Conflicts of Law

Castaneda, Mark Louie A.

Hilton v. Guyot
159 U.S. 113
Facts:
Henry Hilton and William Libbey, citizens of the United States and of the State of New
York and trading as copartners in the cities of New York and Paris and elsewhere under the firm
name of A. T. Stewart. Plaintiff Guyot, an administrator of a French firm, sued defendants
Libbey and Hilton for the recovery of sums, arising out of the dealings between them, amounting
to 660,847 francs, with interest, Defendants appeared and litigated the merits of the case,
alleging fraud on the part of plaintiffs, and sought an injunction from bringing suit, but the court
would not admit evidence and entered a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The judgment
was affirmed in a French appeals court.
Guyot sought to enforce the French judgment in federal district court in New York. That
court held the judgment enforceable without retrial on the merits.  Hilton and Libbey then
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the judgement of French court is enforceable in the U.S even without retrial on
the merits?
Held:
The United States Supreme Court found that comity was reciprocal. Because France did
not recognize final judgments of the United States and would try such judgments anew, French
judgments would be given the same treatment. Thus, the comity of the United States did not
require the court to give conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France. Defendants
could receive a new trial. judgments rendered in France, or in any foreign country, by the laws of
which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and
conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence only of the justice
of the plaintiffs’ claim.

GEMPERLE vs. SCHENKER

 G.R. No. L-18164
Facts:
Paul Schenker acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, Helen Schenker ,previously
filed a case with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a complaint against plaintiff William F.
Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock
of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc.
Mrs. Schenker had caused to be published some allegations thereof and other matters,
which were impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to said case, aside from being false and
derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of
attacking" his" honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into public hatred,
discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman" because of that Gemperle
commenced the present action against the Schenkers for the recovery of damages, and praying
for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker "to retract in writing the said defamatory expressions".

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of Schenker.
Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not been actually served
with summons in the Philippines.

Held:
The court acquired a jurisdiction. It is urged by plaintiff that jurisdiction over the person
of Schenker has been secured through voluntary appearance on his part, he not having made a
special appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an answer having been filed in
this case, stating that "the defendants, by counsel, answering the plaintiff's complaint,
respectfully aver", which is allegedly a general appearance amounting to a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Pennoyer v. Neff 
 95 U.S. 714

. Facts:
Neff during the pendency of land registration case he did not pay his lawyer Mitchell,
thus the latter sued its client, Neff in Oregon state court for unpaid legal fees. At the time Neff
was a non-resident of the state who was not personally served with process. Constructive service
was issued to Neff by publication. Neff did not come to court, and default judgment was entered
against him. After the default judgment, Mitchel acquired 300 acres of land in Oregon. To satisfy
his judgment against Neff, Mitchell had the sheriff seize and sell Defendant’s land. The land was
purchased by Plaintiff Pennoyer, who received a sheriff’s deed as evidence of title. The sheriff
then turned the sale proceeds over to Mitchell. Shortly after the sheriff’s sale, Defendant Neff
discovered what had happened to his land and brought suit against Plaintiff to recover the land.
This appeal followed after Defendant lost his suit against Plaintiff.

Issue:
Whether or not the court acquires a jurisdiction over Neff by publishing the process to
evangelical newspaper?

Held:

The court did not acquire a jurisdiction. The personal judgment recovered in the state
court of Oregon against Plaintiff was without validity, when a suit is merely in personam (i.e.
against a person), constructive service through publication upon a non-resident is ineffective. No
state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.
However, a state may subject property within its boundaries to the payments of its citizens, even
when the land is owned by a non-resident, without infringing upon the sovereignty of the state of
residency of the landowner.

An in personam suit is a suit against a person, whose purpose is to determine the personal
rights and obligations of the defendant. An in rem action, meanwhile, is an action where
jurisdiction pertains to property. Thus the court reasoned that constructive service is sufficient to
inform parties of action taken against any properties owned by them within the forum state,
because property is always in possession of the owner, and seizure of the property will inform
the owner of legal action taken against him.

International Shoe v. State of Washington

 326 U.S. 310
Facts:

International Shoe Co. had its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. While
the corporation did not have an office in Washington (“State”), it employed eleven to thirteen
salesmen, who exhibited product samples to prospective buyers from the State. The corporation
compensated the salesmen in the form of commissions for any sales from customers they
solicited. Due to these business activities, the State issued a Notice of Assessment holding the
corporation liable for contributions to the State’s unemployment compensation fund by virtue
of the Washington Unemployment Compensation Act. Notice was served via mail and personal
service to the Washington salesmen. The corporation refused to pay, arguing that they were not
conducting business in Washington and thus the State had no jurisdiction over it. The trial court
ruled in favor of the State and the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that there was sufficient
business activity to hold the corporation liable for taxes to the State. The corporation appealed
the decision to the Supreme Court of the United States.     

Issue:

whether or not a non-resident corporation's activities in a state make it subject to the

jurisdiction of that state?

Held:

The standard of "minimum contacts" that gave rise to much modern jurisprudence in
the area of personal jurisdiction. The activities carried on in the state of Washington on behalf of
the Corporation were neither irregular nor casual.  They were systematic and continuous
throughout the years in question.  They resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in the
course of which appellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state, including
the right to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights.  The obligation which is here
sued upon arose out of those very activities.  It is evident that the operations of the salesmen in
Washington established sufficient contacts or ties with the state to make it reasonable and just,
according to traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to
enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there.
 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
339 U.S. 306
Facts:
Appellee, Central Hanover Bank & Trust, set up common fund pursuant to a New York
statute allowing the creation of common funds for distribution of judicial settlement trusts. There
were 113 participating trusts. Appellee petitioned for settlement of its first account as common
trustee. Some of the beneficiaries were not residents of New York. “Notice” was by publication
for four weeks in a local newspaper. Appellee had notified those people by mail that were of full
age and sound mind who would be entitled to share in the principal if the interest they held
became distributable. Appellant was appointed as special guardian and attorney for all persons
known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or might thereafter have any interest in the
income of the common trust fund. Appellee was appointed to represent those interested in the
principal. Appellant appeared specially, objecting that notice by publication, permitted under the
applicable statute was inadequate to afford the beneficiaries due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment and that therefore jurisdiction was lacking.

Issue:
Is notice by publication of a judicial settlement to unknown beneficiaries of a common
trust reasonable to acquire a jurisdiction.

Held:

Whether such a proceeding for settlement of accounts be technically in personam, in

rem, or quasi in rem, the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist by the
grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts is such as to establish
beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or
nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be heard. The
statutory notice by publication is sufficient as to any beneficiaries whose interests or addresses
are unknown to the trustee, since there are no other means of giving them notice which are both
practicable and more effective.

Shaffer v. Heitner
 433 U.S. 186
Facts:

Heitner, who was not a resident of Delaware, brought a derivative suit against Greyhound
in Delaware after it was subjected to a large antitrust judgment in Oregon. Heitner owned only
one share of Greyhound stock. He chose Delaware because it was the site of the company's
incorporation. Of the 28 corporate officers whom Heitner also sued, only seven were residents of
Delaware. Jurisdiction in Delaware over the remaining 21 was based on their ownership of
Greyhound stock, which was considered to be located within the state of incorporation. Delaware
permitted plaintiffs to seize property within it ex parte to compel another party to submit to
personal jurisdiction there.

When a freeze order was placed on the corporate books, although none of the stock certificates
was in Delaware, the 21 defendants who were non-residents argued that the court did not have
personal jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not the minimum contacts must establish to sustain the jurisdiction of the
court.

Held:

The Court held that (1) all assertions of state jurisdiction, including in rem and quasi in
rem actions, must be evaluated according to the minimum contacts standard, and (2) neither the
presence of the nonresident defendants' stock in Delaware nor the fact that the nonresident
defendants were officers of a Delaware chartered corporation, provided the requisite contacts to
establish the jurisdiction of Delaware courts.

. In support of its ruling, the court held that the minimum contacts test of International Shoe
should have been applied to assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction. The court
noted that appellant's seized property did not have sufficient contacts with the state to support
Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction over appellants. The court further held that appellants had
neither purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the state,
nor had any reason to expect to be brought before a Delaware court.

IDONAH SLADE PERKINS vs. MAMERTO ROXAS, ET AL

 G.R. No. 47517            
Facts:
the respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of the sum of
P71,379.90
Petitioner filed her answer with a cross-complaint in which she sets up a judgment
allegedly obtained by her against respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, from the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the
possession and control of the shares of stock in question together with all the cash dividends
declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company,Petitioner, Idonah Slade
Perkins, on June 5, 1940, filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that "the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the action," because the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York is res judicata.

ISSUE:
whether or not, in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the
Supreme Court of New York, and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions
raised by the respondent,

Held:

The petition is denied by jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the
cause of action and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority
specially conferred. In the present case, the amended complaint filed by the respondent

Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity and
efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question
that goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each
other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or
not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it
is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be reversed on appeal.