The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030 (2014)

The World Nuclear Supply Chain
Outlook 2030 (2014 revision)
World Nuclear Association

December 2014
2 | The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030
Title: The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030 (2014 revision)
Produced by: World Nuclear Association
Published: December 2014
Series: WNA Report
Report No.: 2014/004
ISBN: 978-0-9550784-9-1
© World Nuclear Association 2014
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The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030 | i
Executive summary
This 2014 edition of The World Nuclear Supply Chain focuses on nuclear power plants and
their supply chain, looking at the challenges and opportunities, including scenarios for the
evolution of nuclear power in the longer term. In particular it examines the advantages
arising from an increasingly global supply chain as well as three potential barriers to a
competitive and reliable supply chain: the control of construction costs and schedules;
ensuring exceptional quality; and the maintenance of confidence among stakeholders.
Nuclear power is making a growing contribution to supplying low-carbon energy worldwide.

Alongside the 435 operational reactors in 31 countries and territories, there are 69
commercial civil reactors under construction with another ten countries are building or
planning to build new plants. Over 60 percent of the world’s people already live in countries
where nuclear generated electricity is being supplied. By 2030 this figure will have risen to
70 percent (from 4.3 billion to 6.1 billion), even after allowing for the fact that a few countries
(Germany, for example) have decided to phase out the technology. The spread of nuclear
technology from the mature industrial economies to emerging markets is well underway.
The majority of nuclear power plants in the world are light water reactors (LWRs), mainly
pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs). For many utilities the
choice lies between these two technologies and there is accordingly considerable
competition between the technology vendors. Apart from the LWRs, pressurized heavy
water reactors (PHWRs) are the norm in Argentina, Canada, India and Romania.
There are today ten consolidated technology vendors offering their technology and services
across much of the nuclear fuel cycle. They are AREVA, Candu Energy, China National
Nuclear Corporation, China’s State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation, GE and Hitachi,
Korea Electric Power Corporation, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the Nuclear Power
Corporation of India, RosAtom and Toshiba/ Westinghouse. In addition, other significant
technology vendors are becoming active in the international market, including Babcock and
Wilcox, China General Nuclear, Doosan and Škoda. Each has developed a supply chain that
is increasingly global in scope. There are around 240 major independent suppliers of nuclear
grade structures, systems, components and services. While the industry remains weighted
towards domestic markets, the leading vendors are, for the most part, internationally
diversified in terms of their corporate make-up and their supplier base. International trade in
nuclear components has the potential to reach US$ 30 billion a year.
Competitive pressures are encouraging the localization of manufacturing, joint ventures and
international procurement. As a result, production is located in several jurisdictions with
materials, semi-processed and finished fabrications perhaps crossing several borders prior
to reaching the final destination for assembly and installation. Services are also performed in
different countries either as a result of sub-contracting or through the participation of
specialist divisions of the same transnational corporation or industrial group. Globalization, in
short, is as much a part of the civil nuclear scene as it is in other industries. The World
Nuclear Association (WNA) believes that the system for import and export controls should be
reviewed to streamline procedures between countries while preserving a sound safeguards
regime.

ii | The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030
A competitive global market exists for the construction and procurement of nuclear power
plants. Around a decade ago, there were concerns that some ‘choke points’ existed along
the supply chain, for instance in terms of heavy forging capacity. However, a combination of
factors, including the cancellation of some planned plants, which followed the Fukushima
Daiichi accident, investment by existing suppliers and the transfer of technology and
localization of manufacturing (especially to China), means there are now sufficient suppliers
available to fabricate key reactor components under currently known plans. Potentially
bottlenecks could re-emerge in the event of multiple reactor orders being issued at the same
time, should the world economy recover from the prolonged recession it has been going
through and see an upturn in capital investment.
In recent years, the time taken to build a nuclear power plant has been significantly longer in
the Americas, Western Europe and South Asia than in East Asia. Chinese-designed reactors
have typically taken around 60 months to construct with some projects being closer to 48
months. This was also the case for South Korean and, prior to the Fukushima accident,
Japanese reactors. The nuclear industry could probably bring down construction times from
70-80 to 50-60 months through the adoption of best practices in project management and
‘lean’ construction techniques and greater use of off-site assembly. A reliable and efficient
supply chain is crucial to ensuring that projects are accomplished to budget and schedule.
Managing the quality and capability challenges along the supply chain is just as important. In
the nuclear industry, the aim of mandatory quality assurance programs is to manufacture
safety-related items within a well-prescribed expected performance set, and so provide
assurance that the finished products will operate reliably over their lifetime. But unlike some
other industries, there is no general quality assurance standard specific to the civil nuclear
sector. Reactor technology vendors and suppliers have had to rely on guidance, codes and
standards issued by national standard development organizations, such as the American
ASME and the French AFCEN. Drawing on the example of the aerospace industry, the
Nuclear Quality Standard Association published a standard for nuclear safety and quality
management in 2011, NSQ-100, that supplements the widely-used ISO 9001 quality
management standard.
Market developments must be seen within the wider framework of energy and electricity
supply over the long-term. Deregulation has not always succeeded in establishing a well-
functioning electricity market that delivers competitive, safe and environmentally-friendly
forms of energy. In most industrialized countries the energy sector is no longer under direct
state control and governments must influence the behaviour of generators, utilities and
consumers indirectly through a mix of tax incentives, subsidies and general market rules to
ensure the long-term reliability of electricity supply. Moreover, business undertakings are not
best placed to manage public interest issues such as combatting global warming and ocean
acidification. There is a danger that the necessary governmental measures to encourage a
shift towards nuclear energy as an affordable, reliable and low-carbon technology will not be
pursued vigorously enough.

The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030 | iii
Key points
 There are 435 operable commercial nuclear power reactors around the world and 69
under construction. Nuclear power worldwide generates sales revenues worth around
US$ 330 billion a year for electricity utilities.
 A competitive global market exists for the construction and procurement of nuclear
power plants, and although heavy forging capacity is more limited there are sufficient
suppliers available to fabricate major reactor components.
 The decline in the number of new units commissioned since the mid-1980s was reversed
at the turn of the century. There are specific plans for another 158 power reactors with a
total net capacity of some 167 200 MWe and another 334 (representing nearly 362 050
MWe) are proposed.
 Three scenarios for the world nuclear generating capacity are presented, referred to as
the reference, upper and lower cases. In the reference case the number of nuclear
reactors worldwide grows to 477 by 2020 and 589 by 2030. The upper case sees a rise
to 512 by 2020 and 714 by 2030 and in the lower case, under which little new
construction takes place, the number of reactors stabilizes at 442 in 2020 and falls to
343 by 2030.
 Of the 266 new units projected to come into operation before 2030 under the reference
case, including the 69 under construction, 58 will be in the OECD group of developed
industrial countries, 120 in China, 37 in the former Soviet Union and 26 in India.
 Under the reference case, the market for nuclear power equipment is expected to grow
at 2 percent annually over the coming two decades with 72 percent of the growth
occurring in the emerging industrial economies (the non-OECD area, including China).

iv | The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030
 The value of the investment in new nuclear build to 2030 is of the order of US$ 1.2
trillion, with significant international procurement of around US$ 575 billion, or US$ 26
billion a year. About US$ 530 billion will consist of equipment purchases, with US$ 110
billion in power generating equipment orders.
 The total value of work for long-term operation could amount to some US$ 50-100 billion
(depending on the amount of refurbishment deemed necessary by the regulatory body).
This could amount to around US$ 4 billion a year of international procurement.
 The market for decommissioning is also substantial. The value of decommissioning work
on projects involving immediate dismantling by 2030 could total US$ 95 billion, of which
US$ 12.4 billion is the estimated cost for cleaning up the Fukushima Daiichi site and at
least US$ 24.2 billion has to be spent in Germany.
 Standardization, lesson learning and competitive pressures are expected to maintain the
advantages in terms of generating costs and environmental benefits that the nuclear
option enjoys in relation to alternative low-carbon sources of electricity generation.

The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030 | v
Contents
Page
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background to the report 1
1.2 Methodology and structure 2
1.3 The drivers of electricity growth 3
1.4 The present position of nuclear power 7
1.5 Principal reactor types 11
1.6 Safety 15
Part 1: Market Outlook

2 Outlook for nuclear power 19
2.1 A changing economic and energy landscape 19
2.2 WNA scenarios 20
2.3 Market value projections 34
3 Major projects 39
3.1 Long-term operation 39
3.2 New build 45
3.3 Decommissioning and waste management 57
Part 2: Industry Status and Trends

4 The international marketplace 71
4.1 The emerging global market 71
4.2 Vendor consolidation 73
4.3 Vendor competition 77
4.4 Localization of production 81
5 The nuclear supply chain 89

5.1 Components of the supply chain 90
5.2 Capacity along the supply chain 95
5.3 The role of EPC contractors 104
5.4 Professional services support 107
6 Harmonizing the regulatory framework 125

6.1 Licensing 125
6.2 Securing nuclear technology from misuse 129
6.3 Import and export controls 131
6.4 Supplier liability 134
6.5 Benefits of a collaborative and international regulatory regime 138

vi | The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030
Part 3: Challenges for Industry

7 Project management 143
7.1 Construction costs and schedules 144
7.2 Lean manufacturing and construction 149
7.3 Project organizational development 150
7.4 Modularization 152
7.5 Small modular reactors 153
8 Quality management 155

8.1 Safety culture 155
8.2 Supplier oversight 158
8.3 Enhance quality assurance 165
8.4 Exceptional performance 168
9 Stakeholder management 173

9.1 Maintaining community support 173
9.2 Government support and energy markets 174
9.3 Investors and financing 177
Appendices
A Acronyms and Abbreviations 183
B Glossary 188

The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030 | 1
1 Introduction
Nuclear power has the potential to deliver clean energy affordably on a global scale. It also
faces challenges, ranging from the economic (large upfront capital cost), through to the
technological sophistication of its supply chain and the importance of maintaining safety and
safeguarding its materials from misuse. Between now and 2050, as the world’s population
approaches nine billion, humankind will consume more energy than the combined total in all
its history. Under present conditions of supply, the consequences could strain the planet’s
carrying capacity for life severely. Pollution from fossil fuels already takes its toll on human
health, while the worrisome prospects from accelerated global warming are becoming
clearer day by day. Nuclear energy is a relatively mature technology, whose principal risk –
the release of radiation into the biosphere – is by now well understood within science, even if
it is widely misunderstood amongst the public at large. But it is the economic risk that is
arguably the major factor holding back the expansion of nuclear power as the preferred
option for around the clock electricity supplies. Unfortunately any postponement of civil
nuclear investment on a large scale makes it more difficult to develop the integrated and
reliable global nuclear supply chain that can deliver the cost-efficiencies needed to cement
nuclear power as the preferred option for a low carbon future.
The World Nuclear Association (WNA) is the international organization that supports the
global nuclear industry, its people, technology and enterprises. Its mission is to promote
valuable connections within the industry and create an informed public policy environment
around it. Representing about 175 member companies from 40 nations in key international
forums, WNA facilitates business-to-business interaction to advance good practice and
seeks to improve the policy context and public confidence through the provision of objective
information. In anticipation of an epoch of worldwide nuclear new build, WNA is devoting
increased attention to supporting companies and investors in the task of constructing robust
supply chains to ensure timely and efficient construction of nuclear power plants. The special
regulations that apply to the nuclear supply chain call for relationships that must be enduring,
responsive to emerging challenges and, above all, socially and environmentally responsible.
1.1 Background to the report

This 2014 edition of The World Nuclear Supply Chain Outlook, which supplements WNA’s
regular report on The Global Nuclear Fuel Market, updates the 2012 report with additional
analysis and a more comprehensive description of major projects. For the purposes of this
report, the nuclear supply chain relates to the structures, systems and components that
make up a nuclear power plant. It excludes the ‘front end’ of the fuel cycle, involving the
mining and manufacture of nuclear fuels (covered by WNA’s The Global Nuclear Fuel
Market report) but includes the ‘back-end’ that deals with decommissioning and the
management of used fuel and radioactive waste materials. It aims to provide the nuclear
power industry, energy suppliers, the investment community and policy-makers with:
 an up-to-date picture of ongoing and planned nuclear power plant construction, major
refurbishment, decommissioning and waste management projects;

 an analysis of the market potential worldwide for major components and the capacity
of leading suppliers;
 a review of industry trends and challenges; and,
 an outline presenting WNA’s approach to developing a robust global supply chain
offering exceptional quality, reliable project delivery and competitive costs.
At a time when the sector is under scrutiny from policy-makers and the public, the report
provides a strategic frame of reference to help the industry address the economic and
industrial challenges ahead.
1.2 Methodology and structure

For several years the World Nuclear Association (WNA) has prepared its authoritative Global
Nuclear Fuel Market Report, which presents three scenarios for the evolution of nuclear
capacity. The present report on the nuclear supply chain deepens this analysis by linking
WNA’s nuclear capacity projections to a set of estimates for the value of the nuclear
generation business. The WNA recognizes the importance of complying with competition law
and interaction between its member organizations during the preparation of this report was
monitored to ensure that no commercially relevant information that was not already in the
public domain was shared.
1.2.1 Methodology
This report has been compiled on the basis of reports and studies in the public domain,
including reports from WNA’s World Nuclear News service, and supplemented by
information derived from WNA member companies. The analysis was undertaken by the
WNA’s secretariat and the findings discussed at its Working Groups, particularly the Supply
Chain Working Group. The scenarios have been checked by a drafting group drawn from
WNA’s membership to make sure that the information contained and opinions expressed are
reliable and reflect the market situation. The information and opinions are those of WNA as
at the date of publication and they do not necessarily represent those of any individual
member organization, government or other company or organization.
Three scenarios for the development of nuclear to 2030 are presented:
 The Reference case assumes the continuation of known policies and investment
strategies, whereby utilities continue to rely upon fossil fuels and maintain a stable
share of nuclear generation while accommodating a growing share from renewable
sources.
 The Lower case assumes that policy changes impede the development of nuclear
power in all countries, leading to a falling share from nuclear generation.
 The Upper case assumes that the economic case for nuclear power is favourable
relative to other generation options, government policies promote clean energy and
public support for nuclear energy strengthens.
The projections for nuclear generating capacity are based upon data collected and
maintained by the WNA on the number of nuclear reactors in operation or planned. The
three cases are not meant to be forecasts, but an illustration of the range in the size of the
potential market for the nuclear power sector.

Energy demand projections are taken from the World Energy Outlook 2013 published by the
International Energy Agency (IEA). The IEA has generated projections for energy supply and
demand up to 2035 for alternative scenarios, which incorporate different assumptions
concerning energy prices and government policies. Although WNA’s Reference case for
nuclear power is developed independently, it is similar to the IEA’s New Policies scenario,
which attempts to capture the policy commitments made by governments to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions following the summit at Copenhagen in December 2009.
1.2.2 Report structure

Part 1 examines the market outlook for nuclear power, including the scenario analysis
already mentioned. The size of global market for new build, refurbishment to allow long-term
operation, and for decommissioning and waste management is estimated.
A more detailed analysis of industry status and trends is presented in Part 2. It looks at the
extent of consolidation and competition within the industry, the potential for the localization of
component manufacturing, supplier segmentation and the prospects for a more
internationally harmonized regulatory regime.
In Part 3 the focus shifts to the challenges facing the industry, especially in relation to the
economics of nuclear power and how cost escalation is being addressed through quality
initiatives, lean manufacturing and construction, new technologies, stakeholder engagement
and financial innovation.
The report includes two appendices providing a list of acronyms and abbreviations
(Appendix A) and a glossary (Appendix B).
1.3 The drivers of electricity growth

Use of nuclear energy is recognized as crucial for sustainable development and to mitigate
global warming and ocean acidification. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched a
sustainable energy for all initiative to help mobilize resources for what he called a “historic
energy transition” to clean energy, in the lead-up to the Rio+20 UN Conference on
Sustainable Development held in June 2012. He highlighted three challenges: energy
poverty, dangerous planetary warming and the need to catalyze low carbon economic
opportunity, especially in developing countries.1 The Rio+20 Conference recognized the
importance of renewable sources and other low-emission technologies, which would include
nuclear power, as well as advanced energy technologies, such as cleaner fossil fuels, for
sustainable modern energy services.2 The recent report from the UN's Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has again highlighted the unequivocal and urgent need to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, necessitating among other things a transition to a low-
1
Speech to the UN General Assembly on 1 November 2011 and Vision Statement by Ban Ki-moon
on Sustainable Energy for All.
2
UN, 2012, The Future we Want - our common vision, para. 127; at
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/288&Lang=E>.

carbon energy system.3 The IPCC report confirmed nuclear energy among the lowest
carbon forms of generation, taking into account both direct emissions and its lifecycle
impacts.
Figure 1.1 shows the build-up of worldwide nuclear electricity production since 1971. The
rate of expansion was high in the period to the late 1980s, but has since slowed as fewer
new plants came into operation.
Figure 1.1: World nuclear electricity production (TWh) (Source: IAEA)4
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Almost all of this growth has occurred in developed industrial countries. Energy policies
typically aim to balance concerns for availability and affordability. Nuclear energy offers
electricity supply utilities the advantage of base-load reliability and low operating costs.5 It is
also an energy technology that can contribute to a nation’s energy security. Uranium is
abundant and supplied by many countries and can be stockpiled in large quantities relatively
inexpensively. Furthermore, nuclear power costs are relatively insensitive to fuel price
movements. That said, the industry faces considerable challenges – discussed in more
detail in Part 3. In deregulated energy markets it has proved difficult to finance investment in
nuclear power plants in recent years. The experience of mature energy markets shows that
nuclear units have performed well, generating not just electricity around the clock for
3
IPCC, 2014, Climate change 2014: Mitigation of climate change, Summary for Policymakers,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III Contribution to Assessment Report 5.
4
IAEA, 2014, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2050, Reference
Data Series No. 1: Table 1: p. 13.
5
Base-load power is the electricity a utility generates around the clock in anticipation of minimum
customer demand that will occur regardless of daily and seasonal fluctuations. This is usually around
60 percent of the maximum demand for electricity, the peak-load.

consumers but also a decent return on investment for their owners. Nuclear remains a
significant part of the energy scene in developed and emerging industrial countries and is
viewed by many governments as vital to the pursuit of low carbon development.
Table 1.1 shows world electricity generation by source for major areas of the world. The
nuclear share within Western Europe has stabilized at 25 percent, the highest of the major
areas covered. The region also boasts the largest contribution from non-hydro renewable
sources.
Table 1.1: Electricity generation by fuel type and region in 2012, %
Region Thermal Hydro Nuclear Renewable Total

North America 64 15 18 3 100
6
Latin America 43 54 2 1 100
7
Western Europe 49 19 25 7 100
8
Eastern Europe 66 15 19 0 100
East Asia 78 16 5 1 100
Middle East & South Asia 87 10 2 1 100
Southeast Asia & Pacific 89 9 0 2 100
Africa 80 17 2 1 100
World 69 18 11 2 100
Source: IAEA, 2013, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the period up to 2050,
Table 9.
The share of mostly fossil-fuelled thermal power plants has declined over recent years and is
being replaced by renewable energy sources. The contribution from nuclear power is small
outside of Europe and North America, although it is of growing importance in East Asia.
In developing countries where, according to estimates by the International Energy Agency,

1.3 billion people lack access to electricity (living mostly in rural areas and slums), the case
for nuclear energy is equally compelling. An even larger number, 2.7 billion, rely on
traditional biomass fuels.9 About 500 million of those who lack electricity live in countries with
nuclear power plants, such as India (289 million) and Pakistan (64 million), as well as South
Africa, China and Brazil. Under current plans by governments and utilities no-one should
lack a power supply connection by 2030 in Latin America, India and South Africa. But,
despite investment in rural electrification and urban development (including slum clearance
and re-housing), in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia there will remain
significant pools of energy poverty, possibly for decades to come. Even with power
connection, poor people may continue to rely upon traditional fuels like wood, charcoal and
animal dung for cooking and heating as they cannot afford to pay for more than a few units
6
Includes Mexico.
7
Includes Turkey.
8
Includes Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Ukraine.
9
IEA, 2011, World Energy Outlook 2011: p. 472.

of electricity. As a result, breathing in smoke from open stoves will remain one of the world’s
biggest causes of premature death, as well as posing a fire hazard. The black carbon from
burning traditional biomass fuels is thought to contribute to global warming.10 The UN
Development Program is advocating a global initiative for universal access to energy, to form
part of the international community’s adoption of new sustainable development goals after
2015.11 Integrating such targets with other development priorities, like water supply and
sanitation, will generate substantial benefits. In many rural areas young women spend at
least an hour a day fetching water for the home, with a minimum of 15 liters per person per
day needed for sustenance, cooking and washing. Women also collect firewood, sometimes
over long distances. Access to reliable and affordable energy, including nuclear power, was
recognized as critical to sustainable development when the G20 countries met in 2013.12
The provision of affordable power is major part of the development solution. Other fuels,
such as liquefied petroleum gas canisters to replace kerosene and biomass, and
decentralized or off-grid solutions using renewable sources, will also play a part. Many poor
people use kerosene for lighting, which is inefficient, expensive and dangerous.13 Electricity,
however, once it is available through the national grid, can also displace more expensive,
and polluting, diesel generators and coal or oil-fired furnaces. The challenge lies in ensuring
that the power is affordable to medium and low income households and available (40
percent of Indian households have supplies for less than four hours a day).14 Most
developing countries do not have the resources to provide social assistance payments to the
disadvantaged so a business solution has to be found if these consumers are to benefit from
electrification.
Urbanization and rising incomes will enable utilities to restructure their tariffs and introduce
‘smart metering’. Wireless technology and ‘smart metering’ enable consumers to manage
their consumption and budgets conveniently, using, for instance, pre-payment systems
accessible from their cell phones or a local vendor.15 In principle, utilities using nuclear
power, and some renewable sources, can provide base-load electricity at a marginal cost.
Provided that their capital costs can be recovered from large-scale commercial customers,
public electricity suppliers should be in a position to pass on operating and maintenance
expenses fully to middle income and richer residential consumers as well as being able to
10
IEA, 2010c: pp. 243-249; and USAID, 2010, Black carbon emissions in Asia: Sources, impacts and
abatement opportunities, Washington DC: US Agency for International Development: pp. 20-22.
11
UNDP, 2011, Human Development Report 2011, New York: p. 98.
12
G20 Leaders’ Declaration made at the St Petersburg Summit of 5-6 September 2013: paras. 90
and 97.
13
A kerosene lamp will provide 60 lumens whereas a 60W tungsten bulb will provide over 700
lumens. A kerosene lamp also gives off harmful fumes and is a fire hazard. Estimates from India
indicate a cost of around US$ 0.07/kWh for kerosene compared to US$ 0.05/kWh for electricity
charged to Indian households; see <http://saurorja.org/2011/07/18/kerosene-vs-klean-lighting-up-
rural-india-cost-and-emission-analysis/>.
14
Statement by Dr. Srikumar Banerjee, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India, to the
WNA India International Nuclear Symposium held on 22 February 2012 in New Delhi.
15
Electricity can be purchased by means of a scratch card using a cell phone, ATM, or local/ street
corner vendor, or from an internet café. The scratch card contains a unique number that can be
entered on the keypad of the meter providing credit for a defined number of units of electricity.

offer concessionary tariffs (or a limited tranche of free power) to the poor.16 Revenue
collection goes up when ‘smart meters’ are installed, so the provision of concessionary tariffs
need not result in a much larger overall cost to the utility. Public-private partnership models
could be designed with such poverty reduction objectives in mind and utilities with low
marginal cost generating sources are in a position to shape their market demand and build
their customer base. These types of initiatives might be eligible for financial support from the
Global Environment Facility, set up in 1991 to assist developing countries in combatting
climate change and other environmental challenges, and from government-owned
infrastructure banks like the Asian Development Bank’s Energy for All Initiative, the Inter-
American Development Bank’s Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Initiative, the
Islamic Development Infrastructure Fund and its energy sector financing, and the World
Bank’s Climate Investment Fund.
1.4 The present position of nuclear power

There are 435 nuclear power reactors operating commercially around the world and 69
under construction. They exploit the physics of nuclear fission, pioneered in the 1930s and
developed during and after the Second World War for weaponry and subsequently as a
source of energy. Nuclear energy has grown into an international industry over a period of
sixty years. These next sections look at the different technologies used to generate nuclear
energy and the approach taken to safety.
Table 1.2 shows the number of nuclear power reactors operating commercially and planned
or under construction in the world today.
Past growth in nuclear power occurred largely in the industrialized countries of Europe and
North America, and in Japan and South Korea in Asia. Today the emphasis has shifted to
the rapidly expanding economies of Asia, especially in China and the Indian sub-continent.
There is nonetheless continuing new build in Europe and North America as older plants are
taken out of service, and require replacement, or reflecting the relocation of economic
activity from the traditional industrial regions to growing regions, such as the Southern States
of the USA.
The share of nuclear power in worldwide electricity production is shown in Figure 1.2,
illustrating that it now represents about 11 percent of the total. The share has declined
slightly from the plateau at around 17 percent reached in the late 1980s onwards, owing to
recent rapid growth in power demand in the developing world. Rather than being the result of
investment into new plants, the relatively stable nuclear share for many years can be
explained by much better operating performance of nuclear plants and some capacity
uprates.
16
The World Bank suggests that poor households should receive 1kWh a day as a ‘lifeline’ supply;
see The World Bank, 2008, Country Strategy for Republic of India for the period FY 2009-2012,
Report No. 46509-IN: Annex 11, p. 5. ‘Smart meters’ can be programmed to provide an initial kWh
free of charge daily; see Engerati, 18 June 2014, Smart meters for Africa – Now is the right time, on
<www.engerati.com/article/smart-meters-africa-now-right-time>.

Table 1.2: Nuclear power reactors by region, number of reactors and capacity
(as of 1 October 2014)
Region Operable Under construction Planned

Reactors GWe Reactors GWe Reactors GWe
North America 119 111.3 5 5.6 7 7.2

Latin America 7 4.8 2 1.3 0 0
European Economic 136 124.5 4 4.0 19 22.4
17
Area
18
CIS 48 36.6 11 9.6 30 31.8
East Asia 98 86.4 37 41.0 66 70.6
19
West Asia 1 0.9 3 4.2 7 7.5
South Asia 24 6.0 7 4.1 24 22.3
Southeast Asia & Pacific 0 0 0 0 4 4.1
Africa 2 1.8 0 0 1 1.2
World 435 372.3 69 69.8 158 167.1
20
of which, OECD 324 297.0 16 18.6 36 43.8
Note: Operable reactors exclude a fast reactor in Russia as this is not a commercial project. Such
demonstration reactors are similarly excluded from the number under construction and from the
estimates for planned reactors.
17
Member countries of the European Economic Area comprise the member states of the European
Union and its associated countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
18
The Commonwealth of Independent States consists of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
19
Includes Turkey.
20
OECD membership in mid-2014 comprised 34 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom and the United States of America.

Figure 1.2: Nuclear share in world electricity production, % (Source: IAEA21)
20
18
16
14
12
10
0
1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Figure 1.3 shows the share of nuclear power as a percentage of total electricity generation in
each of the countries where nuclear plants were in operation in 2012. Nuclear power
accounts for over 40 percent of electricity generation in five of these, including France,
Belgium and some countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
21
IAEA, 2014, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2050, Reference
Data Series No. 1: Table 1: p. 13.

Figure 1.3: Nuclear of electricity by country or territory in 2013, % (Source: IAEA)22
FRANCE
BELGIUM
SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
UKRAINE
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
CZECH REPUBLIC
SLOVENIA
FINLAND
BULGARIA
ARMENIA
SOUTH KOREA
ROMANIA
SPAIN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CHINA - TAIWAN
UNITED KINGDOM
RUSSIA
CANADA
GERMANY
SOUTH AFRICA
MEXICO
PAKISTAN
ARGENTINA
INDIA
NETHERLANDS
BRAZIL
CHINA - MAINLAND
JAPAN
IRAN
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
The contribution from nuclear power to electricity production has remained fairly stable over
the past decade, although in recent years it has fallen in Germany and Japan as a result of
reactor shutdowns following the Fukushima accident.
Based on International Energy Agency (IEA) output, consumption and price data, WNA
estimate that nuclear power plants generate gross revenues worth around US$ 330 billion a
year for electricity utilities (see Table 1.3).
22
IAEA, 2014, Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, Reference Data Series No. 2: Table 6 and
Figure 3: pp. 18 and 76.

Table 1.3: Output & revenues from nuclear power plants, 2000-2013
2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013

OECD Output from NPPs (TWh) 2 249 2 346 2 182 1 990 1 866 1 877
Revenue (US$ billion) 164.2 220.3 284.8 285.8 292.3 293.9
Non- Output from NPPs (TWh) 346 422 468 497 480 482
OECD
Revenue (US$ billion) : 28.1 41.2 43.7 35.2 35.4
World Output from NPPs (TWh) 2 595 2 768 2 650 2 487 2 346 2 359
Revenue (US$ billion) : 248.4 326.0 329.5 327.5 329.3
Sources: IEA, 2011, Electricity Information 2011: Tables 1.2, 2.6, 2.14, 3.5, 3.7 and previous editions;
US Energy Information Administration, 2010, Electricity Prices for Households; WNA estimates.
1.5 Principal reactor types

Nuclear power technology has evolved considerably over the past 60 years. Progress has
been incremental and although the basic functions of the nuclear steam supply system
(NSSS) have not altered, the reliability and efficiency of the system has improved many
times over. Over the history of civil nuclear power, many different reactor designs have been
built and tested. Some designs have never made it past a few prototypes, while a few have
been widely deployed and form the bulk of the current operating fleet.
There is a distinction between the reactor process and the model. The process
distinguishes different classes of reactor based mostly upon the choice of moderator,
primary coolant and, sometimes, their fuel. Table 1.4 lists the operating reactors types by
process.
Table 1.4: Nuclear power reactors in operation on 1 October 2014
Reactor type Main locations Number Capacity Fuel Coolant Moderator

(process) GWe
Pressurized Water US, DE, FR, 273 248.3 Enriched Water Water
Reactor (PWR) JP, KR, RU, CN UO2
Boiling Water Reactor US, JP, DE, SE 84 81.0 Enriched Water Water
(BWR) UO2
Pressurized Heavy CA, IN, AR, RO 48 24.8 Natural Water Heavy
Water Reactor (PHWR) UO2 water
Gas-cooled Reactor UK 15 8.0 Natural U, CO2 Graphite
(GCR) Enriched
UO2
Light Water Graphite RU 15 10.2 Enriched Water Graphite
Reactor (LWGR) UO2
Fast Neutron Reactor RU 1 0.5 PuO2 and Liquid None
(FNR) UO2 Sodium
436 372.8
Of the reactors in Table 1.4, only the top three favoured processes – the PWR, BWR and
PHWR – are still being actively marketed today. Collectively boiling water reactors (BWRs)
and pressurized water reactors (PWRs) are referred to as light water reactors (LWRs), and

combined they dominate current global nuclear capacity. They use pure water (H2O) as their
moderator and coolant. Pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) designs, such as the
Candu type reactors, are the next most common variety and use heavy water (D2O) for their
moderator and water as reactor coolant.
For various reasons the graphite moderated reactors (GCR and the LWGRs) have not
shown the best operating track record and no vendors are offering models of this kind any
longer. Gas-cooled reactor (GCR) type reactors refer mainly to the Magnox and Advanced
Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) models indigenous to the UK. They use carbon dioxide (CO2)
gas as a primary coolant. The light water gas-cooled reactor (LWGR) type reactors (water-
cooled and graphite-moderated) refer mainly to the RBMK, the design made infamous by the
Chernobyl accident and now only operating inside the Russian Federation, where, in any
case, the design is being phased out.
The fast neutron reactors (FNRs) are a special case; only a handful of prototypes have ever
been built and operated. In current versions of FNRs, more fissile fuel is formed than is
consumed; typically 239Pu is formed from the neutron capture of 238U. This requires a ‘fast’
neutron, and thus such reactors – known as fast breeder reactors – require little or no
moderator in order to function. Since 238U makes up over 99 percent of mined uranium this
increases the fuel resource significantly, but it comes at a capital cost premium, both for the
reactor and the subsequent reprocessing.
The idea of a reactor model is actually a fairly recent concept, as, in the past, the level of
customization of each nuclear power plant meant that many reactors were essentially
unique. This situation came about as each new plant sought to implement improvements
that had become evident through the construction and operation of older plant. It is only as
more recent plants have been built that the benefits of standardization for fleet management
have become apparent, and what might be thought of as a reactor model has become a
valid definition.
Reactor models have in turn been divided into four ‘generations’ on the basis of the
sophistication of their design. It must be emphasized that all operating reactors are safe
enough to have received a licence and the improvements introduced over the years in
performance and risk reduction, while significant, represent the maturation of the technology
as experience is fed back into designs. These generations are defined as follows: 23
 Generation I: early prototype and power reactors in the 1950s and 1960s, such as
Shippingport, Calder Hall, Dresden and Fermi 1. None remain in operation.
 Generation II: large commercial power reactors built since the 1970s and still in
operation, including PWR/VVER, BWR, Candu, and AGR types. Nearly all currently
operating reactors are second generation and are still being built in a number of
countries. Safety upgrades have been incorporated in the light of operating
experience and evolving regulatory requirements.
23
US DoE, 2002, A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems, GIF-002-00.
See also NEA, 2010, Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008, Paris: OECD: pp. 371-377.

 Generation III: reactors developed since the 1990s with advanced safety features,
better economy in operation and a 60 year design life, satisfying the Advanced Light
Water Reactor (ALWR) requirements developed in the US under the Utility
Requirements Document (issued by EPRI) or in Europe under the European Utilities
Requirements group. Some reactor technology vendors have designated their
models as Generation III+ to indicate that yet more features have been added.
 Generation IV: reactors that are still at design stage and many of which will not be
operational even as prototypes until the later 2020s at the earliest. They offer the
prospect of further safety features, material safeguard and economic advantages,
whilst minimizing waste production and improving physical protection.24
The technological evolution of Generation II reactor was focused on addressing problems
that had become apparent during their operating lives, including incidents and accidents, as
part of a commitment to continuous improvement. In-service and periodic maintenance times
tended to be lengthier than anticipated originally by vendors and operators. Improving
capacity factors for nuclear power plants through greater on-line maintenance and shorter
shutdown times was therefore a priority. Steam generators tended to under-perform to
expectation due to early stress induced tube corrosion and/or vibration problems. This led to
changes in the size and materials used, including stronger turbine blades, and steam-water
separators to secure higher quality steam. Periodic safety reviews taking account normal
operating experience as well as safety incidents led to improved man-machine interfaces
and reinforcement of safety systems to address external hazards.
Moving from Generation II to Generation III models allowed designers to introduce the safety
requirements from regulatory bodies more efficiently at the design stage, as well as
providing a more economical design through simplification or standardization. Design
simplification has reduced the amount of equipment found in some Generation III reactors
compared to Generation II. In BWRs large external recirculation loops, with their pumps,
valves and piping, were replaced in the ABWR by reactor internal pumps that recirculated
coolant flow within the reactor core. The reactor containment and its housing were made
more compact, reducing the quantity of building materials.25 Big reductions in the volume of
radioactive waste could also be achieved.
There are several reactor models under construction: the ABWR, the ACPR1000, the
AP1000, the APR1400, the CNP-300, the CPR-1000, the EPR, the OPR-1000 and several
types of VVER (e.g. the AES-2006). In addition there are a number of reactor models that
are licenced for construction (or close to gaining such a licence), such as the APWR, the
Atmea1, the CAP1400, the EC6, the ESBWR, the Hualong, the MIR-1200 and the VVER-
TOI. Table 1.5 provides a matrix showing the inter-relationship between reactor types and
the major technology vendors.
24
Most designs are types of fast neutron reactor (FNR), with some based on prototypes built in the
1960s and 1970s. Japan’s prototype FNR at Monju, which started operation in 1994 but has had a
troubled history, may be decommissioned prematurely. Russia completed its first commercial scale
FNR in June 2014, the BN-800 at Beloyarsk, which is also the site of its prototype FNR, and is
cooperating with China in its FNR and high temperature reactor programs. Construction of a high
temperature reactor (HTR) is underway at Shidaowan. India is also constructing a prototype FNR at
Kalpakkam.
25
NEA/OECD, 2000, Reduction of capital costs of nuclear power plants, Paris: NEA/OECD: p. 97.

Table 1.5: Nuclear power reactors models
Reactor vendor Reactor type

Process Generation Models
AREVA BWR III Kerena
GE Hitachi III+ ESBWR-1550
Hitachi GE III ABWR-1350 & 1600
Toshiba III ABWR-1400 & 1600
AREVA PWR III+ EPR

AREVA + MHI III Atmea1
China General Nuclear (CGN) II+ CPR-1000
China General Nuclear (CGN) III ACPR1000
China National Nuclear Corp. (CNNC) II CNP-600 & 1000
China National Nuclear Corp. (CNNC) III ACP600
CGN + CNNC III+ Hualong
State Nuclear Power Technology Co. III+ CAP1400
KEPCO + Doosan II OPR1000
26
KEPCO + Doosan III APR1400
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) III APWR-1400 & 1700
RosAtom III AES-92
RosAtom III+ AES-2006
RosAtom III+ VVER-TOI
RosAtom + Škoda III+ MIR-1200
Westinghouse III+ AP1000
Candu Energy PHWR III EC6

Candu Energy III+ ACR
Nuclear Power Corp. of India Ltd (NPCIL) II PHWR-700
Other technological advances have been incorporated into modern reactors or retrofitted to
existing ones, for example digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. Today’s
reactors have high fuel efficiency and feature streamlined construction and flexible
operation. Some types are designed to permit better load-following, so that their output can
be modified in line with variable electricity demand. The EPR, for instance, is able to
maintain its output at 25 percent and then ramp up to full output much faster. This means
that potentially the unit can change its output from 25 to 100 percent in less than 30 minutes,
26
A Generation III+ design gained approval in 2013.

though this may be at some expense of wear and tear to certain components. Other reactor
types, like ABWRs, have load following capability.
Improvements in fuelling are being incorporated that also offer gains in safety and efficiency.
1.6 Safety
Nuclear safety and security are priorities for the industry. Safety, along with the need to
manage radioactive wastes, is usually cited as being the biggest concern amongst the public
regarding nuclear technology. There is no doubt that nuclear power carries a low health and
safety risk. Notwithstanding, after nearly a century of research our knowledge of the range of
effects of radiation on health is well established (and there is no measurable evidence of
harm at low dose levels). Radiation protection standards nonetheless assume that there is
no ‘safe’ level of exposure. This rule arises from the application of the precautionary
principle. The industry keeps exposures to a fraction of the dose everyone receives from
natural sources of radiation. During operation, workers are monitored to make sure that their
exposure is kept to as low as is reasonably achievable, the ALARA principle. Their shift
patterns and duties are also organized to avoid unnecessary exposure. Operators of nuclear
power plants are subject to stringent oversight and actively manage their operation to
maintain safety.
Safety is an outcome. It is ensured through a combination of design, engineering, quality

assurance in manufacturing and construction and intelligent and rigorously controlled
operational activity by management and staff. Nuclear power plants are designed to
minimize the likelihood of any accidental release of radioactive material into the
environment. The industry has adopted a ‘defence-in-depth approach’, with multiple safety
systems supplementing the natural features of the nuclear reaction. Systems are
manufactured to assure high reliability. Physical barriers prevent the release of radioactive
substances and the penetration of harmful radiation. Back-up electrical and mechanical
systems are available to control the reaction and confine any problems, such as the loss of
cooling, to the reactor’s containment structure. Operational and engineered systems are
designed to accommodate human error and deliberate sabotage or external attack. Most
reactor designs incorporate a mix of so-called active safety systems, including emergency
diesel generators, with inherent or passive safety features, which depend on physical
phenomena such as convection, gravity and neutronic feedback or on materials that are
resistant to high temperatures, radiation damage and corrosion, to continue operating safely
in the event of a problem.
The industry is regulated closely. Vendors submit a design for approval by the regulatory
body. Operators must demonstrate that they will undertake high quality manufacturing and
construction and comprehensive testing before a construction and operating licence is
awarded. Management systems and procedures are formulated to take account of all actions
and events that could compromise safety. Standards set by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) specify that safety be paramount within the management system.27 High
levels of technical competence are achieved through the recruitment and training of qualified
staff. The nuclear industry has a safety culture that supports individuals and teams in
27
IAEA, 2006, The Management System for Facilities and Activities, Safety Requirements No. GS-R-
3: p. 5.

carrying out their tasks safely and successfully, reinforces an attitude of learning and
questioning at all levels and continuously seeks to improve its performance. All nuclear
power plants have guidelines for handling and mitigating severe accidents and incidents.
These fundamental safety principles are incorporated into the Convention on Nuclear Safety
adopted in 1994.
Nuclear reactors are in any case designed to avoid run-away criticality accidents where
there is a surge of energy not mitigated by the normal controls. However, as the Chernobyl
disaster of 1986 showed, serious accidents of this type are possible. Significant lessons
have been learned from this and other incidents, such as the 1979 meltdown at Three Mile
Island (see Table 1.6). The emergency at Fukushima Daiichi in 2011 has been reviewed by
regulatory authorities and industry bodies like the World Association of Nuclear Operators
(WANO). New reactor designs are less vulnerable to core melt accidents. Accident
scenarios that were once considered ‘beyond design basis’ are now included in newer
designs, providing additional reassurance. In a modern reactor a serious problem is more
likely to take the plant off-line temporarily rather than damage it permanently.
The emergency at the Fukushima Daiichi plant exposed safety vulnerabilities. Although
radiation from Fukushima inflicted no fatalities – nor are the public or plant workers expected
to endure any harmful effects – the precautionary evacuation of 100 000 people had a major
social and economic impact. In the aftermath, countries around the world that use nuclear
power have reviewed their energy policies and, with few exceptions, reaffirmed their
commitment to this low-carbon energy resource. The industry is committed to being part of
this wider review process and will apply all lessons learned to its activities.
Table 1.6: Reactor accidents, causes and lessons learned
Reactor Severity Safety Contributing Lessons learned

28
accident (INES) function lost factors
Three Mile Island 2 5 Cooling Lack of operator Need for human

USA training. Failure in performance programs and
1979 the man-machine improved instrumentation,
interface. information and procedures.
Chernobyl 4 7 Control of Lack of safety Need for improved

USSR (Ukraine) reactivity culture. Flaws in exchange on good practice
1986 reactor design. across the industry,
including the fostering of a
safety culture.
Fukushima Daiichi 7 Cooling Failure to consider Need for better emergency

(Units 1-4), Japan worst case accident preparedness and response
2011 scenarios. to improve resilience against
natural hazards and other
extreme events.
28
The International Nuclear Event Scale tries to grade the safety-significance of incidents; see
<http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/ines.asp>.

Part 1: Market Outlook


2 Outlook for nuclear power

The chapter uses a scenario approach to examine the industry’s prospects to 2030. It
summarizes the three scenarios for the development of nuclear power that were prepared in
relation to the WNA’s report on The Global Nuclear Fuel Market (2013). A scenario
methodology seeks to delineate the long-term development trajectories that could plausibly
arise.
Energy markets are undergoing structural change as governments seek to unbundle and
privatize vertically integrated suppliers and to deregulate markets to promote competition.
Climate change is altering the calculus of governments, civil society and business
enterprises. Companies’ strategic planning now needs to examine widely different scenarios.
Business as usual is no longer an option. Given the efficiency advantages that nuclear
power enjoys over alternative low-carbon energy sources, WNA’s scenario analysis
suggests that market drivers will favour the take-up of nuclear power by electricity suppliers,
but only over the longer term. In the shorter term the outlook for nuclear power is less
promising.
2.1 A changing economic and energy landscape

Traditionally governments have adopted long-term energy policies to guide investment but
with the privatization of utilities and the deregulation of electricity markets the relevance of
such policies has diminished. Many governments now aim to provide a legal and policy
environment in which competitive energy markets are expected to deliver secure, sufficient
and environmentally sensitive power to all citizens and enterprises. To be sure, governments
still have a role, through the licensing system for nuclear power plants and related
installations, in setting the terms of the liability insurance framework and in supporting
research and development. But governments have tried to avoid taking an active role in the
energy business and the responsibility to plan the configuration of the power supply system
has therefore fallen upon the public electricity suppliers.
Unfortunately, some deregulated markets have failed to generate the forward prices to
provide sufficient incentive to invest in long-lived capital-intensive projects. A peculiarity of
electricity markets is that the product is produced and consumed at the same instant. Since
electricity is considered an essential service, the market is not able to adjust the quantity
supplied, by cutting off supply, for example, without penalty; or by storing surplus electricity
through a pumped storage scheme, as it is usually more efficient to invest in stand-by
capacity that is ready to generate when required. The result is a volatile spot price as
electricity demand changes and this uncertainty arising from price volatility may, in turn,
send the ‘wrong’ signals and deter investment in additional capacity, especially if this is
capital-intensive. Several governments have therefore begun to re-regulate and design
market interventions that address these market failures.
Other governments, such as in China and India, continue to manage their economic
development actively, and their investment planning encompasses the energy supply sector
accordingly. Developing countries in particular support the extension of the electricity supply

system to permit grid access in the countryside and to the poor and to regulate the price
charged for power to ensure its affordability. Even in developed economies many
governments retain an ownership share in public electricity supply companies, although they
try to manage these assets at ‘arm’s length’, leaving investment decisions to be taken on
largely commercial criteria.
The greater uncertainty regarding future energy prices in deregulated markets has meant
that power producers and utilities must take on a higher level of risk when investing in new
capacity. Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are capital-intensive investments with lengthy pay-
back periods and it has not proved viable to finance such projects on normal commercial
terms in recent years. Almost all NPPs under construction currently were initiated at a time
of regulated energy markets. The problem of potential under-investment in capacity has
affected non-nuclear plants as well and it has provoked concern within regulatory bodies and
government.
The control of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is still in its infancy and counter measures arouse
controversy. The trend towards a more uniform and stable carbon price is hard to predict
and therefore poses a significant risk impacting all forms of energy industry investment. To
date, the volatility of the ‘carbon price’ on the European Emission Trading System (ETS) has
failed to elicit any supply-side response in terms of investment in low-carbon sources of
energy. It is clear that public policy, the scientific consensus, consumer perceptions and
market forces are pulling in contradictory directions. In time, if greenhouse gas
concentrations rise inexorably, governments may choose to stand back from the
complexities of intervening in every market sector to encourage climate change mitigation
activity by civil society and instead proscribe greenhouse gas emission in much the same
way as other harmful pollutants were eliminated through air quality legislation. Generators
could then find themselves with stranded fossil fuel assets.
2.2 WNA scenarios

The WNA does not prepare its own forecasts of world energy and electricity supply and
demand, but relies on the analysis of international organizations such as the International
Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Population,
economic growth and urbanization are the clear long-term drivers of energy demand but
rising concerns over global warming and the imperative to reduce absolute poverty in
developing countries are increasingly shaping the pattern of supply. Significant innovations
in business practices and technology will take shape, altering energy economics
fundamentally. The drivers of innovation are government policy and the commercial risks
associated with continued reliance upon fossil fuels, with the latter probably being the more
significant factor. Business strategies will have to adapt to a much more complex
environment than that hitherto encountered (see box).

Scenarios for strategic planning
Strategic planning under conditions of considerable uncertainty calls for the intelligent use of
scenarios. Scenarios are not forecasts but they nonetheless attempt to provide a frame of
reference for strategic thinking under conditions of uncertainty. Each projection describes a
coherent development pathway resulting from an explicit set of assumptions. Scenarios are
tools to give decision-makers the opportunity to think through the options, opportunities and
threats, and trade-offs, as they relate to their own sector of business. The pathway and its
impacts can be identified but the likelihood of it happening is much harder to estimate. The
energy industry must evaluate the plausibility of such scenarios against its own experience
and insight but it is important to remember that it is the whole set of scenarios that describes
collectively the probable future outcomes. A business strategy cannot assume that a
particular scenario will in fact come about and therefore must take account of a range of
possible futures. Key factors in the sustainable development of energy supply systems are:
 Affordability – the cost-effectiveness of generation options relative to each other

and to other energy sources;
 Availability – the location of resources, be they natural, financial, human or
technological;
 Accessibility – the quality of energy in terms of reliability and coverage; and,
 Acceptability – concerning the safety and environmental impact of forms of energy
supply.29
To reflect the range of uncertainties which surround any forecast, three scenarios have been
prepared; these are referred to as the Lower, Reference and Upper cases. The three cases
reflect the states of the world that are possible given the interplay of energy policy and
economics. The aim with this approach is to cover the full range of possible outcomes for the
future in a comprehensive, logical and internally consistent way.
No attempt is made to attach probabilities to the projections. In principle, the starting point is
that all three must be plausible as representations of future events. Companies may wish to
test their own plans and forecasts against each of the cases. Although there is a natural
tendency to consider the Reference case, as it stands in the middle, to be the most plausible
outcome, the Upper and Lower cases must not be ignored, as they also are judged as fully
credible, depending on underlying political and economic trends. Indeed, until the Fukushima
accident, the greater optimism surrounding nuclear power naturally meant that the Upper
case was becoming increasingly likely and the Lower case less so. Arguably the most
significant impact of Fukushima is that it has changed the likelihood of the scenarios in the
other direction. The Upper case may now be viewed as less likely and the Lower case,
sometimes effectively forgotten at the time of much increased optimism about nuclear, has
suddenly become seriously considered once again.
29
See World Energy Council, 2007, Deciding the Future: Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050, London:
WEC: p.15.

2.2.1 Reference case

The Reference case reflects the current energy market situation, where relatively high fossil
fuel prices and weak regulation of emissions coexist. It is based upon the following
assumptions:
Affordability:
 Continued improvements occur in the relative economics of nuclear power
generation against alternatives such as natural gas and coal, with only minor
increases to fossil fuel prices.
 The gradual restructuring and liberalization of electricity sectors continues in many
key countries. The climate for both state and private investment in large, long-term
projects begins to improve.
Availability:
 Interest in nuclear power from emerging industrial economies continues and
encourages the international community and governments to help them build
technical and regulatory capacity.
Acceptability:
 Concerns about the threat of global warming continue, and moves to incorporate the
external costs of fossil fuel electricity generation into relative prices begin to achieve
a slow shift in the mix of energy sources. Governments realize that renewable energy
sources will be insufficient to meet targets for stabilizing GHG emissions worldwide
and recognize nuclear as a non-greenhouse gas energy resource.
 The Fukushima accident has an impact in some countries, but most governments
continue with their previous plans.
 Public acceptance problems for nuclear projects begin to diminish. Slow but steady
progress on waste management improves public acceptance in most countries.
Accessibility:
 Rural electrification is completed in Asia and southern Africa, contributing to rising
demand for power.
2.2.2 Upper case

The Upper case is consistent with the world moving to a situation in which governments
introduce tough emission curbs and markets reflect higher carbon prices. Such a state of the
world is the most stable scenario presented, but involves market actors and policy-makers
working in coherence. The Upper case assumes:
Affordability:
 Significant improvements occur in the relative economics of nuclear power, based on
higher market prices for fossil fuels and improvements in reactor construction, design
and operation.
 Electricity market restructuring revitalizes the sector and leads to many new
investment projects, contributing to stated national and international energy and
environmental policy goals.

Availability:
 Interest in nuclear power from emerging industrial economies builds up and
encourages the international community and governments to help them build
technical and regulatory capacity and provide investment finance through the
international development banks.
Acceptability:
 Policies are introduced around the world to encourage energy sources with zero or
low greenhouse gas emissions, in order to alter the energy mix sufficiently to reduce
such emissions and limit global warming.
 Fukushima has little adverse impact on government regulation of the nuclear sector.
 Substantial progress is made on the public acceptance of nuclear safety, waste
management and decommissioning.
Accessibility:
 Utilities in emerging industrial markets take advantage of the low marginal costs of
nuclear generation to expand their share of sales to poorer households.
2.2.3 Lower case

The Lower case involves no movement from a world where weak emissions control, a low
carbon price and relatively low fossil fuel prices prevail. It also represents an economically
stable state of the world, although vulnerable to a sudden policy reversal as the effects of
climate change begin to constrain agricultural output in vulnerable zones and alter
communicable disease profiles around the world. For the Lower case the following
assumptions apply:
Affordability:
 Investment in new nuclear power projects appears uncompetitive, as a result of low
gas prices, high nuclear power plant construction costs, and political and regulatory
risks. The emergence of shale gas reserves as economically viable sources helps
keep fossil fuel prices down.
 Electricity market restructuring in many key countries leaves major energy
investment decisions to be taken by private investors with relatively short-term
horizons.
Availability:
 Interest in nuclear power from emerging industrial economies wanes and few
countries embark on the necessary preparation for a nuclear power program.
Acceptability:
 Governments are slow to introduce substantial measures to alter the fuel mix, despite
increasing acceptance of the evidence of global warming.
 Fukushima has a significant impact on nuclear prospects by discouraging
government interest in the technology.
 Public acceptance problems for nuclear power increase, curtailing operating reactor
lives and constraining any new nuclear growth.

 Government-inspired phase-out plans for existing reactors and moratoria on new

nuclear plant construction remain in place in some countries.
Accessibility:
 Off-grid solutions based on decentralized distribution of power from small-scale
renewable energy sources are encouraged but comprehensive rural electrification is
impeded by the higher relative cost of nuclear and renewable energy sources, which
reduces the take-up by poor households in developing countries.
2.2.4 Nuclear power projections

Figure 2.1 shows the scenarios all the way to 2030. From 2015 onwards the three
scenarios begin to diverge as reactor construction programs get better established in the
Upper case and closures increase in the Lower. Beyond 2020, the projections begin to
diverge much more significantly. The general resilience of nuclear generation under the
Lower case ends, as reactor closures become very significant and new build peters out.
The Reference case shows nuclear capacity increasing more quickly to reach 574 GWe by
2030 (from 334 GWe in 2012). Growth in the Upper case also accelerates, as substantial
reactor building programs take off around the world. The Reference case implies an annual
growth rate of 3.0 percent versus 4.2 percent for the Upper and zero percent for the Lower,
although this includes a projected re-opening of some Japanese reactors.
It is worth noting that the projected growth rates for the Upper and Reference cases are
higher than at any time in the last twenty years.
Figure 2.1: Nuclear generating capacity to 2030, GWe

Table 2.1 breaks down WNA’s projections on a regional basis. It will be noted that the OECD
group of advanced industrial economies will continue to have the majority of nuclear power
capacity under all scenarios, even though a small number of OECD member states intend to
phase out or reduce their dependence upon nuclear power. The nuclear industry is
increasingly international with new NPPs under construction in every continent, including
regions where none have been built before, as in West and Southeast Asia.
Table 2.1: Nuclear power by region in 2030, capacity and number of reactors
Region Lower case Reference case Upper case

GWe Reactors GWe Reactors GWe Reactors
North America 69.4 63 121.0 124 131.0 136

Latin America 3.5 4 6.6 8 14.6 16
30
European Economic Area 62.5 56 124.7 122 149.2 145
Commonwealth of Ind. 40.5 40 65.3 63 74.4 72
States
East Asia 138.5 139 201.6 202 244.9 243
West Asia 6.2 5 18.4 17 27.6 26
South Asia 17.6 34 28.0 45 37.7 56
Southeast Asia & Pacific - - 3.9 4 11.4 12
Africa 1.9 2 5.1 4 8.9 8
World 340.1 343 574.6 589 699.7 714
of which, OECD area 181.0 166 318.3 316 366.7 363
Source: WNA, 2013, The Global Nuclear Fuel Market Report.
As already mentioned, probabilities are not ascribed to the scenarios but it is instructive to
note that both the Reference and Lower cases appear to be unsustainable ‘states of the
world’. In the former case, rising GHG concentrations might induce governments to toughen
emission caps and controls, thus providing the policy environment that would favour low-
carbon sources. The Lower case is also consistent with rising GHG concentrations. The
Upper case is a more stable ‘state of the world’, with economic forces and policy measures
reinforcing each other to drive down GHG emissions from the energy sector.
WNA’s projections may be compared with other estimates for future nuclear generating
capacity (Table 2.2). The International Energy Agency’s central scenario is called the New
Policies Scenario and “takes account of existing policies and the anticipated impact of the
cautious implementation of declared policy intentions”. The 450 Scenario illustrates “an
energy pathway compatible with a 50 percent chance of limiting the long-term increase in
average global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius”.31 The methodology for constructing the
projections is quite different from that employed by WNA and is based upon a model of the
energy economy. Nonetheless, the two IEA scenarios compare closely with the WNA’s
30
Plus Switzerland.
31
IEA, 2013, World Energy Outlook 2013, Paris: International Energy Agency: p. 56.

Reference and Upper cases overall.32 Looking at the regional breakdown, the IEA
anticipates greater usage of nuclear power in Africa and North America, and less in Europe
and the Middle East, than the corresponding projections made by WNA.
Table 2.2: Nuclear power by region in 2030, GWe
Region IEA WNA IAEA

New 450 Lower Refer- Upper Low High
Policie Scenario ence
s
33
North America 129 140 70.9 122.5 134.4 103e 146e
Latin America 7 8 2.0 5.1 11.2 6e 12e
34
Western Europe 112 126 59.3 124.9 149.2 68 124
Eastern Europe/Eurasia 58 73 43.7 70.8 82.0 79 104
East Asia 186e 244e 138.5 201.6 244.9 147 268
Middle East 10 13 6.2 12.7 20.0 )
27 54
South Asia 33e 44e 17.6 28.0 37.7 )
Southeast Asia/Pacific 4e 7e - 3.9 11.4 - 4

Africa 4 6 1.9 5.1 8.9 5 10
World 543 661 340.1 574.6 699.7 435 722
of which, OECD 313 346 181.0 318.3 366.7 : :
e: estimated by WNA to ensure consistency between definitions of world regions

Source: IEA, 2014, World Energy Outlook 2014, Annexes; WNA, 2013, The Global Nuclear Fuel
Market Report; IAEA, 2012, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power estimates for the period up to
2050, Table 3.
The IAEA projections are presented as high and low estimates and are derived from a
‘bottom up’ approach undertaken by an expert group. They reflect contrasting, but plausible,
underlying assumptions about the drivers of nuclear power deployment.35 The methodology
is thus similar to that used by WNA, but without a central estimate (WNA’s Reference case).
The IAEA High projection shows a somewhat larger nuclear capacity than the WNA Upper
case but, on the other hand, the WNA Lower case shows a smaller capacity estimate.36
32
In order to improve the comparison, WNA’s regional breakdown has been harmonized with those of
the IEA; for example, the projections for Mexico are included within the North America region, and
Turkey in Western/ OECD Europe, and non-OECD Bulgaria and Romania are included into Eastern
Europe/ Eurasia. WNA has divided the IEA region of Non-OECD Asia into East Asia, South Asia and
Southeast Asia.
33
Includes Mexico.
34
Plus Turkey.
35
IAEA, 2012, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power estimates for the period up to 2050, IAEA-RDS-
1/33, Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency: p. 6.
36
The IAEA regional estimates have been adjusted by WNA to aid comparability. Mexico has been
included within North America to be consistent with the IEA breakdown and certain OECD countries in
Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) have been removed from the IAEA’s
region of Eastern Europe and included in Western Europe. The IAEA has not distinguished between

At Tables 2.3 to 2.5 the number of reactors for each country in WNA’s scenarios is shown
along with the projected generating capacity from nuclear power in the three cases. The
base year used in these tables is 2010, the year prior to the Fukushima accident. The overall
changes in the size of the nuclear fleet between 2010 and 2030 therefore include the reactor
shutdowns that occurred in Germany and Japan in 2011 (and the restart of a limited number
of Japanese reactors). It can be seen that, under the Reference and Lower cases, the
European Economic Area (EEA) will experience a substantial reduction in nuclear
generating capacity, which could endanger the achievement of the region’s targets for
reducing GHG emissions.
In the Reference case, all regions except the EEA are expected to see a net growth in
nuclear capacity and this is most pronounced in the Asian regions and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). In the Upper case, all regions of the world see a net growth in
nuclear capacity. The Lower case projects a reduction in nuclear capacity in all regions
except Asia and the CIS, and an overall decline worldwide. Also, the numbers of reactors
shut exceeds the numbers constructed over the period. The OECD countries are particularly
affected by this trend of reactor closures in the Lower case. By contrast, in the Reference
case, the projected nuclear capacity in the OECD countries may be expected to remain
stable, with reactor closures in the EEA and Japan offset by new construction in North
America and South Korea.
The WNA scenarios assume that 22 of the 50 reactors shutdown in Japan after the
Fukushima accident, which, of course, took out four reactors, are closed permanently. Four
new reactors are projected plus the re-start of 27 existing reactors in the Reference case.
West Asia and South Asia and this consolidated region (Middle East and South Asia) has been
retained in the table.

Table 2.3: WNA Reference case - Nuclear power by territory to 2030, GWe and number of reactors
Nuclear power capacity (GWe) Reactor numbers
2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 +/- 2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 Shut New
North America 114.7 112.5 113.0 118.4 119.6 121.0 +6.3 122 119 120 124 126 124 10 12
Canada 12.6 13.5 13.5 14.2 14.4 13.9 +1.3 18 19 20 20 20 19 2 3
United States of America 102.1 99.0 99.5 104.2 105.2 107.1 +5.0 104 100 100 104 106 105 8 9
Latin America 4.3 4.3 5.0 6.2 6.6 6.6 +2.5 6 6 7 8 8 8 1 3
Argentina 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.0 +1.1 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 2
Brazil 1.9 1.9 1.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 +1.2 2 2 2 3 3 3 - 1
Chile - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Mexico 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 - -
Venezuela - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
European Economic Area 134.5 125.2 126.8 122.3 118.0 124.7 -9.8 148 136 133 131 118 122 49 23
Belgium 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.1 3.0 - -5.9 7 7 5 5 2 - 7 -
Bulgaria 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.9 +1.0 2 2 2 2 2 3 - 1
Czech Republic 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 6.1 +2.3 6 6 6 6 7 8 - 2
Finland 2.8 2.8 4.4 4.4 6.0 6.0 +3.2 4 4 4 5 6 6 - 2
France 63.1 63.1 63.1 63.0 64.6 64.6 +1.5 58 58 58 57 58 58 2 2
Germany 20.5 12.1 12.1 8.1 - - -20.5 17 9 8 6 - - 17 -
Hungary 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 - -
Italy - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Lithuania - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Netherlands 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 +1.0 1 1 1 1 2 2 - 1
Norway - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Poland - - - - 1.0 4.7 +4.7 - - - - 1 3 - 3
Romania 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.6 2.6 +1.3 2 2 2 2 4 4 - 2
Slovakia 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.8 +2.0 4 4 5 6 6 7 - 3
Slovenia 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 - -
Spain 7.6 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 -0.5 8 7 7 7 7 7 1 -
Sweden 9.2 9.8 9.8 9.8 6.9 6.9 -2.3 10 10 10 9 6 6 4 -
Switzerland 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.9 1.2 -2.1 5 5 5 5 2 1 4 -
United Kingdom 10.2 9.2 8.7 8.7 10.2 14.7 +4.5 19 16 15 15 10 12 14 7

2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 +/- 2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 Shut New
CIS 35.6 37.9 37.3 41.8 54.2 65.3 +29.7 48 49 47 47 58 63 22 37
Armenia 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.4 1.0 +0.6 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
Belarus - - - - 1.0 1.0 +1.0 0 - - - 1 1 - 1
Kazakhstan - - - - - - 0 0 - - - - - - -
Russian Federation 22.1 24.4 23.8 26.4 34.9 45.2 +23.1 32 33 31 29 36 42 19 29
Ukraine 13.1 13.1 13.1 15.0 16.9 18.1 +5.0 15 15 15 17 19 19 2 6
East Asia 80.0 50.1 85.3 125.0 159.6 201.6 +121.6 94 50 93 128 163 202 32 140
China, Mainland 10.1 19.8 38.3 58.3 93.1 128.1 +118.0 13 19 41 61 97 131 - 118
China, Taiwan 5.0 5.0 6.3 6.4 3.5 2.6 -2.4 6 6 7 6 3 2 6 2
Japan 47.1 2.3 16.3 29.8 29.8 32.4 -14.7 54 2 19 31 31 33 25 4
Korea, North - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Korea, South 17.8 23.0 24.4 30.5 33.2 38.5 +20.7 21 23 26 30 32 36 1 16
West Asia - 0.9 0.9 5.9 10.0 18.4 +18.4 - 1 1 5 7 17 - 17
Iran - 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.8 +0.9 - 1 1 1 2 2 - 2
Jordan - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Saudi Arabia - - - - 1.0 2.9 +2.9 - - - - 1 3 - 3
Turkey - - - 1.0 1.9 5.7 +5.7 - - - 1 2 6 - 6
United Arab Emirates - - - 4.0 5.3 8.0 +8.0 - - - 3 4 6 - 6
South Asia 5.3 6.0 8.1 13.0 17.9 28.0 +22.7 21 24 26 32 35 45 4 28
Bangladesh - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
India 4.9 5.3 7.5 12.1 17.0 27.1 +16.8 19 21 24 29 32 42 3 26
Pakistan 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 +0.5 2 3 2 3 3 3 1 2
Southeast Asia & Pacific - - - - 2.9 3.9 +3.9 - - - - 3 4 - 4
Indonesia - - - - - 1.0 +1.0 - - - - - 1 - 1
Malaysia - - - - 1.0 1.0 +1.0 - - - - 1 1 - 1
Philippines - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Thailand - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Vietnam - - - - 1.9 1.9 +1.9 - - - - 2 2 - 2
Africa 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 5.1 +3.2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2
Egypt - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
South Africa 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 5.1 +3.2 2 2 2 2 2 4 - +2
World 376.3 334.5 378.3 434.5 490.7 574.6 +198.5 441 387 429 477 520 589 118 266
of which, OECD 312.4 261.3 278.8 300.3 299.5 318.3 +5.9 343 278 296 315 305 316 85 58

Table 2.4: WNA Upper case - Nuclear power by territory to 2030, GWe and number of reactors
2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 +/- 2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 Shut New
North America 114.7 112.5 113.0 119.1 123.5 131.0 +16.3 122 119 119 125 130 136 7 21
Canada 12.6 13.5 13.5 14.9 16.3 17.0 4.4 18 19 19 21 23 24 - 6
United States of America 102.1 99.0 99.5 104.2 107.2 114.0 +11.9 104 100 100 104 107 112 7 15
Latin America 4.3 4.3 5.0 6.2 9.2 14.6 +10.5 6 6 7 8 11 16 - 10
Argentina 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.3 +1.4 2 2 3 3 4 4 - 2
Brazil 1.9 1.9 1.9 3.1 4.4 7.0 +5.1 2 2 2 3 4 6 - 4
Chile - - - - - 1.9 +1.9 - - - - - 2 - 2
Mexico 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 3.4 +1.9 2 2 2 2 3 4 - 2
Venezuela - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
European Economic Area 134.5 125.2 126.8 127.1 134.1 149.2 +14.7 148 136 138 136 133 145 41 38
Belgium 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.1 5.1 4.1 -1.8 7 7 7 5 5 4 3 -
Bulgaria 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.9 2.9 3.8 +1.9 2 2 2 3 3 4 - 2
Czech Republic 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 6.1 6.1 +2.3 6 6 6 6 8 8 - 2
Finland 2.8 2.8 4.4 6.0 6.0 6.0 +3.2 4 4 5 6 6 6 - 2
France 63.1 63.1 63.1 63.0 64.6 66.1 +3.0 58 58 58 57 58 59 2 3
Germany 20.5 12.1 12.1 8.1 - - -20.5 17 9 9 6 - - 17 -
Hungary 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.8 3.8 +1.9 4 4 4 4 5 6 - 2
Italy - - - - - 3.2 +3.2 - - - - - 2 - 2
Lithuania - - - - 1.6 3.2 +3.2 - - - - 1 2 - 2
Netherlands 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.6 2.6 +2.1 1 1 1 1 3 3 - 2
Norway - - - - - 1.9 +1.9 - - - - - 2 - 2
Poland - - - - 1.6 6.3 +6.3 - - - - 1 4 - 4
Romania 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.9 3.2 3.8 +2.5 2 2 2 3 4 6 - 4
Slovakia 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.8 +2.0 4 4 5 6 6 7 - 3
Slovenia 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.7 1.7 +1.0 1 1 1 1 2 2 - 1
Spain 7.6 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 -0.5 8 7 7 7 7 7 1 -
Sweden 9.2 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 +0.6 10 10 10 10 10 10 - -
Switzerland 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.9 1.2 -2.1 5 5 5 5 2 1 4 -
United Kingdom 10.2 9.2 8.7 10.3 13.4 14.7 +4.5 19 16 163 16 12 12 14 73

2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 +/- 2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 Shut New
CIS 35.6 37.9 38.3 47.4 59.4 74.4 +38.8 48 49 50 52 60 72 22 46
Armenia 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.4 1.0 +0.6 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
Belarus - - - 1.0 2.0 2.0 +2.0 - - - 1 2 2 - 2
Kazakhstan - - - - - 1.9 +1.9 - - - - - 2 - 2
Russian Federation 22.1 24.4 23.8 31.0 37.2 48.6 +26.5 32 33 32 33 35 45 19 32
Ukraine 13.1 13.1 14.1 15.0 18.8 20.9 +7.8 15 15 17 17 21 22 2 9
East Asia 80.0 50.1 93.6 140.9 195.2 244.9 +164.9 94 50 103 147 197 243 25 174
China, Mainland 10.1 19.8 38.3 64.1 109.1 154.1 +144.0 13 19 41 67 113 157 - 144
China, Taiwan 5.0 5.0 6.3 7.6 7.6 6.4 +1.4 6 6 7 8 8 6 2 2
Japan 47.1 2.3 24.6 38.1 39.4 40.0 -7.1 54 2 29 41 39 39 23 8
Korea, North - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Korea, South 17.8 23.0 24.4 31.1 39.1 44.4 +26.6 21 23 26 31 37 41 - 20
West Asia - 0.9 0.9 8.1 14.3 27.6 +27.6 - 1 1 7 13 26 - 26
Iran - 0.9 0.9 1.8 2.7 3.7 +3.7 - 1 1 2 3 4 - 4
Jordan - - - - 1.0 1.9 +1.9 - - - - 1 2 - 2
Saudi Arabia - - - - 1.0 3.8 +3.8 - - - - 1 4 - 4
Turkey - - - 1.0 2.9 7.6 +7.6 - - - 1 3 8 - 8
South Asia 5.3 6.0 8.2 14.8 22.5 37.7 +32.4 21 24 27 34 42 56 4 39
Bangladesh - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
India 4.9 5.3 7.5 13.6 20.0 34.2 +29.3 19 21 24 30 36 49 3 33
Pakistan 0.4 0.7 0.7 1.2 2.5 3.5 +3.1 2 3 3 4 6 7 1 6
Southeast Asia & Pacific - - - 1.0 3.9 11.4 +11.4 - - - 1 3 12 - 12
Indonesia - - - - - 1.9 +1.9 - - - - - 2 - 2
Malaysia - - - - 1.0 1.9 +1.9 - - - - 1 2 - 2
Philippines - - - - - 1.9 +1.9 - - - - - 2 - 2
Thailand - - - - - 1.9 +1.9 - - - - - 2 - 2
Vietnam - - - 1.0 2.9 3.8 +3.8 - - - 1 2 4 - 4
Africa 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 5.1 8.9 +7 2 2 2 2 4 8 - 6
Egypt - - - - - 1.9 +1.9 - - - - - 2 - 2
South Africa 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 5.1 7.0 +5.1 2 2 2 2 4 6 - 4
World 376.3 334.5 387.7 466.5 567.2 699.7 +323.4 441 387 447 512 593 714 99 372
of which, OECD 312.4 261.3 287.1 313.1 333.8 366.7 +54.3 343 278 310 330 337 363 71 91

Table 2.5: WNA Lower case - Nuclear power by territory to 2030, GWe and number of reactors
2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 +/- 2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 Shut New
North America 114.7 112.5 113.0 116.5 91.1 69.4 -45.3 122 119 119 121 83 63 65 6
Canada 12.6 13.5 13.5 13.0 12.5 7.2 -5.4 18 19 19 18 16 9 10 1
United States of America 102.1 99.0 99.5 103.5 78.6 62.2 -39.9 104 100 100 103 67 54 55 5
Latin America 4.3 4.3 4.7 4.7 4.1 3.5 -0.8 6 6 6 6 5 4 3 1
Argentina 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.3 0.7 0.7 -0.2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1
Brazil 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.3 -0.6 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 -
Chile - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Mexico 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 - -
Venezuela - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
European Economic Area 134.5 125.2 124.7 117.5 101.0 62.5 -72.0 148 136 130 125 90 56 97 5
Belgium 5.9 5.9 5.9 4.1 2.1 - -5.9 7 7 4 4 2 - 7 -
Bulgaria 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 - -
Czech Republic 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 1.9 -1.9 6 6 6 6 5 2 4 -
Finland 2.8 2.8 2.8 4.4 4.4 3.9 +1.1 4 4 4 5 5 4 1 1
France 63.1 63.1 63.1 63.0 59.4 40.3 -22.8 58 58 58 57 45 32 27 1
Germany 20.5 12.1 12.1 8.1 - - -20.5 17 9 8 6 - - 17 -
Hungary 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.9 -1.0 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 -
Italy - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Lithuania - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Netherlands 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 - -
Norway - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Poland - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Romania 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 - -
Slovakia 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.3 0.9 -0.9 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 -
Slovenia 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 - -
Spain 7.6 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 3.0 -4.6 8 7 7 7 7 3 5 -
Sweden 9.2 9.8 9.8 6.9 6.9 - -9.2 10 10 9 6 4 - 10 -
Switzerland 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.9 1.2 -2.1 5 5 5 5 2 1 4 -
United Kingdom 10.2 9.2 8.7 8.7 6.8 6.0 -4.2 19 16 15 15 7 4 18 3

2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 +/- 2010 2013 2015 2020 2025 2030 Shut New
CIS 35.6 37.9 36.2 33.2 37.3 40.5 +4.9 48 49 46 39 38 40 23 15
Armenia 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 - -0.4 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 -
Belarus - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Kazakhstan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Russian Federation 22.1 24.4 22.7 19.7 24.5 29.1 7.0 32 33 30 23 24 28 19 15
Ukraine 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1 12.4 11.4 -1.7 15 15 15 15 13 12 3 -
East Asia 80.0 50.1 74.4 112.9 128.0 138.5 +58.5 94 50 80 116 129 139 45 90
China, Mainland 10.1 19.8 30.1 55.3 70.1 85.1 +75.0 13 19 32 58 73 88 - 75
China, Taiwan 5.0 5.0 6.3 6.4 3.5 2.6 -2.4 6 6 7 6 3 2 6 2
Japan 47.1 2.3 13.6 24.7 23.9 19.0 -28.1 54 2 15 25 23 18 38 2
Korea, North - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Korea, South 17.8 23.0 24.4 26.5 30.5 31.8 +14.0 21 23 26 27 30 31 1 11
West Asia - 0.9 0.9 4.9 6.2 6.2 +6.2 - 1 1 4 5 5 - 5
Iran - 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 +0.9 - 1 1 1 1 1 - 1
Jordan - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Saudi Arabia - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Turkey - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
South Asia 5.3 6.0 5.9 11.3 12.6 17.6 +12.3 21 24 23 29 31 34 4 17
Bangladesh - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
India 4.9 5.3 5.3 10.7 12.0 17.0 +12.1 19 21 21 27 29 32 3 16
Pakistan 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 +0.2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1
Southeast Asia & Pacific - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Indonesia - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Malaysia - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Philippines - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Thailand - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Vietnam - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
Africa 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 - -
Egypt - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - -
South Africa 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 - -
World 376.3 334.5 361.7 402.9 382.2 340.1 -36.2 441 387 407 442 383 343 237 139
of which, OECD 312.4 261.3 274.0 283.5 244.8 181.0 -131.4 343 278 288 296 224 166 201 24

2.3 Market value projections

Table 2.6 shows projections for revenues from the nuclear power sector estimated on the
basis of the Reference case for electricity output. WNA assumes that electricity prices rise in
accordance with the IEA’s assumptions regarding the price of steam coal in non-OECD
countries, which is, along with nuclear power, the main fuel for base-load operation. In the
OECD it is assumed that the electricity price is set by the gas price.37
Table 2.6: Output & revenues from nuclear power plants, 2010-2030
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

OECD Output from NPPs
2 182 2 092 2 228 2 262 2 357
(TWh)
Revenue (US$ billion) 284.8 274.6 290.0 297.0 317.1
Non- Output from NPPs
468 737 1 005 1 440 1 936
OECD (TWh)
World Output from NPPs
2 650 2 829 3 233 3 702 4 293
(TWh)
Source: WNA estimates based on Reference case.
Currently nuclear power worldwide generates gross revenues worth around US$ 330 billion
a year for electricity utilities. In the Reference case it rises to more than US$ 480 billion by
2030. As can be seen, this represents an increase in value of some 2 percent a year in real
terms. It reflects the generally weaker growth rates WNA is expecting in its Reference case.
These estimates display the long-term tendency in revenue growth. In practice, short-term
volatility in electricity demand and prices will dominate. Such volatility could well continue to
affect markets over the medium-term as the world economy stabilizes following the financial
shocks to which it has been subjected since 2008. Of the 266 new reactors expected to
come on-line in the Reference case to 2030, 58 are projected to be built in the OECD
countries, 120 in China, 37 in the CIS, and 26 in India. Nearly 80 percent of the revenue
growth can be expected to take place in the emerging industrial economies (the non-OECD
area, including China). Even so, two-thirds of revenues could still be generated in the OECD
area where electricity prices are generally higher.
37
IEA, 2013, World Energy Outlook 2013: Table 1.4, p. 48. The IEA assume gas import prices into
European members of the OECD rise in real terms by 2 percent a year to 2030 and by 4 percent a
year in the USA. Steam coal imports into OECD member states are assumed to rise by 0.4 percent a
year in real terms (2012 US Dollars).

WNA estimates that on current plans, the value of the investment in new nuclear build to
2030 is of the order of US$ 1.2 trillion, with significant international procurement expected to
be around US$ 575 billion, or US$ 26 billion a year (see chapter four for more details).38
Estimates of the costs of a new NPP vary considerably according to the technology and the
market, and there are different ways of breaking down the costs. Tables 2.7a and b are
adapted from published sources and give alternative perspectives on the cost breakdown.
Table 2.7a: Indicative breakdown of the cost of constructing

nuclear power plant by activity
Activity Percent
Design, architecture, engineering and licensing 5
Project engineering, procurement and construction management 7
Construction and installation works
 Nuclear island 28
 Conventional island 15
 Balance of plant 18
Site development and civil works 20
Transportation 2
Commissioning and first fuel loading 5
Total 100
Table 2.7b: Indicative breakdown of the cost of constructing a nuclear power plant
in terms of labour, goods and materials
Item Percent
Equipment
 Nuclear steam supply system 12
 Electrical and generating equipment 12
 Mechanical equipment 16
 Information and control system (including software) 8
Construction materials 12
Labour on site 25
Project management services 10
Other services 2
First fuel load 3
Total 100
38
Another estimate, from the Hyundai Research Institute, calculated that future NPP construction to
2030 is worth US$1.15 trillion; cited by Bloomberg on 19 March 2012.

On the above basis, WNA estimates that about US$ 530 billion of the total investment of
US$ 1.2 trillion up to 2030 will consist of equipment purchases, of which US$ 110 billion will
be power generating equipment orders. The balance is made up of design, engineering,
project management, construction, financing and regulatory costs. As already explained
these projections are based on the long-term tendencies evident and there will be variation
over the short- to medium-term.
Figure 2.2 maps the anticipated new build worldwide.

Figure 2.2: New reactors and investment by 2030 (US$ billion)

Based on WNA Reference Scenario


3 Major projects
The chapter describes the major projects underway or planned for long-term operation, new
reactor construction, decommissioning and the disposition of used nuclear fuel and the
management of radioactive waste and used fuel.
International trade in nuclear components has the potential to reach US$ 30 billion a year
according to the Reference case. It comprises up-grading or replacing components and
systems as part of long-term operation projects at existing NPPs and new build projects.
This section maps the projects around the world giving wherever possible details on the
companies, timeframes and investment values.
3.1 Long-term operation

In principle, operating for a longer period than initially expected should normally be
economically attractive. From an economic point of view, the decision to invest in long-term
operation can be compared with any other generating investment decision. Nuclear power is
characterized by high initial capital costs and low fuel costs, with operation and maintenance
(O&M) costs varying according to operator efficiencies and regulatory practices. For well-
managed plants with low O&M costs, the cost of producing electricity can be very
competitive.
The licensing requirements that need to be completed for extending operation vary
significantly from country to country. In the United States, reactor operating licences are
limited to 40 years of operation but a regulatory process was adopted by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the mid-1990s to consider applications to extend the
period of the licence for an additional 20 years. Most reactor operators in the US have
applied for and/or given notice that they will apply for extensions to their operating licences
(see Figure 3.1). Some industry commentators have predicted that over 90 percent of the
US reactors could apply for and be granted licence extensions.
In some other countries, such as Sweden and France, licences are granted for a 10-year
period but there is no overall operating life fixed by the regulatory body. So long as the
nuclear safety authorities are satisfied that a reactor is safe then it can continue to operate.
Regulatory bodies may insist on additional checks on older plants, and may require
upgrades to be carried out. But such requirements may be imposed at any time.
Extended operation, however, may be only one side of the coin. There is nothing that
guarantees reactors will even operate for their design lifetimes if their operating costs are too
high or if they encounter technical, licensing or political problems. Even if operating costs are
not too high, a closure decision may come because a plant requires major additional capital
expenditure to keep it in operation (for example, steam generator replacement). The cost of
servicing the additional capital, added to existing costs, may make operating the plant
uneconomic.

Figure 3.1: Current US situation on operator licence renewal
A typical figure of less than US$ 1 000/kW for extending operations for a further 20 years is
given in a study prepared for the European Commission by Professor William D’haeseleer.39
This would suggest that nuclear long-term operation is the cheapest way of providing power
over a 20-year period. However, low gas prices in North America have undermined the case
for long-term operation, although these cannot be assumed to last indefinitely. (In some
projections natural gas prices increase within the time frame of building new nuclear
plants.)40
Recently, tight operating margins as a result of low gas prices have driven some US
operators to forgo the opportunity to extend the period of operation. Dominion Energy's 566
MWe Kewaunee PWR in Wisconsin was shut down in May 2013, after 39 years operation. In
August 2013 Entergy announced that its 635 MWe Vermont Yankee reactor would be closed
down at the end of 2014 as it had become uneconomic. Ten other nuclear plants (13
reactors) are considered (at the start of 2014) to be at risk of closure, all but one of these in
the northeast of the country, in states with deregulated energy markets.41
39
William D D’haeseleer, 2013, Synthesis on the economics of nuclear energy, Study for the
European Commission DG Energy: pp. 6 and 91-93 on
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/doc/final_report_dhaeseleer/synthesis_economics_nuclear
_20131127-0.pdf>.
40
For example, the US Energy Information Administration projects an increase to US$ 6/MBTU by
2028 (see http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/tablebrowser/#release=AEO2014&subject=0-
AEO2014&table=3-AEO2014&region=1-0&cases=full2013full-d102312a,ref2014-d102413a)
41
Ed Cooks, Uneconomic US nuclear plants at risk of being shut down, Financial Times, 19 February
2014.

In 2014 EDF estimated that it will need to invest € 55 billion up to 2025 to extend the
operation of its reactor fleet to beyond 40 years. According to Bloomberg news the required
investment could amount to € 1.35 billion to extend a reactor’s operation to 60 years.42 The
study by D’haeseleer indicated a range of investment costs for long-term operation of
US$ 490 to US$ 792/kWe in Belgium, Hungary, South Korea, Switzerland and the USA.43
On the same basis the cost for refurbishment of EDF’s reactors is estimated by D’haeseleer
at US$ 1 090/kWe.
Table 3.1 below shows the NPPs that could potentially be subject to extended operation in
the period up to 2030. The total value of this work could amount to some US$ 50-100 billion
if all these projects were to go ahead (and depending on the amount of refurbishment
deemed necessary by the licensee and the regulatory body). At a conservative estimate,
reactor refurbishment for long-term operation could involve international procurement worth
around US$ 4 billion a year in the period to 2030.
42
Tara Patel, EDF may need €1.35 billion to extend life of each reactor, Bloomberg, 10 June 2014.
43
European Commission DG Energy: p. 93.

Table 3.1: Commercial reactors whose operating licence might be extended before 2030
Capacity End date Possible
Operator Technology
NPP & location MWe Type of licence extension Remarks
Country vendor (approx.) date
(net)
North America
Ontario Power Generation Bruce A4 730 PHWR AECL (Candu 2016 2036
Canada Ontario Energy)
Ontario Power Generation Darlington1-4 3 512 PHWR AECL (Candu 2020-2023 2050 Alstom to install new
Canada Ontario Energy) turbines $350M
Amerent Callaway 1 1 190 PWR Westinghouse 2024 2044
USA Missouri
Exelon Braidwood 1 & 2 2 360 PWR Westinghouse 2027 2047
USA Illinois
Exelon Byron 1 & 2 2 300 PWR Westinghouse 2025 2045
USA Illinois
Exelon LaSalle 1 & 2 2 238 BWR GE 2022-2024 2032-2034
USA Illinois
Exelon Limerick 1 & 2 2 264 BWR GE 2025 2045
USA Pennsylvania
First Energy Davis Besse 1 901 PWR Babcock & 2017 2037 At risk of premature
44
USA Ohio Wilcox closure
First Energy Perry 1 1 245 BWR GE 2026 2046
USA Ohio
Pacific Gas & Electric Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 2 240 PWR Westinghouse 2024 2044
USA California
Detroit Edison Enrico Fermi 2 1 122 BWR GE 2025 2045
USA Michigan
Entergy Grand Gulf 1 1 259 BWR GE 2024 2044
USA Mississippi
Entergy Indian Point 2 & 3 2 065 PWR Westinghouse 2013-2016 2033-2036 At risk of premature
45
USA New York closure
44
Ed Cooks, Uneconomic US nuclear plants at risk of being shut down, Financial Times, 19 February 2014, citing research by Morningstar research company
in its Utilities Observer of November 2013.
45
As above.

Entergy River Bend 1 978 BWR GE 2025 2045

USA Louisiana
Entergy Waterford 3 1 176 PWR Combustion 2024 2045
USA Louisiana Engineering
Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah 1 & 2 2 397 PWR Westinghouse 2020 2040
USA Tennessee
STP Nuclear South Texas 1 & 2 2 560 PWR Westinghouse 2028 2048
USA Texas
Latin America
Nucleoeléctrica de Argentina Embalse 600 PHWR AECL 2019 2044
Argentina Córdoba
European Economic Area

Electrabel Tihange 1 962 PWR Framatome 2015 2025 EDF and GDF Suez to
Belgium Liège (AREVA) invest € 600M.
ČEZ Temelín 1 & 2 1 926 PWR Škoda 2020-2022 2030-2032
Czech Republic České Budějovice
Iberdrola Almaraz 1 & 2 2 017 PWR Westinghouse 2020 2040
Spain Extremadura
Iberdrola Cofrentes 1 064 BWR GE 2021 2041
Spain Valencia
Endesa Ascó 1 &2 1 992 PWR Westinghouse 2021 2041
Spain Catalonia
Endesa Vandellos 2 1 075 PWR Westinghouse 2020 2040
Spain Catalonia
EDF Blayais 1-4 3 640 PWR Framatome 2021-2023 2031-2033
France Aquitaine (AREVA)
EDF Bugey 2-5 3 580 PWR Framatome 2018-2019 2028-2029
France Rhône-Alpes (AREVA)
EDF Cruas 1-4 3 660 PWR Framatome 2023-2024 2033-2034
France Rhône-Alpes (AREVA)
EDF Dampierre 1-4 3 560 PWR Framatome 2020-2021 2030-2031
France Centre (AREVA)
EDF Flamanville 1 1 330 PWR Framatome 2025 2035
France Basse-Normandie (AREVA)
EDF Gravelines 1-6 3 640 PWR Framatome 2020-2028 2030-2038
France Nord Pas-de-Calais (AREVA)
EDF Nogent 1 & 2 2 620 PWR Framatome 2028 2038

EDF Paluel 1-4 5 320 PWR Framatome 2024-2026 2034-2036

EDF St-Alban 1 & 2 2 670 PWR Framatome 2025-2026 2035-2036
EDF St-Laurent B1 & B2 1 830 PWR Framatome 2021 2031
EDF Tricastin 1-4 3 660 PWR Framatome 2020-2021 2030-2031
Vattenfall Forsmark 1 978 BWR ABB 2025 2045?
Sweden Uppland
Vattenfall & E.On Ringhals 1 865 BWR ABB 2018 2038?
Sweden Halland
Vattenfall & E.On Ringhals 2 867 PWR Westinghouse 2019 2039?
Sweden Halland
Vattenfall & E.On Ringhals 3 1 057 PWR Westinghouse 2025 2045?
Sweden Halland
Former Soviet Union

Armenian NPP Metsamor 2 376 PWR RosAtom 2016 2026 Loan of $ 300M from
Armenia Armavir Russia agreed.
RosEnergoAtom Balakovo 1-3 2 850 PWR RosAtom 2015-2018 2030-2033
Russia Saratov
RosEnergoAtom Balakovo 4 950 PWR RosAtom 2023 2038
Russia Saratov
RosEnergoAtom Kalinin 1 950 PWR RosAtom 2014 2029
Russia Tver
RosEnergoAtom Kola I-3 & 4 822 PWR RosAtom 2016-2020 2031-2035
Russia
RosEnergoAtom Novovoronezh I-5 950 PWR RosAtom 2015 2030
Russia
East Asia
KHNP Kori 1 576 PWR Westinghouse 2017 2027
Korea South Busan
KHNP Kori 2 637 PWR Westinghouse 2023 2033
Korea South Busan
KHNP Kori 3 & 4 2 020 PWR Westinghouse 2025 2040
Korea South Busan
Source: WNA Reactor database

3.2 New build

Nuclear power is projected to grow globally and is essential for meeting the world’s
increasing need for affordable, reliable and clean energy as urbanization and
industrialization progress. There are some 69 commercial civil power reactors under
construction around the world and another 158 are planned (that is, approval has been
granted and/or funding has been committed by a developer). Another 334 have been
proposed, according to WNA estimates.
New build is led by mostly non-OECD countries which continue to exhibit high levels of
economic growth with an accompanying increase in energy demand. Four countries alone
are expected to account for 70 percent of reactors commissioned in the period to 2030:
China, Russia, India and South Korea. In Europe the nuclear option is appearing more
attractive in the face of the EU’s measures to reduce carbon emissions and the desire for a
greater degree of national energy independence. Ten governments in the region have
collectively stated their desire to see new nuclear development; however, uncertainty around
the EU’s energy policy may cause delay in the speed with which the nuclear ambitions of
countries in the region can be realized.46
In the Middle East and North Africa, development is being driven firstly by the determination
of the oil and gas exporters to maximize their oil export revenues by reducing oil-based
domestic energy demand growth; secondly, by the ever increasing need for fresh water (to
be supplied by desalination plants); and thirdly, by the desire to see a new local skilled
industry established. The manifest ability of oil-exporting country governments to finance
nuclear development is critical to WNA’s Reference Scenario projections. Moreover, in the
case of the UAE, the authorities appear to have chosen realistic procurement localization
targets which should assist KEPCO to deliver on the agreed schedules with less risk of
running into quality issues.
Table 3.2 lists the new build projects that are underway or are planned. Where reported, the
value of the project is recorded in US Dollars or Euro (Pound Sterling in the UK). The data
presented are subject to revision and are presented in good faith as the being the latest
available information at the time of publication.
46
See <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Ten-nations-petition-Brussels-for-nuclear-
0407141.html>.

Table 3.2: NPPs under construction or planned

Target date for Capacity Project Contract &
Operator Technology
operation & MWe value construction Status
Country vendor
location (net) (billion)* information
North America
Ontario Power Generation 2030 1 520 1) Candu Energy $10.0 Project deferred
Canada Darlington 5 & 6, 2) Westinghouse
Ontario
Tennessee Valley Authority 2015 1 177 Westinghouse $4.2 EPC Contract with Under construction. 55%
USA Watts Bar 2, Bechtel terminated completed by 1985. Now
Tennessee 90% complete.
Tennessee Valley Authority 2020 1 260 Babcock & Wilcox $10.2 Contract with AREVA 55% complete when work
USA Bellefonte 1, to complete Unit 1 was suspended in 1988
Alabama
Georgia Power consortium 2017-2018 2 200 Westinghouse $14.0 EPC contract with Under construction
(Southern Company) Vogtle 3 & 4, CB&I & Westinghouse
USA Georgia
SCE&G (SCANA) & 2019-2020 2 234 Westinghouse $10.8 EPC contract with Under construction
Santee Cooper VC Summer 2 & 3, CB&I & Westinghouse
USA South Carolina
Florida Power & Light 2022-2023 2 200 Westinghouse $18.5 Undefined Planned - Licence under
(Next Era Energy) Turkey Point 6 & 7, review by regulator
USA Florida
Duke Energy 2024-2026 2 200 Westinghouse : Undefined Planned - Licence under
USA William States Lee III, review by regulator
South Carolina
Latin America
Comisión Nacional de 2018 25 CNEA $0.4 Direct contracting of Under construction
Energía Atómica (CNEA) CAREM-25, Buenos work packages by the
Argentina Aires owner-operator
Electrobras Electronuclear 2015 1 245 AREVA (KWU) $7.68 Complete construction Under construction
Brazil Angra 3, by AREVA
Rio de Janeiro
Bulgaria Energy Holding 2023 950 Westinghouse Westinghouse to be a Planned – public
Bulgaria Kozloduy 7, strategic investor procurement expected in
Vratsa 2015

ČEZ as After 2025 2 400 To be determined €10.5 Undefined Procurement cancelled.

Czech Republic Temelín 3 & 4, České Undergoing review.
Budějovice
Teollisuuden Voima Oy 2016 1 600 AREVA €8.0 Turnkey contract Under construction
Finland Olkiluoto 3, Satakuna (>82% completed)
Teollisuuden Voima Oy After 2025 1 450 1) AREVA : Undefined Proposed
Finland Olkiluoto 4, 2) GE-Hitachi
Satakuna 3) Mitsubishi
4) KHNP (KEPCO)
5) Toshiba
Fennovoima Oy 2024 1 150 Rusatom €6.0 Project development Proposed – Government
Finland Hanhikivi 1, Overseas agreement. RosAtom approved
Pyhäjoki has 34% stake in the
project equity.
EDF 2017 1 630 AREVA €8.5 Construction contract Under construction
France Flamanville 3
Basse-Normandie
EDF 1 620 AREVA €5.0 Undefined Project deferred
France Penly 3,
Haute-Normandie
Magyar Villamos Művek 2023-2025 2 400 AtomStroyExport €12.5 Undefined. Pre- Planned
(MVM) Paks 5 & 6, financing loan from
Hungary Tolna Russia.
Lietuvos Energija with 2022 1 340 Hitachi-GE €5.0 Concession Project stalled
Eesti Energia & Latvenergo Visaginas, agreement for
Lithuania Ignalina construction plus
equity stake by Hitachi
Polska Grupa 2024-2030 6 000 1) EDF-AREVA €10.5 Worley Parsons Planned - Undergoing
Energetyczna (PGE) with Żarnoweic, Choczewo 2) GE-Hitachi $16.0 undertaking site technical assessment
partners and/or Gąski 3) Westinghouse characterization.
Poland Pomorskie 4) Others
EnergoNuclear 2024-2025 1 440 Candu Energy €6.4 Complete construction Agreement with China
(Nuclearelectrica led Cernavodâ 3 & 4, by Candu Energy & General Nuclear Power as
consortium), Romania Constanţa CNPEC strategic investor signed
Slovenské Elektrárne 2014-2015 782 Škoda with €3.8 Complete unfinished Under construction
Slovak Republic Mochovce 3 & 4 AtomStroyExport construction
Nitra
Slovenské Elektrárne 2025 1 200 Škoda with MoU with RosAtom Proposed
Slovak Republic Bohunice 5 (V3) AtomStroyExport
Trnava

EDF Energy led 2023-2024 3 200 AREVA £16.0 AREVA to take a 10% Planned
consortium Hinkley Point C 1 & 2, stake in Nuclear New
United Kingdom Somerset Build consortium
EDF Energy led 2026-2027 3 200 AREVA £14.0 Undefined Planned
consortium Sizewell C 1 & 2,
United Kingdom Sussex
Horizon (Hitachi lead) 2025-2027 2 700 Hitachi GE £7.5 Undefined Proposed - Generic
United Kingdom Wylfa Newydd 1 & 2, design assessment
Wales underway
Horizon (Hitachi lead) After 2022 2 700 Hitachi GE £7.5 Undefined Proposed - Generic
United Kingdom Oldbury B 1 & 2, design assessment
Gloucestershire underway
Nu Generation (Toshiba & 2024-2027 3 000 Westinghouse Undefined Proposed - Generic
GdF-Suez) Moorside A 1-3, design assessment to be
United Kingdom Cumbria completed
Former Soviet Union

MetsamorEnergoAtom 2020 1 060 AtomStroyExport $5.0 Turnkey plus financing Planned - Inter-
Armenia Metsamor 3 Gidropress Worley Parsons governmental agreement
Armavir (nr Yerevan) contracted to manage with Russia
Belenergo 2018-2020 2 400 AtomStroyExport $11.0 Turnkey plus financing Under construction
Belarus Ostrovetsk 1 & 2, Gidropress & plus lifetime fuel
Grodno supply & return
KazAtomProm After 2027 300-1 200 AtomStroyExport $5.0 Planned - Inter-
Kazakhstan Kurchatov, East governmental agreement
Kazakhstan and loan from Russia
KazAtomProm After 2027 300 AtomStroyExport $5.0 Planned - Inter-
Kazakhstan Ulken, Jambyl governmental agreement
and loan from Russia
RosEnergoAtom 2016 70 RosAtom Under construction
Russia Academician
Lomonsov, Kamchatka
RosEnergoAtom 2014-2016 2 136 RosAtom $5.0 Construction by Under construction
Russia Novovoronesh II 1 & 2, AtomEnergoProekt
Voronezh
Russia Leningrad II 1 & 2, AtomEnergoProekt
Leningrad

RosEnergoAtom 2021-2022 2 344 RosAtom Construction by Planned

Russia Leningrad II 3 & 4, AtomEnergoProekt
Leningrad
Russia Rostov 3 & 4 AtomEnergoProekt
(Volgodonsk), Rostov
RosEnergoAtom 2016-2018 2 200 RosAtom €7.4 AEP with Worley Under construction – work
Russia Baltysky 1 & 2 Parsons as technical on unit 2 suspended
Kaliningrad consultant
RosEnergoAtom 2020-2022 2 400 RosAtom Planned
Russia Kursk II 1 & 2,
Kursk
Russia Kursk II 3 & 4,
Kursk
RosEnergoAtom 2020-2022 2 600 RosAtom $5.0 Detail design contract Planned
Russia Nizhny Novgorod 1-2, by AtomEnergoProekt
Nizhny Novogorod
RosEnergoAtom 2020 70 RosAtom Planned
Russia Pevek 1 & 2,
Chukotka
Russia Smolensk II 1 & 2,
Smolensk
RosEnergoAtom 2030 2 400 RosAtom Planned
Russia Smolensk II 3 & 4,
Smolensk
Russia Kola II 1 & 2,
Murmansk
RosEnergoAtom 2026-2028 2 400 RosAtom $5.0 Detail design contract Planned
Russia Tsentral 1-2, by AtomEnergoProekt
Kostroma
RosEnergoAtom 2028-2030 2 400 RosAtom Detail design contract Planned
Russia Seversk 1 & 2, by AtomEnergoProekt
Tomsk
Russia Bashkir 1 & 2,
Bashkortostan


Russia Tatar 1 & 2, Tatarstan
EnergoAtom 2018-2020 1 900 AtomStroyExport $5.2 Complete unfinished Planned - Inter-
Ukraine Khmelnytsky 3 & 4, Gidropress construction, finance governmental agreement
Khmelnytsky and fuel supply with Russia
East Asia
China National Nuclear 2014 2 000 CNNC Under construction
Corp. Fangjiashan 1 & 2,
China Zhejiang
China National Nuclear 2014-2015 1 200 CNNC Under construction
Corp. Changjiang 1 & 2,
China Hainan
China National Nuclear 2020-2022 1 200 CNNC Planned
Corp. Changjiang 3 & 4,
China Hainan
China National Nuclear 2014-2018 3 240 CNNC $9.5 EPC by China Nuclear Under construction
Corp. Fuqing 1-4, Power Engineering
China Fujian Corp. (CNPE)
China National Nuclear 2019-2021 3 240 CNNC $4.8 Planned
Corp. Fuqing 5 & 6,
China Fujian
China National Nuclear 2013-2014 2 230 Westinghouse $5.9 Turnkey construction Under construction
Corp. Sanmen 1 & 2, and technology
China Zhejiang transfer
China National Nuclear 2019-2020 2 230 Westinghouse $5.3 Planned
Corp. Sanmen 3 & 4,
China Zhejiang
China National Nuclear : 2 230 Westinghouse Project suspended
Corp. Longyu 1 & 2, (inland site)
China Zhejiang
China National Nuclear : 4 460 Westinghouse $9.8 Project suspended
Corp. Taohuajiang 1-4, (inland site)
China Hunan
China National Nuclear : 2 230 Westinghouse Project suspended
Corp. Yangjiashan 1 & 2, (inland site)
China Jiangxi
China National Nuclear 2018-2019 2 120 AtomStroyExport $3.2? Supply of NSSS ($1.3 Under construction
Corp. Tianwan 3 & 4, billion) & Turbine. EPC
China Jiangsu contract with CNPE

China National Nuclear 2020-2022 2 400 CNNC EPC by China Nuclear Planned
Corp. Tianwan 5 & 6, Power Engineering
China Jiangsu Corp. (CNPE)
China National Nuclear : 200 CNNC Project suspended
Corp. & Guodian Hengfeng 1 & 2, (inland site)
China Jiangxi
Corp. & Guodian Ningdu 1 & 2, (inland site)
China Jiangxi
Corp. & Guodian Putian 1 & 2, (inland site)
China Fujian
China Power Investment 2014-2015 2 230 Westinghouse $5.3 Turnkey construction Under construction
Corp. Haiyang 1 & 2, and technology
China Shandong transfer
China Power Investment 2019-2020 2 230 Westinghouse $5.1 Planned
Corp. Haiyang 3 & 4,
China Shandong
China Power Investment 2020-2022 2 230 Westinghouse Planned
Corp. Bailong 1 & 2,
China Guangxi
China Power Investment : 2 230 Westinghouse Project suspended
Corp. Pengze 1 & 2, (inland site)
China Jiangxi
China Power Investment : 2 230 Westinghouse Project suspended
Corp. Xiaomoshan 1 & 2, (inland site)
China Hunan
China Power Investment 20119-2020 2 230 Westinghouse $4.0 Early site works Planned
Corp. & Datang Int Power Xudabao/Xudapu 1-2, underway
Generation, China Liaoning
Huaneng Power 2018-2019 2 800 SNPTC $6.9 Planned
China Shidaowan 1 & 2,
Shandong
China General Nuclear 2015-2016 2 160 China General Under construction
Power Group Fangchenggang I 1-2, Nuclear Power
China Guangxi Group
China Guangdong Nuclear 2020-2025 4 600 China General Planned
Power Group Fangchenggang I 3-6, Nuclear Power group
China Guangxi

CGN/ Liaoning Hongyanhe 2012-2014 4 000 China General $4.1 Under construction
Nuclear Power Co. Hongyanhe 3 & 4, Nuclear Power
China Liaoning Group
Liaoning Hongyanhe 2018-2019 2 000 China General Planned
Nuclear Power Co. Hongyanhe 5 & 6, Nuclear Power
China Liaoning Group
Power Group Ningde 3 & 4, Nuclear Power
China Fujian Group
China General Nuclear 2012-2015 2 000 China General Planned
Power Group Ningde 5 & 6, Fujian Nuclear Power
China Group
China General Nuclear 2013-2014 3 540 AREVA €8.0 Turnkey plus fuel Under construction
Power Group Taishan 1 & 2, supply
China Guangdong
China General Nuclear 2013-2014 3 540 AREVA Planned
Power Group Taishan 3 & 4,
China Guangdong
Power Group Yangjiang 2 & 3, Nuclear Power
China Guangdong Group
China General Nuclear 2018 1 080 China General $2.1 Under construction
Power Group Yangjiang 4, Nuclear Power
China Guangdong Group
China General Nuclear 2018 2 160 China General China Nuclear Under construction
Power Group Yangjiang 5 & 6, Nuclear Power Engineering &
China Guangdong Group Construction Company
China General Nuclear 2022-2023 2 230 Westinghouse State Nuclear Power Planned
Power Group Huizhou 1 & 2, Engineering Company
China Guangdong
China General Nuclear 2019-2020 2 230 Westinghouse State Nuclear Power Planned
Power Group Lufeng 1 & 2, Engineering Company
China Guangdong
China General Nuclear : 4 460 Westinghouse Project suspended
Power Group Shaoguan 1-4, (inland site)
China Guangdong
Power Group Wuhu 1 & 2, (inland site)
China Anhui


Power Group Xianning 1 & 2, (inland site)
China Hubei
Taiwan Power Company 2015-2017 2 600 GE Hitachi $9.4 Turnkey construction Under construction but
(Taipower) Lungmen 1 & 2 excluding fuelling & project suspended.
China Taibei, Taiwan financing
EPDC/ J Power : 1 383 Hitachi-GE $5.0 Construction contract Under construction: 38%
Japan Ohma 1, complete but work
Aomori suspended
Chugoku Electric Power : 1 375 Hitachi-GE Construction contract Under construction: 94%
Co Shimane 3, complete but start-up
Japan Matsue deferred
Chugoku Electric Power After 2018-2022 2 640 Hitachi-GE Project deferred
Co. Kaminoseki 1 & 2,
Japan Hiroshima
Kyushu Electric Power Co. After 2019 1 538 To be determined Project deferred
Japan Sendai 3,
Kagoshima
Chubu Electric Power Co. After 2020 1 380 To be determined Planned but awaiting
Japan Hamaoka 6, re-start of licensing
Shizuoka
General Bureau of Atomic 2014 30 General Bureau of Under construction
Energy Yongbyon, North Atomic Energy
Korea North Pyongang
Korea Hydro & Nuclear 2014 960 KEPCO/ Doosan Construction contract Under construction
Power Co. Shin Wolsong 2 with Samsung/
Korea South Gyeongbuk Daewoo/ GS JV
Korea Hydro & Nuclear 2017-2018 2 800 KEPCO/ Doosan $4.7 Construction contract Under construction
Power Co. Shin Hanul/Ulchin 1-2 with Hyundai/ GS/ SK
Korea South Gyeongbuk joint venture
Korea Hydro & Nuclear 2020-2021 2 800 KEPCO/ Doosan Planned
Power Co. Shin Hanul/Ulchin 3-4
Korea South Gyeongbuk
Korea Hydro & Nuclear 2014-2015 2 800 KEPCO/ Doosan Construction contract Under construction
Power Co. Shin Kori 3 & 4 with Hyundai/ Doosan/
Korea South Busan SK
Korea Hydro & Nuclear 2019-2020 2 800 KEPCO/ Doosan Long-lead items under Planned
Power Co. Shin Kori 5 & 6 contract
Korea South Busan

Korea Hydro & Nuclear 2022-2023 2 900 KEPCO/ Doosan Planned

Power Co. Shin Kori 7 & 8
Korea South Gyeongbuk
South Asia
Atomic Energy 2019-2020 2 000 AtomStroyExport $4.0 Turnkey plus lifetime Inter-governmental
Commission Rooppur, Pabna Gidropress fuel supply & return agreement with Russia
Bangladesh
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2015-2016 1 400 Nuclear Power Corp. Construction by Under construction
India Kakrapar 3 & 4, of India Nuclear Power Corp.
India Gujarat of India
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2016 1 280 Nuclear Power Corp. $2.6 Construction by Under construction
India Rajasthan 7 & 8, of India Nuclear Power Corp.
India Rajasthan of India
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2012-2017 917 AtomStroyExport $2.9 Supply of NSSS & Under construction
India Kudankulam 2, Gidropress turbine plus lifetime Inter-governmental
India Tamil Nadu fuel supply & return agreement with Russia
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2012-2017 1 830 AtomStroyExport Supply of NSSS & Planned
India Kudankulam 3 & 4, Gidropress turbine plus lifetime
India Tamil Nadu fuel supply & return
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2012-2017 4 300 AtomStroyExport Supply of NSSS & Planned
India Kudankulam 5-8, Gidropress turbine plus lifetime
India Tamil Nadu fuel supply & return
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2020-2021 3 300 AREVA €11.6 Turnkey plus 25 years General framework
India Jaitapur 1 & 2, fuel supply agreement and early
India Maharashtra works contract signed
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2020-2021 6 600 AREVA Undefined Proposed
India Jaitapur 3-6,
India Maharashtra
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2020 2 500 GE-Hitachi Undefined Planned
India Kovvada 1 & 2
India Andra Pradesh
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2022-2024 5 000 GE-Hitachi Undefined Proposed
India Kovvada 3-6
India Andra Pradesh
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2019-2020 2 500 Westinghouse $13.4 MoU with Planned
India Mithi Virdi 1 & 2 Westinghouse for early
India Bhavnagar, Gujarat works

Nuclear Power Corp. of 2021-2024 4 500 Westinghouse Proposed

India Mithi Virdi 3-6
India Bhavnagar, Gujarat
Nuclear Power Corp. of 2019-2024 6 000 To be determined Proposed
India Markandi 1-6
India Ganjam, Orissa
Pakistan Atomic Energy 2016-2017 630 SNPTC $2.4 Turnkey plus financing Under construction
Commission Chashma 3 & 4
Pakistan Punjab
Pakistan Atomic Energy 2021-2022 1 100 SNPTC $4.5 Planned
Commission Karachi Coastal,
Pakistan Sindh
Southeast Asia
BATAN After 2027 2 000 To be determined Undefined Proposed
Indonesia Bangka 1 & 2,
Sumatra
Vietnam Electricity Holding 2020-2021 2 000 AtomStroyExport $20.0 Turnkey contract plus Planned - Inter-
Company Ninh Thuân 1 (1 & 2), Gidropress fuel supply government co-operation
Vietnam Phuóc Dinh, Ninh on a feasibility study
Thuân
Vietnam Electricity Holding 2024-2025 2 000 International Nuclear : Undefined Planned - Inter-
Company Ninh Thuân 2 (1 & 2), Energy Development government co-operation
Vietnam Ninh Hài, Ninh Thuân of Japan Co. Ltd. on a feasibility study
Vietnam Electricity Holding By2030 6 000 To be determined $20.0 Undefined Proposed
Company Bình Ðinh, Phú Yên,
Vietnam Quàng Ngãi and/or Hà
Tĩnh
West Asia
Nuclear Power Production After 2020 2 000 RosAtom Planned -
& Development Company Bushehr 2 & 3, Intergovernmental
Iran Bushehr agreement expected
Jordan Atomic Energy 2020-2025 1 834 AtomStroyExport $10.0 Turnkey or Build-Own- Proposed - with Rusatom
Commission Al Amra 1, Operate Overseas as a strategic
Jordan Zarqa partner & operator
Akkuyu NPP 2021-2025 4 800 AtomStroyExport $18.7 Build, own & operate Planned - Licence under
Turkey Akkuyu 1-4, Gidropress with feed-in tariff review by regulator
Mersin

Elektrik Üretim-GDF Suez 2023-2026 4 400 Mitsubishi-AREVA $22.0 To be agreed Proposed -

Turkey Sinop 1-4, Intergovernmental
Sinop agreement with Japan
Saudi Electricity Co. 2022-2032 17 000 To be determined $100 Undefined 16 reactors proposed
Saudi Arabia
Nawah Energy/ Emirates 2017-2020 5 600 KEPCO Consortium $18.6 EPC Contract with Under construction
Nuclear Energy Corp. Braka 1-4 including Doosan KEPCO Consortium
United Arab Emirates
Africa
Atomic Energy Authority 2024 1 200 To be determined $4.0 Worley Parsons Planned – public
Egypt El Dabaa 1 contracted as advisor procurement announced
Matrouh
Eskom Between 2024-2034 3 200 To be determined $20 To be determined Proposed
South Africa ?Thyspunt 1 & 2,
Eastern Cape
Eskom 2024-2034 3 200 To be determined $20 Undefined Proposed
South Africa ?Duynefontein/
Koeberg 3 & 4,
Western Cape
Eskom 2024-2034 3 200 To be determined $20 Undefined Proposed
South Africa ?Skulpfontein 1 & 2,
Northern Cape
Source: WNA Reactor database * Project values are estimated by WNA on the basis of press reports.

3.3 Decommissioning and waste management

All power plants, thermal and nuclear, have a finite life beyond which it is not economically
feasible to operate them. Generally speaking, early nuclear plants were designed for a life of
about 30 to 40 years, though some have proved capable of continuing well beyond this.
Plants today are generally being designed for a 60-year operating life. At the end of
commercial operation a power plant needs to be decommissioned, dismantled and
demolished so that the site is cleaned up and made available for other uses.
For nuclear plants, the term decommissioning usually includes all clean-up of radioactivity
and the progressive dismantling of the plant. This may start with the owner's decision to
declare that it is permanently removed from operation. However, for practical purposes,
decommissioning begins with the removal of the fuel and coolant. The plant will then be
dismantled in stages over a period. It concludes with licence termination by the regulatory
body after decontamination has been verified and all wastes removed. The local authority
will also be involved in the process of re-designating the site for an alternative use as the
development planning authority.
3.3.1 Decommissioning projects

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has defined three options for
decommissioning, the definitions of which have been internationally adopted:
 Immediate Dismantling (or Early Site Release/'Decon' in the US terminology). This

option allows for the facility to be removed from regulatory control relatively soon
after shutdown or termination of regulated activities. Final dismantling or
decontamination activities can begin within a few months or years, depending on the
facility. Following removal from regulatory control, the site is then available for re-use.
 Safe Enclosure ('Safstor') or deferred dismantling: This option postpones the final
removal of controls for a longer period, usually in the order of 40 to 60 years. The
facility is placed into a safe storage configuration until the eventual dismantling and
decontamination activities occur after residual radioactivity has decayed sufficiently.
 Entombment (or 'Entomb'): This option entails placing the facility into a condition that
will allow the remaining on-site radioactive material to remain on-site without ever
removing it totally. This option usually involves reducing the size of the area where
the radioactive material is located and then encasing the facility in a long-lived
structure such as concrete, that will last for a period of time to ensure the remaining
radioactivity is no longer of concern.
Each approach has its benefits and disadvantages. National policy determines which
approach or combination of approaches is adopted or allowed. In the case of immediate
dismantling (and early site release), responsibility for completion of decommissioning is not
transferred to future generations. The experience and skills of operating staff can also be
utilised during the decommissioning program. Alternatively, the Safe Enclosure option allows
significant reduction in residual radioactivity, thus reducing radiation hazard during the
eventual dismantling. Expected improvements in mechanical techniques might also lead to a
reduction in the hazard and also to costs if dismantling is postponed.

Decommissioning and waste management costs are considerable. The French Cour des
Comptes estimated that the future costs for decommissioning all of France’s nuclear facilities
and disposing of radioactive wastes at over € 79 billion, including € 18.4 billion for
dismantling the 58 reactors currently operating. In the UK, the government has made
provision of GB£ 53.7 billion for decommissioning the Magnox plants and other state-owned
installations that were not privatized, although the UK Parliament suggested in 2013 that the
overnight cost could be as high as GB£ 100 billion.47 A Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
was established by the UK government in 2004 to manage its civil nuclear legacy. The
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority awarded a fourteen-year management contract for the
decommissioning of 10 Magnox plants and two research facilities to a consortium of
Cavendish Nuclear (part of Babcock International) and Fluor in 2014.
Estimates by the Swiss Federal Energy Office in 2011 put the cost of decommissioning all
the country’s five operating units at nearly CHF 3 billion (US$ 3.2 billion). The three reactors
operated by Taipower are due to be shut by 2024, with the first plant to undergo
decommissioning and waste disposal in 2018 at an estimated cost of US$ 2.2 billion.
In general, NPP operators are required to set aside funds for decommissioning, site clean-up
and disposal of wastes. These funds are accumulated over the working like of the plant and
the regulatory body (and the ministry for the environment) will oversee the process to ensure
that the operator is putting enough aside to complete the job. Where reactors have been
closed prematurely, however, the funds could prove inadequate to fund an immediate
dismantling project. This might be the case in Germany, for instance, where, after the
Fukushima accident, older plants were forced to close by government decree. As a result the
operators have proposed that the government fund part of the decommissioning program,
especially since Germany has adopted a policy of immediate dismantling. There is about
€ 34 billion available to cover decommissioning costs, but there are 33 reactors to dismantle
entirely and experts estimate it may cost € 1 billion per reactor. The Mülheim-Kärlich NPP in
Rhineland-Palatinate, closed in 1988, will cost € 750M to decommission according to
RWE.48 The four nuclear operators – E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall – have proposed
that the funds be paid into a public foundation managed by the government, which would
then become liable for any cost overruns. In return, the companies could drop their claims
for compensation for the premature shutdown of their stations.49
A shortfall in funding can sometimes arise as a result of a decision to shut a plant early for
economic reasons. The Kewaunee plant operated by Dominion until 2013 has apparently
failed to accumulate sufficient funds. Rather than top up the fund the operator has proposed
47
UN Environment Program, Closing and decommissioning nuclear power reactors, Year Book 2012:
p. 43. The overnight cost of decommissioning assumes that the bill must be paid in full today. The
NDA has estimated a range of between £ 88 and 118 billion depending on varying scenarios; Emily
Gosden, Britain’s nuclear clean-up bill soars to £ 110 billion, The Telegraph, 23 June 2014.
48
Gerald Traufetter, Nuclear headache: Task of decommissioning plants is Herculean, Der Spiegel,
10 May 2013; Klaus Deuse, Scrapping nuclear plants to cost billions, Deutsche Welle, 18 February
2014 on <http://www.dw.de/scrapping-nuclear-plants-to-cost-billions/a-17439221>.
49
Tom Käckenhoff and Christoph Steitz, German utilities want a public body to shut nuclear plants,
Reuters, 11 May 2014 on <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/11/germany-energy-
idUKL6N0NX0DN20140511>; Jeevan Vasagar, Nuclear ‘bad bank’ plan fuels dispute, Financial
Times, 12 May 2014.

to follow a Safstor approach and postpone dismantling until capital growth augments the
total funds sufficiently. Dominion forecasts that the total cost of decommissioning will be
$ 920M and take up to 60 years.50 Available funds amount to $ 578M and the company
hopes to make up part of the difference from the sale of scrap metal.51 But the strategy still
assumes that the returns on the invested funds will grow more rapidly than the rate of future
cost escalation for decommissioning works. The liability for decommissioning will remain with
the owner of the facility until the obligation to clear the site has been discharged.
Considerable experience has been gained in decommissioning various types of nuclear

facilities. About 85 commercial power reactors, 45 experimental or prototype power reactors,
as well as over 250 research reactors and a number of fuel cycle facilities, have been retired
from operation. Of the 140 or so power reactors including experimental and prototype units,
at least 15 have been fully dismantled, over 50 are being dismantled, over 50 are in Safstor
and three have been entombed; for others the decommissioning strategy is not yet specified.
Spain's Vandellós 1, a 480 MWe gas-graphite reactor, was closed down in 1990 after 18
years operation, due to a turbine fire which made the plant uneconomic to repair. In 2003 the
state-owned enterprise set up to manage radioactive waste, ENRESA, concluded the
second phase of the reactor decommissioning and dismantling project, which allowed much
of the site to be released. The cost of the 63-month project was € 95M and employed 2 700
workers, with a peak of 420 on site. After 30 years of Safstor, when activity levels will have
diminished by 95 percent, the remainder of the plant will be removed.
Italy shut all its NPPs by 1990 and decommissioning is managed by a state-owned
enterprise Societa Gestione Impianti Nucleari (Sogin). The Trino Vercellese plant was Italy’s
first commercial power reactor, starting up in 1964. Since its closure in 1990, its cooling
towers, the turbine hall and some ancillary buildings have been demolished, non-nuclear
systems removed and the steam generators decontaminated. Of the 214 000t of waste that
dismantling will generate, about 2 000t is radioactive, and this will be stored on site until a
national repository is constructed. Approval for the complete decommissioning was given in
August 2012 and a budget of € 234M approved. The site will be returned for unrestricted use
by 2024.
Some of the largest decommissioning projects underway are in Central and Eastern Europe.
In 1992, following the Chernobyl accident, the Group of Seven countries and the European
Union agreed to support financially the early closure and decommissioning of Soviet-
designed RBMK and a number of VVER reactors that could not upgraded to a higher level of
safety at an acceptable cost.52 This program involved the Chernobyl plant and reactors in
Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia. The financial assistance has been implemented through
the International Decommissioning Support Fund, managed by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). International support does not cover all the
decommissioning costs, part of which is met by the national governments, with some
50
Thomas Content, Kewaunee nuclear power plant shutdown cost is nearly 1 billion, Milwaukee
Wisconsin Journal Sentinel, 20 April 2013.
51
Matthew L Wald, As price of nuclear energy drops, a Wisconsin plant is shut, The New York Times,
7 May 2013.
52
European Commission, 2011, Nuclear Decommissioning Assistance Programme Data, Commission
Staff Working Paper SEC(2011) 914 final, Brussels: p.7.

additional technical assistance and grants from the European Commission and EU Member
States.
The Chernobyl project is expected to continue until 2065 and final clearance of the site may
not be completed for another century. To date the International Decommissioning Support
Fund for Chernobyl has received € 1.8 billion from donor governments and the EBRD is
aiming to raise another € 1.5 billion. To replace the sarcophagus erected in 1986 over the
destroyed Unit 4, a new safe confinement shelter is being constructed by a consortium
formed by Bouygues and Vinci. The total cost of the new safe confinement project is
estimated at € 2 billion. A replacement interim spent fuel storage facility is under construction
by Holtec at a cost of € 460M. It will also serve the other NPPs operating in Ukraine. A liquid
radioactive waste treatment plant has also been constructed. Around 1 430 workers are
employed at the Chernobyl site at any one time.53
The two RBMK reactors at Ignalina in Lithuania were closed in 2004 and 2009 respectively
and decommissioning started in 2014. All fuel from the units is expected to have been
transported to a new interim used fuel storage facility by 2016 being constructed by Rusatom
Overseas, where it will remain for 50 years. Dismantling and decontamination operations are
in progress and the total cost of the decommissioning project is expected to be more than
€ 2.5 billion, with € 1.4 billion pledged from the EU.
The four reactors at Fukushima Daiichi will be completely demolished in 30-40 years.
Removal of the degraded fuel will be a long process, but will draw on experience at Three
Mile Island in USA. In January 2012 it was reported that an industry consortium (Hitachi GE
Nuclear Energy, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba) would determine how to locate
fuel debris inside units 1-3 and how to fill the pressure vessels with water. Tepco has
allocated ¥ 207 billion (US$2.53 billion) in its accounts for decommissioning units 1 to 4.
Table 3.3 lists the reactors that are due to close and be the subjects of immediate
dismantling by 2030. The value of decommissioning work on these projects could total
US$ 95 billion, of which US$ 12.4 billion is the estimated cost for cleaning up the Fukushima
Daiichi site and at least US$ 24.2 billion is estimated for Germany.
3.3.2 Used fuel and waste management

Disposal of high-level waste is technically proven, with international consensus on deep
geological disposal as the preferred route for final disposition.54 The only real issues in
contention are over the ideal characteristics of geology and storage facility.
The question of what to do with used reactor fuel is largely political rather than technical. The
solution chosen will depend on whether the used fuel is to be reprocessed, which reduces
the volume of radioactive waste that requires disposal, but which can also raise proliferation
concerns. In any case, the necessary public support is required in order to proceed with any
site for geologic disposal. In Finland and Sweden repository plans are considerably
53
EBRD, 2011, Chernobyl 25 years on: New safe confinement and spent fuel storage facility, London
and <http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/nuclearsafety/chernobyl.shtml>.
54
<http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-wastes/appendices/radioactive-waste-
management-appendix-2--storage-and-disposal-options/>

advanced and the governments concerned employed a community-based approach to siting.

In the USA, a political decision, subsequently struck down by a federal court, has halted
progress on a promising repository project in Nevada.
Even if all nuclear power plants around the world were to be shutdown immediately, the
existing waste would still have to be dealt with and someone would have to pay. Nuclear
operators are tasked with providing funds for the ultimate disposal of this waste and they
make allowance for this through contributions built up over the lifetime of the plant. Since the
cost of final waste disposal per kWh can only get less with increasing generation time (via
increasing accumulation of funds) and a larger repository should be cheaper than smaller
ones (economies of scale), the continued and increased use of nuclear power should
decrease the risk that public funds will ever be required for waste disposal.
Interim used fuel storage facilities are being constructed at many decommissioning sites,
such as those at Chernobyl and Ignalina as already mentioned. The Japanese government
is planning to spend about ¥ 1 trillion to construct and maintain facilities to store the
radioactive materials from contaminated zones around the Fukushima plant. A site for the
facility has not yet been agreed, with strong local opposition aroused.
In France, used fuel from is sent to AREVA's La Hague plant in Normandy for reprocessing.
The treatment extracts 99.9 percent of the plutonium and uranium for recycling, leaving 3
percent of the used fuel material as high-level wastes which are vitrified and stored there for
later disposal. The Cour des Comptes estimated the total costs of managing used fuel at
€ 14.8 billion, while waste disposal will cost € 28.4 billion. The National Radioactive Waste
Management Agency (ANDRA) is investigating a potential deep geological repository at
Cigéo Bure, Marne, in eastern France. The results of public consultations have so far shown
the proposed project to be broadly acceptable.55
The Finnish Nuclear Waste Management Fund has € 3 billion available to cover the disposal
of all waste and used fuel accumulated to date from operating reactors, including waste to
be retrieved when these reactors are decommissioned.56 An underground repository at
Olkiluoto for low- and intermediate-level operational wastes has been in operation since
1992. It is designed to be expanded to take eventual decommissioning wastes. A similar
facility at Loviisa was commissioned in 1997. The final disposal of used nuclear fuel is
managed by Posiva Oy, which was set up in 1995 as a joint venture company between TVO
and Fortum. It has well advanced plans for a deep geological repository for encapsulated
used fuel at the Olkiluoto island in Eurajoki, some 400 metres down in two billion-year-old
igneous rock. Site selection involved extensive consultations and a positive vote by the local
council in 2001.
The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (Svensk

Kärnbränslehantering AB, SKB) was set up by the nuclear utilities (Vattenfall, Forsmark,
OKG and E.ON Sweden) to develop a comprehensive concept for the management and
disposal of used fuel and other radioactive wastes. A final underground repository for
operational (up to intermediate-level) radioactive waste and medical and industrial
radioactive wastes has been operating near Forsmark since 1988. It is some 50 metres
55
Platts Nuclear News Flashes, French ‘not opposed in principle’ to Cigeo repository: panel, 4
February 2014.
56
Platts Nuclear News Flashes, Finnish waste fund total grows, ministry says, 22 March 2013.

below the Baltic Sea. An interim repository for used fuel has been operating since 1985 at
Oskarshamn. The used fuel is stored in an underground rock cavern for some 40-50 years. It
will then be encapsulated in copper canisters with cast iron internal structure for final
emplacement packed with bentonite clay in a 500 metre deep repository in granite. The site
is also one of the locations proposed by the local Östhammar community for a final high-
level waste repository.
The operation of the central Zwilag interim waste management facility at Würenlingen,
Aargau, in Switzerland and a planned final deep geological repository were estimated to total
CHF 15.97 billion by the Swiss Federal Energy office in 2011. The Zwilag company is owned
by the NPP operators and the facility was opened in 2000, costing about CHF 538M.
Although the choice of Würenlingen proved controversial, its selection was approved in a
local referendum in 1989.
Following an exhaustive site selection process in Germany, the State government of Lower
Saxony in 1977 declared the salt dome at Gorleben to be the location for a national centre
for disposal of radioactive wastes. It is now considered a possible site for geological disposal
of high-level wastes. The site could be available as a final repository from 2025, with a
decision to be made about 2019. Some € 1.6 billion has been spent since 1979 researching
the site. Work stopped in 2002 due to political edict, but in October 2010 the Federal Office
for Radiation Protection (BfS) applied to resume studies and extend the operating licence to
2020. The State of Lower Saxony allowed this, and in 2013 it agreed that Gorleben should
not be ruled out.
Another site at Konrad, a former iron ore mine also in Lower Saxony, has been under
development as a repository since 1975, and was licenced in 2002 for intermediate- and
low-level waste disposal.
A similar repository for low- and intermediate-level waste is planned to be ready to receive
radioactive wastes in 2020 from the Krško NPP at a nearby site, Vrbina, in Slovenia. The
project is to be managed by the Slovenian Agency for Radioactive Waste Management
(ARAO) and will cost € 178M, assuming that Croatia, which has a 50 percent share in the
reactor, also takes part.
A deep geological repository for high-level waste is under investigation in Russia’s east
Siberian province of Krasnoyarsk at Yeniseysky. In China, a centralised used fuel storage
facility has been built at Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex in central Gansu province. Site
selection and evaluation for a deep geological repository for high-level wastes has been
under way since 1986 and is focused on three candidate locations in the Beishan area of
Gansu province and will be completed by 2020. All sites are in granite formations. The final
repository will be constructed by 2040 and be run on a demonstration basis until 2050. South
Korea constructed a low- and intermediate waste management facility in 2013 at a site in
Gyeongju.
The Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization, which was established by the
power companies in 2002, proposes to store used fuel in a deep geological repository and is
investigating sites in Ontario and Saskatchewan.
In some other countries national and local controversy has delayed the development of
interim and final repositories. The Yucca Mountain project in the USA ran into opposition
from the Nevada State government, while the selection of Britain’s deep geological
repository by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority was blocked by Cumbria County

Council in 2013. The UK Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) was expected to cost around
£12 billion undiscounted from conception, through operation from about 2040, to closure in
2100. Intermediate level waste is stored at Sellafield, Cumbria, where reprocessing of used
fuel takes place.

Table 3.3: Commercial reactor projects likely to be undergoing dismantling by 2030

Capacity Estimated
Operator Technology Date of/for Completion of
Reactor & location MWe project value
Country vendor shutdown dismantling
(net) (billion)*
North America
Southern California Edison (SCE) San Onofre 2 & 3 2 150 Combustion 2013 2033 4.0
USA California Engineering
Exelon Zion 1 & 2 2 080 Westinghouse 1998 2025 0.8
USA Illinois
Latin America

Electrabel Doel 1 & 2 784 Aecowen 2015 2035 2.0
Belgium Flanders
Electrabel Doel 3 & 4 2 024 Aecowen- 2022-2025 2042-2045 4.0
Belgium Flanders Framatome
Electrabel Tihange 1 & 2 1 970 Framatome 2025 2045 4.0
Belgium Flanders
Natsionalna Elektricheska Kozloduy 1-4 1 632 MinAtom 2002-2006 2035 3.2
Kompania, Bulgaria Vratsa
Unión Fenosa José Cabrera 1 141 Westinghouse 2006 2015 0.2
Spain Castile-La Mancha
EDF Bugey 1 540 Framatome 1994 2026 1.0
France Rhône-Alpes
EDF Chinon 1 & 2 250 Framatome 1973-1985 2035 2.0
France Rhône-Alpes
EDF Chooz A 305 Framatome 1991 2020 1.0
France Champagne-Ardenne
EDF Fessenheim 1 & 2 1 760 Framatome ?2016 ?2041 4.0
France Alsace
EDF St-Laurent 1 & 2 855 Framatome 1990-1992 2031-2036 2.0
France Centre
RWE Biblis A & B 2 407 Siemens 2011 2031 2.0
Germany Hesse
RWE Mülheim-Kärlich 1 219 ABB 1988 2019 1.0
Germany Rhineland-Palatinate

E.ON Brokdorf 2 407 KWU 2021 2041 1.0

Germany Schleswig-Holstein
Vattenfall Brunsbüttel 771 AEG 2011 2031 1.0
Germany Hamburg
RWE Emsland 1 329 KWU 2022 2042 1.0
Germany Lower Saxony
E.ON Grafenrheinfeld 1 275 Siemens 2015 2035 1.0
Germany Bavaria
Energiewerke Nord Greifswald 1-6 2 448 MinAtom 1989-1990 2040 4.2
Germany Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
E.ON Gröhnde 1 360 KWU 2021 2041 1.0
RWE & E.ON Gundremmingen B & C 2 572 KWU 2017-2021 2037-2041 2.0
Germany Bavaria
E.ON Isar 1 878 AEG 2011 2028 1.0
Germany Bavaria
E.ON Isar 2 1 410 KWU 2022 2042 1.0
Germany Bavaria
E.ON & Vattenfall Krümmel 1 346 AEG 2011 2031 1.0
Germany Schleswig-Holstein
EnBW Neckarwesheim 1 785 Siemens 2011 2031 1.0
Germany Baden-Württemburg
EnBW Neckarwesheim 2 1 310 KWU 2022 2042 1.0
EnBW Obrgheim 340 Siemens 2005 2025 1.0
EnBW Philippsburg 1 890 KWU 2011 2031 1.0
EnBW Philippsburg 2 1 402 KWU 2019 2039 1.0
E.ON Stade 640 Siemens 2003 2015 1.0
E.ON Unterweser 1 345 Siemens 2011 2031 1.0
Soc. Gestione Impanti Nucleari Caorso 860 GE-Ansaldo 1990 2025 0.5
Italy Emilia-Romagna
Soc. Gestione Impanti Nucleari Garigliano 150 GE 1982 2017 0.5
Italy Campania

Soc. Gestione Impanti Nucleari Trino Vercellese 250 Westinghouse 1990 2024 0.3
Italy Piedmont
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant Ignalina 1 & 2 2 370 MinAtom 2004-2009 2029 2.5
Lithuania Ignalina
Slovenské Elektrárne Bohunice V1-1 & 2 816 MinAtom 2006-2008 2025 1.6
Slovak Republic Trnava
Axpo Beznau 1 & 2 730 Westinghouse 2019-2021 2039-2041 2.0
Switzerland Aargau
BKW FMB Energie Mühleberg 373 GE-ABB 2019 2039 1.0
Switzerland Berne
Former Soviet Union

RosEnergoAtom Beloyarsk 1 & 2 248 MinAtom 1983-1990 2032 1.0
Russia Svedlorsk
RosEnergoAtom Leningrad I 4 925 MinAtom 2017 2032 0.5
Russia Svedlorsk
Ministry of Ecology & Natural Chernobyl 1-3 2 775 MinAtom 1991-2000 2064 1.4
Resources of Ukraine Kiev
East Asia
Taipower Chin Shan 1 & 2 1 208 GE 2018 2038 2.2
China (Taiwan) Northern Taiwan
Taipower Kuosheng 1 & 2 1 970 GE 2021 2041 2.0
China (Taiwan) Northern Taiwan
Taipower Maanshan 1 & 2 1 840 Westinghouse 2024-2025 2045 2.0
China (Taiwan) Southern Taiwan
TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi 1-4 2 719 GE-Toshiba 2011 2050 12.4
Japan Tōhoku
TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi 5 & 6 1 827 GE-Toshiba 2013 2038 2.0
Japan Tōhoku
Kansai Electric Mihama 1 & 2 790 Mitsubishi- 2020-2022 2045-2047 2.0
Japan Chūbu Westinghouse
Kansai Electric Mihama 3 780 Mitsubishi 2026 2051 2.0
Japan Chūbu
Kansai Electric Ōhi 1 & 2 2 240 Mitsubishi- 2017-2018 2042-2043 2.0
Japan Chūbu Westinghouse
Japan Atomic Power Company Tsuruga 1 340 GE 2016 2041 1.0
Japan Chūbu
Japan Atomic Power Company Tsuruga 2 1 108 Mitsubishi 2026 2051 1.0
Japan Chūbu

South Asia
NPCIL Rajasthan 1 90 AECL 2022 2062 0.5
India Chittorgarh, Rajasthan
NPCIL Tarapur 1 & 2 300 GE 2019 2059 1.0
India Thane, Maharashtra
Pakistan Atomic Energy Karachi 1 125 AECL 2019 2059 0.5
Commission Karachi, Sindh
Source: WNA Reactor database * Project values are estimated by WNA on the basis of press reports or public sources. Estimates in italics are
by WNA.


Part 2: Industry Status and Trends


4 The international
marketplace
The international market for nuclear energy has opened up. A competitive global market
exists for the construction and procurement of nuclear power plants (NPPs), and although
there has been concern that some ‘choke points’ exist along the supply chain, for instance in
terms of heavy forging capacity, the transfer of technology and localization of manufacturing
(especially to China) means there are now sufficient suppliers available to fabricate key
reactor components under currently known plans. This chapter examines the extent to date
of technology vendor consolidation and competition, the major players and the success
achieved in the localization of manufacturing.
According to the IAEA, some 29 countries have considered, or have made active
preparations for, the introduction of a nuclear power program.57 Belarus and the United Arab
Emirates began construction of their first reactors in 2012-2013. Jordan and Turkey have
contracted to build NPPs for the first time. Kazakhstan and Lithuania, which shutdown their
NPPs, also plan new nuclear build. The remaining new entrants to the nuclear market over
this period could include Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, North Korea, the
Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Vietnam. If all these were to join (or re-join)
the nuclear club, it would mean that 70 percent of the world’s population in 2030 would be
relying on nuclear energy for part of their electricity supply – 6.1 billion people from an
estimated total of 8.7 billion.
Other countries considering nuclear power but whose plans are less advanced or have been
put on hold include Albania, Algeria, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Chile, Ecuador, Georgia,
Ghana, Israel, Kenya, Libya, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela and Yemen.
4.1 The emerging global market

In the 60 years since 1954, when the world’s first nuclear-powered electricity generator
began operating in the USSR, civil use of nuclear energy has spread from a small number of
technology pioneers to 31 countries and territories.58 A nationally sequestered industry that
had originated within the military-industrial complex has become part of the international
market place. Light water reactors, such as the boiling water reactor (BWR) and the
pressurized water reactor (PWR), using enriched uranium as a fuel were established as
industry standard designs in the USA and the USSR. However, the first decades were
57
IAEA, 2012, International Status and Prospects of Nuclear Power 2012, GC(56)/1, Vienna: IAEA:
Table C-2 and p. 9. See also NEA, 2010, Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008, Table 2.1, p. 75.
58
Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China (mainland and Taiwan), Czech
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico,
Netherlands, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK, Ukraine, and USA.

characterized by the search for national self-sufficiency and national solutions were adopted
that attempted to meet security-related priorities. In the immediate aftermath of the Second
World War neither the USA nor the USSR were willing to share nuclear reactor technology,
nor their uranium enrichment technology and supplies of enriched uranium. As a result,
outside the USA and USSR, there was an initial focus upon gas- and heavy-water cooled
reactors. The UK and France were able to develop gas-cooled reactor designs that could
use natural uranium as a fuel and from which they were able to extract plutonium for military
purposes. In Western Europe for the most part, electricity supply was the responsibility of a
state-owned corporation and the manufacture of the reactor was controlled by a state-
sponsored research and development establishment. The private sector was only employed
as a sub-contractor.
The export of the technology was made possible by the First Geneva Conference of the
United Nations in 1955 which led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and Euratom and the introduction of safeguards against the technology’s
military use. In the following years the pioneers provided scientific and technical assistance
to a large number of countries. With the exception of the USA, however, the pioneers’ civil
industry remained heavily state-sponsored. Reactor exports were not a priority and in the
late 1950s and 1960s the pioneers provided their national NPP designs to other countries on
a government-to-government basis.
The situation differed in the USA. Electricity supply was in the hands of regional utilities
whose interest lay in securing economic power generation. Early on, the US Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) had involved the major power engineering companies, General Electric,
Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering, General Dynamics, and American Machine and
Foundry, in building demonstration NPP projects. Competition between these reactor
suppliers encouraged them to standardize their product and to seek export opportunities. As
the BWR and the PWR began to dominate the international market place, utilities in Western
Europe were persuaded of the benefits of adopting the same technologies. The pattern was
followed in Asia and Latin America, with only a few exceptions. The light water reactor is
likely to remain the primary reactor technology at least to the mid-21st century.59
Meanwhile in the socialist bloc, the USSR gave strong support to its partners to develop the
nuclear industry, though on mutually advantageous terms. For instance, it had been
anticipated that China would supply uranium in exchange for Soviet reactor technology. In
some cases, such as in Cuba and North Korea, recipient governments were unable to pay
for the NPPs and the projects stalled. While not being an open market, economic pressures
within the socialist bloc favoured the Soviet PWR, the VVER, as the leading technology. The
adoption of market reforms in the 1990s reinforced this tendency and has enabled the
Russian nuclear conglomerate, RosAtom, to offer its technology along commercial lines.
59
NEA, 2010a, Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008, Paris: OECD: p. 372.

4.2 Vendor consolidation

The first wave of nuclear power expansion involved a large number of industrial companies.
The engineering and manufacture of a nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) requires
competence in boiler making and electrical engine building. Historically therefore these two
types of company have come to dominate the NSSS market (see Table 4.1). Steel makers
for the heavy forgings and castings were recruited from the shipbuilding and structural steel
making companies. Construction and major project engineering companies were required for
the site works and assembly of the power plants. As nuclear programs were rolled out, the
companies formed consortia to bid and manage the individual projects.
Table 4.1: The early movers (1950s)*
Electrical engine builders Boiler makers
Westinghouse Electric Co., US Babcock & Wilcox Co. (B&W), US
General Electric (GE), US Combustion Engineering (CE), US
Associated Electrical Industries (AEI), UK John Thompson, UK
C A Parsons, UK Clark Chapman, UK
English Electric, UK Babcock & Wilcox Ltd., UK
General Electric Company (GEC), UK Simon Caves, UK
Compagnie Générale d’Électricité (CGE), FR Babcock-Atlantique SA, FR
Framatome (Schneider, Empain & Westinghouse), FR
Kraftwerk Union (Siemens AG & AEG), DE
ASEA, SE Uddcomb Sweden AB, SE
Brown, Boveri & Cie., CH Finanziaria Ernesto Breda SpA, IT
Mitsubishi Electric Corp., JP Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), JP
Hitachi Ltd., JP Babcock-Hitachi KK, JP
Toshiba Corp., JP Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI), JP
Fuji Electric Company Ltd., JP Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd., JP
Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd., JP Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd., JP
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, CA
MinSredMash-MinAtom, SU
* The pairing of companies in the two columns does not necessarily imply that the two companies
were partners or had formed a consortium.

Unfortunately nuclear construction was insufficiently large to provide a market share for all
the companies and consortia that had planned to enter the market. By the 1970s industrial
restructuring had reduced the leading nuclear technology vendors to:
North America Western Europe Asia
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., ABB, CH/SE (from 1988) Hitachi, JP

CA
Framatome, FR Mitsubishi, JP
Babcock & Wilcox, US
Kraftwerk Union (Siemens), DE Toshiba, JP
Combustion Engineering, US
National Nuclear Corp., UK Nuclear Power Corp. of India,
General Electric, US IN
Westinghouse, US
The decline in NPP construction from the 1980s in the advanced industrial countries
encouraged further industry consolidation, on an international basis, especially since the
1990s. Figure 4.1 shows how the principal industry players have merged their businesses.
Figure 4.1: Reactor vendor consolidation
During this process of industrial consolidation and restructuring, the British and Swiss-
Swedish champions were broken up. There are today ten consolidated reactor vendors
offering the technology and services over much of the full nuclear fuel cycle:
 AREVA, a French state-controlled enterprise, formed from the merger of Framatome,

CEA Industrie, Siemens Power Generation’s nuclear business, and fuel supplier
Cogema in 2001. Framatome was a Franco-American joint venture set up in 1958 to
develop nuclear power under licence from Westinghouse; Siemens pulled out of the
partnership in 2009 and withdrew from the nuclear technology business in 2011. The
nuclear fuel and services activities of the US-based Babcock & Wilcox Company

were taken over by Framatome in 1992. Another acquisition in 2002 brought in Duke
Energy’s engineering and technical services operations, further strengthening
AREVA’s position in North America. AREVA has developed two advanced PWRs,
the EPR and the Atmea1 (with Mitsubishi)), and the Kerena, an advanced BWR.
 Candu Energy is the subsidiary of the Canadian engineering and construction
company SNC-Lavalin, which purchased the reactor division of the state-owned
enterprise Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL) in 2011. The Candu reactors have
been exported to India, China and elsewhere. The Advanced Candu Reactor (ACR)
has been developed to run on slightly enriched uranium and AECL signed a
memorandum of understanding in 2009 with the Indian engineering and construction
company Larsen and Toubro to develop a cost-competitive model for the ACR-1000.
 China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), established in 1988, has over 100
subsidiary enterprises in China encompassing nuclear power and fuels, as well as
research, design and international cooperation. CNNC is state owned. It has a 10
percent share in the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC),
which was set up in 2004 to take the lead in the development of NPPs, including
technology transfer from other vendors, such as AREVA and Westinghouse. The
Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute (formerly Institute
728), established in 1970, is a subsidiary of SNPTC. CNNC also has a stake in the
China General Nuclear Power Group.
 GE and Hitachi formed a strategic business alliance in 2007 forming GE Hitachi
Nuclear Energy (GEH) and Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy to provide state-of-the-art
BWRs. The companies are considering combining to create a single entity. Hitachi is
a supplier of steam turbines for thermal and nuclear power plants. Babcock-Hitachi
K.K. (wholly owned by Hitachi since 1987) is able to provide reactor pressure vessels
and steam generators. Hitachi and GE are partners, with Toshiba, in Global Nuclear
Fuel, providing fuel sub-assemblies for BWRs. There is also a Canadian company
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Canada Ltd that supplies fuel and services for Candu
reactors. GEH offers the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR), which has been
supplied to Japan, Chinese Taiwan and, potentially, Lithuania.
 The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), a government controlled
corporation established in 1982, manages Korea’s power industry through subsidiary
power generation companies, including the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power
Company (KHNP) and the national grid. It has spearheaded the country’s nuclear
export drive. The subsidiary KEPCO Engineering and Construction Company
(KEPCO E&C), founded in 1975, designs and builds thermal and nuclear power
plants, including an advanced PWR, the APR1400.
 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) has been a major nuclear technology vendor
since the 1970s when it constructed Japan’s first PWR under licence from
Westinghouse. MHI was re-established in 1964, although the company’s roots go
back nearly another hundred years. The group’s Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Company
Ltd, established in 1971, manufactures nuclear fuel. MHI has developed an
advanced PWR, the APWR, and has a joint venture with AREVA to develop and
market the Atmea1 reactor.
 The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) is a state-owned enterprise
responsible for the design, construction, commissioning, operation and maintenance
of nuclear power plants in India. The company was established in 1987. The 1962
Atomic Energy Act prohibits private sector control of nuclear power, although it may
take a minority share and the government gave a green light for this in 1999. At
present, NPCIL relies upon the national plan for its investment funding and its
ownership and governance are not yet segregated, so it is unlikely to be privatized in

the foreseeable future. Mining and processing of uranium is undertaken by another

state-owned enterprise, the Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. Conversion and fuel
fabrication is provided by the Nuclear Fuel Complex, a division of the Department of
Atomic Energy, which is responsible for nuclear technology to the prime minister.
 The State Atomic Energy Corporation RosAtom is a government enterprise formed
in 2007 to develop Russia’s nuclear industry and give an impetus to innovation.
Originally part of the Ministry for Atomic Energy and Industry (MinAtom), a Federal
Agency for Atomic Energy RosAtom was set up in 2004 and later transformed into a
corporation. Its subsidiary enterprises and organizations are divided into four large
groups: the Nuclear Power Complex, including AtomStroyExport, the reactor export
arm, and TechsNabExport (Tenex), the nuclear fuel and isotope production
company; the Nuclear Weapons Complex; the Nuclear and Radiation Safety
Complex; and the Scientific and Technical Complex. RosAtom operates Russian
NPPs through its RosEnergoAtom subsidiary, along with the nuclear icebreaker fleet,
AtomFlot. Its civil business is due to be privatized in 2016. The company aims to
boost its power capacity substantially and to offer non-nuclear technologies.
 Westinghouse Electric Company, one of the pioneers of the industry, has since
2005 been majority-owned by Toshiba, whose Power Systems Company is a BWR
vendor. Westinghouse also has a fuel fabrication business. There is also a strategic
partnership with the uranium mining company KazAtomProm, which is a minority
shareholder with Toshiba in Westinghouse. Westinghouse integrated the nuclear
reactor activities of ABB and Combustion Engineering into its business while it was
under the ownership by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd between 1999 and 2006.
Other significant players with nuclear engineering capability include:
 Alstom and ABB (ASEA-Brown Boveri) which merged their energy businesses in
1999, with ABB selling its 50 percent share in the merged company to Alstom in
2000. ABB had acquired Combustion Engineering in 1990, but sold its commercial
nuclear power business to Westinghouse (then owned by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd)
in 1999. Alstom Power was one of the largest suppliers of turbines, turbo-generators,
heat exchangers, pumps, valves and control and safety systems with manufacturing
facilities in ten countries until its recent acquisition by GE Energy.
 Babcock International (the former UK company Babcock & Wilcox Ltd., renamed in
1979) purchased the commercial division of the state agency UK Atomic Energy
Authority in 2009 to gain capability in nuclear decommissioning works. The company
merged with the VT Group (formerly Vosper Thorneycroft, a British defence
contractor) in 2010, which had acquired the nuclear services operations of British
Nuclear Fuels Ltd in 2008.
 The US-based Babcock & Wilcox Company was reformed in 2007 after emerging
from bankruptcy protection (related to claims from victims of prolonged exposure to
asbestos). The company is engaged in the manufacture of nuclear components,
naval reactors, power generation equipment and technical and management
services. In 2009 it acquired Nuclear Fuel Services and has also formed a joint
venture with Bechtel to develop a small advanced LWR. It was spun-off from its then
parent company McDermott International in 2010.
 China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) has partnered with EDF and AREVA
in constructing the “improved Chinese PWR”, the CPR-1000 model and is developing
an advanced version in conjunction with major reactor equipment suppliers (including
Dongfang Electric, Shanghai Electric, Harbin Electric, China First Heavy Industries
and China Erzhong). CGN and its associate companies operate 11 units, including
the Daya Bay NPP that supplies electricity to Hong Kong and Shenzhen.

 The Doosan Corporation, which took over the state-owned Korea Heavy Industries
and Construction when it was privatized in 2001, and acquired UK-based Babcock
Energy (from Mitsui) in 2006 and Škoda Power in 2009, giving the group capability in
nuclear construction, boiler making, steam turbines and generators.
 Larsen & Toubro has supplied equipment for India’s nuclear power program with a
range of heavy manufacturing plants and high-tech or clean facilities across the
subcontinent.
 OMZ is a Russian-based power engineering company, linked to GazPromBank,
whose founder was the state-controlled energy corporation GazProm. OMZ was
formed in 1998 by the merger of the Ural Heavy Machinery Works (UralMashZavod),
machine building and steel making plant, with the Izhora Works (Izhorskiye Zavody),
which has supplied nuclear island equipment, including reactor pressure vessels for
PWRs constructed in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. Since 2004 the group
also includes Škoda JS a.s., the Czech-based power plant equipment supplier for
PWRs and BWRs.
Engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) undertakings are examined separately at

section 5.3.
4.3 Vendor competition

Belying its history – and reputation – as a state sponsored activity, the nuclear industry is an
open business, with opportunity for new market entrants. There are at least 20 countries with
definitive programs for nuclear power construction. Even emerging industrial economies, like
China and India, have been remarkably open to international procurement, although
governments have been keen to maximize locally manufactured content (see section 5.4).
This has encouraged the formation of an internationally diverse supply chain and joint
ventures.
According to a Nuclear Energy Agency study, the degree of concentration in the market for
new NPPs shows it to be a competitive marketplace with moderate concentration and a
diverse range of suppliers. Table 4.2 updates this study and provides a calculation of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.60 An HHI value of over 1 500 is accepted as indicating an over-
concentration of market power (and over 2 500 as high concentration).
60
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the square of the market shares of all market participants. See
NEA, 2008, Market Competition in the Nuclear Industry, Paris: OECD/NEA: p.19. It is named after the
economists Orris C Herfindahl and Albert O Hirschman.

Table 4.2: NPP Vendors with the number of reactors completed in or after 2000 or under
construction or contracted
Company No. of units Share (%) HHI
China Nuclear Power Design Co. Ltd (CGN 24 20.5 421

Group)
RosAtom (incl. AtomStroyExport) 24 20.5 421
Doosan-KEPCO 14 12.0 143
Nuclear Power Corp. of India Ltd. (NPCIL) 14 12.0 143
Toshiba/ Westinghouse 12 10.3 105
AREVA NP (incl. Siemens) 8 6.8 47
China National Nuclear Corp. (CNNC) 8 6.8 47
GE/ Hitachi 6 5.1 26
Škoda 4 3.4 12
Candu Energy (formerly AECL) 2 1.7 3
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) 1 0.9 1
Total 117 100.0 1 368
Source: WNA Reactor Database

As the NEA noted, “despite the consolidation which has taken place, there appears to be no
shortage of competition to supply NPPs”.61 A report for the UK government by IBM Business
Consulting Services concluded similarly that “a strong global market for most systems and
sub-systems” exists with “sufficient capacity” to support an expansion of nuclear power.
However, “the global capacity for a small number of key items appears to be limited” in the
case of forgings for reactor pressure vessels, primary circuit pressure vessels and steam
generators. Additional capacity has become available since IBM conducted its study (see
section 5.2), but potentially bottlenecks could re-emerge should there be multiple reactor
orders at the same time as an upturn in capital investment worldwide occurs.62
The outcome of an anti-trust inquiry in Europe bears out the conclusion that the civil nuclear
power market is a competitive one. The European Commission initiated an anti-trust inquiry
in 2010 into an agreement between AREVA and Siemens limiting competition for some
years after the break-up of their joint venture (case 39.736), which was judged to be too
61
NEA, 2008: p. 35.
62
IBM, 2005, An evaluation of the capability and capacity of the UK and global supply chains to
support a new nuclear build programme in the UK, Basingstoke: IBM Business Consulting Services:
pp. 10-11.

restrictive in scope and duration.63 The Commission nevertheless accepted a voluntary

scaling back of the non-compete obligation from the companies to limit the condition’s
application to the nuclear island, fuel assemblies and nuclear services, with the implication
that sufficient competition exists in the European market for these nuclear technologies to
permit the continued operation of the agreement so as to legitimately protect AREVA’s
confidential technical information.
Thus the market is not a ‘sellers’ market’; however neither is it a ‘buyers’ market’. The main
technical barriers to trade are the licensing requirements imposed by the nuclear regulatory
bodies for the protection of health and safety and to safeguard materials and know-how from
misuse. Although a number of technology vendors have obtained regulatory approval for
their reactor models across several jurisdictions, no vendor is able to offer its technology
everywhere (see chapter 6). In certain jurisdictions, such as in the Russian Federation, the
safety regulatory body (RosTechNazdor) has never been requested to approve a foreign
technology. This probably helps explain why RosAtom enjoys a strong lead with one of the
largest market shares in NPPs as its business is conducted largely in a protected domestic
market.
That said, among the major technology vendors only CNNC and NPCIL have not so far
competed to sell their technologies on the international market, although two Chinese CNP-
300 reactors are being built in Pakistan under an intergovernmental program, and two earlier
units are already in operation. Another agreement with Pakistan envisages the construction
of two Chinese 1000 MWe reactors at Karachi. CNNC was reportedly interested in building
Belarus’ first reactor and has also expressed interest in South Africa. In July 2014 a high-
level agreement was signed by the Argentine and Chinese presidents towards construction
of Atucha 3 as a PHWR unit based on a Candu design. A Chinese investment alongside
EDF and AREVA in the UK may be an early indication that further exports are contemplated.
The CAP1400 design promoted by SNPTC or the Hualong from CNNC and CGN may be
submitted to the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation for generic design assessment.64
Current capacity exists within China to manufacture five AP1000 units a year, according to
China First Heavy Industries, and although there are apparently hurdles to achieving
consistently high quality in forging, around 50 percent of components are already sourced
locally and the proportion is rising.65 So it is possible that, in conjunction with Westinghouse,
Chinese supplied AP1000s might be offered to the world market later this decade. The
Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute (SNERDI) and Westinghouse
are collaborating on another advanced reactor design, the CAP1400, whose intellectual
property will be fully Chinese.
63
European Commission Notice of 14 February 2012, Official Journal of the European Union, C75/10-
11. Under the European Commission’s ruling Siemens was freed to compete without restriction for
sales and services related to the conventional island and certain other non-nuclear technologies.
64
Information provided by SNPTC and CGN on 23 January 2014 at a forum organized by the UK
Trade and Investment agency.
65
China Daily, 15 March 2012. SNPTC stated that 70 percent of equipment for the construction of an
AP1000 at Haiyang-2 is being sourced locally: information provided on 9 April 2014 at the WNA
Supply Chain Working Group meeting in Singapore.

AREVA announced plans in February 2012 to cooperate with its longstanding partners CGN
and EDF on developing a 1 000 MWe reactor based on the Atmea1 model the company has
designed with Mitsubishi.66 The new model is aimed at the international market. Bringing a
new design to market can be a lengthy process. Work on the South Korean APR1400 was
begun in 1992, construction of the first plant was begun in 2007 and the first overseas sale
made in 2009, a period of 17 years. Construction of a demonstration CAP1400 is due to be
started by the end of 2014, seven years after design work began, and the earliest that a fully
Chinese advanced nuclear reactor will be marketed overseas is likely to be towards the end
of the current decade.
Indian reactor design has concentrated on developing the PHWR, which has not had the
same international success as the LWRs offered by most of the other established vendors.
India is developing a relatively small 300 MWe Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) that
will use thorium fuel, as part of its strategy to ensure greater security of supply through use
of indigenously-sourced resources. Thorium has not been commonly used in the nuclear
cycle and thus the AHWR is unlikely to attract much interest in the international market. In
general, Indian manufacturers lag behind their Chinese peers in terms of productivity and
quality, though they are strong at so-called ‘frugal engineering’. While India has the potential
to rival China and Southeast Asian countries as an exporter of industrial components, the
country faces serious binding constraints on growth, the most serious of which are the
inadequacy of its infrastructure and ineffective public institutions, according to the World
Bank.67 Established suppliers, like Larsen & Toubro and the Electronics Corporation of India,
have, despite some of these domestic hurdles, demonstrated their capability in export
markets, while India’s consulting engineers have established a reputation as leading
practitioners globally.
Although nuclear energy is a relatively mature industry, it has not been exposed to
international competition to the same extent as some other high technology sectors. As a
result of restructuring there are a smaller number of internationally recognized models on the
market, but the process of vendor consolidation and specialization could go further to leave
perhaps a core of around four to six vendors by 2030.
More important to the development of the global market is the emergence of export quality
capacity for nuclear systems and components, especially from China, rather than new, and
country-specific, reactor designs. The additional capacity coming on stream in Asia as a
result of localization could prove crucial to the continued competitiveness of the established
vendors from Japan, North America and Europe.
66
Bloomberg, 10 February 2012. The ATMEA1 is a 1 100 MWe advanced reactor that has been
developed jointly by Areva and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries since 2006 and is aimed at locations with
small-scale transmission systems.
67
World Bank, 2006, India: Inclusive growth and service delivery – Building on India’s success,
Development Policy Review, Report No. 34580-IN. Total factor productivity in India is estimated to be
half that of China (ibid., p. 7).

4.4 Localization of production

Encouraging a high local content in the nuclear supply chain is a potentially important tool for
economic development. Localization supports the transfer of technology and raises
productivity in the host country. It creates employment, especially in professional and skilled
occupations, directly and indirectly as local companies develop their capabilities and
relationships with global companies. Direct employment is created from the ‘backward
linkages’ in the supply chain through the processing and manufacture of basic inputs and
intermediate products and services. Jobs may also be stimulated indirectly by helping local
suppliers upgrade their capacities so that they are more competitive in international markets,
although economic evidence pertaining to its impact is inconclusive.68 Localization attempts
to capture some of the investment in electrification for national economic development by
raising productivity among local firms and moving their product portfolio ‘up the value chain’.
A local supply base can provide a convenient service during plant operation and
maintenance. The procurement policies for spare parts, supplies and maintenance by plant
operators is another important factor.
There have been several successful localization programs in the nuclear power industry.
France, Japan, South Korea and China developed internationally competitive and integrated
domestic nuclear supply chains in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s respectively. It is possible
that other countries may follow suit but some nations, such as the UK and to a lesser extent
the USA, have abandoned the goal of complete self-reliance. Many more countries have a
stake in a segment of the supply chain in which they have established a comparative
advantage.
France
The development of an indigenous nuclear supply industry in France was viewed by the
government as an important objective that would contribute to export-led growth as well as
national (and European) self-sufficiency. Technology transfer through licensing of patents
and intellectual property was the main method by which French companies acquired
American technology before the removal of capital controls from the 1960s onwards and the
era of liberalized foreign direct investment.69 The Empain Schneider engineering group had
longstanding links with Westinghouse and became its licensee for PWR parts in 1959. The
two companies built two PWRs (Chooz A and Tihange 1 in Belgium) and later founded
Framatome to compete for NPP orders in France. The reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) for
Chooz and Tihange were forged at Le Creusot, Burgundy, in eastern France. The factory
gained an ASME ‘N-stamp’ in 1973. The experience gained with the Chooz RPVs allowed
the Creusot forge to supply two more units to Switzerland, Beznau 1 and 2, and two to the
USA for Prairie Island 1 and 2 (with the NSSS supplied by Westinghouse). In 1972,
Westinghouse agreed to extend the licensing agreement with Framatome for all components
associated with the reactor core and vessel design, giving Framatome’s engineers in-depth
68
See Theodore H Moran, 2011, Foreign Direct Investment and Development: Launching a second
generation of policy research, Washington DC: Peter G Peterson Institute for International
Economics.
69
Hubert Bonin and Ferry de Groey (editors), 2009, American Firms in Europe 1880-1980: Strategy,
identity, perception and performance, Geneva: Droz; pp. 19-20.

knowledge of the design and the capability to develop and standardize it. With support from
the CEA and EDF, Framatome developed a French standardized reactor design during the
1970s and 1980s. A technical cooperation agreement was signed in 1981 in which
Westinghouse recognized Framatome’s competence in PWR technology and provided for
two-way exchange of technical information with lower licence fees. The accord was
terminated in 1992 with an agreement by Westinghouse to accept Framatome as free to
market its own PWR design. The French 900 MWe PWR was sold in 1975 to Iran (though
the order was subsequently cancelled), to South Africa (Koeberg 1 and 2) and then South
Korea (Ulchin 1 and 2). Two units of the M310 design were supplied by Framatome for the
Daya Bay project in China, which led to the development of the CPR-1000 model. The
indigenous N4 type 1 450 MWe reactor began construction at Chooz B in 1984 and Civaux 1
and 2 in 1988.
With the emergence of Framatome, backed by Schneider, as the national champion, and
EDF’s decision to order a fleet of 16 PWRs after the oil price rise of 1974-74, there was a
major investment in local capacity. Framatome won orders for Tihange and Fessenheim 1
and 2 in 1969. A new reactor vessel fabrication workshop at Framatome’s factory at Le
Creusot was built in 22 months, able to produce up to six units a year, which was soon
scaled up to handle loads of 600t and produce eight forged vessels a year. A steam
generator assembly line was constructed at Chalon Saint-Marcel, also in the Burgundy
industrial region, again able to manufacture six units a year. The latter was scaled up to
manufacture 24 steam generators and eight pressurizers a year. There was a pre-existing
base of forging, casting and rolling facilities along with boiler making, pump and valve
manufacturing and state-of-the-art welding capability, and non-destructive testing
laboratories in the region. The area is connected by wide-gauge waterways to the Rhône
and Rhine rivers, giving access to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. Turbines were
supplied by Alsthom-CEM, which later became Alstom, from its plant at Belfort, Franche-
Comté on France’s eastern border. The coal mining industry in northern and eastern France
meant that there was an established manufacturing sector for pumps at Schneider’s factory
at Jeumont and valves from Rateau Velan, SEREG and Darling Bouvier. Primary circuit
pipes were produced by Schneider’s SPIE, Nordon and Socaltra. Tube makers like Vallourec
(named after the location of its pipe mills and forges in Valenciennes, Louvroil and
Recquignies), from the north, had the capability to make seamless tubing from special steels
and alloys able to withstand the stresses of temperature, pressure and corrosion found in a
nuclear plant. Although France is almost fully self-sufficient in terms of its supply chain, in
practice international competition as well as European rules on public procurement means
that sourcing is increasingly global.
Japan
Localization efforts in Japan were coordinated by Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI). In 1967 MITI initiated a plan to establish ‘total engineering capability’,
including prime contractor capability for construction, among Japanese firms with foreign
partners. Financial support was made available through the Japan Development Bank. The
first PWRs had been built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) under licence from
Westinghouse in the 1970s, starting with the Mihama 1 NPP, where the pressurizer and the
steam reheating system and turbine generators were manufactured domestically. There was
about 60 percent of local content in the construction of Mihama 1. For Mihama 2, for which
construction started in 1968, MHI acted as main contractor and in addition to the steam

generator, manufactured the reactor pressure vessel. Mitsubishi supplied the reactor core
internals for its Genkai 1 NPP, begun in 1969, and the reactor coolant pump for Genkai 2,
started in 1976. From 1975, MITI supported a 10-year program for the development of an
improved and standardized Generation II LWR. The first example was the Sendai 1 NPP,
also built by Mitsubishi.
Hitachi and Toshiba opted to focus on BWRs. GE and Hitachi collaborated in the
construction of the Tsuruga 1 NPP for the Japan Atomic Power Company starting in 1966.
Local content was around 60 percent. The Advanced BWR was developed between 1981
and 1986 through the collaboration of GE, Hitachi and Toshiba with TEPCO. In 1984, Hitachi
completed the first improved standard BWR with Fukushima Daini 2. By the time of the
construction of the Shimane 1 BWR in 1970-74, local content had risen to 93 percent. By the
end of the 1970s Japanese industry had achieved full localization of NPP components.
Toshiba initially supplied turbine generators, balance of plant and instrumentation and
control systems before it provided the whole NSSS for the first unit of the Fukushima Daiichi
NPP in 1971. Toshiba went on to supply the NSSS for several more NPPs being built by
TEPCO and the Chubu Electric Power Company in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Japan had
continued to invest in nuclear power and from the 1990s onwards, Toshiba was providing
the complete power plant, for the 1 100 MWe Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP (units 2 and 3) for
TEPCO and the Onagawa 2 and Higashidoori 1 NPPs for Tohoku Electric Power. Toshiba
also manufactured the NSSS for the first Advanced BWR for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6 and 7,
which was commissioned in 1996.
South Korea
Over last 30 years South Korea has built up an internationally competitive indigenous
nuclear power industry. A localization policy was adopted in 1979 to develop project
management and supplier experience in constructing NPPs. Turnkey contracts with
Westinghouse and Framatome (now AREVA) gave Korean engineers the chance to gain
experience with the PWR technology. The local content of early plants, bought from
Westinghouse, such as Kori 1-4, begun during the 1970s, increased from 8 to 29 percent of
equipment; the local content of the Framatome supplied Ulchin 1 and 2 plants built in the
1980s increased to 40 percent.70 In his memoir of the Korean nuclear story, Dr. Kim Byung-
Koo affirms that Korea “gained invaluable experience in the total project management while
overseeing three foreign prime contractors” for the four Kori and two Yonggwang units:
Westinghouse supplied the NSSS, GE the turbine generators and the architect-engineer was
Bechtel.71 The government restructured the Korea Electric Company as the Korea Electric
Power Corporation (KEPCO) in 1982. The new company initiated a standardization project
to foster technical self-reliance and go beyond ‘know how’ to ‘know why’.
Many local companies expressed interest for a more active participation in the nuclear
program. Their participation was facilitated by the adoption of competitive bidding for
70
KEPCO, 2011, Presentation to NIASA Nuclear Industry Localisation Conference held in Cape Town
on 1 June 2011; see <www.niasa.co.za/event-presentations>.
71
Kim Byung-Koo, 2011, Nuclear Silk Road: The ‘Koreanization’ of nuclear power technology,
Amazon: p. 54.

components by KEPCO since the early 1980s. National self-reliance was reinforced under a
government program endorsed in 1985, through which Korea aimed for 90 percent local
content by the early 1990s and to take charge of the NSSS design for what was to become
the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP). For this, the country needed established
technical partners. In 1987 agreements were made between KEPCO E&C and ABB-
Combustion Engineering (later to be merged into Westinghouse) for the NSSS design, along
with Sargent & Lundy (S&L) for plant design and engineering. Another agreement was made
between Doosan and GE for turbine generator components. Technology transfer involved
documentation, computer codes, training, research and development support, and
consulting services.
With KEPCO as project manager, the first KSNP was constructed at Yonggwang, on the
western coast of Jeollanam province near Gwangju, over the period 1987 to 2002, achieving
74 percent in local content for equipment in units 3 and 4 and 79 percent for units 5 and 6.
Although KEPCO took responsibility as architect-engineer and Korean Heavy Industries
Corporation (KHIC) was the prime contractor, Combustion Engineering and S&L were
required to assume warranty responsibilities to guarantee system design accuracy, interface
correctness, licensing (by the Korean regulatory body) and for completion on time and within
budget.72 KHIC supplied the NSSS components from its factory at Changwon under licence
agreement made with Combustion Engineering and with GE for the turbine generators in
1977 and 1976 respectively. Construction was undertaken by Hyundai Construction
Company. Certain special items including reactor coolant pumps, instrumentation and
control (I&C) equipment and reactor vessel internals remained the responsibility of
Combustion Engineering.73 KHIC was privatized in 2001, as part of the economic reforms
pursued by President Kim Dae-jung, through a trade sale to the Doosan group.
Since the late 1980s the KSNP design has been further enhanced and streamlined and was
re-branded the OPR1000 (Optimized Power Reactor 1000) in 2005, which was aimed at the
export market. KEPCO E&C is also marketing the APR1400, an advanced pressurized water
reactor. The country has reduced construction time significantly for its OPR1000 and
APR1400 reactors.
In 2010, KEPCO and Korean steelmaker POSCO agreed to work together on developing
appropriate alloys for reactor internals and fuel cladding, which would raise domestically-
sourced equipment to 90 percent.
China
Chinese cooperation with technology vendors has also been based on a combination of
technology transfer and localization. The national objective of “self-reliance in design,
manufacturing, construction and operation” by 2015 is on track, with major investment in
new capacity taking place. Although the China National Nuclear Corporation had made
some steps towards developing its own PWR technology, China struck an agreement with
Westinghouse in 2007 for the transfer of technology to Chinese companies. The State
Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNTPC) selected Westinghouse's AP1000 as the
72
Kim, 2011: p. 157.
73
Kim, 2001: pp. 124-128

'technology basis' for four reactors at Sanmen and Haiyang. The agreement covered
technology transfer, development of a standardized design for Chinese application and its
mass manufacture. In January 2011 the technology cooperation agreement between
Westinghouse and the SNPTC was extended for a further two years and included scope for
cooperation in overseas markets. SNPTC and Tsinghua University have established a state
engineering research center in Beijing for mass deployment of the AP1000 technology.
According to SNPTC, the value of the technology transfer is US$ 3.3 billion.74
The self-reliance program has involved technology transfer from Westinghouse’s technology
partners on the AP1000. Ansaldo has supported SNPTC on the containment vessel; Curtiss-
Wright provided support for the reactor coolant pump; the reactor vessel, steam generator
and integrated head packages were the subject of technology transfer from Doosan; and
SPX transferred technology for squib valves.
The China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (now China General Nuclear Power
Corporation, CGN) has worked with EDF and Framatome/ AREVA since the 1980s. The
French supplied Generation II PWRs were the basis for the localized CPR-1000 design,
piloted at Ling Ao, Guangdong province (Phase I: 1997-2003). Units 1 and 2 were
constructed with 30 percent local content, while under Phase II (2005-2011), units 3 and 4
incorporated 50 percent and 70 percent local content respectively. Further reactors being
constructed at Ningde, Fujian province, between 2008 and 2015 have 75 percent local
content (units 1 and 2) and 80-85 percent is anticipated for units 3 and 4. The same is true
for the CPR-1000 reactors being built at Yangjiang, Guangdong province, and Hongyanhe,
Liaoning.
The state-owned holding China National Nuclear Corporation has built the Chinese designed
CNP reactors, also derived from Framatome technology, with similar local content. For
Qinshan Phase I (1985-1991), the first unit was also the first indigenous plant built with only
the reactor pressure vessel being imported (from Mitsubishi). In Phase II (1996-2012), the
Qinshan CNP-600 plant had 55 percent local content for units 2 and 3 and 77 percent for
unit 4. Doosan supplied the RPV for Qinshan Phase II unit 3. Chinese domestic suppliers
have emerged to fill the remaining specialist supply gaps. Some of these new suppliers are
joint ventures with foreign companies, for example, valve manufacturers Vanatome with the
Harbin Valve Co. (part of Harbin Power Group) and turbine makers Shanghai Electric Group
with Siemens. Others are foreign direct investment ventures such as those by AREVA,
Vallourec and Weir.
Other cases
Other examples of plans for localization are shown in Table 4.5.
74
Liu Yiyu, Firms to adopt AP1000 nuclear plant technology, China Daily, 15 March 2012.

Table 4.5: Planned localization of NPP construction and manufacture
Site Country Operator / vendor Percentage of local

content planned
Ostrovets 1 & 2 Belarus Belenergo/AtomStroyExport 30
Kozloduy 7 Bulgaria Kozloduy/Westinghouse “significant”
Temelín 3 & 4 Czech Republic ČEZ/ vendor to be decided 60
Paks 5 & 6 Hungary MVM/ AtomStroyExport 30-35
Jaitapur 1 & 2 India NPCIL/AREVA “maximal”
Kudankulam 3 & 4 India NPCIL/AtomStroyExport 45
Akkuyu 1-4 Turkey AtomStroyExport 37.5-40
Flamanville 3 France EDF/AREVA 70
Hinkley Point C, UK EDF Energy/AREVA 50-60
Sizewell C & Wylfa B
As can be seen, even in mature industrial countries like the Czech Republic, France and the
UK, the proportion of local content is expected to be between 50 to 70 percent. British
industry faces a major challenge in upgrading its manufacturing systems to achieve nuclear
grade performance, as the lack of new build since the last NPP was completed in 1995 has
eroded capability.75
Those countries that have pursued localization most vigorously have done so in order to
foster self-reliance in design, build and operation. It is also seen as a way to leverage local
economic development and create well qualified employment. Nevertheless, localization is
not a ‘silver bullet’ for developing an indigenous nuclear manufacturing industry and in an
increasingly interdependent and international economy there is little economic advantage to
locating every possible industry on a national territory. As long as there are a number of
competing suppliers, there is security in supply and prices will be keener. In the 1960s
governments in several countries encouraged the formation of competing consortia to
provide NPPs (see section 4.2) but the collapse in new plant orders resulted in restructuring
and consolidation both nationally and internationally. In the USA, Westinghouse closed its
East Pittsburgh electrical equipment works in 1988, established by George Westinghouse in
1894, and now the company “buys where we build”. The USA can no longer source all
components of an NPP from factories within the country and must import several key
components, including heavy forgings, from abroad. US infrastructure projects, such as the
US$ 6.4 billion new Skyway suspension bridge over the San Francisco Bay, have used
imported Chinese and Japanese steel.
Specialization in activities in which a company possesses a competitive edge can be a better

business strategy in many markets than to try to be a full scope supplier. The size of the
potential market for each component is critical to obtaining economies of scale. The
components and equipment in a nuclear power plant’s conventional island is similar to the
scope of requirements found in thermal power plants or other types of electricity generating
75
Many components for the UK’s PWR at Sizewell B were manufactured abroad, including the RPV
from Framatome and the turbines from GEC Alsthom.

plant. The vessels and heat exchangers manufactured for the NSSS have parallels with
those manufactured for the petro-chemical industry. The exceptional performance specified
in the nuclear industry is similar to that called for in the aerospace and defence industries.
Modularization provides an opportunity for localized assembly of sub-modules in-country. In
order for the localization strategy to be sustainable over the long-term, each venture must
have a viable business case that looks to sales in the wider marketplace. A localization
strategy should therefore be built around local companies, from the ‘bottom up’. It is unlikely
that the proportion of local content could rise above 30 percent where a nuclear power
program involves a small number of reactors.
Good international practice in local economic development suggests that a localization

strategy should be built around two tracks:
 Close working is needed between the EPC contractor, the relevant economic
development agency and the plant operator on the procurement procedures to be
followed, perhaps using the International Finance Corporation’s Local Procurement
Guidelines as a framework, prepared with the extractive industries.76 Realistic
opportunities for increasing local content can be identified and then followed up by a
joint task force, so that requirements can be announced well in advance of tendering,
giving local companies the chance to pre-qualify and compete.
 Complementary measures should be undertaken by the economic development
agency to promote capacity up-grading among local companies and to help them
achieve the necessary certification. Companies must be ready to present a business
plan in applying for any subsidy under the localization program.
A localization program will also require investment in human resources so that the skills and
education necessary to support the development of nuclear power are available.
76
Downloadable from The Oil, Gas and Mining Sustainable Community Development Fund set up by
the World Bank Group at <http://www.commdev.org/content/document/detail/2741/>.


5 The nuclear supply chain

This chapter describes the different segments of the nuclear supply chain and the most
prominent companies involved in supplying key components. The formation of a competitive
global nuclear power market is underway with the entry of new suppliers and new
customers. The availability of nuclear technology is much less constrained than was the
case historically. National barriers to entry have come down in several advanced industrial
countries, although there remain some regulatory and technical constraints applying to the
nuclear steam supply system (NSSS). A study by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
concluded that “NPP vendors are traditionally strong in their home countries, so preference
for a domestic supplier clearly plays a role in some cases”. There are, the study went on,
“formidable” technology barriers to firms that might seek to offer an NSSS, and indeed the
exceptional performance required from suppliers makes it expensive to enter the component
market.77 Nevertheless a competitive international market exists with sufficient technology
vendors to assure genuine competition (section 4.2) and through the localization of
component manufacture to develop new specialist suppliers (section 4.4).
Challenges have emerged as nuclear power plant (NPP) construction has started to take off
again. As the world economy slid into recession from 2008, earlier concerns that capacity to
manufacture and construct new nuclear power plants receded. Potential ‘pinch points’ in
capacity around large forging capacity and specialized alloys and rare earths along with the
retirement of experienced personnel from industry contributed to the rising cost estimates for
construction. A fall-off in orders for new NPPs in several industrial countries eroded
capability further. To ensure on-going capacity remains adequate as world economic growth
picks up again and confidence in nuclear technology recovers the supplier base will need to
maintain:
 Investment in capacity to minimize any potential bottlenecks;

 Certification to international standards of quality assurance in manufacturing and
construction processes to demonstrate that new suppliers can enter the market;
 Harmonization of national technical regulations where appropriate (see chapter 6).
Technology vendors have built up their own supply chains, and though these are not
necessarily exclusive relationships, a number of strategic partnerships exist.78 The current
line-up of key players may be grouped according to the reactor models being offered on the
market, as shown in section 5.2. There is a wide array of companies from around the world
which possess the capability to supply the civil nuclear industry.
This chapter also looks at the role of the international engineering, procurement and
construction (EPC) contractors in developing high performing and well integrated supply
chains and at the international professional support services sector.
77
NEA, 2008, Market Competition in the Nuclear Industry, Paris: OECD/NEA: pp. 33-35.
78
NEA, 2010, Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008, Paris: p. 321.

5.1 Components of the supply chain

Nuclear reactors employ sophisticated engineering to generate electricity and heat for
periods of 40 to 60 years, operating at relatively high temperatures and pressures. (An
operating life of up to 80 years is even being investigated for some US plants.) The main
components are often large, manufactured from specialized materials, precision-engineered
and capable of withstanding severe stresses and wear. Stainless steel with low cobalt
content is needed for some reactor applications to avoid a radiation risk, and this has to be
procured from specific nickel ore deposits and the steel alloy manufactured in controlled
batches especially for the nuclear industry.79 Instrumentation and control systems monitor a
wide range of conditions and functions and must be fully reliable even under exceptional
circumstances. The nuclear industry shares many features with the defence and
petrochemical sectors in terms of operating at the leading edge of technology. It also has a
lengthy history of reliable operational experience.
The supply chain for a nuclear power plant is usually divided into three elements:
 The Nuclear Island, comprising the NSSS, the reactor containment building, primary
mechanical and electrical systems and auxiliary systems (such as the used fuel
pool);
 The Conventional Island, which includes the turbines, secondary mechanical and
electrical support systems and the feed-water system; and,
 The Balance of Plant, covering the transmission links, water supply and cooling
towers, transportation and loading facilities, administration and workers’ welfare
blocks, emergency facilities, and so on.
The elements are illustrated in Figure 5.1.
In turn, these three elements of a nuclear power plant may be divided into two broad quality
categories:
 Plant structures, systems and components that must be of ‘nuclear grade’, which
involves meeting standards approved by the regulatory body that specify particular
technical requirements to assure safety, security and the safeguarding of nuclear
materials; all such items are either (i) ‘safety-related’ – which means that they are
essential to the control and shutdown of the nuclear reactor and to the prevention of
radiation release – or are (ii) ‘safety significant’ – that is, they contribute to the safety
of the plant.
 Other structures, systems and components that must conform to the commercial or
general industry standard set by the technology vendor.
79
Standard chromium-nickel stainless steels offer useful mechanical properties and corrosion
59
resistance, but may contain residual levels of naturally occurring cobalt ( Co), which transmutes
60
during a fission reaction to Co, an isotope that emits high energy gamma radiation that poses a
health hazard; Andrew Backhouse, Supply chain considerations for low-cobalt stainless steels in
nuclear power plants, Nuclear Exchange, September 2013: pp. 26-29.

Figure 5.1: Schematic of a PWR
Nuclear Island Conventional Island Balance of Plant
Source: University of Chicago, 2011, Analysis of GW-Scale Overnight Capital Costs: p. 8.
Table 5.1 illustrates these divisions in a matrix format for the main items in the supply chain.
As can be seen, the nuclear supply chain has certain very specific features not found in most
other industries, with the exceptions of aerospace and defence. In general, civil nuclear
power, aerospace and defence goods must provide exceptional performance: safety and
reliability must be demonstrated in management, at manufacture, during installation and in
operation and decommissioning. These principles are fundamental to the nuclear industry’s
philosophy and government safety regulatory bodies require the industry to demonstrate that
these are achieved in practice. This, in turn, means that the ‘paper trail’ has to be clear
through every stage of manufacture, installation, operation and decommissioning. This does
not come cheaply, with enhanced safety systems comprising around one-third of the capital
cost of a reactor.80
80 st
Ian Hore-Lacy, 2010, Nuclear Energy in the 21 Century: The World Nuclear University Primer,
London: World Nuclear Association: p. 98.

Table 5.1: Nuclear power plant structures, systems and components1

4
Nuclear industry grade components – Design Nuclear industry grade components – Other Commercial grade components & structures
2 3
specified or proprietary items safety-related items
NUCLEAR ISLAND
Containment structure (pre-stressed concrete Outer containment building (if applicable)
construction)
Reactor vessel (pressure vessel & reactor vessel head)
Shielding
Core internals (core support system, fuel channels, tube
and control rod array, primary moderator and/or coolant
circuit, etc.)
Pressurizer (if applicable, for a PWR)
Refuelling machine
Refuelling water storage pits (if applicable)
Reactor coolant system (secondary coolant circuit, pump, pipes, steam generator, etc.)
Radiation monitoring system Health physics equipment
Instrumentation and control system (computing, communication, process monitoring, alarms, etc.)
Polar crane (if applicable) Cranes, hoists, elevators
Emergency systems (lighting, condenser, auxiliary Platforms & ladders
shutdown, etc.)
Primary support systems (heating & ventilation, fire Primary support systems (lighting, etc.)
protection & prevention, etc.)
Electrical power system (cables, wiring, switch gear, Electrical power system (cables, wiring, switch gear,
transformers, batteries & chargers, etc.) transformers, batteries & chargers, etc.)
Mechanical equipment (some piping, some pumps, Mechanical equipment (piping, pumps, valves, tanks,
some valves, etc.) drains, etc.)
Spare parts for above equipment (bearings, flanges, etc.) Spare parts for above equipment (bearings, flanges,
fasteners, bolts, fuses, greases, seals, adhesives, etc.)
CONVENTIONAL ISLAND
Turbine hall
Main turbine
Main generator
Main condenser
Feed-water system

Secondary support systems (fire protection & Secondary support systems (heating & ventilation,
prevention, emergency lighting, etc.) lighting, etc.)
auxiliary transformers, batteries & chargers, etc.) transformers, batteries & chargers, etc.)
Mechanical equipment (piping, pumps, valves, tanks,
drains, heat exchangers, etc.)
Spare parts for above equipment (bearings, flanges, Spare parts for above equipment (bearings, flanges,
etc.) fasteners, bolts, fuses, greases, seals, adhesives, etc.)
BALANCE OF PLANT (SITE WORKS & SERVICES)

Training center (simulator, etc.) Technical support facilities (radiochemistry, sampling & High voltage towers, transformers, high voltage
analysis laboratory, etc.) disconnect switches, etc.
First aid medical center Cooling towers
Environmental monitoring system Water intake, circulation & discharge system
Secondary support systems (fire protection & Secondary support systems (heating & ventilation,
prevention, emergency lighting, etc.) lighting, etc.)
transformers, batteries & chargers, etc.) transformers, batteries & chargers, etc.)
Mechanical equipment (some piping, some pumps, Mechanical equipment (piping, pumps, valves, tanks,
some valves, etc.) drains, heat exchangers, etc.)
Operations center for emergency event management Auxiliary boiler
Emergency communication network Telecommunications
Emergency diesel generator Cranes, hoists & elevators
Emergency siren tower & siren warning system Railway connection
Emergency water reservoir/tank Roads & parking areas
Emergency water services Port facilities (if applicable)
Helicopter landing pad & refuelling facility Physical security system (gates, fencing, guardhouse,
alarms, monitoring cameras, etc.)
Outdoor lighting system
Maintenance & repair workshops
Warehouses & stores
Fuel oil storage facility
Staff welfare facilities (canteen, rest & recreation area,
etc.)

OFF-SITE FACILITIES SITE DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION SITE DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION
Evacuation center Earthworks, excavation, drainage & foundations
Water supply works
Building works (concrete works, pre-cast concrete, etc.) Building works (structural steel works, etc.)
Material assembly facilities
Transportation facilities
Lifting & hoisting plant
Rigging & hauling plant
Warehouses
Safety & security facilities Site management facilities
Non-destructive examination & testing facilities Quality control facilities
Workers’ welfare facilities
Notes:
1. Safety, security & safeguard features are an integral part of all specifications for plant, equipment, systems and works in accordance with
international/national technical regulations.
2. Tailor-made (according to vendor’s design specification) and suppliers’ proprietary products.
3. Licence specific items requiring certification from suppliers (e.g. ASME N-stamp certification).
4. Manufactured or constructed to commercial or industry standard. No specific nuclear requirement.

5.2 Capacity along the supply chain

The expansion of the nuclear supply chain in both developed and developing countries has
meant that there is adequate capacity in the sector. According to market research and
consulting company GlobalData, there were 147 companies holding an ASME N-stamp in
2009, which is required for the manufacture of vessels, pumps, valves, piping systems,
storage tanks, core support structures and concrete containments. Of these, 69 were
companies based in the USA and Canada, 22 were from the EU, and 52 from Asia.81 As
countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia take up the nuclear option, localization
programs will add to this supplier base. Competitive pressures will tend to restrain costs
although tough quality management and export control regimes, which we examine in
chapter 6, will restrict market entry.
The supply chain may be divided into several tiers, as in Figure 5.2. In the case of new
construction, the first tier comprises the client’s contractor, who might be an EPC contractor
or the principal technology vendor, or a partnership between them. In the example shown,
the Tier 1 contractor supplies the NSSS; but, depending on the way the client is undertaking
the procurement (see section 5.3) this could equally well be the complete NPP, as would be
the case in a turnkey contract package. A vertically-integrated company might well
manufacture a large proportion of a major component, like an RPV; in which case there will
be fewer tiers of sub-contracting.
Tier 2 is labelled ‘the system integrators’. If the client’s EPC contractor (Tier 1) contracted for
the NSSS, then the reactor vendor would be a Tier 2 supplier and a system integrator.
Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), here shown as Tier 3, provide major
components, such as steam generators, which in turn will include sub-components and sub-
assemblies from Tier 4 suppliers. Figure 5.2 shows that a steam generator’s supplier will
need to manufacture or procure tube bundles that, in turn, are formed from an alloy, which
requires inputs from raw material processors, and eventually mined ores. A reactor pressure
vessel (RPV) can be broken down into many different sub-components and sub-assemblies.
81
GlobalData, Asian rise visible in US N-stamp popularity jump, Nuclear Engineering International,
August 2010: pp. 36-37.

Figure 5.2: Tiers in the supply chain for a nuclear power plant
There are not just huge numbers of separate items in a nuclear reactor, but large quantities
of similar items. A modern LWR will have 2 000 kilometers of cabling, 210 km of piping,
5 000 valves, 200 pumps and 4 000 tonnes of forgings. So there is ample scope for
competition among suppliers below Tier 2, although new entrants will face a considerable
challenge in manufacturing to the requisite quality. The essential purpose of the NSSS is to
boil and circulate water and steam and seen from this angle it is a system made up of pipes,
pumps and valves.
Some of the key structures, systems and components for a PWR are illustrated in Figure
5.3. It shows how the NSSS breaks down into sub-systems and how these in turn are made
up from components and sub-components. Many of these items will be manufactured by
different companies and assembled into a finished component by an OEM.
Greater detail on suppliers is provided in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 at the end of this chapter. The
information is gathered from media sources (reporting deals for the supply of equipment),82
company websites, company brochures and exhibitor materials and publically available
reports.83 Historical data is included and therefore the inclusion of a supplier in the table of
reactor technology vendors’ supply chains does not imply that the company is a current
supplier to the industry or to the specific reactor model. The tables nevertheless map many
of the key suppliers to the nuclear power industry and demonstrate its international nature.
82
Including Platts UDI World Electric Power Plants Database, Platts Nuclear News Flashes and World
Nuclear News.
83
For example, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Events Reports provide
information from suppliers on items of safety-related equipment that have been furnished to US
nuclear power plants if an out of specification issue has been identified. See also the Westinghouse
letter to the NRC dated 16 November 2007 (reference DCP/NRC1917) submitting information on the
AP1000 Potential Vendor List for Safety Related suppliers.

Figure 5.3: Simplified breakdown of a PWR’s structures, systems and components

Forgings and large components

Amongst the most critical components are complex or heavy forgings, tubing and valves.
The containment vessel and the reactor vessel components, the turbine rotors and steam
generators on a Generation III NPP are made from nearly 200 forgings, amounting to over
4 000t of steel, some weighing 500-600t each.84 The EPR from AREVA uses four steam
generators, each weighing up to 500t. The ingots for the largest components in
Westinghouse’s AP1000 are at least 350t. There are a limited number of forging presses
capable of accepting such large hot steel ingots. Forging presses of about 140-150MN (14-
15 000t) capacity operate in Japan, China, Russia, South Korea and India. Since 2008,
AREVA Creusot Forge has renovated its forging presses of 7 500t and 11 300t and installed
a new 9 000t press in 2014. The current capacity situation is shown at Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Heavy forging capacity in 2014
Company Heavy forging Maximum ingot RPV* sets

press (tonnes) size (tonnes) a year
Japan Steel Works, Japan 14 000 x 2 600 12
Japan Casting & Forging Corp., Japan 13 000 500
Doosan Heavy Industries, South Korea 17 000 540
China First Heavy Industry, China 15 000 & 12 500 600 5
China Erzhong & Dongfang, China 16 000 & 12 700 600 5
Harbin Boiler, China 8 000
Shanghai Electric Group, China 16 500 & 12 000 600 6
Bharat Forge, India 14 000
Bharat Heavy Electricals, India 10 000
Larsen & Toubro, India 9 000 300
OMZ Izhora, Russia 15 000 600 4
OMZ Pilsen Steel, Czech Republic 12 000 250
Vitkovice Heavy Machinery, Czech Republic 12 000
AREVA, Le Creusot, France 11 300 & 9 000 250-260
Saarschmiede GmbH (Saarstahl), Germany 12 000
Sheffield Forgemasters, UK 10 000
Lehigh Heavy Forge Corp., USA 10 000 270
DCD Dorbyl, South Africa 14 000? 500?
* Or other major component
For reactor pressure vessels (RPVs), the leading suppliers include AREVA,
AtomEnergoMash, Chicago Bridge & Iron, Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction,
Equipos Nucleares, IHI Corporation, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, China First Heavy
84
Peter Alpem, US cedes capability for largest nuclear forgings, Industry Week, 24 June 2009 at
<www.industryweek.com/PrintArticle.aspx?ArticleID=19453>.

Industries, Dongfang Electric Corporation, Shanghai Electrical Group, Larsen & Toubro,
OMZ, Škoda, and Vitkovice Machinery Group. China First Heavy Industries manufactured its
first RPV for Sanmen 2 in 2014 under Westinghouse supervision, along with its first AP1000
steam generator. Shanghai Electrical has fabricated an RPV for Haiyang 2.
Steam generators transfer heat from the PWR’s coolant to the secondary coolant water
circuit to create steam, which passes through the steam line to the turbogenerator. (A BWR
does not have a steam generator as the coolant water is turned to steam within the reactor
pressure vessel itself. Steam generators are also used in PHWRs.) A PWR can have up to
four loops, each with a steam generator. The secondary coolant water enters the steam
generator at a temperature of over 200oC and leaves as dry steam at over 300oC. They can
weigh between 350 and 640 tonnes, be well over 20 m in length and contain several
thousand tubes to effect the heat exchange.
Major manufacturers include:
 AREVA, based on the Jeumont-Schneider works in northern France, has factory

floor space of 13 000 m2 to handle steam generators, pressurizers and pumps.
AREVA’s other site at Chalon/St-Marcel, with 39 000 m2 of covered workshop space,
manufactured the steam generators for the Olkiluoto EPR under construction in
Finland.
 Ansaldo Nucleare, a subsidiary of Ansaldo Energia SpA, which is scheduled for a
stock market listing, has supplied a range of nuclear components, including steam
generators, pressurizers and vessels. Ansaldo Nucleare no longer has the
manufacturing capability it formerly possessed but is considered strategically
important to maintaining the capacity of the Italian supply chain. The Fondo
Strategico Italiano, which owns 84.55 percent of Ansaldo shares, signed a strategic
partnership in May 2014 with Shanghai Electric to take a 40 percent stake in the
company.
 Dongfang Electric Corporation has manufactured steam generators, pressurizers
and reactor pressure vessels at its works in Chengdu.
 Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction Co. Ltd. is supplying the steam
generators to the NPPs being built in the USA, China and the United Arab Emirates.
 Equipos Nucleares SA (ENSA) has increased the cranage capacity at its Santander
works to 1 300 tonnes so as to handle much larger forged components.
 Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. replaced the steam generators for the Kori NPP’s
unit 1 in South Korea.
 Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI), which built a new plant at Yokohama in
2011 to manufacture large steam generators; the 3 000 m2 facility has special cranes
for loading them directly onto ships.
 The Joseph Oat Corporation can handle fabrications of up to 200 tonnes in its
11,000 m2 shop in Camden, New Jersey. It manufactures pressure vessels, casks
and heat exchangers.
 Larsen & Toubro Ltd. with heavy engineering facilities at Hazira and Mumbai can
handle several large fabrications simultaneously.
 Mangiarotti Nuclear SpA has a newly constructed 50 000 m2 heavy equipment
workshop at San Giorgio di Nogaro with port access to the Adriatic Sea, close to its
existing works at Monfalcone and Pannellia, Udine, in Italy. Westinghouse purchased

Mangiarotti in 2014 which was assembling the steam generators, after Mangiarotti
experienced financial problems.
 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) has manufactured over 100 of new and
replacement steam generators at its Kobe shipyard and machinery works. Since
1970, MHI has supplied steam generators to all of Japan’s PWRs.
 Shanghai Electric Nuclear Power Equipment Co. Ltd., part of the Shanghai Electric
Group, has been collaborating with ENSA to manufacture steam generators for the
Sanmen plant.
 The ZiO-Podolsk plant near Moscow has constructed steam generators weighing up
to 430 tonnes for reactors in Russia and overseas.
Manufacturers of steam generators also supply pressurizers and condensers for NPPs and
there is a significant market for replacements. Tube degradation through ageing – ‘tube
plugging’ – can mean that steam pressure decreases and this affects the plant’s electrical
output. EDF placed major orders worth € 1.1 billion for 32 replacement steam generators in
2011 to be delivered by 2018 with AREVA and ENSA and for 12 steam generators from
Westinghouse (€ 545M). These orders supplemented orders for 15 replacement steam
generators being supplied by a consortium of MHI and French manufacturer Comex
Nucléaire from the Kobe works since 2005.
Turbines
Larger NPPs with an electrical capacity of 1 000 MWe or over usually have low-speed (1500
or 1800 rpm depending on the frequency) turbines, which are more reliable and efficient.
These are made by Alstom, AtomEnergoMash, Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction,
GE Energy, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Siemens, and OMZ. In China, the market leaders
are Dongfang Electric Corporation, Harbin Electric, and Shanghai Electrical Group. In India,
Bharat Heavy Electricals and Larsen & Toubro are major suppliers. A joint venture
incorporating Alstom’s nuclear steam turbine technology business is to be established by GE
Energy with the support of the French government, which will buy a stake in the new
company – the Global Nuclear and French Steam Alliance – and hold intellectual property
rights. The Alstom board turned down a rival bid from Siemens to acquire the whole
company in June 2014 and which had also attracted interest from Hitachi and Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries.
Reactor cooling systems

Specialist valves and tubing are manufactured by the Vallourec Group, Vanatome, Alfa
Laval, Armatury, Larsen & Toubro, Sandvik, Sumitomo Metal Industries, Weir Power and
Industrial, and others. In April 2010, Sumitomo announced an investment in its Amagasaki
plant near Osaka, Japan, to triple production of steam generator tubes for PWRs, including
the Westinghouse AP1000. In March 2009, Vallourec stated that it was expanding capacity
at its tube production sites in France and the USA with an € 80M investment in its nuclear
business. Its subsidiary, Valinox Nucleaire plans to more than double its capacity at
Montbard for stainless steel and nickel alloy tubes for steam generators. Another subsidiary
Valtimet will double its production capacity for stainless steel tubes for secondary circuits in
Venarey-les-Laumes and at Brunswick, Georgia. It is also investing € 160M in expanding
production of seamless alloy steel tubes at its plant in Changzhou in China. A joint venture
with Boati Group, the Xi’an Baotimet Valinox Tubes company, started production in 2007.

The company undertakes a lot of its business with AREVA for the EPR. Vallourec and
Sumitomo are longstanding partners with joint ventures in Brazil, China and the USA.
Sandvik also has contracts with AREVA for steam generator tubes, and expanded its
capacity for high-alloy tubes at the Sandviken plant in Sweden. The Czech Armatury Group,
which supplies specialist valves and fittings for VVERs, opened a facility at Dolní Benešov in
2007. Combustibles Nucleares Argentinos (CONUAR) manufactures special alloy tubes for
steam generators and PHWR calandria at its Buenos Aires facility.
There are a number of OEMs providing flow control systems, including pumps and valves.
Pumps are an integral feature of several NPP systems. Most of the pumps in a nuclear
reactor are centrifugal pumps. They are used to drive a fluid around several systems,
including the reactor coolant system, the feedwater and service water systems, the
condensate and circulating water system, the residual heat removal system and the
emergency core cooling system. Pumps are often safety-related and have to operate almost
continuously over the reactor’s life (or be ready to operate at any time from a stand-still
state). Some must be able to operate continuously and reliably in harsh environments. They
become subject to considerable mechanical stress. A reactor coolant pump in an EPR can
drive the coolant flow at a rate of up to 28 000 m3 an hour. Most reciprocating pumps are
double-acting, which means they have valves that permit the discharge of the fluid on the
forward stroke and the recharge on the return stroke. They may also have a pressure relief
valve to protect the pump against pressures generated by the pump itself.
Pumps employ valves and actuators to control their operating cycle. Valves can be either
rotary (ball, plug or disk valves) or linear (globe or gate valves). They are used to regulate
the flow of a fluid and must be operated pneumatically (air operated valves), electrically
(motor operated valves) or manually. Actuators, a type of motor, are used to operate valves
on main steam lines, ventilation systems, service water systems and reactor isolation
systems.85 In safety-related systems electric valve actuators must perform under potentially
harsh conditions to control coolant flow when normally they are idle; so they have to be
highly reliable. Flow systems will also require pressure relief valves to safeguard the system.
Industrial consolidation and the localization of manufacturing facilities have resulted in the
formation of a number of specialized groups. Major providers of centrifugal pumps include:
 Afrikantov OKBM joint stock company, part of the RosAtom State Corporation, has
designed and produced primary and circulating pumps, including pumps for the
NPPs under construction at Tianwan and Kudankulam, as well as in Russia.
 AREVA JSPM Equipement, manufactures reactor coolant pumps and other
motorized pumps.
 Dongfang Electric Corporation has a joint venture with AREVA for primary reactor
coolant pumps.
 Curtis-Wright Flow Control Co. has supplied equipment, motors and systems for
NPPs since the 1950s, including pumps, valves and actuators. The group includes
specialized business units, such as EMD.
85
John Gonzales, A New Age of Automation, Nuclear Engineering International, 21 January 2011.

 EBARA Corporation has manufacturing facilities at Haneda and Futtsu in Japan and
in China (EBARA Boshan Pumps Co. Ltd.)
 Flowserve Corporation is a long established supplier to the nuclear industry,
including Class 1 pumps for use within the reactor and incorporates brands such as
Byron Jackson and Durco. A 9 300 m2 manufacturing facility was opened in
Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, India, for domestic and export markets.
 Hayward Tyler Inc. was formed through the acquisition of the pump division of
Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd. and the Westinghouse condensate pump division.
 HMS Pumps joint stock company, based in Livny, Russia, supplies to a number of
industries requiring pumps for extreme conditions, including nuclear power plants.
 Kirloskar Brothers Ltd is one of the largest fluid handling specialists in India and
has supplied pumps and valves for the pumping heavy water and cooling water. It
has several manufacturing facilities.
 KSB AG is a major supplier of reactor coolant pumps, feedwater and condensate
pumps and safety injection pumps for PWRs in Europe, China, Korea and the USA.
The company has production facilities in Germany, France, the Americas and Asia
(including Shanghai and Pune).
 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries manufactures a range of pumps, including reactor
coolant pumps.
 SPX Flow Technology, formerly Sealed Power Corporation, incorporating historic
suppliers to the nuclear industry, such as Balcke-Dürr, Copes-Vulcan and Clyde
Union Pumps.
 Sulzer Pumps’s operation in Portland, Oregon, has supplied pumps and valves to
PWRs, BWRs and PHWRs across North America and beyond. It incorporates the
heritage Bingham design pumps and Willamette valves.
 Teikoku Electric Manufacturing Co. Ltd., incorporating Chempump, a US
manufacturer, has sealed pumps for the circulation and chemical and volume control
systems.
 Weir Power and Industrial provides pumps and compressors. It has operations in
France, the UK and China supplying nuclear applications.
Prominent suppliers of valves and actuators include:

 Arako spol. s.r.o. supplied valves for NPPs under construction in India, Russia and
Ukraine as well as for operating plants in Eastern Europe. It is owned by
AtomEnergoMash, part of the RosAtom Group.
 AUMA, based in Germany but with facilities through subsidiaries or joint ventures in
the EU, India and Russia. In 2004 the company expanded its Mülheim factory to a
production area of 12 400 m2.
 Armatury Group a.s., has provided high-pressure valves for the nuclear industry, in
particular for VVERs.
 Bernard Controls Group has supplied actuators to over 100 reactors worldwide
inside and outside the nuclear containment. Its factory is based in Gonesse, on the
outskirts of Paris.
 Conval Inc. of Somers CT, USA, is the supplier of Clampseal forged steel valves for
the nuclear industry.

 Dresser Consolidated, part of GE Energy since 2011, produces safety-related

pressure relief valves for PWRs, BWRs and PHWRs. Its major facility at Alexandria,
Louisiana, has a production area of 23 000 m2 and a new 7 400 m2 factory has been
established in Suzhou, Jiangsu, in China. Dresser Masoneilan, part of Dresser Inc.,
has supplied control valves to China’s NPPs.
 Dresser-Rand Company has an established position in supplying Terry pump drive
steam turbines to US nuclear plants. Siemens announced its intention to buy
Dresser-Rand in September 2014, which has a significant oil and gas business.
 Emerson Process Management offers instrumentation, control and automation to
the power industry under several brands. In the nuclear sector its leading brand is
Fisher Controls International, which has supplied control valves and actuators for
PWRs and BWRs, including the AP1000 units being built in China and the USA. The
company also owns the ASCO Valve brand of solenoid operated valves, switches
and actuators used in BWRs, PWRs and PHWRs.
 Flowserve Corporation supplies valves from its Atomac, Durco, Gestra and Valtek
ranges and is supplying steam isolation valves and Limitorque actuators to China.
 Guichon Valves has supplied ball and globe valves adapted for the nuclear industry
from their works in Chambéry, Rhône-Alpes, France.
 Högfors Oy opened a new valve factory in 2009 in Salo, Finland. It has supplied
butterfly valves for Finnish reactors and internationally.
 KSB AG supplied 5 000 valves for the Angra 2 PWR in Brazil and over 1 000 valves
for Olkiluoto 3 in Finland.
 Larsen & Toubro Ltd. have a valve business unit, based in Chennai and a high-tech
valve facility at Coimbatore.
 Oka Ltd. specializes in safety valves for NPPs and has supplied these to the Bushehr
and Kudankulam NPPs as well as to Russian plants.
 Okano Valve Manufacturing Co. Ltd. supplies pressure safety valves for BWRs.
 Pentair is a supplier of actuators, valves and flow control systems, based in
Minneapolis, USA. In 2012 it merged this business with that of Tyco Flow Control,
whose brands included Crosby, SABO and Sempell for LWR steam isolation,
pressure relief and safety valves. Sempell valves have been installed most recently
in China.
 Rotork Plc provides electric actuators and gearboxes for nuclear applications. The
company also supplies fluid power valve actuators. Manufacturing sites are located in
Europe, particularly Bath in the UK and Lucca in Italy, as well as in Asia and the
USA.
 SPX Flow Technology also offers Copes-Vulcan control and isolation valves and
actuators.
 Thompson Valves, part of UK-based IMI Nuclear, has supplied nuclear-qualified
valves under its Ashford brand for safety-related applications for a range of LWRs,
PHWRs, and gas-cooled reactors. IMI Nuclear is a division of IMI Plc’s Critical
Engineering platform, which also includes CCI (Control Components Inc.), Newman
Hattersley technology for Candu, and Zimmermann and Jansen. The company offers
severe service valves and actuators for the oil and gas and power generation
markets as well as system medium actuated technology for isolation valves and pilot-
operated safety valves.

 Toa Valve Engineering Inc., Japan, has supplied steam isolation valves, pressure
relief valves and others for BWRs.
 TyazhPromArmatura joint stock company opened a new workshop in 2009 for high-
tech long-life valves for thermal and nuclear power plants at its Aleksin facility in the
Tula region of Russia.
 Weir Power and Industrial manufactures the Sarasin and Sebim ranges of specialist
nuclear valve that are designed to operate under high temperatures. The company
has manufacturing facilities in France, the UK, the USA and China and has supplied
safety relief valves and main steam isolation valves for LWRs and PHWRs. It has
also supplied the Khmelnitsky NPP in Ukraine with relief valves.
 Velan Inc. has provided control valves for the EPR design, and a range of valves for
LWR and PHWR reactors.
Flow systems are vulnerable to corrosion and erosion over time. The integrity of seals is also
crucial. As with other nuclear grade components a service life of 60 years is now envisaged.
Servicing and refurbishment of equipment have to be scheduled to fit with longer operating
periods and shorter shutdowns. Service intervals are being extended from 5 to 10 years but
this depends upon national regulation.
With NPPs of varying ages and models there is a market for replacement equipment,
including for discontinued product ranges that can require special manufacturing runs and
modified items that can be substituted.
Many other significant items of equipment and plant are required in an NPP, including heat
exchangers, tanks, lifting devices, cabling, electrical, electronic and mechanical systems.
5.3 The role of EPC contractors

An expansion in nuclear build is likely to involve greater involvement of engineering,
procurement and construction (EPC) contractors employed to project manage, sometimes
on a turnkey basis. Utilities and government agencies from countries with little or no
experience in constructing NPPs can buy in the capability from an EPC contractor to
manage the complexity a first-of-a-kind (FOAK) engineering project entails. The EPC
contractor should bring project management and construction experience from other
industries as well as familiarity with more recent nuclear new build good practice. Its
procurement role will be crucial in developing a reliable and integrated supply chain.
A survey of industry professionals conducted by consultants Arthur D Little suggested that a

number of factors linked to project management and governance were responsible for cost
overruns on new NPP construction.86 These included:
 Starting construction before the completion of the detailed design leading to the late
introduction of design modifications;
 Failure to appreciate regulatory requirements and to incorporate these into the
detailed design and procurement strategy;
86
Arthur D Little, 2010, Nuclear New Build Unveiled: Managing the complexity challenge, Boston MA:
p.11.

 Interface issues between parties (including language use and lack of clarity in
defining responsibilities);
 Insufficient planning by the plant owner;
 Inadequate staff training by the parties.
The high degree of interdependency between the plant owners and EPC contractors “must
not be underestimated”, the consultants concluded. The relationship has to endure over the
life of the construction project, and possibly beyond. The plant owner and the EPC
contractor need to take account of each other’s capability and experience to determine
functional responsibilities for: engineering and project planning; construction; procurement of
materials, structures, components and systems; quality control and commissioning. In some
cases the partners may establish a joint team, sharing office and site facilities to facilitate
communication and problem-solving.
Good practice suggests that the partners will wish to focus on their respective but
complementary goals, which are:
 For the plant owner: to have a high degree of certainty that the project will be
completed to time and budget;
 For the EPC contractor: to have an incentive to complete the project profitably to the
client’s satisfaction.
Their contract and working arrangements should therefore recognize the aims each partner
is seeking to achieve and the shared risks that they each accept to further their mutual goal
of completing the project as planned. Alternative contracting arrangements are available
(see Table 5.3).The choice of contracting method will be determined by the plant owner’s
project management capability and experience and it is evident from case studies that a
utility’s past experience in managing plant maintenance may not sufficient to enable it to take
on a major refurbishment or new build project. A risk management tool will be needed to
enable the project team to plan and adapt, while keeping the project on track in terms of cost
and schedule.
A construction project of this size is by its nature complex, involving many sub-contractors, a
large and temporary workforce and often an evolution in the original design. Even with
sophisticated 3D computer-aided design tools, the actual construction and installation can
require modifications. In a regulatory environment that mandates prior authorization of
changes to safety-significant items, this can easily lead to disruption in the work schedule,
re-work, additional expense and delay. An EPC contractor can bring valuable experience
from nuclear and non-nuclear projects which can minimize the likelihood of design
modification as construction proceeds.

Table 5.3: Approaches to contracting strategy for major projects
Contracting Scope of Advantages Risks

method responsibility
Multi-package Prime contractors Plant owner Owner’s project
deliver discrete enjoys direct management is spread
packages of control over the over a multiplicity of
engineering, works and project. contractors.
component supply. Packages can be
tendered to a
wider range of
suppliers.
Split-package Responsibility for the Plant owner Accountability for risks

works is divided retains detailed may be blurred unless
between two to five oversight of the there is a strong project
EPC contractors (e.g. project but must management
for nuclear island, coordinate organization set up by
conventional island, contractors. the plant owner.
civil engineering, etc.).
Single EPC EPC contractor Reduced need for Clear accountability for
package assumes responsibility owner’s project performance is
for completing all management required to ensure risks
phases of the project. organization. are managed. A close
and durable
relationship must be
fostered between the
plant owner and the
EPC contractor.
At the same time the risks associated with a nuclear power plant project are significant. With
regulatory and societal risks difficult to determine accurately, the plant owner has to accept a
large proportion of project management responsibility during construction. So although a
turnkey project is conceivable, whereby the scope of work covers the whole project through
to commissioning, this has in practice not always worked well. AREVA and its client TVO
have found themselves in disagreement over the construction of the Olkiluoto 3 project,
which was let on a turnkey project at a global price. RosAtom offers a Build-Own-Operate
(BOO) service, whereby the utility and the vendor agree a long-term power purchase
agreement, with a specified feed-in tariff. But these contractual arrangements are made
within the framework of a government-to-government agreement that reduces the
uncertainties regarding political approval.
Experience in nuclear new build projects will contribute to the strengthening of a safety
culture on the construction site. In the construction industry, management and workforce
move from project to project and may be used to safety and quality control regimes that do
not match the high standards expected in the nuclear sector. Even if the plant owner is an
experienced NPP operator, it may lack the expertise in managing a construction site
workforce that is necessary to instil an appropriate safety culture. Such a culture will
prioritize safety considerations ahead of scheduling and cost control and can easily lead to
cost overrun if not managed within an integrated framework (see section 8.3).

An EPC contractor can also bring in ‘best-in-class’ procurement practices and hedging
techniques that reduce the financial risks arising from exchange rate variation and inflation.
With a strategic partnership between the EPC contractor and the technology vendor in place,
the project can take advantage of deals with suppliers to secure manufacturing capacity for
long-delivery items, early purchasing of materials and bulk discounts for standardized
components or on repeat orders. The EPC contractor may also be able to provide temporary
site facilities and services more cheaply.
Leading EPC companies with nuclear construction experience include AtomEnergoProekt

with AtomStroyExport, Bechtel Corporation, China Nuclear Power Engineering (CNPE),
China Nuclear Power Engineering Corp. (CNPEC), Daewoo Engineering & Construction, the
E4 Group, Hyundai E&C, Industrias Metalúrgicas Pescarmona SA (IMPSA), Jacobs
Engineering Group, Korea Electric Power Corporation E&C, Samsung C&T Corporation,
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. (which took over the Shaw Power Group), SNC-Lavalin and
Toshiba E&C. Most of these operate internationally across several industries and project-
manage a range of power projects, including renewable, geothermal and fossil-fuelled
plants.
A number of utilities manage the engineering, procurement and project management without
recourse to an EPC contractor, notably EDF and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, as does the
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. Nevertheless it will be the global EPC companies
that will foster the internationalization of the supply chain alongside the technology vendors.
Their access to local manufacturers and construction companies active in non-nuclear and
defence sectors will facilitate the opening of nuclear-related capability around the world.
5.4 Professional and engineering services support

Professional and engineering services to the nuclear industry are available to assist
companies plan and implement major projects and operations. This section provides an
overview of the principal organizations with a strong specialist capability and a significant
international presence.
Planning a major project requires access to information, analytical and design resources that
can be acquired externally if it is beyond the capacity of the investor/developer to deliver in-
house. The types of service demanded may include legal and regulatory advice,
accountancy and financial services, insurance, engineering and technical services, feasibility
studies, project management and market research. Some of the most prominent service
providers are shown in Table 5.4. (See also section 8.2.1 for quality certification suppliers.)

Table 5.4: Major providers of professional services to the global nuclear industry
Legal services Financial services

Milbank
Allen & Overy
Morgan Lewis & Barclays HSBC
Baker & McKenzie
Brockius BNP Paribas Natixis
Burges Salmon
Norton Rose Fulbright Citibank Nordea
Cameron McKenna
Pillsbury Winthrop Crédit Agricole Royal Bank of
Clifford Chance
Shaw Pittman Deutsche Scotland
Eversheds
Pinsent Masons Credit Suisse Sberbank
Freshfields Bruckhaus
Shearman & Sterling Gazprom Société Générale
Deringer
ThirtyNine Essex GE Capital Markets Sumitomo Mitsui
Herbert Smith
Street
Freehills
White & Case
Accountancy Insurance services

American Nuclear
Insurers Marsh & McLennan
Aon Nuclear Electric
Deloitte Assuratome Insurance
EY (Ernst & Young) Crawford Nuclear Risk Insurers
KPMG European Mutual Price Forbes &
PricewaterhouseCoopers Association for Partners
(PwC) Nuclear Insurance Russian Association
European Liability of Nuclear Insurers
Insurance for the SOGAZ
Nuclear Industry
Engineering & technical services Strategy advice

International Nuclear
AECOM (URS)
Services
Altran
HSB Global
AMEC Accenture Oliver Wyman
Standards
Ansaldo Nucleare Booz Allen Hamilton PA Consulting
Mott MacDonald
Aquila Boston Consulting PwC
MPR
Arup EY (Ernst & Young) Rider Levett Buknall
M+W Group
Assystem IBM Roland Berger
Nuvia
Atkins Lightbridge Rolls-Royce
Parsons Brinckerhoff
Boccard McKinsey & Co Tata Consulting
Pöyry
Burns & McDonnell NAC International Services
Sargent & Lundy
CH2M Hill
Siempelkamp
Cockerill
Tecnicas Reunidas
ENERCON
Worley Parsons
Project management advice Market data & research

Nuclear Energy
PwC Bloomberg Insider (FCBI)
Exelon Nuclear Partners Serco CRU Platts (McGraw Hill)
IBM Thales Global Trade Media Engerati/
Worley Parsons IHS SPIntelligent
Ux Consulting

Table 5.5a: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components – Pressurized Water Reactor87
EPR VVER-1000, 1200 &
CNP-600 OPR1000 & APR1400 APWR-1400 & 1700 AP1000
(based on N4 & Konvoi) TOI
Design: AREVA Reactors Design: China Design: OKB Design: Korea Electric Design: Mitsubishi Design: Westinghouse
& Services, Paris (FR) National Nuclear Gidropress, RosAtom Power Corp. E&C Heavy Industries Electric Co., Cranberry
Corporation-NPIC, State Corporation (RU) (KEPCO) Seoul (KR) (MHI), Kobe (JP) PA (US)
Beijing (CN)
Architect Engineer: Architect Engineer: Architect Engineer: Architect Engineer: Architect Engineer: Architect Engineer:
Électricité de France (EDF), Shanghai Nuclear AtomEnergoProekt JSC Korea Electric Power MHI Nuclear Burns & Roe Inc., Oradel NJ
Paris (FR) Engineering Research (AEP) (formerly SPb AEP), Corp. Engineering & Engineering Co Ltd., (US)
and Design Institute St Petersburg/ NIAEP Construction (KEPCO Tokyo (JP) Burns & McDonnell, Kansas
(SNERDI), Shanghai OJSC, Nizhny Novgorod E&C), Seoul (KR) City, MO (US)
(CN) (RU)
EPC: EPC: EPC: EPC: EPC: EPC:

- Électricité de France - China Nuclear - AtomTechnoProm ZAO - Korea Hydro & Nuclear - Mitsubishi Atomic - Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.,
(EDF), Paris (FR) Engineering & NPK, Moscow (RU) Power Co., Seoul (KR) Power Industries Inc. Plainfield IL & Charlotte NC
- Bechtel Corporation, San Construction - TechnoPromExport JSC - Samsung C&T Corp. Tokyo (JP) (US)
Francisco (US) Corporation (CNEC), (TPE), Moscow (RU) (E&C Group), Seoul (KR) - Taisei Corporation, - Nuvia Ltd (Soletanche
- Jacobs Engineering Group, Beijing (CN) NIKIMT - Hyundai E&C, Seoul Tokyo (JP) Freyssinet, Vinci Group),
Pasadena CA (US) - FNK Engineering, St (KR) - Black & Veatch Warrington (UK)
- China Nuclear Power Petersburg (RU) - Daelim Industrial Co. Corporation, Overland - China Nuclear Power
Engineering Corp. (CNPEC, - Titan-2 JSC, Sosnovy Ltd., Seoul (KR) Park, Kansas City KS Engineering Corp. (CNPEC,
part of CGN), Shenzhen Bor, Leningrad (RU) - Daewoo Engineering & (US) part of CGN), Shenzhen
(CN) - EnergoProekt, Kyiv (UA) Construction, Seoul (KR) (CN)
- Shanghai Electric Group (E4 Group) - Doosan Babcock Ltd.
Co. Ltd., Shanghai (CN) - Škoda JS a.s., Plezň Renfrew (UK)
- Construtora Andrade (CZ) - SK Engineering &
Gutiérrez SA, São Paulo - Iberdrola Ingeniería y Construction Co. Ltd.,
(BR) Construcción SAU, Seoul (KR)
- Construtora Quieroz Erandio, Bilbao (ES) - GS E&C Corporation,
Galvão, Rio de Janeiro (BR) - Worley Parsons Ltd, Seoul (KR)
Sydney (AU)
87
N.B. The inclusion of named companies is an indication of potential capability in one or more elements of the component and does not imply that the
company is a current supplier to the industry or the specific reactor model.

Table 5.5b: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components – Pressurized Water Reactor (continued)
VVER-1000, 1200 & OPR1000 & APWR-1400 &
EPR CNP-600 AP1000
TOI APR1400 1700
Civil construction: Civil construction: Civil construction: Civil construction: Civil construction: Civil construction:
- Bouygues Construction, - China Nuclear - AtomStroy OJSC, - Samsung C&T Corp. - Obayashi - Iberdrola Ingeniería y
Saint-Quentin-en-Yveline, Engineering & Moscow (RU) (E&C Group) Seoul (KR) Corporation, Tokyo Construcción SAU, Erandio,
Paris (FR) Construction Corporation - Park Teknik (Ciner - Hyundai E&C, Seoul (JP) Bilbao (ES)
- Vinci SA, Rueil Malmaison, (CNEC), Beijing (CN) Group), Ankara (TR) (KR) - Iberdrola Ingeniería y
Paris (FR) - Hua Xing Nuclear - China Nuclear Power - Daewoo Engineering & Construcción SAU,
- Kier Group Ltd, Sandy, in JV Construction Co. (HXCC) Engineering Co (CGNPC Construction, Seoul Erandio, Bilbao (ES)
with BAM Nuttall Ltd., (subsidiary of CNEC), Group), (CN) (KR)
Camberley (UK) Yangzhou (Jiangsu) (CN) - Daelim Industrial Co.
- China Nuclear Engineering & - China Nuclear Industry Ltd., Seoul (KR)
Construction Corporation Construction Co. #22 & 24 - Doosan Heavy
(CNEC), Beijing (CN) (CNI22 & CNI24), (CNEC Industries &
- Hua Xing Nuclear subsidiaries), Beijing (CN) Construction Co. Ltd.,
Construction Co. (HXCC) - China State Construction Changwon (KR)
(subsidiary of CNEC), Engineering Co. Ltd. - SK E&C Construction
Yangzhou (Jiangsu) (CN) (CSCEC), Beijing (CN) Co. Ltd., Seoul (KR)
- GS E&C Corporation,
Seoul (KR)
Containment structure: Containment structure: Containment structure: Containment structure: Containment structure: Containment structure:
- Bouygues Construction, - China Nuclear Industry - OAO MetroStroy, St - Samsung C&T - Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.
Saint-Quentin-en-Yveline, Fifth Construction Co, Petersburg (RU) (Construction & Trading) (CB&I), President's Island,
Paris (FR) & VSL International (CNEC subsidiary), Beijing - NPO Mostovik OOO, Corp. (E&C Group), Memphis TN (US)
(part of Bouygues), Saint- (CN) Omsk (Western Siberia) Seoul (KR) - IHI Corporation
Légier (CH) - China Nuclear Industry (RU) - Hyundai E&C (Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy
- Eiffage SA, Paris (FR) & Construction Co. #22 - Hindustan Construction (Engineering & Industries), Yokohama (JP)
Carillion Plc, Wolverhampton (CNI22), (CNEC Company Ltd. (HCC), Construction), Seoul - Shandong Electric Power
(UK) JV subsidiary), Beijing (CN) Mumbai (IN) (KR) Construction Corp. (SEPCO)
- Nuvia Travaux Spéciaux - China Nuclear Industry - Nuvia Travaux Spéciaux - Daewoo E&C, Seoul /Shandong Nuclear Power
(Soletanche Freyssinet Construction Co. #23 (Soletanche Freyssinet (KR) Construction Group Corp. ,
Group), Aix-en-Provence (FR) (CNI23), (CNEC Group), Aix-en-Provence - Doosan Heavy Jinan (Shandong) (CN)
- VSL International Ltd, Köniz subsidiary), Beijing (CN) (FR) Industries & - China First Heavy
(CH) Construction Co. Ltd., Industries Group Co. Ltd,
- Babcock Noell Nuclear Changwon (KR) Dalian (Liaoning) & Qiqihar
GmbH, Wűrzberg (DE) - SK Engineering & (Heilongjiang) (CN)
- Shandong Electric Power Construction Co. Ltd., - Laing O'Rourke Plc.,
Construction Corp. (SEPCO) Seoul (KR) Dartford (UK)
/Shandong Nuclear Power - GS E&C Corporation,
Construction Group Corp., Seoul (KR)
Jinan (Shangdon) (CN)

Table 5.5c: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components – Pressurized Water Reactor (continued)
VVER-1000, 1200 & OPR1000 &
EPR CNP-600 APWR-1400 & 1700 AP1000
TOI APR1400
Reactor vessel: Reactor vessel: Reactor vessel: Reactor vessel: Reactor vessel: Reactor vessel:
- AREVA, Chalon Saint- - China Nuclear - OMZ Group (GazProm - Doosan Heavy - Mitsubishi Heavy - Saarschmiede GmbH
Marcel & Le Creusot (FR) Engineering & Group), Izhora Plant, Industries & Industries Ltd. (MHI), (Saarstahl AG), Völklingen
- Brück GmbH, Saarbrücken Construction Group (CN) Kolpino (St Petersburg) Construction Co. Ltd, Kobe (JP) (DE)
(DE) - China First Heavy (RU) Changwon (KR) - Japan Steel Works - Mangiarotti Nuclear SpA,
- Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Industries, Heilongjiang - Russian Energy Machine (JSW), Muroran (JP) Udine & Monfalcone (Friuli),
Energy Inc., Baberton OH & (CN) Building Company - Kobe Steel Group [merged with former Ansaldo
Mount Vernon IN (US) - Shanghai Electric Group, (REMCO) & ZiO (KOBELCO), Takasago Camozzi Energy Special
- Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Shanghai (CN) (AtomEnergoMash), & Harima (JP) Components SpA and now
(MHI), Kobe (JP) - Deyang Heavy Podolsk (Moscow) (RU) - Japan Casting & owned by Westinghouse],
- Japan Steel Works (JSW), Equipment Co Ltd. (China - ZAO PetrozavodskMash, Forging Corporation (JP) Milan (IT)
Muroran (JP) Erzhong Group), Shanghai Petrozavodsk (Karelia) - Vítkovice a.s., Ostrava (CZ)
- China Nuclear Engineering (CN) (RU) - Doosan Heavy Industries &
& Construction Group (CN) - Shanghai Morimatsu - Škoda JS a.s., Plezň Construction Ltd, Changwon
- China First Heavy Pressure Vessel Co, (CZ) (KR)
Industries Group Co. Ltd, Shanghai (CN) - Vítkovice Heavy - IHI Corporation, Yokohama
Dalian (Liaoning) & Qiqihar - Hubei Nuclear Power Machinery a.s. (Vítkovice (JP)
(Heilongjiang) (CN) Equipment Co., Wuhan Machinery Group), - Japan Steel Works (JSW),
- Shanghai Electric Group (Hubei) (CN) Ostrava (CZ) Muroran (JP)
Co. Ltd., Shanghai (CN) - China First Heavy - ZAO EnergoMash - Nuclebras Equipamentos
Industries Group Co. Ltd, (Volgodonsk) AtomMash, Pesados SA (NUCLEP), Rio
Dalian (Liaoning) & Volgodonsk (Rostov) (RU) de Janeiro (BR)
Qiqihar (Heilongjiang) - Larsen & Toubro,
(CN) Mumbai (IN)
- Shandong Nuclear
Power Equipment
Manufacturing Co. (part of
SNPTC ), Haiyang
(Shandong) (CN)
- Harbin Boiler Co, Harbin
(Heilongjiang) (CN)

Table 5.5d: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components – Pressurized Water Reactor (continued)
VVER-1000, 1200 & OPR1000 & APWR-1400 &
EPR CNP-600 AP1000
TOI APR1400 1700
Core internals: Core internals: Core internals: Core internals: Core internals: Core internals:
- Valinox Nucléaire, Montbard - Deyang Heavy Equipment - ZiO Mar, (part of - Doosan Heavy - Mitsubishi Heavy - Valinox Nucléaire, Montbard (FR)
(Vallourec Group) (FR) Co Ltd. (China Erzhong AtomEnergoMash) Industries & Industries Ltd. (MHI), & Nansha, Guangzhou
- Eiffel (Eiffage Group), Group), Shanghai (CN) Podolsk (Moscow) (RU) Construction Co. Ltd, Kobe (JP) (Guangdong) (CN)
Frouard, Nancy (FR) - Jiaxing Merkers Machinery - OMZ Group (GazProm Changwon (KR) - Kobe Steel Group - KSB AG, Frankenthal & Halle
- RÉEL SA, Nantes (FR) Co., Baibu Industrial Zone, Group), Izhora Plant, - Hyundai Heavy (KOBELCO), (DE)
- KSB AG, Frankenthal & (DE) Jiaxing, Zhejiang (CN) Kolpino (St Petersburg) Industries Co. Ltd Takasago (JP) - Westinghouse Electric Co.,
- Loire Industrie, Saint- - Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-tech (RU) (HHI), Ulsan (KR) Newington NH (US)
Chamond, Loire (FR) Metals Co Ltd., Huzhou - Škoda JS a.s., Plezň - BHI Co. Ltd., - Westinghouse Electric Co.,
- Outokumpu Oyj, Espoo, (FI) (Zhejiang) (CN) (CZ) Gunbuk, nr. Western Zirconium plant, Ogden
- Rolls-Royce, Derby (UK) Changwon (KR) – UT (US)
- Siempelkamp Nuklear - Samshin Ltd., - CB&I Modular Solutions, Lake
Technik GmbH, Krefeld (DE) Cheonan (KR) Charles LA (US)
- Škoda JS a.s., Plezň (CZ) - Joseph Oat Corp., Camden NJ
- Excon Steel a.s., Hradec (US)
Králové (CZ) - Outokumpu Oyj, Espoo, (FI)
- Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear - Tioga Pipe Inc., Houston TX (US)
Energy Inc., Baberton OH & - Westerman Nuclear LLC,
Mount Vernon IN (US) Bremen OH (US)
- Curtiss-Wright Corp., Cheswick,
Pittsburgh PA (US)
- Shanghai Electric Heavy Industry Group, Shanghai (CN)
- EBARA Corp., Futtsu (JP)
- Shanghai Electric Group Co. Ltd. and SEC-KSB Nuclear Pumps
- Toshiba Corporation, Keihin
& Valves Co. Ltd., Lingang, Shanghai (CN)
Product Operations, Isogo &
Tsurumi, Yokohama (JP)
Polar crane: Polar crane: Polar crane:

- Eiffel (Eiffage Group), Lautherbourg (FR) - ?AtomEnergoMash - NKM Noell Special Cranes GmbH (RÉEL Group), Veitshöchheim, Wűzburg (DE)
- NKM Noell Special Cranes GmbH (RÉEL Group), Wűzburg (DE) OJSC (AEM) (part of - Konecranes Oy, Hyvinkää (FI), ?Kűnzelsau & Liebengrűn (DE)
- Konecranes Oy, Hyvinkää (FI), ?Kűnzelsau & Liebengrűn (DE), AtomEnergoProm), - Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik GmbH, Krefeld (DE)
?East Kilbride (GB), & JV Shanghai High Tech Industrial Cranes, Moscow (RU) - NuCrane Manufacturing LLC (PaR Nuclear Inc. [subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric Co.] &
Shanghai (CN) - ? OAO Baltkran, Hutchinson Manufacturing LLC JV), Hutchinson, Minneapolis-St. Paul MN (US)
- ?Demag Cranes AG (DE) Kaliningrad (RU) - PaR-TZ Nuclear Co. (PaR Nuclear Inc. & Taiyuan Heavy Machinery Group Co. JV), Taiyuan
- Shanghai Electric Group Co. Ltd., Shanghai (CN) - Škoda JS a.s., Plezň (CN)
- Taiyuan Heavy Industry Co. Ltd. (TYHI), Taiyuan (Shanxi) (CN) (CZ) - Ederer LLC (PaR Systems Inc.), Brunswick GA (US)
- ?Jiangsu SanMa Crane Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (JV with - ? Columbus McKinnon (US)
Konecranes), Jingjiang (Jiangsu) (CN) - Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction Co. Ltd., Changwon (KR)
- ?Shaanxi SanMa Crane Machinery Co. Ltd. (JV with - ?Kito (JP)
Konecranes), Xi'an (Shaanxi) (CN) - Doosan Vina Cranes (Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction Co. Ltd.), (VN)
- Dalian Huarui Heavy Industry & Crane Co Ltd., Quanshui, Dalian
(Liaoning) (CN)

Table 5.5e: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components – Pressurized Water Reactor (continued)
VVER-1000, 1200 &
EPR CNP-600 OPR1000 & APR1400 APWR-1400 & 1700 AP1000
TOI
Reactor coolant system & Reactor coolant system Reactor coolant system & Reactor coolant system & Reactor coolant system Reactor coolant system &
components: & components: components: heavy components: & components: components:
- AREVA JSPM - Shanghai Electric - AtomEnergoMash OJSC - Doosan Heavy Industries - Mitsubishi Heavy - Ansaldo Nucleare SpA,
Equipement, Jeumont (FR)& Nuclear Power (AEM) (part of & Construction Co. Ltd, Industries/ Weir Group, Genova (IT)
AREVA Dongfang, Deyan Equipment Co. Ltd. AtomEnergoProm), Changwon (KR) Glasgow (UK) JV - Equipos Nucleares SA (ENSA)
(Sichuan) (Shanghai Electric Moscow (RU) -Hyosung Power & (SEPI Group), Santander (ES)
- AREVA Zirconium Group), Shanghai & - ZiO-MAR (part of Industrial Systems, incl. - Mangiarotti Nuclear SpA,
(CEZUS), Rugles (FR) Lingang (CN) AtomEnergoMash Group), Hyosung GoodSprings Monfalcone, Gorizia (IT)
- Equipos Nucleares SA - Shanghai Electric Podolsk (Moscow) (RU) (Hyosung Corp.), - Salzgitter Mannesmann
(ENSA) (SEPI Group), Group Co. Ltd. / KSB - Vítkovice Power Changwon (KR) Stainless Tubes GmbH,
Santander (ES) JV, Lingang (CN) Engineering a.s. (Vítkovice - Hyundai Heavy Mülheim (DE) & Montbard (FR)
- Alfa Laval Corporate AB, - Shenyang Machinery Group), Industries Co. Ltd (HHI), - Sandvik Materials Technology,
Lund (SE) Turbomachinery Corp. Ostrava (CZ) Ulsan (KR) Sandviken (SE)
- Velan Inc., Montréal (CA), (Shenyang Blower - Modřany Power a.s. - Sheffield Forgemasters,
Williston VT (US), Lyon & Works Group), (CTY Group), Praha (CZ) Sheffield (UK)
Mennesy, Paris region (FR) Shenyang (Liaoning) - Sigma Group a.s., Lutín - Holtec International Inc., Turtle
- Bernard Controls SA, (CN) (CZ) Creek/ East Pittsburgh PA (US)
Gonesse, Paris (FR) - CNNC SUFA - Ansaldo Energia SpA, - Precision Custom Components
- Boccard SA, Villeurbane, Technology Industry Co. Genova (IT) LLC, York PA (US)
Lyon (FR) Ltd., Suzhou (Jiangsu) - IHI Corporation (Ishikawajima-
- Salzgitter Mannesmann (CN) Harima Heavy Industries),
Stainless Tubes GmbH, - Harbin Electric Nuclear Yokohama (JP)
Mülheim (DE) & Montbard Equipment Co. Ltd, - Toshiba Corporation, Isogo
(FR) Harbin (Heilongjiang) Works & Keihin Product
- Wilh. Schultz GmbH, (CN) Operations, Isogo & Tsurumi,
Krefeld, Düsseldorf (DE) - Harbin Boiler Co, Yokohama (JP)
- Sigma Group a.s., Lutín Harbin (Heilongjiang) - Shandong Nuclear Power
(CZ) (CN) Equipment Manufacturing Co
- EBARA Corp., Futtsu (JP) (part of SNPTC ), Haiyang
- Fine Tubes Ltd., Plymouth (Shandong) (CN)
(UK) - Shanghai Electric Nuclear
- Rolls-Royce, Derby (UK) Power Equipment Co., Shanghai
- Valinox Nucléaire, (CN)
Montbard (Vallourec Group) Dongfang Electric Corporation
(FR) & Nansha, Guangzhou (DEC), Chengdu, Sichuan (CN)
(Guangdong) (CN) - DCD DORBYL Pty Ltd.,
- Valtimet (Vallourec Group), Vereeniging, Gauteng (ZA)
Venarey-les-Laumes (FR),
Morristown TN (US) &
Changzhou, Jiangsu (CN)

Table 5.5f: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components – Pressurized Water Reactor (continued)
VVER-1000, 1200 & OPR1000 & APWR-1400 &
EPR CNP-600 AP1000
TOI APR1400 1700
Reactor coolant special Reactor coolant special Reactor coolant special Reactor coolant special Reactor coolant Reactor coolant special
components: components: components: components: special components: components:
- Alfa Laval Corporate AB, - CNNC SUFA - Afrikantov OKBM JSC - Alfa Laval Corporate - Mitsubishi Heavy - ASCO (Emerson Process
Lund (SE) Technology Industry Co. (part of AB, Lund (SE) & LHE Industries/ Weir Management Power & Water
- Vanatome SA, Saint-Vallier, Ltd., Suzhou (Jiangsu) AtomEnergoProm), Nizhny (Leader Heat Group (Weir Power Solutions Inc.), Aitken SC (US),
Valence (FR) & Harbin Valve (CN) Novgorod (RU) Exchanger) Co. Ltd, & Industrial), Lucé, Chartres (FR) & Hyogo (JP)
Co. (Harbin Power Group) JV - Baoji Titanium Industry - Oka LLC, Pavlovo, Gimhae (KR) Glasgow (UK) JV - Dresser Inc. (GE Energy),
- Velan Inc., Montréal (CA), Co. Ltd. (Baoti Group), Nizhny Novgorod (RU) - Hyosung Power & - Nippon Steel & Alexandria LA (US) & Suzhou (CN)
Williston VT (US), Lyon & Shaanxi (CN) - Arako spol. s.r.o. (part of Industrial Systems, incl. Sumitomo Metal - KSB AG, Frankenthal (DE) &
Mennesy, Paris region (FR) - Clyde Union Pumps AtomEnergoMash), Opava Hyosung GoodSprings Corp., Amagasaki, Gennevilliers, Paris (FR)
- Sigma Group a.s., Lutín (CZ) Glasgow (UK) & Annecy (CZ) (Hyosung Corp.), Hyōgo (JP) - Weir Power & Industrial (Weir
- Clyde Union Pumps Glasgow (FR) (SPX Corp.) JV - Armatury Group a.s., Changwon (KR) - ASCO (Emerson Group), Vendin le Vieil, Lens &
(UK) & Annecy (FR) (SPX with Shandong Dolní Benešov, Opava - HIM Tech Co. Ltd. Process Châteauneuf-les-Martigues,
Corp.) JV with Shandong Shuanglun Group Co (CZ) (Weir Group), Ansan Management Power Marseille (FR), Huddersfield (UK),
Shuanglun Group Co Ltd, Ltd, Weihai, Shandong - Modřany Power a.s. (KR) & Water Solutions Suzhou, Shanghai (CN) & Bangalore
Weihai, Shandong (CN) (CN) (CTY Group), Praha (CZ) - PK Valve Co. Ltd., Inc.), Aitken SC (IN)
- EBARA Corp., Futtsu (JP) - Sandvik AB, - Sigma Group a.s., Lutín Changwon (KR) - (US), Lucé, Chartres - SPX Corp., (formerly Sealed Power
- KSB AG, Frankenthal (DE) & Sandviken, Gävleborg (CZ) - Samshin Ltd., (FR) & Hyogo (JP) Corp. + United Dominion) Charlotte
Gennevilliers, Paris (FR) (SE) & Jiading - Vanatome SA, Saint- Cheonan (KR) - Okano Valve NC, Battle Creek MI & McKean PA
- Rolls-Royce, Derby (UK) (Zhejiang) (CN) Vallier, Valence (FR) - Sumitomo Metal Manufacturing Co. (US)
- Sempell GmbH (Tyco - Zhejiang Zhongda - Sempell GmbH (Tyco Industries Ltd., (TVE), Kitakyushu - Shaw Alloy Piping Products Inc.,
International Flow Systems), Special Steel Co., Baibu International Flow Amagasaki, near Osaka (JP) Shreveport LA (US)
Korschenbroich, nr Düsseldorf Industrial Zone, Jiaxing, Systems), (Hanshin Industrial - Toa Valve - Fisher Controls International LLC,
(DE) Zhejiang (CN) Korschenbroich, nr Region) (JP) Engineering Inc., (Emerson) Marshalltown IA (US)
- Balcke-Dürr GmbH (SPX Düsseldorf (DE) - Flowserve Corp., Amagsaki, near - Curtiss-Wright Corp., Cheswick,
Corp.), Ratingen (DE) - Weir Power & Industrial Raleigh NC (US) & Osaka (Hanshin Pittsburgh PA, Brea, Los Angeles
- Sandvik AB, Sandviken, (Weir Group), Vendin le Cheonan (KR) Industrial Region) CA & Target Rock, East
Gävleborg (SE) & Jiading Vieil, Lens & Châteauneuf- (JP) Farmingdale NY (US)
(Zhejiang) (CN) les-Martigues, Marseille - Flowserve Corporation, Raleigh
- Thompson Valves, (IMI Plc.) (FR) NC, Vernon CA and Springville UT
Poole, Dorset (UK) (US), Haywards Heath (UK)
- Transco Products Inc., Streator IL
- China Valves Technology & Dongfang Electric Corp. (US)
Chengdu, Sichuan, (CN) JV - Velan Inc. Montréal (CA), Williston
- Jiangsu Shentong Valve Co. Ltd., Qidong, Nantong VT (US), Lyon & Mennesy, Paris
(Jiangsu), ? (Guangdong) & Guangxi Zhuang AR (CN) region (FR)
- Samshin Moon Valve Yantai Co. Ltd., Yantai (Shandong) - Sulzer AG, Winterthur, Zürich (CH),
(CN) Portland OR (US) & Dalian, Liaoning
- Weir Power & Industrial (Weir Group), Vendin le Vieil, Lens & (CN)
Châteauneuf-les-Martigues, Marseille (FR), Huddersfield (UK), - EBARA Corp., Futtsu (JP)
Suzhou, Shanghai (CN) & Bangalore (IN) - Samshin Ltd., Cheonan (KR)

Table 5.5g: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components – Pressurized Water Reactor (continued)
VVER-1000, 1200 &
TOI
Instrumentation & control: Instrumentation & Instrumentation & control: Instrumentation & control: Instrumentation & Instrumentation & control:
- AREVA T&D SA, Meylan, control: - AtomEnergoProekt JSC - Doosan Heavy Industries control: - L-3 MAPPS, Saint-Laurent
Grenoble (FR) - State Nuclear Power (AEP), Moscow (RU) & Construction Co. Ltd, - Mitsubishi Electric (Québec) (CA)
- ?Altran Technologies, Automation System - RTSoft OJSC, Moscow & Changwon (KR) Corp., Kobe (JP) -CS Innovations LLC
Levallois-Perret, Paris (FR) Engineering Co, (JV of Chernogolovka (Moscow) - Doosan HF Controls, (Westinghouse Electric Co),
- ABB Power Products, SNPTC & Shanghai (RU) Carrollton TX (US) Scottsdale, AZ, USA
Zurich (CH) Automation - I&C Energo a.s. (MOL - Samchang Enterprise - DRS Technologies Inc.,
- Siemens AG, Erlangen Instrumentation Corp.), Magyár Olaj es Gazipari Co. Ltd., Ulsan (KR) Consolidated Controls
(DE) Shanghai (CN) Rt), Brno and Třebič (CZ) (Finmeccanica SpA),
- Rolls-Royce Data Systems - VÜJE a.s., Trvana (SK) Danbury CT (US)
& Solutions, Derby (UK), - Rolls-Royce Data - Emerson Electrical Co.
Meylan, Grenoble (FR) and Systems & Solutions, (Emerson Process
Huntsville AL (US) Derby (UK) Management Rosemount
- M+W Group GmbH Nuclear Instruments),
(Stumpf Group), Stuttgart Chanhassen MN & St Louis
(DE) MO (US)
- I&C Energo a.s. (CZ) - General Dynamics Electric
- Mitsubishi Electric Boat, Groton CT (US)
Corporation, Kobe (JP) and - Rolls-Royce Data Systems
- China Techenergy & Solutions, Derby (UK)
Corporation (CTEC) (JV - I&C Energo a.s. (MOL
between CNPEC & Beijing Magyár Olaj es Gazipari Rt),
Hollysys Co. Ltd), Beijing Brno and Třebíč (CZ)
(CN) - State Nuclear Power
- Škoda JS as, Plezň (CZ) Automation System
Engineering Co,, Shanghai
(CN)
- Lockheed Martin Corp.
Nuclear Systems &
Solutions, Archbald PA (US)
- INVAP SE (Investigaciones
Aplicadas), San Carlos de
Bariloche (Patagonia) (AR)
- Ultra Electronics, Round
Rock TX (USA) & Wimborne,
Dorset (UK)

Table 5.5h: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components – Pressurized Water Reactor (continued)
VVER-1000, 1200 &
TOI
Radiation monitoring system: Radiation monitoring Radiation monitoring Radiation monitoring Radiation monitoring Radiation monitoring system:
- AREVA Canberra, Meriden system: system: system: system: - AREVA Canberra, Meriden
CT (US) - PriboroStroitelny Zavod - Korea Institute of Nuclear CT (US)
- Berthold Technologies FSUE (PSZ), Tryokhgorny Safety (KINS), Daejeon - Mirion Technologies
GmbH, Bad Wildbad (DE) , (Chelyabinsk) (RU) (KR) (MGPI) Inc., Smyrna, Atlanta
- Mirion Technologies (MGPI) - VF a.s.,Černá Hora, - CANA Inc., Ansan (KR) GA (US), Munich (DE),
Inc., Smyrna, Atlanta GA (US), South Moravia (CZ) Lamanon, Arles (FR),
Munich (DE), Lamanon, Arles Farnborough (UK)
(FR), Farnborough (UK) - Thermo Fisher Scientific
Inc., Waltham MA (US)
Training simulator: Training simulator: Training simulator: Training simulator: Training simulator: Training simulator:
- CORYS Training & - GSE-UNIS JV - VÜJE a.s., Trvana (SK) - Doosan Heavy Industries - L-3 MAPPS, Saint-Laurent
Engineering Support Systems, between GSE & Construction Co. Ltd, (Québec) (CA)
Grenoble (FR) Systems, Inc., Changwon (KR) - GSE Systems, Inc.,
- L-3 MAPPS, Saint-Laurent Baltimore MD (US) Baltimore MD (US)
(Québec) (CA) and Beijing UNIS
- GSE Systems, Inc., Investment Co. Ltd.,
Baltimore MD (US) Beijing (CN)
- Siemens AG (DE)
Electrical power systems: Electrical power Electrical power systems: Electrical power systems: Electrical power Electrical power systems:
- General Cable Corp., systems: - OJSC Power Machines), - General Cable Corp., systems: - ABB Inc., Florence SC (US)
Highland Heights KY & - Jiaxing Fanrong St Petersburg (RU) Highland Heights KY & - Electric Machinery
Willimantic CT, (US) Electrical Appliances - Ruselprom (RU) Willimantic CT, (US) Company (WEG Industries),
Co., Jiaxing, Zhejiang - Tyazhmash (RU Minneapolis MN (US)
(CN) - EnerSys, Reading &
Horsham PA (US)
- Fairbanks Morse, Beloit WI
(US)
- General Cable Corp.,
Highland Heights KY &
Willimantic CT, (US)
- RSCC Wire & Cable LLC,
East Granby CT (US)
- GUTOR Electronic
(Schneider Electric),
Wettingen, CH & Shah Alam,
Kuala Lumpur (MY)

Table 5.5i: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components – Pressurized Water Reactor (continued)
VVER-1000, 1200 &
TOI
Main turbine: Main turbine: Main turbine: Main turbine: Main turbine: Main turbine:
- Alstom, Belfort (FR) & - Harbin Power - Alstom- - Doosan Heavy Industries - Mitsubishi Electric - Saarschmiede GmbH
Chattanooga TN (US) - Equipment Co, Harbin AtomEnergoMash JV & Construction Co. Ltd, Corp. (MELCO), Kobe (Saarstahl AG), Völklingen
Siemens AG, Erlangen (DE) (Heilongjiang) (CN) (AAEM), Volgodonsk Changwon (KR) (JP) (DE)
- Bharat Heavy Electricals - Shanghai Electric (Rostov) (RU) - Hyundai Heavy - IHI Corp. (Ishikawajima - Ansaldo Energia SpA,
Ltd. (BHEL), Group, & Siemens JV - Russian Energy Machine Industries Co. Ltd (HHI), Heavy Industries), Genova (IT)
Rainpur/Haridwar (SEPG), Shanghai (CN) Building Company Ulsan (KR) Yokohama (JP) - Škoda Power as (Doosan
(Uttarakhand) (IN)/ Sheffield - Shanghai Electric (REMCO) & ZiO Podolsk - Mitsubishi Power Power Systems), Plezň (CZ)
Forgemasters, Sheffield Group, & SPX (part of AtomEnergoMash Systems Americas, Inc., - Siemens Energy, Orlando
(UK) JV Engineering & OJSC) (Moscow) (RU) Orlando FL (US) FL (US)
- Mitsubishi Heavy Technology Co. Ltd. JV, - PetrozavodskMash (part - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Industries Ltd. (MHI), Shanghai (CN) of AtomEnergoMash (MHI), Kobe (JP)
Takasago (JP) Group), Petrozavodsk - Toshiba IHI Power Systems
(Karelia) (RU) Corp. (JV with IHI
- Electrosila (part of OJSC Corporation), Yokohama (JP)
Power Machines), St - Alstom, Belfort (FR) with
Petersburg (RU) Dongfang Electric Corp.
- ElectroTyazhMash (DEC), Chengdu (Sichuan)
(ETM), Kharkiv (UA) (CN)
- TurboAtom, Kharkiv (UA) - Harbin Power Equipment
- Siemens AG, Erlangen Co, Harbin (Heilongjiang)
(DE) (CN)
- Toshiba JSW Turbine &
Generator Pvt Ltd. (JV with
Jindal Steel Works Group),
Chennai (IN)

Table 5.5j: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components – Pressurized Water Reactor (continued)
VVER-1000, 1200 &
TOI
Main generator: Main generator: Main generator: Main generator: Main generator: Main generator:
- Alstom, Belfort (FR), - Harbin Power - Russian Energy Machine - Doosan Heavy Industries - Mitsubishi Electric - Škoda Power as (Doosan
?Rugby (GB), Elbląg (PL), & Equipment Co, Harbin Building Company & Construction Co. Ltd, Corp. (MELCO), Kobe Power Systems), Plezň (CZ)
Chattanooga TN (US) (CN) (REMCO) & ZiO Podolsk Changwon (KR) (JP) - Mangiarotti Nuclear SpA,
- Siemens AG, Erlangen - Shanghai Electric (part of AtomEnergoMash - Hyundai Heavy - Mitsubishi Power Udine & Monfalcone (Friuli),
(DE) Group Co. Ltd., Lingang, OJSC) (Moscow) (RU) Industries Co. Ltd (HHI), Systems Americas Ltd, [merged with former Ansaldo
- Siemens Energy, Orlando Shanghai, & Siemens - PetrozavodskMash (part Ulsan (KR) Orlando FL (US) Camozzi Energy Special
FL & Charlotte NC (US) JV (SEPG) (CN) of AtomEnergoMash - IHI Corp. (Ishikawajima Components SpA and now
- ?Babcock & Wilcox - Deyang Heavy Group), Petrozavodsk Heavy Industries), owned by Westinghouse],
Nuclear Operations Group Equipment Co Ltd. (Karelia) (RU) Yokohama (JP) Milan (IT)
Inc., Euclid, OH (US) (China Erzhong Group), - Electrosila (part of OJSC - Doosan VINA, Dung Quat
- Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Shanghai (CN) Power Machines), St (VN)
Ltd. (MHI), Kobe (JP) Petersburg (RU) - Alstom, Belfort (FR) with
- China First Heavy - ElectroTyazhMash Dongfang Electric Corp.
Industries Group Co. Ltd, (ETM), Kharkiv (UA) (DEC), Chengdu (Sichuan)
Dalian (Liaoning) & Qiqihar - Siemens AG, Erlangen (CN)
(Heilongjiang) (CN) (DE) - China First Heavy
- Shanghai Electric Group Industries Group Co. Ltd,
Co. Ltd., Lingang, Shanghai Dalian (Liaoning) & Qiqihar
(CN) (Heilongjiang) (CN)
- Dongfang Electric Corp. - Deyang Heavy Equipment
(DEC), Chengdu (Sichuan) Co Ltd. (China Erzhong
(CN) Group), Shanghai (CN)
- Balcke-Dürr GmbH (SPX - Harbin Power Equipment
Corp.), Ratingen (DE) Co, Harbin (CN)
- Shanghai Electric Group
Co. Ltd., Lingang, Shanghai
(CN)
- Mitsubishi Electric Corp.,
Kobe (JP)
- Toshiba IHI Power Systems
Corporation, Yokohama (JP)
- Toshiba JSW Turbine &
Generator Pvt Ltd. (JV with
Jindal Steel Works Group),
Chennai (IN)
- Nuclebras Equipamentos
Pesados SA (NUCLEP), Rio
de Janeiro (BR)

Table 5.6a: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components
Boiling Water Reactor Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor

Kerena
ESBWR-1550/ ABWR-1350 ABWR-1350 ACR-1000/ EC6 PHWR-220 & PHWR-700
(formerly SWR-1000)
Design: AREVA Reactors & Design: GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Design: Toshiba Corporation, Design: Atomic Energy of Design: Nuclear Power
Services, Paris (FR) Ltd., Wilmington NC (US) & Hitachi- with Hitachi-GE, Tokyo (JP) Canada Ltd (AECL) Candu Corporation of India Ltd
GE Nuclear Energy Ltd-Toshiba, Energy, Toronto ON (CA) (NPCIL), New Delhi (IN)
Tokyo (JP)
Architect Engineer: Architect Engineer: Architect Engineer: Architect Engineer: Architect Engineer: Nuclear
Burns & Roe Inc., Oradel NJ (US) Toshiba Corp., Tokyo (JP) Candu Energy (SNC Lavelin), Power Corporation of India Ltd
Toronto ON (CA) (NPCIL), Mumbai & Bharat (IN)
EPC: EPC: EPC: EPC: EPC:

- Bechtel Corporation, San - Shaw Power Group Inc., - Bechtel Corporation, San - Nuclear Power Corp of India
Francisco (US) Charlotte NC (US) Francisco (US) Ltd (NPCIL), Mumbai & Bharat
- Black & Veatch Corporation, - Toshiba Engineering & - Ontario Power Generation , Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL),
Overland Park, Kansas City, KS Construction Co. Ltd., (JP) Toronto (CA) JV (IN)
(US) - Toshiba Plant Systems & - SNC-Lavalin Nuclear Inc., - Hindustan Construction
- Fluor Corp., Irving TX (US) Services Corporation, Montreal QC (CA) Company Ltd. (HCC), Mumbai
- Iberdrola Ingeniería y Construcción Yokohama (JP) - AMEC, Toronto ON (CA) (IN) and AMEC
SAU, Erandio, Bilbao (ES) - Ansaldo Nucleare SpA, - Punj Lloyd, Gurgaon (IN)
- AMEC, Knutsford (UK) Genova (IT) - BGR Energy Systems Ltd.,
- Atkins, Bristol (UK) Chennai (IN)
- Cavendish Nuclear, London &
Bristol (UK)
- Jacobs Engineering Group,
Pasadena CA (US)
- Hitachi Ltd., Tokyo (JP)
Civil construction: Civil construction: Civil construction: Civil construction: Civil construction:
- New Asia Construction & - Kajima Corporation, Tokyo (JP) - Hindustan Construction
Development Corp., Taibei (TW) - Hazama Corporation, Tokyo Company Ltd. (HCC), Mumbai
- GAMA Power Systems & (JP) (IN)
Engineering Contracting Inc., Ankara - Larsen & Toubro Ltd
(TR) Construction, Chennai (IN)
- ?Calik Enerji (TR) - Gammon India Ltd., Mumbai
- Kajima Corp. Ltd, Tokyo (JP) (IN)
- Takenaka Civil Engineering &
Construction Co Ltd, Osaka (JP)

Table 5.6b: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components (continued)
Kerena ESBWR-1550/ ABWR-1350 ABWR-1350 ACR-1000/ EC6 PHWR-220 & PHWR-700
Containment structure: Containment structure: Containment structure: Containment structure: Containment structure:
IHI Corporation Yokohama - Hindustan Construction
(JP) Company Ltd. (HCC),
Mumbai (IN)
- Gammon India Ltd.,
Mumbai (IN)
Reactor vessel: Reactor vessel: Reactor vessel: Reactor vessel: Reactor vessel:
- Equipos Nucleares SA (ENSA) IHI Corporation - Candu Energy ,Toronto ON - Nuclear Power Corp of
(SEPI Group), Santander (ES) (Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy (CA) India/Larsen & Toubro,
- Stocznia Gdansk, Gdansk (PL) Industries), Yokohama (JP) Mumbai & Hazira, Gujarat
- Japan Steel Works (JSW), (IN) JV
Muroran (JP) - Heavy Engineering Corp.
- Kobe Steel Group Ltd. (HEC), Ranchi
(KOBELCO), Takasago & (Jharkhand) (IN)
Harima (JP)
Core internals: Core internals: Core internals: Core internals: Core internals:
- RAFAKO, (PL) - Toshiba Corporation, - Candu Energy ,Toronto ON - Larsen & Toubro Ltd.,
- Joseph Oat Corp., Camden NJ Keihin Product Operations, (CA) Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu (IN)
(US) Isogo & Tsurumi, Yokohama - Outokumpu Oyj, Espoo, - Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd
- Kobe Steel Group (JP) (FI) (MIDHANI), Hyderabad AP
(KOBELCO), Takasago (JP) - ?Škoda JS as, Plezň (CZ) - CONUAR, Buenos Aires (IN)
- EBARA Corp., Futtsu (JP) (AR)
Polar crane: Polar crane: Polar crane: Polar crane: Polar crane:
- MKM Noell Special Cranes Ederer LLC (PaR Systems - ?COH Inc. (RÉEL Group), - Konecranes India Pvt Ltd,
GmbH (RÉEL Group), Inc.), Brunswick GA (US) Boisbriand, Montréal (CA) - Kolkata (IN)
Veitshöchheim, Wűzburg (DE)
- Konecranes Oy, Hyvinkää (FI),
?Kűnzelsau & Liebengrűn (DE)

Table 5.6c: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components (continued)
Reactor coolant system & Reactor coolant system & Reactor coolant system & Reactor coolant system & Reactor coolant system &
components: components: components: components: components:
- Allegheny Technologies Inc. (ATI), - Toshiba Corporation, Isogo - Valinox Nucléaire, Montbard - Larsen & Toubro Ltd., Chennai
Washington PA & Albany OR (US) & Works & Keihin Product (Vallourec Group) (FR) & Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu (IN)
Sheffield (UK) Operations, Isogo & Tsurumi, - ASCO (Emerson Process - BFL-NTPC Energy Systems
- Dresser Inc. (GE Energy), Yokohama (JP) Management Power & Water Ltd. [Bharat Forge Ltd (BFL)
Alexandria LA (US) & Suzhou (CN) - IHI Corporation Solutions Inc.), Aitken SC (US), (Kalyani Group) & National
- Emerson Process Management (Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Lucé, Chartres (FR) & Hyogo (JP) Thermal Power Corp. (NTPC),
(ASCO Numatics), Florham Park NJ Industries), Yokohama (JP) - Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd., Delhi JV], Solapur (Maharashtra)
& Aitken SC (US), Lucé, Chartres - EBARA Corp., Futtsu (JP) Cambridge ON (CA) - Velan Inc., (IN)
(FR) & Hyogo (JP) & & (Fisher) - Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Montréal (CA), Williston VT (US), - Kirloskar Brothers Ltd., Pune,
Marshalltown IA (US) Metal Corp., Amagasaki, Lyon & Mennesy, Paris region Maharashtra (IN)
- Fisher Controls International LLC, Hyōgo (JP) (FR)
(part of Emerson Process - Okano Valve Manufacturing - Doosan Heavy Industries &
Management Power & Water Co, Kitakyushu (JP) - Construction Co. Ltd., Changwon
Solutions Inc.) Marshalltown IA (US) (KR)
- Joseph Oat Corp., Camden NJ - Dresser Inc. (GE Energy),
(US) Alexandria LA (US) & Suzhou
- Sulzer AG, Winterthur, Zürich (CH), (CN)
Portland OR (US) & Dalian, Liaoning - Sulzer AG, Winterthur, Zürich
(CN) (CH), Portland OR (US) & Dalian,
- Babcock-Hitachi KK, Kure, Liaoning (CN)
Hiroshima (JP) - Weir Power & Industrial (Weir
- ?Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Group), Châteauneuf-les-
(BHEL), Rainpur/Haridwar Martigues, Marseille (FR)
(Uttarakhand)/ NPCIL, Mumbai / - Equipos Nucleares SA (ENSA)
Alstom JV (IN) (SEPI Group), Santander (ES)
- Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd.,
Amagasaki, near Osaka (Hanshin
Industrial Region) (JP) –
Instrumentation & control: Instrumentation & control: Instrumentation & control: Instrumentation & control: Instrumentation & control:
- GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy, - Toshiba Corp. Power - Ansaldo Energia SpA, Genova - Electronics Corporation of India
Wilmington & Lockheed Martin Corp. Systems Co, (JP) (IT) Ltd, Hyderabad (IN)
(US) JV - Rolls-Royce ODIM Numet, - BGR Energy Systems Ltd.,
Peterborough ON (CA) Chennai (IN)

Table 5.6d: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components (continued)
Radiation monitoring Radiation monitoring system: Radiation monitoring system: Radiation monitoring system: Radiation monitoring system:
system:
Training simulator: Training simulator: Training simulator: Training simulator: Training simulator:
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Ltd., L-3 MAPPS, Saint-Laurent
Wilmington NC QC (CA)
Electrical power systems: Electrical power systems: Electrical power systems: Electrical power systems: Electrical power systems:
- ABB Inc., Florence SC (US) - General Cable Corp.,
- Belden Inc., Richmond IN (US) Highland Heights KY &
& Neckartenzlingen, Baden- Willimantic CT, (US)
Württemberg (DE) - Ansaldo Energia SpA,
- Electric Machinery Company Genova (IT)
(WEG Industries), Minneapolis
MN (US)
- Fairbanks Morse, Beloit WI
(US)
- General Cable Corp., Highland
Heights KY & Willimantic CT,
(US)
- RSCC Wire & Cable LLC, East
Granby CT (US)

Table 5.6e: Nuclear suppliers - nuclear industry grade components (continued)
Main turbine: Main turbine: Main turbine: Main turbine: Main turbine:
- GE Energy, Schenectady NY, - Toshiba IHI Power Systems - Alstom, Belfort (FR) & - Alstom / Bharat Forge Ltd.
[Greenville SC or Atlanta GE] Corp. (JV with IHI Chattanooga TN (US) (BFL) (Kalyani Group) JV,
(US) & Belfort (FR) Corporation), Yokohama - GE Energy, Schenectady Pune (Maharashtra) &
- Hitachi Power Systems (JP) NY [Greenville SC or Atlanta Mundra (Gujarat) (IN)
Company, Tokyo & Yamate, - Toshiba JSW Turbine & GE] (US) & Belfort (FR)
(JP) Generator Pvt Ltd. (JV with
- Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Jindal Steel Works Group),
Ltd. (MHI), Takasago (JP) Chennai (IN)
- Toshiba (JP) - Bharat Heavy
Electricals Ltd. (BHEL),
Rainpur/Haridwar (Uttarakhand)
(IN)
- GAMA Boiler Technology Inc.,
Ankara (TR)
Main generator: Main generator: Main generator: Main generator: Main generator:
- GE Energy, Wilmington NC, - Toshiba IHI Power Systems - Alstom, Belfort (FR), - Nuclear Power Corp of
Schenectady NY (US) & Belfort Corp. (JV with IHI ?Rugby (GB), Elbląg (PL), & India/Larsen & Toubro,
(FR) Corporation), Yokohama Chattanooga TN (US) Mumbai (IN) JV
- Doosan Heavy Industries & (JP) - GE Energy, Wilmington - Bharat Heavy Electricals
Construction, Changwon (KR) - Toshiba JSW Turbine & NC, Schenectady NY (US) & Ltd./ Alstom Power
- Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd Generator Pvt Ltd. (JV with Belfort (FR) Generation AG consortium,
(MHI), Kobe (JP) Jindal Steel Works Group), Tiruchirappalli (Tamil Nadu)
- Toshiba Corp., Yokohama (JP) Chennai (IN) (IN)
- ElectroTyazhMash (ETM),
Kharkiv (UA)


6 Harmonizing the
regulatory framework
Different regulatory regimes have evolved across the world to ensure public safety and
security and inevitably there are inconsistencies to the way safety and security is
approached between countries and even within countries. Such variations may introduce
additional compliance costs for global supply chains which can then hamper the
development of an open international trading system.
Although responsibility for regulating nuclear energy lies at the national level there is a
special international regime established to ensure a high level of safety, safeguard the
technology against misuse and provide compensation for victims of accidents with trans-
boundary effects. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides common, but not
mandatory, guidance to its member states. The nuclear industry is one of a small number of
industries to be subject to stringent oversight in the public interest at both the national and
international levels; other examples include the production of food and drugs, weapons
manufacture, railways and air travel. The control system that applies to nuclear power
developed from the application of quality assurance techniques pioneered in the USA. These
were developed further to establish a worldwide framework based on common principles.
In essence, a nuclear reactor must be designed to offer defence-in-depth against an

accident that might pose a radiation hazard to the public. Components must be
manufactured to specification, with minimal defects that might contribute to an erosion of
defence-in-depth. Manufacturers must, to that effect, demonstrate that their production
process provides consistently high quality output by gaining certification from, usually, an
independent body. They must also undertake continual improvement, whereby, as
experience of defects emerges, they investigate the root causes of any process failures and
rectify these. Lastly, the operator of the nuclear power plant (NPP) is responsible for its safe
design, construction, operation and decommissioning, and must be capable of meeting its
liability for any damage, injury or death caused by an accident, although governments may
set an upper limit to the total damages payable to third parties from any one incident. In
many countries, operators have set up an insurance pool to meet their obligations.
It requires the nuclear supply chain to deliver exceptional performance beyond that found in
most other industries.
A more collaborative, less prescriptive and internationally harmonized regulatory regime

would, WNA believes, facilitate the development of a global market and enhance safety,
security and environmental protection. This chapter examines the regulatory framework that
applies to the nuclear supply chain and proposes improvements that, while maintaining full
scope protection of nuclear facilities, would further facilitate the development of a global
market.
6.1 Licensing
The licensing of a nuclear facility is the responsibility of a state’s regulatory body. While it is
the operator’s responsibility to manage the installation safely, it is the regulatory body’s
responsibility to establish a framework of objectives and supervise their implementation

through an inspection process. The regulation of nuclear power is deemed to be a national

prerogative in the international system with informal cooperation between regulatory bodies.
As nuclear technologies become more international, however, cooperation between
regulatory bodies should be enhanced to avoid duplication of effort while at the same time
ensuring that each country’s regulatory body has sufficient knowledge of a design approved
elsewhere. A regulatory body is bound by law to decide whether a proposed plant complies
with national provisions for safety, environmental protection, etc., and this duty cannot be
assigned to another organization. Through cooperative arrangements, regulatory bodies
could nonetheless familiarize themselves with different designs, without costly repetition of
the safety review process.
There are good reasons why national approaches to regulating safety and security differ.
These may arise due to the need for:
 Compatibility with the principles of public law, common law and/or contract law that
apply to a particular jurisdiction: it is important that enterprises are subject to
consistent legal and regulatory requirements, whatever sector or business they are
involved in;
 Applicability to differing industrial structures: an industry where small enterprises are
predominant will have to be regulated differently from one where a few large public or
private corporations operate in the sector;
 Appropriate incentives and penalties that encourage compliance: values differ across
cultures and inducement, deterrence and enforcement arrangements must take
account of these.
On the other hand, variance in regulatory regimes may potentially add to the costs of
production and constrain both exports and imports. For the reasons mentioned, the
international community established the World Trade Organization in 1994 to oversee the
application of technical regulations that are imposed by national governments on imports. In
principle, technical regulations on imports should be the same as those that regulate
domestic trade. Technical regulations should also be proportionate to the safety risk (if any)
that the product poses and if special measures are specified to protect health then these
should be based on a valid, scientifically-based justification. A risk assessment should take
account of any uncertainty in the science and therefore apply the precautionary principle in
drawing up technical regulations along with other ethical, social and environmental factors,
such as, for example, the product’s risk of harming vulnerable groups, like infants.
Trade in nuclear technology, systems and components and in radiological materials is

subject to country-specific technical regulations to ensure safety and security. Although there
is considerable consensus among governments on the form that technical regulation should
take, there is no international set of regulations, with only guidance from the IAEA as the
foundation for national regulation.
6.1.1 Regulatory regimes

Good regulation emphasizes what must be achieved by the industry rather than how the
desired results and outcomes should be obtained. Since 2002, the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has adopted what it calls ‘performance-based regulation’ with objective
criteria by which performance can be assessed and measurable parameters for monitoring
licensee compliance. This philosophy stems from an acronym used in project management

that calls for goals to be specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and timely (SMART). It
moves away from the more traditional rules-based approach towards a principles-based
approach.88 The UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation operates a goal-oriented, non-
prescriptive regime. Its philosophy starts from the proposition that the licensing of a
hazardous facility “is not an acceptance that the duty holder’s [the operator’s] arrangements
are safe”. The ‘permission to operate’ “is an acceptance of the duty holder’s approach to
identifying and meeting health and safety needs”. Operators must demonstrate that they are
controlling the risks and must “think for themselves”.89 This is sometimes termed a ‘risk-
informed’ approach to safety regulation.
In general, we may distinguish between different regulatory approaches to achieving safety

as follows:
Approach Control modalities Industry responsibilities
Prescriptive (rules-based) Direct regulation by the  Duty of vigilance (e.g.

regulatory body through: checking the paperwork
 Normative legislation; accompanying
 Prohibition of specified purchases).
Comment: practices, processes and  Certification of conformity
Relies upon clear rules and products; for processes and
offers greater certainty. Can  Mandatory approval for products.
be inflexible and stifle new processes;  Documented procedures.
innovation. The technology
 Mandatory testing of new  Follow-up actions to
vendor will tend to design the
products; inspection visits.
product to meet the regulatory
 Regular inspection of
body’s requirements.
premises.
Collaborative (objective or Self-regulation by industry  Duty of care exercised at

principles-based) within a framework set by the all levels of management
regulatory body (sometimes (e.g. systematic
called ‘co-regulation’) consideration of risks,
mandating the use of: safety culture, etc.).
 Codes of practice;  Quality assurance
Comment:  Codes of conduct; program with hold points
Provides scope for negotiating  Technical standards; for inspection and testing
alternative ways of achieving  Performance standards; where warranted.
the specified performance.  Risk registers;  Certification of conformity
May be inconsistently applied  Guidance. for processes.
and depends upon finding a  Risk assessment.
consensus among
stakeholders.
88
A good example of the difference between rules-based and principles-based regulation is found in
football. American football is strongly rules-based, which limits strictly what players may do on the
pitch. Soccer has fewer rules and gives the players and the referee more scope to shape the game
play; see James Surowiecki, Parsing Paulson, The New Yorker, 28 April 2008.
89
UK Health and Safety Commission, 2003, Our approach to permissioning regimes, Bootle: Health
and Safety Executive: pp. 5-6.

Cautionary (Guidance- Self-regulation by industry  Duty of care to the

based) with government providing customer (e.g. companies
limited information and accept the advice of
advice to consumers and professional bodies on
producers: good practice and act in
 Qualified practitioners good faith).
Comment: advise customers on  Companies contribute to
May be appropriate where the their options; and participate in
product carries little or no risk  Customers are free to industry-wide
of harm (e.g. garments) or choose between arrangements to ensure
where there is a small and products and safety, including honest
well-defined risk that technologies; consumer information on
customers are willing to  Product liability law is a products.
accept in return for the back-stop which ensures  Rigorous pre-sales
benefits and advantages that only safe products testing of products by
consumption brings (e.g. for and technologies reach companies.
over-the-counter medical the market place.
drugs and treatments).
The prescriptive approach has dominated the regulation of civil nuclear power and in
combination with differing national frameworks this has resulted in significant design
variation being incorporated in NPP construction. This creates a challenge in securing
effective knowledge management over the plant’s lifetime. Current practice locates the
responsibility for safe operation with the plant’s operator, normally an energy utility.
Operators have organized themselves into the World Association of Nuclear Operators
(WANO), the US Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and specialist technology
groupings like the Candu Owners Group (COG), the BWR Owners Group and the PWR
Owners Group (PWROG). These exchange information on plant performance and incidents,
evaluate performance, analyze problems, facilitate interaction with regulatory bodies, and
offer training and guidance. However a key player, namely the technology vendor, has no
formal role once the regulatory body has certified the design, since it is the operator who
must apply for an operating licence specific to an NPP and obtain any approvals that
introduce modifications later on.90 As a result there is no formal responsibility designated for
fleet oversight on the part of vendors. Under existing rules, the operators are required to
establish a ‘design authority’ to manage changes to the design over a reactor’s operating
life.91 This is acceptable in countries where only one operator exists (such as France, India
or Russia) but creates a potential hurdles to the exchange of information on performance
and problems if there are multiple operators. Moreover, there is no worldwide design
authority.
Following the Fukushima accident, WANO launched a design project on whether to expand
the scope of its activity to cover some aspects of design during peer review missions. WNA
is working with the technology vendors, operators and the regulatory bodies to explore
90
WANO membership, for example, includes French utility EDF but not until recently the technology
vendor Areva. In contrast, INPO’s membership includes 27 US utilities and 13 supplier participants,
such as Areva and Westinghouse.
91
IAEA, 2003, Maintaining the design integrity of nuclear installations throughout their operating life,
INSAG-19.

whether to invest vendors with more involvement in fleet oversight. It follows that if
technology vendors had greater responsibility for the knowledge management of their
reactor models then the system of international technical regulation would need to recognize
this. As a first step towards this, the role of owners groups in long-term knowledge
management of NPP fleets could be enhanced.
6.1.2 Consistency in regulation

A second difficulty arises from the way regulatory bodies have treated specific components.
The defence-in-depth approach means that safety-related items include structures, systems
and components whose performance must be assured to prevent any incident that could
lead to harm, such as the release of radiation. Some items may also have safety significance
if their failure could impair the performance of safety-related items. Other items, which are,
for example, required for the normal operation of any type of power plant, need not be
considered as being safety-significant.
National regulatory bodies interpret the safety significance of components differently. The
IAEA is considering new guidance on the safety classification of structures, systems and
components. In principle this will mean that design engineering and quality assurance rules
will match the safety significance of the item more appropriately. Safety significance is based
primarily on a deterministic basis, complemented by probabilistic methods, by reference to:
 The safety function performed by the item;

 The consequences of failure to perform the safety function (that is, the potential
severity of the safety failure);
 The frequency the item will be called upon to perform a safety function (this has
implications for the item’s reliability in performance);
 The time period following a postulated initiating event at which it will be called upon
to operate (affecting the item’s level of endurance).
WNA coordinated the industry’s response to these proposals with the aim of establishing
greater clarity and consistency in the guidelines to national regulatory bodies and technology
vendors.
There are also substantial differences in the format, scope and content of licensing
documents, required by regulatory bodies, which support the safety case for the reactor
design and pre-construction approval. The alignment of assessment criteria, establishing a
common structure for all licensing processes and the harmonization of procedures by
regulatory bodies would facilitate the development of a global market in civil nuclear power
and foster good practice internationally.
6.2 Securing nuclear technology from misuse

Regulations governing the security and safeguarding of nuclear technology and radioactive
materials are also to a large extent based on IAEA guidance. These norms and an IAEA
surveillance and inspection system are intended to deter and detect the diversion of
materials from civil uses. After the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) came into force in 1970 several signatories formed an informal inter-governmental
grouping in 1971, known as the NPT Exporters Committee or Zangger Committee (after its

first chairman), to agree which technologies, such as uranium enrichment technology,

radioactive sources and fissionable materials should be covered by export controls. The
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), set up in 1975 by a number of countries adhering to the
NPT, issues guidelines on safeguarding and controlling the international trade in nuclear and
related dual-use technology, equipment and materials. The NSG and Zangger guidelines are
disseminated by the IAEA. Under NSG’s arrangements, countries producing the specified
technologies, software, equipment and materials may only export these to those countries
that have accepted the full-scope safeguards applied by the IAEA to their nuclear facilities
(unless alternative exceptional arrangements are agreed).
In the early 1990s, as the international community became more aware of the existence of
clandestine nuclear weapons development programs in certain countries, the NSG
guidelines were revised to address the risk that a state could covertly import strategic
technologies. The guidelines concerning the trigger list (part 1 of the guidelines) were
broadened to require the application of full-scope safeguards as a condition of export. A
second ‘dual-use list’ was added (part 2 of the guidelines) covering technologies whose
export would not trigger a requirement for IAEA safeguards but which would nonetheless
require a licence from the national authority in the exporting state. The guidelines were also
updated to include a ‘Non-Proliferation Principle’, whereby an exporting country’s
government must satisfy itself that the transfer of technology or export of goods and services
will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or pose a risk of nuclear terrorism.
If there is doubt concerning an importing country’s government’s intentions to comply with its
commitments under the NPT (or other equivalent treaties), then the transfer or export
concerned must be prohibited. In some cases the exporting country’s government may
request assurances from the importing country’s government that the goods or technology to
be supplied will not be used to make a weapon. As the NSG is not linked to the NPT, or to
any other body of international law, these measures were not legally binding on participating
states.
Participating governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
North America: Canada, Mexico, USA Europe: Austria, Belarus, Belgium,

Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
South America: Argentina, Brazil Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia,
Asia: China, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Korea, UAE (nominated)
Turkey, Ukraine, UK
Africa:92 South Africa Oceania: Australia, New Zealand
92
Namibia is expected to apply for NSG membership.

The NSG governments have agreed a system for notifying each other of any decisions to
restrict exports to a particular country. Furthermore, all governments are required to take
measures to prohibit unauthorized entities and individuals from acquiring or using nuclear
weapons and sensitive materials and technology, under UN Security Council Resolution
1540 of 2004. Lastly, international cooperation mechanisms under the Convention on the
Physical Security of Nuclear Materials (1987) and the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007) have been established for detecting,
countering and punishing acts of theft and smuggling of materials, the unlawful release of
radioactive sources or detonation of devices, and of sabotage or attacks on nuclear facilities.
The conventions oblige states to safeguard all radioactive and nuclear materials (including
military stocks), to return all stolen materials and devices to the country of origin, to
prosecute or extradite terrorist suspects, and to render assistance in a crisis.
A large number of countries have agreed an ‘Additional Protocol’ with the IAEA, since 1997.
The model protocol is aimed at strengthening the safeguards system and places additional
reporting requirement on IAEA member states. Article 2 (a) (ix) requires governments to
provide information on the export of nuclear equipment and certain non-nuclear materials
(IAEA member states are obliged to report on nuclear material transfers as part of the
general safeguards regime). If requested, governments must also provide information on
imports.93
A summit on nuclear security held in Seoul in March 2012 recognized the need to integrate
safety and security and to strengthen dialogue between governments and industry. There
are divergences between jurisdictions on what is controlled and how guidelines are
interpreted. The existence of two ‘trigger lists’ of goods and sensitive technologies (prepared
by the Zangger Committee and the NSG), multiple country-to-country agreements, not to
mention country-specific import-export regulations, imposes an administrative burden on
companies.94 It should be noted that those governments which have developed nuclear
weapons capability since the NPT was introduced have not done so through the diversion of
equipment or materials from their civil nuclear power industry, but established separate,
dedicated and frequently clandestine facilities with their own chain of command.
Governments have preferred to deny IAEA access to suspect facilities, rather than attempt
to cheat on its safeguards regime.
6.3 Import and export controls

Competitive pressures are encouraging the localization of manufacturing, joint ventures and
international procurement. Production is located in several jurisdictions with materials, semi-
processed and finished fabrications perhaps crossing several borders prior to reaching the
final destination for assembly and installation. Services are also performed in different
93
IAEA, 1997, Model Protocol additional to agreements between the IAEA and States for the
application of safeguards, INFCIR/540. Annex II of the Additional Protocol specifies the equipment
and non-nuclear materials that should be reported to the IAEA in the event of their export or import.
94
An item on a ‘trigger list’ triggers a requirement for the application of IAEA safeguards in the
importing country and for government-to-government assurances on the use of the item and its re-
export or return.

countries either as a result of sub-contracting or through the participation of specialist

divisions of the same transnational corporation or industrial group. The rapid development of
telecommunication has facilitated the transfer of information while the growing amount of
personal travel means that people can carry knowledge with them. Globalization, in short, is
as much a part of the civil nuclear scene as it is in other industries.
Knowledge management processes are required within organizations to protect intellectual

property and ensure compliance with export controls, but also to facilitate learning and share
experience, especially in relation to safety. Though these objectives are not incompatible
they call for active management.
Despite the development of regional free trade areas, such as the European Union, the
North American Free Trade Area, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation area and others,
export controls on nuclear technology, reactor components and radioactive materials are still
exercised exclusively on a national basis. This situation is unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future. Steps could nonetheless be taken by both suppliers and export control
authorities to facilitate legitimate trade and exchange.
The national and international dimensions of export control have evolved since the 1950s
and present a complex, and sometimes confusing, picture. Strategic export controls are part
of the authorities’ armoury to prevent weapons of mass destruction from being acquired by
unauthorized entities. They complement the other elements of non-proliferation/ counter-
terrorism strategy to protect the public against such threats and to pursue and prosecute
those responsible.95 Nuclear export and import licensing has tended to focus on what is to
be controlled, that is, upon the items on the control list.
Implementing the strategic export control regime is achieved through a number of measures:
 Legislation to establish the appropriate competencies and enforcement processes;

 Regulation to define the technologies, goods, services and materials to be controlled
(a control list);
 Export licensing of defined technologies, goods, services and materials;
 Border control activities (intelligence gathering, detection, inspection, interception,
etc.);
 Financial sanctions on specified parties; and,
 Awareness-raising measures, public information and industry outreach activities.
The current control regime provides a ‘triple lock’ to prevent misuse and the proliferation of
nuclear weaponry (see Figure 6.1). It controls the cross-border transfer of sensitive
technology96 and the transport97 of dual-use goods, equipment and fissile materials to
95
See, for example, the UK Government’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism: Pursue,
prevent, protect, prepare (March 2009) London: Cm 7547.
96
Technology is defined by the NSG as the information necessary for the development, production or
use of controlled items. It may take the form of ‘technical data’ (e.g., blueprints, calculations,
diagrams, formulae, models or specifications) or ‘technical assistance’ (e.g. knowledge and skills,
instruction and training, or consulting services). The 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export

preclude illicit trafficking and prevent their acquisition and application by unauthorized
entities or persons.
Figure 6.1: The ‘triple lock’ of the export control regime
Governments have tended to emphasize the first ‘lock’ (what are the items to be controlled).
But arguably it is the third lock (who is licenced to acquire and use the technology) that is
most important. IAEA safeguards provide the necessary reassurance in respect of trigger list
exports. But safeguards are not relevant for the exports of dual-use technology to
unsafeguarded sites, and some other verification mechanism might be needed to provide
sufficient confidence. The UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee, which is charged with
examining the implementation of SCR 1540, has considered this problem. The Committee
proposed that the final recipient of the exported controlled item should be required to state
what use it will make of it. Therefore, the Committee suggested, the export licence should
include tougher end-user controls, with end-user certificates, and ‘catch-all’ clauses that
require the exporter to verify the reliability of the end-user’s intentions. Catch-all clauses also
require exporters to consider the potential for proliferation posed by their supply of
technology, goods and services, even if some items to be delivered do not appear on a
control list. In effect, the exporter is required to undertake a degree of verification
commensurate with the proliferation risk posed by the export.
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies has the same definition but
provides additional examples of what constitutes technical data and technical assistance.
97
Transport may include trans-shipment under which the goods do not move out of a transport hub
but are handed over from one carrier to another.

Many governments have thus added an extra layer of scrutiny to the licensing process,
which, given the fact that in many instances IAEA safeguards on nuclear facilities already
exist, may be sometimes unnecessary. In principle, exports to recipients whose facilities are
under IAEA safeguards should not be considered a proliferation risk; on the other hand,
exports to unsafeguarded facilities – in states that have not acceded to the NPT or, say, to
nuclear power plant construction sites or assembly shops and intermediaries – must be
checked out thoroughly. In the case of exports associated with the construction of a nuclear
power plant a government will wish to assure itself that the plant in question will be placed
under safeguard on its commissioning. It will also want to check the status of intermediate
recipients, who may be assembling the sub-modules of the planned plant from components
arriving from various locations and suppliers. But, in principle, if the recipient is bona fide,
then, for many controlled items the export in question should pose a low proliferation risk
and could be licenced routinely. The degree of scrutiny of an application should be exercised
proportionately.
A further issue could arise from the possibility that a recipient of an exported controlled item
might in turn re-export it. Much of the international trade in nuclear technology, goods and
materials takes place between NSG participating states. Therefore, in principle, these
governments operate a system of export control already. Furthermore, in many cases, the
exporting country and the importing country will have concluded a nuclear cooperation
agreement (known as a ‘123 Agreement’ in the USA), which commits the parties to peaceful
collaboration in using nuclear technology under IAEA safeguards. There will often be a pre-
existing level of government-to-government assurance regarding the general usage of
nuclear technology.
Good practice suggests that the nuclear, transport and security industries could codify their
internal compliance programs as an international standard which would in principle permit
export control authorities to extend the remit of Trusted or Authorized Economic Operator
programs, currently run by the customs service, to embrace export control compliance.
Adopting risk-weighted strategic export controls and rating control list items according to
their potential to contribute to proliferation (as some governments have already done so)
would also be helpful. If the control on transfers of technology, goods and materials between
NSG participating governments were streamlined, governmental and industry resources
would be freed up to concentrate on identifying illicit procurement attempts.
6.4 Supplier liability

There is an overarching framework within which the nuclear industry operates worldwide.
The international system was established in recognition of the trans-boundary nature of a
nuclear accident. Civil liability in the event of a nuclear accident lies with the plant’s licenced
operator. International conventions recognize that governments are responsible for ensuring
that NPPs on their territory are safe and have a regulatory system for licensing the design
and the operators. The conventions are:
 Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability of 1968;

 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1977; and,
 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage adopted in 1997.

Figure 6.2 shows which countries have signed the three conventions.
Figure 6.2: Main signatories to the international conventions

on civil liability for nuclear damage
Collectively the international conventions mean that:
 Civil liability to third parties (including, for example, injury to or costs incurred by
employees, members of the public, government agencies that respond to an incident,
and so on) is channeled to the licenced operator; operators are assessed by the
regulatory body to ensure that they are capable technically and financially to manage
nuclear technology.
98
 The operator is held to be strictly and exclusively liable; the operator cannot
therefore seek to mitigate his liability by blaming someone else, for example, a
supplier or sub-contractor; there is therefore a clear-cut mechanism to enable a
victim to claim compensation and the victim does not need to prove that the operator
has liability or was negligent.
98
In general, liability under the law of tort is based on fault or negligence being established. Under the
Paris and Vienna Conventions a nuclear installation operator is liable, regardless of whether fault or
negligence can be established.

 Licenced operators must obtain insurance for the harm or damage caused by a
nuclear accident, or provide other surety; in some countries, such as in the USA, the
government requires operators to establish an insurance pool to cover their liability;99
suppliers, however, need only provide their normal warranty for goods and services
supplied and are relieved from third party civil liability.
 National legislation may set a limit to the liability in the event of nuclear accident to
facilitate insurance, and in such a case the government must act as the back-stop in
100
funding compensation payments if the total value of claims exceeds the limit;
under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which
has not yet come into force, an international compensation fund is to be set up.
A number of countries with NPPs are not signatories to the conventions. This could leave
them vulnerable to retaliatory measures, such as economic sanctions, should an NPP on
their territory cause damage or harm in a neighbouring country. Countries with nuclear
installations that have not so far signed the conventions include China, Iran, the two Koreas,
Pakistan and South Africa. Even though their national laws generally follow the international
principles set out in the conventions, in some instances the vendors have decided that there
remains an element of doubt as to how the courts will interpret any discrepancy. Such
considerations played a part in GE’s decision not to enter the Chinese market, whilst
Westinghouse took another view.
Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the IAEA’s member states agreed to work
towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime that provided appropriate compensation
for nuclear damage in the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant.101 The aim was
endorsed by the leaders of the G20 countries, representing the world’s largest economies in
September 2013.102
Strict liability
Although the principle governing nuclear liability – that if a nuclear accident leads to offsite
radiological damages then the operator of the plant is strictly and exclusively liable – is
widely accepted not all countries with operating plants have incorporated it into their national
legislation.
The Indian government has signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation but
has not yet ratified it. Several legal commentators believe that the Indian Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damages Act, passed in 2010, includes provisions that are incompatible with the
99
In the USA, the Price-Anderson Act of 1957 provides for economic channelling of liability to the
operators, who must purchase insurance protection from American Nuclear Insurers, a consortium of
US insurance companies. Although a supplier may be legally liable for its products and services, any
compensation has to be covered by the operator’s insurance. Should these funds prove to be
inadequate, the President is required to submit proposals to the Congress to cover the outstanding
sums needed to compensate victims of a nuclear accident.
100
In Japan there is no limit to the operator’s liability and the utilities manage an insurance pool to
cover their exposure. The UK is raising by stages the limit of liability for an accident to €1.2 billion,
which will apply in full from 2018 onwards.
101
IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear safety, GOV/2011/59-GC (55)/14: p. 5.
102
G20 Leaders’ Declaration made at the St Petersburg Summit of 5-6 September 2013: para. 97.

Convention. The act permits an operator recourse to the supplier if the "nuclear incident has
resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, which includes supply of
equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services." This was
adopted by legislators who were concerned that Indian victims from the 1984 gas release
103
accident in Bhopal were inadequately compensated. Secondary legislation issued under
the act in 2011 limits a supplier’s liability to the value of the original contract for the goods or
services and to any product liability period specified in the supply contract, when the
operator’s right of recourse has been accepted explicitly by the supplier.104 These provisions
are viewed as an erosion of the principle of strict liability residing with the operator and have
held back foreign participation in India’s nuclear program and created concern among
domestic suppliers as well. (Inter-governmental agreements between India and France and
between India and Russia explicitly channel liability to the operator, so certain existing
projects will be unaffected.) Whether the Indian courts would in practice uphold a claim
under the law of tort as overriding the terms of a contract between buyer and seller remains
to be seen. Furthermore, there is at present no insurance pool to insure any of the parties
involved in constructing NPPs in India, which might also need access to international re-
insurance if the provision allowing unrestricted third party liability for accidents remained on
the statute book.
It is unlikely that India’s example will be followed by other emerging industrial economies
investing in nuclear power. Operators and technology vendors have the autonomy to agree
between themselves the extent of liability owed by either party in the event of equipment
failure or inherent design flaws. The obligations of the seller to the buyer and the obligations
of the owner of an asset to other parties are usually treated separately in civil law so it is
hard to imagine how the linkage of the right of recourse against suppliers to the obligations
of the plant owner-operator could be replicated in other jurisdictions.
Limit to liability
In some countries nuclear operators benefit from limits of liability – which means that after a
certain limit is reached (often coinciding with the mandated financial coverage) they are no
longer obliged to pay additional compensation. Other countries insist on unlimited operator
liability, under which the operators would presumably be forced into bankruptcy if damages
were large enough. Unlimited operator liability is not perceived as a problem when the
operator or energy sector is state-owned, but it poses a risk for private operators.
103
The Union Carbide pesticide plant disaster killed well over 10 000 people and injured another
555 000, making it one of the world’s worst industrial accidents. Indian and US courts ruled that
claims regarding liability had to be heard in India as the plant was owned by the Indian registered
subsidiary of Union Carbide. The company denied that its equipment (a valve was alleged to have
malfunctioned) or its operational practices and maintenance led to the accident, and blamed
sabotage, but nevertheless agreed to an out-of-court settlement in 1989 with the Indian government,
which had taken responsibility for representing the victims. Seven managers, including the former
managing director of Union Carbide India Ltd, were convicted of causing death by negligence in 2010.
Some Indian political parties consider the international conventions to be weighted in favour of US
companies.
104
The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Rules, 2011, published in The Gazette of India, 11
November 2011. These rules do not modify §17 (b) of the 2010 Act, which implies that the supplier’s
liability is unlimited even though the operator’s liability has been limited.

At root, the problem is that utilities and their operating companies provide a public good. It
simply does not make sense to bankrupt a private utility with ruinous damages claims if it
interferes with the provision of energy to their customers, which utilities often have a duty to
supply. Each and every nuclear installation goes through a demanding licensing procedure
and is subjected to ongoing regulation all the time. The quid pro quo of this arrangement is
that the state is expected to assume some residual risk in the worst case scenario, as it
might do with chemical or other industrial accidents.
The costs of a serious nuclear accident are indisputably enormous. However, of the three
major reactor accidents which have occurred, none involved the use of the international
framework and none have brought up the issue of liability caps. The Three-Mile Island
accident led to insurers paying out some US$ 71 million – none of which related to radiation-
induced harm. The damages associated with Chernobyl are estimated at € 339 billion in
today’s terms. The USSR relocated the affected population in the case of the Chernobyl
accident and did not pay compensation to other countries as it was not signed up to any
international liability conventions. Japan has not signed any conventions either, but the
Fukushima accident did not result in trans-boundary damage or harm and the operator
Tepco is to take full responsibility for paying all damages. The government has had to inject
funds into the company for this, taking a certain level of control in the process, but the
company has pledged to pay this back. About US$ 30 billion compensation has been paid so
far.
6.5 Benefits of a collaborative and international

regulatory regime
Ultimately, it would make sense to move towards a less prescriptive regulatory regime.
Regulatory bodies are trying to cooperate with the industry through the OECD-NEA
Multinational Design Evaluation Program’s Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working Group
to better control project-related risk and to reduce the burden on themselves and upon key
vendors. The OECD-NEA also has a Working Group on the Regulation of New Reactors.
One of its objectives is to identify deficiencies in the design and construction of NPPs and
share data on construction events under its Construction Experience (ConEx) program.
There is also a raft of non-nuclear related regulations (e.g. on chemical hazards and
environmental protection) that vary between jurisdictions and require attention from
designers and vendors.
Under a more collaborative and international regime, technology vendors would have greater
responsibility for their designs and once a design was approved by the national regulatory
body, all other regulatory bodies would be entitled to accept it also. Such a system would
involve the negotiation of an international convention to coordinate and regulate (through the
IAEA) the use of civil nuclear technology. The IAEA guidance could evolve into becoming
the benchmark standards for safety, security and environmental protection which all
signatories to the convention must apply in granting design and construction licences to a
vendor or an operator. The burden on vendors of complying with numerous nationally
prescriptive regulatory regimes would be reduced, while the vendors’ responsibilities for
assuring their designs provided health and environmental protection that reduced risks to as
low as reasonably achievable over a plant’s whole life would be greater. (It should be noted
that technology vendors are normally required to pay a fee to the regulatory body to obtain a

generic design licence. The US NRC, for instance, is required to recover 90 percent of its
funding from fees charged to its licensees and applicants.) In essence, governments would
recognize certain companies as responsible organizations with adequate internal and
contractual controls to assure full-scope protection in safely and securely safeguarding and
managing nuclear technology, operations and materials. Such recognition would be
respected by other IAEA member states, with the IAEA continuing to provide assurance that
governments were regulating the industry soundly. Technology vendors would also
undertake due diligence on their supply chain to provide assurance that their security
systems complied with their obligations of ensuring that designs and activities did not
contribute to weapons proliferation.
Integrating safety and security objectives into a seamless approach to all hazards assurance
would contribute to regulatory efficiency and effectiveness. Keeping technology and
materials secure means that they are not available to cause harm. From the vendor’s or
operator’s perspective the rules can provide the basis for integrated measures and
procedures for operation. Contradictions and omissions can be ironed out and licensing can
be streamlined.
A more collaborative and international regulatory regime should be combined with objective-
based regulation that would allow regulators to focus on the priorities and outcomes that
matter. Countries with smaller nuclear programs could place greater reliance on the shared
responsibilities of the IAEA, national regulatory bodies and technology vendors that the
NPPs they were constructing were safe, secure, reliable and efficient. Investors developing
nuclear programs would have the added assurance that the licensing process was sound,
consistent and predictable.
There would also be a public benefit in moving towards a more collaborative regulatory
regime. An enhanced role for vendors in a harmonized international licensing setup will
streamline the examination, development and introduction of design improvements across
the whole fleet. National regulatory bodies would remain fully responsible for the licensing of
the operator, adaptation of the design to accommodate site-specific features and the quality
of the construction. A regulatory body in the country where the technology vendor’s design is
registered could act as the lead regulator to assess and accept the design. The design
review team could include experts from other regulators, thus adding to its capability. After
the lead regulator’s approval of the design, other regulatory bodies could take over the
licensing process in their own countries through a validation procedure.105 Collaboration
should therefore bring down the cost of regulation and enhance regulatory capability and
consistency.
105
The law governing a regulatory body would have to provide the regulator with the authority to
accept as valid an assessment by another country’s regulatory body.


Part 3: Challenges for Industry


7 Project management
This chapter considers the scope for achieving savings in costs and time from the use of
efficient construction techniques on new nuclear build projects, and the potential offered by
the development of small modular reactors (SMRs).
The sustained expansion of nuclear generation will depend as much upon the economics of
the technology as upon public perceptions and energy policy. The evidence from many
countries suggests that significant cost savings are achievable when a standard nuclear
plant can be constructed in series, as part of sustained program of investment over many
years. In several emerging industrial economies where fast-growing demand for electricity
exists, state-sponsored nuclear power programs are well underway. Standardized designs
and repeat orders have lowered construction times and costs in South Korea and China in
particular. Elsewhere, in the mature industrial economies with established generating
capacity and only slowly growing demand for power, investment in new build tends to be
incremental. This has a marked impact upon the business case for nuclear construction.
Utilities in slowly growing markets order one plant at a time and vendors cannot be certain
that same model will be ordered by the customer or gain regulatory approval across several
jurisdictions. As a result new nuclear plants are often first-of-a-kind (FOAK) ‘mega-projects’
carrying significant risks in terms of program and price. Financing costs can then erode
project viability sharply.
From a supply side perspective the challenge in emerging industrial economies, where the
demand for power is rising strongly to meet the needs of industry and expanding urban
communities, involves finding an appropriate mix of local and international suppliers and the
development of the technical capability to manage and finance a program effectively. The
challenge in the mature industrialized economies, where in many cases the focus is on
replacing generating capacity with a low carbon alternative, is how to capture the benefits of
economies of scale and standardization without a major installation program. WNA believes
that the solution lies in developing an international supply chain that delivers high quality,
reliable and cost-competitive components on a large scale. This involves investment in:
 Manufacturing and engineering capacity to minimize bottlenecks and assure

availability of nuclear grade components;
 Business and technical processes that enable companies and organizations to adopt
good practice and integrate their activities;
 Certification of suppliers to international standards for quality control of
manufacturing and construction processes;
 Strengthening the institutional framework between government and industry so that,
with appropriate harmonization, national technical regulation and licensing facilitates
international trade and technical exchange.
There is no single approach to securing the efficiency and cost benefits that are potentially
available. The challenges are complex and inter-related.

7.1 Construction costs and schedules

Several new construction techniques are enabling the industry to shorten project duration
and improve the process through ‘lean construction’, better organization, reducing re-work
and supply interruptions and the use and assembly of pre-fabricated modules.
7.1.1 Cost escalation

There are a number of good reasons to expect that the recent rises in construction costs will
be contained and even reduced. In 2000, the OECD-NEA prepared a comprehensive report
on the potential for reducing capital costs. It identified several areas where improvements
could be made to get costs down to the levels that would ensure that nuclear remained
competitive.106 Most of these factors are still applicable. For example:
 larger unit capacities provide substantial economies of scale;

 replicating several reactors of one design on one site can bring major unit cost
reductions;
 standardization of reactors and construction in series will yield substantial savings
over the series;
 learning-by-doing through replication at the factory for component manufacture and
at the construction site for installation and improved construction methods;
 simpler designs; and,
 a predictable licensing process should result in substantial savings.
In the intervening period, however, the NEA’s expectations have been tested by an apparent
rise in the construction costs for new NPPs, most obviously outside of Asia. So although the
cost of building and operating nuclear power plants remain competitive with alternative low-
carbon generating technologies, the capital costs seem to have risen substantially over the
past decade and a half. The NEA’s calculation of the overnight cost for a new NPP built in
the OECD rose from about US$ 1 900/kWe at the end of the 1990s to US$ 3 850/kWe in
2009 (see Table 7.1).
To be sure, the NEA figures must be treated with caution as the estimates given for 1998 are
not in line with some other data sources. The US Energy Information Administration
calculated that, in constant 2002 values, the realized real overnight cost of an NPP built in
the USA grew from US$ 1 500/kWe in the early 1960s to US$ 4 000/kWe in the mid-1970s.
The EIA cited increased regulatory requirements (including design changes that required
plants to be back-fitted with modified equipment), licensing problems, project management
problems and mis-estimation of costs and demand as the factors contributing to the increase
during the 1970s.107 The NEA average cost of US$ 2 000/kWe in 2000, in part based on
vendors’ estimates at the time, may therefore have been overly optimistic.
106
NEA/OECD, 2000, Reduction of capital costs of nuclear power plants, Paris.
107
EIA, 2004, Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs, Annual Energy Outlook, Washington DC: p.
55.

Table 7.1: Capital cost estimates for a new NPP, US$/kWe

1 2
Country Overnight cost Investment cost
Technology 1998 2009 1998 2009
Europe
Belgium PWR (EPR) 5 383 7 117
Finland BWR 2 256 : 2 672 :
France PWR 1 636 : 2 280 :
PWR (EPR) : 3 860 : 5 219
Germany PWR : 4 102 : 5 022
Netherlands PWR : 5 105 : 6 383
Spain PWR 2 169 : 2 957 :
Switzerland PWR : 4 043 : 5 612
East Asia
Japan BWR 2 521 : 3 146 :
ABWR : 3 009 : 3 940
South Korea PWR 1 637 1 876 2 260 2 340
North America
Canada PHWR (Candu) 1 697 : 2 384 :
USA APWR 1 441 3 382 2 065 4 296
OECD Average 1 908 3 845 2 538 4 991
1. Overnight cost includes owner’s costs pre-construction and during construction and EPC cost.
2. Overnight cost plus imputed interest charges during construction at 10 percent a
year.
Source: IEA, 2001, Nuclear Power in the OECD, Paris: OECD: table 15, p. 131; IEA-NEA, 2010,
Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, Paris: OECD: Table 3.7a, p. 59.
A study by the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago attributed the rise in
overnight capital costs from US$ 2 000/kWe to US$ 4 210/kWe from 2004 to 2011 to several
factors, “design maturation, vendor and supplier agreements and risk management” and to
108
commodity price rises. Construction costs rose sharply after 2005 for non-nuclear plants
as well. According to IHS CERA’s index for power plant capital expenditure, the costs of
constructing power plants in North America surged by 2.3 times between 2000 and 2008, as
a result of pressures created by full order books, the spike in commodity prices, including
109
steel, and the decline of the US Dollar against the Japanese Yen. A similar rise took place
in the capital costs for oil and gas installations. Labour shortages and tight supply chain
capacity were significant pressures, according to ratings agency Standard & Poor’s.110 A
similar study by Moody’s also pointed to rising constructions costs driven by labour and
111
commodities. Uncertainty in prices has meant that the EPC contractors and their suppliers
108
Robert Rosner, Stephen Goldberg and others, 2011, Analysis of Gigawatt scale overnight capital
costs, Technical Study, University of Chicago: Figure 1, pp. 5 and 29. The study suggested that “the
‘number one’ reason why nuclear capital costs have increased” was to be found in the EPC
contracting arrangements, whereby the main contractor took on the construction risk and was subject
to penalty clauses. These terms were in turn passed onto suppliers through similar contract provision
so that there was a ‘pancaking’ of contingencies built into the full EPC price.
109
See Mott MacDonald, 2010, UK Electricity Generation Costs Update, for the UK Department of
Energy and Climate Change: Brighton: p. 11.
110
Standard & Poor’s, Construction costs to soar for new US nuclear power plants, Ratings Direct, 15
October 2008.
111
Moody’s Investment Service, New nuclear generating capacity: Potential credit implications for US
investor owned utilities, Moody’s Corporate Finance, May 2008: p.14.

have had to raise the contingency element where there was no escalation provision in their
contracts.
The French program also provides some useful data. The French national audit body, the
Cour des comptes, said that the overnight capital costs of building NPPs increased over time
from € 1 070/kWe (at 2010 prices) when the first PWR was built at Fessenheim
(commissioned in 1978) to € 2 060/kWe when Chooz 1 and 2 were built in 2000; and to a
projected € 3 700/kWe for the Flamanville EPR. It can be argued that much of this escalation
relates to the smaller magnitude of the program by 2000 (compared with when the French
were commissioning 4-6 new PWRs per year in the 1980s) and to the subsequent loss of
economies of scale. The total overnight cost of the French PWR program amounted to less
than € 84 billion at 2010 prices. When divided by the total installed capacity (62.5 GWe), the
average overnight cost is about € 1 335/kWe. This is much in line with the costs that were
then provided by the manufacturers. When imputed financing charges are included the cost
112
of the French program was € 1 535/kWe. Converting the Euro values cited above into US
Dollars at purchasing power parity, gives a projected overnight cost for a first-of-a-kind EPR
of US$ 4 240/kWe, which is very similar to the University of Chicago’s estimate.113
Furthermore, it is clear from several studies that major cost reductions can be expected from
building a series of standard NPPs – going from FOAK to NOAK, the nth-of-a-kind.
Consultants Mott MacDonald listed four elements that raise the cost of a FOAK plant:
 Low economies of scale on a first plant; with multiple orders, manufacturers can offer
bulk discounts;
 Additional construction costs from a first project, reflecting the ‘learning curve’;
 A risk premium, depending upon the size of the contingency built into prices;
 A profit element, which takes account of the risk that the plant may be a ‘one-of-a-
kind’ and which may be discounted if repeat orders are approved.
Taken together, Mott MacDonald estimated that a FOAK plant with an overnight capital cost
of US$ 6 000/kWe could fall to US$ 3 600/kWe on a NOAK, a reduction of 40 percent.114 A
significant element is the risk premium included by equipment manufacturers, the EPC
contractor and the plant owner. The risk premium drops from 16 to 11 percent of the total
capital cost. In a FOAK project the risk premium includes a provision to cover regulatory and
political risks, which will diminish with repeat orders. The University of Chicago team put the
FOAK premium at 35 percent overall.115 D’haeseleer, based on his survey of the literature,
provides an average percentage overnight capital cost difference between a FOAK and a
112
Cour des comptes, 2012, Les coûts de la filière électronucléaire, Paris: pp. 24, 225 and 266-267.
The report may be downloaded from
<http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/CC/documents/RPT/Rapport_thematique_filiere_electronucleaire.pdf>.
113
The OECD calculates French national income in 2010 in purchasing power parity terms at a rate of
US$ 1: € 0.873, see <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/purchasing-power-parities-for-
gdp_2074384x-table11>. The actual exchange rate over the course of 2010 was about US$ 1: € 0.74.
114
Mott MacDonald, 2010: pp. 15-16.
115
University of Chicago, 2004, The Economic Future of Nuclear Power, Chicago: University of
Chicago with Argonne National Laboratory: p. 3-2. See also the NEA study which reported costs
savings of between 15 to 40 percent; NEA/OECD, 2000, Reduction of capital costs of nuclear power
plants: pp. 12 and 58-70.

NOAK reactor (on a brownfield site and in the same country) as about 20 percent.116 Other
industry sources consider it to be around 25 percent.
The FOAK cost hurdle may be overcome if utilities are able to order a series of standardized
NPPs. Energy market regulators can facilitate this by establishing a durable framework for
capacity planning and investment, consistent and predictable policies for pricing electricity,
uniform environmental standards, and a technology-neutral approach to power system
innovation. The economics of nuclear power are much improved if a series of standard
models can be ordered. Economies of scale and scope then come into play and the
commercial risks involved in supply nuclear grade components and systems can be
amortized over several units.
7.1.2 Construction times

The construction period for NPPs has lengthened in several countries but shortened in
others (South Korea, for example). It is clear from an analysis of past trends that the
increased requirements for safety since the 1980s lengthened construction times. The
construction time of a nuclear power plant is usually taken as the duration between the
pouring of the first ‘nuclear’ concrete and grid connection. In advance of this, a substantial
amount of time and effort is involved in planning and gaining approvals and licensing for the
facility. The amount of preliminary earthworks and site preparation and transport access
should not be underestimated. Interest payments during the construction period are an
important element of total capital costs. For a five-year construction period, the University of
Chicago study shows that the interest payments during construction can be as much as 30
percent of the overall expenditures. This increases to 40 percent if applied to a seven-year
construction schedule, demonstrating the importance of completing the plant quickly. Some
in the industry, however, believe that the construction period can be as low as four years.
Table 7.2 presents an analysis of the average construction time for all NPPs ever built for
commercial service. It will be seen that prior to the 1980s the average construction period for
Generation I and Generation II reactors was 61-64 months. The period lengthened after the
1980s to give a worldwide average of 96 months for Generation II reactors. Construction
time was significantly longer in the Americas, Western Europe and South Asia than in the
rest of the world. Some special factors must be recognized. The South Asian construction
times were probably pushed out as a result of the difficulties Indian builders had to contend
with as a result of the denial of dual-use equipment and materials by the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the 1990s, NPP completions
were hampered by the general lack of funding for infrastructure projects with many sites
lying idle for several years. This was also the case for the Iranian Bushehr plant and Watts
Barr 2 in the USA; two projects severely delayed until work re-started in the 2000s.
Generation III reactors have recently experienced extended construction schedules largely
as a result of FOAK issues.
116
European Commission DG Energy: p. 5; see also pp. 59-67.

Bucking this trend, it must be noted that construction times in East Asia have consistently
been much shorter. Chinese-designed reactors have typically taken around 60 months to
construct with some projects being closer to 48 months. This is also the case for South
Korean and Japanese reactors.
Table 7.2: Average construction time for NPPs worldwide

Region NPPs Net Construction completed within period (months)
capacity
(number) (MWe) Before 1980 1980-1999 From 2000
Generation I reactors
North America 14 1 331 51 : :
EEA 45 8 005 60 : :
CMEA 4 346 89 : :
East Asia 1 137 56 : :
World 64 9 819 61 : :
Generation II reactors
North America 137 125 844 69 130 :
Latin America 6 5 364 74 150 294
EEA 142 132 290 65 92 178
CMEA/FSU 84 56 823 63 88 259
East Asia 101 86 070 51 54 59
South Asia 23 5 122 65 139 91
Southeast Asia 1 621 : 96 :
◊
West Asia 1 915 : : 436
Africa 2 1 830 : 101 :
World 497 414 879 64 96 109
Generation III reactors
North America - - : : :
Latin America - - : : :
EEA - - : : :
FSU - - : : :
East Asia 4 5 063 : 40 46
‡
South Asia 1 917 : : 139
Southeast Asia - - : : :
West Asia - - : : :
Africa - - : : :
World 5 5 980 : 40 77
◊ Bushehr only ‡ Kudankulam 1 only
While a lot of negative attention is often focused on the two overdue single-unit EPRs
underway in Finland and France, these schedules are not expected to be typical for future
plants. EPRs being built in China look likely to be completed in about 60 months while UK
timelines for the design are set at 60 months.117 The four US AP1000s being built in Georgia
and South Carolina, have experienced some delays, whilst the AP1000s being constructed
in China are still mostly on track to be finished in around 60 months. In India, the Russian-
designed Kudankulam reactors have experienced considerable delay for a variety of
reasons, some political, and future Indian projects could be anticipated on a much shorter
timescale as a result of learning from experience. RosAtom’s VVER-TOI reactor is designed
117
EDF Energy, Draft Overview of HPC Construction, February 2011, Figure 2.1, p. 9 on
<http://hinkleypoint.edfenergyconsultation.info/websitefiles/Overview-of-HPC-Construction-
FINAL.pdf>.

to achieve a 30 percent saving in costs and to be built in 48 months through raising labour
efficiency and design solutions.118
International experience suggests that the first nuclear plants built in a country will be
constructed in not less than 100 months. The exception might well be the Barakah nuclear
power plant in the United Arab Emirates which currently remains slightly ahead of its 60-
month schedule, and where the key components are being imported and there is
considerable usage of expatriate personnel.
If good practice in project management is implemented, the 60-month schedule for
constructing a nuclear power plant in a country with an established nuclear industry remains
realistic. Since investors add a risk premium to the interest charges applied to nuclear
plants, the impact of shorter schedules on the financing charges will be substantial. The
industry has to demonstrate consistent achievement of building plants on schedule and on
budget, as is already the case in Asia, if it is to roll back the perception that cost escalation in
constructing NPPs is an inherent characteristic. It can do so through the adoption of leading
practices from similar industries.
7.2 Lean manufacturing and construction

Lean construction techniques seek to apply the lessons learned from manufacturing, notably
from the innovations introduced by Toyota in the 1950s. Taiichi Ohno and Shigeo Shingo
identified seven types of waste in mass production plants which could be minimized by
adopting the ‘just-in-time’ approach. These ideas came to be known as lean manufacturing
and were applied later to construction projects. It was realized that the flow of work through
the workshop had a greater impact on cost than an attempt to minimize the time and money
expended on each task. The inter-relationship of activities meant that centralized planning of
the whole process could become counter-productive and it was more effective to delegate
planning to production units. Improving the reliability of the process could generate a better
quality product than speeding-up the process through mechanization (though this did not
imply that automation should be abandoned). The so-called Toyota Production System
emphasized that the key to achieving high performance was flow and the key factor in flow
was removing variability.
Lean production is focused on the value chain and seeks to remove any non-value-adding
activities, such as waste, re-work or applications that the customer does not actually want to
pay for. This implies that product design and production be integrated fully, as should the
supply chain, through an emphasis upon partnership and trusting (and enduring)
relationships. In terms of construction, the lean production philosophy involves improving the
process as a whole. Investing in the front-end activities to manage joint project risks with the
client and contractors, rationalizing procurement among contractors, planning logistics and
handling, and establishing cross-functional teams can have the largest impact on cost. Four
elements are important:
 Built-in quality: getting it right first time with rigorous quality control;
 Customer focus: elimination of activities that do not add value to the customer;
118
Nuclear.ru news, NIAEP plans to lower N-plant cost by 30% through design solutions, 8 May 2014.

 Minimization of waiting time: involvement of suppliers in planning;

 Creation of a continuous flow of activity: pulling in resources just-in-time when
needed.119
Traditionally construction was monitored against the schedule of activities and any disruption
had a ‘knock-on’ impact on other activities (and the sub-contractors assigned to undertake
the activity). As a result delays and claims for compensation could proliferate. Lean
construction seeks to eliminate disruption by identifying constraints to achieving performance
in advance and removing these and by including buffers of activities that can be brought
forward or moved back in the schedule. Events that present a risk to achieving project
milestones are controlled on a ‘look-ahead’ schedule. The aim is to keep the project on track
through continual recovery planning and control of conformity, as well as through critical-
path planning and cost-control, which are the traditional tools for project management.
Inventory control plays an important part as well. Items can be classified into those that
involve the largest purchasing expenditure and those whose cost of purchase and holding
buffer stocks is least expensive. The arrival of the first class of items must be tightly
controlled, while the second class deserve less attention.120
Tasks are standardized and specified in terms of quality, time, sequencing and safety. These
need to be developed with the involvement of the sub-contractors and craft personnel so that
everyone understands what they have to do.
According to one study of 19 projects, lean construction leads to a time saving in project
delivery of 20-30 percent.121
7.3 Project organizational development

Lean production has to be bolstered by organizational reform. Rationalizing the organization
of the construction project enhances communication and reduces the complexity of
scheduling activities. Team working has proved to be critical in improving communication
within the project organization. Countering the adversarial relationships that can emerge
from breaking down a project into elements that are delivered by different sub-contractors
and self-employed craft personnel can empower the project team at all levels to find cost-
effective and timely solutions. De-layering, so that the number of hierarchical levels in the
overall project is reduced to four or five, is also important.
Breaking down the institutional barriers between the designer and the construction
organization with the introduction of the design-build concept was an early move in
improving project organization and communication. Under this more collaborative approach,
the construction organization takes on greater responsibility for the project design. The
119
G Ballard and G Howell, 1994, Implementing lean construction: Stabilizing work flow, Paper
nd
presented at the 2 annual conference on lean construction, Santiago, Chile.
120
Peter F Court, Christine L Pasquire, Alistair G F Gibb and David Bower, 2009, Modular assembly
with postponement to improve health, safety and productivity in construction, Practice Periodical on
Structural Design and Construction, American Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 14, No. 2: pp. 81-89.
121
Giorgio Locatelli, Mauro Mancini, Giulia Gastaldo and Federica Mazza, 2013, Improving projects
performance with lean construction: State of the art, applicability and impacts, DOI
10.5592/otmcj.2013.2.2 Research Paper: p. 780.

product and the processes of manufacture and construction are undertaken jointly with a
cross-functional team drawn from the architect-engineer and the EPC contractor-
construction organization. Adopting a partnership approach will improve relationships
between the client, contractors and sub-contractors. But unless it is done well in advance, it
can create difficulties for the regulatory body if modifications to the design and work
processes are introduced during construction. Collaborative construction should therefore
begin as early in the design stage as possible.
The partnership approach allows sub-contractors to have a voice in the project planning and
implies that they share some of the construction risks. This ensures that everyone is focused
on delivery but it also means that sub-contractors must build in a larger contingency element
into their prices and introduce more buffers into their schedules. With de-layering this can be
better accommodated within the overall project budget, but if several tiers of contracting are
involved in the process it can potentially inflate the overall cost, as indicated by the
University of Chicago Study cited in 7.1.
Workforce involvement enables quality to be checked on completion of the activity and

contributes to the effective flow of work by empowering personnel to initiate and, if
necessary (for safety reasons, for instance), halt a process. Machine operators are well-
placed to manage their equipment’s maintenance and to carry out trouble-shooting if there is
a breakdown. These functions add to the demands put upon the workforce and may mean
that further skill development and training is required. A multi-skilled and versatile workforce
enjoys a wider range of professional pathways to advance their careers across more than
one discipline. It reduces the demarcation between trades that could impede the flow of
work. But multi-skilling requires a well-funded vocational education and accreditation system
and a coherent wage rate structure to back it up and to provide the incentives for craft
workers to take on new roles.
Another factor in maintaining the integrity of project scheduling is integrated design and
planning. It is clear from the Japanese nuclear construction experience that the detailed
design, engineering design and production planning, procurement specification, construction
and assembly scheduling and documentation through to the preparation of drawings and
operating manuals are crucial to completing a project and handing-over after commissioning
in a timely manner. This process involves integrating the work of many specialisms and sub-
contractors. That, in turn, requires a rigorous change control procedure and a pro-active
corrective action program to be put in place. The client and its architect-engineer must
therefore ensure the compatibility of computer-aided design and project management
software throughout the project supply chain to avoid interface issues arising. These good
practices are being adopted around the world by the international EPC companies. The EPC
contractor for the Summer and Vogtle plants in the USA, Chicago Bridge & Iron, won the
Bentley Systems 2013 “Be Inspired” award for innovation in advancing information mobility,
improving communication and effective collaboration between project partners.122 These
advances will reduce the risk of delay arising from the complexity of nuclear power plant
122
See <http://www.bentley.com/en-
US/Corporate/Be+Inspired+Awards+Event/collaboration+using+imodels.htm>.

projects and contribute to building the plant as it was designed and authorized by the
regulatory bodies.
7.4 Modularization
Structures with steel frames and reinforced concrete lend themselves to modular
construction techniques. The technique is used widely in shipbuilding, mining, oil and gas
and power plant construction. Modular construction techniques can reduce the time required
to build a structure using conventional methods by conducting activities in parallel. Structural
modules may consist of steelwork for elements of the building, such as walls, floors,
stairways and platforms, which can be erected into position prior to concrete being poured
around them. Other modules comprise assemblies of piping and equipment that are pre-
assembled in an on-site assembly building and then lifted into position for fitting. The
construction of an AP1000 reactor has been divided into more than 300 modules. One of the
heaviest modules is the large CA20 structural module weighing 700t and is the height of a
four-storey building. The CA20 module is made up of 70 sub-modules.123 The last module to
be erected at an AP1000 reactor is the 312t passive containment cooling cylindrical water
tank that will provide water in the event of emergency.
Modular designs aim to integrate the advantages of standardization with prefabrication in a

factory setting. The construction process is simplified into the on-site assembly of sub-
modules. Factory-based manufacture of the sub-modules provides a controlled weatherproof
environment that is less subject to interruptions in the supply of materials and more
conducive for continuous operation (as work can be undertaken under artificial lighting
around the clock). On-site congestion of work activities, especially around mechanical and
electrical works, which has been shown to worsen productivity and cause accidents, is
reduced through pre-assembly.124 Economies of scale can be achieved through high volume
repeat production of standardized units and sub-modules. Hitachi’s construction of an ABWR
for the Shimane 3 NPP, for example, was 94 percent complete at the time work was halted
following the Fukushima accident. Construction had been due to be completed in 53 months.
The work involved the assembly of 190 modules at a specially commissioned facility.
Modularization has been used in Japan by Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi and is being
applied in China and the USA by Westinghouse. An AP1000 module factory was established
in 2010 by the Hubei Nuclear Power Equipment Company, jointly owned by the State
Nuclear Power Technology Corporation and others, in China. The factory has the capacity to
assemble two AP1000s a year, effectively creating a production line for nuclear power
plants. The Shaw Group, then Westinghouse’s EPC partner, opened a US$ 100 million
purpose-built facility at Lake Charles, Louisiana, USA in 2010 to manufacture structural and
piping modules for the nuclear, chemical and petrochemical industries. It is a 38 000 m2
facility with seven production bays and truck, barge and rail access. Quality and safety
culture issues led Shaw’s new owners, Chicago Bridge & Iron, to move some module
123
Nuclear News, Ron Jones: The Summer construction project, June 2014: p. 60.
124
Court, and others, 2009, op. cit..

fabrication work to Oregon Iron Works and to Japan.125 Oregon Iron Works can handle items
weighing up to 145t at its 30 000 m2 fabrication and machining shop in Clackamas, Oregon.
Larsen & Toubro have a major modular fabrication facility at Hazira in Gujarat with access to
the Arabian Sea, including a shop area of 70 000 m2.
By manufacturing sub-assemblies off-site, the EPC contractor can make better use of on-site
resources through tighter scheduling of deliveries, erection and fitting, eliminate congestion
and reduced material stock-holding. The amount of scaffolding and field-operations,
including welding, is reduced. Lower variation in work intensity allows the site workforce to
be maintained at a more constant level, avoiding large peaks and troughs. Factory-based
assembly of components into sub-assemblies provides a more closely controlled
environment for work and can reduce the amount of re-working through tighter quality control
than is possible on a construction site. On the other hand, modular construction methods
present a tougher logistical challenge, since larger items have to be shipped further and
timed more precisely, and greater lifting capacity is required for erection. Given the weight of
the modules, more use tends to made of water transport and this can necessitate
infrastructure modifications (to bridges, canals, ports, etc.). It is claimed that on-site labour
may be reduced by 35 percent, partly achieved through reduced use of skilled trades as
compared to semi-skilled labour; and although part of the work has been shifted to off-site
locations, there is an overall saving of 8-9 percent in labour costs, much of it arising from
fewer stoppages and re-work.126
Not all reactor designs have incorporated modularization. AREVA’s EPR is to a large extent
being constructed in-situ, although with a significant proportion of work undertaken in factory
settings to achieve some of the advantages from modularization without the need for as
much cranage at the construction site. RosAtom is moving in the same direction.
7.5 Small modular reactors

There has been revival of interest in small and simpler units for generating electricity from
nuclear power and for process heat. This interest in small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs)
is driven both by a desire to reduce the impact of capital costs and to provide power away
from large grid systems. They are designed for serial construction from pre-fabricated
modules and collectively to comprise a large nuclear power plant. Due partly to the high
capital cost of large power reactors generating electricity and partly to the need to service
small electricity grids under about 4 GWe, there is a move to develop smaller units. These
may be built independently or as modules in a larger complex, with capacity added
incrementally as required.
Three main options are being pursued: light water reactors, fast neutron reactors (FNRs)
and graphite-moderated high temperature reactors. The first has the lowest technological
risk, but the second (FNRs) can be smaller, simpler and with longer operation before re-
fuelling. The designs are diverse and some are based on technologies that were abandoned
125
William Freebairn, SCE&G changes module vendors for Summer-3, Nucleonics Week, 19 June
2014: pp. 1-3.
126
Court, and others, 2009, op. cit..

in the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, development work on SMRs is proceeding in a

number of countries, notably Argentina, China, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the
USA. Some similarities exist with the naval propulsion reactors in use today and there is
military interest in such designs, as they may be transportable, be readily made blast-proof
through burial and bunkering, and can provide a secure replacement power source in the
event that the grid is sabotaged.
With serial assembly under factory conditions an SMR can be transported by rail, barge or
ship to the site for erection and commissioning in sequence to build up to the required
capacity. Although the SMR route sacrifices the economies of scale achieved in operation by
a large NPP, it may suit a relatively small grid. Potentially, SMRs could displace small fossil-
fuelled thermal power plants. The economics are yet to be demonstrated, however.

8 Quality management
This chapter considers the scope for developing the supply chain to avoid expensive and
time-consuming quality non-conformity and improving the system of supplier certification and
licensing in the nuclear industry. Each tier of the supply chain incurs costs if production is not
right first time, which the industry cannot afford if it is to be competitive with alternative
technologies. It also discusses the significance of exceptional performance and how this is
being integrated into business excellence models to ensure that the organization pursues
non-contradictory goals.
Following an extended period during which there has been a relative lack of orders for new
nuclear power plants, much of the industry is facing a capability challenge and needs to
invest to ensure quality and reliability in manufacturing, especially in relation to safety-related
components. Suppliers from previous periods of construction may need to adopt the safety
culture that has been developed over more recent years and adapt to regulatory changes.
The supplier certification process is expensive and time-consuming for both vendors and
their suppliers, while multiple vendor inspection can also be burdensome and confusing.
Lack of reliability during production adds a risk that must be managed and mitigated through
the conformity assessment process. Furthermore, as the supply chain becomes more
international, and new suppliers are seeking to become global players, it face challenegs
that arise from divergent national regulation and differences in industrial practices.
Even suppliers with a nuclear pedigree have faced problems in achieving performance
because they lacked up-to-date know-how, due to the hiatus in new build in many countries,
and failed to appreciate how the nuclear culture differed from other industries.
At the heart of the problem is the challenge of fostering a safety culture right along the
supply chain. From this a number of good practice measures follow. A shared commitment
aspiring to exceptional performance and based on consensus around well-defined
objectives, clear communication, and appropriate organizational structures will reduce
confrontational relationships between management and workforce within a company and
between companies.
8.1 Safety culture

It is important that the licenced operator’s management system addresses the relationships
and interfaces to prioritize safety and security. One key element of the exceptional
performance required from the nuclear industry is to have a strong safety culture. The IAEA
promoted the idea of a safety culture following the Chernobyl disaster as a means of
127
ensuring that safety consciousness permeated throughout an organization’s activities.
The concept of a safety culture is also to be found in off-shore oil and gas extraction, where
it was promoted in the aftermath of the explosion on the Piper Alpha oil platform in the North
Sea in 1988. Investigations into accidents with severe consequences have highlighted that
127
IAEA, 1991, Safety Culture, Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-4, Vienna: IAEA.

more than human error, technology failure or chance environmental factors are involved.
Attitudes, behaviour and management systems can compromise an organization’s response
to risk and emergency if its culture does not prioritize safety.128 The IAEA defines a safety
culture as that “assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals
which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive attention
warranted by their significance”.129
Working within a safety culture involves a formal framework for management, a shared
understanding, and competency in undertaking actions and practices.130 Managing a
complex set of activities involving several organizations, often with their own institutional
arrangements, as would be found on a construction site or large industrial plant over an
extended time period is a major undertaking. The Olkiluoto 3 project in Finland constructing
the EPR has involved 1 800 sub-contractors and some million components. It is important
that the licenced operator’s management system addresses the relationships and interfaces
involved to capture and act upon information in a timely, efficient and effective way. The
management system must deliver leadership, communication, competency and consistency
in performance, cost-effective resourcing, the pledged outputs, and monitoring, feedback
and learning for continual improvement. It depends upon the quality of information and its
communication. So the key elements of a safety culture involve ensuring that everyone in
the organization understands the:
 goals that have been set in line with the operator’s licence for safety;
 personal responsibility that each member of staff and workforce has for safety;
 relevance of their own role to overall safety (including their own health and safety);
 rationale for the procedures in operation;
 chain of command for task setting and reporting; and,
 controls and checks that will identify any nonconformities.
Elements of a weak safety culture commonly include inaccurate specification of work and
tasks, ambiguity or inconsistency in communication, misunderstanding on the part of an
operative, high staff turnover and insufficient staff training, poor compliance with procedures,
perverse incentives, low morale and lack of trust, divergent sub-cultures, and inadequate
record-keeping. The human dimension and institutional culture are crucial to achieving a
high degree of safety. Indeed, analysis of accident reports suggests that most arise from
either human or organizational failings.
Based on work undertaken by the US Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), ten
traits of a safety culture may be identified:
 Personal accountability;
 Leadership that values and promotes safety;
128
S Gadd and A M Collins, 2002, Safety Culture: A review of the literature, HSL/2002/25: Sheffield:
Health & Safety Laboratory: p.3; on <http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/hsl_pdf/2002/hsl02-25.pdf>.
129
IAEA, 2007, Safety Glossary.
130
IAEA, 2011, Safety Culture during pre-operational phases of Nuclear Power Programmes.

 Respectful work environment;

 Decision making which integrates risk into all planning and activities;
 Questioning attitude;
 Continuous learning;
 Problem identification and resolution;
 Environment for raising concerns;
 Work processes are controlled, understood and procedures observed;
 Effective safety communication.131
These personal and organizational attributes lie at the heart of the nuclear industry’s
management approach. Figure 8.1 shows the link between a safety culture and the project
cycle.
Figure 8.1: Safety culture in the project cycle
Vendors face the challenge of integrating this management approach into their
organizations’ processes and systems and disseminating them along their supply chains.
Jointly, technology vendors, OEMs and their suppliers, must operate management systems
that deliver high quality, inculcate shared values, collaborate to foster communication and
learning, and provide personnel with the training and support needed to achieve excellence
in performance. These elements are discussed in the following sections.
131
Based on INPO, 2013, Traits of a healthy safety culture, INPO 12-012, Atlanta, GE: p.1.

8.2 Supplier oversight

The prime responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations lies with the licensee (the
operator). Part of this responsibility is to ensure that its suppliers maintain an appropriate
management system to ensure that their products conform to specification and report any
non-conformances.132 Quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) are elements of a
management system that has to integrate safety with other requirements.133 QA is focused
on the organization’s procedures, while QC focuses on the product or process of production.
In some jurisdictions, national regulatory bodies require operators and their suppliers to
maintain a QA program that is certified (in relation to a standard) by an independent third
party in addition to their own assessments. In some others, such as China, the regulatory
body itself undertakes the accreditation and the operator has to use the approved suppliers.
The operator’s approved supplier list may thus include (a) those suppliers that have been
independently assessed (third party inspection and certification), and (b) suppliers that have
been assessed by the operator’s staff (known as first party inspection and certification) and
the operator’s prime contractor (second party inspection and certification). Normally the
costs of obtaining independent (third party) certification fall upon the supplier and the costs
of the operator’s audit upon the operator (though the supplier must make its staff available
for the audit and provide documentation, etc.). In the USA, where there are several utilities
operating NPPs, the operators have established a mechanism (through the NUPIC
program)134 to undertake joint audits, which reduces the need for multiple audits and shares
some of the burden of undertaking those audits.
Technology vendors and OEMs perform their own supplier assessments to maintain their
approved supplier lists. They must also undertake QC activities to ensure that the goods and
services they accept from their suppliers conform to specification. QC may involve
monitoring the production process, inspection and testing of the products and the
supervision of corrective and preventive actions. The supplier will also undertake QC to
ensure that the product it releases meets the customer’s requirements. Normally each side
will bear their own costs in implementing quality controls. A technology vendor or OEM is
unlikely to delegate QC to another party. It may also use regular inspections and audits to
cement its commercial relationship and support continual improvement efforts. Any
duplication of inspection visits and associated activities will add costs to manufacturing and
construction. A more international supply chain also means that the production process may
be performed by several companies that might be located in different jurisdictions.
In a nuclear reactor many components may need to work reliably for 40 years or more and
must be robust enough to survive high temperature and pressure and/or exposure to
132
IAEA, 2006, Fundamental safety principles, Safety Standards SF-1: pp. 6-7.
133
IAEA, 2006, The management system for facilities and activities, Safety Standards No GS-R-3: p.
5.
134
The Nuclear Procurement Issues Committee (NUPIC) was set up by US nuclear power plant
operators to undertake joint assessments of the QA programs at their suppliers. It has some non-US
utility members. NUPIC audits use a standardized checklist relating to QA programs mandated by 10
CFR Part 50 Appendix B. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff may accompany a NUPIC
audit and the NRC states that it relies “on the effectiveness of the NUPIC joint utility audit process for
evaluating the implementation of quality assurance programs of suppliers to the nuclear industry”.

radiation. In the case of safety-related components it is imperative that they do not fail in
service. It may not be practical to replace some components in the event they do fail. Nor is
it practical to test equipment that must continue working under accident conditions during
normal reactor operation. Opportunities for testing some components can therefore be
limited and it is important to validate that the production process used in manufacture
conforms to the specified code of practice or process standard. If a supplier cannot
demonstrate that its production process will reliably result in defect-free products (for
example, for off-the-shelf items) then the technology vendor or OEM may need to seek
approval from the regulatory body for commercial-grade dedication, whereby the
vendor/OEM or a third party inspects, tests or analyzes the item to provide reasonable
assurance as to its conformity.
Such considerations imply higher compliance costs for nuclear reactor components than is
the case for other energy technologies. Differing national practices and regulations can raise
costs further.
In the current regulatory environment, vendors are being asked to demonstrate that their
products are capable to achieving the performance expected of them. However, the metrics
are not available for comparative evaluation. Technology vendors are investing in test rigs
and other facilities to generate the data demanded by regulators. Data on non-conformity or
component failure is collected by vendors but not necessarily shared within the industry
(unless it relates to items of safety significance). Safety regulators would welcome the
provision of more data on defect rates.135 There is also growing concern around counterfeit
parts and fraudulent certification. Without robust statistics companies cannot benchmark
their level of defects and regulators cannot assess whether the best available technology is
being applied. Regulatory bodies may resort to rule-making if the industry is unable to
generate the information needed to identify common cause failures.
The exceptional performance being demanded from suppliers to the nuclear industry
increases the complexity and costs of operating QA and quality control. The standard for QA
goes beyond that called for by ISO 9001: 2008 in requiring suppliers to report defects and
implement corrective and preventive actions. In comparison to some other high technology
industries, there can be a smaller range of qualified suppliers available to reactor technology
vendors. Furthermore, technology vendors and OEMs (the ‘prime vendors’, in the
terminology found in the aerospace industry) view the safeguarding and nurture of their
supply chain as forming part of their competitive advantage. At the same time, if quality
problems arise, the reputational damage can impact the whole industry.
Lessons can be adapted from other industries, particularly regulated industries where high
levels of safety, reliability and performance are expected. The transport, aerospace and
defence industries have similar quality management, critical process control and product
realization systems and use statistical analysis to drive up supplier performance.
135
The Nuclear Energy Agency has established the construction event database (ConEx) to enable
experience of problems and defects from the construction of new reactors to be shared.

Joint oversight in the aerospace sector
In the aerospace sector companies generally operate their quality management system in
accordance with the Aerospace Standard 9100, which builds on ISO 9001 by including
additional controls for tighter traceability for critical items and processes, personal safety,
project management and configuration management. The standard was developed by the
US-based Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).
NADCAP (formerly the National Aerospace and Defence Contractors Accreditation Program)
is managed by the Performance Review Institute (PRI), a not-for-profit affiliate of SAE.
Through NADCAP the prime vendors in the aerospace industry are jointly managing the
oversight and quality control of ‘critical manufacturing processes’: for example, casting,
machining, welding, heat treating, NDT, etc. There are now 50 prime vendors and 3 000
supplier companies in the program. It is an industry-managed program and the prime
vendors approve the recruitment (by PRI) of independent inspectors or ‘expert assessors’
who have substantial expertise in the process concerned and of quality management
systems. The independent expert assessors who inspect suppliers do so with full
confidentiality and to a specific technical specification. NADCAP undertakes special process
audits of critical manufacturing processes to check whether a supplier is fulfilling
requirements. It also audits a project or product to establish whether a company is meeting
its obligations in terms of root cause analysis of and corrective action of non-conformances.
Not all prime vendors are part of NADCAP, but suppliers have found it has helped drive up
standards of conformity in the industry and reduce common cause failures.
In 2013 WNA established a Task Force on Vendor Oversight and Control of Suppliers to
develop a concept for an industry-wide program to strengthen the capability of companies
and organizations supplying the civil nuclear industry with goods and services that meet its
quality requirements more reliably and predictably.
8.2.1 Supplier certification

Certification is the procedure whereby a supplier shows that it complies with a code of
practice, a standard or a specification and this is formally recognized by the customer or a
regulatory body. Certification is the result of a conformity assessment procedure and
normally a certificate is awarded on its successful completion. Third-party certification is
often required by regulatory bodies in order for companies to become part of the nuclear
facilities’ supply chain.
There are several major service providers that are competent in certifying different elements
of the nuclear supply chain, including ASME, Bureau Veritas, Cotecna, DEKRA, Intertek
Moody, Lloyd’s Register, SGS, and the TÜV, along with smaller players, such as ABS
Consulting, Arsenal Consulting, BCP Engineers & Consultants, IQC Inc., Project Assistance
Corp. and System One.
There are three types of certification required of an organization supplying to the nuclear
industry:

 An enhanced quality management system that supplements benchmark quality

programs such as ISO 9001 (quality management). Companies must be pro-active in
investigating and correcting problems, embrace a safety culture and aim to improve
not just business and technical performance but also human performance; the
management system must be subject to independent audit periodically. Additional
compliance with standards such as ISO 14001 (environmental management) and BS
OHAS 18001 (occupational health and safety management may sometimes be
needed.
 It must demonstrate that its production processes are good enough to ensure that its
products will meet the performance specifications required by the design; in other
words, the equipment or components supplied must be fit for purpose and will
perform as intended in all design basis situations over the whole life of the plant.
 Personnel must be suitably qualified to carry out their tasks in accordance with, for
example, ASME’s Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code which covers the capability that
welders must achieve.
The performance standard demanded for ‘nuclear grade’ components is very high. For
example, the reactor coolant pump for the AP1000, manufactured by Curtiss-Wright Flow
Control, with its electric motor in the same casing as its wheel, has to operate for 60 years
136
without repair. A graded approach is applied based on the degree of importance to safety
of the item.
There are three types of component in a nuclear power plant:
‘Nuclear grade’ components ‘Commercial grade’

Enhanced QA program is mandatory components
QA program may be required
Safety-related items Safety-significant items
 Production process is  Reasonable assurance  Good commercial practice
subject to inspection, that the component will required.
verification and/or testing. perform safely.
 Any defects or non-  Analysis of past
compliance discovered performance required.
during production that
could cause a substantial
safety hazard must be
reported to the licensee
and/or the regulatory body
and corrected.
 Performance testing  Performance testing  Performance testing
according to a specified according to a specified according to a specified
code of practice or code of practice or code of practice or
standard. standard. standard may be required.
136
Platts Nuclear News Flashes, 2012, Modified AP1000 pump passes endurance test, 15 March,
New York: McGraw-Hill.

Supplier certification in the nuclear industry is of itself a time-consuming and expensive

process to achieve. But it does not stop there, as suppliers are expected to be as good as
the best.
8.2.2 Quality management standards

The nuclear industry has developed codes and standards that are specific to its context. Key
players have been the national and international standards bodies, such as ASME, AFCEN,
CEN and ISO, as well as the IAEA. Codes have been developed for the manufacture of
mechanical and electrical components, instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, fuel
assemblies, and civil construction and structures. The further development of harmonized
nuclear specific codes and standards is discussed below.
In addition to QA standards for production, ISO is developing standards for security, such as
ISO/PAS 22399: 2007 on societal security and ISO/PAS 20858: 2004 on port security. This
work could be extended by building on the best practice guides prepared by the World
Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS).
Industry codes and standards
Codes and standards are developed and established by certification and examination
bodies, such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Codes set out good
practices that must be complied with in undertaking a particular process or operating
procedure. Standards establish technical criteria against which a requirement can be
assessed as being in conformity. The application of uniform standards in an industry results
in standardization, which may generate public and private benefits.
In 1956 ASME established a committee to update its pressure vessel code for the nuclear
age and went to publish other codes and standards for manufacturing, construction and
maintenance. From the late 1960s the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) advocated the
use of QA for nuclear components and this was codified in 1970 as Appendix B on quality
assurance criteria for nuclear facilities, known as 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. In turn, the
American National Standards Institute, ASME and other technical societies responded by
setting up the Committee on Reactor Plants and their Maintenance, which in 1971 published
a standard for quality assurance programs for NPPs (ANSI N45.2-1971). ASME, which had
acted as the secretariat for the N45 sub-committee, took over these standards in 1975 when
it became an accredited standards development organization. ASME’s Nuclear Quality
Assurance Committee has since issued the ASME NQA-1 standards. These standards do
not just apply to safety-related structures, systems and components, as is the case with the
NRC’s regulations (10 CFR 50 Appendix B), but cover all essential items and activities and
all nuclear facilities.
ASME nuclear standards are similar to the French RCC codes, developed by the French
Society for Design and Construction and In-service Inspection Rules for Nuclear Island
Components (AFCEN), an association formed in 1980 to codify the procurement
requirements of EDF, for the design and construction of NPPs. AFCEN is working with
WNA’s CORDEL working group on aligning the mechanical codes with ASME and on
personnel qualification with European Standards.

WTO and regional free trade areas, such as the EU, the European Free Trade Area and the
North American Free Trade Area, recognize the importance of standardization for open
markets, economic integration, mobility and interoperability. WTO rules require the
standardization process to be transparent and impartial, efficient and relevant, consistent
and consensus-based.
The development and application of ASME, ISO and RCC-M standards has reduced but not
eliminated the need for technology vendors and operators to undertake their own technology
audits of their supply chain and to inspect and test goods delivered to ensure conformity and
quality. But unlike some other industries, there is no general quality assurance standard
specific to the civil nuclear sector. As with the aerospace standard SAE AS 9100, it is
necessary to go beyond ISO 9001.137 This is recognized explicitly in the RCC-M standard
which supplements ISO 9000: 2000 with IAEA guidance on quality assurance for safety
(Safety Guide 50-C/SGQ). AREVA and Bureau Veritas established the Nuclear Quality
Standard Association (NQSA) to develop a standard for nuclear safety and quality
management, NSQ-100: 2011. This also builds upon the ISO 9001 standard, IAEA
guidelines and ASME NQA-1 (see box).
NSQ-100 Quality Management Standard for the nuclear industry
The Nuclear Quality Standard Association (NQSA) is a non-profit association jointly

launched by AREVA and Bureau Veritas in 2011. Open to all major nuclear utilities, nuclear
engineers and manufacturers, NQSA promotes the application of the NSQ-100 standard,
and sets a nuclear oriented supplier evaluation process. NSQ-100 is based on ISO 9001:
2008 and two other standards: IAEA GS-R-3: 2006 and ASME NQA-1: 2008. It is said to
cover 70 percent of what a supplier needs to achieve and the rest is up to the vendor to
specify.
An objective of the NQSA is to bring down the costs and timescale of the supplier approval
process since suppliers can apply to be certified by a third party assessor ahead of seeking
prime vendor qualification. NSQ-100 has a similar structure to ISO 9001 so when a supplier
seeks to renew its ISO certification the NQSA assessor needs simply to include the
additional elements into the audit. It does not remove the need for an assessment by the
prime vendor’s own staff, but it permits the prime vendor to focus on its own specific
requirements, in the knowledge that the applicant has an appropriate QA system in place.
The NQSA is seeking support from other industry stakeholders to transform NSQ-100 into a
truly international ISO standard. It should also be noted that ASME’s NQA-1 standard (QA
Requirement for Nuclear Facility Applications) is essentially seeking to achieve much the
same purpose as NSQ-100. WNA joined NQSA as an observer in 2013.
137
Paul Murphy, 2011, The value of nuclear quality standards, Nuclear Engineering International,
July: pp. 38-39.

However, variant approaches to manufacturing can make it difficult for regulatory bodies to
accept components from companies, even if these approaches are essentially providing the
same degree of assurance. Since codes reflect good industrial practice and there is rarely
just one way to do or make something, it makes little sense to seek a universal code that fits
well for all. Instead, WNA is supporting guidance on identifying the common denominators
between the main codes to demonstrate their equivalence to national regulatory bodies.
WNA’s CORDEL working group is examining the harmonization of codes dealing with
permitted analysis methods, non-destructive examination (NDE) methods, evaluation
methods and material specification. It is also developing harmonized competency profiles for
key professions, so that an engineer who qualified in one country can be accepted to work in
another.
The hiatus in building nuclear power plants in several countries, and particularly in the USA,
has meant that codes of practice and standards may not be aligned with current
manufacturing and construction practices. As a result regulatory bodies may require a
manufacturer or constructor to demonstrate the suitability of the proposed process through
testing and inspections in some detail.
Standardization and the mutual recognition of equivalent standards and codes have the
potential to reduce costs without damaging safety, security and environmental protection.
8.2.3 Accreditation
Accreditation is the procedure whereby a certification body gains recognition as being
qualified to certify that a person is competent or a process is being followed correctly. ASME,
for example, has accredited authorized inspection agencies to perform inspections of
companies to assess their compliance with its codes and standards. ASME’s authorized
inspection agencies undertake inspections to ascertain whether a company’s QA program
conforms to ASME’s NQA-1. If so, the company is accredited as possessing the required
level of QA and may then be authorized, following an additional inspection, to manufacture
nuclear components (or, say, components for the automotive industry). The manufacturer
will need to hold the relevant certificates for specific processes.
There is an international system of accreditation for testing laboratories, inspection services

and certification bodies. This facilitates international trade in goods and services as it permits
the authorities in one country to rely upon the certification system in the exporter’s country to
guarantee that quality standards are met. Goods may be held up at a border if the importing
country’s authorities are not satisfied with the credentials supplied by the exporter. Free
trade agreements between countries and the treaties supervised by the World Trade
Organization rely upon the international accreditation system to ensure that goods and
services are being produced to the same standard in member countries. Accreditation also
ensures that production processes within a country are of the same standard. National
accreditation bodies exist in most countries to assess the competence of calibration,
certification, inspection and testing services. They are members of the International
Accreditation Forum (IAF), which provides a peer review facility of the conformity
assessment procedures used by the national accreditation bodies. This means that a
national authority can be sure that the certificates of conformity provided by an organization
in another country are equivalent to their own procedures.

If a vendor is to satisfy the regulatory body that its products and management systems and
production processes meet the specified standards, it needs to provide third-party
certification in many instances. The certification body – a testing laboratory or inspection
service – has itself to be accredited as competent.138
8.3 Enhanced quality assurance

In the nuclear industry, the aim of the mandatory QA program is to manufacture safety-
related items within a well prescribed expected performance set, and so provide assurance
that the finished products will operate reliably over their lifetime. Quality control techniques
were developed by engineers like Walter Shewhart at Western Electric Telephones (now
part of AT&T) in the 1920s and were later adopted by the US defence industry. Any
manufacturing process will have some variation in the outputs produced and the aim of
quality control is to reduce the proportion of out-of-specification items from a batch as far as
it is possible. In a batch there will be a spread of deviations from the mean, and while most
deviations will be minor and within the specified tolerance, a few will normally be out-of-
specification altogether.
In the 1970s Motorola developed a quality control methodology to achieve very low process
variation that is known as Six Sigma (6σ).139 Many manufacturers have used Six Sigma
approaches to monitoring performance metrics and to improve their processes – although its
140
application to other sectors, such as retail, has not been so successful. The statistical
analysis of process capability will reveal common-cause variation as metrics are
accumulated through experience.141 Defects may be identified and this can be used track
down the source of variation through root cause analysis. The QA programs that apply to
‘nuclear grade’ components require the manufacturer to detect, analyze and correct defects
(that is, a deviation from specification), and to document and report the defects and how they
were dealt with, whereas standard QA simply requires the company to collect and analyze
such information. The reasons for this are not only to ensure continual improvement in the
processes, but also to comply with the philosophy of defence-in-depth, which is fundamental
to the licensing of nuclear installations.142 Failure rate data is an important input for safety
138
For example, the US NRC is expected to endorse the accreditation of testing laboratories under
the mutual recognition arrangement between members of the International Laboratory Accreditation
Cooperation (ILAC) organization. This will permit the acceptance of foreign testing certificates for
imported components and avoid the necessity to re-test these at US laboratories.
139
The performance of a process can be assessed statistically by measuring the dispersion of items
from the mean. A low standard deviation from the mean indicates that most items will be within
specification. In a normal distribution 99.7 percent of items will fall within three standard deviations
(1σ to 3σ) either side the mean (μ). If a process can be controlled so as to generate defect-free
outputs to within six standard deviations from the specified mean it will have a defect rate of less than
3.4 in a million.
140
See Bloomberg Business Week, 11 June 2007
<http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_24/b4038409.htm> and Andrew Hill, Financial
Times, 14 October 2011 <http://blogs.ft.com/businessblog/2011/10/whatever-happened-to-six-
sigma/#axzz1lKMspx6H>
141
A common cause failure is the failure of two or more structures, systems or components due to a
single specific event or cause.
142
The IAEA guidance states that a combination of deterministic and probabilistic techniques,
together with sound engineering judgement, should be used in the safety assessment; see IAEA,

and reliability engineering tools such as failure mode and effect analysis and fault tree
analysis that form part of a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). Regulatory bodies require
all segments of the supply chain to gather, report and act on defects and non-compliances
that affect safety-related items to the licensee, that is, the NPP operator, and/or directly.
Should an unexpected defect or failure happen while the plant is operating, even after many
years of operation, it is required that its manufacturing history is available and trustworthy, in
order to take all preventive measures for other parts of the plant, or in other plants, so that a
similar incident will not recur. All this is established in the End of Manufacturing report.
These requirements can be onerous on industry and not all suppliers accept them. If a
manufacturer is implementing Six Sigma or similar quality management tools it is less of a
problem, since the information is being collected already. But not all companies find this
quality control method cost-effective. Accordingly, regulatory bodies may permit a
technology vendor to adopt a dedication procedure, whereby it takes on the liability of the
supplier for an industrial grade item that will be used in a safety-related function. Under NRC
rules, for example, “dedication is an acceptance process undertaken to provide reasonable
assurance that a commercial grade item [can] be used as a basic component”, that is, in a
safety-related application.143 In such cases the technology vendor must test all batches to
gather the data on defect variation for an item.
In addition to the QA program, suppliers must qualify their production processes in

accordance with special codes and standards that apply to the nuclear industry. Each
process may require a separate certification. The IAEA’s Fundamental Safety Principles
state that the protection of people and the environment from radiation exposure “applies for
all facilities and activities, … including planning, siting, design, manufacturing, construction,
commissioning and operation, as well as decommissioning and closure”.144 A checklist of
the main processes involved is illustrated at Figure 8.2.
2000, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design Safety Requirements, IAEA Safety Standard Series
No. NS-R-1: pp. 14-18 and 26.
143
Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission: §21.3
Definitions.
144
IAEA, 2006, Fundamental Safety Principles: pp. 4-5.

Figure 8.2: Key technical processes associated with the construction and operation of a nuclear installation (may be undertaken in parallel)
Design & Sourcing & Fabrication Construction Testing & Operation & Modification & Decommissioning
specification procurement commissioning maintenance improvement
Establishment of Definition of Product definition Site evaluation, Program planning Fuelling & re-fuelling Design program Characterization of
performance goals procurement & planning selection & site & planning of the
strategy preparation work
Conceptual design Selection of Forming, incl. Stakeholder System Power generation Assessment of Stakeholder
contracting casting, molding, consultation configuration & options & consultation
modalities forging, etc. calibration feasibility
Establishing design Market review & Machining, milling Works of civil System Sales Planning the work Segregation of facility
requirements assessment & finishing engineering performance for safe enclosure
testing
Due-diligence Tendering & Joining, incl. Excavation works System integration Maintenance & Replacement of Decontamination
assessment of design negotiation, incl. welding, brazing, & piling testing repair of structures, components &
& engineering options amendments to riveting, soldering, systems & systems
contract etc. components
Feasibility Supplier capability Heat & diffusion Erection of Fuel loading In-service Adapting & back- Dismantling of
assessment assessment treatment structures inspection fitting systems & structures, systems
components & components
Preliminary & detail Quality control Non-destructive Transportation of Sub-criticality Used fuel Upgrading the Demolition works
design & specification programing testing materials & testing management capacity of the
components installation
Development of I&C Witnessing tests, Assembling Assembly & Initial criticality & Radioactive waste Revision of Removal of
systems, procedures etc. at hold points installation of low-power testing management procedures & radioactive materials
& instructions components instructions
Architectural works Expediting & Inspection & Functional testing Power testing Final shutdown of Inspection & Site clean-up works
logistics testing reactor testing
Hand-over of design Hand-over of Hand-over of Hand-over of Hand-over of Hand-over of Hand-over of Hand-over of site
& specifications for materials, goods components permanent works installation for installation for modified works &
procurement & systems operation decommissioning systems
Documentation & Documentation & Documentation & Documentation & Documentation & Documentation & Documentation & Documentation &
record keeping record keeping record keeping record keeping record keeping record keeping record keeping record keeping

8.4 Exceptional performance

Improved performance follows from enhanced organizational capability, the capacity to
achieve objectives. A general feature of the approach is an explicit recognition that there
may be several ways to achieve an objective and it is the continuous search for better ways
that allows the organization to improve its performance. It moves away from the ‘command
and control’ model of operation. Hence it is important for management to be systematic,
strategic, informed, open-minded, customer-oriented, cost-conscious and committed in its
approach. Personnel should be competent, motivated, responsible, involved and
knowledgeable about their work. The organization’s capability to plan, execute and deliver
on its objectives is central. Many companies have adopted quality management standards
and a business model for excellence to drive improved performance through investment in
its capability.
Increasingly technology vendors, operators and regulators are recognizing that exceptional
performance involves the adoption of a range of processes and that these should be
integrated into a sound business excellence model. In 1991 the US Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) pointed to the problem of conflicting organizational goals. It suggested that a
common organizational response to a plant failure or safety event was to put in additional
resources to address the problem. But over time pressures to improve productivity and
profitability meant that there was “drift from an intended level of safety” until “some salient
event occurs”.145 The cycle was then repeated indicating that the system for managing
safety was to a degree disconnected from other management systems. The goals of safety,
profitability, customer satisfaction, and so on, were pulling the organization in different
directions. To align these goals a company must introduce an enhanced quality assurance
program and foster a safety culture and a learning culture within a sound and viable
business model. Integrating these will drive improved performance through investment in its
capability.
The objectives described above are reflected in the ISO 9000 Quality Management
Principles:146
 Customer focus;
 Leadership;
 Involvement of people;
 Process approach;
 System approach to management;
 Continual improvement;
 Factual approach to decision-making;
 Mutually beneficial supplier relationships.
The ISO Principles reflect an international consensus on good practice in quality

management and will help an organization achieve excellence, including evaluating and
145
EPRI, 1991, Final Report on Leading Indicators of Human Performance, Technical Report
1003033, Paolo Alto, CA: Electric Power research Institute and the US Department of Energy: p. 5-1.
146
ISO 9004: 2009.

managing risks stemming from its activities and their consequences and impacts. But, of
course, the ISO Principles do not prescribe how they are to be implemented. They are very
similar to the fundamental concepts on which the European Foundation for Quality
Management has based its Business Excellence Model (BEM) and the values enumerated in
the Baldridge model, popular in the USA. (The major difference is that ISO 9000 does not
deal with corporate social responsibility, while the BEM and Baldridge include this explicitly.)
8.4.1 Learning culture

Buttressing the safety culture and enhanced quality management to achieve exceptional
performance is a learning culture, which recognizes the need to seek out better ways of
carrying out business and identify new issues and problems early. Learning is a key attribute
of an organization that can adapt to and manage change. INPO advised that becoming a
‘learning organization’ could enhance performance in Principles for Effective Self-
assessment and Corrective Action Programs (1997) and the US NRC built this into its
recommendations for problem identification and resolution in 2000.
Typically most formal education and training involves first-order learning, concerned with the
transfer of information, and it is based on the learner’s capacity to adapt his or her behaviour
and to take an action. Incidental learning on-the-job also takes place whereby individuals
discover things for themselves and become more efficient at their task. This is about ‘doing
things better’. Second-order learning involves ‘doing better things’ or ‘finding solutions’,
according to the model proposed by the systems theorist Gregory Bateson. It is more
challenging and requires the learner to use critical reasoning. For example, a learner needs
to understand the assumptions and rationale that support the message he or she is receiving
and, if necessary, change his or her own assumptions and beliefs to comply. An organization
that is seeking to achieve second-order learning will have to provide a supportive structure of
colleagues, coaching and communication. The foundations of a safety culture lie in an
organization being capable of promoting second-order learning.
The third-order of learning within an organization calls for the learner to ‘see things
differently’.147 It may involve “a restructuring of basic assumptions caused by the recognition
of ‘incoherence’ between assumptions and experience”.148 For example, if an organization is
finding that safety is being compromised by the pursuit of its other goals then it needs to
change the company’s culture so that goals are aligned appropriately. This should mean that
the organization is open to critical appraisal and to learning from other organizations and
outside events. To take another example, it is now clear that not enough thinking about the
unthinkable took place in Japan on the potential impact of a major tsunami. As a result of the
crisis at Fukushima, the industry has been going through a process of third-order learning.
Establishing a learning culture is by no means easy. The organization must be able to codify
and communicate tacit knowledge, owned by individuals, into explicit knowledge that is
owned by the work collective (employees, agency staff and advisers, regular sub-contractors
147
Stephen Sterling, 2010, Transformative learning and sustainability: sketching the conceptual
ground, Learning and Teaching in Higher Education, 5/2010-11: pp. 17-33.
148
Sterling, 2010: p. 25.

and key suppliers). This takes place through the preparation of manuals, written procedures,
databases and intranets, induction and job-related training, orientation courses and
professional development (such as that provided by the World Nuclear University),149 and
drills to prepare for emergencies. Capturing feed-back from customers is also vital. The
organization should, to adapt a Chinese proverb, not just learn from its own experience but
from the experience of others. It should also facilitate two-way communication and dialogue
in its hierarchy, since management structures may filter, distort or block information and
instructions. It should ensure that systems of accountability do not inhibit learning by
promoting a ‘no-blame culture’ that encourages personnel to report incidents. Decision-
making must take account of expertise and evidence.
8.4.2 Human performance improvement

Any misalignment between the management system, activities and practices and individual
and organizational understanding introduces risk. The aim of the human performance
approach is to reduce human error and manage processes in order to introduce defences
that render systems less vulnerable to events that have the potential to cause harm or
damage. In the nuclear industry the approach was championed by INPO in the USA. It seeks
to go beyond training and learning, the interventions usually associated with human resource
development, and reliance upon procedures. Whereas training helps develop individual
competencies, the aim of human performance improvement is to develop organizational
capability through investment in its people, technology and external relationships. In
particular, the approach attempts to integrate organizational, environmental and behavioural
factors that would hinder exemplary or exceptional human performance if they pulled in
different directions. The approach is therefore associated with the work undertaken for
McKinsey & Co. by management consultants Tom Peters and Bob Waterman in the late
1970s, eventually published as In Search of Excellence.150 Among the eight common
themes that Peters and Waterman distilled from their research was the idea that productivity
and quality came from empowering the company’s people and that a company’s leadership
should be committed and value-driven. The approach has been applied in several industries,
including aviation and health care, and by the military. The emphasis on excellence
demonstrates that an organization is addressing fundamental features that will affect its
future performance and that it has gone beyond a simple focus on results, since results are
‘lagging’ indicators that reflect past performance. It is also the basis for driving continual
improvement in performance.
The approach is founded on a model of error causation which contends that human
performance is the output from a system that comprises a network of elements that work
together to produce repeatable outcomes (for example, customer satisfaction), thus assuring
reliability.151 A finding arising from the research around this model is that people cannot
perform better than the organization supporting them. It is suggested that 75-90 percent of
149
See <www.world-nuclear-university.org>.
150
Thomas J Peters and Robert H Waterman, Jr., 1982, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from
America’s best run companies, New York, NY: Warner Books.
151
US DoE, 2009, Human Performance Improvement Handbook, Volume 1 – Concepts and
Principles, DOE-HDBK-1028-2009, Washington: Department of Energy Standards; p. v.

injuries and incidents occur as a result of human error, but, of these, 70 percent are
attributable to latent organizational weaknesses that influenced the human error on the part
of the individual.152 Individual behaviour is influenced by the organization’s processes and
values and by the encouragement and guidance offered by colleagues. Human error is a
symptom of problems rooted in the system (so called ‘latent conditions’).
The weakness in a risk control regime that relies upon being responsive to an incident and
putting things right after the event is that it is managing safety reactively, not proactively.
Reactive management has improved productivity and reliability but its very success means
that fewer things go wrong and complacency can set in. Management can become
preoccupied with circumventing problems instead of trying to fix them. Proactive
management takes productivity and reliability to the next stage by identifying vulnerabilities
and opportunities for improvement; benchmarking the organization’s performance against
that of its peers; setting challenging goals; and engaging with personnel to design and
implement improvement initiatives. Once people recognize that they are fallible, and even
the best make mistakes, situations where errors are likely can be identified and defences put
in place. The conclusions reached by Harvard Business School professor John Kotter on the
importance of leadership in taking an organization through the process of identifying
performance gaps through monitoring results, analyzing problems and implementing
corrective action programs have been influential to this line of thinking.153
Human performance improvement is founded upon two capability sets: those owned by
individuals, namely their competencies and innate aptitudes, and those that accrue to the
organization, as a culture. These are the foundations for building a strong safety culture and
human resource development programs, which can be brought together and integrated into
a business excellence model. For example, the senior leadership of the company must
communicate the corporate vision effectively to all personnel, who, in turn must be involved
in the planning of tasks, so that error-likely situations are avoided. The linkages between
investing in the company’s common capabilities are illustrated below.
152
See US DoE Office of Health, Safety and Security at
<www.hss.doe.gov/sesa/corporatesafety/hpc/fundamentals.hmtl> citing Charles Perrow, 1984
(updated 1999), Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technologies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press: p.183; and James Reason, 2000, Human error: models and management, British
Medical Journal, 320: 768.
153
John P Kotter, 1996, Leading Change, Harvard Business School Press.

Individual assets Organizational assets

Ability sets Culture sets
Competencies  Attitudes and  Honest reporting and focus on taking
(‘Skill sets’) behaviour. corrective action.
 Knowledge.  Professional development encouraged:
 Skills.  Fair performance appraisal;
 Transparent remuneration and
reward;
 Targeted hiring of specialisms
through recruitment, consultancy or
out-sourcing;
Aptitudes  Creativity.  Coherent recruitment and retention;
 Diligence.  Forward-looking human resource
 Empathy. development.
 Leadership.  Participatory target setting.
INPO has put forward four desired outcomes against which an organization’s performance
improvement can be measured:154
 The picture of excellence is well known;

 Problems are prevented and mistakes avoided;
 Performance gaps are analyzed thoroughly and solved efficiently; and,
 Performance improvement is ingrained as a core business practice.
The approach draws upon the experience of many companies and organizations in error
prevention, causal analysis and corrective action programs. There is no single model and it
remains an evolving set of tools. The strength of the human performance approach lies in its
potential to support and maintain high quality standards in production as much as in
ensuring safety. Companies committed to improving human performance will be better
placed to manage the challenge of achieving exceptional performance in their operations
and in meeting regulatory expectations, which are to be strengthened shortly when the IAEA
issues revised safety guidance on leadership and management for safety (GSR Part 2).
A more collaborative relationship between management and workforce within a company

and between companies along the supply chain where the commitment to quality and safety
is strong has contributed to the exceptional performance achieved in countries such as
Japan, where NPPs have been delivered over shorter timescales, as explained in chapter 7.
154
INPO, 2009, Achieving excellence in performance improvement, INPO 09-011, Atlanta, GA:
Institute of Nuclear Power Operators.

9 Stakeholder management
There remain significant challenges to be overcome before the development of the nuclear
power sector can be said to have secure prospects. Notably, there are several hurdles to
securing state support, the confidence of the financial community and, perhaps most of all,
broad-based public acceptance of nuclear technology.
WNA is tackling these issues on behalf of the industry through its industry working group
activities, its dialogue with regulatory bodies, standard development organizations and
international agencies, and in its public outreach work.
9.1 Maintaining community support

Managing the societal and political dimensions of building and operating nuclear power
plants (NPPs) must involve local community engagement and the provision of public
information on the plant’s activities and about the industry generally. International experience
indicates that concerned citizens target specific sites and investments in order to mobilize
support for their point of view and make an impact on the national political scene. Such
tactics exploit the tendency within a local community to worry about risks that they feel are
being imposed upon them, possibly without sufficient consultation or compensation.
Organized citizens groups can become the main source of information on a project or
incident and the news media is, of course, duty-bound to report all sides of the story. It is
difficult to diffuse a public concern once it has spread beyond a small number of committed
activists.
Nuclear power is by no means unique in this regard. Local opposition to many types of
development is manifested quite widely – projects to build highways, railways, dams,
airports, all forms of power plants whether fossil fuelled, nuclear or renewable, housing
estates, farms, factories and waste disposal sites have all been halted on economic and
environmental grounds by concerned citizen groups in developed and developing countries
alike. A strategy for mitigating the social and environmental impacts of a project has to be at
the center of development planning.
Accessible public information is another crucial element. WNA information materials and
news service is used by member companies and others in their own public communication.
These common resources cover all aspects of the nuclear debate and are produced to high
standards of accuracy and reliability. NPP operators can combine these materials with their
own messages on how the nuclear component of their generating capacity helps insulate
their customers against price volatility at an affordable cost.
Any industrial facility has to behave as a good a neighbour within its community. In general,
established NPPs enjoy strong support within their immediate communities. Examples like
these can be helpful in instilling confidence within communities that are being considered as
hosts to a new plant. As fossil-fuelled power plants are decommissioned, new sites will be
needed for replacement NPPs. Community engagement will be crucial to securing the
development.

Polling by IPSOS-Mori suggests that there was a dip in support for nuclear power following
Fukushima but that in most countries support rebounded quickly, although not yet reaching
the levels of confidence seen prior to the accident.155 First-time surveys carried out after the
accident to determine attitudes lack a baseline and therefore must be interpreted carefully.
Long-running national surveys are typically commissioned by governments and energy
associations, many of which have asked the same or similar questions over a number of
years and these can be trusted to give a better indication of the trends involved over time.
Figures from the US156 (where almost a third of all reactors are located) are both informative
and re-assuring. The long-term trend for public support of nuclear is clearly heading up. Just
as importantly opposition is going down. It is also relevant to note that educators and
physicians can provide authoritative information and play a critical role in influencing the
communities they serve.
Not all countries are so positive of course: Chinese Taiwan, Germany, India and Japan are
examples of places where very serious acceptance issues clearly exist. However a note of
caution should be sounded when factoring into account media portrayal. While protests
make news headlines, they may reflect the views of a motivated minority and not necessarily
the public at large.
The resilience in public and political support for nuclear in a wide range of countries,
including China, Russia, the UK and the USA, suggests that further expansion remains a
credible scenario. With new NPPs under construction in every continent, including regions
where none have been built before, like the Middle East, the industry needs to be ready to
respond to stakeholder concerns. Regaining public confidence, then, involves tackling the
local anxieties first and foremost, and realizing that concern over safety is often a sign of
dissent, rather than its cause.
9.2 Government support and energy markets

Until governments bring forward measures that reward and penalize energy sources
objectively in terms of their greenhouse gas emissions and any other pollution that they
cause – the disposal of radioactive wastes must, of course, be part of the equation – and
reduce the contribution from fossil-fuelled thermal power plants, the growth of nuclear power
is likely to be constrained. To flourish, the nuclear power sector requires fair treatment and
recognition of its environmental benefits.
The modalities of market regulation play an important part in this regard. No energy market
is unregulated entirely. Traditionally, governments have regulated electricity prices and this
has in the past dissuaded private utilities from entering the market and, in many countries,
left power supply to vertically integrated state-owned utilities. Liberalization and unbundling
is intended to regulate electricity prices through the competitive process. It shifts the focus of
utilities towards cost reduction, which, if pursued single-mindedly, may undermine security of
supply and environmental goals.
155
Cited in IEA, 2013, Tracking Clean Energy Progress, Paris: International Energy Agency: pp. 34-
35.
156
See <http://www.emagcloud.com/et/POPO_2013/pubData/source/PoPoBinder1.pdf>

New nuclear build
There are currently 16 commercial civil nuclear reactors under construction in OECD
countries:
 Finland: Olkiluoto 4;
 France: Flamanville 3;
 Japan (construction ongoing but delayed): Ohma 1; Shimane 3;
 Korea, South: Shin Wolsong-2; Shin Hanul/Ulchin 1 & 2; Shin Kori 3 & 4;
 Slovakia: Mochovce 3 & 4;
 USA: Watts Bar 2; Vogtle 3 & 4; VC Summer 2 & 3.
Apart from Finland, all these projects were started within a regulated electricity market. In
Finland, which has a deregulated market, the risk is shared between the generator and the
electricity customers under the Mankala cost-price model (see 9.3 below). Outside of the
OECD another 50 civil reactors are under construction and all of these projects are taking
place in regulated electricity markets.
A key feature of regulated markets is that the electricity market regulator allows the utility to
factor into the sale price of electricity an element to fund or amortise capital investment.
Vertically-integrated utilities are also in a better position to plan for the medium to long-term
as they do not face intense competition for their customers, as is the case in countries where
electricity supply has been unbundled. Even so, some governments have accepted the need
to offer state aid to projects to encourage private financing of low carbon energy
technologies. The US federal government provided loan guarantees worth US$ 6.5 billion
towards the construction of the two Vogtle units in Georgia and shortlisted the Summer
project in South Carolina for similar guarantees. The guarantees may cover up to 80 percent
of the projected financing costs.
Among those countries that have deregulated their energy markets, the UK’s Electricity
Market Reform, promulgated in 2013, is attracting wider interest. A key feature of the
measures is the Contract for Difference (CfD), which is a mechanism to provide investor
certainty in a deregulated energy market. The merits of the CfD mechanism include the
following:
 It incentivizes investment in low-carbon generation in a way that leaves much of the

risk of the investment with the investor;
 It provides a route to market on bankable terms for merchant low-carbon generation
plants, including nuclear power and renewable energy sources;
 It offers greater comfort to private investors as it is a legally enforceable contract
providing an avenue to obtain redress and compensation in the event of policy
change by government.
It is important to note that a generator still has to sell the power into the market in the normal
way and there is no priority grid access, as is often the case with a statutory Feed-in Tariff.
The CfD is a bet between the generator (the punter) and its counterparty (a special
government-sponsored enterprise) on the outcome of the competition to sell power into the
electricity market. If the outcome is a market price (the ‘reference price’) higher than the bet
(the ‘strike price’) then the generator compensates the counterparty; if the market price turns

out to be lower than the ‘strike price’, then the counterparty compensates the generator. The
UK Government has stated that the reference price for a nuclear power plant will be a
measure of the market price in the season-ahead market, or, if conditions allow, the year-
ahead market for electricity.157 The CfD does not ‘reimburse’ the generator; rather, it
resembles a hedging operation in the absence of a futures contract for a commodity.
The UK Government has designed the CfD mechanism to attract a range of low-carbon
generation technologies. It is available on similar terms to renewable energy sources and for
carbon capture and storage projects and has been accepted as compatible with a market-
oriented energy system by the European Commission. As the CfD is an agreement that is
enforceable in the courts it has an advantage from the private sector perspective over a
fiscal measure, such as a carbon tax. The latter does not provide the same level of
assurance as can be seen from the case of Australia, where a Labor government
established a carbon pricing scheme in 2012 but following an election this was removed by
the incoming Liberal-led coalition government.158
For emerging industrial economies, the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model offered by

RosAtom helps a country take the initial steps in implementing a nuclear power program.
Under the model, a single company or consortium is responsible for the construction and
operation of the nuclear power plant under a contract with the electricity utility or the
government. RosAtom is a state-owned enterprise with several functions that include design,
construction, operation and decommissioning and waste management. The RosAtom
corporation receives subsidies from the Russian government for some of its non-commercial
and defence-related activities, but in other areas it must work on a commercial basis.
In the export field, RosAtom has offered the BOO model as an option and an inter-
governmental agreement was signed with Turkey in 2010 to build the Akkuyu nuclear power
plant. In the subsequent negotiations a Feed-in Tariff of US$ 0.1235/kWh until 2030 was
agreed (the same as the Feed-in Tariffs available for biomass and solar power plants). A
similar deal has been proposed in Jordan. The corporation can make use of export finance
extended by the Russian foreign trade bank VTB. Russia’s sovereign wealth fund intends to
invest about US$ 3 billion in nuclear projects abroad.159 An inter-governmental loan was
agreed between Russia and Hungary in January 2014 for the financing of two NPPs. The
30-year loan of up to € 10 billion will have a 10 year grace period.160 RosAtom’s director
general Sergey Kiriyenko stated in June 2014: “it is not enough anymore to build and take
157
UK Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013, Electricity Market Reform: Delivering UK
investment, Cm 8674, Appendix B, p. 15.
158
Disquiet has also been voiced in Spain where the government led by the Popular Party is
dismantling the system of Feed-in Tariffs from solar power supplied to the national grid that were
established by the Socialist Workers’ Party and plans to tax solar power generators, with widespread
financial distress for the investors.
159
Anna Sains, Russian state to invest funds in international nuclear projects, Nucleonics Week, 19
June 2014: p.5.
160
Reuters, Hungary soon to clinch Russian loan for nuclear plant project, 26 January 2014.

responsibility for just the five-year construction period. Responsibility does not stop at the
point of commissioning.”161
9.3 Investors and financing

A nuclear power plant represents a major item of capital expenditure and is a long-life asset
(and liability) for a power utility. It is an element of infrastructure with a century-long footprint.
These characteristics are by no means unique to nuclear; a hydroelectric dam, an oil or gas
pipeline or sometimes a coal mine are close parallels. Such complex, large-scale projects
are prone to construction delays.162 Their development may be subject to political
controversy and close regulatory scrutiny.
In principle, financing a nuclear power plant should be little different from financing any other
large-scale, complex, capital project and there is no evidence to suggest that investment
banks apply non-standard criteria in deciding whether to finance a nuclear plant. In practice,
however, most commercial investment banks and a large number of state-backed
development banks are not prepared to finance a nuclear project.
This situation was not always the case. In the past, the World Bank163, the European
Investment Bank and a wider range of commercial lenders financed nuclear projects. The
Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) is the only international development bank to
have made a loan in recent times: to support the refurbishment and licence extension of
Argentina's Embalse nuclear power plant in 2013. Amounting to US$ 240 million, it will help
Nucleoeléctrica Argentina SA refurbish the Candu pressurized heavy-water reactor at
Embalse.
Four developments, specific to nuclear power, seem to have altered the investment climate:
 Greater attention is now paid to examining whether projects have detrimental social or
environmental impacts and these questions have been codified into the Equator
Principles.164 It is WNA’s view that nuclear power projects meet the Equator Principles
and demonstrating this is an on-going aspect of its work in relation to the investment
community.
 The hiatus in constructing new nuclear power plants in several OECD countries during
the past two decades has meant that there is less of a track record upon which to assess
the project risk involved. The reactors under construction in the USA and those planned
in the UK are in some ways test cases for first-of-a-kind nuclear and project engineering
in their respective countries. By contrast, China, Japan and South Korea – and to a
lesser extent, France – have had an uninterrupted record of nuclear power plant
construction and achieved significant cost and schedule efficiencies in the past.
161
Ariane Sains, Nuclear industry should focus on bilateral negotiations: Rosatom CEO, Nucleonics
Week, 12 June 2014: p.6.
162
See <http://www.mega-project.eu/>.
163
World Bank archive -
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,contentMDK:20125
474~pagePK:36726~piPK:36092~theSitePK:29506,00.html
164
See <http://www.equator-principles.com/>.

However, in both Japan and South Korea the autonomy of regulatory bodies is being
strengthened and it is not clear whether the rapidity of past construction can be repeated
in the near future.
 The economic case for nuclear energy has been eroded in some countries (as discussed
in chapter 7).
 The degree of political risk is arguably higher in respect of a nuclear project. Energy and
infrastructure projects often arouse controversy and, in the case of nuclear power, public
and governmental perceptions play a significant role.
Responding to these pressures, some reactor vendors have taken a share in the equity of
new nuclear power plants. AREVA has taken a 10 percent share in NNB Generation, which
is to construct the Hinkley Point C plant in the UK. Toshiba and Hitachi have bought sites
designated for new reactors, but as private companies they will have to raise finance on the
same terms as other private companies. They are likely to sell their stakes in the power
plants once they are operational. Westinghouse has stated its intention to become a
strategic investor in the Bulgarian project company New Builds Plc., which will fund the
construction of Kozloduy 7.
Under the Finnish Mankala model, major local electricity customers (industrial and
municipal) are shareholders in the generating company. The generating company sells the
heat and power to its shareholders at cost. It is a type of joint venture with the power
purchase agreement (PPA) written into the generating company’s articles of association.
The existing assets of a Mankala-type company support any debt taken on to finance a new
power plant (or other type of asset, such as housing) and the Nordea Bank claims that the
model is “inherently bankable”. No Mankala company has ever defaulted.165 RosAtom has
agreed to take a share in a Finnish plant as a partner.
However it is not easy to see why this institutional arrangement should be adopted in
countries where electricity supply is undertaken on a regional or national basis. The model
operates well in Finland where municipalities and large local power users agree to finance
the construction of additional or replacement generating capacity. The Mankala model has
not been exported thus far, although a variant may be tried in Poland, where major energy
users from the mining and steel industries are to take a strategic stake in that country’s
nuclear program.
Putting in place the infrastructure for sustainable development is essential if we are to offer
decent livelihoods for a growing population, especially in emerging industrial economies. But
the complexity of the risks associated with building an NPP have held back the financing on
a project basis and even large utilities have found it hard to secure the financial resources
necessary for investment. Not all regions and countries will pursue nuclear technology, but
165
See
<http://www.ben.ee/public/Tuumakonverentsi%20ettekanded%202009/Peter%20S.%20Treialt%20-
%20Mankala%20principles.pdf> retrieved on 20/02/2014. Debt is kept low as a result of the
customers’ equity in the generating company and the arrangement has enabled Finland to invest in a
range of low-carbon energy technologies.

many will conclude that it is one of the cleanest and most cost-effective means of power
generation.


Appendices


Appendix A: Acronyms and abbreviations
ABWR Advanced boiling water reactor

ACR Advanced Candu reactor
AFCEN Association Française pour les règles de Conception, de construction et de
surveillance en exploitation des matériels des Chaudières Électro Nucléaires
(French Society for Design and Construction and In-service Inspection Rules
for Nuclear Island Components)
AFNOR Association Française de Normalisation (French Standards Association)
ALARA As low as reasonably achievable
AP1000 Westinghouse-designed Advanced PWR (with an output of 1100 MWe)
APR Advanced Power Reactor
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BOO Build-Own-Operate
BTU British Thermal Unit (a measure of energy equivalent to about 1055 joules)
BWR Boiling water reactor
C Celsius (a scale for measuring temperature)
Candu Canadian Deuterium Uranium reactor (a PHWR)
CCGT Combined-cycle gas turbine
CCS Carbon capture and storage
CEN Comité Européen de Normalisation (European Committee for Standardisation)
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation
CHP Combined heat and power
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CO2 Carbon dioxide
CORDEL WNA Working Group on Cooperation in Reactor Design Evaluation and
Licensing
CSR Corporate social responsibility
E&C Engineering and construction
EASC Euro-Asian Interstate Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification
of the CIS
EDF Électricité de France
EEA European Economic Area, comprising EU and EFTA countries
EFQM European Foundation for Quality Management
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EN European Standard
ENISS European Nuclear Installations Safety Standard
EPC Engineering, procurement and construction undertaking
EPCC Engineering, procurement, construction and commissioning undertaking
EPCM Engineering, procurement and construction management undertaking
EPR Evolutionary Power Reactor, a PWR developed by AREVA

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

ESS European Standardization System
ETC EPR Technical Code (issued by AFCEN)
ETS Emission Trading System
EU European Union
FNR Fast neutron reactor
FOAK First-of-a-kind project or model
FSU Former Soviet Union
G Giga (one billion units or 1 x 109)
GB Chinese standards or guojia biaozhun issued by the SAC
GHGs Greenhouse gases
GOST EASC Standards (formerly the State Standards or gosudarstvennyy standart
of the USSR)
HWR Heavy water reactor
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAF International Accreditation Forum
I&C Instrumentation and control function
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IEA International Energy Agency
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IFC International Finance Corporation (part of the World Bank Group)
INSAG International Nuclear Safety Group of the IAEA
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPP Independent power producer
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITUC International Trade Union Confederation
JV Joint venture
k Kilo (one thousand units or 1 x 103)
KAERI Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute
KSNP Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant
kW Kilowatt
kWe Kilowatt electrical
kWh Kilowatt hour
LCoE Levelized cost of electricity
LWR Light water reactor
M Mega (one million units or 1 x 106)
m milli (one-thousandth of a unit or 1 x 10-3)
MBNQA Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award
MDEP Multinational Design Evaluation Program
METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan

MN Meganewton (a unit of force)

Mtoe Million tonnes of oil equivalent
MW Megawatt
MWe Megawatt electrical
NDT Non-destructive testing
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD
NOAK Nth-of-a-kind project or model
NPCIL Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd
NPP Nuclear power plant
NPV Net present value
NRAI Nuclear Regulatory Authority of India
NRC US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
O&M Operation and maintenance function
OEM Original equipment manufacturer
OPR Optimized Power Reactor
PPA Power purchase agreement
PSA Probabilistic safety assessment
Pu Plutonium
PHWR Pressurized heavy water reactor
PWR Pressurized water reactor
PV Photovoltaic
QA Quality assurance
RBMK Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosti Kanalniy (a Soviet-designed LWR)
RCC Règles de Conception et de Construction (AFCEN design and construction
codes)
RCC-M AFCEN design and construction code for mechanical components for a PWR
R&D Research and development
RD&D Research, development and demonstration
RSE Règles de Surveillance en Exploitation des Matériels Mécaniques (AFCEN in-
service inspection rules)
SAC Standardization Administration of the People’s Republic of China
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance (an inspection company)
SMART Specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and timely
6σ Six Sigma methodology (a QA system)
SSC Structures, systems and components
Sv Sievert (a unit of the probability of biological damage caused by a radiation
dose)
TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company
Th Thorium
TQM Total quality management
TSO Transmission system (or service) operator

TÜV Technischer Überwachungsverein (Technical Inspection Association)

U Uranium
235 238
U, U Isotopes of Uranium with 235 (or 238) neutrons
UN United Nations
UNDP UN Development Program
UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNIDO UN Industrial Development Organization
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VVER Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactor (a Soviet-designed PWR)
W Watt (a unit of power)
WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators
WENRA Western European Regulators Association
WINS World Institute for Nuclear Security
WNA World Nuclear Association
WNU World Nuclear University
WTO World Trade Organization

Country abbreviations
AE United Arab HU Hungary PL Poland
Emirates ID Indonesia RO Romania
AM Armenia IL Israel RU Russian Federation
AR Argentina IN India SA Saudi Arabia
AU Australia IT Italy SD Sudan
BD Bangladesh IR Iran SE Sweden
BG Bulgaria JO Jordan SL Slovenia
BR Brazil JP Japan SK Slovak Republic
BE Belgium KE Kenya SU Union of Soviet
BO Bolivia KP North Korea Socialist Republics
BY Belarus KR South Korea SY Syria
CA Canada KZ Kazakhstan TH Thailand
CH Switzerland LT Lithuania TN Tunisia
CL Chile LY Libya TR Turkey
CN China MA Morocco TW China (Taiwan)
CZ Czech Republic MN Mongolia UA Ukraine
DE Germany MY Malaysia UK United Kingdom
DZ Algeria NA Namibia US United States of
EC Ecuador NG Nigeria America
EG Egypt NL Netherlands VE Venezuela
ES Spain NO Norway VN Vietnam
FI Finland PH Philippines UA Ukraine
FR France PK Pakistan ZA South Africa

Appendix B: Glossary
ALARA: As Low As Reasonably Achievable, economic and social factors being taken into
account. This is the optimization principle of radiation protection.
Atom: A particle of matter which cannot be broken up by chemical means. It consists of a

nucleus of protons and neutrons, and of electrons.
Background radiation: The naturally-occurring ionizing radiation which every person is

exposed to, arising from the Earth’s crust (including radon) and from cosmic radiation.
Base-load: The part of electricity demand which is continuous, and does not vary over a 24-
hour period. Approximately equivalent to the minimum daily load.
Boiling water reactor: A common type of light water reactor (LWR), where water is allowed
to boil in the core thus generating steam directly in the reactor vessel.
Burn-up: Measure of thermal energy released by the nuclear fuel relative to its mass,
typically gigawatt days per tonne of fuel (GWd/t).
Candu: Canadian Deuterium Uranium reactor, moderated and cooled by heavy water
(except the ACR design, which is cooled by light water). These are the most common
pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs).
Chain reaction: A reaction that stimulates its own repetition, in particular where the
neutrons originating from nuclear fission cause an ongoing series of fission reactions.
Complexity: The complexity of a project varies according to the number of interconnections

between the activities necessary to deliver the project’s goals which are undertaken by
autonomous agents who are accountable to different authorities for their performance.
Control rods: Devices to absorb neutrons so that the chain reaction in a reactor core may
be slowed or stopped by inserting them further, or accelerated by withdrawing them.
Coolant: The liquid or gas used to transfer heat from the reactor core to the steam
generators or directly to the turbines.
Core: The central part of a nuclear reactor containing the nuclear fuel and any moderator.
Critical mass: The smallest mass of fissile material that will support a chain reaction
under specified conditions.
Decommissioning: The removal of a nuclear facility from service and its dismantling.
Dose: The energy absorbed by tissue from ionizing radiation.
Fast neutron reactor: A reactor with no moderator. It may be configured to produce more
fissile material than it consumes and in such a case it is called a fast breeder reactor.
Fissile material: Material that is capable of undergoing fission and losing neutrons and thus
potentially being able to sustain a chain reaction, such as uranium and plutonium isotopes:

235
U, 233U, 239Pu, and 241Pu. Isotopes that are capable of becoming fissile by capturing
neutrons, such as 238U and 240Pu, are fertile.
Fission: The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two, accompanied by the release of a
relatively large amount of energy and usually one or more neutrons.
Fossil fuel: A fuel based on carbon, such as coal, oil and gas.
Gigawatt (GW): A unit of power: 109 watts or one million kW; see also Megawatt.
Graded approach: A regulatory approach to controlling a process under which the

stringency of the control measures applied is commensurate with the risk of harm.
Greenhouse gases: Radiative gases in the Earth’s atmosphere which absorb long-wave
radiation from the Earth’s surface and re-radiate it as heat, thereby warming the Earth.
Carbon dioxide, methane and water vapour are the main ones.
Ionizing radiation: Radiation capable of breaking chemical bonds, thus causing ionization
of the matter through which it passes and damage to living tissue.
Isotope: An atomic form of an element having a particular number of neutrons, for

example, uranium with 235 neutrons (235U). Some isotopes are unstable and disintegrate
(decay) to form isotopes of other elements.
Light water reactor (LWR): A common nuclear reactor cooled and usually moderated by
ordinary water. It is a generic designation including BWR and PWR types.
Megawatt (MW): A unit of power: 106 watts. MWe refers to the electrical capacity (the
potential output of electricity) from a generator and MWt to thermal capacity from a heat
source (for instance, the gross potential heat output from a reactor).
Moderator: A material such as light or heavy water or graphite used in a reactor to slow
down fast neutrons.
Nuclear facility: A place where radioactive material is produced, processed, handled,

stored or disposed of on such a scale that radiation protection is required.
Nuclear fuel: Reactor fuel consisting of fissile material, such as oxides of uranium,
plutonium or thorium, fabricated into fuel assemblies for loading into the reactor core.
Neutron: An uncharged elementary particle found in the nucleus of every atom except
hydrogen. (Protons are positively charged and electrons are negatively charged.)
Precautionary principle: An approach in decision-making that aims to protect society and

the environment from an activity that could plausibly cause harm. Under the principle the
mandated level of protection may only be relaxed if there is proof that harm will not result.
The approach is used in radiation protection.
Pressurized water reactor (PWR): The most common type of light water reactor (LWR),
which uses water at very high pressure in a primary circuit and forms steam in the secondary
circuit.

Radiation: The emission and propagation of energy by means of electromagnetic waves or

particles.
Radiation protection: An activity to protect people and the environment from being harmed
by exposure to ionizing radiation.
Radioactivity: The spontaneous disintegration (decay) of an unstable nucleus in an atom,

giving rise to radiation.
Reactor: A device (consisting of a tank or tubes) in which a chemical or nuclear reaction is

contained and controlled normally yielding heat as an output. A nuclear reactor uses a chain
reaction to generate the heat.
Reactor pressure vessel: The main steel vessel of a nuclear reactor containing the nuclear
fuel, moderator and coolant under pressure.
Reprocessing: Chemical treatment of used nuclear fuel undertaken to separate uranium

and plutonium and possibly other elements, which leaves a much reduced volume of highly
radioactive waste products for disposal.

The World Nuclear Supply Chain: Outlook 2030 (2014)

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The World Nuclear Supply Chain

Outlook 2030 (2014 revision)

World Nuclear Association

© World Nuclear Association 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this

The information and opinions are

World Nuclear Association

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Nuclear power is making a growing contribution to supplying low-carbon energy worldwide.

© World Nuclear Association 2014

© World Nuclear Association 2014

© World Nuclear Association 2014

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Part 1: Market Outlook

Part 2: Industry Status and Trends

5 The nuclear supply chain 89

6 Harmonizing the regulatory framework 125

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Part 3: Challenges for Industry

8 Quality management 155

9 Stakeholder management 173

© World Nuclear Association 2014

1.1 Background to the report

© World Nuclear Association 2014

1.2 Methodology and structure

Three scenarios for the development of nuclear to 2030 are presented:

© World Nuclear Association 2014

1.2.2 Report structure

1.3 The drivers of electricity growth

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Figure 1.1: World nuclear electricity production (TWh) (Source: IAEA)4

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Table 1.1: Electricity generation by fuel type and region in 2012, %

Region Thermal Hydro Nuclear Renewable Total

In developing countries where, according to estimates by the International Energy Agency,

© World Nuclear Association 2014

© World Nuclear Association 2014

1.4 The present position of nuclear power

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Region Operable Under construction Planned

North America 119 111.3 5 5.6 7 7.2

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Figure 1.2: Nuclear share in world electricity production, % (Source: IAEA21)

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Figure 1.3: Nuclear of electricity by country or territory in 2013, % (Source: IAEA)22

© World Nuclear Association 2014

2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013

1.5 Principal reactor types

Table 1.4: Nuclear power reactors in operation on 1 October 2014

Reactor type Main locations Number Capacity Fuel Coolant Moderator

© World Nuclear Association 2014

© World Nuclear Association 2014

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Table 1.5: Nuclear power reactors models

Reactor vendor Reactor type

AREVA PWR III+ EPR

Candu Energy PHWR III EC6

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Safety is an outcome. It is ensured through a combination of design, engineering, quality

© World Nuclear Association 2014

Table 1.6: Reactor accidents, causes and lessons learned

Reactor Severity Safety Contributing Lessons learned

Three Mile Island 2 5 Cooling Lack of operator Need for human

Chernobyl 4 7 Control of Lack of safety Need for improved