G.R. No. L-5028 November 26, 1952 and the defendants in consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo.

s in consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another,

the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry". For breach of
FELIPE CABAGUE and GERONIMO CABAGUE, plaintiffs-appellants, that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. This is such
vs. action, and evidence of such mutual promise is admissible.2 However Felipe Cabague's
MATIAS AUXILIO and SOCORRO AUXILIO, defendants-appellees. action may not prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of
marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this action could not be
maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to marry".3 Neither may it be regarded as
Generoso F. Obusan for appellants.
action by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."
Pedro M. Tagala for appellees.

Consequently, we declare that Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for
BENGZON, J.:
such damages as may have resulted from her failure to carry out their mutual
matrimonial promises.
According to the Rules of Court parol evidence is not admissible to prove an agreement
made upon the consideration of marriage other than a mutual promise to marry.1 This
Wherefore this expediente will be returned to the lower court for further proceedings in
litigation calls for application of that rule.
accordance with this opinion. So ordered.
In the justice of the peace court of Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and his son
Geronimo sued the defendant Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover
damages resulting from defendants' refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage
between Socorro and Geronimo.

The complaint alleged, in short: (a) that defendants promised such marriage to
plaintiffs, provided the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud and spend
for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride; (b) that relying upon such promises
plaintiffs made the improvement and spent P700; and (c) that without cause defendants
refused to honor their pledged word.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the contract was oral, unenforceable
under the rule of evidence hereinbefore mentioned. And the court dismissed the case.
On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs reproduced their complaint and
defendants reiterated their motion to dismiss. From an order of dismissal this appeal
was perfected in due time and form.

It should be observed preliminarily that, under the former rules of procedure, when the
complaint did not state whether the contract sued on was in writing or not, the statute of
frauds could be no ground for demurrer. Under the new Rules "defendant may now
present a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was not in writing, even if
such fact is not apparent on the face of the complaint. The fact may be proved by him."
(Moran Rules of Court 2d ed. p. 139 Vol. I.)

There is no question here that the transaction was not in writing. The only issue is
whether it may be proved in court.

The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other,
really involves two kinds of agreement. One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague
G.R. No. L-8166 February 8, 1916
JORGE DOMALAGAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS BOLIFER, defendant-appellant.
M. Abejuela for appellant.
Troadio Galicano for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Misamis,
on the 17th of December, 1910. It was not presented to the Supreme Court until the 11th
of January 1916. Its purpose was to recover of the defendant the sum of P516, together
with damages estimated in the sum of P350 and interest, and costs.
In support of his claim the plaintiff alleged that, in the month of November, 1909, he
and the defendant entered into a contract by virtue of the terms of which he was to pay
to the defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan
with the daughter of the defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer, that later, in the month of August,
1910, he completed his obligation under said contract by paying to the defendant the
said sum of 500, together with the further sum of P16 "as hansel or token of future
marriage," that, notwithstanding said agreement, the said Bonifacio Bolifer, in the
month of August, 1910, was joined in lawful wedlock to Laureano Sisi; that
immediately upon learning of the marriage of Bonifacia Bolifer he demanded of the
defendant the return of the said sum of P516 together with the interest and damages;
that the damages which he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in order to raise said
sum of P500, was obliged to sell certain real property belonging to him, located in the
Province of Bohol, at a great sacrifice.
To the complaint the defendant presented a general denial. He also alleged that the facts
stated in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. Upon the issue presented the
cause was brought on for trial. After hearing the evidence the Honorable Vicente
Nepomuceno, judge, in an extended opinion in which all of the evidence adduced
during the trial of the cause is carefully analyzed reached the conclusion "of fact that
plaintiff delivered to defendant the sum of P516 sued for and that Carlos Bolifer and
Laureana Loquero received and did not return the said amount," and for the reason that
the evidence did not sufficiently show that the plaintiff had suffered any additional
damages, rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in said
sum of P516 together with the interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the 17th of
December, 1910, and costs.
From that judgment the defendant appealed to this court and made the following
assignments of error:
1. In holding to be proven the fact of the delivery by the plaintiff of the sum of
P516 to the defendant, Carlos Bolifer; and
2. In holding to be valid and effective the verbal contract entered into by the
plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by reason of
a prospective marriage.
The first assignment of error presents a question of fact. The lower court found that a
large preponderance of the evidence showed that the plaintiff had delivered to the
defendant the sum of P516 in substantially the manner alleged in the complaint. Taking
into consideration that the lower court saw and heard the witnesses, together with the
further fact that there is an abundance of uncontradicted proof supporting the findings
of the lower court, we are not inclined to disturb its judgment for any of the reasons
given by the appellant in support of his first assignment of error.
With reference to the second assignment of error, the appellant calls our attention to the
provisions of paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Action. The
appellant argues that by virtue of the provisions of said paragraph and by virtue of the
fact that the agreement upon which the plaintiff relies and under which he paid to the
defendant the sum of P516 had not been reduced to writing, he could therefore not
recover. The appellant contends that a contract, such as the one relied upon by the
plaintiff, in order to be valid, must be reduced to writing. We have examined the record
in vain to find that the defendant during the trial of the cause objected to any proof or
any part thereof, presented by the plaintiff which showed or tended to show the
existence of the alleged contract. That part of said section 335 which the appellant relies
upon for relief provides:
In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by
action unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing,
and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of
the agreement can not be received without the writing or secondary evidence
of its contents:
1. . . .
2. . . .
3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual
promise to marry.
It will be noted, by reference to said section, that "evidence " of the agreement referred
to "can not be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents." As
was said above all of the "evidence" relating to said "agreement" was admitted without
the slightest objection.
Said section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and
yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it. Said section provides
that the contract shall not be enforced by an action unless the same is evidence by some
note or memorandum. Said section simply provides the method by which the contract
mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that said contract are invalid,
which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph 5
of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not
clothed with the necessary form. If it is not made in confirmity with said section of
course it cannot be proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to
evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the
statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law. If the parties to an action, during the
trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support
contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence
other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced
to writing. (Anson on Contracts, p. 75; Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko, 15 Phil. Rep.,
387; Gallemit vs. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. Rep., 241, 246; Kuenzle and Streiff vs. Joingco, 22
Phil. Rep., 110, 112; Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil. Rep., 485, 489.)

For the foregoing reasons we find nothing in the record justifying a reversal or
modification of the judgment of the lower court based upon either assignment of error.
Therefore the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
 FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA v. CA +
DECISION
109 Phil. 629
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of
the Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complainant, filed with
said court of first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and
moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child
and expressed willingness to support the later, but denied having ever promised to
marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27,
1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February
16 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a
decision the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima,
as the natural daughter of defendant, and! confirming the order pendente lite, ordering
defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00),
payable on or before the fifth day of every month; sentencing defendant to pay to
plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for
actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as
attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant."
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to
the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to
P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for
breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a
teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost
ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as
engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave
up teaching and became a life insurance under writer in the City of Cebu, where
intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening, in 1953, when
after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February, 1954, Soledad
advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and
clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita
Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of
Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach of promise to marry. Articles 43
and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. "A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract
marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such
promise is sought."
ART. 44. "If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a
minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration
of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who without just cause
refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or
she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
"The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be
brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the
marriage."
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philipipnes, this Court ruled in De
Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced *
* * upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of
the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deemed it best, however, to change the law
thereon. We quote from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil
Code:
"Articles 43 and 44 of the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But
these articles are not in force in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the proposed
Civil Code not only as to the aspects treated of in said articles but also in other
particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might
arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the
adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that
creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken."
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under
Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
"ART. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly."
"ART. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed x directly by the future
spouses."
"ART. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or
guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a
female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the
parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for
damages in case of breach of the promise."
"ART. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years
is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian."
"ART. 60. In cases referred to in the preceding articles, the criminal and civil
responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected."
"ART. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be
brought."
"ART. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved
party even though a minor without the assistance of his or her parent or guardian.
Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action."
"ART. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and
pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering."
ART. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the
affianced parties, who causes a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for
damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected."
"ART. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement
shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account
of the promise of the marriage."
These articles were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth
in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
"The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866.
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown
that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action
in the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida
................................................................................................................... 1344
Maryland
................................................................................................................ 1762
Nevada
..................................................................................................................
Maine
....................................................................................................................141
New Hampshire
.......................................................................................................
California
...............................................................................................................
Massachusetts
.......................................................................................................
Indiana
.................................................................................................................
Michigan
1935 p. 201
...............................................................................................................
New York
1935
..............................................................................................................
Pennsylvania
p. 450
.........................................................................................................
"The Commission perhaps thought that it has followed the more progressive trend in
legislation when it provided for breach cf promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the
creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of
years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong
direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)"
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the
clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of
promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower court is, accordingly,
untenable. The Court of Appeals said in justification of said award:
"Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seductive powers,
plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires
in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be
recovered from him under the provisions of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil
Code."
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the
paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court' of Appeals, and
the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein
contemplated is the crime punished as such in Articles 337 and 338 of the Revised
Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves
unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who was around thirty-six
(36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a
1945 pp. 1342-
mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for
1945 pp.1759-
him, she "wanted to bifid" him "by paving a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy."
1943 p. 75
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly
1941 pp. 140- pension of P30.00 for the support of the child; (2) P4,500, representing the income that
complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth
of the child, as actual and compensatory damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and
1941 p. 223
(4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum
of P1,114.25 consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in
1939 p. 1245
connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing expenses incurred to
support the child and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.
1938 p. 326
1936 p. 1009
With the elimination of this award for moral damages, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to costs in this instance. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964 On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear
vs. before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant. of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear
"the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant. resolution."
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following
day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan
de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is
worse, complete public humiliation.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired
on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6,
Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time.
however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case
Dear Bet — amicably were nil.

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving
on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That
would only create a scandal.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a
quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.

Paquing A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram: valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached
to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due
SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE . to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like
this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co
Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December
PAKING
29, 1960.)

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29,
1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees;
and the costs.
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary,
or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it
having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province
of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's
consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in
default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs.
Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa
vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is
not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the
draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The
argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This
Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's
judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law
may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides
that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license
to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was
set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends
and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was
bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a
note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... "
He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he
never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive.
No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really
assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an
order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing
appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957,
the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli
Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying
love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings";
that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded
to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through
his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having
carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to
resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a
month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to
defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The
prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that
plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that
of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00
attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided
the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel
recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint
did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and
directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise
to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court
in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21
above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum
submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original
draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the
Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined
or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in
the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission
has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot
bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman
has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
 To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that
effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual
desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that
to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the
female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations
there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman,
Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525
Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other
sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting
and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the
defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for the
plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as
are wont of young people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very
close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration
of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to
the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a
short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the
defendant through his protestations of love and promises of marriage
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started
conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed
the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage,
but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant
stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not
visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement
and his promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because
of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again
yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no
case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions
may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On
that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here
involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review
and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the
issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on
the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with
the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is
twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then
visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their
approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live
with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him;
a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain
of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already
married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees
and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances
of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or
because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He
thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his
place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay
captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and
that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur
expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for
an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident
(sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1,
1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present
and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant
to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner
was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
 1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of
three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand
(P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner
and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose
morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent,
d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered
by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not
fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner
and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good
customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private
respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and
ridicule if her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the
respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time
and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting
her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to
her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to
her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their
intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with
plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told
plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry
her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because
plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to
his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise
allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the
few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant
later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school,
and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made
her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result
of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant
gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to
live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry
her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a
lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan
City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent
by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him
to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the
truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is
still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant
had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked
for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by
looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many
relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial
court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in
ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the
trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant
who was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl
of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her
unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She
is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and
accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic)
not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive
promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with
the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been
sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the
deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed
 herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving
and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E".
We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a
nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually
ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta
on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party
together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987
when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry
her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan
City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to
plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some
kind of special relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her
parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to
her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage
to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned
from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good
moral character and must think so low and have so little respect and
regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he
studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S.
Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a
common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with
another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just
like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so
little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to
marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to
satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic)
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and
undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are
even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to
study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant
should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he
had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its
decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he
raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to
the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not
committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he
has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not
conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he
is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which
purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage
had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility
could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also
be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that
even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in
view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition
and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in
support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the
credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate
courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the
latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe
closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly
overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of
the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts
had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before
the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257
[1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb
or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there
is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]);
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz
v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
(Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate
and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay
v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate
courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of
the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to
marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De
Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no other action lends
itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American
states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed
to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest
of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following
rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"
seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage
either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is
above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of
promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
 Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved,
would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness
or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a
civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine
legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New
Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to
be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite
spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have
been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated
that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and
to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and
sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina,
not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable
for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach
of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus,
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the
woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years
of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and
a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became
intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible
recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We
were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition
and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set
forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a
minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that
in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise
of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121;
U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be
some sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust
 and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is
no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56)
She must be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have
and do have that effect, and which result in her
person to ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence
of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the
willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity
of the female, and the defendant merely affords her
the needed opportunity for the commission of the
act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery
in all such cases would tend to the demoralization
of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of
adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the
idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did
not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action
being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance
in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who
recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there
had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse
was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30,
1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the
CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral
seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the
other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages,
because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses
for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code.
The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar
sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without
any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself
to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the
basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness
(sic), the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of
fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances,
because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may
not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age.
But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the
criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of
the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto;
hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down
in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the
petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had itself procured by
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own fraud. 36
doing, 33 for:
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a
doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should
graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code).
51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the
of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply
need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f.
this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
been offered by the petitioner. 34
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant
love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would
want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied
by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of SO ORDERED.
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly
violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect
Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every
person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent
may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is
not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a
similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it could be conceded
that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties,
where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of
undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was
Panganiban September 9, 1933
JOSE R. PAÑGANIBAN, complainant,
vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, respondent.
The Respondent in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
These proceedings looking to the disbarment of the respondent attorney are before us on
the representations of the Solicitor-General that the respondent appear and show cause,
if any he has, why he should not be proceeded against for professional malpractice. The
respondent admits that, in his capacity as notary public he legalized the document which
is the basis of the complaint against him, and that the document contains provisions
contrary to law, morals and good customs, but by way of defense disclaims any
previous knowledge of the illegal character of the document.
On November 25, 1931, Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala husband and wife,
subscribed a contract before the notary public Elias Borromeo, who was at that time a
regularly admitted member of the Philippine Bar. The contract in question had been
prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Attorney Borromeo
cooperated in the execution of the document and had, at lease, some knowledge of its
contents, although he may not have been fully informed because of a difference in
dialect. The contract in substance purported to formulate an agreement between the
husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and
the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from
either one of them.
wanton disregard of good morals. We hold the contract to contain provisions contrary to
law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.
Passing to the second question, we think there can be no question as to the right of the
court to discipline an attorney who, in his capacity as notary public, has been guilty of
misconduct. To the office of notary public there is not attached such importance under
present conditions as under the Spanish administration. Even so, the notary public
exercise duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. It is for the notary to inform
himself of the facts to which he intends to certify, and to take part in no illegal
enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to the practice
of law, and such, in the commingling of his duties as notary and lawyer, must be held
responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act
as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the
court even to the extent of disbarment. (See 2 Thornton on Attorneys At Law, pp. 1258,
1259; In re Chappell [1909], 115 N.Y.S., 868; In re Bernard [1912], 136 N.Y.S.,
185; In re Arctander [1879], 1 N.W., 43; In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; In
re Adriatico [1906], 7 Phil., 173; U.S. vs. Kilayko [1916], 34 Phil., 796; De la Cruz vs.
Capinpin and Albea [1918], 38 Phil., 492.)
It now becomes necessary to pronounce sentence. As mitigating circumstances, there
may be taken into consideration (1) that the attorney may not have realized the full
purport of the document to which he took acknowledgment, (2) that no falsification of
facts was attempted, and (3) that the commission of the respondent as a notary public
has been revoked. Accordingly, we are disposed in this case to exercise clemency and to
confine our discipline of the respondent to severe censure. So ordered.

Two questions are suggested by the record. The first concerns the points of whether or
not the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose. The second concerns the
point, on the supposition that the contract did sanction an illicit and immoral purpose, of
whether a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct as a notary public.

The contract of the spouses, it will be recalled, was executed at a time when the Spanish
Penal Code, as modified by Act No. 1773 was in force. Conceding, however, that the
more liberal provisions of the Revised Penal Code should be given application, it is
herein provided that the consent or pardon given by the offended party constitutes a bar
to prosecution for adultery or concubinage. In this instance, if the spouses should retain
their present frame of mind, no prosecution of either one by the other could be
expected. Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of the Legislature to legalize
adultery and concubinage. They still remain crimes, with the qualification that
prosecution cannot be instituted if the offended party consent to the act or pardon the
offender. This is a matter of future contingency and is not matter for legalization in
A.C. No. 932 June 21, 1940 moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the
respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent, malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. The admission of a
lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment
of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.
society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit
or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right
LAUREL, J.: to continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared
terminated. In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General against provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the complainant legal advice.
the respondent Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and praying that Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is the opinion of some members of
disciplinary action be taken against him. the court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow the recommendation of the
investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated in the
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife report of said investigator and the fact that immediately after discovering his mistakes,
Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a respondent endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another document
second marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time a cancelling the previous one.
practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, after
hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a separation The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended
from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the from the practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the respondent right then and there
prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among other things, that
the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again,
at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against
the party so marrying. After the execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the
parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and assured them that they
were single and as such could contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then
remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and,
pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document
turns out not to be valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on
June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also
evidence to show that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but
as the evidence on this point is not clear and the same is not material in the resolution of
the present case, we do not find it necessary to make any express finding as to whether
the full amount or any portion thereof was paid or, as contended by the respondent, the
service were rendered free of charge.

The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he
had the idea that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of
them to contract a second marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but
immediately after the execution of said document he realized that he had made a
mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June
30, 1939, came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit A.

There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses
Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared
by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law,
A.M. No. 804-CJ May 19, 1975
SATURNINO SELANOVA, complainant,
vs.
ALEJANDRO E. MENDOZA, City Judge of Mandaue City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with gross
ignorance of the law for having prepared and ratified a document dated November 21,
1972, extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his
wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse (as the
case may be) would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each
had filed against the other and that they waived their "right to prosecute each other for
whatever acts of infidelity" either one would commit against the other.
Judge Mendoza in his comment on the charge purposed to convey the impression that
he was aware of the invalidity of the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it and gave
it his nihil obstat on the assurance of the spouses that they would ask the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental (where they were residing) to approve the agreement. That
pretension is disbelieved by the Judicial Consultant.
Respondent Judge alleged that he relied on the provision that "the husband and the wife
may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject
to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code).
He argues that to give the prohibition against an extrajudicial liquidation of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage "an unqualified and literal legal construction" would
lender nugatory the aforequoted provisions of article 191. He cites Lacson vs. San Jose-
Lacson, L-23482, L-23767 and L-24259, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 837 as authority
for the propriety of an extrajudicial agreement for the dissolution during the marriage of
the conjugal partnership as long as the agreement is subsequently approved by the court.
However, the respondent overlooks the unmistakable ruling of this Court in
the Lacson case that judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage should be "secured beforehand."
Respondent Judge surmised that Selanova's complaint was instigated by a lawyer whose
case was adversely decided by the Judge. That speculation was denied by Selanova who
also belied Judge Mendoza's version that the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza,
"together with their parents", came to the office of Judge Mendoza and solicited his
help in the amicable settlement of their marital imbroglio.
According to Selanova, in 1972 his father was already dead and his mother was ninety-
one years old. They could not possibly have come to Judge Mendoza's office. Selanova
said that only he and his brother-in-law, Arcadio Ceniza, an alleged classmate of Judge
Mendoza, were the persons who went to the Judge's office. But that version may be
inaccurate and oversimplified, considering that the agreement was signed before Judge
Mendoza not only by Selanova but also by his wife and two witnesses, Lamberts M.
Ceniza and Florencio C. Pono.
Judge Mendoza retired on February 27, 1975 when he reached the age of seventy. In his
letter of April 8, 1975 he asked for a compassionate view of his case considering his
forty-three years' service in the government (he started his public career in 1932 as a
policeman and became a justice of the peace in 1954). He also cited the financial
predicament of his big family occasioned by the delay in the payment of his retirement
and terminal leave pay.
The case was not referred to a Judge of the Court of First Instance for investigation
because actually no factual issues necessitate a hearing and presentation of evidence.
Respondent Judge admitted that he was responsible for the execution of the questioned
document, an extrajudicial "Liquidation of Conjugal Properties", which he caused
complainant Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina Ceniza, to sign.
In that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the
spouses by allocating to the husband a thirteen-hectare riceland and to the wife the
residential house and lot. The last paragraph of the instrument, which licensed either
spouse to commit any act of infidelity, was in effect a ratification of their personal
separation. The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the following
provisions of the Civil Code:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of
property between husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx
Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, this Court held that the extrajudicial
dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval was void (Quintana vs.
Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15, De La Rosa vs. Barruga, L-2368,
June 30, 1950, 4 ROP Digest 171, sec. 29).
On the other hand, disciplinary action had been taken against notaries who extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership, prepared the said void agreement
authenticated agreements for the personal separation of spouses wherein either spouse which was acknowledged before him as "City Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio".
was permitted to commit acts of infidelity. (Because he was admitted to the bar in 1948 and, consequently, he did not study the
new Civil Code in the law school, he might not have been cognizant of its aforecited
Thus, in Panganiban vs. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367, a lawyer was severely censured for article 221).
having notarized a document containing "an agreement between the husband and the
wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live Taking into account that circumstance and his apparent good faith and honest desire to
in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of terminate the marital conflict between the complainant and his wife, we are of the
them". The document was prepared by another person. opinion that a drastic penalty should not be imposed on him. But he deserves a severe
censure for his mistake in preparing and notarizing the aforementioned immoral and
In that case this Court noted that while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, illegal agreement. Such severe reprimand should not be an obstacle to his enjoyment of
"they still remain crimes" and a contract legalizing their commission is "contrary to law, retirement privileges, assuming that there are no causes for depriving him of such
morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable". Since the benefits.
notary's commission was already revoked, this Court did not disbar him. The fact that
he "may not have realized the full purport of the document to which he took WHEREFORE, the respondent is severely censured.
acknowledgment' was considered mitigating.
SO ORDERED.
Severe censure was also administered to a notary of Cebu City who ratified a document
entitled "Legal Separation", executed by husband and wife, wherein they agreed that
they separated mutually and voluntarily, that they renounced their rights and
obligations, and that they authorized each other to remarry, renouncing any action to
which they might be entitled and each promising not to be a witness against the other.
Those covenants are contrary to law, morals and good customs and tend to subvert the
vital foundation of the legitimate family (Biton vs. Momongon, 62 Phil. 7).

In the Santiago case respondent lawyer prepared for a married couple (who had been
separated for nine years) a document wherein it was stipulated, inter alia, that they
authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing whatever right of
action one might have against the other. When the husband inquired if there would be
no trouble, respondent lawyer pointed to his diploma which was hanging on the wall
and said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid." The husband
remarried. The respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one year for
having been ignorant of the law or being careless in giving legal advice (In re Santiago,
70 Phil. 66).

In Balinon vs. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277, Attorney Celestino M. de Leon prepared an

affidavit wherein he declared that he was married to Vertudes Marquez, from whom he
had been separated, their conjugal partnership having been dissolved, and that he was
consorting with Regina S. Balinon his "new found life-partner," to whom he would
"remain loyal and faithful" "as a lawful and devoted loving husband for the rest of" his
life "at all costs". Attorney Justo T. Velayo notarized that affidavit. This Court
reprimanded Velayo and suspended De Leon from the practice of law for three years.

In the instant case, respondent Judge, due to his unawareness of the legal prohibition
against contracts for the personal separation of husband and wife and for the
 [ GR No. 80965, Jun 06, 1990 ]
SYLVIA LICHAUCO DE LEON v. CA +
DECISION
264 Phil. 711
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 06649 dated June 30, 1987 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig in SP Proc. No. 8492 dated December 29, 1983; and its resolution dated
November 24, 1987 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor
of Binangonan, Rizal. On August 28, 1971, a child named Susana L. De Leon
was born from this union.
Sometime in October, 1972, a de facto separation between the spouses occurred due to
irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home. Sometime in
March, 1973, Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained American
citizenship.
On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, County of
San Francisco, a petition for dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente. In the said
divorce proceedings, Sylvia also filed claims for support and distribution of
properties. It appears, however, that since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident
and did not have any assets in the United States, Sylvia chose to hold in abeyance the
divorce proceedings, and in the meantime, concentrated her efforts to obtain some sort
of property settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines.
Thus, on March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement with
her mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria De Leon, which We quote in
full, as follows (pp. 40-42, Rollo):
"March 16, 1977
"Mrs. Macaria Madrigal de Leon
12 Jacaranda, North Forbes Park
Makati, Metro Manila
Dear Doña Macaria:
This letter represents a contractual undertaking among (A) the undersigned, (B) your
son, Mr. Jose Vicente de Leon, represented by you, and (C) yourself in your personal
capacity.
You hereby bind yourself jointly and severally to answer for the undertakings of Joe
Vincent under this contract.
In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the
undersigned and her lawfully wedded husband, Jose Vicente de Leon, your son, the
following are agreed upon:
Obligations of Jose Vicente de Leon and/or yourself in a joint and severalcapacity:
1. To deliver with clear title free from all liens and encumbrances and subject to no
claims in any form whatsoever the following properties to Sylvia Lichauco-de Leon
hereinafter referred to as the wife:
A. Suite 11-C, Avalon Condominium, Ortigas Ave., corner Xavier
St.,Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines.
B. Apartment 702, Wack Wack Condominium, Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines.
C. The rights to assignment of 2 Ayala lots in Alabang, Rizal (Corner lots, 801 sq.
meters each). (Fully paid).
D. 2470 Wexford Ave., South San Francisco, California, U.S.A. (Lot 18 Block
22 Westborough Unit No. 2). (Fully paid).
E. 1) The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000)
2) $30,000
3) $5,000
2. To give monthly support payable six (6) months in advance every year to any
designated assignee of the wife for the care and upbringing of Susana Lichauco de Leon
which is hereby pegged at the exchange rate of 7.50 to the dollar subject to adjustments
in the event of monetary exchange fluctuations. Subsequent increase on actual need
uponnegotiation.
3. To respect the custody of said minor daughter as pertaining exclusively to the wife
except as herein provided.
Obligations of the wife:
1. To agree to a judicial separation of property in accordance with Philippine law and
in this connection to do all that may be necessary to secure said separation of property
including her approval in writing of a joint petition or consent decree.
2. To amend her complaint in the United States before the Federal Court of California,
U.S.A. entitled "Sylvia Lichauco de Leon vs. Jose V. de Leon" in a manner compatible
with the objectives of this herein agreement. It is the stated objective of this agreement
that said divorce proceedings will continue.
3. All the properties herein described for assignment to the wife must be assigned to
Sylvia Lichauco de Leon upon the decree of the Court of First Instance in the Joint
Petition for Separation of Property; except for the P100,000, $30,000 and $5,000 which
will be paid immediately.
4. This contract is intended to be applicable both in the Republic of the Philippines
and in the United States of America. It is agreed that this will constitute an actionable
document in both jurisdictions and the parties herein waive their right to object to the
use of this document in the event a legal issue should arise relating to the validity of this
document. In the event of a dispute, this letter is subject to interpretation under the laws
of California, U.S.A.
5. To allow her daughter to spend two to three months each year with the father upon
mutual convenience.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd) Sylvia de Leon
t/ SYLVIA L. DE LEON
CONFORME:
s/t/ MACARIA M. DE LEON
with my marital consent:
s/t/ JUAN L. DE LEON"
On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the amount of
P100,000.00 and US $35,000.00 or P280,000.00, in compliance with her obligations as
stipulated in the aforestated Letter-Agreement.
On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal
partnership, the main part of which reads as follows (pp. 37-38,Rollo):
"5. For the best interest of each of them and of their minor child, petitioners have
agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership and to partition the assets thereof, under
the following terms and conditions - this document, a pleading being intended by them
to embody and evidence their agreement:
xxx
"(c) The following properties shall be adjudicated to petitioner SylviaLichauco De
Leon. These properties will be free of any and all liens and encumbrances, with clear
title and subject to no claims by third parties. Petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon fully
assumes all responsibility and liability in the event these properties shall not be as
described in the previous sentence:
Sedan (1972 model)
Suite 11-C, Avalon Condominium, Ortigas Ave., corner Xavier
St.,Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines
Apt. 702, Wack-Wack Condominium, Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines
The rights to assignment of 2 Ayala lots in Alabang Rizal (corner lots, 801 sq. meters
each) (Fully paid)
2470 Wexford Ave., South San Francisco, California, U.S.A. (Lot 18, Block 22
Westborough Unit 2) (Fully paid)
The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (100,000.00)
$30,000.00 at current exchange rate
$5,000.00 at current exchange rate"
After ex-parte hearings, the trial court issued an Order dated February 19, 1980
approving the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 143,Rollo):
"WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that the conjugal partnership of the Spouses is
DISSOLVED henceforth, without prejudice to the terms of their agreement that each
spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her separate estate,
without the consent of the other, and all earnings from any profession, business or
industries shall likewise belong to each spouse."
On March 17, 1980, Sylvia moved for the execution of the above-mentioned
order. However, Jose Vicente moved for a reconsideration of the order alleging that
Sylvia made a verbal reformation of the petition as there was no such agreement for the
payment of P4,500.00 monthly support to commence from the alleged date of
separation in April, 1973 and that there was no notice given to him that Sylvia would
attempt verbal reformation of the agreement contained in the joint petition.
While the said motion for reconsideration was pending resolution, on April 20,
1980, Macaria filed with the trial court a motion for leave to intervene alleging that she
is the owner of the properties involved in the case. The motion was granted. On
October 29, 1980, Macaria, assisted by her husband Juan De Leon, filed her complaint
in intervention. She assailed the validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement which
had for its purpose, according to her, the termination of marital relationship between
Sylvia and Jose Vicente. However, before any hearing could be had, the judicial
reorganization took place and the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig. On December 29, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment,
the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 35-36, Rollo):
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the complaint in intervention in favor
of the intervenor, declaring null and void the letter agreement dated March 16, 1977
(Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2', and ordering petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon to
restore to intervenor the amount of P380,000.00 plus legal interest from date of
complaint, and to pay intervenor the amount of P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees,
and to pay the costs of suit.
"Judgment is likewise rendered affirming the order of the Court dated February 19,
1980 declaring the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Vicente De Leon and
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon DISSOLVED; and adjudicating to each of them his or her
share of the properties and assets of said conjugal partnership in accordance with the
agreement embodied in paragraph 5 of the petition, except insofar as the adjudication
topetitioner Sylvia L. De leon of the properties belonging to and owned
byIntervenor Macaria De Leon is concerned.
"Henceforth, (a) each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or
her separate estate, present and future without the consent of the other; (b) all earnings
from any profession, business or industry shall likewise belong to each of them
separately; (c) the minor child Susana De Leon shall stay with petitioner
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon for two to three months every year - the transportation both
ways of the child for the trip to the Philippines to be at the expense of the petitioner Jose
Vicente De Leon; and (d) petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon shall give petitioner
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon the sum of P4,500.00 as monthly support for the minor child
Susana to commence from February 19, 1980.
Sylvia appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals raising the following errors:
1) The trial court erred in finding that the cause or consideration of the Letter-
Agreement is the termination of marital relations;
2) The trial court failed to appreciate testimonial and documentary evidence proving
that Macaria de Leon's claims of threat, intimidation and mistake are baseless; and
3) The trial court erred in finding that Sylvia Lichauco de Leon committed breach of the
Letter-Agreement; and further, failed to appreciate evidence proving Macaria de Leon's
material breach thereof.
The respondent court affirmed the decision in toto. The motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, the present petition.
The only basis by which Sylvia may lay claim to the properties which are the subject
matter of the Letter-Agreement, is the Letter-Agreement itself. Themain issue,
therefore, is whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid.
The third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement, supra, reads:
"In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relationsbetween the
undersigned and her lawfully wedded husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the
following are agreed upon:" (underscoring supplied)
It is readily apparent that the use of the word "relations" is ambiguous, perforce, it is
subject to interpretation. There being a doubt as to the meaning of this word taken by
itself, a consideration of the general scope and purpose of the instrument in which it
occurs (see Germann and Co. v. Donaldson, Simand Co., 1 Phil. 63) and Article 1374 of
the Civil Code which provides that the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from
all of them taken jointly, is necessary.
Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement was the
termination of property relations with her husband. Indeed, Sylvia and Jose Vicente
subsequently filed a joint petition for judicial approval of the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership, sanctioned by Article 191 of the Civil Code. On the other
hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration was the termination of
marital relationship.
We sustain the observations and conclusion made by the trial court, to wit (pp. 44-
46, Rollo):
"On page two of the letter agreement (Exhibit 'E'), the parties contemplated not only to
agree to a judicial separation of property of the spouses but likewise to continue
with divorce proceedings (paragraphs 1 and 2, Obligations of the Wife, Exhibit 'E-
1'). If taken with the apparentlyambiguous provisions in Exhibit 'E' regarding terminati
on of 'relations',the parties clearly contemplated not only the termination of propertyrela
tionship but likewise of marital relationship in its entirety. Furthermore, it would be safe
to assume that the parties in Exhibit 'E' nothaving specified the particular relationship
which they wanted topeacefully and amicably terminate had intended to terminate all ki
nds ofrelations, both marital and property. While there could be inherentbenefits to a te
rmination of conjugal property relationship between thespouses, the court could not clea
rly perceive the underlying benefit forthe intervenor insofar as termination of property r
elationship betweenpetitioners is concerned, unless the underlying consideration forinte
rvenor is the termination of marital relationship by divorceproceedings between her son
Jose Vicente and his wife petitioner Sylvia. The last sentence
of paragraph 2 under "Obligations of the Wife"unequivocally states: "It is the stated
objective of this agreement that said divorce proceedings (in the United States) will
continue." There is merit in concluding that the consideration by
which intervenor executed Exhibit 'E' to 'E-2' was to secure freedom for her
son petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon, especially if Exhibit 'R' - Intervenor, which is (sic)
agreement signed by petitioner Sylvia to consent to and pardon Jose Vicente De Leon
for adultery and concubinage (among others) would be considered. In the light,
therefore, of the foregoing circumstances, this Court finds credible the testimony
of intervenor as follows:
"Q Will you please go over the Exhibit 'E' to 'E-2' - intervenor consisting of three
pages and inform us whether or not this is the letter of March 16, 1977 which you just
referred to?
"A Yes, this is the letter.
"Q Why did you affix your signature to this Exh. 'E' - intervenor (sic)?
"A Because at that time when I signed it I want to buy peace for myself and for the
whole family.
"Q From whom did you want to buy peace and/or what kind of peace?
"A I wanted to buy peace from Sylvia Lichauco whom I knew was kind of 'matapang;'
so I want peace for me and primarily for the peaceful and amicable termination of
marital relationship between my son, Joe Vincent and Sylvia." (Deposition dated
September 6, 1983 - Macaria de Leon, p. 6-7)
"This court, therefore, finds and holds that the cause or consideration for
the intervenor Macaria De Leon in having executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was the
termination of the marital relationship between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon.
"Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides:
'Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.'
'If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the contract is void and
inexistent from the beginning.
"Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
'(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy;
xxx
'(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
'These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of
illegality be waived.'
"But marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the
Civil Code provides:
'Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations...'
"From the foregoing provisions of the New Civil Code, this court is of theconsidered
opinion and so holds that intervenor's undertaking under Exhibit 'E' premised on the
termination of marital relationship is not only contrary to law but contrary to Filipino
morals and public policy. As such, any agreement or obligations based on such
unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public policy should be deemed null
and void."(underscoring supplied)
Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Code contemplates properties belonging to the
spouses and not those belonging to a third party, who, in the case at bar, is Macaria. In
the petition for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made to appear that
the said properties are conjugal in nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that the
questioned properties are owned by her. Neither Sylvia nor Jose Vicente adduced any
contrary evidence.
Granting, in gratia argumenti, that the consideration of the Letter-Agreement was the
termination of property relations, We agree with the respondent court that (pp. 46-
47, Rollo):
"x x x the agreement nevertheless is void because it contravenes the following
provisions of the Civil Code:
'Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
'(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
'(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between
husband and wife;"
Besides, the Letter-Agreement shows on its face that it was prepared by Sylvia, and in
this regard, the ambiguity in a contract is to be taken contraproferentem, i.e., construed
against the party who caused the ambiguity and could have also avoided it by the
exercise of a little more care. Thus, Article 1377 of the Civil Code provides: "The
interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party
who caused the obscurity" (see Equitable Banking Corp. vs. IAC, G.R. No. 74451, May
25, 1988, 161 SCRA 518).
Sylvia alleges further that since the nullity of the Letter-Agreement proceeds from the
unlawful consideration solely of Macaria, applying the pari delictorule, it is
clear that she cannot recover what she has given by reason of the Letter-Agreement nor
ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised her. On her part, Macaria raises the
defenses of intimidation and mistake which led her to execute the Letter?Agreement. In
resolving this issue, the trial court said (pp. 148-151, Rollo):
"In her second cause of action, intervenor claims that her signing ofExhibits 'E' to 'E-2'
was due to a fear of an unpeaceful and troublesome separation of her son with petitioner
Sylvia Lichauco de Leon. In support of her claim, intervenor testified as follows:
'Q Will you please inform us how did Sylvia Lichauco disturb or threaten your son or
yourself?
'A Despite the fact that Sylvia Lichauco voluntarily left my son Joe Vincent and
abandoned him, she unashamedly nagged Joe and me to get money and when her
demands were not met she resorted to threats like, she threatened to bring Joe to court
for support. Sylvia threatened to scandalize our family by these baseless suits; in fact
she caused the service of summons to Joe when he went to the United
States.' (Intervenor's deposition dated Sept. 6, 1983, p. 8).
"On the other hand, petitioner Sylvia claims that it was intervenor and petitioner Jose
Vicente who initiated the move to convince her to agree to a dissolution of their
conjugal partnership due to the alleged extra-marital activities of petitioner Jose Vicente
De Leon. She testified as follows:
'Q Now in her testimony, Macaria Madrigal De Leon also said that you threatened
her by demanding money and nagged her until she agreed to the letter agreement of
March 1977, what can you say about that?
'A I think with all the people sitting around with Atty. Quisumbing, Atty. Chuidian,
my father-in-law, my sister-in-law and I, you know, it can be shown that this was a
friendly amicable settlement that they were much really interested in settling down as I
was. I think there were certain reasons that they wanted to get done or planned, being at
that time Jose was already remarried and had a child. That since she then found out that
since she was worried about what might be, you know, involved in any future
matters. She just wanted to do what she could. She just want me out of the picture. So
in no way, it cannot be said that I nagged and threatened her.' (TSN dated December 8,
1983, p. 137-138)
"In resolving this issue, this Court leans heavily on Exhibit 'R' - intervenor, which was
not controverted by petitioner Sylvia. A reading of Exhibit 'R' would show that
petitioner Sylvia would consent to and pardon petitioner Jose Vicente, son
of intervenor, for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage, with a string attached;
that is, the transfer of the properties subject herein to her. There appears some truth to
the apprehensions of intervenor for in petitioner Sylvia's testimony she confirms the
worry of intervenor as follows: ". . . being at that time Jose (De Leon) was already
remarried and had a child. That since she (intervenor) found out that, she was worried
about what might be, you know, involved in any future matters. She just want me out
of the picture." The aforesaid fear of intervenor was further corroborated by her
witness Concepcion Tagudin who testified as follows:
'Q Now, you mentioned that you were present when Mrs. Macaria De Leon signed
this Exhibit 'E?2,' will you inform us whether there was anything unusual which you
noticed when Mrs. Macaria M. De Leon signed this Exhibit 'E-2'?
'A Mrs. Macaria M. De Leon was in a state of tension and anger. She was so mad
that she
remarked: 'Puñetang Sylvia ito bakit ba niya akoginugulo. Ipakukulong daw niya si Jo
e
Vincent kung hindi kopipirmahan ito. Sana matapos na itong problemang ito pagkapir
mangito,' sabi niya.' (Deposition - Concepcion Tagudin, Oct. 21, 1983, pp. 10-11)
"In her third cause of action, intervenor claims mistake or error in having signed
Exhibits '1' to 'E-2' alleging in her testimony as follows:
'Q Before you were told such by your lawyers what if any were your basis to believe
that Sylvia would no longer have inheritance rights from your son, Joe Vincent?
'A Well, that was what Sylvia told me. That she will eliminate any inheritance rights
from me or my son Joe Vincent's properties if I sign the document amicably. x x x'
(Intervenor's deposition - Sept. 6, 1983, pp. 9-10).
"On the other hand, petitioner Sylvia claims that intervenor could not have been
mistaken in her having signed the document as she was under advice of counsel during
the time that Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was negotiated. To support such claims by
Sylvia Lichauco De Leon, the deposition testimony of Atty. Vicente Chuidian was
presented before this Court:
'Atty. Herbosa: Now you mentioned Atty. Norberto Ouisumbing, would you be
able to tell us in what capacity he was present in that negotiation?
'Atty. Chuidian: He was counsel for Doña Macaria and for Joe Vincent, the spouse
of Sylvia.' (Deposition of V. Chuidian, December 16, 1983, p. 8)
"The New Civil Code provides:
'Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud is voidable.'
'Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the
substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which
have principally moved one or both parties to enter into a contract. x x x'
"The preponderance of evidence leans in favor of intervenor who even utilized the
statement of the divorce lawyer of petitioner Sylvia (Mr. Penrod) in support of the fact
that intervenor was mistaken in having signed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' because when she
signed said Exhibits she believed that fact that petitioner Sylvia would eliminate her
inheritance rights and there is no showing that said intervenor was properly advised by
any American lawyer on the fact whether petitioner Sylvia, being an American citizen,
could rightfully do the same. Transcending, however, the issue of whether there was
mistake of fact on the part of intervenor or not, this Court could not see a valid cause or
consideration in favor ofintervenor Macaria De Leon having signed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2.'
For even if petitioner Sylvia had confirmed Mr. Penrod's statement during the divorce
proceedings in the United States that she would undertake to eliminate her hereditary
rights in the event of the property settlement, under Philippine laws, such contract
would likewise be voidable, for under Art. 1347 of the New Civil Code 'no contract
may be entered into upon future inheritance.'"
We do not subscribe to the aforestated view of the trial court. Article 1335 of the Civil
Code provides:
"x x x.
"There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable
and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or
upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his
consent.
"To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person
shall be borne in mind.
"A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or
legal, does not vitiate consent."
In order that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the
following requisites must concur: (1) that the intimidation must be the
determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be given; (2) that
the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there
being an evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can
offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a
reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes
has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury. Applying the
foregoing to the present case, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia threatened her to bring
Jose Vicente to court for support, to scandalize their family by baseless suits and that
Sylvia would pardon Jose Vicente for possible crimes of adultery
and/or concubinagesubject to the transfer of certain properties to her, is obviously not
the intimidation referred to by law. With respect to mistake as a vice of consent, neither
is Macaria's alleged mistake in having signed the Letter-Agreement because of her
belief that Sylvia will thereby eliminate inheritance rights from her and Jose Vicente,
the mistake referred to in Article 1331 of the Civil Code, supra. It does not appear that
the condition that Sylvia "will eliminate her inheritance rights" principally
moved Macaria to enter into the contract. Rather, such condition was but an incident
of the consideration thereof which, as discussed earlier, is the termination of marital
relations.
In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both parties acted in violation of the laws. However,
the pari delicto rule, expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur actio" and
"In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to
an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are, does not apply in this
case. Contrary to the ruling of the respondent Court that (pp. 47-48, Rollo):
"x x x. [C]onsequently, intervenor appellees' obligation under the said agreement
having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore to each other that things
which have been subject matter of the contract, their fruits and the price or its interest,
except as provided by law (Art. 1398, Civil Code)."
Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is the
proper law to be applied. It provides:
"When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be
repudiated by one of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before
any damage has been caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if the
public interest will thus be subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract to recover
the money or property."
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished
and to adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the
circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be granted toMacaria. Justice would
be served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which she was before the
transaction was entered into.
With the conclusions thus reached, We find it unnecessary to discuss the other issues
raised.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals dated June 30, 1987 and its resolution dated November 24, 1987 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling
on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American
wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that
the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between
two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce
decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse,
as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in
its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens,
but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained
a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos
who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated
to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it
would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13
 G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO,, Petitioner, v.REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments;
hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision 1 and the March 24, 1999 Order 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick
A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both
parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both
parties.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate
of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner -- a Filipina
-- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City. 7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as single and Filipino. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia. 9cräläwvirtualibräry
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage 10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. 11 He contended that his
first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989; 12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for
the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down. 13cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent. 15The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties. 16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution. 17cräläwvirtualibräry
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended,
but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition. 18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
 1 Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.
4 allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5 A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our
courts.19cräläwvirtualibräry
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on
two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the
rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce
decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction
only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and
(2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to
establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of
the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. 21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 22 and 17 23 of the Civil Code. 24 In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 26 A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 27cräläwvirtualibräry
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. 28Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first
comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar
which shall specify the following:
xxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence
of a judgment is the judgment itself. 31The decree purports to be a written act or record
of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.32cräläwvirtualibräry
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested 33 by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 34cräläwvirtualibräry
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only
to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City. 36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification. 37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38cräläwvirtualibräry
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. 39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juristhat had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of
sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence
of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. 41 In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. 42Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. 43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws
are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. 44The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was
legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was
void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case
at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected. 46cräläwvirtualibräry
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage
only after proof of good behavior. 47cräläwvirtualibräry
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.48cräläwvirtualibräry
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have
been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the
legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license.
According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent,
had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license. 50cräläwvirtualibräry
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity
to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the
following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit
A Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan
City, Nueva Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification
that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson
was in its records; 54 and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick
A. Recio; 55 (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit 2
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recio; 58 (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995. 60cräläwvirtualibräry
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January
12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that
the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he
was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence,
we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE , in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
peralta, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks
to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in
SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a
judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012.
The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing,
counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts
Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern
Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to
appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the
title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the
proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The
Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named
YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese
Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce
Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter
are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese
husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore
that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband
or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of
marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by
virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said
entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname,
MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for
her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be
sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5,
2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that
the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based
on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the
right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens
of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos'
family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter
no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably
with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law
should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent
behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to
the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court,
the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as
similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a
foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage,
are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital
bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is
allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took
effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil
Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet
meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws
in force in the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to
remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the
spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she
had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was
that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil
Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have
already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce
proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v.
Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce
in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law
and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse
who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of
enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the
cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would
not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides
to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and
to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree
that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on
the issues of child custody and property relation,respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his
Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised
sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction,
on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the
"nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider,
arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In
ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the
Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting
of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign
divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was
filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an
accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared
with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she
initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that
the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the
foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court
of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own
representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our
rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national,
was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage
between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of
bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of
the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III
("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed
for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the
RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that
the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his
capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent
with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We
referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this
Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the
Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no
longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie
is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status
is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree
which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without
dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary
ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the
Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to
respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of
the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth
of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have
used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there
should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to
mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the
Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League
of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the
resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of
a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or
the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law
control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry
under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at
the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their
alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation
on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the
mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide
for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are
constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and
that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such
classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge
its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and
more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly,
and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes
compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state
for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or
interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former
to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies
with respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless
declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse
is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences
between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a
Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another
Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon
the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws,
both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien
land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against
the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in
treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino
citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds
similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on
these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim,
tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she
chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for
she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance
with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in
Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is
duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate
practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against
their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to
support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith
in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e.,
satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent
of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the
law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is
whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a
Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It
is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection,
rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact
that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are
more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to
prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it
was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure
their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the
only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not
meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their
exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be
understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a
prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention
was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily
discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal
opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11,
1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on
the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710
of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred
upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive
Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act
No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or
unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action,
slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to
make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When
the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it
ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30,
1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute
divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet
17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the
House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act
Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on
Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the
grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or
amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner,
a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six
(6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether
in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other
than one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement
of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or
when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child
or a child of a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more
than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years,
either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on
said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as
follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage
was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or personl having
 substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining
the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be
serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the
marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the
petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family
Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from
one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the
transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total
breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to
our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an
institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do
with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause
the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause
the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State
and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
is sincerely believes that they are good for country.77While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family
Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a
legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total
isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others,
the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the
State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is
not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims
of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation
passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna
Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as
amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional
mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human
rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We
disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or
she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the
stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor
of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all
over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is
recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more
often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate
reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self
fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical
to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the
truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In
reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact,
for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the
sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as
it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we
are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always
an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the
Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of
divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven
by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of
an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the
Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the
Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules
of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus,
We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of
the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the
divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial
notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese
law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon
her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that
Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18,
2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court
of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
law on divorce.

SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. L-16925. March 31, 1962.]
FABIAN PUGEDA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS,
SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel Sanchez, CLARA TRIAS,
assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera, GABRIEL TRIAS, minors
ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR.,
assisted by guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias, TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA
PUGEDA, assisted by her husband Ramon Portugal, Defendants-Appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, is certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate Administration known as
lots Nos. 225, 226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2282, 2284,
2378, 2412, 2682, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San Francisco
de Malabon estate located in General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a barn
(camarin) also of strong materials, and a store also of strong materials in General Trias,
Cavite and sets of household furniture. The plaintiff claims participation in the said
properties on the ground that the same were acquired by him and the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died on
February 11, 1934.
The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed
Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano
Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children of the
plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.
The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273,
2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with the following
interest therein: 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in
lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner
of one-half of the said interest in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria
C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said properties and
defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the
properties above described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned and one-half thereof be given as share therein
of plaintiff.
The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra denied the claims of the plaintiff to the
properties described in the complaint, or that said properties had been administered by
the defendants in trust as co-owners with the plaintiff, and by way of special and
affirmative defense they alleged that the properties subject of the complaint had been
inherited by the defendants from their deceased father Mariano Trias and deceased
mother Maria C. Ferrer and had been in possession and full enjoyment thereof for more
than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and adversely under a claim of
ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that plaintiff is estopped from claiming or
asserting any rights or participation in the said properties. Defendants Trias also denied
for lack of knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in his complaint that he was
married to Maria C. Ferrer and that the marriage continued up to the death of the latter
in 1934. They further presented a counterclaim against the plaintiff for the sum of
P40,000, this amount being what was contributed by them in support of the candidacies
of plaintiff when running for the office of provincial governor of Cavite. They also filed
a counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in cash amounting in
value to the total sum of P50,000 and a counterclaim for P100,000 which is the value of
four big parcels of land belonging to the defendants which the plaintiff had appropriated
for his own use.
The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter’s claim that the properties
mentioned in plaintiff’s complaint were joint properties of the plaintiff and the
defendants. They also allege that the properties had gone to the management and control
of the defendants Trias who should be required to answer for the fruits and profits
thereof during the administration by them of said properties. As cross-claim against
their co-defendants, they allege that they are each entitled to one-eighth of the
properties left by their mother as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the complaint, as
well as a share of one-eighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the San Francisco de
Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in Lingad, Litlit in Silang, Cavite and in 60 heads
of cattle.
Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and the defendants Trias,
answering the cross-claim of their co-defendants Pugeda, denied all the allegations
contained in the answer of the defendants Pugeda, and further alleged that the cross-
claim is improper as the same should be the subject of probate proceedings, and the
defendants Pugeda are estopped and barred by prescription from claiming any further
right to the properties left by their deceased mother.
There are two questions or issues raised in the present case. The first is the alleged
existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the claim
of the plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate under certificates
of sale issued first in the name of Mariano Trias and later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer,
but paid for in part during the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer. A third but
minor issue is the claim for furniture alleged by plaintiff to have been bought by him
and Maria C. Ferrer during the marriage, which plaintiff claims is in the possession of
the defendants.
On the first issue, the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente
testified that in the afternoon of January 5, 1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three
Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of the
Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that
accordingly Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses
one of whom was Santiago Salazar and another Amado Prudente, deceased; that after
the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage
contract, and after the witnesses had signed the same, he delivered one copy to the
contracting parties and another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer
was at that time the keeper of the records of the civil register. Plaintiff and his witnesses
explained that no celebration of the marriage was held in spite of the prominence of the
contracting parties because plaintiff was then busy campaigning for the office of
Member of the Provincial Board and Maria C. Ferrer was already on the family way.
The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a photostatic copy
of the record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of
January 1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed therein; but
this absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept
the register forgot to make an entry of the marriage in the registry.
Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage plaintiff lived in
the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which was the house of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria
C. Ferrer. Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue was baptized on
August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C.
Ferrer. The baptismal certificate submitted states that the baptized child was the issue of
the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The registry of said birth was also
submitted and it states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and the mother is Maria C.
Ferrer.
It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the deceased wife,
as husband and wife, until the death of the latter, publicly and openly as husband and
wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of Partition" (Exhibit 5-Trias) was signed by
the parties defendants themselves. The document contains the following significant
statement or admission.
"WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of the said
deceased: Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias y
Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with Mariano Trias, now deceased: and
Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y Ferrer, are the children of her second
marriage with Fabian Pugeda.
". . . That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that Lots Nos. 3177 and
3178 known as the Buenavista property will be administered by one of the parties to be
agreed upon and for said purpose they appoint Miguel F. Trias, and all earnings, rentals
and income or profits shall be expended for the improvement and welfare of the said
property and for the payment of all claims and accounts of our deceased mother Maria
C. Ferrer, and for the maintenance and education of Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda y
Ferrer."cralaw virtua1aw library
The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of the testimonial and documental
evidence, arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to
Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne out not only by the
chain of circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration of
the marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact that plaintiff and
deceased Maria C Ferrer lived together as husband and wife for eighteen years (1916-
1934) and there is a strong presumption that they were actually married.
On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to prove the marriage we cite
the following authority:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 53. — As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate
of the record in the civil register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been
kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the
marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind." (p. 27, Civil Code)
"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff’s natural father and
mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not
appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and
the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites."
(Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1)
"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage." (55 C. J. S., p. 900).
In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda
was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer, said marriage subsisting from 1916 until 1934,
upon the death of the latter, and we affirm the finding of the trial court to that effect.
On the second issue the evidence introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject of
the action were formerly Friar Lands included in the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of sale in the name of
Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the
year 1916. The different lots, the dates of their acquisition and assignment to said Maria
C. Ferrer, widow, are set forth in a table appended to this decision as Annex "A."
On the basis of the facts about their acquisition and assignment Judge Lucero declared
that the lots in question, were conjugal properties of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer,
and consequently decreed that 1/2 thereof, should be adjudicated to Mariano Trias, as
the latter’s share in the conjugal properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the
rate of 1/6 each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer, as her share in the conjugal
properties, to be assigned to her children by both marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and
the balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda in usufruct. From this judgment the case
was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
When the case was before the Court of Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants
presented a motion for new trial on the ground that they discovered copies of four
documents namely - Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E" Record on Appeal, pp. 108-
117, (The last document is a copy of a court order issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran
approving the project of partition in Case No. 860, Intestate of Mariano Trias) which if
admitted might alter decision. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded
the case to the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the consideration of said evidence.
Upon the return of the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo Gonzales
who then presided the court, rendered a new decision. Judge Gonzales found that the
total amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer on the lots in question amount
to only P8,911.84, while the installments paid during the marriage of the spouses Fabian
Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found that lots 3177 and 3178
were paid for during the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer in the total sum of P16,557.32.
Judge Gonzales therefore ruled that the two marriages should participate in the
ownership of the lands, according to the actual contributions made by each marriage in
the installments in payment of the lands. The dispositive part of the decision, now
subject of the appeal is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby renders
judgment:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2282, 2284,
2412, 2682, 273, 2650, 2652, 2680, 2718, 2764, (21 lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda
and Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion of percentage and indicated in each individual lot;
2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the installments for the same were fully paid
during the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer are hereby declared conjugal of the
couple Pugeda and Ferrer; and even some of the installments for these two lots were
paid after death of Maria C. Ferrer, they do not lose the character of conjugal property
for payments were made from the crops thereof;
3. That since Mariano Trias during his marriage to Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the
payment for the installments of these 21 lots amounting to P8,911.84, half of which
must be reimbursed in favor of the children or heirs of Mariano Trias to be paid from
the mass of the hereditary estate of Maria C. Ferrer; the other half of P4,455.92 to be
distributed among all the children of heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second
marriage to be deducted from the mass of her estate;
4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the installments for these
six (6) lots were fully paid during marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they
are hereby declared to be conjugal between them — one half of which must go to the
children or heirs of Mariano Trias, the other half must equally go to the children or heirs
of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage;
5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the properties which commenced after the
death of his mother who died on February 11, 1934, must render an accounting of his
administration within three (3) months time from the date this judgment has become
final.
6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action." (Record on Appeal, pp. 154-
156)
Against this ruling the appeal has come to this Court. Defendants-appellants claim that
Judge Gonzales had no power or authority to change the decision of Judge Lucero, as it
was not he but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the evidence. They have also
assigned before Us a set of errors which may be boiled down to the three main issues
set forth above. As the issue of marriage has already been considered we will now pass
to the second and more important question as to whether the lands subject of the action
may be considered conjugal properties of the first marriage or of the second or of both.
A consideration of the legal nature and character of the acquisition of the various lots is
necessary that the issues in the action may be justly determined.
A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120) discloses that the friar
lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual occupants (actual settlers and
occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government). (Paragraph 3 of
Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said act expressly declares that the lands are
not public lands in the sense in which this word is used in the Public Land Act, and their
acquisition is not governed by the provisions of the Public Land Act (Par. IV,
Declaration of Purposes, Id.)
The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 12. — . . . When the costs thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the Chief of
the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate which
shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler and
occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided
in this Act at the office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the
United States or its equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the payment of the
final installment together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such
settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance,
which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one
hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
"SEC. 13. — The acceptance by the settler and occupant of such certificate shall be
considered as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the
installments and at the interest specified in the certificate, and he shall by such
acceptance become a debtor to the Government in that amount together with all accrued
interest. . . . Provided, however, That every settler and occupant who desires to purchase
his holding must enter into the agreement to purchase such holding by accepting the
said certificate and executing the said receipt whenever called on so to do by the Chief
of the Bureau of Public Lands, and a failure on the part of the settler and occupant to
comply with this requirement shall be considered as a refusal to purchase, and he shall
be ousted as above provided and thereafter his holding may be leased or sold as in case
of unoccupied lands: . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
"SEC. 15. — The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land
sold under the provisions of this Act until the full payment of all installments of
purchase money and interest by the purchaser has been made, and any sale or
encumbrance made by him shall be invalid as against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and shall be in all respects subordinate to its prior claim."cralaw virtua1aw
library
"Sec. 16. — In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is
provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the
Government to any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land
stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of
law for the purchase of the same. In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving
of the deed and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate
shall descend and deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine
Islands would have taken had the title been perfected before the death of the holder of
the certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all the
requirements of the certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his
interest in the land before having complied with all the conditions thereof, the purchaser
from the holder of the certificate shall be entitled to all the rights of the holder of the
certificate upon presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
for registration." (Vol. III, Public Laws, pp 315-316).
A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the conveyance executed
in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of
the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may
be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale
certificates were made in favor of Mariano Trias, and upon his death they were assigned
in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But the law provides that when the buyer
does not leave a widow, the rights and interests of the holder of the certificate of sale
are left to the buyer’s heirs in accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of the
Director of Lands, Et Al., v. Ricardo Rizal, Et Al., G.R. No. L- 2925 prom. December
29, 1950, this court thru Mr. Justice Montemayor held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . All this clearly and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the purchaser, even
before the payment of the full price and before the execution of the final deed of
conveyance, is considered by the law as the actual owner of the lot purchased, under
obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being
that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.
". . . In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under
Act 1120, pending payment in full of the purchase price, although the Government
reserves title thereto, merely for its protection, the beneficial and equitable title is in the
purchaser, and that any accretion received by the lot even before payment of the last
installment belongs to the purchaser thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely different from a
sale of public lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the case of public
lands, a person who desires to acquire must first apply for the parcel of land desired.
Thereafter the land is opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to an applicant or to a
qualified bidder the successful bidder is given a right of entry to occupy the land and
cultivate and improve it, (Secs. 22-28, Commonwealth Act 141). It is only after
satisfying the requirements of cultivation and improvement of 1/5 of the land that the
applicant is given a sales patent. (Sec. 30).
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the
certificate of sale in his favor, subject only to cancellation thereof in case the price
agreed upon is not paid. In case of sale of public lands if the applicant dies and his
widow remarries both she and the second husband are entitled to the land; the new
husband has the same right as his wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As
indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies before the payment
of the price in full, the sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but if the buyer does not
leave a widow, the right to the friar land is transmitted to his heirs at law.
It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now subject of the
action none was paid for in full during the marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C.
Ferrer, and that payments in installments continued to be made even after the marriage
of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it is also true that even after said
marriage the certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and installments for
the lots after said marriage continued in the name of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the
amounts paid as installments for the lots were taken from the fruits of the properties
themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda himself,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Mr. Viniegra:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q De los productos de esos terrenos, durante la administracion por los demandados,
recibia Vd. su participacion?
A No, señor.
Q Nunca?
A Because I know there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of Lands, and I have
been informed that the obligations have been paid annually from the products of the
land.
Q Therefore, from the products of these lands - the proceeds — the obligations to the
Bureau of Lands are being discounted from the said proceeds and after the remainder,
as in palay, are equally divided, is that what you mean to say?

A Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products of the lands the
obligations to the Bureau of Lands would be paid.
Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les darian alguna participacion?
A No señor, porque estaba en Manila, but they informed me that the obligations to the
Bureau of Lands were being paid from the products of the lands.
Mr. Viniegra:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q You do not claim any participation in the remainder of the products after paying the
Bureau of Lands?
A How would I ask for I knew they were still paying the obligations to the Bureau of
Lands — that was until the Japanese time, and I knew some obligations were not paid,
as a result of which the sales certificates of some big lots were cancelled.
Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Como se mantenia Vd?
A Mi Madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My mother helped me.
(Session of November 20, 1951, before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp. 259-261, Matro.) (Brief
for Defendants-Appellants, pp. 49- 51).
There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the case at bar, and
that is the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August 1915, the inventory of the estate left by
said deceased included the lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias)
and the project of partition in said especial proceedings submitted to the court as Exh. 3-
Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal
properties, the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.
The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the
friar lands purchased as above described and paid for, had the character of conjugal
properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. But another compelling
legal reason for this conclusion as against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement on
said nature of the lands in question. In the year 1915, even before the marriage of
plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter was appointed administratrix of the
estate of her deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860 of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of the estate left by the deceased
Mariano Trias, dated January 15, 1929, was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the
project of partition of the properties was submitted. The project includes the friar lands
subject of the action, and in accordance with it one-half of the properties listed in the
inventory was adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and the other half
adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share of Mariano Trias was
decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This project of partition was approved by
Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order dated February 11, 1929, submitted to the Court of
Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the record on appeal.
The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Mariano Trias must have been known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It
does not appear, and neither does he claim or allege, that he ever appeared in said
proceedings to claim participation in the properties subject of the proceedings. His
failure to intervene in the proceedings to claim that the friar lands or some of them
belonged to himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a conviction on his part that
the said friar lands actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer,
and that he had no interest therein. The project of partition was approved as late as
1929, by which time plaintiff and defendant had already been married for a period of 13
years. Plaintiffs failure to assert any claim to the properties in the said intestate
proceedings during its pendency now bars him absolutely from asserting the claim that
he now pretends to have to said properties.
We will now proceed to consider plaintiff’s claim that the lands in question had,
through the joint effort of himself and his wife, increased in productivity from 900
cavans to 2,400 cavans of rice because of the introduction therein of improvements such
as a system of irrigation for the lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff himself, the
installments remaining unpaid were taken from the produce or the yield of the said
lands and if it be taken into account that one-half of said lands already belonged to the
children of the first marriage, to whom the lands were adjudicated in the settlement of
the estate of their father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias, the only portion of the products
or produce of the lands in which plaintiff could claim any participation is the one-half
share therein produced from the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer. How much
of said produce belonging to Maria C. Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of
the lands is not shown, but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in continuous political
campaigns, ever since his marriage in 1916 (he had devoted most of his time while
married to Maria C. Ferrer to politics), portions of the products of the paraphernal
properties of Maria C. Ferrer must have been used in these political campaigns as well
as in meeting the expenses of the conjugal partnership. The value of the useful
improvements introduced on the lands, joint properties of Maria C. Ferrer and her
children, was not proved in court by plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of
the old Civil Code, to the effect that useful expenditures for the benefit of the separate
properties of one of the spouses are partnership properties, cannot be applied. But even
if such useful improvements had been proved, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff’s
action to recover his share therein because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas the
present action was instituted by plaintiff only in the year 1948. After the death of Maria
C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife, and was not heard from for 14
years, that is, until he instituted this action in 1948. His claims for the improvements, if
any, is therefore also barred.
 Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased Maria C.
The above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the improvements Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of
in the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer is barred, is also applicable to the claim her properties be divided among her eight children at the rate of one- eighth per child.
of the plaintiff herein for the construction alleged to have been made and the furniture As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
supposedly bought by him and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which had the character
of conjugal partnership property of said spouses. In the year 1935, defendant herein
presented a project of partition to plaintiff for his signature (the project of partition is
dated March, 1935 and is marked Exhibit "5" -Trias). In this project of partition of the
properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, mention is made of the participation of the
plaintiff’s children with the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made therein of
any participation that plaintiff had or could have as usufruct or otherwise, or in any
building or improvement. This deed of partition was shown to plaintiff but the latter did
not sign it.

The express omission of the name of plaintiff herein in the above deed of partition as
one of the heirs of the deceased Maria C, Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that
defendants had intended to deprive him of any share or participation in the properties
left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law assigns to him.
But in spite of his knowledge of this fact no action was taken by him until February,
1948 when plaintiff demanded his share in the properties and later brought this action.

The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before plaintiff instituted this action.
Consequently, whatever rights he may have had to any portion of the estate left by the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise, must be deemed to have
prescribed. As a consequence, we find that the order of Judge Lucero granting to the
plaintiff herein one-ninth share in the estate of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct
should be set aside and the objection to the grant of such share to plaintiff on the ground
of prescription is sustained.

Having disposed of the claims of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to
consider the cross-claim of his children, namely, Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda.
Judge Lucero decreed that the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Pugeda be
divided among her children, including the two cross-claimants Teofilo Pugeda and
Virginia Pugeda, and decreed one-ninth of the properties of the said deceased Maria C.
Ferrer to each of these two children of hers with the plaintiff and assigning also to the
plaintiff one-ninth share in the said estate left by her in usufruct.

In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the estate of his wife
Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the statute of limitations, the decree entered by
Judge Lucero declaring that her properties be divided into nine parts, one part belonging
to each heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by eliminating the share
in usufruct of the plaintiff therein and increasing the share of each of her heirs to one-
eighth.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff’s complaint is hereby

dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio G.
G.R. No. L-8014 March 14, 1955
PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent-appellant.
Claro M. Recto and Jose Nava for petitioner-appellant.
Josefina R. Phodaca and Naomi P. Salvador for respondent-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V.
Paraiso were among the candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of
Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while
Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed
the latter as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending
that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate
under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo
warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office and
that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He also prayed that he
be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as
minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his
resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo,
Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office,
petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor, being
an ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it declared his proclamation as mayor null and void,
but refrained from declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so. from this election both parties have appealed, respondent from that
portion finding him ineligible, and petitioner from that portion holding he cannot be
declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.
The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals. However, as the latter court
found that while petitioner raises in his brief only questions of law respondent raises
both questions of law and fact, and both appeals are indivisible in that they pertain to
only one case, that court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the provisions of
sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, upon the theory that one of the appeals
is exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.
The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to
hold office under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, or whether he
actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and his resignation duly
accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability. As may be noted, this is a
question of fact the determination of which much depends upon the credibility and
weight of the evidence of both parties.
The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of
the Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to
solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944 up to 1950 he
acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without
interruption and has been renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by
the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries; that on April 19, 1950, respondent
transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been assigned to
work in the same place and chapel during the years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951,
respondent applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau
of Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952; that said
license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church nor
respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly
known as minister of the United Church of Christ, but he has not attached to his
certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister.
The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends to show that while he was
formerly a minister of the United of Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed his
resignation as such minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to engage in
politics; that said resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special
meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951; that respondent turned over his
chapel and his office to the elder members of his religious order on August 21, 1951,
and since then he considered himself separated from his order and in fact he has
refrained ever since from conducting any religious services pertaining to that order.
Which of these versions is correct?
After careful examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its credibility and
probative value, we have not found any reason for deviating from the finding of the trial
court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged and
that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but
a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who
desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely intended
to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he belonged for the purpose
of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance
of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries.1 The importance of
resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform
the public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but
equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is
necessary for the protection of the public. This is specially so with regard to the
authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law
mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to
secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
upon the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of such registration,
upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise
imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the
instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to do. And what is more, he failed
to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister
knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.

It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by submitting as evidence

certain documents purporting to show the alleged resignation and its acceptance by the
cabinet of his church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951, but, considering said
documents in the light of the shortcomings we have pointed out above, one cannot help
but brand them as self-serving or as documents merely prepared to serve the political
designs of respondent in an attempt to obviate his disqualification under the law. And
this feeling appears strengthened if we examine the so-called minute book wherein,
according to witness Jose Agpalo, are entered the minutes of all the meeting of the
church, because upon an examination thereof one would at once get the impression that
it was prepared haphazardly and not with such seriousness and solemnity that should
characterize the religious activities of a well established religious order. As the trial
court aptly remarked "All these lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the
supposed resignation and acceptance were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility
of the respondent." We are therefore constrained to hold that respondent is disqualified
to hold the office of mayor as found by the trial court.

As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared

elected, having obtained second place in the elections, our answer is simple: this Court
has already declared that this cannot be done in the absence of an express provision
authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such provision but
apparently seems to prohibit it. This is what we said in at least two cases where we laid
down a ruling which is decisive of the present case.

. . . . In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot
declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if
he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor
of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his
certificate of candidacy. (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645.)

Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised Election Code,
does not provide that if the contestee is declared ineligible the contestant will
be proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered that the law contemplates no such
result, because it permits the filing of the contest by any registered candidate
irrespective of whether the latter occupied the next highest place or the lowest
in the election returns. (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz.,
[No. 2] p. 727.)
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of
the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on
17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines
Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to
inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise
deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.1âwphi1.nêt
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he
reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered
from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage
license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage
void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to
him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge
followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their
marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships
and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August
2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge
initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage
license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage.
However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application
and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither
embarrassment and sufferings.
petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the
has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000.
Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued
another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that
the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan
of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T.
which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then
Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license
requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request
due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
he acceded.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a
examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the
duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine
parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the
marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.1âwphi1.nêt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge
held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-
Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area
of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry
the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However,
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his
act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. We further held that:
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded
the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such
license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted
in gross ignorance of the law.1âwphi1.nêt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of
the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as
the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this
nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to
depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another,
condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a
matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise,
that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and
impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen.
They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law.
It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones
involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons."3

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects
him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for
he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.
Domingo Franco, for appellant.
Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were
married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose
Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio
civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the
peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the defendant,
in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage
before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage.
Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of the peace,
by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states
the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where
actually present in the office of the justice on the same day named; that they ratified
under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had there
asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the
presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness
for the wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace
and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September,
1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by
the justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were
legally married on the day named. The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The
document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The evidence of the
defendant, who testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the
peace at the time named, together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori,
and that they all signed the document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias
Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the
defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign
the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the
same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice
of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-
named, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the
peace at the time mentioned.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never
appeared before the justice of the peace and never was married to the defendant. She
admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she signed it in her own
home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a
paper authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which
we think, when properly considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the
time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married brother and was there for about
two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left
the house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination that she
herself went to school every morning and that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to
church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force when the testimony
of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of the defendant on the day
named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese named
Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked the mother of the
plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the
purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two
rights left the store, but instead of going to the house of the witness they went directly to
the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place; that after the
ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching,
and that they thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house of
Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.
The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of
the peace, who died after the ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain
statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony
of the witnesses for the defendant.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant
in his brief. It appears that during her first examination she was seized with an
hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was adjourned to
a future day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by
counsel that her collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely
in stating the office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the municipal building,
when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies the
claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of the office of the justice of the
peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told the
facts substantially as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was
not telling the truth when she said she did not appear before the justice of the peace.
This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were all written by
the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The
authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9 is as follows:
 ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very
angry and if he be informed that we have been married civilly, I am sure that
he will turn me out of the house.
Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.
Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not
remain here.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of
the 25th of September, is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning
because my sister in law will not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that
this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and
have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store, because I don't like to go without
Pacita.
The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know
anything about it.
Yours, ROSAL.
It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to
her meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7
is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before the justice of the
peace. It is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by
and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see that the tide is high because my brother
will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.
Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are
willing to celebrate the marriage at this time, because I don't like her to know
to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me this
morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we must not
cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being married I must do it right.
Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.
I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he
wishes.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the
steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my father's permission for our
marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem proper,
and, if he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you must request
his consent.
Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my
brother ill treatment is a matter of no importance, as every thing may be
carried out, with patience.
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as
indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified,
however, that she had no communication with the defendant during the voyage. The
plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her
arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced
this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring the cancellation of the
certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor
of the decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the
justice of the peace at the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even
admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal
marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties
must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they
take each other as husband and wife.
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the
justice of the peace said nothing until after the document was signed and then
addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The
petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had
mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the
marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the
peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition
and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by
the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which
certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due
form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as
husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated
in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the
marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the
parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said
document which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It
was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the
Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed;
and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what
took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.

The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the
complaint. Among these allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain
previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was afterwards allowed
to amend his answer so that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except
that relating to the condition in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff
objected to the allowance of this amendment. After the trial had commenced the
defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the
parents. It will be seen that this second amendment destroyed completely the first
amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to allege in his first
amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he
had unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After
argument the court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this
allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in
any way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a
continuance.

The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930
MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his guardian ad litem, Pedro
Madridejo, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
L. D. Abaya and S. C. Pamatmat for appellants.
Aurelio Palileo for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al. from
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna holding as follows:
Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next
of kin, and hereby orders the defendants in case No. 5258 to restore and deliver
the ownership and possession of the property described in the complaints filed
in the aforesaid case, to Melecio Madridejo, without cost. So ordered.
In support of their appeal the defendants assign the following alleged errors as
committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage between Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez is valid.
2. The lower court also erred in declaring that solely because of the subsequent
marriage of his parents, the appellee Melecio Madridejo, a natural child, was
legitimated.
3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering judgment in favor of the
defendants and appellants.
The relevant facts necessary for the decision of all the questions of fact and of law
raised herein are as follows:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de
Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During
her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of
births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was
born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo, the
necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a
24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being
made of the father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door,
was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of
Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de
Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as
well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the
2nd of May, 1928.
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of
Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a
copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the
marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law
for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
Touching the second assignment of error, there has been no attempt to deny that
Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee, is the natural son of the Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, The only question to be decided is whether the subsequent marriage of
his parents legitimated him.
Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage
only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the
celebration thereof.
According to this legal provision, in order that a subsequent marriage may be effective
as a legitimation, the natural children born out of wedlock must have been
acknowledged by the parents either before or after its celebration. The Civil Code has
established two kinds of acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsary. Article 131
provides for the voluntary acknowledgment by the father or mother as follows:
Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of
birth, in a will, or in some other public document.
Article 135 provides for the compulsary acknowledgment by the father, thus:
Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the
following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his
paternity, is in existence.
 2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child of the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father
himself of that of his family.
3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the provisions of the Penal Code
with regard to the acknowledgment of the issue, shall be observed.
Article 136 providing for the compulsory acknowledgment by the mother, reads:
Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural child:
1. When the child is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the cases
mentioned in the next preceding article.
2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of the child are fully proven.
Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo, has been acknowledged
by his parents Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, under any of the provisions above
quoted.
To begin with the father, no document has been adduced to show that he has voluntarily
acknowledged Melecio Madridejo as his son, except the registry certificate of birth,
Exhibit B. This, of course, is not the record of birth mentioned in the law, for it lacks
the requisites of article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry. It, no doubt, is a public
instrument, but it has neither been executed nor signed by Pedro Madridejo, and
contains no statement by which he acknowledges Melecio Madridejo to be his son.
Although as Pedro Madridejo testified, he furnished the municipal secretary of Siniloan
with necessary data for recording the birth of Melecio Madridejo, and although said
official inscribed the data thus given in the civil registry of births, this is not sufficient
to bring it under the legal provision regarding acknowledgment by a public document.
As to the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the data set forth in the
civil registry of births, Exhibit B, or in the baptismal register, where of Exhibit 2 is a
certificate, and which constitutes final proof only of the baptism, and not of the kinship
or parentage of the person baptized (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil., 350). Furthermore,
church registers of baptism are no longer considered public documents (United States
vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil., 215).
Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or
Flaviana Perez, either before or after their marriage. 1awph!l.net
Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his son, by compulsion?
The compulsory acknowledgment by the father established in article 135 of the Civil
Code, and by the mother according to article 136, requires that the natural child take
judicial action against the father or mother, or against the persons setting themselves up
as the heirs of both, for the purpose of compelling them to acknowledge him as a
natural son through a judgment of the court.
In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not demanded to be
acknowledged as a natural child, which is the condition precedent to establishing his
legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his right to the estate of his uterine brother,
Domingo de Leon, but he has not even impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or
the heirs of his mother, Flaviana Perez, in order that the court might have authority to
make a valid and effective pronouncement of his being a natural child, and to compel
them to acknowledge him as such.
The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of the defendants' answer
amounts to an admission that he is indeed Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of the
burden of proving that his mother acknowledged him as a son before her marriage. Such
an admission would have been affective if the present action had been brought for the
purpose of compelling Flaviana Perez or her heirs to acknowledge the appellee as her
son.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by
compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not
legitimate him.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the defendants
absolved with costs against the appellee without prejudice to any right he may have to
establish or compel his acknowledgment as the natural son of Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez. So ordered.
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing
the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444,
which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly
married to the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de
Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased
Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to
Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated
by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is
evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were
destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children,
namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on
23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr.,
born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his
whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that
Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura
Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the
name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being
bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties
acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with
counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio
who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated
on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case
was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir
of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido
(Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid
marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900
to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of
Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to
the Office of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office
(NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and
marriages that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of
the Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945,
were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued
by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed
by Second World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar
 of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true
transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30
March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and
Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that
took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of
Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not
the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set
forth documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for
damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the
date of marriage on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as
single when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a
common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4)
children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed
Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her
capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated
in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an
heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as
Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent
PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged
disregard of the evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the
validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the
marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The
CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the
wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September
1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who
testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla]
herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed
that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the
condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were
shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of
the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008, raises the
following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage"
to overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken
cognizance of, without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the
unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a
probative value to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest
who issued the same being presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the
trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio
relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without
such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the
period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the
National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it,
likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation
of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from
the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952.
Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified
true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have
been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the
testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving
assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce
her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the
existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage
between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and
begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the
testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the
CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA
found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in
Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that
the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof
of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of
Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus
confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by
secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the
existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the
contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the
inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight
of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be
prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or
even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The
Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact
of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character
are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy
the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil,
who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to
the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence.
Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the
evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted
to prove the fact of marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be
present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the
event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon,
Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact
of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant
evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses
to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the
fact of marriage."
marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume
marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the
testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage
issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner
Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared
NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the
wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September
1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who
testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla]
herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed
that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the
condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were
shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the
rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of

marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
 G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109,
Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of
Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109.
Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I,
Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9,
1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence,
located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two
men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of
the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that
he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to
show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification
on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of
another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:cralawlibrary
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:cralawlibrary
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office,
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO
and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS
and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose
or intents it may serve.7?r?l1
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in
2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of
his counsel.8?r?l1
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to
Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9?r?l1
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11,
2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not
issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other
person.11?r?l1
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz,
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a
barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He
testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with
the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage
license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared
by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and
copy of the marriage license with that office.17?r?l1
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed
Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he
requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this
Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further
testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained.20He attended the
wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and
witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer
and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21?r?l1
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her
son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993
at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City
Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take
place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage
license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the
marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the
marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from
Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed
at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated
January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.26?r?l1
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she
is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9,
1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons
depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and
Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage
contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A
certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for
them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them
to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they
gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.
Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28?r?l1
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29?r?l1
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a
certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and
that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
Manila.30?r?l1
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan,
but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites,
because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at
the time were Chinese.31?r?l1
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license
was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and
Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no
marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact
that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage
was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the
respondent declaring as follows:cralawlibrary
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the
nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the
marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas
on January 9, 1993 in Manila. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
SO ORDERED.34?r?l1
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied
the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of
errors:cralawlibrary
I SO ORDERED.39?r?l1
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE
ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY
SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A
VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A
MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF
LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL
BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED
IN THE COURT BELOW.35?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent
search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that
said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly
married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37?r?l1
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract.
The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife,
and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.38?r?l1
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05
October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993
remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41?r?l1
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF
LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS
DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING
AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42?r?l1
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The
pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3),
which read as follows:cralawlibrary
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:cralawlibrary
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided
in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:cralawlibrary
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with
the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the
marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a
valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of
this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the
couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that
there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued
said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as
permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:cralawlibrary
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:cralawlibrary
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license
was issued and such other relevant data.44?r?l1
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage
license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified
machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it
did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to
have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could
not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is
worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower
court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty
of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof
does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967
was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do
not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a
location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said
license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom
Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not
knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was
secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as
the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a
copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office
and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further
weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove
that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a
simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was
proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of
the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria
and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:cralawlibrary
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that
appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate
of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The
parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his
name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing
appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members
of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-
C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring,
Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten
(10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition
appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit
"1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent
marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward
(appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50?r?l1
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the
license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and
thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may,
the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a
valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of
a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite,
is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5,
2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ,
MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound
by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against
respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For
this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City. 1 Four children were born out of that marriage. 2 On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. 3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or
ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly
stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated
the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife
for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit. 4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he
would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be
charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit
and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.
Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal
of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention
of the Court to two separate affidavits 5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were
allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits,
both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and
had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge
alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the
time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least
five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their
marriage.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that
in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent
Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their
prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. 7 In
fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he
would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge
cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to
before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses
for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses
who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in
such a case the marriage bonds are not severed.Elsewise stated,legal separation does
not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true
all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven
years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized
a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has
special application to judges, 8who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly
imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. 9 And
when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. 10cräläwvirtualibräry

ACCORDINGLY , the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby

ADOPTED,with theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis
of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was
thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3,
Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article
58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that
the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family
as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which
shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a
special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure
but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting
of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the
day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons
under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof
and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law
in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions
monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be
applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second
ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane
spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages
are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding
co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the
children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the SO ORDERED.
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if
it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing
the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus,
Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent
Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4
of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007,
Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC
ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine
the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at
the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial,
hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As
a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the
surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a
misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter
into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties
went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he
never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage
was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family
life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February
5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as
they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and
that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties
never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband
and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal
gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration
of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD
THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship
and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the
marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the
benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should
be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of
marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage
in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage,
for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be
rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand
that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the
beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for
review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted
for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00,
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of
marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In
the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose
or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes.
Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of
their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud
in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not
intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was
modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986
(IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was
not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States."
The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however,
that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for
the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases
on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946,
the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to
stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain
a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a
marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not
a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go
through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which
may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is
not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of
representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put
an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed
to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily
understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive
others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which
declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the
United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of
Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was
intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have
generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA
ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly
did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the
parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of
consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite
shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in
the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be
real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence.24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature
and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired
their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such
as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in
form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages
in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios
and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond
necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only
a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit
for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might
have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that
the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered
into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to
have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by
law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is
not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article
45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same
Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man;
(3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug
addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage
for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the
listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only
be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party
because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have
no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts
as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution
to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to
get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore,
be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court
cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the
needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-
06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA
PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by
husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband
FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO,
ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO
PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO
SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO
PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO,
JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ
PERIDO, respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R.
No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
in Civil Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His
first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael,
and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had
five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in
1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still
living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia,
Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora
Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons,
Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely:
Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is
dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely:
Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido,
Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is
survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of
Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471,
506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan,
Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second
thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February
22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the
so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition
of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among other
things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in
question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots
which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido
with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to
the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing
allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the
partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that
the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were
legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio
Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment
as follows: declaring the following as the legitimate children and
grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix
Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido,
Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia
Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando
Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great
grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and,
Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the legitimate
children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido,
Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa
Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A.
Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3)
declaring all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except
Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of
them should be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix
Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same
should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of
age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel
Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana;
1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to
Letia Perido, of age, married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia
Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of
age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is now dead the
same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando
Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8
belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five
children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to
Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age
married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already
dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single;
1/40 to Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita
Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he
is already dead with seven children, the same should be divided and
alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56
goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido,
of age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age,
married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single;
1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of
age, married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but
because he is already dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan
A. Perido, of age, married to Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido.
of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age,
widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to
Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No.
458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes
to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal shares and 11/24
goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal shares or
11/120 for each of the children and again to be divided by the
children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido owner
of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be
determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit
"J" of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without
costs and without adjudication with respect to the counterclaim and
damages, they being members of the same family, for equity and
justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in
declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo
Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471,
506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot
458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals
affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down.
Thereupon they instituted he instant petition for review reiterating in effect the
assignments of error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to the appellate
court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the
theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio
Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not
recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In support of their contention
they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as
testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora
Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of
the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second
wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony
of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to
show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This
finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance,
Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of
their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued
to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not
conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat.
Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living
together husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially
where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by
cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs.
Cheong Seng Gee1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus:
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the
presumption of marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both
the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated
testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said
witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio
Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because "during the celebration of
the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed
in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five
children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and,
therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos.
471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio
Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of
Appeals said:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that
the lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all
declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing
that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother
(t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive
properties of the late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and
second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided
accordingly among his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the
aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and contend
that they were able to establish through the testimonies of their witnesses that the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again,
the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question involves appreciation of the evidence,
which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the factual findings of which are
not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the
appellate court:têñ.£îhqwâ£
With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be
considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need
not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh.
L) that Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina
Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a
property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be
conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48
Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes
stronger when the document recites that the spouse in whose name the
land is registered is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar.
It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged to
the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the
contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal
property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove
that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first
wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot
came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his
three children of the first marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue
raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence and, consequently, the finding of
the appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court. Indeed, a review of that
finding would require an examination of all the evidence introduced before the trial
court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances
surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well
as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the
distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the
other, and thus defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure has been established.2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-5877 September 28, 1954 Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
vs.
ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant. (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

Nestor A. Andrada for appellant. (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news
appellee. of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered
as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
PARAS, C.J.: contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted
being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First court.
Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, with This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person
costs. during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis
Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been
were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first
marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said
1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.1âwphïl.nêt
marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to
his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy. Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted,
with costs de officio so ordered.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and
void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with
Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to
Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy
because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however,
argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is
not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of
said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.

The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not
controlling. Said case is essentially different, because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas,
impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the
Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit.

In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of
the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second
marriage in 1941, provides as follows:1âwphïl.nêt
G.R. No. L-10016 February 28, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for
appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for defendant and
appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty
of bigamy. The facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima,
contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent
Church in Cebu (Exhibits "1" and "1-A"). While his marriage with Maria
Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon,
contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the
Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was
then an employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a
certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and testimonies
of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol). After the said marriage, the
accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was
then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained
Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died
in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and
seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to
Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse.
It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital
life in Cebu, for it appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered
injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the
accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo,
allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her
absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C.
Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E"
and "F")
The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin
Sibonga, Cebu, on October 3, 1953, Although the accused made an attempt to
deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes
that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage was fully
established not only by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by the
testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the
wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See
Exhibits "A" and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express
provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of
nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with
Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by
the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the
instance of the latter. Authorities given for this ruling are 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651; 35
American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N. H.
466, 69 A. 579.
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off.
Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613)
plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's second
marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse,
Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and
void by a subsequent court.
We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case
above-quoted But this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle
of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not
ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our
Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in
America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within
the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should
have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict
interpretation already adverted to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose
marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before
the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and
appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his
prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-43905 May 30, 1983
SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG, BULACAN, respondents.
Amelita G. Tolentino for petitioner.
Hermin E. Arceo for Maria Clemente.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The reversal of respondent Court's Order, dismissing petitioner's suit for her
"declaration ... as the lawful surviving spouse of deceased Amado Tolentino and the
correction of the death certificate of the same", is sought in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with
private respondent herein, Maria Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1,
1948 (Annex "C", Petition), while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino,
celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting (Annex "A", Petition).
Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2768 of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, which Court, upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced
him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison sentence
imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25,
1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse — Maria
Clemente."
In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct
the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to
"Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of
the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed
proceeding,
Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the
Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving
spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. In an Order, dated October
21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the case,
stating:
The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants in this case, thru
counsel Atty. Hernan E. Arceo, for the reasons therein mentioned, is
hereby GRANTED. Further: (1) the correction of the entry in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because
the issue involved is marital relationship; (2) the Court has not
acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art. 108,
read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code — publication is needed
in a case like this, and up to now, there has been no such publication;
and (3) in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly
discussed in Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has
already dismissed, for lack of the proper requisites under the law.
In view of the above dismissal, all other motions in this case are
hereby considered MOOT and ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by
respondent Court in ordering dismissal.
We rule for petitioner.
First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry
contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she
initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the
deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death
certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary
character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted
against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual
most affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend
her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. The publication
required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely
necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. 2 Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule
108, it was the Court that was caned upon to order the publication, 3 but it did not. in the
ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so much with the form of actions as with
their substance. 4
Second, for the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for
Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner
and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the
accused of the existence of such marriage. 5 The second marriage that he contracted
with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the
beginning and of no force and effect. 6 No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely concluded, then, without need of further
proof nor remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse
of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the
records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.

Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no longer be
discussed.

In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage
with private respondent and that the entry made in the corresponding local register is
thereby rendered false, it may be corrected. 8 While document such as death and birth
certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption
is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their
inaccuracy. 9

WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is hereby set
aside and petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, hereby declared the surviving spouse of the
deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the corresponding correction be made in the latter's
death certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.

No costs.

SOORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986 (2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present
evidence in her favor.
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs. We find the petition devoid of merit.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
WIEGEL, respondents. committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be
void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner. no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was
still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent. VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all
PARAS, J.:
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time
she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff
therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders
the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony
having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon SO ORDERED.
City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that
said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having
been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue
agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence
of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely
voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court
for an opportunity to present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first
husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married
to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of
force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the
case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question
for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending
before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case
for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge
ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City
Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information
for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance
of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said
court. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B.
Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration
of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which
action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the
ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was
petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was
already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner
Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second
marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to
obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent
or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least
five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978,
for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article
76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-
02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case
can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for
denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further
directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of
his grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case
of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent
judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated
April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution
of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in a criminal case.5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted
that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the
nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or
innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the
herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was required
to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated
upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said case
states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered
into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial
questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of
marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to
such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage
must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly
different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on
February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse,
not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that
petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party
complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her
should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on
the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the
outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused
much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the
hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the
second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We
cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited
case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having
contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela
Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as
contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B.
Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not
aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a
judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz
was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot
apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is
proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress,
violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage
was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The
preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the
prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second
marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B.
Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent
through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent
marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an
affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit
of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally
ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed
the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only
when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse
of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with
the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private
respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that
Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent
Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-
emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal action
for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued
by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy
B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly
immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained
subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent
successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of
the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could not be found nor
reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is
after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court
noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's
Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the
practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against
him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside
and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that
she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain
Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her
prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had
mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the
child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing
in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted
marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A.
Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as
evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy
further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered
as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to
avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech
position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by respondent
Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and
hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and
instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor
General. He set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7
July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since
respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another
hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant;
respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally
offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2
October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should
he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly
considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the
case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective
memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did
not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and
Recommendation" to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the
complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified
substantially as follows: she and respondent met for the first time in
1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School
(tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla,
while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her
marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting
her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they
[complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were they
respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at
the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent
continued courting her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11);
she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he
[respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab
initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12);
convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice
from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in
their marriage license, despite her [complainant's] objection, he
[respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to
 declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge
Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977
(Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of
their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all
through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared
in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the
allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she
was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out
later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit
C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment
of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was
subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as
Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she
likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina
Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan,
where a prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7,
pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative case
against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot
and academic when respondent was considered automatically
separated from the service for having gone on absence without
official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan
Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is
further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married
Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into,
respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having
been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in
good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab
initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious
defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the
basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place,
that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant
into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and
void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was
free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being
a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether
a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to
assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the
same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first
marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his
second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in
character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by
other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to
Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry
him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went
through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from
respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten
complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and
without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions,
"eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but
likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because
marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the
oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme.
Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness
for membership in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a
joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by
complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values.
Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216,
Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral
conduct" because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her
to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the
mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies,
keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . .
." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the
Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling
complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning
complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law
school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting
a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant
Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment
of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place.
The Court will correct this error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to

STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be
spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office.
A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January
20091 and 3 April 20092 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
of the absent spouse of respondent.
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada
(Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where
both were then working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3
March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio
Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received
any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her
brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s
whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of
RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-0530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively
dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision.
Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and
thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an
Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule
41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a
summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory
and, thus, not appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,3 the
CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final
and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated 3 April 2009.4
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that
the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code
based on the evidence that respondent presented
Our Ruling
1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the
Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject
to ordinary appeal
In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition
assailing the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-
Lorino,5 the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for
the purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code.
Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore
not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal
is unavailing.
We affirm the CA ruling.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law." Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall
apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such
cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as
they are applicable.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of
the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,6 the Republic likewise appealed the CA’s affirmation
of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her
absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a
Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately
final and executory."
xxx xxx xxx
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the
bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a
notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals
acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on
that ground.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached
by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG
should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review
under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by
the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,7 issued a few months later.
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the
RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of
Appeal on the ground that, under the Rules of Court,8 a record on appeal is required to
be filed when appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In
reversing the CA, this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or
absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special
proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same
Code. Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage,
petitioner’s action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code,
rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that
this action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on
appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
We do not agree with the Republic’s argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our
ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in
Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the
Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling
on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial court’s
Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code was intended "to set the records straight and for the future
guidance of the bench and the bar."
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in
Republic v. Tango:9
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments
rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our
previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary
court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall
apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such
cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in
chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as
they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall
be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can
be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision
of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors
which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on
the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved
party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of
Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately final and executory and,
hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the
evidence that respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the
evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already
dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic
v. Nolasco,10 United States v. Biasbas11 and Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Alegro12 as authorities on the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA’s affirmation of the
RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent
spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving birth to
their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer. Petitioner
Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to
establish his "well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead," as required by
Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this
provision imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil
Code.13 The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the
absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is
believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a "well-founded
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and
 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a
"well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited
United States v. Biasbas,14 which it found to be instructive as to the diligence required
in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in
ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his admission that that he
only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was the
fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the
reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had
not been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was already dead. The
Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria for
determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family
Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that
he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme
se funde en motivos racionales."
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of
the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
(Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts
of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate
Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for
her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from
the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan
or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the
Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded
belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to
declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or
reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.1âwphi1 It
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a
slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in
truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the
motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their
disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the
ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted
on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated August 27,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be
order3 dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F.
Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor’s husband, presumptively dead under
Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by:
(1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would
have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s
father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the
respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard
anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance,
the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of
presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a
well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from
her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and
friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point
to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest
efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and
declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed
without the former receiving any news about the latter or his whereabouts. The
dispositive portion of the order dated December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F.
Cantor is presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse
Jerry F. Cantor.5
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner,
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its
August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the assailed Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively
dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition
The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final
orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial
courts in summary judicial proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are deemed
immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the Family
Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to
justify the declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the respondent
failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the
petitioner invites this Court’s attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the
case, particularly, the degree of search conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure
to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders
of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
 (2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already
dead.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Court’s Judgment in the Judicial
Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such
as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code, shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
[underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an
appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and
unalterable not only as against the parties but even as against the courts.8 Modification
of the court’s ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and
executory nature of this summary proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As
explained in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not
granted to parties because of the express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to
wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately
final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due
course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express
provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs.
Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is
merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family
Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are
"immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the
parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to
appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the
Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While
jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an
aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final
does not automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by the trial
court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal
is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the case of Republic v.
Tango,11 wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments
rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our
previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary
court proceedings in the Family Code:
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall
apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such
cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in
chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as
they are applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall
be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can
be had of the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was
proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown
that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of
the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.12
The Present Spouse Has the Burden
of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under
Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for
purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the
issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil
Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded
belief " that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same observation in Republic
v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family
Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to
four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to
enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either
that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of
any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion
proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-
founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts
but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-
to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes
that under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort (not a mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an
analysis of the following relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that
the present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent
spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife
allegedly consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her
whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in
malls during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse.
The Court found that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made
inquiries and only reported his wife’s absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss
his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-
founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted
on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of
the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present
spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-
founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries
from their relatives regarding the absent spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did
not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass media. Applying the standards
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against
the present spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts
of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate
Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for
her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from
the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan
or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of
his wife, who had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to
find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
 (3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved
fruitless. The Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too
sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces
of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate with
their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
iv.The present case
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged
"earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors
and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the
patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.1âwphi1 It can be
inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the
patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a
diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily
directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to
engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature
of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find
it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the
aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends,
who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she
allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present
spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries
were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that
she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she
had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends
and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the
respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated
inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search
because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her
husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
(Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."
Strict Standard Approach Is
Consistent with the State’s Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in
nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is
to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should
never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required by
the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),23 we emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by
this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a
missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41
of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully
well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those
who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx
summary nature of its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider
the State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.24 Since marriage
serves as the family’s foundation25 and since it is the state’s policy to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic social institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to
be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is
the underlying rationale –to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of
Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the
preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here
involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution
there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit

The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and
consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the
present spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if
he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead,
the present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively
established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her
good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively
negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the
stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.

Final Word

As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required
in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the
lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has
consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the
use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are
now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases under
Article 41 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F.
Cantor presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43701 March 6, 1937
In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escaño.
ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellant-appellee,
vs.
FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir, oppositor-appellant-
appellee.
Salvador E. Imperial for petitioner-appellant-appellee.
Vicente L. Faelnar , Hipolito Alo and Ciriaco S. Salazar for oppositor-appellant-
appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
March 14, 1935 , in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Marciana Escaño, denying
thereby: (1) the motion to appoint a new administrator and (2) to set aside the order of
May 9, 1932, declaring the heirs of said deceased; (3) holding it unwarranted to declare
that the properties of the intestate estate are paraphernal properties of said deceased, but
reserving to the parties the right to discuss which of said properties are paraphernal and
which are conjugal; (4)setting aside the order of January 10, 1933. granting to the
administrator fees in the sum of P10,000, and that of June 26, 1933, approving the
project of portion and the final account; and (5) ordering the presentation of another
project of partition and final account.
As Marciana Escaño had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed
judicial administrator of her entire estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932,
Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her widower
by her second marriage, were declared her only heirs. In a motion filed with the
conformity of the guardian of the heiress Angelita Jones, Felix Hortiguela, as
administrator, prayed that his fees, as such, be fixed at P10,000 which was granted by
the court in its order of January 10, 1933. The administrator later presented an inventory
of the properties left by said deceased Marciana Escaño, a final account of his
administration, and a project of partition of the intestate estate wherein he adjudicated to
himself a part of the estate in payment of his share of the conjugal properties and his
usufructuary right, and the remaining part to Angelita Jones. The latter, who was a
minor, was represented in the proceedings by her guardian Paz Escaño de Corominas.
The project of partition and final account were approved in an order of June 26, 1933,
and the properties were turned over to the respective grantees by virtue thereof.
On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a
motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana
Escaño; that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela
or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it
were valid, Felix Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the
inheritance; that the petitioner was a minor and that during the hearing of the intestate
proceedings she had not been assisted by counsel but was represent by the same
attorney of Felix Hortiguela; that during said proceedings there had been committed
many errors and inaccuracies which impaired her rights and that the fees of P10,000
charged by the administrator were highly unreasonable and unconscionable. She
prayed: (a) for the reopening of the proceedings; (b) that her husband appointed special
administrator without bond; (c) that her mother's alleged marriage to Felix Hortiguela
be declared null and void; (d) that the partition of the properties made by administrator
or Hortiguela be declared null and void that petitioner be declared the only universal
heir of her deceased mother; and (e) that in case there was a valid marriage between
Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño, Hortiguela be declared not entitled to the
widower's usufruct; the errors in the administrator's account be corrected; the latter be
granted a remuneration of only P4 a day, and new partition of the properties be made.
After Hortiguela's answer had been filed and the evidence for both parties received, the
court issued the order of March 14, 1935, the provisions of which are stated in the first
paragraph of this decision. Both parties appealed therefrom.
The principal question upon the resolution of which depends that of the others, is
whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to Marciana Escaño was celebrated.
It is a fact that in December, 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. Jones in the
suburban catholic church of San Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones
secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. In
October, 1919, proceedings were institute in the Court of First Instance of Maasin,
Leyte, at the instance of Marciana Escaño, to have her husband judicially declared an
absentee. On the 25th of said month, the court issued an order declaring Arthur W.
Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of article 186
of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not
take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers. Said order
directed the publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper "El Ideal".
Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the Official Gazette during the month of
December, 1919, and January, February, March, April, May and June, 1920. On April
23, 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of
absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal."
On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño were married before the justice
of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage.
Now, Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to
have been made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and
that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of the marriage, only
6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General
Orders, No. 68, the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño is
null and void. This court does not believe so. For the purposes of the civil marriage law,
it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for
its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration
of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III,
paragraph 2, General orders, No. 68).
In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escaño's
former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last
news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927,
more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
For some unknown reason not attributable, of course, to the fault or negligence of Felix
Hortiguela or Marciana Escaño, the marriage contracted does not appear recorded in the
marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog. Angelita Jones assigns as one of the
errors of the court its having declared that failure to record said marriage does not affect
the efficacy and validity thereof.
On this point, the court a quo very correctly stated as follows:
Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as amended, provides that the person
solemnizing the marriage must transmit the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary, and failure to transmit such certificate shall be fined not
less than twenty-five and not more than fifty dollars; but does not provide that
failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary annuls the
marriage. Interpreting this legal provision, the Supreme Court, in its decision
of September 5, 1931 (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1 ) said:
"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's
natural father and mother, while the latter was in articulo
mortis failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does
not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity
were not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate
not being one said requisites."
In another case (U. S. vs. De Vera, 28 Phil., 105), the court said:
"Certificate issued pursuant the provisions of section 20 of the Municipal Code
by municipal secretaries, marriages recorded in their respective registers, are
not the only ones that can attest and prove such facts to such an extent that
other proofs established by law may not be presented or admitted at trial, when
through the omission or fault either of the municipal secretary himself or of the
person who solemnized the marriage, it was not duly entered or recorded in the
municipal register."
Furthermore, Marciana Escaño believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when she
contracted her second marriage. Her daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same
belief, since she lived with her mother after the latter had married Hortiguela, treated
Hortiguela as her true stepfather, and lived and traveled with him together with her
mother. She certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be
dead. Still furthermore, according to section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead.
Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escaño and was
divorced from her at the time of her death there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit
in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession, as in the present case (6
and 7 Manresa, pages 497-499 and 134-141, respectively).
Therefor, there is no reason to annul the order of May 9, 1932, declaring that the heirs
of the deceased were her widower and her daughter Angelita Jones. Neither is there any
reason to annul the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition of the properties of
the intestate estate.
The inaccuracies and error attributed to the administrator Felix Hortiguela in Angelita
Jones' motion and alleged therein as one of the grounds for asking for the reopening of
any assignment of error. It should, therefore, be considered that the petitioner has
desisted from her intention relative to this alleged ground for the nullity of the
proceedings.
As to the administrator's fees, the evidence shows that of the P10,000 granted by the
court to Hortiguela as his own sum of P8,000 for the latter's professional services in this
as well as in other cases affecting the estate of his deceased wife. Taking into
consideration the nature of and the amount involved in this and in the other cases
wherein Attorney Faelnar has rendered his services this court is of the opinion that the
sum of P8,000 paid by the administrator is a reasonable and moderate compensation.
Angelita Jones' objection to the effect that she had no reason to contribute to the
payment of Faelnar's fees is untenable, considering the fact that said attorney's
professional services were rendered for the benefit of the administration of the estate of
the deceased Escaño prior to the controversy provoked by said heiress. As to the
remainder of P2,000, said administrator is entitled to collect the sum of P4 for every day
employed by him as such, and considering the importance of the inheritance in question
and the time elapsed since the inception of the administration proceedings this court is
of the opinion that the sum of P2,000 is an adequate compensation for said
administrator's services.
Lastly, had the court jurisdiction to set aside, as it did, the order of January 10, 1933,
approving the administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the
partition and the final account? Had the court jurisdiction to order the presentation of
another project of partition and final account? These are the questions raised by Felix
Hortiguela and this court is of the opinion that said orders having therefrom, the court
has lost jurisdiction that no appeal was ever taken therefrom, the court has lost
jurisdiction over the case and it could not resume it under section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure or under section 598 thereof because the above-cited section refer to
grounds other than those upon which Angelita Jones' motion of May 3, 1934, is based.

For all the foregoing consideration this court reverses the appealed order of March 14,
1935, in so far as it set aside the order of January 10, 1933, relative to the
administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the final account and the
project of portion, and in so far as said order of March 14, 1935, required the
presentation of a new project of partition; denied the appointment of Angelita Jones
husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932, relative to declaration of
heirs; and holds it unwarranted to make a finding as to whether or not the properties of
this intestate estate are paraphernal properties of the deceased Marciana Escaño
reserving to the parties the right to discuss which are paraphernal and which are
conjugal properties. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-1780 August 31, 1948
Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw. CONSUELO
SORS, petitioner-appellant.
J. Rodriguez Serra for appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
Pleading under oath that she is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to
whom she was married in Manila on November, 1936, whom she bore a child named
Alexis Szatraw born on 8 September 1937, with whom she had lived from the time they
were married until February, 1940, when her husband, on the pretext that he would call
on some friends, departed from the conjugal abode carrying the child along with him
and never returned, about whose whereabouts she made inquiries from among her
husband's friends and countrymen and learned that her husband and child had left for
Shanghai, where, according, however, to information obtained from Polish citizens who
had arrived from that place, he and the child had not been seen and could not be found;
that all her efforts to know the whereabouts of her husband and child were in vain; and
that, because of her husband's absence for more than seven years during which she has
not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead, Consuelo
Sors prays that her husband be declared dead and that her parental authority over her
child, should the latter be alive and later on appear, be preserved.
The foregoing facts pleaded in the petition were proved. The evidence further shows
that she and her husband did not acquire any property during their marriage and that his
life was not insured.
Upon the foregoing evidence the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it
is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee, and because the rule of evidence
establishing the presumption that a person unheard from in seven years is dead, does not
create a right upon which a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be predicated. The
petitioner has appealed.
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does
not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had
acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the
latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead
after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an
action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision
to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or
special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the
final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact
(Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration
that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any
pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension
cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made,
would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already
established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory,
would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason
that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The
latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the
right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights
and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final
judgement, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a
final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon
the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res
judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially
provided by law. It is. therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he
had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to
have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person
presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become
final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an
appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to
contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary,
superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable
time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.
Little effort is necessary to perceive that a declaration such as the one prayed for by the
petitioner, if granted, may make or lead her to believe that the marital bonds which bind
her to her husband are torn asunder, and that for that reason she is or may feel free to
enter into a new marriage contract. The framers of the rules of court, by the
presumption provided for in the rule of evidence in question, did not intend and mean
that a judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption may be made. A petition
for a declaration such as the one filed in this case may be made in collusion with the
other spouse. If that were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot be obtained or
granted under the provisions of the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily be secured
by means of a judicial decree declaring a person unheard from in seven years to be
presumptively dead. This is another strong reason why a petition such as the one
presented in this case should not be countenanced and allowed. What cannot be
obtained directly under the provisions of Divorce Law could indirectly be secured under
the provisions of Rule 123, section 69 (x). Obviously, the latter must not be made to
prevail over the former.

The order appealed from is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs is made, because no

adverse party appeared in this Court and in the court below.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
vs. complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents. quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would
be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could
PANGANIBAN, J.:
no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings
and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to
"psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been run the household and handle their finances.
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground.
Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in
the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and
in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor 1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at
General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay 2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
Family Code.
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
The Facts
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on
Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to
April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
"E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
conference.
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel,
as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as
provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof
to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the
trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil
Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the
part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well
as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C.
Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor
physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor
get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better
for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with
another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the
parties are psychologically unfit for each other but
they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their
professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
 The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation
is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of
this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of
the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend
Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during
the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed
down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and
apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing
guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and

SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
remains valid.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002]
LENI O. CHOA, Petitioner, vs.ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the
subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued
with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or
speedy under the circumstances.Indeed, when the plaintiffs evidence is utterly and
patently insufficient to prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to deny
the demurrer and to require the defendant to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting
case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the courts docket and an
assault on the defendants resources and peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly
delays and, thus, effectively denies justice.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 16, 2000 Decision1 and the May 22, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.[3cräläwvirtualibräry
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[4
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two
children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a
Complaint[5 for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098. Afterwards he filed an Amended
Complaint[6 dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last
witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits[7 dated February 20, 1998.
Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to
Evidence)[8 dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be
filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order9 denying petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence. It held that [respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner]
must controvert.10 After her Motion for Reconsideration11 was denied in the March 22, 1999
Order,12 petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for
Certiorari,[13 docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the
defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed down later, to
take an appeal therefrom.14 In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.[15cräläwvirtualibräry
The CA also ruled that the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests
on the sound exercise of the [trial] courts discretion.[16Further, the [p]etitioner failed to
show that the issues in the court below [had] been resolved arbitrarily or without
basis.[17cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, this Petition.18
The Issues
In her Memorandum,19 petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, is she under obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as what the
Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and when an unfavorable
[verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law, despite the
palpably and patently weak and grossly insufficient or so inadequate evidence of the
private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of marriage case, grounded on
psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such
circumstances, can the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be directly and immediately
resorted to by the petitioner; and
2) In upholding the lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did the
Court of Appeals wantonly violate, ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner the
doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13,
1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA
17)?[20cräläwvirtualibräry
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a
demurrer to evidence? and (2) in its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of
discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent
weakness and gross insufficiency of respondents evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the
immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Echoing the CA,
respondent counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.
We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to
certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,[21 this Court declared that
appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was
no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and
allow certiorari when the lower court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:
No appeal may be taken from:
xxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65. 22cräläwvirtualibräry
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.[23cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.24 In Cruz
v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:
Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to
challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the
assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of
discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.25
Second Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional circumstances,
this Court is now tasked to determine whether the present case falls under the exception;
that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a patent error or grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by one of the parties in
an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the
issue.26 The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a
verdict.[27 In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the
court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to
sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.[28cräläwvirtualibräry
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that
the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any
finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the
parties marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him
are proof of the latters psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury,29 false
testimony,[30 concubinage[31 and deportation.[32 According to him, the filing and the
prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not
only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends that WITNESS:
this is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her
husband as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary.[33cräläwvirtualibräry She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she wants
me to hire an attendant in order to take care of the child. Even when the children were
We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any sick she does not bother to let the children see a doctor.35
way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity
and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital xxx
obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if
taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that
STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):
the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally
erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
ATTY. CHUA:
Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his
documentary offerings, sufficient to prove petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant, did
He testified in these words: you notice any characteristic or traits which you consider as psychological incapacity?

Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by psychologically WITNESS:
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. What do you mean
by that? Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she wont talk to me
when I call her up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and
A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even at the time when I am busy with some other things. So, I think that is
even want it aborted by taking pills. She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked all.[36cräläwvirtualibräry
the intention of procreative sexuality.34
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three
xxx aspects of petitioners personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their
children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative sexuality. None of
these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Far from it.
ATTY. CHUA:
In Santos v. CA,[37 this Court clearly explained that psychological incapacity must be
And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated? Will
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.[38 Said the
you please elaborate on this what you mean by carefree approximating psychologically
Court:
incapacitated?
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
ATTY. MIRANO: importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the
use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been
I think we better ask the witness what he means by carefree. meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
ATTY. CHUA: circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Okay. Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing
COURT:
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
Witness may answer. incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and the husband and the wife in the present case have a personality which is normal. That is
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of your conclusion?
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability WITNESS:
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated.[39cräläwvirtualibräry
They are normal, but they cannot mix together.

Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,[40 we ruled that the psychological incapacity must

Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they
be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital
are not compatible with each other?
obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
A. Yes.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his
wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any
gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital personality disorder, bordering on abnormality?
union.
A. Yes.
Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was
grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly
of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that mild characterological peculiarities, mood match?
changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of
psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there knows how to handle marriage, that should try to intervene.
should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.41cräläwvirtualibräry
A. Yes.
Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative
Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call
sexuality is easily belied by the fact that two children were born during their union.
maximum tolerance and give and take, will that serve the purpose?
Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged defect was already existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
A. That would served the purpose of getting well.
Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert
testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed Q. Yes?
to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity.
Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or A. Yes.
clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?
The pertinent portions of his testimony are quoted thus:
A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally
ATTY. CHUA: disordered. It cannot be harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried professional
help to take care of their marital problem, it could have been solved.
Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?
A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any
from Tom, Dick and Harry could handle this. That means from the very beginning they
have personalities which they were incompatible. So if anybody would handle that, they
will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each other. They should not have got
married.42
xxx
Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff, and you
found out that both are normal?
A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.
Q. Normal, simply incompatible.
A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in my last
page. That they are like oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and water, they will not mix.
Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about the
frequent quarrels had with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or major
quarrel?
A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.[43
xxx
Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?
A. Yes.[44
xxx
Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those
who possess the necessary [expertise] could be worked out?
A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.[45
xxx
Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in
this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Because of the
A. The incompatibility.
Q. Incompatibility.
A. Yes.[46cräläwvirtualibräry
His testimony established merely that the spouses had an incompatibility, a defect that
could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound
further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to establish the psychological
incapacity of petitioner.
Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on
descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any
psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his
Professional Opinion47 began with the statement [I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his
wife Leni is true, x x x.[48 The expert witness testified thus:
ATTY. CHUA
Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data
from the plaintiff who is the husband?
WITNESS
A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to
interview Leni, and he said, he doesnt know.
ATTY. CHUA
Q He doesnt know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same
personal interview and written psychological examination on the part of the wife,
[w]ould you be willing to do that?
WITNESS
We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.53 Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to
overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave
abuse of discretion.[54cräläwvirtualibräry

A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile.49cräläwvirtualibräry
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these
had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure
suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the case at bar. An appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner
from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless
action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted
trial, which would further clog the court dockets with another futile
case.[55cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA

Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess
petitioners character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also
through the formers at least fifteen hours[50 of study of the voluminous transcript of
records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to
examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment of petitioners
psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer to Evidence
is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged
psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never been
objected to, the objection raised thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court
has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of admissibility of
evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence
should be disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative
value.51cräläwvirtualibräry

We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not

a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality
of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately.52 Here, however,
the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination.

The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by
respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could
then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed further
with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously,
grossly and clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny
the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the
process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties
and an unwelcome imposition on the trial courts docket.
 G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]
DIANA M. BARCELONA,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R.
BENGZON, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision1 as well as the 7
August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the Order2 dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court
refused to dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to
state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner
Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first petition) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.3 On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo
filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7
June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-
24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106
(trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the
second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum shopping.
Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional
Arguments in Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order
(first order) deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments
in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the trial
court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an
Order (second order) denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration,
Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to
state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself.
Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in
the petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus
giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that
respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison
explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil
Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without
prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the
Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and
the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order
erred in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint
states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial
courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for
reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed
with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action
sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To
determine the existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or
a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, there
is no litis pendentiabecause respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without
prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because there is no final decision on the merits.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING
OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS
TERMINATION AND STATUS.4
 The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is
untenable. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
legal right of the plaintiff.5 A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three
essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the
plaintiff.6cräläwvirtualibräry
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.7 The
petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at the
Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract
attached to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The
union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28
October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7
March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that
petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their
marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity
subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital
obligations in this manner:
xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing.
Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was
frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the
whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and
the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak
to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina
Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the
latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted
to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner
argued that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate
respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from
demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy,
the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a
condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the
respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents
favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The
separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present
time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The
extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C
and taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity
subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in
the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and
the respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with
Article 39 thereof.
xxx.8cräläwvirtualibräry
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.9Ultimate facts refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of
action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence which establish the material elements.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner Diana relies mainly11 on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals12 as well
as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.13Santos gave life to the phrase
psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining the term in
this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
 the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties
in cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity.14cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth
in Santosand Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective
because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The
second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from
the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second
petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the
disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the
second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana
allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new
Rules).15Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege
the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.16 The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not
be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral
sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since
the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of
the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and
control the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know
about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological
disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are
evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical
manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second
petition complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent
Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of
petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court
held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause
of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or
allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to
be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra).
If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that
may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992]
citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663
[1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint
must show that the claim for relief does not existrather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board,
27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the complaint.18 Given the
hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render
judgment over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate
of non-forum shopping which does not mention the filing of the first petition and its
dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94.19Petitioner Diana refers to this
portion of Circular No. 04-94-
1. The plaintiff, Petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original
pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith,
to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the
best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or
proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the
status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification
contemplated herein have been filed.20cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of
non-forum shopping that he had previously commenced a similar action based on the
same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping
should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to
the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself
constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal of
the complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of
substantial compliance applies to the contents of the certification.21cräläwvirtualibräry
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the
omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same
parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:
Circular No. 04-94,23 now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must
be interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the
Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The Circular
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.24cräläwvirtualibräry
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family that the state cherishes and protects.25 In
rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the
marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve
this issue after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their
respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the
allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and
does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to
attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as
well as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would
not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit
the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought
to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled
in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal
interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be
more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first
petitions dismissal did not also amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in
the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-
24471) about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-
23445).

The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo
to keep the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened
before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of
the first petition when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal
without prejudice.
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein
respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio
went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at
his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion
for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion
on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition,
was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days
from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to
the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7,
1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no
collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to present
her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita
M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and
VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are
ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties
pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological
incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill
his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter.
Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and
welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear
manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced
to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision
dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after
the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his
family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he
never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent
sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code
of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the
cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why
should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not
around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family
life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68
to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being
a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations,
despite respondent’s failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in
the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity
to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely
indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder
on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
 of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis
supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support
his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent
sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did
not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was
caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There was
no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context
of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we
ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply
here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution
that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent,
terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated
August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005 amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision3(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002 decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which
The Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar
and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15,
1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been
having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had
been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for
the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological
incapacity.8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an
associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically
incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.9
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent
abandonment of the family home.10He testified that he continued to provide financial
support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with
Alvin.11
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda
Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita
was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness,"13 but had been "unable
to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal
problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and
"her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good
marital and family relationship."16
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding
sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality
disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital
obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that
infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a
marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due course, attained his
objective. The CA set aside its original decision and entered another, which affirmed
the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision,20 the CA found two circumstances
indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross
infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar;
and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose that
Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations
established her grave and incurable psychological incapacity.
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify
Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity.
Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her
subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as his continued financial support to
her and their children even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely mentioned in
passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling.
responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from
human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully
established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one
another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot
serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar
abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship30 is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court
cannot support.
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological
incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its original
decision.1âwphi1
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31 protected by the
State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and
continuation and against its dissolution and nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim
of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we
DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true,
do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for
legal separation.26 To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s
infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to

prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact,
established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores’
observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind, does not
suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage –
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the
time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be
equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and
G.R. No. 201988
MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-CRUZ, Petitioner
vs.
NILO SANTOS CRUZ, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The most challenging part of being in a difficult marriage is to thrive in one. In the case
of petitioner Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz (Marivi) and respondent Nilo Santos
Cruz (Nilo), their marriage withered as this was beset with problems such as the lack of
quality time, recriminations, disillusionment, loss of passion, and infidelity. The
estranged spouses considered their union as non-functional, attributing the failure of
their marriage to their respective personality disorders that repelled each other.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1challenges the November 22, 2011
Decision2 and May 29, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 93736 that affirmed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 207,
Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 05-095 which refused to declare the marriage
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Factual Antecedents
Twenty-two-year-old Marivi met 28-year old Nilo sometime in March 1986. They
became steady in August of the same year. Nilo, whose job was then in Hong Kong,
prodded Marivi to marry him so she could join him there soonest. Marivi agreed. The
couple married in a civil ceremony5 on October 21, 1986 followed by a church
wedding6on February 8, 1987. The marriage produced two sons: Antonio Manuel, born
on April 25, 1988, and Jose Nilo, born on September 9, 1992.
On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage7 based on psychological incapacity. She averred that it
had been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate personality
disorder related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal
complex,"8 while she herself was found to be suffering from a "personality disorder of
the mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic with immaturity x x x."9
To show that Nilo failed to provide her with the necessary emotional, psychological,
and physical support, Marivi cited the following:
1. His infidelity and his non-commitment to the marriage as he continued to act like a
bachelor;
2. The lack of 'oneness' in the marriage as Nilo would make decisions (on financial
matters) without consulting or considering her suggestions; treating her as a housemate
or a "mayordoma;" keeping from her his whereabouts, when he would come home or
how much his income was;
3. The lack of sexual contact for more than a decade as Nilo made excuses;
4. Putting up a facade that he is a caring, concerned, and loving husband, especially to
his bosses; and
5. Preference towards the company of his peers/friends.10
In his Answer,11 Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi; that at the start of
their relationship, both he and Mari vi would exhibit negative personality traits which
they overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi were suffering from
psychological incapacity; and that he was not singularly responsible for the breakdown
of their marriage. He stressed that Marivi also contributed to the deterioration of their
union, to wit:
1. Marivi would demand that he behave in ways he was not accustomed to or
inconsistent with his career position;
2. Marivi was jealous of his friends; and would often make hasty conclusions that he
was having an affair with other women;
3. Marivi would exhibit volatile temperament if things did not go her way; would not
admit mistakes, and blame others instead;
4. Marivi would make decisions impulsively, such as changing an item she gets tired of,
or demanding that Nilo change a motor vehicle simply because she did not like it; and
5. She lacked respect for Nilo, and would speak to him degradingly, and even accuse
him of being gay or a homosexual.12
On October 11, 2006, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision13 approving the parties'
Compromise Agreement14pertaining to custody, support, and dissolution of the
properties. Trial on the issue of the nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity ensued.
Marivi's Version
Marivi narrated that when they were still going steady, Nilo would only spend
Saturdays and Sundays with her and devote the weekdays to partying with his friends;
that even after their engagement, Nilo would still meet other women and accept
invitations to beauty pageants and cocktails;15 that Nilo was not the type who would
kiss passionately; that Nilo would not engage in foreplay during sex, but wished only to
satisfy himself; that Nilo would engage in anal sex and would only stop when she
complained that it was painful; that Nilo would thereafter sleep, leaving her feeling
"used," and that Nilo was impulsive, daring, and adventurous.16
She also claimed that Nilo would habitually come home late; that Friday nights were
Nilo's boys' night out; that unless she would ask him to take her out on a date, Nilo
would not do so; and that Nilo would call her a "nagger" even if she was merely asking
him to come home early.17
Marivi further narrated that Nilo would engage in extramarital affairs; that a few
months into their marriage, Nilo had an affair with an unmarried female
officemate;18 that Nilo ended the affair only after she (Mari vi) threatened to tell his
employer/supervisor;19 that Nilo had another affair a few weeks after the birth of their
second son; that when confronted with his womanizing and made to choose between her
and the children or the other women, Nilo replied that he was "confused,"20 which
prompted her to leave and stay in Cebu with her parents; and that she heard from her
friends that while she was in Cebu, Nilo was living a bachelor's life.21
Marivi added that she eventually reconciled with Nilo but despite the reconciliation,
Nilo never really changed, and that he remained indifferent, insensitive, and
unappreciative. According to Marivi, she would instead call up her parents and sisters to
talk about their family problems;22 that while he (Nilo) told people that he was proud of
her, he never gave her the emotional, psychological, and physical support she
needed.23 She felt like she was no more than a mayordoma to him, and that they were
just "housemates." Nilo would come home late on weekdays and preferred to go out
with his friends. Their quarrels were frequent and their conversations were superficial;
Nilo would rather talk about himself, instead of asking Marivi about her day or about
their children. He was controlling and domineering,24 and refused to consider her
suggestions; he would not want his money mingled with her (Marivi's) money.25 Nilo
would shell out money when he wanted to buy things, but would make excuses when it
came to Mari vi's suggestion for a family vacation.26 Marivi also claimed that Nilo had
no sense of companionship with their children; and that Nilo even told their son that
their brand new house was everything to him.27
Marivi was moreover bothered by Nilo's effeminate ways; he was vain and would have
weekly "beauty" treatments.28 Furthermore, they no long had sex after the birth of their
second son. While they tried to have sex twice, Nilo failed to have an erection. After
that, Nilo would refuse to have sex with her which made her (Marivi) question his
sexual orientation, so much so that Nilo physically hurt her when she questioned his
virility.29
Marivi's father, Manuel, likewise stated that Marivi would call them up for help because
Nilo had hurt her during the couple's quarrel; that their marriage was not harmonious
due to Marivi's youth and her unfamiliarity with Nilo's personality and family values.
He considered Nilo only as a provider, not as a husband and a good father to his sons.30
Marivi's younger sister, Margarita Ledesma (Margarita), who lived for four years with
Nilo and Marivi, claimed to have witnessed how lonely Marivi was. She alleged that
Nilo was absent when Marivi gave birth to their second son; that Nilo was short-
tempered when driving; and that the couple would often fight because Nilo would
always come home late or because Marivi suspected Nilo of infidelity. Margarita
believed that Nilo did not really want to save the marriage, although he told her that he
loves Marivi and the children.31
Nilo's Version
Nilo acknowledged his contribution to the breakdown of the marriage because his job
required him to come home late, his inability to sexually perform adequately, his failure
to be the "ideal husband,"32 and because he had had extramarital affairs in the years
1992, 2002, and 2006.33 At the same time, Nilo insisted that Marivi also contributed to
the collapse of their union.
According to Nilo, Marivi would always want to know his companions and
whereabouts; would demand information about his female acquaintances; and would
even call up his workplace to ask where he was. Moreover, her conceit and her "prima
donna" attitude embarrassed him. Marivi would order him to act in accordance with
their stature in life, and would demand that he instruct his office staff to accord her
special treatment as Hewlett Packard's "first lady" during the time that he was Hewlett
Packard's President. Marivi would also instruct their housemaids to call him "sefiorito;"
and she would make a "big deal" out of her being a "mestiza," and would think of
herself a "trophy wife."34
Nilo claimed that Marivi was "unappreciative" of him, had a misdirected sense of self-
entitlement, and would complain if she did not get her own way, as she was used to, she
being her father's favorite daughter; Marivi did not even care about discussing family
finances with him as long as she got what she wanted. She also had a violent temper and
would hurl things at him during their fights; that she would blame him for everything,
and would keep on reciting his past mistakes. Marivi did not understand the demands of
his job, and unfairly compared his work to her father's job, the operation of which was
limited to a single area, a compound in a mine site in Cebu. He explained that the
multinational companies he then worked for required him to work beyond the normal
office hours because he has to meet "sales quotas in millions of dollars," entertain
people from different headquarters, and meet with different clients from areas far from
his residence.35
Worse, Nilo was turned off by Marivi's act of broadcasting to her whole clan his
inadequacies during their intimate sexual relations, which began after he witnessed
Marivi giving birth to their first child. When he confided to Marivi about this, she
instead accused him of having another affair. Since then, he did not feel any sexual
excitement and attraction toward her when they were together. Instead of discussing the
problem with him candidly, she accused him of being gay. Nilo stated that the last time
they had sex was in 1997 or in 1998.36
The Clinical Findings
In support of her claim that she and Nilo were suffering from psychological incapacity,
Marivi presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Ruben
Encarnacion (Dr. Encarnacion), a clinical psychologist.
Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nilo to have "inadequate personality disorder related to
masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex,"37 while she diagnosed
Marivi to have "personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic, with
immaturity x x x."38
In the March 21, 2005 Psychiatric Report,39 Dr. Villegas stated:
The root cause of the above clinical conditions, on the part of Marivi Cruz, were the
overindulgence and over attention of her parents, in a prolonged manner, carried over to
adult adjustments. On the part of Nilo Cruz, his negative identification and resentments
towards his father and close attachments to his mother, continued by his long-time
maid, to the point of an oedipal situation led to his inadequacy, along masculine
strivings, with difficult assertions of his authority and power.
The above clinical conditions existed prior [to] marriage but became manifest only after
the celebration due to marital stresses and demands. Both are considered as permanent
in nature, because they started early in their developmental stage, and therefore became
so deeply engrained into their personality structures. Both are considered grave in
degree, because they hampered, interfered and disrupted their normal functioning
related to heterosexual adjustments.40
According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each others' weaknesses and
that the incapacities of the parties are grave because they preferred to satisfy their own
needs rather than to give in to the other's needs.41
She claimed that Nilo's lack of a father figure weakened his masculinity. He cross-
identified himself with his mother because his father, a disciplinarian and the thrifty
one, was often absent because of his military service. While he was still a teenager, his
mother migrated to Canada and their long-time maid acted as his surrogate mother. Nilo
sought from his wife his mother's nurturing qualities, but he felt hostility when Marivi
failed to meet his ego ideal. His aggression was in the form of passivity, punishing his
wife by not sexually performing.42
Dr. Villegas noted that Nilo would put on a facade, a compensatory mechanism
according to social norms. While he was not exactly a homosexual, he covered up his
weak masculine traits by being a "playboy." Nilo could only comply with the financial
obligation of marital life, but not the psychological and emotional parts of it.43 Nilo
likewise was an inadequate father figure to his own two sons, especially the younger,
who has already manifested strong feminine traits.44
Marivi, on the other hand, expected that her interactions with the world would be like
that of her own close-knit family, a perception attributable to her parents' prolonged
gratification of her dependency needs. Her father was a dedicated, devoted, and
responsible family man who regularly came home to spend time with them, while her
mother was a good housewife, who always found time to personally attend to their
needs. Dr. Villegas described Marivi’s one with strong mood fluctuations, emotionally
immature, with low self-esteem has difficulty neutralizing the outbreak of negativity in
her behavior, is suggestible, egocentric, and impelled by a desire to "extort" from
others. To Dr. Villegas, the couple's respective personality disorders were mutually
repelling, their brain waves not being in sync because what Marivi expected from Nilo
happened to be Nilo's weakest point.45
Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas' diagnosis. On the basis of Nilo's five-to-six
sessions and Marivi's eight bi-weekly psychotherapy sessions with him, Dr.
Encarnacion concluded that there was no chance of a successful marriage in a
dysfunctional union when there is double psychological incapacity. He categorically
stated that Nilo was incapable of being a good husband and a good father. Nilo lacked
an individual coherent identity and instead went by the standards of general society,
which is driven by the desire to gain material wealth, power, and control. Nilo did not
like close relationships and was incapable of forming some; his social anxiety,
associated with paranoid fears, was manifested by excessive vanity. Nilo projected an
image of a wealthy, successful, handsome man surrounded by women, in none of
whom, however, he was interested in a long-term sexual relationship; he saw himself as
a performer-provider and was disinterested in spending quality time with his family, in
carrying on conversations with members of his family, insensitive, intolerant, and
demanding.46
Dr. Encarnacion attributed respondent's psychological disorder to his childhood, in
which he did not have fond memories of tender moments and vacation times with his
family. Nilo grew up very close to his mother who always listened to his complaints and
with whom he sympathized, hence his unresolved oedipal issues; even as he patterned
his masculinity strivings after his stingy father, the family provider, but whom he
nonetheless described as "unappreciative, undemonstrative, and quite materialistic." At
the age of 18, when his parents migrated to Canada and left him in the Philippines, he
then lost his role models, incapacitating him from creating his own identity. Thus, when
he began working at the age of 21, he imbibed the values of his workplace, where
feelings and emotional discussions were absent, factors that nonetheless somehow
worked to his advantage in his job.47 Dr. Encarnacion opined that Nilo's incapacity was
his "rigidity," which drove him into imposing his family upbringing on his mvn family,
instead of adjusting to the modem family setup, i.e., that the modem father should take
on new roles and be part of family activities where his family needs him to
be, e.g. taking the children to the pediatrician or to the park, camping with the family, or
being with them in church, instead of strictly confining himself to being a provider.48
As for Marivi, Dr. Encarnacion found that she exhibited "Histrionic Personality
Behaviors and Features" as manifested by her impressionistic speech, her exaggerated
expression of emotions, and her suggestibility. He stated that Marivi's "inflexibility"
consisted in her expecting a high standard of faithfulness from all men as exemplified
by her dad, who was also very devoted to her mother. However, because dissatisfied
and frustrated by her actual marital situation, she sought attention, externalized blame,
displayed anger, mistrust, resentment, and self-indulgence.49
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its October 13, 2008 Decision,50 the RTC denied the Petition.
The RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses' attribution of a double psychological
incapacity to Marivi's nature of being a "father figure woman," and to Nilo's "oedipal
complex." The court noted that Marivi already disengaged herself from her father as her
standard of an ideal husband when she married Nilo, despite the latter's limitations and
his then being already very focused on his job. Marivi's need for assurance that she is
loved, vis-a-vis her looking up to her father as her standard, was not by itself sufficient
to declare her psychologically incapacitated.
As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of "oedipal complex;" the RTC held
that prioritizing his work over the emotional needs of his family was not reflective of
his psychological incapacity because what he did was still for his family's benefit.
Neither was Nilo's lack of sexual interest in Marivi a case of psychological incapacity,
for this was a result of his being turned off by Marivi's unabated naggings and her
revelations to her family of his sexual inadequacies.
From the RTC's verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its November 22, 2011 Decision,51 the CA united with the RTC in rejecting the
alleged existence of psychological incapacity pointed out by Dr. Villegas and by Dr.
Encarnacion.
The CA found that Dr. Villegas and Dr. Encarnacion failed to paint a clear picture of
the supposed gravity or seriousness of Nilo's psychological incapacity, and that it was
unconvinced of the doctors' conclusion that Nilo had a deep propensity to cover up for
his serious inadequacies.
It ruled that Marivi failed to prove that Nilo's failure to comply with his sexual
obligation was due to some psychological condition or makeup, as this could very well
be explained by the stress brought about by Marivi's negative attitude toward Nilo, who
was turned off by her act of revealing to her clan their bedroom secrets instead of
privately resolving the problem with him. Moreover, the CA said it is a non
sequitur, that just because he could not sexually perform according to Marivi's standard,
he should thus be labelled a gay or homosexual. It appears that Nilo has "selective"
impotency, for while he could not have an erection for Marivi, he nevertheless had had
extramarital affairs. Neither did the CA see anything wrong with Nilo's "put-on fa9ade"
of a happy marriage to protect the family's privacy.
The CA did not even consider Marivi's alleged histrionic traits as reflected in her
behavior, e.g., her persistent demand as to Nilo's whereabouts, her constant naggings,
her attention-seeking acts, grave or serious enough to qualify as psychological
incapacity. The CA ruled that it was the couple's irreconcilable differences that marred
their marriage; that the negative acts or actions of one spouse were neutralized or offset
by the other's negative acts or actions, and that these are "mere character flaws or bad
habits that the spouses developed over the years [which] can be modified or changed
depending on the desire of either spouse to do so."52 The CA thereafter disposed of the
appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in CV
No. 05-095 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage between appellant
Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz and appellee Nilo Santos Cruz for insufficiency of
evidence is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED."53
Marivi moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in the CA's May 29, 2012
Resolution.54
Issue
At issue before us is whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall under
Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision. In Republic v.
De Gracia, 55 we reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 56 "that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved)." Also,
in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 57 we reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, as embodied in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 58 viz.:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage.x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted as root
causes.x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
Notably, "mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting personalities' [as
in the present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity."59 "Nor does
failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons"
amount to psychological incapacity.60 We further elucidated in Yambao v.
Republic61that the psychological condition should render the subject totally unaware or
incognitive of the basic marital obligations:
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education
of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It
is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological illness.62
In Marcos v. Marcos, 63 the actual medical examination of the one claimed to have
psychological incapacity is not a condition sine qua non, for what matters is the totality
of evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological incapacity. While it behooves this
Court to weigh the clinical findings of psychology experts as part of the evidence, the
court's hands are nonetheless free to make its own independent factual findings. "It
bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base
their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings."64
With specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both parties did suffer
from personality disorders as evaluated by the expert witnesses, we find that the
conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do not irresistibly point to the fact that
the personality disorders which plague the spouses antedated the marriage; that these
personality disorders are indeed grave or serious; or that these personality disorders are
incurable or permanent as to render the parties psychologically incapacitated to carry
out and carry on their marital duties. What can be inferred from the totality of evidence,
at most, is a case of incompatibility. For a personality disorder to be declared clinically
or medically incurable or permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or to be
reluctant to perform his/her marital duties is another.65
Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and the CA. More than that,
too, the evidence on record do not square with the existence of psychological incapacity
as contemplated by law and jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo, what brought about the
breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not necessarily attributable to his so-
called "psychological disorder" but can be imputed to his work and marital stress, and
his ordinary human failings.
With regard to his failure to sexually perform "adequately," the same appeared to be a
case of "selective impotency," as he was turned off by Marivi's disclosure of their bed
secrets to her family. Furthermore, Nilo testified that the sexual problem with Marivi
did not crop up until the birth of their second son, and that he felt that the blame was
invariably and unfairly laid on upon him, thus:
THE COURT:
The Court has just some questions with regard to the main issue. During your direct
testimony; Mr. Witness, you mentioned some of your faults which [may be] the reason
why the instant case was filed. x x x one of those faults is no sex. When did that
happen? x x x
A. If I recall it right, Your Honor; I [had] some challenge[s] immediately after the first
birth of my eldest son which I x x x shared with the psychologist or psychiatrist who
[had] examined me.
THE COURT:
But when you got married with your wife that was not a problem until the birth of your
last son?
A. Yes, your Honor.
x x x x66
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
Q. So it is attributable to the petitioner though you claim that it is your fault, is that
correct?
A. Because, your Honor, that kind of situation, I always get blamed, so for the purpose
of settling all these questions, when you make that mistake, you'll always be the one to
be blamed although as per the psychologist and the psychiatrist, there's also a reason
why I am not able to perform sex to my wife because in those ten (10) years that we
were together, after the first one, [didn't] have any other affairs but I kept being blamed
that I [had] just because I [was] not able to perform sex to her. The whole family, her
family knows that in that premise because I got, one time, in one of our quarrels x x x
told me, ''maybe you're not making love with my daughter because you are having an
affair with another woman." So, I know 1 made a mistake in the past but if I'm x x x
kept [being] reminded of it, it's a punishment, your Honor.
xxxx
Q. What you initially said was your fault was ... as you're now talking before this
Honorable Court, is really the fault of 1he petitioner; is that what you are saying?
A. There [were] times, your Honor, I would say it was my fault. There [were] times it
was caused by her faults as well. H's not one plus one It was hers and one plus one it
was mine, it depends on the situation. We've been dealing with cases before so not all
the time it's the fault of Mrs. Cruz. And not all the time it's the fault of Mr. Cruz. It's a
relationship, there are times it's hers, there are times, it's mine but we're able to fix it
until this annulment situation came.
x x x x67
Nor can it be said that Nilo's failure to provide quality time for the family was caused
by his "inadequate personality disorder" or "unresolved oedipal complex." Nilo
explained that he has a taxing and demanding job, and that unfortunately, with his
working hours eating up his home life, while he was able to provide his family with an
adequate standard of living, the lack of quality time for his wife became attenuated and
resulted in severing his bond with Mari vi, who failed to understand the nature of his
job. They were a happy couple during the period of courtship, and even during the early
years of their marriage. Nilo testified:
ATTY. REVILLA:
Q. x x x What was the reason why you had to stay up late?
A. Ma'am, I'm .. .in those I.T. companies that I worked for whether manager or
managing director, my companies are ... the companies are involved in sales and
marketing and support so it entails entertainment of clients, entertainment of principals
coming from headquarters and entertainment of customers with my staff and other
company.
Q. When you say LT., what does it stand for?
A. Information Technology.
Q. You also referred to a headquarters. What do you mean by headquarters?
A. Headquarters, if you work in a multinational company like companies I worked for,
they have headquarters in Hong Kong, they have headquarters in Singapore, they have
headquarters in the U.S.
Q. So you had to entertain principals coming from [these] headquarters?
A. As a part of the job as required by the principals who [visit] us.
Q. How often were you required to stay out late because of your job?
A. Ma'am, it is unpredictable. Sometimes, we were required to stay for dinner and
entertainment thereafter. Sometimes, we can go home early also.
Q. Could you not refuse the invitations of going out and just go home and spend time
with your family?
A. Sometimes I can refuse, sometimes I cannot. Because it becomes a condition of sale
of the clients x x x.
xxxx
Q. So x x x what's the latest time of the night that you usually come home?
A. My objective as a husband and as a father is to really come as early as I can which I
have explained on and on, your Honor. But to meet my million dollar targets of the
country, I have to do things beyond 5 o'clock. In several occasions when I tried to go
home early, to my disappointment, my kids are not at home because they were
borrowed by my in-laws to have merienda. That's why I complained to my wife that
time that "please tell me if they are going with my in-laws because I don't want to
deprive them also of the few times I'm able to go home early."
Q. So, you are saying that you only have few times of coming home early?
A. Well, yes, but not very few.
Q. Okay. Have you tried to make an effort to remedy the situation?
A. Well, if I have my way to be able to direct my appointments in the South, my
meetings in Amkor Anam, Mamplasan, in Sta. Rosa then that will allow me to be home
at least 5-6 o'clock. But most of my meetings in Makati, Quezon City, Manila especially
with government clients [do] allow me to go home early, your Honor.
x x x x68
THE COURT:
What about another fault you mentioned which is staying late, when did this thing
happen?
A. When I came back from my assignment in Hong Kong in 1988 when I was given a
new job in sales and marketing.
xxxx
THE COURT:
So before the birth of your children, that is after your marriage with the petitioner, this
was not a problem?
A. Because, your Honor, I was assigned in Hong Kong and I was only twelve (12)
minutes [away] by [foot] to our office x x x.
xxxx
And I was not in [sales] and marketing, I was the Administrative Assistant of the
President of IBM in Southeast Asia so it's the ... purely management administrative
work as an administrative assistant so there's [not] much of entertaining done in Hong
Kong.
THE COURT:
Okay, so in other words, at that time, that was not a problem. It was only a problem
when you were appointed to your position in ...
A. IBM. xxxx

THE COURT: Your Honor, sometimes, I get all these complaints. But when they saw my picture in the
newspaper or in the TV having success stories and contract signing, they are proud of
That was so many years after you got married with your wife me.

A We got married, your Honor, in 1987 then we went back to the Philippines in July THE COURT:
1988 [when] I was given a new marketing and [sales] role as a manager of general
marketing which is ... which encompasses all industries aside [from] the government. When you say "so proud of me," to whom are you referring x x x?

THE COURT: A. My family. They call me, they congratulate me, we have dinners together to
celebrate but to get to that, is the working hard and staying away from the family.
So you mean to say that this problem of staying late only happened lately?
xxxx
xxxx
THE COURT:
A The definition, your Honor, of my family... late is when you don't make it at 7:00
o'clock or. .. [with] the family at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. So ifl don't make it at How long did you court your wife?
seven, I considered myself late.
A. Six (6) months, your Honor.
THE COURT:
x x x x69
What is the reason why you have been late?
THE COURT:
A Your Honor, my job is not a 9 to 5 job because we ... we call on customers, we
entertain customers, partners, principals, we also have fellowship with our teams. So, Could you say that you were a perfect couple at that time?
we either have dinner or we have happy hours. We also see friends after. So but,
physically I cannot do that everyday, your Honor, because I also wake up automatically
A. When we were starting, your Honor, we [were] happy, and during the time that we
at 6:00 everyday whether I have a drink, or have dinner, or I worked out in the evening
were in Hong Kong. But when we went back to Manila, there are times (the witness is
or play[ed] basketball during that time, I always wake up at six. So if I stayed up late
in tears) ... adjusting to work and family that is why it affected my relationship to her
like previously... like 2, 3, it's gonna be a burden for me physically and [I would be]
family and combination of mistakes happened which I admitted.
unable to perform my job well. So, like I mentioned earlier in a hearing, your Honor,
many times I tried to be home by 10 to be able to watch. Before 10 to be able to watch
the 10:00 o'clock news and be able to enjoy my ice cream while watching it. THE COURT:

THE COURT: How would you describe your wife during your first years of marriage?

Well, one of those faults you mentioned is also working hard, why did you say that it is A. [She was] a very good wife.
your fault?
THE COURT:
A In our industry, your Honor, when you work out, you will definitely end up late
several couple of times, but not all the time. Did she perform her duties as a wife and as a mother?

A. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:
And was she that independent from her parents or she was too dependent [on] her
parents?
A. On her performing her duties, with the ... as a wife and as a friend, she's independent.
When it comes to our problems, she would consult her family.
THE COURT:
So only those times when you have a problem. Like what problems, Mr. Witness?
A. Our relationship, your Honor.
THE COURT:
But most of the time, you were able to patch up your problems?
A. Yes, your Honor.
x x x x70
Interestingly, when asked if there was no more functional marital life between him and
Marivi, Nilo candidly highlighted his different perception from his estranged wife:
ATTY. STA MARIA, JR.:
Q. So, Mr. Witness, well in reality today, Mr. Witness, even the petitioner believes that
there is no more functional marital life in this relationship, would you agree with that?
A. If that's the way she thinks, I...I will have my own way of looking at things because
...
xxxx
Q. Even ... as I was saying since she was asking for nullity and you were asking for
nullity, it's a fact of life as of today, as you speak today that there is no more functional
marital life between the two (2) of you?
A. You see, your Honor, that's why we're different. Her style is conclude and conclude.
I have a different style because of my background. I will only stop till death. I cannot
share her legal counsel's statement with my own thinking, your Honor.
x x x x71
Even the psychiatrist Dr. Villegas pinpointed the differences of the estranged couple
which led to squabbles -
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
Q. Doctor, from your examination of both respondent and petitioner the obligation of
trust and respect for each other, how did it not manifest in this relationship?
A.The respondent [sees] the petitioner as one who's very negativistic on him or who's
very demanding and who is also trying to put him down because according to him, the
petitioner would always see his weak points rather than his strong points.
Q. Are you saying that this developed a non-trust just between them?
A None trust. They do not trust each other anymore.1âwphi1 On the part of the
petitioner, because of his womanizing activities and on the part of the respondent, that
the petitioner is always looking at his weak points rather than his strong points.
x x x x72
It is significant to note that Marivi failed to substantiate Nilo's penchant for womanizing
as a manifestation of his psychological incapacity. Aside from her bare allegations,
which were chiefly based on what other people told her, she never presented irrefutable
proof to corroborate her claims of his sexual proclivities, i.e., that these proclivities
were already existing before the marriage and during the first years of their marriage.
Nilo, on the other hand, categorically admitted to having extramarital affairs in 1992,
2002, and 2006, the period when the marriage was already on the rocks. Neither is there
evidence of Nilo's alleged oedipal complex, the manifestations of which were not cited
by the experts, that caused the couple to fall out of love.
Anent Marivi's case, based on her family history as reflected in the experts' clinical
evaluation, she grew up in a well-functioning, supportive, and emotionally healthy
family environment. Even Nilo himself attested that she was a good wife and a good
mother to their children. Her demand for attention, time, love, and fidelity is normal for
a wife. The anger she felt within her is also a legitimate reaction.
Yet the psychologist Dr. Encarnacion himself acknowledged that Marivi's so-called
psychological incapacity is in fact, curable. Thus:
ATTY. REVILLA:
Q. So even without the respondent, Nilo Cruz, petitioner would still be psychologically
incapacitated?
A. I beg to [differ]: from that because the needs were not fulfilled in this particular
marriage, it's like a tendency to have cancer, but if you take care of yourself with the
right environment, you will not catch cancer. Those were previous positions, that's why
I called them Histrionic Personality Traits Behaviors and Features not a full blown
Histrionic Personality Disorder, the needs were badly unfulfilled in this marriage
because she married a man who did not know the language of feeling of showing some
attention towards his spouse, meaning, if she is put in a relationship with a man who is
able to address these needs, she would be better, she would be better in a marriage.
Q. So this psychological incapacity of the petitioner is only dormant at
the time that she was not yet married?
A. Well, it's grave ...
Q. Was it grave already at the time ...
A. Yes, it is, it's grave but. ..
Q. Even before the marriage?
A. ... but not incurable, that is the only adjective, grave, pre-existing ...
Q. Pre-existing?
A. Grave and pre-existing, yes, incurable, no, in the sense that if she married properly if
her needs were addressed, it would not appear in that marriage.
Q. But because of her marriage to the respondent, are you saying now that her
psychological incapacity now…
A. Became an incapacity, yes
Q. ... became incurable?
A. No.
xxxx
Q. Okay. I am quite curious about the curability of the personality disorder of the
petitioner. Now, if her needs are satisfied with ... in case, assuming the petitioner enters
into another relationship and her needs are satisfied then her incapacity is cured, is that
what you're saying?
A. In effect, yes, in effect, yes.
Q. Would you say, what are these needs of the petitioner that [you're] ... not satisfied of
the respondent?
A. Need to be paid attention to, need to be valued, need to have an effect on someone, it
is a universal need. She was made to feel that she did not have any effect on him and so
are the children, x x x well, the father made the children feel that they, wife and two
sons did not have any effect on him, ma'am.
x x x x73
Q. One last question. The needs of the petitioner, like you say, do you think she was
able to convey, clearly convey her needs to the respondent, properly convey?
A. Very clearly, yes, and then when they were still not being heard, well, iyon na nga
eh, yung hostility niya and resentment would get the better of her as a ano ... so it would
become dysfunctional reaction upon reaction. That's a good question.74
Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes that the protagonists in this
case are in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution for each other's personality
differences, and have thus become overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or
disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a
null and void marriage.75
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 193544, Aug 02, 2017 ]
YOLANDA E. GARLET v. VENCIDOR T. GARLET +
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner Yolanda E. Garlet assails in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court the: (1) Decision[1] dated June 21, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142, which reversed and set aside the Decision[2] dated
November 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City in
JDRC Case No. 6796; and (2) Resolution[3]dated August 24, 2010 of the appellate court
in the same case, which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent Vencidor T. Garlet met each other sometime in 1988. They
became intimately involved and as a result, petitioner became pregnant. Petitioner gave
birth to their son, Michael Vincent Garlet (Michael), out of wedlock on November 9,
1989. Petitioner and respondent eventually got married on March 4, 1994. Their union
was blessed with a second child, Michelle Mae Garlet (Michelle), on January 23, 1997.
However, petitioner and respondent started experiencing marital problems. After seven
years of marriage, petitioner and respondent separated in 2001. Petitioner now has
custody over their two children.
On May 6, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition[4] for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital
obligations to petitioner and their children. The Petition was docketed as JDRC Case
No. 6796. On June 30, 2005, respondent filed his Answer[5] to the Petition.
At the pre-trial, the parties admitted the following facts:
1. The petitioner and respondent contracted marriage on [March[6]] 4, 1994;
2. The parties' first son was named Michael Vincent Garlet and was born on
November 9, 1989;
3. The petitioner gave birth to another child named Michelle Mae Garlet on
January 23, 1997;
4. The respondent is aware that the petitioner is working in Japan as an
entertainer;
5. There is no ante-nuptial agreement prior to the celebration of the marriage;
6. There is no separation of properties during the marriage;
7. The petitioner has the custody and the one supporting the children from the
time the respondent lost communication with the children as he does not exert
effort to see them;
8. The petitioner admitted that the parties acquired several properties during
cohabitation with qualification that the same was bought out of the efforts and
finances of the petitioner; and
9. The petitioner likewise admitted that the respondent was not subjected to
psychological examination by the psychologist sought by the petitioner with
qualification that respondent was given several opportunities to attend the
psychological evaluation but failed to do so.[7]
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Testifying for petitioner were petitioner herself; Marites Ereve (Marites), petitioner's
sister who served as the children's nanny from 1993 to 2001; and Ms. Nimia Hermilia
C. De Guzman (De Guzman), the clinical psychologist.
Petitioner and respondent were introduced to each other by a common friend in 1988.
Respondent courted petitioner and they became close. One day, after partying and
drinking liquor with some friends, petitioner and respondent lost their inhibitions and
indulged in sexual intercourse. Petitioner became pregnant as a result. Respondent
doubted if he fathered the unborn child and refused to support petitioner. Respondent
urged petitioner to have an abortion, to which she did not agree. During petitioner's
pregnancy, respondent did not visit her nor did he give any financial assistance. After
giving birth to Michael, respondent visited petitioner only once.[8]
In order to support Michael, petitioner left for Japan to work for six months as a cultural
dancer. Petitioner temporarily entrusted Michael's care and custody to her mother and
siblings in Bicol. Upon returning to the Philippines, petitioner took Michael back to live
in Manila. Petitioner also brought Marites with them to Manila to serve as the
nanny.[9] Respondent visited petitioner and Michael several times but respondent still
did not offer petitioner any monetary help as he was jobless.[10]
From 1990 to 1994, petitioner returned to Japan several more times to work, but she
maintained her relationship with respondent for the sake of their son. Sometime in
1992, petitioner instructed respondent to scout for a real property on which she may
invest her money. With the money petitioner remitted, respondent purchased a 210-
square meter lot in Morong, Rizal (Morong property),[11] but registered the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-38509[12] covering said property in his name. Despite
petitioner's pleas, respondent refused to transfer the certificate of title to the Morong
property in petitioner's name.[13] Later on, respondent, without petitioner's consent, sold
a 69-square meter portion of the Morong property to spouses Avelino Garlet (Avelino)
and Cipriana A. Garlet, respondent's brother and sister-in-law, respectively, who
secured TCT No. M-56993 for said portion in their names.[14] Respondent also
mortgaged the Morong property to his sister-in-law's friend, which forced petitioner to
redeem it for P50,000.00.[15]
Petitioner bought another parcel of land in Pila, Laguna on March 3, 1994 (Pila
property).[16] Respondent insisted on including his name as one of the buyers in the deed
of sale for the Pila property even though he was jobless and had no money to contribute
for the purchase of said property.[17]
It was also in 1992 that petitioner and respondent started living together on the Morong
property. They often quarreled but respondent stayed with petitioner because she was
the breadwinner of the family. Respondent later asked petitioner to marry him. Thinking
it was for the best interest of their son, petitioner agreed and she married respondent on
March 4, 1994.[18]
After their wedding, respondent turned into a "selfish, greedy, irresponsible,
philandering and physically abusive husband." From 1994 to 1997, their family relied
on petitioner's savings for their needs. Petitioner purchased a jeepney to augment their
family's finances but respondent did not ply the jeepney.[19]
Petitioner hoped and asked respondent to change his ways. But even after the birth of
their daughter, Michelle, respondent never bothered to look for a stable job. Worse,
respondent maintained his vices of gambling, drinking, and womanizing.[20] Respondent
neglected Michael and Michelle, and relied on Marites to take care of the children.[21]
In 1998, petitioner was forced to work in Japan again as all her savings had been
exhausted. Petitioner was able to save enough money to invest in a mini-grocery store.
Petitioner placed respondent in charge of the store but the store suffered losses, which
respondent could not account. Petitioner infused additional capital into the store but it
still ultimately closed.[22]
Upon returning to the Philippines in 2000, petitioner felt devastated upon learning that
respondent had squandered her hard-earned money, pawned her jewelry, and incurred
debts in her name.[23] Petitioner also discovered the incident when respondent allowed a
"male friend" to sleep in the master's bedroom. According to petitioner, this was highly
unusual as they never previously allowed anyone to sleep at their house.[24]
Additionally, every time petitioner came home and brought presents for her parents and
siblings, respondent got angry and demanded from petitioner all her earnings.[25]
Petitioner and respondent were fighting constantly. Sometime in 2001, they had a
serious altercation during which, respondent strangled petitioner. Fortunately, a third
person intervened and saved petitioner.[26]
Petitioner and respondent tried to settle their marital issues before the barangay. There,
respondent admitted taking petitioner's money and jewelry because he had no means to
support himself and the family. Realizing that there was no more love and respect
between them and that respondent was just using her, petitioner finally separated from
respondent.[27] Petitioner and respondent executed on September 10, 2001 before
the barangay a Kasunduang Pag-aayos[28] wherein they agreed that respondent would
leave the house in exchange for the jeepney, tricycle, and P300,000.00; and that
respondent would have visitation rights, i.e., twice a week, over their children. Since the
separation, petitioner had been solely supporting their children with the income from
her businesses in Bicol, Bulacan, and Pasig.
Petitioner filed an application for support, alleging that she had been spending
approximately P15,000.00 a month for the two children, and paying the children's
tuition fees in the following amounts[29]:
Michael Michelle
Grade 6 P 18,118.10 Nursery P 18,280.00
1st year high school 20,366.00 Grade 1 21,741.00
2nd year high school 24,241.00 Grade 2 15,050.00
3rd year high school 26,996.00 Grade 3 17,704.00
4th year high school 29,676.00
In addition, petitioner had expended around P15,000.00 for the children's medical and
dental needs and about P100,000.00 for the children's clothing needs since 2001. As the
children would be starting school again, Michael would need P15,000.00 for his tuition
fee for the first semester in college, plus P20,000.00 for his monthly allowance, books,
supplies, and other miscellaneous expenses; while Michelle would need P30,000.00 for
her annual tuition fee, as well as P15,000.00 for food allowance, school supplies,
tutorials, clothing, and other miscellaneous expenses.[30]
Considering the children's foregoing expenses, petitioner asserted that her demand for
respondent to pay P20,000.00 per month, or P10,000.00 a month for each child, was just
and reasonable.[31]
Clinical psychologist, Ms. De Guzman, reported that she interviewed petitioner and
gathered information from the couple's relatives and neighbors.[32] Ms. De Guzman's
attempts to talk to respondent at his house were unsuccessful. Ms. De Guzman,
however, explained that her failure to personally interview respondent would not affect
her findings, saying that "what is being tapped in the psychological assessment is the
unconscious level, more or less. And what is represented or uncovered in the
unconscious level would be correlated to the manifested behavior. Having observed the
respondent since the time that I have been appearing in this case, there are some aspects
or some attitudes and behaviors that correlated with the descriptions of those people
whom I interviewed."[33]
In her report entitled "Psychological Capacity of Petitioner Yolanda Ereve
Garlet"[34] (Psychological Report), Ms. De Guzman cleared petitioner of any
psychological disorder, saying that petitioner has the capacity to understand and comply
with her marital obligations. In contrast, Ms. De Guzman found respondent to be
suffering from a narcissistic type of personality disorder. Quoted below are Ms. De
Guzman's test results and her evaluation of both petitioner and respondent:
Petitioner is endowed with an average intellectual capacity and possesses practical
sounding cognitive skills that enables her to confront her challenges in an efficient
manner. However, her better judgment and analytical functions are inclined to falter
when pressures and stresses overwhelm her.
Personality profile reveals a woman who is overly submissive to the point of being
gullible such that she normally gets the raw end of a deal in most social situations. As
much as possible, she would want a smooth sailing interaction especially with her loved
ones, trying to compensate for lost time when she is not around them.
She is however, the type who knows and honors her commitments and obligations even
if the people she trusts, as in the case of her wayward husband – Respondent have
already betrayed her.
She is basically goal-focused and independent-minded but these mature and positive
traits easily dwindle when her sentimental nature gets the better of her. She welcomes
praises and attention accorded to her by her milieu such that she sometimes fail to
decipher who among them are merely taking advantage of her generosity/kindness.
Consequently, she easily gets fooled, particularly as she could really be too trusting.
Assertiveness and strength of character are the least among her traits but Petitioner
always makes it a point to maintain a positive outlook and disposition in life despite her
failures. She is very sensitive and considerate of the feelings of other people.
Pyschosexual adjustment is basically adequate even if she has developed a wary attitude
towards members of the opposite sex.
Over-all analysis of the test data failed to yield traces of any on-going
psychopathological condition nor of any type of personality disorder.
Thus, Petitioner is still Psychologically Capacitated to understand, comply and
execute her marital obligations.
The same could not be said as true for the Respondent who is undoubtedly
suffering from the Narcissistic Type of Personality Disorder, as evidenced by the
following symptomatic behavior:
1. He is unable to maintain his own direction in life without the financial help and
support of other people. He clings to the Petitioner, who is the breadwinner,
sacrificing to be away from home to be able to build up a stable future, for his
finances. He also maintains an amorous relationship with different women as a
source of added emotional support, boost of and satisfaction of his self-
directed/immediate needs and desires.
2. He is not motivated to work and likewise capitalizes on his physical assets to
attain what he wants to achieve.
3. He is contented with his present lifestyle without thought of others and has no
foresight to prepare for a healthy family, emotionally and socially. He is not
bothered by his conscience and even flaunts his indiscretions publicly.
4. He has marked adjustment difficulties with his immediate relatives.
5. He has a very poor impulse control, easily using invectives/verbal tirades and
at times unable to control his aggressions that physical fights with Petitioner
arose.
6. He took advantage of Petitioner's kindness, resourcefulness and industry, by
not fulfilling his part of the marriage covenant. He never cared nor attended to
his children but often delegated them to whoever would be willing to assist
him.
7. He appears not to make use of his judgment and decision making abilities as he
is under the mercy of his immature impulses where the important aspect of his
life, is himself and immediate gratification of his needs.
Thus, attending to his responsibility, understanding and complying with his obligations
in marriage are beyond his capacity. Conclusively, the breakdown of their marriage
could be traced to Respondent's aforementioned traits plus his inadequacy and
insecurity in dealing with mature roles. Respondent's traits and attitudes have been
present even before marriage so that to effect any change or improvement in his
dispositions, would be difficult to do. The Psychological Incapacitation is pervasive,
permanent and clinically proven to be incurable. Respondent has accepted it as his
means of coping with stressing life demands and is not aware that it was the source of
their estrangement and final breakdown of their marital relationship.
The root cause of which started in his early days of training where ambivalent/matter-
of-fact treatment was received from immediate caregivers. Because of his ordinal
position among the children, being the youngest boy, he was always given the choice of
what to do, favored or praised. He was not able to overcome such indulgence, carried it
to his adolescent/adult years, as he was always given the most attention.
Contrarily, they were also somehow neglected because of financial lack so much so that
parents had to work overtime to earn adequately for their living. Respondent together
with his younger siblings were left to the care of elder brothers/sisters who just
simply/literally followed what their parents would want of them. Guidance and
discipline were imposed upon the elder siblings but became oblivious towards the
Respondent. It developed in Respondent on how he would go about his life without
experiencing the deprivation and hardship that he had undergone. He became self-
focused and at the same time hunted for women vulnerable to his superficialities.
Thus, they are better off apart for the sake of everyone who are within their bounds of
reach" for Respondent does not realize the pain he is causing towards other people,
specifically his legal wife – the Petitioner as well as their children.
It is therefore recommended that their marriage covenant be dissolved for everyone's
peace of mind, through due process in this Honorable Court.[35]
Respondent testified on his own behalf. However, in an Order[36] dated September 14,
2006, the RTC declared respondent's direct testimony stricken off the record because of
respondent's failure to appear for his cross-examination. After petitioner submitted her
Memorandum,[37] the case was deemed submitted for decision.[38]
In its Decision dated November 27, 2006, the RTC gave weight to Ms. De Guzman's
conclusion that respondent was suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder and
ruled that:
Based on the evidence submitted, the parties never shared a true married life.
After a careful evaluation of the records, this Court finds the petition to be impressed
with merit. The respondent is described as suffering from narcissistic personality
disorder found to be permanent, severe, serious, and incurable, rendering him as
psychologically incapacitated to perform the marital obligations.
Respondent neglected his obligations as a husband and father to their children. Even
prior to the marriage, the respondent manifested his psychological incapacity. He
suspected the paternity of his son with the petitioner and even turned his back upon
learning it. He has visited only on the day of giving birth by the petitioner of their son.
He never cared for his son and would only visit him once in a while. He never worked
to support his son. In fact, the respondent was financially dependent on the petitioner
even before the marriage. He defrauded the petitioner by registering all the properties
bought by the petitioner from the latter's exclusive income under his name declaring
themselves as married. Worst, he sold a portion of the property in Morong without the
knowledge of the petitioner.
During the marriage, the respondent's laziness became manifest. He focused on his self
and does not care who gets hurt for as long as it satisfies him. He gambles and drinks at
the expense of the petitioner. He was given the chance to earn for himself and for the
family and still, he did not handle it well and instead continued with his vices.
The respondent disregarded his obligations to spend quality time with the petitioner and
especially with their children. He even committed infidelities.
All deeds and actions of the respondent are clear demonstrations of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
By reason of the respondent's immaturity and irresponsibility stemming from his
NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER, he was unable to fulfill his duties and
responsibilities towards his wife and children, thus constituting psychological
incapacity.
The psychological report shows that respondent's psychological incapacity is
characterized by juridical antecedence as it was found to have existed even prior to the
time he contracted marriage with petitioner. Respondent's personality disorder, the root
cause of which can be traced in his childhood years was found to be pervasive and
permanent. Being the youngest boy, Respondent was always favored and praised but
was not properly guided and disciplined by his parents as the latter were pre-occupied
with improving their finances.
It also speaks of gravity because respondent is incapable of rendering marital
obligations like commitment, fidelity, trust, support and love toward the petitioner and
their children which are very vital in a marital relationship. In fact, Ms. De Guzman
stated in her report that attending to his responsibilities, understanding and complying
with his obligations in marriage are beyond respondent's capacity.
It is incurable because the psychological incapacity of the respondent is deeply rooted,
it is already in his character. No amount of therapy, no matter how intensive, can
possibly change the respondent insofar as incapability to perform his essential marital
obligations with the petitioner and to his children are concerned. Respondent has
already accepted such incapacity as his means of coping with stressing life demands.[39]
The RTC further held that all of the properties which were acquired during the marriage
were bought with petitioner's exclusive funds, thus, negating the presumption of
equality of shares between the parties in a void marriage under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The RTC awarded the custody of the children to petitioner, but granted
weekly visitation rights to respondent and ordered respondent to give support to the
children.
In the end, the RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between
YOLANDA EREVE GARLET and VENCIDOR TAEP GARLET held at the Office of
the Mayor, Morong, Rizal on March 4, 1994, as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO on
[the] ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent to perform the essential
marital obligations in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code, with all the legal
effects thereon.
The property relation between the petitioner and respondent under Article 147 of the
Family Code is deemed DISSOLVED. The real properties acquired prior to marriage
and cohabitation is hereby declared exclusive properties of the petitioner particularly
the real property covered by Transfer Certificate [of Title] No. M-38509 of the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal; and the tricycle and jeepney covered by Certificate of Registration
Nos. 13175616 and 27224267, respectively.
The parties are directed to submit list of properties for liquidation, partition and
distribution; and the delivery of presumptive legitime of their common children with
notice to their creditors upon finality of this decision.
The custody of the children, namely: 1) Michael Vincent E. Garlet; and 2) Michelle
Mae E. Garlet is hereby awarded to the petitioner subject to visitorial right of the
respondent once a week at the most convenient time of the said children. The
respondent is hereby adjudged to give support to the children in the amount of
P3,000.00 a month each to be deposited every 5th day of the month in their respective
bank accounts under trust of the petitioner; and he is hereby directed to provide at least
one-half of the cost of their education.
The petitioner shall revert to the use of her maiden name.
The Local Civil Registrars of Morong, Rizal, and Pasig [City] are directed to cause the
entry of the foregoing judgment in the Book of Marriages upon issuance thereof.
A decree of declaration of nullity of marriage shall be issued upon compliance with the
foregoing judgment.[40]
The RTC denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated February
26, 2007.
Respondent's appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
89142. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated June 21, 2010, reversed the RTC
judgment, reasoning as follows:
[W]e scrutinized the totality of evidence adduced by Yolanda and found that the same
was not enough to sustain a finding that Vencidor was psychologically incapacitated.
In essence, Yolanda wanted to equate Vencidor's addiction to alcohol, chronic
gambling, womanizing, refusal to find a job and his inability to take care of their
children as akin to psychological incapacity. At best, Yolanda's allegations showed that
Vencidor was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature. The incidents cited
by Yolanda did not show that Vencidor suffered from a psychological malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond.
Yolanda's portrayal of Vencidor as jobless and irresponsible is not enough. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same
may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated
by this rule. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will.
In ruling for Yolanda, the trial court gave credence to the psychological report prepared
by Ms. De Guzman. x x x
While it is true that courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of
human personality, still the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and said
incapacity established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. Likewise,
although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist (as a
condition sine qua non), there is nevertheless still a need to prove the psychological
incapacity through independent evidenceadduced by the person alleging said disorder.
In the instant case, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its
incapacitating nature and the incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained. What can
be perused from the psychological report prepared by Ms. De Guzman is that it only
offered a general evaluation on the supposed root cause of Vencidor's personality
disorder. The report failed to exhaustively explain the relation between being a
pampered youngest son and suffering from a psychological malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond.
The psychological report failed to reveal that the personality traits of Vencidor were
grave or serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Ms. De Guzman merely stated in the said report that it is beyond the
capacity of Vencidor to attend to his responsibility and understand and comply with his
marital obligations. Such statement is a mere general conclusion which, unfortunately,
is unsubstantiated. We cannot see how Vencidor's supposed personality disorder would
render him unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by him.
Also, we cannot help but note that Ms. De Guzman's conclusions about Vencidor's
psychological incapacity were primarily based on the informations fed to her by
Yolanda whose bias for her cause cannot be doubted. Moreover, Ms. De Guzman
testified that the informations that she obtained from Yolanda were the result of one-
hour interview with Yolanda and initial testing given at intervals.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias,
her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and
stringent set of standards. Ms. De Guzman only examined Vencidor from a third-party
account. To make conclusions on x x x Vencidor's psychological condition based on the
information fed by Yolanda, during a one-hour interview, is not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in
its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. Presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[41]
The dispositive portion of the foregoing Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated November 27, 2006 and
the Order dated February 26, 2007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage between herein parties is hereby declared as still subsisting and valid.[42]
Petitioner received a copy of the Decision of the appellate court on June 28, 2010.
Petitioner filed a motion[43] seeking an extension of twenty days, or until August 2,
2010, within which to file a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed her Motion for
Reconsideration on August 2, 2010. However, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution[44] on August 24, 2010 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for
being filed out of time, citing the ruling in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon[45] that
the filing of the motion for extension of time does not toll the fifteen-day period for
filing a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner seeks redress from this Court through the instant Petition, grounded on the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING
THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN YOLANDA GARLET AND VENCIDOR
GARLET TO BE SUBSISTING. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED
AND MISAPPRECIATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND CONSEQUENTLY DECREEING THAT THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.[46]
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in (a) disregarding Ms. De Guzman's
findings for being based solely on petitioner's version of events, which was a third party
account; (b) treating petitioner's evidence as "no different from hearsay;" (c) finding
that the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was not sufficiently
explained; and (d) declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid.
Petitioner argues that based on Marcos v. Marcos,[47] it is not required that the
psychologist personally examine the spouse who is alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. What matters is that the totality of petitioner's evidence
establish psychological incapacity.
Petitioner asserts that her evidence consists of not just her testimony, but also those of
her witnesses. Petitioner's description of her marriage was substantiated by the
statements of respondent's brother, sister-in-law, and neighbors, which were
incorporated in the Psychological Report. What is more, the root cause of respondent's
psychological incapacity had been properly alleged in the Petition, clinically identified,
and proven by Ms. De Guzman in her testimony and her Psychological Report.
Petitioner points out that the RTC gave considerable weight to her evidence, and found
respondent to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder so permanent,
serious, severe, and incurable that it rendered respondent incapable of performing his
marital obligations. Considering that the RTC had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses when they testified, its findings are entitled to respect from
the appellate courts. Underscoring the importance of the appreciation of the facts by the
trial court in determining whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated,
petitioner refers to the case of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te [48] wherein the findings of the
trial court were declared to be final and binding on the appellate courts. Based on the
totality of the evidence, petitioner maintains that her marriage should be declared null
and void on account of respondent's psychological incapacity.
Lastly, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in denying her Motion for
Reconsideration for being filed out of time based on Habaluyas Enterprises, and pleads
for liberality in the application of the rules in the interest of substantial justice.
The Petition is without merit.
The Court shall first address the procedural issue regarding the denial of petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration by the Court of Appeals for being filed out of time.
In its Resolution issued on May 30, 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises, the Court already
elucidated, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, that:
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the [Court of Appeals]. Such a motion may be filed only in
cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.[49]
The foregoing rule is still good presently. The Court, in the more recent case of V.C.
Ponce Company, Inc. v. Municipality of Parañaque,[50] still observed strict adherence to
the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises. The Court acknowledged in said case that
it sometimes allowed a liberal reading of the rules in the interest of equity and justice,
so long as the petitioner is able to prove the existence of cogent reasons to excuse its
non-observance. However, the Court also found therein that petitioner's reason for
failing to meet the deadline, i.e., it was without aid of counsel, did not warrant a
relaxation of the rules as "it is incumbent upon the client to exert all efforts to retain the
services of new counsel."
Petitioner's counsel in the instant case sought extension of time to file the motion for
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision claiming that she had already started
the draft of said motion but was unable to finalize the same "due to heavy pressure of
work in the preparation of pleadings in other equally important cases requiring
immediate attention."[51] The excuse of petitioner's counsel does not constitute cogent
reason or extraordinary circumstance that warrant a departure from the general rule.
Pressure and large volume of legal work do not excuse a counsel for filing a pleading
out of time. It is the counsel's duty to devote his/her full attention, diligence, skills, and
competence to every case that he/she accepts.[52]
The Court stressed in De Leon v. Hercules Agro Industrial Corporation[53]that
compliance with the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal is not only a
procedural issue, but jurisdictional, thus:
As the period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, petitioner's motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the reglementary
period to appeal; thus, petitioner had already lost his right to appeal the September 23,
2005 decision. As such, the RTC decision became final as to petitioner when no appeal
was perfected after the lapse of the prescribed period.
Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who
seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays.
Moreover, the perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not
only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders the
judgment final and executory.
The CA correctly ordered that petitioner's appellant's brief be stricken off the records.
As the CA said, the parties who have not appealed in due time cannot legally ask for the
modification of the judgment or obtain affirmative relief from the appellate court. A
party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within
the period prescribed by law loses his right to do so. As petitioner failed to perfect his
appeal within the period for doing so, the September 23, 2005 decision has become final
as against him. The rule is clear that no modification of judgment could be granted to a
party who did not appeal. It is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of
procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the
setting forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in making its determinations.
It is not installed in the rules merely to make litigations laborious and tedious for the
parties. It is there for a reason.
Petitioner received a copy of the Decision dated June 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
on June 28, 2010 and the 15-day reglementary period expired on July 13, 2010 without
her filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, hence, the said judgment already
became final.
Moreover, the Court is unconvinced that it should set aside the finality of the Court of
Appeals judgment for the sake of substantive justice, as the appellate court did not
commit reversible error in ruling that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is
subsisting and valid because petitioner failed to establish respondent's psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner insists on respondent's psychological incapacity, a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,[54]which provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Jurisprudence had laid down guiding principles in resolving cases for the declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. In Azcueta v.
Republic,[55] the Court presented a summation of relevant jurisprudence on
psychological incapacity, reproduced hereunder:
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State
can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the
concern alone of the family members.
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Molina stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation". It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable", thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle ofejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's". The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts x x x.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It should
refer to "no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the
guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court. With the advent of Te v. Te, the Court encourages a reexamination of
jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no
major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine. (Citations omitted.)
It bears to stress that the burden of proving the nullity of the marriage falls on
petitioner. Petitioner's evidence shall still be scrutinized and weighed, regardless of
respondent's failure to present any evidence on his behalf. Any doubt shall be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage. Tested against the present
guidelines, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of petitioner's
evidence is insufficient to establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner imputes almost every imaginable negative character trait against respondent,
but not only do they not satisfactorily constitute manifestations of respondent's
psychological incapacity as contemplated in the Family Code, petitioner's averments are
riddled with inconsistencies that are sometimes contradicted by her own evidence.
Petitioner avers that respondent tried to persuade her to have an abortion when she
became pregnant with Michael and respondent even questioned Michael's paternity.
Yet, notably, respondent never sought the correction of Michael's Certificate of Live
Birth, which specifically named him as Michael's father. The following verbal
exchanges between the couple in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos[56] also show that
respondent acknowledged his children with petitioner, namely, Michael and Michelle,
and was concerned with their welfare:
Yoly - Ayoko na nga basta umalis ka sa bahay natin at kung hindi ka aalis kami
ng mga anak mo ang aalis.
Vencidor
Paano mga anak natin, sinong mag-aalaga sa kanila.
–
Yoly – Ako na ang bahala sa mga anak ko bubuhayin ko sila.
xxxx
Makikita mo pa naman ang mga anak mo, puwede mo rin naman dalawin
Yoly –
kahit dalawang beses sa isang lingo.
Vencidor Ayoko yata Yoly na magkahiwalay tayo paano na ako, sino ang mag-
– iintindi sa mga anak ko, halimbawa na umalis ka uli papunta abroad.
Even assuming that respondent initially reacted adversely to petitioner's pregnancy with
Michael, it would appear from respondent's subsequent actuations that he had come to
accept that he is indeed Michael's father.
In her testimony, petitioner claimed that her relationship with respondent was cut off
when she got pregnant; that respondent never visited her during her pregnancy; and that
respondent visited her only once after she gave birth to Michael on November 9, 1989.
According to petitioner, she had no relationship with respondent until she purchased the
Pila property on March 3, 1994.[57] The records, though, bear out the continuous
relationship between petitioner and respondent. First, petitioner stated in her own
Memorandum before the RTC that she "did not sever her ties with
[respondent]."[58] Second, petitioner remitted money to respondent sometime in 1992 for
the purchase of the Morong property, where they eventually lived. Third, Ms. De
Guzman recounted in her Psychological Report that sometime "[i]n 1992, Petitioner and
Respondent started to live [in] Morong, Rizal."[59] And fourth, petitioner married
respondent on March 4, 1994, which would just be the day after she bought the Pila
property.
Petitioner further alleges that respondent meddled with the purchase and registration of
the Morong and Pila properties. Although he did not make any monetary contribution at
all for the said purchases, respondent registered the TCT of the Morong property in his
name and as one of the owners in the TCT of the Pila property. In addition, respondent
purportedly sold a portion of the Morong property without petitioner's consent. But the
Court notes that petitioner and respondent had already deported themselves as husband
and wife long before the purchase of the Morong and Pila properties and their actual
marriage. Petitioner had a direct hand in the preparation of Michael's Certificate of Live
Birth in 1989 and she made it to . appear therein that she and respondent were already
married on December 27, 1988 in Pasay City. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that
petitioner and respondent continued to misrepresent themselves as a married couple in
the purchase of the Pila property and in the case of the Morong property, the purchase
took place when petitioner was then working in Japan. It appears that petitioner
belatedly renounced respondent's authority to purchase and register the subject
properties, as well as to sell a portion of the Morong property, only after their
relationship had gone sour.
Furthermore, petitioner complains about respondent's joblessness, gambling,
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, and neglect of the children during their marriage.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, it appears that respondent took on several jobs. As
indicated in Michael's Certificate of Live Birth, respondent's occupation was listed as a
"vendor." Respondent was also in-charge of the mini-grocery store which he and
petitioner put up. Most recently, respondent worked as a jeepney driver. Petitioner's
claim that respondent never plied the jeepney[60] was contradicted by her own sister and
witness, Marites, who testified that respondent sometimes plied the jeepney himself or
asked somebody else to drive it for him.[61] Petitioner criticized respondent for not
looking for a stable job, but did not specify what job suits respondent's qualifications.
More importantly, it is settled in jurisprudence that refusal to look for a job per se is not
indicative of a psychological defect.[62]
As for respondent's alleged drinking and gambling vices, petitioner herself had no
personal knowledge of the same, relying only on what relatives relayed to her while she
was in Japan.[63] Being hearsay evidence, petitioner's testimony on the matter had no
probative value[64] even if allowed by the Court as part of her narration. It is Marites, in
her testimony[65] and Sinumpaang Salaysay,[66] who recounted that petitioner would
often play tong-its and mahjong until early morning, come home drunk, sleep until
afternoon, and leave again to gamble. While respondent could have indulged in the
vices of drinking and gambling, it was not established that it was due to some
debilitating psychological condition or illness or that it was serious enough as to prevent
him from performing his essential marital obligations. As the Court pronounced
in Suazo v. Suazo[67]:
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All
these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations
that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of
psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
There is utter lack of factual basis for respondent's purported sexual infidelity. Aside
from petitioner's bare allegations, no concrete proof was proffered in court to establish
respondent's unfaithfulness to petitioner. Petitioner failed to provide details on
respondent's supposed affairs, such as the names of the other women, how the affairs
started or developed, and how she discovered the affairs. Ms. De Guzman, in her
Psychological Report, quoted respondent's brother, Avelino, as saying that different
women often looked for and visited respondent at the latter's house after petitioner and
respondent separated, but this is still insufficient evidence of respondent's marital
infidelity.
The Court already declared that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that a
spouse is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which makes the spouse
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.[68] In Navales v.
Navales,[69] the Court still found no factual basis for the husband's claim that his wife,
being flirtatious and sexually promiscuous, was psychologically incapacitated,
regardless of the submitted psychological report concluding that the wife was a
nymphomaniac. The Court reasoned as follows:
The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to
establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that
Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a borderline
personality, has strong sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her
actual role as a wife, has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a
social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions, an
alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms,
deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggressive, irresponsible and vain. She further defined
"nymphomania" as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior
as shown by her sexual relationship with various men other than her husband.
The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual
relationship with or the circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by
Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit
relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul claims, during her
testimony, that in coming out with the report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo
but also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and
sister, respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain Susan. Vatanagul however, did
not specify the identities of these persons, which information were supplied by
whom, and how they came upon their respective informations. Indeed, the
conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack sufficient factual
bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda's
psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a "natal or
supervening disabling factor" or an "adverse integral element" in Nilda's character that
effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential
marital obligations, and that her psychological or mental malady existed even before the
marriage, x x x. (Citations omitted.)
That respondent delegated the care for the children to Marites, petitioner's sister, does
not necessarily constitute neglect. While it is truly ideal that children be reared
personally by their parents, in reality, there are various reasons which compel parents to
employ the help of others, such as a relative or hired nanny, to watch after the children.
In the instant case, it was actually petitioner who brought Marites from Bicol to Manila
to care for Michael, and also later on, for Michelle. Granting that Marites was primarily
responsible for the children's care, there is no showing that a serious psychological
disorder has rendered respondent incognizant of and incapacitated to perform his
parental obligations to his children. There is no allegation, much less proof, that the
children were deprived of their basic needs or were placed in danger by reason of
respondent's neglect or irresponsibility.
Petitioner additionally accuses respondent of taking her money and jewelry after their
marital dispute sometime in 2001, and submitted the Kasunduang Pag-aayos they
executed before the barangay in which respondent admitted doing so. The submitted
document recorded the exchange between the couple, thus:
O sige Yoly ibabalik ko yong alahas mo at pera mo magsimula uli
Vencidor –
tayo.
Ayoko na nga makisama sa iyo, basta ibalik mo na lang ang pera ko at
Yoly –
mga alahas ko.
Vencidor – Paano naman ako dapat tayo ay hati.
Yoly – O sige ibalik mo ang P150,000.00, at alahas ko.
Vencidor – Gawin mo namang P300,000.00.
O sige gawin mo ng Tatlong daan, pati bahay sa Pila, Laguna jeep at
Yoly –
trysikel sa iyo na umalis ka lang ng bahay.
Vencidor – Saan naman ako uuwi, pero pansamantala lang ito di ba?
Makikita mo pa naman ang mga anak mo, puwede mo rin naman dalawin
Yoly –
kahit dalawang beses sa isang lingo.
Ayoko yata Yoly na magkahiwalay tayo paano na ako, sino ang mag-
Vencidor –
iintindi sa mga anak ko, halimbawa na umalis ka uli papunta abroad.
Ayoko na nga makisama sayo kung [di] ka aalis mapipilitan ako na itataas
Yoly –
ko na ito kaso natin.
O sige kukunin ko ang pera sa bangko at ibibigay ko sa iyo dadalhin ko sa
Vencidor –
bahay.
Yoly – Ang kikita (sic) ko lagi niyang sinisilip.
Dapat naman mag-asawa naman tayo kung ano ang iyo ay akin rin yon di
Vencidor –
ba.
Yoly – Bakit mo kinuha ang pera ko [?]
Ginalaw ko iyon kasi inuunahan mo ako. Di mo ako pinalalapit
Vencidor – pagtulog ay mag-asawa tayo. At yong Hapon palaging tumatawag,
kaya naitago ko ang mga alahas mo. Hinabol pa niyan ng saksak.
Sinisiraan niya ako sa Hapon ay iyon ay mga kustomer ko. Masasakit ang
Yoly –
mga sinasabi niya sa kin.
Vencidor – Binabalewala niya ako.
Basta umalis ka na sa baliay at naibigay ko na sa iyo ang [b]ahay sa
Yoly – [L]aguna, jeep, trysikel at pera ano pa ang gusto mo[?] [S]a amin ng mga
anak mo ang bahay sa Natividad St., Ibaba. Wala ka pakialam roon at ako
ang nagpundar noon.[70] (Emphases supplied.)
A perusal of the aforequoted verbal exchange between petitioner and respondent in
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, though, reveals that respondent only hid petitioner's money
and jewelry as a desperate attempt to stop petitioner from leaving him, taking with her
the children. In fact, respondent repeatedly expressed concern about saving their
marriage, offering to return the money and jewelry back to petitioner as long as they
stay together. It was petitioner who categorically stated that she no longer wanted to
live with respondent, offering to the latter P300,000.00 cash, the Pila property, the
jeepney and the tricycle, just for respondent to leave their marital home.
Petitioner asserts too that she had been physically abused by respondent, but offers no
substantiating evidence, such as details on the instances of abuse, pictures of her
injuries, medico-legal report, or other witness' testimony.
While the Court does not hold respondent totally without blame or free of shortcomings,
but his failings as husband and father are not tantamount to psychological incapacity
which renders their marriage void from the very beginning. Worthy of reiterating herein
is the declaration of the Court in Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador[71] that:
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some
marriages. The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders – existing at the time of
the marriage – clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a
party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she is about to assume. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
Finally, the Court is not bound by Ms. De Guzman's Psychological Report. While the
Court previously held that "there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician," yet, this is
qualified by the phrase, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity."[72] The psychologist's findings must still be
subjected to a careful and serious scrutiny as to the bases of the same, particularly, the
source/s of information, as well as the methodology employed.
In Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[73] the Court did not give credence to the clinical
psychologist's report because:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side –
the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report,
testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of
standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed
the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see
and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the
doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this
basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful
person who "believes that the world revolves around him"; and who "used love as a . . .
deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." Dr.
Tayag then incorporated her own idea of "love"; made a generalization that respondent
was a person who "lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse," and who engaged
"in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool"; and finally concluded
that the respondent's character traits reveal "him to suffer Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
incurable."
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive
to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the
respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to
identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of
fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.
Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report –
i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of
Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable – is an unfounded
statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of
the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been
used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement
cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information
fed by only one side is. to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
The Court similarly rejected the psychiatric evaluation report presented by the petitioner
in Agraviador for the following reasons:
The Court finds that Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the
respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to
"undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent." Dr. Patac relied only
on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties' second child, Emmanuel, and
household helper, Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the information provided by the
petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioner's
own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder.
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v.
Marcos that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be
personally examined by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such
declaration. If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such
independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case.[74]
Much in the same way, the Court finds herein that Ms. De Guzman's sources and
methodology is' severely lacking the requisite depth and comprehensiveness to
judicially establish respondent's psychological incapacity. Ms. De Guzman relied on the
information given by petitioner; Avelino, respondent's brother; Ramil Ereve, petitioner's
brother; an anonymous female cousin of petitioner;[75] and the couple's neighbors who
refused to give their names.[76] On the basis thereof, Ms. De Guzman determined that
respondent suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, the root cause of which, Ms.
De Guzman traced back to respondent, as the youngest child in the family, being
favored, praised, and indulged by his caregivers. From there, Ms. De Guzman already
concluded that respondent's disorder rendered it beyond his capacity to understand,
comply, and attend to his obligations in the marriage; was present even before marriage;
and was "pervasive, permanent and clinically proven to be incurable." To put it simply,
Ms. De Guzman is saying that respondent was a spoiled child, and while it can be said
that respondent has grown up to be a self-centered and self-indulgent adult, it still falls
short of establishing respondent's psychological incapacity characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability, so as to render respondent's marriage to
petitioner void ab initio.
All told, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in declaring that the marriage of
petitioner and respondent as subsisting and valid. As the Court decreed in Republic v.
Galang[77]:
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the
basic social institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented
clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly
entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at
the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital
tie.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review

on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 21, 2010 and Resolution
dated August 24, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 217993, August 09, 2017 ]
MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III, PETITIONER, VS. NORA REYES BAKUNAWA,
RESPONDENT,
RESOLUTION
REYES, JR., J:
For resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by Manuel R.
Bakunawa III (Manuel) challenging the Decision[2] dated March 27, 2014 and
Resolution[3] dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
98579, which upheld the validity of his marriage to Nora Reyes Bakunawa (Nora).
The Facts
Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where they were
students and became sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel got
married on July 26, 1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.[4]
Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time, they lived
with Manuel's parents. While Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to stop his studies
to help his father in the family's construction business. Manuel was assigned to
provincial projects and came home only during weekends. This setup continued even as
Nora gave birth to their eldest child, Moncho Manuel (Moncho). However, whenever
Manuel came back from his provincial assignments, he chose to spend his limited time
with friends and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora resented this and they started
quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel depended on his father and on
Nora for their family's needs.[5]
In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was during this
period that Manuel first observed Nora's passiveness and laziness; she was moody and
mercurial. Their house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus, Manuel became more
irritated with Nora and their verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.[6]
On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing changed in
their relationship. Manuel spent most of his time with friends and engaged in drinking
sprees. In 1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom came home. He eventually left
Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered
themselves separated.[7]
In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their children. After
Manuel spent a few nights with them in the new house, Nora became pregnant again
and thereafter gave birth to their third child.[8]
On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,[9] on the ground that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified that
Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and aggressive
behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora with
Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative attitude and
passive resistance in her relationship with Manuel. Her findings were based on her
interview with Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho, because Nora did not
participate in the psychological assessment.[10]
Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with his common-law wife and
has a son with her, whereas, Nora lives alone in her unit in Cubao, Quezon City. Their
house and lot was already foreclosed following Nora's failure to pay a loan secured by a
mortgage on the said property.[11]
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition in its Decision[12] dated March 28, 2011. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby-rendered declaring the
marriage between MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III and NORA REYES
BAKUNAWA null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Office of the City Civil Registrar of Quezon City is hereby ordered to make entries
into the records of the respective parties pursuant to the judgment of the Court.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished upon the Office of Solicitor General, the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, the Office of the Civil Registrars of Quezon
City, and the National Statistics Office, as well as the parties and counsel.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Nora appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing inter alia that the RTC erred in
finding that the testimony of the psychiatrist is sufficient to prove the parties'
psychological incapacity.
Ruling of the CA
The CA, in its Decision[14] dated March 27, 2014, granted Nora's appeal and reversed
the RTC decision. The decretal portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal filed by [Nora]
is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 28, 2011 of the RTC, National Capital
Judicial Region in Civil Case No. Q-08-62822 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The CA denied Manuel's motion for reconsideration[16] through a Resolution[17] dated
April 22, 2015.
Manuel filed the present petition raising the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF
THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES DESPITE MORE THAN CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO DECLARE ITS NULLITY DUE TO
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES
TO PERFORM THEIR MARITAL OBLIGATIONS; and
II. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECONSIDER ITS
DECISION DATED MARCH 27, 2014 DESPITE MORE THAN
COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE REVERSAL THEREOF.[18]
Ruling of the Court
As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of
his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation
report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the
spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a
reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to
Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents
were married.
The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on
Manuel despite having had the opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared that
there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated
should be personally examined by a physician,[24] much less be subjected to
psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. In this case, the supposed
personality disorder of Manuel could have been established by means of psychometric
and neurological tests which are objective means designed to measure specific aspects
of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.[25]
With regard to the Confirmatory Decree[26] of the National Tribunal of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese
of Manila in favor of nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel and Nora, the Court
accords the same with great respect but does not consider the same as controlling and
decisive, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March
27, 2014 and Resolution dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 98579 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder
and that Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code,[19] is solely based on
her interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA
did not err in not according probative value to her psychological evaluation report and
testimony.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang,[20] the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can
be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot
be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologist's examination and report."[21] In Toring v. Toring, et al.,[22] the Court stated
that:

Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to
them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could
testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the time of
marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity
already present at the time of marriage.[23]
G.R. No. L-26462 June 9, 1969
TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig Branch; VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY, in her own behalf and in her
capacity as Special Administratrix in the Intestate Estate of the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay and JESUS MONZON, MARY YAPTINCHAY ELIGIR, ERNESTO
YAPTINCHAY, ANTONIO YAPTINCHAY, ASUNCION YAPTINCHAY,
JOSEFINA Y. YAPTINCHAY, ROSA Y. MONZON, ISABEL Y. VALERIANO,
REMEDIOS Y. YAPTINCHAY, FELICIDAD Y. ARGUELLES, MARY DOE and
JOHN DOE,respondents.
V. E. del Rosario and Associates for petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The problem posed in this, an original petition for certiorari, is whether or not this
Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers should stake down as having been issued
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the respondent judge's order
of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873 (Court of First Instance of Rizal) directing
petitioner to deliver to Special Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of the estate of
the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the North Forbes Park property hereinafter
described, and to refrain from disturbing or interfering in any manner whatsoever with
the latter's possession thereof, such order having been amended by said respondent
judge's subsequent order of June, 28, 1966 in turn enjoining defendants in said case
(private respondents herein) and/or their duly authorized agents or representatives from
selling, disposing, or otherwise encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever
pending the termination of said case. We granted the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction prayed for and directed respondents to return the possession of the North
Forbes Park property to petitioner upon a P50,000-bond.
The controlling facts are the following:
On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as Special Administratrix
and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in
Hongkong on July 7, 1965. This is known in the record as Special Proceedings 1944-P.
Petitioner there alleged that the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her
continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for nineteen (19) years: from
1946 to 1964 at 1951 Taft-Avenue, Pasay City, and from 1964 to July 1965 at 60
Russel Avenue, Pasay City; that the deceased who died without a will left an estate
consisting of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and
other places with an estimated value of about P500,000; that to petitioner's knowledge
and information, the deceased left three daughters, Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary
Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion Yaptinchay, all of age; that on July 7, 8 and 11, 1965,
certain parties carted away from the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging
to the deceased together with others exclusively owned by petitioner. It was averred that
in these circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to take custody and
care of the interests of the deceased pending appointment of a regular administrator
became an urgent necessity.
Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued on July 17, 1965 an order appointing
herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix of the state of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a P25,000-bond.
To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered by Josefina Y.
Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children,
of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay,
not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the
settlement of the latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix
thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of years
said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity. At the
same time, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as special administratrix and of Josefina Y.
Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving spouse, as regular administratrix.
To give oppositors an opportunity to be heard, the probate court, on July 19, 1965, set
aside its order of July 17, 1965 appointing petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special
administratrix.
On July 30, 1965, after the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-
petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix upon a
P50,000-bond.1awphil.nêt
On August 18, 1965, the special administratrix submitted a preliminary inventory of the
assets of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay. Included amongst these was
"[a] bungalow residential house with swimming pool, situated at Park corner Talisay
Road, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal" adverted to at the start of this opinion.
It was after respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay had been appointed special
administratrix that herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay made her second move.
That was on August 14, 1965. This time, petitioner filed in another branch (Pasig
Branch) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for replevin and for liquidation
of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro
Y. Yaptinchay and for damages. This case was docketed as Civil Case 8873. 1 Pending
hearing on the question of the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary
injunction prayed for, respondent judge Guillermo E. Torres issued an order of August
17, 1965 temporarily restraining defendants therein (private respondents here) and their
agents from disposing any of the properties listed in the complaint and from interfering
with plaintiff's (herein petitioner's) rights to, and possession over, amongst others, "the
house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal."
On August 25, 1965, defendants (private respondents herein) resisted the action,
opposed the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction, mainly upon
these propositions: (1) that exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was already vested in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasay City Branch in the special proceedings heretofore mentioned (Special
Proceedings No. 1944-P); (2) that the present liquidation case was filed to oust said
probate court of jurisdiction over the properties enumerated in this, the second case
(Civil Case 8873); and (3) that plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy of injunction
prayed for, her alleged right sought to be protected thereby being doubtful and still in
dispute.
Said defendants (private respondents before this Court) in turn prayed the court for a
writ of preliminary injunction to direct plaintiff (petitioner here) and all others in her
behalf to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever defendant Virginia
Y. Yaptinchay's possession amongst others of the North Forbes Park house and to order
the removal from the premises of said North Forbes Park house of the guards, agents
and employees installed therein by plaintiff; to enjoin plaintiff and her agents from
entering the aforesaid house and any other real property registered in the name of Isidro
Y. Yaptinchay and from interfering with or from disturbing the exercise by Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay of her rights and powers of administration over the assets registered in the
name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and/or in the latter's possession at the time of his death.
Came the herein disputed order of June 15, 1966 issued in said Civil Case
8873, the pertinent portion of which reads: "From the pleadings as well as the
evidence already submitted and representations made to the court during the
arguments, it appears that one of the properties in dispute is the property
located at the corner of Park Road and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park,
Makati, Rizal which at the time of the death of the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay was still under construction and it also appears that after his death
said property was among the properties of the deceased placed under the
administration of the special administratrix, the defendant Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay. Information has been given that in the evening of August 14,
1965, the plaintiff was able to dispossess the special administratrix from the
premises in question and that since then she had been in custody of said house.
While the Court is still considering the merits of the application and counter-
application for provisional relief, the Court believes that for the protection of
the properties and considering the Forbes Park property is really under the
responsibility of defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by virtue of her being
appointed Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro
Yaptinchay, the Court denies the petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction of the plaintiff with respect to the Forbes Park property
and the restraining order issued by this Court is lifted. The Court also orders
the plaintiff to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever the
defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.
WHEREFORE, upon defendant's filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00,
let a writ of preliminary injunction is requiring the plaintiff, her representatives
and agents or other persons acting in her behalf to deliver the possession of the
property located at the corner of Park Road and Talisay Street, North Forbes
Park, Makati, Rizal to the Special Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, and
to refrain from disturbing interfering in any manner whatsoever defendant's
possession thereof.
Which, as aforestated, was amended by the court order of June 28, 1966, which in part
recites:
Considering that the present case treats principally with the liquidation of an
alleged partnership between the plaintiff and the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay
and considering further that said house in North Forbes Park is included among
the properties in dispute, the Court hereby clarifies its Order of June 15, 1966
by enjoining the defendants and/or their duly authorized agents or
representatives from selling, disposing or otherwise encumbering said property
in any manner whatsoever pending the termination of this case.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the June 15, 1966 order was overturned by respondent
judge's order of August 8, 1966, which recites that:
Considering that defendants, principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or
physical possession of the said properties which were formerly held by the
deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and the plaintiff, by virtue of her appointment and
under her authority, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased
Isidro Yaptinchay, the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.2
The orders of June 15 and August 8, 1966 triggered the present proceedings in this
Court.
1. Petitioner's stance before us is this: As she was occupying the Forbes Park property at
the time of the death of Isidro Yaptinchay, grave abuse of discretion attended
respondent judge's order issuing an injunctive writ transferring possession of said
property to respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.
A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that injunction is not to
be granted for the purpose of taking property out of possession and/or control of a party
and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not been clearly
established. 3 With this as guidepost, petitioner would have been correct if she were
lawfully in possession of the house in controversy when Civil Case 8873 (where the
injunctive writ was issued) was commenced in the Pasig court, and if respondent special
administratrix, to whom the possession thereof was transferred, were without right
thereto. But the situation here is not as petitioner pictures it to be. It is beyond debate
that with the institution on July 13, 1965 of Special Proceedings 1944-P, properties
belonging not only to the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay but also to the conjugal
partnership of said deceased and his legitimate wife, Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, 4 were
brought under the jurisdiction of the probate court, properly to be placed under
administration.5 One such property is the lot at North Forbes Park. 6
With respect to the Forbes Park house, petitioner offers varying versions. In the verified
petition before this Court, petitioner avers "that the construction of said North Forbes
Park property was undertaken jointly by petitioner and the deceased, petitioner
even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor." 7 This is a reproduction of an
allegation in petitioner's June 27, 1966 alternative motion for reconsideration or for
clarification/amendment of the herein controverted order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case
8873. 8 And again, in the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay dated August 3, 1965, she
spoke of the acquisition of properties, real and personal, in her own words, "through
our joint efforts and capital, among which properties are those situated" in "North
Forbes Park." 9 All of which contradict her averment in the amended complaint dated
October 25, 1965 — also verified — in said Case 8873 to the effect that she "acquired
through her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as ... the house now
standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal." 10
But herein private respondents vehemently dispute petitioner's claim of complete or
even partial ownership of the house. They maintain that the construction of that house
was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay without her (petitioner's)
intervention and the deceased paid with his own personal funds all expenses incurred in
connection with the construction thereof. 11
It was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the fact that after
the death of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the Forbes Park house "was among the properties of
the deceased placed under the administration of" respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay,
that respondent judge issued the injunction order of June 15, 1966 herein complained
of. Worth repeating at this point is that respondent judge, in his order of August 8, 1966,
declared that defendants (private respondents herein), "principally Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession", amongst others, of the North Forbes
Park house — "by virtue of her appointment and under her authority, as Special
Administratrix."
On this score, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for below.
2. As well established is the rule that the grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the
sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere
except in a clear case of abuse. 12
A considerate and circumspect view of the facts and circumstances in this case
obtaining will not permit us to tag the disputed order of June 15, 1966 with the vice of
grave abuse of discretion. It is quite true that, in support of the allegation that the house
in North Forbes Park was her exclusive property, petitioner presented proof in the form
of loans that she had contracted during the period when said house was under
construction. But evidence is wanting which would correlate such loans to the
construction work. On the contrary, there is much to the documentary proof presented
by petitioner which would tend to indicate that the loans she obtained from the Republic
Bank were for purposes other than the construction of the North Forbes Park home. And
this, we gather from pages 17 to 18 of petitioner's memorandum before this Court; and
the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, Annex A thereof, which states in its paragraph 4
that she obtained various loans from the Republic Bank "for her own exclusive account"
and that the proceeds thereof "were also used by affiant both for her business and for
the construction, completion and furnishing of the said house at North Forbes Park",
and which cites her seven promissory notes in favor of Republic Bank, Appendices 1 to
7 of said affidavit. Not one of the promissory notes mentioned reveals use of the
proceeds for the construction of the North Forbes Park house. On the contrary, there is
Appendix 2, the promissory note for P54,000 which says that the purpose of the loan for
"Fishpond development"; Appendix 3 for P100,000 for the same purpose; Appendix 5
for P50,000, "To augment working capital in buying & selling of appliances & gift
items"; and Appendix 7 for P1,090,000, "For Agricultural Development". In plain
terms, the fact alone of petitioner's indebtedness to the Republic Bank does not establish
that said house was built with her own funds.
It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park
house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the prima facie
presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or
of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage
with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the
control of the special administratrix.
3. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of
Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said Article 144 says that: "When man and a
woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership." .
But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged
in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be
shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One such
condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during
cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such
right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in
controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available
the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence of a clear
positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is
not to protect contingent or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract
right. 16

At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better
safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in the hands of the
bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be subject to
the control of the probate court.

Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein petition for
certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction 17 issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set aside.

Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107,
Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011
of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru
Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did
not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki
prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of
the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the
RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground
of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore
entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty
parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult
to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity
would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest
and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry)
of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the
Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The
Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or
annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local
registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The
petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely
erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own.
Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court
cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial
court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In
its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court
reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki
as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of
divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x
as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other
ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v.
The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza
ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground"
to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum
shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition
under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition
for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office
of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x
x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially
if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse"
who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be
a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present
case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the
civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family
Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive
for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him
the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted
any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no
reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his
or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the
rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an
official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan,
the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the
judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f
every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be
forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine
courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule
of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under
the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are
not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to
its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment,
it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts
of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or
Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime
of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the
spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On
the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to
the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for
bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of
a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband
or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the
purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-
Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a
real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous
marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is
effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of
foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his
or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s
decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the
marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not
contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy,
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy
as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only
remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and
the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected
in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition
of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal
Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of
prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections
4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City,
in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the
Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and
daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon
(Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth
Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as
SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each
other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned
the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico
(Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as
her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the
estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment
as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by
filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at
the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the
petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix
of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the
venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the
position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as
hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration
over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma.
Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of
₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating
the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that
Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common
residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975
up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the
RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August
2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT
ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO
ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE
QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
– Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor.13Even where the statute uses word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant."15In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and
the same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo
was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his
lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said
city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his
estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs
of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not
binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had
been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to
the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo
filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being
bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia
before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the
final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than
supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous
appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was
though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed
out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in
effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by
contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties
to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would
be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned
directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as
an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as
in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the
death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now
proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being
bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage
between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate
of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the
Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a
competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no
information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of
the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no
longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely
remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been
dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who
are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to
the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences
of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship
with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of
Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August
2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August
25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent
Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage
contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend
of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did
not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in
the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as
parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have
appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the
time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as
a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the
supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who
owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an
employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was
indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was
definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to
cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the
petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record
and rectify the terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of
the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor
General, the petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance
of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a
Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles
35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and
Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE
ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR
CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE
PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or
corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided
by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in
fact, the latter’s personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in
the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage
null and void ab initio.16Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the
decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are
raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the probative
value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or
not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure
question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship;
(l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending
such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case,
a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar
concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and
the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v.
Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate
adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the
trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish
the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the
inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by
the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make
orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss
the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that
her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or
if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that
when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was
married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife
portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-
respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule
108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of
the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in
the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a
document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence.
With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.23 The court
thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as
she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his
entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence
that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence"
of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that
Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify
the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and
all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent
indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of,
but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way,
declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in
SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria
Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry

cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4,
in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of
seven (7) months of prision correccionalas minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the
appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4)
years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with
each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete
from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they
became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant
to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on
August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on
January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of
nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case
for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No.
8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7)
Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayoras maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in
a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.
Gmur,9 which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial
court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law,
and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does
not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before
the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring
the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final
and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020
could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article
34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the
first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage
was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from
the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article
1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot
be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that
the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law
(such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.16 However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s
original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the
opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first
marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak
of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since
herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S
LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND
MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE
FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed
bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing.
The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction
or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished
under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal
intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between
the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an
intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in
the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our
ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully
prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the
Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone
is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was
in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by
his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we
must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision
in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing
the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the
Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage
contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing
of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The
trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles
322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that
such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for
all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage
as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken
from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long
become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity
of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this
argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to
Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In
the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as
"void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued
and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the
first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption
of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need
not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated

October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his
guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that
the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of
the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together
continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The
Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously
united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract
a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of
the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first
marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988,
with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were
validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable
her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He
further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no
record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54,
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for
lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND
THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A
QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY,
DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL
FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
 (1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies
the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is
an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence,
petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and
prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to
prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract
between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the
document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a
Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification
issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of
Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The
marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner
and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National
Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila
on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact
that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as
to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent
for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no
evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving
testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter,
Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first
marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first
marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the
first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-
existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3,
1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to
his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution
to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code.
What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s
valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since
a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned.
The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s
deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses,
which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks
the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are
classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties
and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal
(authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein
the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in
the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male
or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they
voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at
least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present
in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for
purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for
the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage
is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an
individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic
social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall
be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court
which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting
petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 183805, Jul 03, 2013 ]
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI v. PEOPLE +
DECISION
G.R. No. 183805
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution[2] dated
July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y.
Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.[3]
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a
pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of
Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is
declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as
a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in
view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or
incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on
the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of
the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss)
praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the
ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been
declared void by the RTC.
In an Order[4] dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner's
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a
decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-
Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and
Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among
others, that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the
issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case
would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties,
this Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by
the accused as it appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and
Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of
Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of
the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to
speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision[5] dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's
decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same
was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorarialleging that:

1. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER
DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY
AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID
ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE
IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO
CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE
CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION
WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND
PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND
VOID.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN
ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT
IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY
CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID
DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR
ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS
APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND
THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS
FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE
4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME
"CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF
THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED
IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN
THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.[8]
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the
second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.[9]
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present
when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999.
Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
marriage was celebrated.
SO ORDERED.
In Jarillo v. People,[10] the Court affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy ruling
that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question
in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner's innocence or
guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.[11]

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and
ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further
held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.[12]

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law.[13] It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was
committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner's second
marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated
December 17, 2009 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616.
The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to and receive
evidence on respondent's motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the
assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993,
respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a
petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with
Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003,
Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis
Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.7She thus filed a
Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9 for Bigamy committed
as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
being then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract
a second or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which
second/subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.10
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed
to present evidence to support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that
the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two
grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished.12
On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus
Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information – that there was a valid
marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been
dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime
of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on
the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of
nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order15 dated
February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court16 before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the
information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and
void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.17
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to and
receive evidence on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that
there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the
evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential
element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court further held that
respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such
doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the
petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable
declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him.21 The CA thus
concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to
quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not
charge an offense.22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING
RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED
MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY
ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S FIRST
MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT’S
CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID
JUDGMENT.23
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez
v. Cipriano,24 Teves v. People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the
subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001,
respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the
ground of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14,
2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however,
moved for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint
alleging that her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to the
filing of the bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of
their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006,
petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the
ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations.
On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court
eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their
marriage, respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007,
respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became
final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an
information for bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the
above cases. As in Antone and Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information
on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal
liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA,
however, reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an
Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence
aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered.27 To be sure, a
motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its
fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.29 If the motion to quash is sustained,
the court may order that another complaint or information be filed30 except when the
information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy.31
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the
sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all
the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 34932 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally
married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3)
that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with
Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is
null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an
evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a
first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This
should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion
to quash.34It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the
benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be
unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the
information on the basis of the document presented by respondent.35 With the
presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the
prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical
admission thereof.
Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his
marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration,
one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do
not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his
criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Court’s
pronouncement in Morigo v. People36where the accused therein was acquitted because
the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage
was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there
was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage.
Logically, the accused was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter.1âwphi1 A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.37 It has been held in a
number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.38
of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In
addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to
the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends
to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal
complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.42
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore,
immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for
Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to
the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters
of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.43
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to
quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No.
108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondent’s line of defense and
the CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and
hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him.41

Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information
against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and
the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration
of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin,
and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally)
who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s
family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February
1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against
the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During
the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in
the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and
8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of
Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground
that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a
valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for
the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered
properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the
seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in
her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the
trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also
denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals
never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the
pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several
opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September
2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008.
Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her
evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial
court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil
Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported
Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court
ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting
marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.
The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage
license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on
the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties
to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not
married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley
who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties
she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial
court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties
that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to
their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the
names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely
descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using
his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property
or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner
of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two
condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that
the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the
earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos.
61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute
his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that
Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial
court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal
ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO
on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and
VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties
under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in
Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623,
194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633,
194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211,
206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely:
Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B.
Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally
Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are
properties acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent,
hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently,
petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is
ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5)
properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No.
61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn
over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents
of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under
co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is
declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan.
The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre.
The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further
processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’
children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the
Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for
Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion.
Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision.
The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the
instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to
present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for
decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite
the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his
action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no
evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the
second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed
no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed
by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that
only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were
acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of
Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be
owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall
accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while
Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad
faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would
justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively,
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are
hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be
exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and
common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to
the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant
shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March
2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the
trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the
trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she
waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present
evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a
matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s
presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six
resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October
2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the
scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she
still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the
date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s
counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be
presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of
the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her
evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the
trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her
evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she
was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities
given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it
was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of
the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer
to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary
restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to
ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of
the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage
to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and
void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she
would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally
asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his
wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their
children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin
introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there
was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further
alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At
the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the
marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros),
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was
no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only
Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February
1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month.
Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local
civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any
suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage
contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management
and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J.
Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage
between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance
of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from
relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and
Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes
that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in
Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which
did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and
void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code,
a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no
license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established
that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did
not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts
under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did
not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision
stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be
gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the
decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or
former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and
there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract.
However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was
committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article
349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties
is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and
repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any
instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage
license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated
by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there
was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported
marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally
is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the
37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his
children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court
even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to
his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of
Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by
TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the
descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin"
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name
of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution
from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the
Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit
himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate
her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically
labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in
favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience
and sound discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there
must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in
addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In
this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting
the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his
prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would
justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23433 February 10, 1968 On April 17, 1964, defendant notified the court below of his intention to appeal to
this Court from the abovementioned orders of December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964,
GLORIA G. JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee, and March 9, 1964. The appeal bond and amended record on appeal, dated April 15,
vs. 1964, were thereafter approved.
RICARDO R. ROBLES, defendant-appellant.
It is noted that, as specified in the notice of appeal, defendant is taking exception
REYES J.B.L., J.: from the lower court's orders of December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9,
1964; however, there is no indication or certification or proof that the filing of the
appeal notice, bond and record on appeal on April 17, 1964 were made within the
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court an action for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles (Civ. reglementary period, as required by the provisions of Section 6, Revised Rule 41 of the
Case No. E-00013), on the ground that it was bigamous. It was alleged in the amended Rules of Court. Thereunder, the record on appeal must contain, not only the full names
of all the parties to the proceeding, as well as the pleadings, petitions, motions and
complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles
orders related to the order or judgment subject of the appeal and which are necessary for
had contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal
the proper understanding of the issue involved therein, but also "such data as will show
action for Bigamy against the same defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila
that the appeal was perfected on time." This requirement, incorporated in the new Rules
(Crim. Case No. 64124). Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and
of Court to enable the appellate courts to determine without protracted inquiry whether
exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that during their cohabitation,
an appeal was timely made or not, was held to be jurisdictional, failure to comply with
she was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature
which shall cause the dismissal of the appeal. 1 There is here no showing that the present
birth of their first child, who died three days later.
appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, which datum should have
appeared in the record on appeal.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged
plaintiffs' parents with having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to
On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly
contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a married
denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88
man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January, 1963 when
and 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a
he was finally able to get away and live apart from the plaintiff.
decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
no genuine issue of fact is involved in the case. It was claimed that defendant's
contention, that his consent to the marriage was secured by force and intimidation
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, this proceeding is hereby dismissed,
employed upon his person by the relatives of plaintiff, was allegedly supported by the
conformable to Section (a) of Revised Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and the judgment
joint affidavit of plaintiff's father and brother, dated October 28, 1963, attached to the
motion (pp. 22-32, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted the case appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
for judgment on the pleadings.

On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied,
the court ruling that before it can pass upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that when he contracted
marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage.
The evidentiary requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not met
in the motion for summary judgment. Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as
having been brought about by force and intimidation, was also denied, the court finding
indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of
said marriage. Reconsideration of this order, sought by defendant, was denied on
January 18, 1964. And, when both parties failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on
March 9, 1964, the court directed the dismissal of the action.
 G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974
ROMULO TOLENTINO, Petitioner, vs. HELEN VILLANUEVA and
HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, Respondents.
Magno T. Bueser for petitioner.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Petitioner prays for the nullification of the order dated July 29, 1963 of the respondent
Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his
marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained
through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that
private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her
prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as
immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and her
whereabouts remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she
is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City
Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September 28, 1959. Said case was docketed as Civil
Case No, 43347 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen
failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a
motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in
default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his
report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a negative
finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence;
and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the
complaint and such other documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information and
guidance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his
complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to
petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other
documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at 10:00
A.M.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal
Jose that he could not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the
respondent Judge to set the date for the reception of his evidence on the ground that the
City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty (60) days
from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the
complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner
unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to
report whether or not there is collusion between the
parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of
the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City
Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New
Civil Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied on July
29, 1963 and on April 11, 1964, petitioner now files his petition to annul said order of
July 29, 1963 and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition
of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-
appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff.
Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2,
shall be observed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that
the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines,
direct that actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless
the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved (Sec. 10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules of
Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1964 Revised Rules,
with "legal separation" being substituted for "divorce", obviously because the present
Civil Code does not authorize absolute divorce.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that
the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the
concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital
interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition
against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more
than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to
appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the
State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds (De Ocampo vs.
Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 38-40; Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia de
Cardenas vs. Cardenas, et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79; Roque vs. Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil.
643, 646).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without

merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED

AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST
PETITIONER.
GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941 Finding the appealed sentence adjusted to law, it must be confirmed, as we hereby
confirm, in all its parts, with the costs to the appellant. That's how it is ordered.
GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT, defendant-appealed.

D. Feliciano Leviste, D. Tomas P. Panganiban and Doña Sotera N. Megia on behalf of

the appellant.
Mrs. Luida Mangonon de Buccat in her own representation.

HORRILLENO, J .:

This matter has been raised to this Superiority by the Baguio Court of First Instance,
since it only raises a purely law issue.

On March 20, 1939, the plaintiff opened the case, in which the defendant did not
appear, despite having been duly summoned. Therefore, the plaintiff allowed to present
his evidence, the lower court ruled the matter in favor of the defendant. Hence this
appeal.

The plaintiff requests the annulment of his marriage with the defendant Luida
Mangonon de Buccat on November 26, 1938, in the City of Baguio, based on the fact
that, by consenting to said marriage, he did so because the defendant had assured him
that she was Virgin.

The following facts emerge from the decision of the lower Court:

The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After several interviews, both were
engaged on September 19 of the same year. On November 26 of the same year, the
plaintiff married the defendant in the Catholic cathedral of the City of Baguio. After
living together for eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth to a nine-month-old boy,
on February 23, 1939. As a result of this event, the plaintiff abandoned the defendant
and did not return to marital life with she.

We see no reason to revoke the appealed sentence. Indeed, it is unlikely that the
plaintiff and appellant allegation that he had not even suspected the taxed status of the
defendant, being this, as proven, in a very advanced pregnant condition. So there is no
place to estimate the fraud the appellant is talking about. The alleged by this in the
sense that it is not uncommon to find people with a developed abdomen, seems childish
to deserve our consideration, especially since the plaintiff was a first-year law student.

Marriage is a very sacred institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To

cancel it, clear and reliable evidence is necessary. There is no such evidence in this
matter.
G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for
annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the
ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo,
herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando
Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she was
pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their
marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was
conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to
prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither
appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that
he would present evidence on a later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court — noting that no birth certificate was presented to
show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and
holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute
such fraud sa would annul a marriage — dismissed the complaint. Through a verified
"petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the
certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955,
which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before
the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect
in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth
certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception
of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff
and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child
could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or
even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court,
nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered,
or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for
new trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following
documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and
plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant was living at the time plaintiff met,
courted and married her, and with whom defendant has begotten two more
children, aside from her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that
he is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he
and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's
marriage to defendant;
2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her
pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at
the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from
plaintiff before and up to the time of their marriage;
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino
and defendant lived together as husband and wife before December 27, 1954,
the date of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing
her date of birth to be April 26, 1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of
defendant with Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of
Cesar Aquino and defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to as
late as November, 1954, the November, 1954 photo itself does not show
defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost four months old at the
time the picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo
and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was representing the Government, to
answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer for new trial
until after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an
answer, and stating that it "does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion
and its annexes", the Court of Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From
that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition
for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint cannot be sustained.

Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is
ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In
the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed,
which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud,
plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to
be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage
of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement, however,
cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more
than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are
not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was
"naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even
on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below
the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen
so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on
the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p.
122) If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be
expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of
their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of
affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows
and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of
pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine,
Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).

The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to
have had sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could be
their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or
justification in the record.

Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken
together with what has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to
sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have
denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her
answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion,
especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government
precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and
its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In the
circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered.

Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a
quo for new trial. Without costs.
 [G.R. No. L-27930. November 26, 1970.]
AURORA A. ANAYA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FERNANDO O.
PALAROAN, Defendant-Appellee.
Isabelo V. Castro, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Arturo A. Romero, for Defendant-Appellee.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court, Manila, of a complaint for annulment of marriage, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. E-00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, Plaintiff, v. Fernando O.
Palaroan, Defendant."cralaw virtua1aw library
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora
and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando
filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered
therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the
validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV)
while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment,"
Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-
marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of
the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked
their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced .
. . frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from
going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted `FRAUD’, in
obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil
Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the annulment of the marriage
and for moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegations in paragraph IV of the
complaint and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he
averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from
her and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he
denied having committed any fraud against her. He set up the defenses of lack of cause
of action and estoppel, for her having prayed in Civil Case No. 21589 for the validity of
the marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had been granted her. He
counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did
not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the
alleged moral damages."cralaw virtua1aw library
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she
alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and
pretended to shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so but
because she merely happened to be the first girl available to marry so he could evade
marrying the close relative of his whose immediate members of her family were
threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative);
"(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not
because he loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the
marital duties and obligations appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made
up his mind not to live with her;
"(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely
concretized for him, when in order to placate and appease the immediate members of
the family of the first girl (referent being the close relative) and to convince them of his
intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a courtship with a third girl with whom,
after gaining the latter’s love cohabited and had several children during the whole range
of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated between them (parties);"
(Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26
August 1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expediente, the court
realized that Aurora’s allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her
marriage, and, on the authority of Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168,
holding:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the
courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation,
or annulment of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no
such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record." —
the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be
dismissed. Plaintiff Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but the
court found it inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the
dismissal of the complaint; it also denied reconsideration.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-
marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in
marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the
Civil Code, which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage
"(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;"
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of
fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband.
"No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage."cralaw virtua1aw library
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as
ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the
fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one
given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable
marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85,
for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But
Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds
(misrepresentation as to identity, nondisclosure of a previous conviction, and
concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all other
frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds
was followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage."cralaw virtua1aw library
Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one
of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is
further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel
having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the
she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The
lawmaker’s intent being plain, the Court’s duty is to give effect to the same, whether it
agrees with the rule or not.
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-
divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the pre-marital relationship of her husband
with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her
reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with
his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in ignoring these allegations in
her reply.
This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and absence
of intention to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of
action." According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations is "apart, distinct
and separate from that earlier averred in the Complaint . . ." (Record on Appeal, page
76). Said allegations were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a
reply a party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of action as set
forth in his complaint (Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow
such party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the
series of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret
intention on the husband’s part not to perform his marital duties must have been
discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on
that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since
appellant’s wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only
pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.

JUAN SISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FAUSTINO RAMOS, Defendant-Appellee.
TORRES, J. :
On the 24th of August, 1906, counsel for the plaintiff, Juan Sison, presented a written
complaint against Faustino Ramos, alleging that plaintiff owned in the sitio of Tabao,
barrio of Magallanes, town of Sagay, Occidental Negros, a tract of land, 94 hectares, 39
ares, and 25 centares in extent, the boundaries of which are described in the complaint;
the said land formerly belonged to Pedro Catalbas, as shown by a title issued by the
Government and recorded in the registry of property although later by a judicial
decision it became the property of Mariano Devesa, from whom it was ultimately
bought by the plaintiff; that the defendant Faustino Ramos, a resident of Sagay and
brother-in-law of Pedro Catalbas, occupied, and by mere tolerance was allowed to live
on a parcel of the said tract of land of about 5 hectares, more or less, which forms an
integral portion of the property described in the complaint, wherein are described the
boundaries of the 5 hectares usurped; that in May, 1905, on the defendant being
requested by the plaintiff to vacate the parcel occupied by him, he refused to do so,
alleging right of ownership over the same, and ever since he has continued to
unlawfully occupy it and to receive the benefits and fruits therefrom, inasmuch as the
said parcel is planted with coconut palms and bamboo, which at the present time yield
P200 profits in coconuts, P90 in tuba, and P60 in bamboo — that is to say, a total of
P350 — and through the illegal retention of the said parcel, the plaintiff has been
subjected to loss and damages to the extent of P500; therefore, he prayed that judgment
be entered against the defendant, ordering the restoration of the said parcel of land to
the plaintiff, and sentencing him to pay the sum of P850 for loss and damages, and also
the costs of the proceedings.
Counsel for Faustino Ramos, the defendant, answered the complaint on October 1,
1908, and denied each and every one of the allegations thereof, and in defense alleged
that the parcel in question did not measure 5 hectares, but that it had approximately an
area of 3 cavanes, and that the said land as well as the coconut palms, bamboo, and
other useful trees planted thereon are of the exclusive and absolute ownership of the
defendant who has been in the possession thereof since the year 1884, the date of the
purchase thereof from the original owners, and that up to the present day he has been in
the quiet, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession thereof; the defendant therefore prayed
that he be absolved of the complaint and that costs be adjudged in his favor, without
prejudice to any further remedy that might be just and equitable.
By a writing dated February 25, 1907, the plaintiff Sison prayed the court below to
issue an injunction to restrain the defendant from cutting down any useful plants or trees
on the land in question, and that the letter be finally sentenced as prayed for in the
complaint.
At the trial, evidence was adduced by both parties to the suit, and the documents
exhibited by them were made of record; on February 29, 1908, the trial judge rendered
judgment, holding that the parcel of land claimed in paragraph 3 of the complaint was
the property of the defendant, Faustino Ramos. The writ of prohibition issued against
him was thereupon annulled and he was absolved of the complaint with the costs in his
favor.
On being notified of the above decision, the plaintiff, by a petition dated March 3, 1908,
moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was not in consonance with the
facts and the principles of law indicated, and that, therefore, said decision was unlawful;
his motion was overruled to which the plaintiff excepted three days later, and in due
course presented the corresponding bill of exceptions.
In order that an action for recovery, which is that which the plaintiff, Juan Sison, has
brought, may prosper, it is indispensable, according to the constant jurisprudence of the
courts, that whoever brings it must fully prove, not only his dominion over the thing
claimed, but also the identity of the same.
The plaintiff endeavors to procure from the defendant, Faustino Ramos, the delivery or
restoration of a parcel of land 5 hectares in extent, or, according to the latter, of 3
cavanes, which, the plaintiff says, forms an integral portion of his Hacienda Antipolo,
which consists of more than 94 hectares of land. He has not, however, satisfactorily
substantiated his claim, as it appears from the evidence submitted that the parcel of land
described in the complaint is owned by the defendant Ramos, who has possessed it as
owner since 1884, in which year he acquired one portion of the land from Constantina
Gereos and the other portion from Raymundo Lobaton, as appears from the documents
A and B, the authenticity of which has been proven by the testimony of proper
witnesses, who also testified to the possession of the defendant as owner of the property
in question.
Hence, it is an unquestionable fact, admitted by the plaintiff and his witnesses, that the
defendant possessed the above-mentioned parcel of land, although it was alleged that
the latter, as brother-in-law of the original owner, Pedro Catalbas, was occupying it by
mere sufferance of the latter; he was requested by the administrator of said hacienda,
Pedro Arellano, to vacate the parcel of land, but Ramos, refused to do so, alleging that it
belonged to him.
Against the assertion, which has not, however, been proven, that the possession of the
parcel of land in question on the part of the defendant was a precarious one, the case
furnishes conclusive evidence that the said defendant Ramos had acquired the said
parcel of land in two portions by means of proper conveyances from the original owners
thereof since 1884, and that ever since that time he has exercised over the property real
acts of ownership, and that as such owner he has been in peaceful and public
possession, without any interruption whatever, for more than twenty-one years. (Art.
348, Civil Code.)
The fact that the said parcel of land was included in the title which Pedro Catalbas
obtained by composicion from the Government for the large tract of land which
afterwards formed the Hacienda Antipolo, does not prejudice or interfere with the rights
of the defendant Ramos, because, apart from the fact that such inclusion is rationally
explained by the relationship existing between Catalbas and Ramos, who are brother-in-
law, and of the natural desire of the latter to avoid heavy expense in securing title deeds
for such a small parcel of land, the son of the former, Quintin Catalbas, as attorney-in-
fact for his father, and in his own name, acknowledged to Ramos, as he had promised to
do, that the parcel in question, which was included in the title of his father, Pedro
Catalbas, was the exclusive property of his uncle, Faustino Ramos, as proven by the
document marked Exhibit C, drawn up by the said attorney-in-fact, and which is
literally as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned, as attorney-in-fact of Sr. Pedro Catalbas, declares that Sr. Faustino
Ramos, residing in the town of Sagay, owns one parcel of land included in the royal title
of the said Sr. Catalbas, measuring three hectares more or less, planted with bamboo;
the said parcel is bounded on the north by the beach; on the south by lands of Sr.
Catalbas and the road leading to Tabao; on the west by lands of Sra. Leoncia Catalbas
and Sr. Mariano de la Paz; and on the east by lands of the said Sr. Catalbas.
"In witness whereof, as such attorney-in-fact I issue the present in Sagay on the 10th of
August 1902. — pp. Pedro Catalbas." — An unintelligible signature follows. — (The
words one year, corrected.)
Quintin Catalbas having before him the document lettered C, said that the signatures
which appeared at the foot of the same appeared to be his own, and although he said
that he did not recollect having signed such a document, he added that he remembered
signing many documents in favor of the defendant, and that he was actually attorney-in-
fact for his father by virtue of a power of attorney executed by the latter in 1898, a date
long prior to that of the said document.
The case does not present any rational or legal reason opposed to the action of the lower
court in adjudging that the signatures of Quintin Catalbas, as affixed to the said
document marked C are genuine and authentic, in view of those written by him in the
presence of the court, with which they were compared; and on his part, the defendant
affirmed under oath that he had received the said document from Quintin Catalbas
signed by him. The witnesses Mariano Paz and Joaquin Galicia recognized the
signatures as those of Quintin Catalbas, and the witness first named furthermore avers
that he was present when Quintin signed the aforesaid document.
Therefore, the dominion of the defendant over the land in question has also been duly
recognized by Pedro Catalbas through his attorney-in-fact, and for this reason, when the
ownership of the Hacienda Antipolo was transferred to Mariano Devesa, and
subsequently to Juan Sison, the parcel of land of said defendant was not included;
indeed, according to the affidavit filed by the original owner, Pedro Catalbas, and
certain proceedings for the attachment of said property, certified copies of which were
produced at the trial, this land is cited as one of the adjoining properties to the said
hacienda.
Moreover, the ownership alleged by the defendant appears corroborated, without any
sort of contradiction, by the contents of the certified copies of the proceedings that were
offered in evidence at the trial as Exhibit F, from which it appears, that, as the said
parcel of land was attached as the property of Juan Sison, bondsman of Enrique
Catalbas, and principal insolvent debtor, the defendant Faustino Ramos, as owner of the
land, and third party whose prejudice was at issue, objected to the levy and on the 20th
February, 1906, moved for the release of the attachment; the sheriff was obliged to
accede to the claim and admit the right of the intervening party; in view thereof the
municipal president, on the motion of the sheriff, ordered by means of a commissioner
the return and delivery of the property to Ramos, the intervener.
In view of the allegations of the defendant in defense of his rights, that as such owner he
has been in the quiet, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the said parcel of land
from 1884, in which year he purchased it from the original owners, up to the present
day, the court below rightly considered, that even supposing that Catalbas and his
successors were the owners of the land claimed (and it has been seen that the contrary is
the case), Ramos has acquired the ownership by prescription through possession for
more than twenty years with good faith and by virtue of a just title; which is the nature
of the legal means for the acquisition of real estate as contained in the documents
marked A and B. The fact that the latter are merely private documents is not a bar to the
consideration of the contracts contained in them as a just title.
In the decision rendered in case No. 4274, Alano v. Babasa (10 Phil. Rep., 511), the
following rule was laid dow:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Essential elements of a contract. — A contract in which the three requisites imposed
by article 1261 of the Civil Code are present is valid, perfect, and efficient, and,
notwithstanding the fact that it was drawn up in the form of a private document, it is,
however, binding as provided by article 1278 of said code.
"Contract: public or private document; registration. — The legalization by a public
writing and the recording of the same in the registry are not essential requisites of a
contract entered into, as between the parties, but mere conditions of form or solemnities
which the law imposes in order that such contract may be valid as against third persons,
and to insure that a publicly executed and recorded agreement shall be respected by the
latter."cralaw virtua1aw library
In its decision of July 12, 1904, the supreme court of Spain, in applying certain articles
of the Civil Code in force in these Islands which relate to this case laid down the
following rule:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That, as it has been repeatedly held by the supreme court, it is not within the scope of
article 1280 to require, in order to prove the dominion, that a contact shall appear in a
public instrument, inasmuch as according to article 1278, all contracts which contain the
conditions of validity to which article 1261 refers, produce full effect as between the
contracting parties, without prejudice to their right to demand and obtain that they be set
out in a public instrument as provided by article 1279; the absence of said requisite can
not be availed by either of such parties, and much less by a third person, to deny the
existence and reality of the contract when it is supported by elements of proof
admissible in law."cralaw virtua1aw library

Even supposing that the plaintiff Sison, who succeeded Devesa and Catalbas in the
dominion of the Hacienda Antipolo, was the lawful owner of the parcel of land sued for
— an unfounded supposition, as has already been demonstrated — the provisions of
article 1949 of the Civil Code and article 35 of the Mortgage Law do not include or
affect the lawful owner of the realty or right that is the object of the prescription, nor
those who derive their rights from him; by the said article of the special law the lawful
owner of the property is not considered as a third person, as held by the supreme court
in its decision of January 11, 1888, because the precept of the code is only efficacious
with respect to third persons so qualified in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law; and it does not nor can it in any manner govern with respect to the
owner of the property that is the subject of prescription, or his successors, by universal
or separate title; by the common law the time for prescription to the prejudice of the
same shall be counted as provided for by the fourth and last paragraph of article 35 of
said law, which is an exception to the rule contained in article 27, that is to say, from
the commencement of the possession under title of ownership, although the title by
virtue of which it prescribed may not have been registered.

It should also be noticed that the title by composicion of Pedro Catalbas is the only one
which appears to have been temporarily recorded in the registry, while those of the later
acquisition by Mariano Devesa and Juan Sison do not seem to have been so recorded;
for this reason the latter, as plaintiff, can not be considered as a third person, as
described in the Mortgage Law, in view of the fact that his title was not recorded; but
even if it had been recorded, the plaintiff, as he pretended owner of the land in question
is not comprehended in the said articles of the code and Mortgage Law, as such third
person, and prescription to his prejudice is in accordance with the law even by virtue of
titles not recorded in the registry of property, and those contained in the said documents
A and B of the defendant.

With the foregoing, it has been demonstrated, in our opinion, how unfounded are the
errors attributed to the judgment appealed from, and it should be noted that though the
ownership of the property unduly claimed by the plaintiff was satisfactorily proven,
nevertheless, this decision has dwelt on the questions set up by said plaintiff relative to
the prescription and to matter of third persons whose rights might be affected by such
prescription, for the reason that it is so required by the nature and the conditions of a
decision rendered on appeal to the second instance, as in this case.

In view of the foregoing considerations and of those contained in the judgment of the
court below, it is our opinion that the same should be and hereby is affirmed with costs.
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960 examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from
the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the
REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant. strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant. wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent during
the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
appellant. Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is
PADILLA, J.: the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about
of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The
incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the
plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable
Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in
question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and
small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition
seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist;
established, becase from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the
and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had
decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined
been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the
or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit
Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see
to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court
that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17
December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination.
physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical
presumption is in favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is
certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that
five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that
her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate have bound them together as husband and wife.
would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the
evidence presented by her husband would be rendered. The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court costs.
entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26
April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus
entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined
because she had refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the
Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a
physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be
reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to
collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He
prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical
 [G.R. No. L-8492. February 29, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of: LOURDES G.
LUKBAN, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellee.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration
that Petitioner is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be
dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized
by law. After Petitioner had presented her evidence, the court sustained the opposition
and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.
Lourdes G. Lukban, Petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on
December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same
year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not been heard
from despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parents
and friends but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he
is still alive, his last known address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that
he is already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years, and because
she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she
may be relieved of any liability under the law.
We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case
of Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup., 243, wherein it was held that a petition for
judicial declaration that Petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made
in a special proceeding similar to the present, much less can the court determine the
status of Petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact
of death of the husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to
decree that he is merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st sup.
243).
The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in a
proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we there said
that “A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be
a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be
the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass cralaw. It is,
therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because
he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.”
Appellant claims that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in the present
proceedings because in the case of Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880, it was declared
that a special proceeding is “an application or proceeding to establish the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact”; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut, as already said, that
remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of the husband,
and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of death. If it can be
satisfactorily proven that the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny a
declaration to that effect as has been intimated in the case of Nicolas Szartraw, supra.
Appellant also claims that the present petition can be entertained because article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, in defining bigamy, provides that a person commits that crime
if he contracts a second marriage “before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” and, it
is claimed, the present petition comes within the purview of this legal provision. The
argument is untenable for the words “proper proceedings” used in said article can only
refer to those authorized by law such as those which refer to the administration or
settlement of the estate of a deceased person (Articles 390 and 391, new Civil Code).
That such is the correct interpretation of the provision in question finds support in the
case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil., 179, wherein this Court made the following
comment:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has
been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of
the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).”
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-14058 March 24, 1960
In the matter of the petition for the declaration of William Gue, presumptively
dead. ANGELINA L. GUE,petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Virgilio V. David for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor E. M. Salva for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by
Judge Bonifacio Ysip, dismissing the petition of Angelina Gue. Involving as it does
only question of law, the appeal was taken directly to us.
On November 20, 1957, Angelina L. Gue filed a petition in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Civil Case No. 34303, alleging that she was married to William Gue; that
they had a child named Anthony L. Gue; that January 5, 1946, her husband left Manila
where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China, but since then, he had not been
heard of, neither had he written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his
whereabouts; that despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him; and that
they had not acquired any property during the marriage. She asked the court for a
declaration of the presumption of death of William Gue, pursuant to the provisions of
Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. After due publication and hearing, the
trial court issued the order of dismissal, which we reproduce below:
This is a petition filed by Angelina L. Gue to declare her husband. William
Gue, presumptively dead. During the hearing of this petition, it was established
by the testimony of the petitioner that she and her husband were married on
October 11, 1944 in the City of Manila before the parish priest of Tondo,
Manila, as shows in Exhibit B, the marriage contract. Her husband, who is a
Chinese citizen, left the Philippines for Shanghai on January, 1946. The
petitioner joined him in Shanghai in August of the same year. In January,
1949, the petitioner came back to the Philippines alone with her children, on
which occasion her husband promised to follow her. However, up to the
present time, said William Gue has not returned to the Philippines. From
January, 1949, the petitioner had sent letters to her husband in Shanghai, but
she never received any reply thereto. She made inquiries from the Bureau of
Immigration in 1955 and 1958 as to whether her husband had already returned
to the Philippines and she received Exhibit D and Exhibit E from said Office,
which gave no information as to the whereabouts of her husband. It was also
established by petitioner's testimony that no properties have been acquired by
said spouses during their union, and during which they begot two children,
named Eugeni and Anthony, surnamed Gue.
With this evidence on record and considering the allegations in the petition, it
is clear that no right had been established by the petitioner upon which a
judicial decree may be predicated, and this action is not for the settlement of
the estate of the absentee, as it is clear that he did not leave any.
In the case of "Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw", 81
Phil., 461, a case similar to the present, the Supreme Court held:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because
it does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and
because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner.
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the
court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been
unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise
and be invoked and made in a case, whether in an action or in a special
proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a special
proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner for the final determination of his right or status or
for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil.,
880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at
securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension
cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration
that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even
if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a
presumption is established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect,
even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is
still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a
case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide
finally the controversy the right or status of a party or established finally a
particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise;
and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment or such right or
status is determined, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or
the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a
particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a
few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a
judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to
contrary proof cannot reach the state of finality or become final. Proof of
actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in
seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person
presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years,
cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary
 period within which an appeal may be taken, for such a presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a
declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to
perform a superfluous and meaningless act.
"Little effort is necessary to perceive that a declaration such as the one prayed
for by the petitioner, if granted, may make or lead her to believe that the
marital bonds which binds her to her husband are torn asunder, and that for
that reason she is or may feel free to enter into a new marriage contract. The
framers of the rules of court, by the presumption provided for in the rule of
evidence in question, did not intend and mean that a judicial declaration based
solely upon that presumption may be made. A petition for a declaration such as
the one filed in this case may be made in collusion with the other spouse. If
that were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot be obtained or granted
under the provisions of the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily be
secured by means of a judicial decree declaring a person unheard from in
seven years to be presumptively dead. This is another strong reason why a
petition such as the one presented in this case should not be countenanced and
allowed. What cannot be obtained directly under the provisions of the Divorce
Law could indirectly be secured under the provisions of Rule 123, section 69
(x). Obviously, the latter must not be made to prevail over the former."
In view of the foregoing and the doctrine of the Supreme Court laid down in
the case above-cited, the Court hereby orders that this case be, as it is hereby
dismissed, without pronouncement as the costs.
In her appeal, Angelina invoked the provisions of the Article 390 of the New Civil
Code, which for purpose of reference, we reproduce below.
ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not
the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening this
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
She contends that under Article 191 of the Old Civil Code, which reads:
After thirty years have elapsed since disappearance of the absentee, or since he
was last heard from, or ninety years from his birth, the judgment upon the
petition of any party lawfully interested, shall make an order declaring that
such absentee is presumed to be dead.
a person could be declared presumptively dead, but that said legal provision was
repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure and continued to be repealed by the Rules of
Court. Consequently, only a mere disputable presumption of death was available to any
party, and that the case of Nicolai Szatraw, cited by the trial court, was decided on the
law then existing, namely, the Code of Civil Procedure, and later the new Rules of
Court. However, according to appellant, with the promulgation of the New Civil Code
in 1950, particularly, Article 390 thereof, the Courts are now authorized to declare
persons presumptively dead.
In answer to her contention, the Solicitor General, as appellee herein, correctly cites our
decision in the recent case of Lourdes G. Lukban vs. Republic of the Philippines, 98
Phil., 574; 52 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1441, decided long after the New Civil Code went into
effect, wherein we reiterated the doctrine laid own in Nicolai Szatraw, supra. We quote
the pertinent portions of our decision in that case:
This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration
that petitioner is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed
to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not
authorized by law. After petitioner had presented her evidence, the court
sustained the opposition and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.
Lourdes G. Lukban, petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco
Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On
December 27, of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel
and since then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her.
She also inquired about him from his parents and friends but no one was able
to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last
known address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is
already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years, and
because she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined
in order that she may be relieved of any liability under the law.
We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in
the case of Nicolai Szatraw, 46 Off. Gaz. 1st Sup. 243, wherein it was held that
a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be
dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such
declaration cannot be made in a special proceedings similar to the present,
much less can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this
matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the
court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely
presumed to be dead. (Nicolai Szatraw, 48 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup. 243).
 The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be
made in a proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case above-cited.
Thus, we there said that "A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final
and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a
case, or upon which a competent court has to pass .. It is, therefore, clear that a
judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to
contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final."

We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of the case. The appealed order
dismissing the petition is hereby affirmed, with costs.