, 1996, petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with
Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben
Parane, committed as follows:
That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with treachery and evident
premeditation, then armed with a firearm, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN PARANE Y MAGSAMBOL, inflicting gunshot wound on his
body, resulting to his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired
hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the
commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. All the accused
have been arrested and detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large.
Respondent Lucita Parane is the spouse of victim Ruben Parane.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, on March 4, 1997, moved for
the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses.
In an Omnibus Order2 dated September 5, 1997, the trial court granted petitioner’s application for
bail and denied the prosecution’s motion for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix. The
prosecution moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to discharge accused Abutin and
Tampelix to be state witnesses. It alleged that the testimonies of the two accused are absolutely
necessary to establish that petitioner masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane. The
prosecution likewise claimed that it was premature and baseless for the trial court to grant
petitioner’s application for bail because the prosecution had not yet rested its case in the hearing
for the discharge of the two accused.
The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and
Domingo Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond
of petitioner Salvanera. In its Resolution dated September 22, 1999, it denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed his Motion for Clarification with Leave of Court. The
same was also denied in a Resolution dated May 11, 2000.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner enumerates the grounds for his appeal, as follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE FIRST,
SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE THEREON WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 9, RULE 119
OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT WAS SATISFIED BY THE PROSECUTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT
-
A. THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT MUST BE SATISFIED THROUGH THE
TESTIMONY OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHO ARE NOT AN (sic) ACCUSED SOUGHT
TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS, NOT BY ANOTHER ACCUSED LIKEWISE SOUGHT TO BE
DISCHARGED.
B. THE SWORN STATEMENT OF AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED CANNOT BE USED AS
EVIDENCE FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN HIS OWN DISCHARGE PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE BY A
COMPETENT COURT OF THE ORDER OF HIS DISCHARGE.
C. THE TESTIMONIES OF ABUTIN AND TAMPELIX CANNOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY CORROBORATED IN
ITS MATERIAL POINTS BY THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
D. THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS
CANNOT BE USED TO CORROBORATE THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY ANOTHER ACCUSED LIKEWISE
SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE FIRST,
SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS, DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER,
WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONER'S BAIL BOND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE
ALREADY RULED THAT THE EVIDENCE OF HIS GUILT IS NOT STRONG.3
We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions
must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. 4
According to petitioner, the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to become a state
witness must be substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused likewise sought to be discharged,
but by other prosecution witnesses who are not the accused in the same criminal case. Petitioner
justifies this theory on the general principles of justice and sound logic. He contends that it is a
notorious fact in human nature that a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame on
others, if by doing so, he will be freed from any criminal responsibility. Thus, in the instant case,
3
petitioner supposes that both Abutin and Tampelix will naturally seize the opportunity to be
Page
absolved of any liability by putting the blame on one of their co-accused. Petitioner argues that
prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are not accused, do not have personal knowledge
of the circumstances surrounding the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they could not testify to witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in
corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that petitioner is the mastermind or the determining whether the petitioner is entitled to bail.
principal by induction. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolutions of the Court of
We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To require the two Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated April 30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000,
witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto.
same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct SO ORDERED.
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
the state witness."5 The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of
the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled
that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other
method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence,
then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to
some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects."6 It is
enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence.
In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin
and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other’s testimonies and the
circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such
extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest." 7
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators.
Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because
only they have knowledge of the crime.8 The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to
the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the
murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can
directly link petitioner to the commission of the crime.
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,9 we ruled that the trial court has to rely on the information offered
by the public prosecutor as to who would best qualify as a state witness. The prosecutor knows
the evidence in his possession and the witnesses he needs to establish his case. In Mapa v.
Sandiganbayan,10 we held:
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution
process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to
achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all
who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of
the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude
the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be
extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound
judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall
be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.
We further ruled:
In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the
respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and
not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and
then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral
courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For fairness
demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due
process demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and

4
perpetually level.

Page
Lastly, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail bond of petitioner. The
grant of petitioner’s application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony of state
G.R. No. 152643             August 28, 2008
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, petitioners, vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE,
respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 15, 2001 and its Resolution2 dated March 12, 2002. The CA
decision set aside the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders dated August 25, 2000 3 granting
Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra’s (Concepcion’s) motion to take deposition, and dated
November 3, 20004 denying the motion for reconsideration of respondents Raul G. Risos, Susana
Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel D.B. Bonje.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow:
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Document before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a criminal information dated October
27, 1999, which was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999. The case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-52248,5 arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage
allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of
the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document.
Hence, the criminal case.6
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in
Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal
bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment. 7
On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal
Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-
20359, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved. 8
On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcion’s motion for reconsideration
was denied on June 5, 2000.9
This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60266
and remains pending before the appellate court to date. 10
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s deposition. 11 He
explained the need to perpetuate Concepcion’s testimony due to her weak physical condition and
old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcion’s deposition be
taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. 12 The respondents’ motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural
technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion
was already of advanced age.13 After several motions for change of venue of the deposition-
taking, Concepcion’s deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her residence. 14
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25 and November 3 RTC orders in a special civil action
for certiorari before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551.15
On August 15, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision16 favorable to the respondents, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 25, 2000 and November 3, 2000 orders of
the court a quo are hereby SET ASIDE, and any deposition that may have been taken on the
authority of such void orders is similarly declared void.
SO ORDERED.17
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondents’ petition by not
impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the
appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution
witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate
court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119,
Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is
pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in
issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. 18
In its Resolution dated March 12, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the CA
added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the same court is
the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The appellate court
likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because the situation was
adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure. 19
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPLIES TO THE
DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES" IN A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL CASE A QUO CONSTITUTES A WAIVABLE DEFECT IN THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.20
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents failed to implead
the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously
defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all
criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the
petition.21
However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an indispensable party is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the
latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner’s/plaintiff’s failure to comply. 22
In this case, the CA disregarded the procedural flaw by allowing the petition to proceed, in the
interest of substantial justice. Also noteworthy is that, notwithstanding the non-joinder of the
People of the Philippines as party-respondent, it managed, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file its Comment on the petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was given the
opportunity to refute the respondents’ arguments.
Instructive is the Court’s pronouncement in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer23 in this wise:
5
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose
Page
is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were
created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They
do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are
designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an
end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the administration of justice
is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty. 24
Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on the merits despite the procedural
defect.
On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to the instant case,
we rule in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of
the judge.25 This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses face to face.26 It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility
of said witnesses.27 Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor. 28
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for
the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are
adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal
proceedings, Sections 12,29 1330 and 15,31 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense
and prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the
petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus
comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Petitioners contend that Concepcion’s advanced age and health condition exempt her from the
application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is
at once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Rule 119
specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date
of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too
sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her
outside the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court for
examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required
that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also
necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right
to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate
that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question
and answer.
At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcion’s motion and in actually taking
her deposition, were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative. The
appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City
erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court
where the case is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous
Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be
taken before any "judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so
designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction,
before an inferior court to be designated therein," the examination of a witness for the
prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may
be done only "before the court where the case is pending." 32
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be
made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, there is
nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies
only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is
kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated. 33
When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room
for application.34
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil
procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil
procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we
find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to
depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere,
the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this
requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the witness’ deportment to enable
him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true when the witness’ testimony is crucial
to the prosecution’s case.
While we recognize the prosecution’s right to preserve its witness’ testimony to prove its case, we
cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused’s
constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict
construction of the rules.
6
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dated
Page
August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 167710               June 5, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA,
Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and
set aside the Resolutions1 dated January 25, 2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano
(Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-
accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil
(Leonardo), who were at-large.2 It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730, the pertinent portion
of which reads:
That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 o’clock and 10:00 o’clock in the evening, in Barangay
Balakilong, [M]unicipality of Laurel, [P]rovince of Batangas, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, all the above named accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one
another, motivated by common design and intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, and by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, shoot EMMANUEL
MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon him eight gunshot wounds and causing his death thereby,
thus committing the crime of MURDER to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the amount as
the Honorable Court shall determine. 3
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged;
while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Thereafter,
respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecution’s evidence was not strong. 4
Meanwhile, considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor of Laurel, Batangas at
the time when the crime was committed, Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios moved that
the venue be transferred from the RTC, Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas to any RTC in Manila.
Consequently, the case was transferred to the RTC Manila for re-raffling amongst its Branches.
The case was re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-129988 and was initially re-raffled to Branches
6, 9, and 11 before being finally raffled to Branch 27, RTC, Manila. 5
Before transferring the case to the RTC, Branch 27, Manila, the trial court deferred the resolution
of respondents’ motion for bail and allowed the prosecution to present evidence. Thereafter, the
hearing of the application for bail ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Teresita and Dr.
Leonardo Salvador. After finding that the prosecution’s evidence to prove treachery and evident
premeditation was not strong, the RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted respondents’ motion for bail.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied. 6
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41110,
which was denied. Aggrieved, they sought recourse before this Court in G.R. No. 129604. In a
Resolution dated July 12, 1999, this Court granted the petition and set aside the decision of the
CA together with the Order of the RTC granting bail to the respondents. The RTC was also ordered
to immediately issue a warrant of arrest against the accused. The resolution was also qualified to
be immediately executory.7 As a result, Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando were
not.8
However, upon respondents’ motion for reconsideration, this Court, in a Resolution dated
September 4, 2001, resolved to remand the case to the RTC. We noted that, in view of the
transmittal of the records of the case to this Court in connection with the petition, the trial court
deferred the rendition of its decision. Consequently, the case was remanded to the RTC for
further proceedings, including the rendition of its decision on the merits.
After the presentation of the parties’ respective sets of evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision 9
dated April 25, 2002, finding several accused guilty of the offense as charged, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, CONSIDERING ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused JOVEN DE GRANO,
ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and there being no modifying
circumstance attendant, hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and
to indemnify the heirs of Emmanuel Mendoza the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The case as against accused Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil is hereby sent to the files or
archived cases to be revived as soon as said accused are apprehended.
Let alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Leonardo Genil and Leonides Landicho.
Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.
Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated May 8, 2002,
praying that the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set aside and a new one be
entered acquitting them based on the following grounds, to wit:
1. The Honorable Court erred in basing the decision of conviction of all accused solely on the
biased, uncorroborated and baseless testimony of Teresita Duran, the common-law wife of the
victim;
2. The Honorable Court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the evidence adduced by the
defense, which was amply corroborated on material points;
3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the failure of the prosecution to present rebuttal
evidence renders the position of the defense unrebutted;
4. The Honorable Court erred in adopting conditional or preliminary finding of treachery of the
Supreme Court in its Resolution dated July 12, 1999; and
5. The Honorable Court erred in rendering a verdict [sic] of conviction despite the fact that the
guilt of all the accused were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 10
In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly moved for the
reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-large. Having opted to
become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost their right to file such motion for
reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the court. 11
Acting on respondents’ motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order 12 dated April 15, 2004
modifying its earlier decision by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the conviction
of Domingo and Estanislao from murder to homicide. The decretal portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court modifies its decision and finds accused
DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt, as principal
of the crime of Homicide, and in default of any modifying circumstance, sentences them to an
indeterminate prison term of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
TWELVE YEARS [and] ONE DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. Said accused shall be credited
with the full period of their preventive imprisonment pursuant to B.P. Blg. 85.1avvphi1
7
Accused ARMANDO DE GRANO and JOVEN DE GRANO are hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of
Page
reasonable doubt. They are likewise declared free of any civil liability.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the Decision dated April 25, 2002 stands.
SO ORDERED.13
Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the prosecution sought reconsideration of the Order
arguing that:
1. There was absolutely no basis for this Court to have taken cognizance of the "Joint Motion for
Reconsideration" dated May 8, 2002, citing Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
2. The testimony of Teresita Duran deserves credence. The delay in the taking of Ms. Duran’s
written statement of the events she witnessed is understandable considering that Joven de Grano
was the mayor of the municipality where the crime was committed and that another accused,
Estanislao Lacaba, was a policeman in the same municipality.
3. The crime committed is murder.
4. Accused Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano participated in the conspiracy.
On September 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order14 denying the motion and giving due course to
Estanislao’s notice of appeal.
Petitioner, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the Manila City
Prosecutor, with the assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael E. David, filed a Petition 15 for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA arguing that:
(a) the private respondents, having deliberately evaded arrest after being denied bail and
deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of the Decision despite due notice, lost the right to
move for reconsideration of their conviction; and
(b) the grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision are utterly erroneous. 16
Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy, considering that the
State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. However, by way of exception, a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court upon a showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed
not only reversible errors of judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Consequently, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy. 17
Respondent De Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss, 18 arguing that the verification and certification
portion of the petition was flawed, since it was signed only by counsel and not by the aggrieved
party. Also, the petition did not contain the conformity of the Solicitor General. 19
On January 31, 2005, petitioner, through the private prosecutor, filed an Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss.20 Petitioner explained that, for lack of material time, it failed to secure the conformity of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when it filed the petition, but it would nevertheless
obtain it. A day after filing the petition, the private prosecutor sought the OSG’s conformity in a
letter21 dated January 12, 2005. The OSG, in turn, informed the private prosecutor that rather
than affixing its belated conformity, it would rather await the initial resolution of the CA. 22 Also, so
as not to preempt the action of the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the case, the OSG instructed
the private prosecutor to secure the necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the
case. Anent the verification and certification of the petition having been signed by the private
prosecutor, petitioner explained that private complainant Teresita was in fear for her life as a
result of the acquittal of former Mayor Joven de Grano, but she was willing to certify the petition
should she be given ample time to travel to Manila. 23
However, in a Resolution24 dated January 25, 2005, which was received by the petitioner on the
same day it filed its Opposition or on January 31, 2005, the petition was dismissed outright by the
CA on the grounds that it was not filed by the OSG and that the assailed Orders were only
photocopies and not certified true copies. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 25 In addition to the justifications it raised in
its earlier Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner argued that the petition was not only
signed by the private prosecutor, it was also signed by the prosecutor who represented the
petitioner in the criminal proceedings before the trial court. Petitioner also maintains that the
certified true copies of the assailed Orders were accidentally attached to its file copy instead of
the one it submitted. To rectify the mistake, it attached the certified true copies of the assailed
Orders.26 This was opposed by the respondents in their Comment/Opposition to Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.27lawphi1
Meanwhile, in its 1st Indorsement28 dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez,
endorsed the petition filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor, with the assistance of the private
prosecutor, to the Solicitor General for his conformity.
On April 5, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution29 denying the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
In denying the motion, the CA opined that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state from
appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of
the case. If there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom, if it will not put the accused in double
jeopardy, on the criminal aspect, may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor
General. It added that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may
be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. Moreover, the records reveal that the petition was not filed in the
name of the offended party; and worse, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
attached to the petition was signed not by the private offended party, but by her counsel.
Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the petitioner to secure the confirmation of the OSG and
the endorsement of the DOJ, there is no showing of any subsequent participation of the OSG in
the case.
Hence, the petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR NOT HAVING BEEN FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL NOR IN THE NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ATTACHED TO THE PETITION WAS SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE
COUNSEL AND NOT BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.30
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao, none of the
respondents appeared at the promulgation of the Decision. Neither did they surrender after
promulgation of the judgment of conviction, nor filed a motion for leave to avail themselves of
the judicial remedies against the decision, stating the reasons for their absence. The trial court
thus had no authority to take cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration filed by the
respondents as stated in Section 6, Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As
8
such, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Page
Having been issued without jurisdiction, the Order dated April 15, 2004 is void. Consequently, no
double jeopardy attached to such void Order. The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when
it dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy.31
Petitioner also contends that, with the endorsement of the DOJ and the letter of the OSG
manifesting its intention to pursue the petition, the OSG had in fact conformed to the filing of the
petition and agreed to pursue the same. Had the CA given the OSG ample time to file the
necessary pleading, the petition would not have been dismissed for the reason that it was filed by
the said office.32
With respect to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, petitioner invokes a
liberal application of the Rules for private complainant’s failure to personally sign it. Petitioner
maintains that out of extreme fear arising from the unexpected acquittal of Joven, private
complainant was reluctant to travel to Manila. After she was taken out of the witness protection
program, she took refuge in the Visayas and she was there at the time her signature was required.
Since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was about to lapse, and it could not be filed
without the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, the private prosecutor was left
with no option but so sign it, instead of allowing the deadline to pass without filing the petition. 33
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the OSG has the authority to sign the verification and
certification of the present petition, because the real party-in-interest is the OSG itself as the
representative of the State. 34
On their part, respondents contend that the petition for certiorari questioning the order of
acquittal is not allowed and is contrary to the principle of double jeopardy. Respondents argue
that, contrary to the OSG’s contention, respondents Joven and Domingo’s absence during the
promulgation of the Decision dated April 25, 2002 did not deprive the trial court of its authority to
resolve their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, considering that one of the accused, Estanislao,
was present during the promulgation.35
Joven, Armando, and Domingo maintain that while they were not present during the
promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police custody, attended the
promulgation of the said Decision. Thus, when they filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration,
which included that of Estanislao, the RTC was not deprived of its authority to resolve the joint
motion.36
Respondents insist that the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as it was not
instituted by the OSG on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and that the verification and
certification portion thereof was not signed by private complainant Teresita. 37
Respondents also argue that the petition for certiorari before this Court should be dismissed,
since the verification and certification thereof were signed by a solicitor of the OSG, not private
complainant.
The petition is meritorious.
Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first address the technical objections raised
by respondents.
As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, a
liberal application of the Rules should be applied to the present case.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
petition have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith
does not necessarily render it fatally defective. 38 Truly, verification is only a formal, not a
jurisdictional, requirement. Hence, it was sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the
verification.
With respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that the certification
requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial
procedure.39 However, this Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring
the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not
jurisdictional.40 Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals41 and Wee v. Galvez,42 the Court noted that the petitioners were
already in the United States; thus, the signing of the certification by their authorized
representatives was deemed sufficient compliance with the Rules. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,43
the Court upheld substantial justice and ruled that the failure of the parties to sign the
certification may be overlooked, as the parties’ case was meritorious. In Torres v. Specialized
Packaging and Development Corporation,44 the Court also found, among other reasons, that the
extreme difficulty to secure all the required signatures and the apparent merits of the substantive
aspects of the case constitute compelling reasons for allowing the petition.
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals45 and similar rulings, the following has always been pointed out:
The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Court’s consideration, petitioners
here must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners
must convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration
of justice.
Thus, petitioners need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure to sign the
certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat
the administration of justice.46
We find that the particular circumstances of this case advance valid reasons for private
complainant’s failure to sign the certification. As pointed out in the petition, it was out of extreme
fear that private complainant failed to personally sign the certification. It is to be noted that when
Armando and Joven were acquitted, Teresita was already out of the witness protection program
and was in hiding in the Visayas. As such, she could not travel to Manila to personally sign the
petition. Moreover, as maintained by the petitioner, since the period for filing the petition for
certiorari was about to lapse, the private prosecutor was left with no option but to sign the
verification and certification, instead of allowing the period to file the petition to pass without it
being filed. A relaxation of the procedural rules, considering the particular circumstances, is
justified. The requirement was thus substantially complied with.
As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,47 when a strict and literal
application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification would result in a patent denial of
substantial justice, they may be liberally construed. An unforgiving application of the pertinent
provisions of the Rules will not be given premium if it would impede rather than serve the best
interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
We reiterate our holding in City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella,48 that the signature of
the Solicitor General on the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition
before the CA or with this Court is substantial compliance with the requirement under the Rules,
considering that the OSG is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities; more so, in a criminal case where the People or
the State is the real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party. 49
Also, respondents’ contention that there is no showing of any subsequent participation of the
OSG in the petition before the CA does not hold water. In the letter dated January 18, 2004, the
OSG instructed the private prosecutor to secure the necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to
9
pursue the case. In its 1st Indorsement dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez,
Page
endorsed the petition to the Solicitor General for his conformity. When the CA denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration for its outright dismissal of the petition, the OSG filed motions 50 for
extension of time to file the present petition. Moreover, the OSG filed a Comment 51 on
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration. 52 Thus, any doubt regarding the endorsement,
conformity, and participation of the OSG in the petitions is dispelled.
Now on the substantive aspect.
A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner has sought recourse before the CA, via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial court drastically modifying its
earlier findings convicting the respondents of the crime of murder, by acquitting Joven and
Armando, and downgrading the convictions of their co-accused from murder to homicide; this,
notwithstanding that all the accused, except Estanislao Lacaba, failed to personally appear at the
promulgation of the Decision despite due notice thereof.
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA
was the proper remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to
Armando and Joven despite the fact that they had not regained their standing in court.
Petitioner’s recourse to the CA was correct.
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.53 An act of a court or tribunal may be considered as grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or
hostility.54
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that
the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment
but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.55 In which event, the accused cannot be
considered at risk of double jeopardy — the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the
accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense.
Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is charged under a
complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court
has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or
acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his express consent. 56
Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to
correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the
lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its
very power to dispense justice.57
Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal existed where
the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a defendant before such a court was not
actually placed in jeopardy.58 Hence, any acquittal or conviction before a court having no
jurisdiction would not violate the principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first
place.
Section 14(2),59 Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to
be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and
plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification
purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case,
the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his
presence is required and cannot be waived.60
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules applicable at the time
the Decision was promulgated, provides:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. –The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence
of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is
for a light offense the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place
of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court
promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the
bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only
be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused, personally or through his bondsman or
warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the
accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him
shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the accused
may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice.61
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available
in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves
that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15
days from notice.62
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was present.
Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence,
Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In
blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who
were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration
10
with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as
a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and
Page
Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless
he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.63
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very
beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without
jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal
cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.64
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it entertained
the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the promulgation of the
judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the RTC’s ruling
downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone,
the proscription against double jeopardy applies.
Factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in a certiorari proceeding. We can no longer
be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them
again to ascertain if the trial court was correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of
evidence of one party or the other. 65 The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and does not include a review of the RTC’s evaluation of the evidence and the factual
findings based thereon.66
True, were it not for the procedural lapses of the RTC and its blatant disregard of the Rules, the
finality of respondents’ acquittal and their co-accused’s conviction of homicide instead of murder
would have been barred by the rule on double jeopardy.
We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the innocent or from
an attempt to uphold the accused’s treasured right to a fair trial, but when these concerns are not
evident, an erroneous acquittal is a source of substantial dismay and warrants this Court’s
corrective action via a special writ of error.
Moreover, although the CA dismissed the appeal filed before it, the RTC Judge cannot hide behind
such fact considering that the dismissal of the appeal was not based on the validity of the assailed
Order of the RTC, but was based on technical rules and the rule against double jeopardy.
It is to be stressed that judges are dutybound to have more than a cursory acquaintance with laws
and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law
from which no one may be excused, not even a judge. 67 The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
that "a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." 68 It bears
stressing that competence is one of the marks of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter
lack of familiarity with the Rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our
courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he/she
owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law.69
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 25, 2005 and April 5, 2005,
issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
pertinent portions of the Order dated April 15, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court, convicting
Domingo Landicho of the crime of Homicide and acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven de
Grano, are ANNULLED and DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order stands.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision dated April 25,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE Judge Teresa P. Soriaso for

11
possible violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial Conduct in issuing the Order dated April
15, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-129988.

Page
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186001               October 2, 2009
ANTONIO CABADOR, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision
of August 4, 20081 and Resolution of October 28, 20082 in CA-G.R. SP 100431 that affirmed the
August 31, 2006 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
The facts are not disputed.
On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC of
Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-00-93291 of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N.
Valerio.4 On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent
trial, the RTC declared at an end the prosecution’s presentation of evidence and required the
prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from
notice.5 But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time, the last of which was to end
on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did not make the required written offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, 6 complaining of a turtle-
paced proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a
speedy trial. Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not consider any
evidence against him that had not been formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution
witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.
Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006 the prosecution
asked the RTC for another extension of the period for its formal offer, which offer it eventually
made on August 1, 2006, the day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss. 7
On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s August 1, 2006 motion
to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the
RTC declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court
deemed the case submitted for decision insofar as he was concerned. Cabador filed a motion for
reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it on February 19, 2007. 8 Cabador questioned
the RTC’s actions before the CA but on August 4, 2008 the latter denied his petition and affirmed
the lower court’s actions.9 With the CA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, on October 28,
2008 petitioner came to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
The issue in this case is whether or not petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial
court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he
effectively waived his right to present evidence in his defense and submitted the case for decision
insofar as he was concerned.
The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the prosecution’s presentation of
evidence against the accused and, second, the accused’s presentation of evidence in his defense.
If, after the prosecution has presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a
conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the
second stage and dismiss the criminal action.10 There is no point for the trial court to hear the
evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an acquittal.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the
case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court,
he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered
submitted for judgment.11 On occasions, this presents a problem such as when, like the situation
in this case, the accused files a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a
demurrer to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled that
it is.
This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections 12 that, to determine whether the pleading
filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations
in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary
objective of the party filing it.
Here, the pertinent portions of petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss read as follows:
2. On November 9, 2001, the accused was arrested and subsequently brought to the Quezon City
jail through a commitment order dated November 21, 2001 where he had been detained during
the course of this case.
3. The accused was arraigned on January 8, 2002 and trial began soon after.
4. UP-OLA entered its appearance as counsel for the accused on January 20, 2005.
5. On February 10, 2006, the Honorable Court terminated the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution considering that the case has been going on for 5 years already and during that
period the prosecution has only presented 5 witnesses. Moreover, xxx there had been numerous
postponements due to failure of the prosecution to ensure the presence of its witnesses.
6. In an order dated March 31, 2006, the Honorable court required the public prosecutor to
submit its formal offer of evidence within fifteen (15) days from receipt of such order.
7. On April 17, 2006, the public prosecutor was again absent so the presentation of evidence for
the accused was reset to June 6, 2006.
8. During the same hearing, the Prosecution was again granted an additional fifteen (15) days
within which to file their formal offer of evidence.
9. On June 6, 2006, the public prosecutor again failed to appear and to file their formal offer of
evidence. In an order, the Honorable Court again extended to the prosecution an additional
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order within which to file their formal offer of evidence.
10. On June 28, 2006, the Honorable Court issued an order granting the prosecution a thirty-day
extension, or until July 28, 2006 within which to file their formal offer of evidence since the public
prosecutor was on leave.
11. Upon the expiration of the extension granted by the Honorable Court, the prosecution failed
to file their formal offer of evidence.
10. (Sic) Despite three (3) extensions, the prosecution failed to file formal offer of evidence.
11. (Sic) Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to
base their findings of fact and their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial (Ong vs. CA, GR No. 117103). Hence, without any formal offer of evidence, this
Honorable Court has no evidence to consider.
12. The charge against the accused has no leg to stand on. The witnesses that had been presented
by the prosecution testified mainly on the occurrences on the night of the incident and had no
knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the accused in the incident.
13. The hearings of the case have been delayed since 2001 through no fault of the defense to the
12
prejudice of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial, mandated by no less than Art. III, Sec. 16 of
the Constitution.
Page
14. Since UP-OLA had entered its appearance in 2005, the case had been reset for twelve (12)
times, most of which are due to the fault or absence of the prosecution. For the five year duration
of the case, the prosecution still has not presented any evidence to prove the guilt of the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to
beyond reasonable doubt. Meanwhile, the accused has been unduly stripped of this liberty for evidence. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
more than five (5) years upon an unsubstantiated charge. On a final note, a demurrer to evidence shortens the proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must,
15. The accused was injured and debilitated in the course of his arrest which resulted in the however, be exercised17 in view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused to
amputation of his left leg. His movement is severely hampered and his living conditions are less present evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity of the
adequate. To subject him to further delays when there is no substance to the charge against him penalty involved.
would tantamount to injustice.13 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the August 4, 2008 Decision and the October 28, 2008
It can be seen from the above that petitioner Cabador took pains to point out in paragraphs 2, 3, Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 100431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, "10 (sic)," 13, 14, and 15 above how trial in the case had painfully dragged on August 31, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 is NULLIFIED. The
for years. The gaps between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of latter court is DIRECTED to resolve petitioner Antonio Cabador’s motion to dismiss based on the
the prosecutor’s absence. This was further compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecution’s circumstances surrounding the trial in the case.
repeated motions for extension of time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within such SO ORDERED.
time. Cabador then invoked in paragraph 13 above his right to speedy trial. But the RTC and the
CA simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and altogether treated Cabador’s motion as
a demurrer to evidence because of a few observations he made in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12
regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against him.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s right
to speedy trial.14 This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays
without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the
trial.15 This was the main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this
up for a ruling by the trial court.
Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12,
saying that the trial court "has no evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and
that "the witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the
accused in the incident." But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial
had accomplished.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He
did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects
such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not
touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed,
he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of
exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss. 16 To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to
evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant, and
exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section
23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or
without leave of court. (Emphasis supplied)1awphi1
Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on August 1, 2006, the same day
Cabador filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to
object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after

13
such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed his
motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before the trial court
could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he

Page
had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.
In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador

G.R. No. 167526               July 26, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. DANTE TAN, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the June 14, 2004 Resolution2 and February 24, 2005 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 83433.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On December 21, 2000, two Informations for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1, 4 in relation to Sections 32
(a)-15 and 566 of the Revised Securities Act, were filed by petitioner People of the Philippines
against respondent Dante Tan in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 153. They
were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832.
The Information7 in Criminal Case No. 119831 reads:
That on December 10, 1998, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the beneficial
owner of 84,030,000 Best World Resources Corporation shares, a registered security sold
pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership constitutes
18.6% of the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by law to be
reported, and covered by Certificate Nos. DT-UK 55485704 and DT-UR 55485776, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission
and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares of
which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such beneficial owner, in
violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and regulations prescribed and pursuant
thereto.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The Information9 in Criminal Case No. 119832 reads:
That on June 18, 1999, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the beneficial owner of
75,000,000 Best World Resources Corporation shares, a registered security which has been sold
pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership constitutes
18.6% of the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by law to be
reported, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount
of all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such
beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and regulations
prescribed pursuant thereto.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty 11 to both charges and the trial ensued.
On November 24, 2003, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence,12 consisting of Exhibits "A" to
"E" with sub-exhibits, Exhibits "K-1," "K-10" and "K-11," "Q," "R," "S," "T" and "W" with sub-
exhibits, and Exhibit "X."
On December 11, 2003, the RTC issued an Order13 admitting Exhibits "A," "B," "W" and "X," but
denied admission of all the other exhibits on the grounds stated therein.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in an
Order14 dated January 27, 2004.
In the meantime, on December 18, 2003, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence15 and to admit the attached Demurrer to Evidence.
On January 29, 2004, the RTC issued another Order16 granting respondents’ Motion for Leave to
File the Demurrer and forthwith admitted respondent’s attached Demurrer. The RTC also ordered
petitioner to file an opposition.
On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition17 to the Demurrer to Evidence. Respondent
then filed a Reply.18
On March 16, 2004, the RTC issued an Order19 granting respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the Demurrer to Evidence filed by accused Dante Tan to be meritorious, the
same is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.20
On April 12, 2004,21 petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari22 before the CA assailing the December
11, 2003, January 27, 2004, and March 16, 2004 Orders of the RTC.
On June 14, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petition, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the context of all the foregoing considerations, it would be futile to take further
action on the herein petition, which is therefore DISMISSED outright for evident want of merit.
SO ORDERED.23
In denying the petition, the CA ruled that the dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a
Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which reason, the
prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. 24
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in
a Resolution dated February 24, 2005.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the lone assignment of error, to wit:
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE PEOPLE FROM PROSECUTING ITS
CASES AGAINST DANTE TAN.25
The petition has no merit.
Notwithstanding the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner contends that
the CA erred in applying the rules on double jeopardy. Specifically, petitioner argues that double
jeopardy does not apply in cases decided by the trial court without jurisdiction and in violations of
petitioner’s right to due process.26
In People v. Sandiganbayan,27 this Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to
evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution
had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such
dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do
14
so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case
ends there.28
Page
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been
arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.29
These elements are present here: (1) the Informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and
119832 against respondent were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the
RTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832; (3) respondent was arraigned
and entered a plea of not guilty; and (4) the RTC dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and
119832 on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence which amounts to
an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., 30 this
Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion, thus:
x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in
such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused
its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 31
After an extensive review of previous Court decisions relevant to herein petition, this Court finds
that the abovementioned exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. This Court finds
that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the trial,
as well as its grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 32
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,33 this Court ruled that the prosecution was denied due process of
law when the trial was but a mock trial, to wit:
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as
we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire
proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as
innocent of all the respondents-accused.34
35
In addition, in People v. Bocar, this Court ruled that there is no double jeopardy when the
prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the trial court, to wit:
It is evident from the brief transcript of the proceedings held on July 7, 1967 that the parties were
not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the respondent Judge (pp. 11-17,
rec.). Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before
respondent Court. Respondent Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary,
whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit.
Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a chance to
introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court (pp. 11-17, rec.).
Verily, the prosecution was denied due process.
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right
to due process is thereby violated. x x x36
Likewise, in People v. Judge Albano, 37 this Court held that there is no double jeopardy when the
trial court preemptively dismissed the case, thus:
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution failed to
establish the culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does not even require the
prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction,
when it preemptively dismissed the cases and, as a consequence thereof, deprived the
prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to
due process." With this violation, its Orders, dated 28 October 1976 and 20 December 1976, are
therefore null and void. Likewise, for being null and void, said orders cannot constitute a proper
basis for a claim of double jeopardy.38
In Saldana v. Court of Appeals,39 this Court ruled that the prosecution’s right to due process is
violated when the trial court aborted its right to complete its presentation of evidence, thus:
The order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial
court does not violate the rule on double jeopardy. One of the elements of double jeopardy is a
competent court. The trial court in this case was ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the
right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to complete the presentation of its
evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. The remand of the case for further
hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy. It does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy. x x x40
Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is "did the RTC
violate petitioner’s right to due process?" On this note, this Court rules that petitioner was given
more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual antecedents which
led to the grant of respondent’s demurrer.
On September 18, 2001, petitioner completed its presentation of evidence and, on the day after,
filed its formal offer of evidence. On January 21, 2002, respondent filed an opposition to
petitioner’s formal offer. Instead of filing a reply as directed by the RTC, petitioner filed a "Motion
to Withdraw Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence and to Re-open Presentation of Evidence." 41
Said motion was granted by the RTC and petitioner thus continued its presentation of evidence.
On January 28, 2003, petitioner ended its presentation of additional witnesses and was then
ordered by the RTC to formally offer its exhibits. On February 26, 2003, petitioner filed a request
for marking of certain documents and motion to admit attached formal offer of evidence. 42 The
motion was initially denied by the RTC, but on motion for reconsideration the same was granted
by the RTC. The RTC, thus, ordered petitioner to file anew its formal offer of evidence. Finally, on
November 24, 2003, petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. 43
After respondent filed its Demurer to Evidence, the RTC, in an Order dated January 29, 2004,
directed petitioner to file its opposition thereto. On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its
Opposition44 to the demurrer.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC never prevented petitioner from presenting its
case. Unlike in Bocar and Saldana where the prosecution was prevented from completing its
presentation of evidence, petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case, formally offer
its evidence and oppose respondent’s demurrer. It even bears to point out that the RTC even
allowed petitioner to withdraw its formal offer of evidence after having initially rested its case and
then continue its presentation by introducing additional witnesses. Thus, no grave abuse can be
attributed to the RTC as petitioner’s right to due process was not violated. Even Galman finds no
application to the case at bar as clearly such trial cannot be considered a sham based on the
abovementioned considerations.
15
Petitioner argues that the RTC displayed resolute bias when it chose to grant respondent’s
demurrer to evidence notwithstanding that it had filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance the
Page
Resolution of Accused Dante Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence and The Prosecution’s Opposition
Thereto."45 Petitioner contends that instead of acting on the motion, the RTC peremptorily
granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence which prevented petitioner from its intention to file a the prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is manifestly mistaken. Assuming,
petition for certiorari to question the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the RTC. however, that there is an error of judgment on the denial of admission of certain exhibits of the
While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to prosecution and the appreciation of the prosecution’s case, there is to this Court’s mind, no
evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if this Court capricious exercise of judgment that would overcome the defense of double jeopardy.
were to consider the same as an error on the part of the RTC, the same would merely constitute Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription
an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as persistently argued by against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and
petitioner. Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. 49 While
plea of antrefois acquit.46 We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been petitioner insists that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that none can
committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea be attributed to the RTC. Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed the assailed Orders of
of double jeopardy.47 To reiterate, the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC.
the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction On a final note, this Court is aware of this Court’s Third Division Decision dated April 21, 2009
which cannot be attributed to the RTC simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance the entitled Dante Tan v. People of the Philippines50 wherein respondent argued that his right to a
resolution of the demurrer to evidence. Consequently, petitioner’s attempt to put in issue the speedy trial was violated by the prosecution. This Court denied the petition and ruled for the
December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the RTC which denied admission of certain remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. It must be pointed out that said decision
documentary exhibits in evidence must fail. As correctly manifested by the CA, the said Orders involves Criminal Case No. 119830,51 which is distinct and separate from Criminal Case No. 119831
have already been overtaken by the March 16, 2004 Order, which already granted respondent’s and Criminal Case No. 119832 which are the subject matter of herein petition. Thus, the
demurrer to evidence. Hence, this Court would be violating the rules on double jeopardy if the resolution of the case at bar is without prejudice to the proceedings that are being conducted in
twin orders were to be reviewed after a finding that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of Criminal Case No. 119830 at whatever stage it may be.
discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The June 14, 2004 Resolution and
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the demurrer to February 24, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83433 are AFFIRMED.
evidence, no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page Order granting the
SO ORDERED.
demurrer was arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto. As correctly observed by
the CA, the RTC extensively discussed its position on the various issues brought to contention by
petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTC’s decision to grant the demurrer was the absence
of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the Best World Resources Corporation stocks were
divided into, whether there are preferred shares as well as common shares, or even which type of
shares respondent had acquired, thus:
To secure conviction for the violations of RSA Secs. 32 (a-1) and 36 (a), it is necessary to prove the
following: (1) the BW Resources Corporation ("BW") has equity securities registered under the
Revised Securities Act; [2] that the equity securities of BW Resources Corporation are divided into
classes, and that these classes are registered pursuant to the Revised Securities Act; (3) the
number of shares of BW Resources Corporation (authorized the number of shares of BW
Resources (authorized capital stock) and the total number of shares per class of stock; (4) the
number of shares of a particular class of BW stock acquired by the accused; (5) the fact of the
exact date, the accused [becomes] the beneficial owner of ten (10%) percent of a particular class
of BW shares; and (6) the fact, the accused failed to disclose his ten (10%) percent ownership
within ten days from becoming such owner.
It is very clear from the evidence formally offered, that the foregoing facts were not proven or
established. These cases were for Violations of RSA Rule 32 (a)-1 and Section 56 of Revised
Securities Act, however, it is very surprising that the prosecution never presented in evidence the
Article of Incorporation of BW Resources Corporation. This document is very vital and is the key to
everything, including the conviction of the accused. Without the Article of Incorporation, the
Court has no way of knowing the capitalization authorized capital stock of the BW Resources
Corporation, the classes of shares into which its stock is divided and the exact holdings of Dante
Tan in the said corporation. Its not being a prosecution’s evidence renders impossible the

16
determination of the ten (10%) percent beneficial ownership of accused Dante Tan, as there is no
focal point to base the computation of his holdings, and the exact date of his becoming an owner

Page
of ten (10%) percent.48
There is no showing that the conclusions made by the RTC on the sufficiency of the evidence of

G.R. No. 160067               November 17, 2010
NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. MARICEL M. JOSON, ET AL. Respondents.
G.R. No. 170410
SANTOS FRANCISCO Petitioners, vs. SPS. GERARD AND MARICEL JOSON Respondents.
G.R. No. 171622
NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. HILARION FELIX, ET AL., Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
Filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari at bench primarily assail the decisions rendered in the following cases, viz.: (a)
Decision dated 4 September 2003 of the then Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 74030;1 (b) Decision dated 26 October 2005 of said Court’s then Special Eighth
Division in CA-G.R. No. 81262;2 and, (c) Decision dated 17 February 2006 of the same Court’s then
Special Sixth Division in CA-G.R. No. 87906. 3
The Facts
At or about 2:00 o’clock in the morning of 11 May 2001, along the portion of the National
Highway in Barangay Concepcion, Sariaya, Quezon, an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck collided with a
Fuso six-wheeler truck. Owned by petitioner Nelson Imperial, the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck was
then being driven by petitioner Santos Francisco, while the Fuso six-wheeler truck was driven by
respondent Santiago Giganto, Jr. who was, at the time, accompanied by a helper or pahinante,
respondent Samuel Cubeta. After colliding with the Fuso six-wheeler truck, the Isuzu ten-wheeler
truck further rammed into a Kia Besta Van which was, in turn, being driven by respondent Arnel
Lazo. The KIA Besta Van was owned by Noel Tagle who was then on board said vehicle, together
with the following passengers, namely, Gloria, Jonathan, Jaypee, Jervin, Jerald and Lydia, all
surnamed Felix; Marvin, Martin and Jan-Jon, all surnamed Sadiwa; Antonio Landoy; and,
respondents Evelyn Felix, and Jasmin Galvez.4
There were multiple damages on the vehicles. Much more tragic than that, the accident resulted
in the death of Noel Tagle, the owner of the KIA Besta Van, and seven of its passengers, namely,
Gloria, Jonathan, Jaypee, Jervin, Jerald and Lydia, all surnamed Felix; and, Antonio Landoy.
Although they survived the mishap, on the other hand, respondents Arnel Lazo, Evelyn Felix and
Jasmin Galvez all suffered serious physical injuries and were immediately brought to the nearest
hospital for treatment.
As a consequence of the collisions, a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property was filed against
petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel Imperial on 16 May 2001. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 01-99 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sariaya, Quezon. 5
On 3 July 2001, a complaint for damages was also filed by petitioners Francisco and Imperial
against respondents Giganto and Cubeta, the driver and pahinante of the Fuso six-wheeler truck,
respondent Leticia Pedraja, its alleged registered owner, and respondent Maricel Joson, its
alleged present owner. Anchored on the supposed fact that the accident was caused by the
recklessness and gross negligence of respondent Giganto, the complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2001-0296 before Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City. In turn
alleging that the mishap was attributable to the negligence of the driver of the Isuzu ten-wheeler
truck, respondent Giganto joined respondent Maricel Joson and her husband, respondent Gerard
Ferdinand Joson, in filing against petitioners Francisco and Imperial the complaint for damages
docketed as Civil Case No. 8314 before Branch 82 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Valenzuela City.6
On 6 August 2001, respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson moved for the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 2001-0296 before the Naga RTC, on the ground of litis pendentia. Invoking the "interest of
justice rule", said respondents argued that Civil Case No. 8314 before the Valenzuela MeTC should
be maintained despite petitioners’ earlier filing of their complaint for damages before the Naga
RTC. Likewise invoking litis pendentia and relying on the earlier filing of their complaint, on the
other hand, petitioners filed a motion dated 28 September 2001, seeking the dismissal of the
complaint for damages respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson filed against them before the
Valenzuela MeTC. In a supplement to their motion to dismiss dated 4 February, 2002, however,
respondents Giganto and the Spouses Joson argued that it was the case before the Naga RTC
which should be dismissed since petitioners not only failed to implead their respective spouses
and that of respondent Pedraja but had already received payment from their insurer, the
Standard Insurance Company, Inc., for the damages sustained by the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck. 7
With the Valenzuela MeTC’s 28 February 2002 dismissal of the complaint filed against them by
respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson, petitioners amended their complaint before the Naga
RTC for the purpose of impleading the following additional defendants: (a) the respective spouses
of respondents Giganto, Cubeta, Maricel Joson and Leticia Pedraja; (b) the driver of the KIA Besta
Van, respondent Lazo; and (c) the surviving spouse of the registered owner thereof, respondent
Agnes Tagle. In said amended complaint, petitioners averred, among other matters, that the
vehicular accident was caused by negligence of respondents Giganto and Lazo, the drivers of the
Fuso six-wheeler truck and the KIA Besta Van, respectively. In a motion dated 16 March 2002,
however, respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson sought the reconsideration of the dismissal of
their complaint by the Valenzuela MeTC on the ground that petitioners’ claim of priority was
effectively discounted by the fact that their amended complaint in Civil Case No. 2001-0296 did
not retroact to the date of filing of their original complaint before the Naga RTC. 81avvphi1
In the meantime, respondents Lazo, Tagle, Felix and Galvez joined respondents Gregorio Felix and
Antonio Landoy, the heirs/relatives of the deceased passengers of the KIA Besta Van, in filing a
complaint for damages against petitioners on 13 September 2001. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-
0325 before Branch 74 of the RTC of Parañaque City, said complaint asseverated that petitioner
Francisco’s negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the mishap. In a motion filed on 19
November 2001 before the Parañaque RTC, however, petitioners sought the dismissal of said
complaint in view of the complaints for damages then still pending before the Naga RTC and the
Valenzuela MeTC. In turn utilizing the pendency of Civil Case No. 01-0325 before the Parañaque
RTC alongside their complaint before the Valenzuela MeTC, respondents Giganto and Spouses
Joson filed a motion dated 18 March 2002 praying for the dismissal of petitioners’ amended
complaint before the Naga RTC on the ground of litis pendentia. 9
On 2 August 2002, the Naga City RTC issued an order dismissing petitioners’ amended complaint
on the ground that the same was barred by the complaint for damages filed against them before
the Parañaque RTC. Differentiating said pleading from a supplemental pleading which only serves
to bolster or add something to a primary pleading, the Naga RTC ruled that petitioners’ amended
complaint supplanted and did not retroact to the time of their original complaint. 10 Subsequent to
the Naga RTC's 16 September 2002 denial of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing order,11 the Valenzuela MeTC went on to issue an order dated 30 September 2002
17
reconsidering its earlier dismissal of Civil Case No. 8314 and requiring petitioners to file their
answer to the complaint filed by respondents Giganto and the Spouses Joson. 12 In view of the
Page
Parañaque RTC's further issuance of the 7 October 2002 order denying their motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 01-0325,13 petitioners assailed all of the foregoing orders in the petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 74030. 14
On 4 September 2003, the CA's then Tenth Division issued a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 74030 to
the following effect: (a) nullifying the Valenzuela MeTC's 30 September 2002 order which
reinstated Civil Case No. 8314; (b) affirming the 2 August 2002 and 16 September 2002 orders
issued by the Naga RTC which dismissed petitioners' amended complaint in Civil Case No. 2001-
0296 on the ground of litis pendentia; and, (c) affirming the Parañaque RTC's 7 October 2002
order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-0325. Finding that the damages in
the aggregate sum of P576,876.03 asserted by respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson in Civil
Case No. 8314 were beyond the jurisdictional amount then cognizable by the Valenzuela MeTC,
the CA Tenth Division ruled that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the Naga
RTC and the Parañaque RTC whose combined orders gave premium to Civil Case No. 01-0325 over
Civil Case No. 2001-0296. In the absence of proof that the greater number of cases pending
thereat would actually result in the violation of petitioners' right to a speedy trial, the jurisdiction
of the Parañaque RTC was upheld with the added ground that it was the venue most accessible to
majority of the parties.15
Aggrieved, petitioners assailed the foregoing order in the 9 November 2003 petition for review on
certiorari docketed before this Court as G.R. No. 160067. 16 In the meantime, the Sariaya MTC
proceeded to conduct the mandatory pre-trial conference in Criminal Case No. 01-99 after
petitioner Francisco entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment scheduled in the case. 17 Thru
his counsel, Atty. Aristotle Dominguez, petitioner Francisco proposed the following facts for
stipulation with the prosecution, to wit:
"(a) that the assistant public prosecutor had told the undersigned counsel inside the courtroom
during a court break[sic] (upon undersigned's inquiry) that he had already interviewed Arnel Lazo
(the driver of the Besta Van carrying the people who were injured and several others who
eventually died);
(b) That Arnel Lazo declared during said interview to Prosecutor Zabella that, as opposed to the
affidavits of the driver and 'pahinante' of the FUSO 6-wheeler truck, Arnel Lazo clearly saw the
driver of the FUSO 6-wheeler truck attempt an overtake, which attempt was rendered
unsuccessful because it was hit by the on-coming 10-wheeler truck driven by the accused herein;
and
(c) that for some reason, (the) prosecutor did not and still does not believe the version of events
as declared to him by Arnel Lazo in that interview." 18
In view of Prosecutor Rodolfo Zabella, Jr.’s refusal to stipulate on the foregoing matters, the
Sariaya MTC went on to issue a pre-trial order dated 14 August 2001 stating, in part, that "1.Atty.
Dominguez made a proposal for stipulation and admission to the effect that sometime after the
arraignment of the accused, he (Atty. Dominguez) was able to talk and interview Arnel Lazo, the
driver of the Besta Van who admitted to him that it was his 6-wheeler truck which attempted to
overtake another vehicle thereby causing the vehicular (accident) subject of the instant case. The
Public Prosecutor did not agree." 19 As a consequence, petitioner Francisco filed on 30 August 2001
a motion styled as one "to compel and disqualify Prosecutor Zabella and to correct the pre-trial
order" on the ground that the latter cannot refuse to stipulate on matters of which he has
personal knowledge and that the Judge’s recollection of the proposed stipulation was different
from that actually proposed.20 With the Sariaya MTC’s denial of said motion in an order dated 18
October 2001,21 petitioner Francisco filed a motion for reconsideration on 19 November 2001. 22
On 9 January 2002, the Sariaya MTC issued an order which, while denying petitioner Francisco’s
motion for reconsideration, directed that the pre-trial conference be set anew in view of the
reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Francis Sia and the appearance of a new private
prosecutor in the case.23 Dissatisfied, petitioner Francisco filed on 1 April 2002 the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 2002-37 before Branch 58 of the
Lucena City RTC. Likewise contending that the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference in
Criminal Case No. 01-99 were capricious, vexatious and oppressive, petitioner Francisco further
moved for the dismissal of the case on 14 March 2004, on the ground that his constitutional right
to a speedy trial had been violated. Upon the Sariaya MTC’s 17 April 2002 denial of said motion as
well as the motion for reconsideration he subsequently interposed, petitioner Francisco filed yet
another petition for certiorari and prohibition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2002-90
before Branch 58 of the Lucena RTC and, later, consolidated with Civil Case No. 2002-37. 24
On 23 June 2003, the Lucena RTC rendered a consolidated decision in Civil Case Nos. 2002-37 and
2002-90, dismissing petitioner Francisco’s petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for
lack of merit.25 Elevated by petitioner Francisco to the CA via the petition for certiorari thereat
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81262, said decision was upheld in the 26 October 2005 decision
rendered in the case by said court's then Special Eighth Division. 26 Brushing aside the grave abuse
of discretion petitioner Francisco imputed against the Lucena RTC, the CA ruled that: (a) the pre-
trial order cannot be corrected in the absence of evidence of the error supposedly reflected
therein; (b) the Public Prosecutor cannot be compelled to enter into any stipulation that would
substantially affect the theory of the prosecution; and, (c) the postponements of the hearings a
quo were brought about by the assignment of at least three Public Prosecutors to the case and
cannot, therefore, be considered capricious and violative of petitioner Francisco’s right to a
speedy trial.27 Undaunted, the latter filed the petition for review on certiorari docketed before this
Court as G.R. No. 170410.28
In Civil Case No. 01-0325, on the other hand, petitioners Francisco and Imperial filed with the
Parañaque RTC their 14 December 2002 answer, with motion to admit the third-party complaint
therein incorporated against respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto, Cubeta and their respective
spouses.29 Upon receipt of the Parañaque RTC’s 2 June 2003 order requiring them to pay the
necessary filing and other docket fees relative to their third-party complaint, 30 petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration dated 17 June 2003, pleading as ground for non-payment of said fees
the pendency of their petition for certiorari assailing, among other matters, the Naga RTC’s
dismissal of Civil Case No. 2001-0296.31 Having issued the 14 November 2003 order holding
petitioners’ payment of the same fees in abeyance pending the final outcome of said petition for
certiorari,32 the Parañaque RTC, upon the motion dated 20 May 2004 filed respondents Felix,
Galvez, Tagle, Lazo and Landoy,33 issued the 8 June 2004 notice setting the case for pre-trial
conference on 16 August 2004 and requiring the parties to file their pre-trial briefs. 34
However, for failure of petitioners and their counsel to attend the pre-trial conference and to file
their pre-trial brief, the Parañaque RTC issued the order dated 16 August 2004 authorizing
respondents Hilarion and Gregorio Felix as well as respondents Tagle and Landoy to present their
evidence ex parte. In said order, respondent Evelyn Felix was likewise declared non-suited
alongside respondents Galvez and Lazo whose complaints were, as a consequence, dismissed
without prejudice in view of their failure to attend the same pre-trial conference. 35 Aggrieved by
the Parañaque RTC’s 6 October 2004 denial of their motion for reconsideration of said order, 36
petitioners filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition which, under docket of CA-G.R. SP No.
87906, was subsequently denied for lack of merit in the 17 February 2006 Decision eventually
rendered by CA’s then Special Sixth Division. 37 Petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari
questioning said decision rendered by the CA was docketed before this Court as G.R. No. 171622 38
and, pursuant to the 16 May 2006 report submitted by the Clerk of Court of this Court's Second
18
Division,39 was consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160067 and 170410.
The Issues
Page
In G.R. No. 160067, petitioners Francisco and Imperial essentially fault the CA for upholding the
jurisdiction of the Parañaque RTC over the Naga RTC with respect to the parties’ causes of action
for damages against each other. Calling attention to the lesser case load of the Naga RTC,
petitioners argue that the cause for the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case will
not be served by the Parañaque RTC. Despite said court’s relative proximity to majority of the
parties, petitioners likewise maintain that majority of the witnesses material to the complete
disposition of the case live closer to the Naga RTC. 40
In G.R. No. 170410, on the other hand, petitioner Francisco argues that the CA erred in failing to
appreciate the fact that the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference in the case
attributable to the prosecution amounted to a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy
trial.41
In G.R No. 171622, petitioners Francisco and Imperial maintain that the CA incorrectly discounted
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Lucena RTC when it authorized Hilarion and Gregorio
Felix as well as respondents Tagle and Landoy to present their evidence ex parte in Civil Case No.
01-0325.42
The Court’s Ruling
It bears emphasizing at the outset that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition petitioners filed
before the CA were all anchored on the grave abuse of discretion supposedly imputable against
the RTCs of Naga, Lucena and Parañaque for issuing the rulings therein assailed. Like prohibition, 43
however, the rule is settled that certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Because their
function is limited to keeping inferior courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction, 44 the writs
therefor may be issued only in cases of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the context of said special civil actions, it has been consistently
held that grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 45
In G.R. No. 160067, petitioners Francisco and Imperial argue that grave abuse of discretion is
imputable against both the Naga and Parañaque RTCs for, respectively, dismissing Civil Case No.
2001-0296 and denying the motion to dismiss they have filed in Civil Case No. 01-0325.
Contending that the speedy disposition of the parties’ causes of action for damages against each
other will be better achieved by the Naga RTC, petitioners contrast said court’s 121 pending cases
as of 31 October 200246 to the Parañaque RTC’s 1,019 pending cases as of September 2002. 47
While conceding that the Parañaque RTC is nearer to the respective residences of all the parties, 48
petitioners also maintain that the cause for inexpensive resolution of the parties’ cases would be
best served by the Naga RTC which is purportedly more accessible to the material witnesses
whose testimonies are indispensable to the just resolution of the case, namely, Santiago Carale
and Manuel Nacion, respondent Francisco's two pahinantes,; and, Martin, Marvin and Jan-Jon
Sadiwa, the passengers of the KIA Besta Van.49
Although the Constitution concededly guarantees that "(a)ll persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies", 50 it is
evident that petitioners’ arguments in G.R. No. 160067 have more to do with the wisdom of the
assailed rulings of the RTCs of Naga and Parañaque than said courts’ jurisdiction to issue the
same. Consistent with its function as a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, 51
however, the rule is settled that errors of judgment involving the wisdom or legal soundness of a
decision are beyond the province of a petition for certiorari. 52 Not being intended to correct every
controversial interlocutory ruling,53 a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised in order to review the
judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the
case.54 As long as the trial court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged error committed in the
exercise of its discretion will, therefore, amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgments,
correctible by an appeal and not by a petition for certiorari.55
Even prescinding from the foregoing considerations, our perusal of the record also shows that, by
filing their answer and third-party complaint against respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and
Cubeta in Civil Case No. 01-0325, petitioners have already submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Parañaque RTC. In addition, petitioners have filed before said court the
following motions and incidents, viz.: (a) 17 June 2003 motion for reconsideration of the 2 June
2003 order directing the payment of the filing and other docket fees for said third-party
complaint; (b) 11 June 2003 opposition to set the case for hearing; 56 and, (c) 2 September 2004
urgent motion for reconsideration and to set aside order of default. 57 Having filed their third-party
complaint as aforesaid and repeatedly sought positive relief from the Parañaque RTC, it stands to
reason that petitioners' should no longer be allowed to question said court's jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 01-0325 which, unlike the suit for damages pending before the Naga RTC, additionally
involves all the parties indispensable to the complete resolution of the case.
Under the "interest of justice rule", moreover, the determination of which court would be "in a
better position to serve the interests of justice" also entails the consideration of the following
factors: (a) the nature of the controversy; (b) the comparative accessibility of the court to the
parties; and, (c) other similar factors.58 Considering that majority of the parties live closer to the
Parañaque RTC,59 we cannot hospitably entertain petitioners’ insistence that the abatement of the
case before said court in favor of the one they filed before the Naga RTC would promote the
expeditious and inexpensive disposition of the parties’ complaints for damages against each other
which are indisputably personal in nature. Even assuming that they would all be called to testify
regarding the circumstances surrounding the subject vehicular accident, it also appears that, as
residents of Brgy. Inocencio Salud, General Emilio Aguinaldo (GMA), Cavite City, the witnesses
Martin, Marvin and Jan-Jon Sadiwa60 live closer to the Parañaque RTC rather than the Naga RTC.
In G.R. No. 170410, on the other hand, we find that petitioner Francisco is similarly out on a limb
in insisting that the Lucena RTC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Sariaya MTC’s denial
of his motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 01-99 on the ground that his constitutional right to a
speedy trial has been violated. Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice, said right is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. 61 In the case of Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan,62 this
Court significantly ruled as follows:
"While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and
not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is
supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances.
It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must
be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court
are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels
the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for
the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant." xxxx
Petitioner Francisco claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated when the Public
19
Prosecutors assigned to the case failed to attend the nine hearings scheduled by the Sariaya MTC
on 10 and 17 October 2001, 7 November 2001, 23 January 2002, 13 March 2002, 4 September
Page
2002, 6 November 2002, 15 January 2003 and 5 March 2003. Far from being vexatious, capricious
and oppressive, however, the delays entailed by the postponements of the aforesaid hearings
were, to a great extent, attributable to petitioner Francisco’s own pursuit of extraordinary
remedies against the interlocutory orders issued by the Sariaya MTC and the assignment of at
least three public prosecutors to the case, namely, Prosecutors Rodolfo Zabella, Jr., Francis Sia
and Joel Baligod. Indeed, the record shows that, on 30 August 2001, petitioner filed a motion
styled as one to compel Prosecutor Zabella to agree to his proposed stipulations and/or to
disqualify him from the case as well as to correct the pre-trial order issued on 14 August 2001. 63
Considering that said motion was denied by the Sariaya MTC only on 18 October 2001, 64 we find
that Prosecutor Zabella's absence at the 10 and 17 October 2001 pre-trial conference in the case
can hardly be considered capricious, vexatious and oppressive.
The record further shows that, upon the Sariaya MTC’s issuance of the 9 January 2002 order
denying his motion for reconsideration of said 18 October 2001 order and setting anew the pre-
trial conference in the case,65 petitioner Francisco proceeded to file on 1 April 2002 the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 2002-37 before Branch 58 of
the Lucena City RTC.66 Although Prosecutor Sia, as replacement of Prosecutor Zabella, failed to
attend the 7 November 2001, 23 January, 2002 and 13 March 2002 hearings scheduled in the
case, petitioner Francisco cannot, consequently, complain of violation of his right to speedy trial in
view of his pending petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which raised, among other
matters, issues pertinent to the conduct of the pre-trial conference by the Sariaya MTC. Without
even taking into consideration the additional time Prosecutor Sia understandably needed to study
the case, we find that the foregoing developments justified the Sariaya MTC’s 17 April 2002 denial
of the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Francisco on the ground that the cancellation of the
hearings on the aforesaid dates violated his right to the speedy disposition of the case. 67
With the Sariaya MTC’s 18 July 2002 denial of his motion for reconsideration of said 17 April 2002
order, petitioner Francisco once again elevated the matter to Branch 58 Lucena RTC via the
petition for certiorari and prohibition which, under docket of Civil Case No. 2002-90, incorporated
a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to stop further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 01-99.68 The same prayer for provisional relief petitioner was
reiterated in his 2 January 2003 and 14 March 2003 supplement to the petition which,
respectively, took issue against the absence of a prosecutor and/or the complaining witnesses at
(a) the 4 September 2002 and 6 November 2001 pre-trial conferences before the Sariaya MTC; 69
and, (b) the similar settings scheduled for 15 January 2003 and 5 March 2003. 70 To our mind,
petitioner Francisco’s harping on his right to a speedy trial before the Sariaya MTC is materially
attenuated by his motion for the disqualification of Prosecutor Zabella from the case and, later,
his repeated prayer for the stoppage of the proceedings a quo in his petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Lucena RTC.
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates commencement of the
trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order 71 and the continuous conduct thereof for a
period not exceeding 180 days,72 Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from
extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time
within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
moreover, courts are "required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case" and to give particular regard to the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case. 73 Viewed in the context of the above discussed
procedural antecedents as well as the further reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Baligod as a
consequence of Prosecutor Sia’s subsequent transfer to another government office, we find that
the CA correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's claim that the postponements of the pre-
trial conferences in the case before the Sariaya MTC were violative of his right to a speedy trial.
Finally in G.R. No. 171622, petitioners Francisco and Imperial take issue against the Parañaque
RTC's issuance of the 8 June 2004 order setting the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 01-0325
and requiring the parties to file their respective pre-trial briefs. Calling attention to the fact that
respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto, Cubeta had yet to file an answer to the third-party
complaint incorporated in their 14 December 2002 answer, petitioners argue that the Parañaque
RTC's issuance of said 8 June 2004 order was both premature and attended with grave abuse of
discretion. Further claiming that they did not receive a copy of said 8 June 2004 order, petitioners
asseverate that CA should have nullified the Parañaque RTC's 16 August 2004 order which: (a)
authorized respondents Hilarion and Gregorio Felix, Tagle and Landoy to present their evidence ex
parte; and, (b) dismissed the complaint without prejudice insofar as it concerned respondents
Evelyn Felix, Galvez and Lazo who were declared non-suited.
Despite the Parañaque RTC's issuance of the 14 November 2003 order holding in abeyance the
payment of the filing and other docket fees for petitioners' third-party complaint, the record is,
indeed, bereft of any showing that summons were issued requiring respondents Pedraja, Joson,
Giganto and Cubeta to file their answer to the aforesaid pleading. If only in the interest of the
orderly, expeditious and complete disposition of the parties' complaints for damages against each
other, we find that the Parañaque RTC should have first awaited the full joinder of the issues
before its 8 June 2004 grant of the motion to set the case for hearing filed by respondents Felix,
Galvez, Tagle, Lazo and Landoy. More so, when it is borne in mind that the necessity for
respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta to be accorded a chance to participate in the
case was rendered imperative by the Naga RTC's 2 August 2002 dismissal of Civil Case No. 2001-
0296 and the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8314 before the Valenzuela MeTC pursuant to the 4
September 2003 decision rendered by the CA's Tenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 74030.
Although what constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsel is also subject to
the sound discretion of the judge,74 the fact that petitioners have filed their answer and third-
party complaint in Civil Case No. 01-0325 also militates against the Parañaque RTC's 16 August
2004 order which, at bottom, amounted to their being declared in default. Inasmuch as
procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, courts have likewise
been exhorted to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to have their cases justly
determined, free from the constraints of technicalities. 75 Time and again, this Court has espoused
a policy of liberality in setting aside orders of default which are frowned upon, as a case is best
decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their
arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof.76 Thus, the issuance of the orders of default
should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal
by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court. 77
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160067 and 170410 are both DENIED
for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 171622, the petition is GRANTED and the 17 February 2006 decision
in CA-G.R. No. 87906 is, accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered
NULLIFYING the Parañaque RTC's 16 August 2004 order and directing said court to: (a) order
petitioners Francisco and Imperial to pay the filing and other docket fees for their third-party
complaint; (b) order the issuance of summons to respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta
with respect to said third-party complaint; and, thereafter, (c) to conduct the mandatory pre-trial
conference without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
20
Page

G.R. No. 174504               March 21, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third division) and MANUEL G. BARCENAS, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and
cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is
reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
This is a Petition for Certiorari which seeks to nullify the Sandiganbayan’s July 26, 2006 Resolution 1
which granted private respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
Factual Antecedents
On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 14452 before the Sandiganbayan. The Information reads —
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo
City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused MANUEL G. BARCENAS, a high-ranking public officer, being a Vice-Mayor of
Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from
the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE PESOS (P61,765.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for
which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate
intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate
said cash advances of P61,765.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount. 3
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27990 and raffled to the Third Division. On October
20, 2004, private respondent was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution
presented its lone witness, Manolo Tulibao Villad, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor.
Thereafter, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
4
On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On
June 16, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution5 granting the motion. On June 30, 2006,
private respondent filed his demurrer6 to evidence.
Sandiganbayan’s Ruling
On July 26 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Resolution, viz:
WE find the demurrer to evidence well taken.
The testimony of the prosecution’s lone witness City Auditor Manolo Tulibao confirming his
Report (Exhibit "D") that the accused had indeed liquidated his cash advances did not help the
prosecution but rather weakened its cause of action against the accused. At the time this case
was filed in Court, the accused had already liquidated his cash advances subject matter hereof in
the total amount of P61,765.00. Hence, We find the element of damages wanting in this case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted and this case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.7
Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in giving due course to and eventually granting the demurrer to evidence. 8
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner contends that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offense
defined and penalized under Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445: (1) the private respondent, an
accountable officer, received cash advances in the total amount of P120,000.00 to defray the
expenses of the Public Assistance Committee and Committee on Police Matters covering the
period January-March 1993, (2) the purpose of the cash advance has been served, (3) the private
respondent settled his cash advances only in March 1996, (4) the city auditor sent a demand letter
to the private respondent to settle the cash advance within 72 hours from receipt thereof, and (5)
the private respondent received said letter on December 22, 1995 but failed to liquidate the same
within the aforestated period.
Although it concedes that the private respondent eventually settled the subject cash advances
sometime in March 1996, petitioner theorizes that damage is not one of the elements of the
offense charged. Hence, the settlement of the cash advance would not exonerate the private
respondent but only mitigate his criminal liability. Otherwise, the purpose of the law would be
rendered futile since accountable officers can easily make cash advances and liquidate the same
beyond the period prescribed by law without being penalized for doing so.
Finally, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not lie in this case because the order of
dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Private Respondent’s Arguments
Private respondent counters that the grant of a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to an acquittal
from which the prosecution cannot appeal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
Further, assuming that the Sandiganbayan erroneously granted the demurrer, this would, at most,
constitute an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. Thus, certiorari does not lie to
correct the grant of the demurrer to evidence by the Sandiganbayan.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an
acquittal unless the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer 9 is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order
may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. 10 Although the
dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. 11 For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. 12 The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice.13
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove that the government suffered any damage from private respondent’s
non-liquidation of the subject cash advance because it was later shown, as admitted by the
21
prosecution’s witness, that private respondent liquidated the same albeit belatedly.
Sections 89 and 128 of P.D. No. 1445 provide—
Page
SECTION 89. Limitations on Cash Advance. — No cash advance shall be given unless for a legally
authorized specific purpose. A cash advance shall be reported on and liquidated as soon as the
purpose for which it was given has been served. No additional cash advance shall be allowed to
any official or employee unless the previous cash advance given to him is first settled or a proper
accounting thereof is made.
SECTION 128. Penal Provision. — Any violation of the provisions of Sections 67, 68, 89, 106, and
108 of this Code or any regulation issued by the Commission [on Audit] implementing these
sections, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, COA Circular No. 90-331 14 or the "Rules and Regulations on the Granting,
Utilization and Liquidation of Cash Advances" which implemented Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445
pertinently provided–
5. LIQUIDATION OF CASH ADVANCES
5.1 The AO (Accountable Officer) shall liquidate his cash advance as follows:
5.1.1 Salaries, Wages, etc. - within 5 days after each 15 day/ end of the month pay period.
5.1.2 Petty Operating Expenses and Field Operating Expenses - within 20 days after the end of the
year; subject to replenishment during the year.
5.1.3 Foreign Travel - within 60 days after return to the Philippines.
Failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within the prescribed period shall constitute a valid
cause for the withholding of his salary.
xxxx
5.7 When a cash advance is no longer needed or has not been used for a period of two (2)
months, it must be returned to or deposited immediately with the collecting officer.
5.8 All cash advances shall be fully liquidated at the end of each year. Except for petty cash fund,
the AO shall refund any unexpended balance to the Cashier/Collecting Officer who will issue the
necessary official receipt.
xxxx
9. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COA AUDITOR
xxxx
9.6 Upon failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within one month for AOs within the
station and three months for AOs outside the station from date of grant of the cash advance, the
Auditor shall issue a letter demanding liquidation or explanation for non-liquidation.
9.7 If 30 days have elapsed after the demand letter is served and no liquidation or explanation is
received, or the explanation received is not satisfactory, the Auditor shall advise the head of the
agency to cause or order the withholding of the payment of any money due the AO. The amount
withheld shall be applied to his (AO's) accountability. The AO shall likewise be held criminally
liable for failure to settle his accounts.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
As can be seen, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, actual damage to the government
arising from the non-liquidation of the cash advance is not an essential element of the offense
punished under the second sentence of Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 as implemented by COA
Circular No. 90-331. Instead, the mere failure to timely liquidate the cash advance is the
gravamen of the offense. Verily, the law seeks to compel the accountable officer, by penal
provision, to promptly render an account of the funds which he has received by reason of his
office.16
Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the law
and its implementing rules, the error committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Petitioner failed to establish that the dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion
such as the denial of the prosecution’s right to due process or the conduct of a sham trial. In fine,
the error committed by the Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that can no longer be rectified on
appeal by the prosecution because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. 17
In United States v. Kilayko,18 the accused was charged with a violation under Section 12 of the
Chattel Mortgage Law19 which prohibited the mortgagor from selling the mortgaged property
without the consent of the mortgagee while the debt secured remained outstanding. The accused
was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he moved to dismiss the Information.
After the prosecution and defense entered into a stipulation of facts, the trial court dismissed the
case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we acknowledged that the trial court erred in
interpreting Section 12 when it ruled that the subsequent payment of the secured debt
extinguished the accused’s criminal liability arising from the unlawful sale of the mortgaged
property. Nonetheless, we ruled that the judgment dismissing the Information, although based
upon an erroneous interpretation of the law, was in effect a judgment on the merits from which
no appeal lay on the part of the prosecution as it would place the accused in double
jeopardy.201avvphi1
In another case, People v. City Court of Silay,21 after the prosecution had presented its evidence
and rested its case, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The trial
court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we
were of the view that the dismissal order was erroneous and resulted to a miscarriage of justice.
However, we ruled that such error cannot be corrected because double jeopardy had already set
in:
In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against them was one
on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other dismissals at the instance of the
accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution
had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being one on the
merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was
erroneous.
As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not charged
with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The basis for the accusation was that the
accused entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in
"tarjetas" which were submitted to the laboratory section of the company. The act of making a
false entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document, the
accused having made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they were under
obligation to accomplish as part of their duties - Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda. Malisbog,
and the other accused as scalers of the offended party, the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby
causing damage to the latter.
However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice
resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil. 1133, such
error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. 22
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
22
SO ORDERED.
Page

G.R. No. 172777               October 19, 2011
BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., Petitioner, vs. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 172792
RESALLY DE ASIS DELFIN, Petitioner, vs. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure assailing the March 14, 2006 Decision 1 and the May 22, 2006 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83704 entitled "Sally Go-Bangayan v. Hon. Luisito C.
Sardillo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Caloocan City, Branch 126, Benjamin B.
Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de Asis Delfin."
The Facts
This case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally Go)
accusing petitioners Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin, Jr.) and Resally de Asis Delfin (Resally) of
having committed the crime of bigamy.3
On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City and they had two children. 4 Later,
Sally Go learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently
married on January 5, 2001 under the false name, "Benjamin Z. Sojayco." 5 Benjamin, Jr. fathered
two children with Resally. Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that on September 10, 1973,
Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued a
Resolution dated June 5, 2002 recommending the filing of an information for bigamy against
Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was
still legally married to Sally Go.6 The information was duly filed on November 15, 2002 and was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (RTC) where it was docketed as
Criminal Case No. C-66783.7
After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge against
them, the prosecution presented and offered its evidence. 8 On September 8, 2003, Benjamin, Jr.
and Resally separately filed their respective motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. 9 This
was granted by the RTC in its Order dated September 29, 2003. 10
On October 20, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case
for bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence
of his guilt.11 His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to
Sally Go because of the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was
unable to show that he and the "Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.," who married Resally, were one and the
same person.12
In its December 3, 2003 Order,13 the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and
Resally for insufficiency of evidence.14 It reasoned out that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Benjamin, Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., in
contracting his marriage with Resally.15 Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted of bigamy because
the prosecution failed to establish that Resally married Benjamin, Jr. 16
Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On March 14, 2006,
the CA promulgated its Decision17 granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to
the RTC for further proceedings. The CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by
the prosecution were sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three
marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love notes from
Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage to Sally Go and
Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.’s admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a
relationship.18 The CA further stated that Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not
be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he
was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him to
be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge. 19
Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were both denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May
22, 2006.20
Hence, these petitions.
The Issues
Petitioner Benjamin, Jr. raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in a certiorari proceedings may inquire into the
factual matters presented by the parties in the lower court, without violating the constitutional
right of herein petitioner (as accused in the lower court) against double jeopardy as enshrined in
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not the order of the trial court that granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the
petitioners as accused therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion that is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction as to warrant the grant of the relief as prayed for in the
Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent Sally [Go-Bangayan].
3. Whether or not the prosecution was indeed denied due process when the trial court allegedly
ignored the existence [of the] pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution. 21
On the other hand, petitioner Resally poses the following questions:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in giving due
course to the petition for certiorari notwithstanding the lack of legal standing of the herein
respondent (petitioner therein) as the said petition was filed without the prior conformity and/or
imprimatur of the Office of the Solicitor General, or even the City Prosecutor’s Office of Caloocan
City
2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ordering the
further proceedings of the case as it would violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.22
Essentially, the issues which must be resolved by this Court are:
1. Whether Sally Go had the legal standing to file a petition for certiorari before the CA despite
the lack of consent of either the Office of the Solicitor General or the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Caloocan.
2. Whether petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA when it reversed the
December 3, 2003 RTC Order dismissing the criminal case against them.
The Court’s Ruling
23
The Court finds merit in the petitions.
Only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order
Page
granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case.
Petitioner Resally argues that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before
the CA because the case against them (Resally and Benjamin, Jr.) is criminal in nature. It being so,
only the OSG or the OCP of Caloocan may question the RTC Order dismissing the case against
them.23 Respondent’s intervention as the offended party in the prosecution of the criminal case is
only limited to the enforcement of the civil liability. 24
Sally Go counters that as the offended party, she has an interest in the maintenance of the
criminal prosecution against petitioners and quotes Merciales v. Court of Appeals25 to support her
position: "The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them
of due process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any
adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy." Moreover, the OSG and
the OCP had impliedly consented to the filing of the petition before the CA because they did not
interpose any objection.26
This Court leans toward Resally’s contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition
for certiorari before the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General,
acting on behalf of the State. 27 The private complainant or the offended party may question such
acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. 28 As explained in
the case of People v. Santiago:291awphil
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor
General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The
private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended
party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it
is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the
person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party
or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such
special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant. [Emphases Supplied]
A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought
reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the
trial court’s order granting petitioners’ demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial
of the criminal case. Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of
petitioners. It is apparent that her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case
against the petitioners. Because bigamy is a criminal offense, only the OSG is authorized to
prosecute the case on appeal. Thus, Sally Go did not have the requisite legal standing to appeal
the acquittal of the petitioners.
Sally Go was mistaken in her reading of the ruling in Merciales. First, in the said case, the OSG
joined the cause of the petitioner, thereby meeting the requirement that criminal actions be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. 30 Second, the acquittal of the
accused was done without due process and was declared null and void because of the
nonfeasance on the part of the public prosecutor and the trial court. 31 There being no valid
acquittal, the accused therein could not invoke the protection of double jeopardy.
In this case, however, neither the Solicitor General nor the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City joined
the cause of Sally Go, much less consented to the filing of a petition for certiorari with the
appellate court. Furthermore, she cannot claim to have been denied due process because the
records show that the trial court heard all the evidence against the accused and that the
prosecution had formally offered the evidence before the court granted the demurrer to
evidence. Thus, the petitioners’ acquittal was valid, entitling them to invoke their right against
double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy had already set-in
Petitioners contend that the December 3, 2003 Order of dismissal issued by the RTC on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal. The prosecution is, thus, barred
from appealing the RTC Order because to allow such an appeal would violate petitioners’ right
against double jeopardy.32 They insist that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the
lower court for further proceedings because it disregarded the constitutional proscription on the
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. 33
On the other hand, Sally Go counters that the petitioners cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy because the RTC decision acquitting them was issued with grave abuse of discretion,
rendering the same null and void.34
A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is
required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to
warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the
evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one
on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. 35 Well-established is the rule
that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in
double jeopardy.36
The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of Rights
(Article III) contained in the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge;
and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. 37 However, jurisprudence allows for certain
exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to
wit:
(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an
acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right
to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. 38
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy
is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the
24
opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. 39 For instance,
there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of
Page
the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of
evidence;40 and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial
and adjudication.41
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information for
the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal case
against them before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and
subsequently, the case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA
erred in reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it
placed them in double jeopardy.
As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable
because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only by
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. 42
Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. "The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." 43 The party questioning the acquittal of an
accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such
that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice. 44
The CA determined that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the
evidence presented by the prosecution and granting petitioners’ demurrer to evidence on the
ground that the prosecution failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime. 45
An examination of the decision of the trial court, however, yields the conclusion that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on its part. Even if the trial court had incorrectly overlooked the
evidence against the petitioners, it only committed an error of judgment, and not one of
jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by a petition for certiorari because double jeopardy had
already set in.46
As regards Sally Go’s assertion that she had been denied due process, an evaluation of the records
of the case proves that nothing can be further from the truth. Jurisprudence dictates that in order
for a decision of the trial court to be declared null and void for lack of due process, it must be
shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard. 47 Sally Go cannot deny that she
was given ample opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against petitioners. Thus,
her claim that she was denied due process is unavailing.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The March 14, 2006 Decision and the May 22, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 3, 2003 Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66783, granting the
Demurrer to Evidence of petitioners Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de Asis Delfin and
dismissing the case against them is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

25
Page