Professional Documents
Culture Documents
An administrative complaint filed by the spouses Virgilio and Angelina Aranda (spouses Aranda) before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, charging their former counsel, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda (Atty.
Elayda), with gross negligence or gross misconduct in handling their case. The spouses Aranda were the defendants in
Civil Case filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72.The spouses Aranda hired Atty Elayda
to be their counsel for their civil case. They filed a complaint against the respondent for his failure to follow elementary
norms and civil procedure and evidence. However, to their surprise in July 2006, an adverse judgment was issued against
them, thus they lost possession of their car. Apparently, their counsel never appeared in court for them. Atty. Elayda
failed to inform the spouses of the date of hearing as well as the order of judgment. No motion for reconsideration or
appeal was interposed by the lawyer as well.In his defense, Atty. Elayda said that it was the spouses who never went to
court; that the spouses neglected to check on their case in court; that one time when their case was scheduled, he even
notified the court stenographer to notify him if the spouses are in court so that he could be there for them as he was in
another court branch for another case.An investigation was conducted and the result finding Atty. Elayda guilty of gross
negligence.
HELD: Yes. It was established that Atty. Elayda was remiss and negligent in handling the Aranda case. Although it is true
that the client and their counsel must equally share the burden of communication, it is the primary duty of the counsel
to inform the client of the status of their case in court and the orders which have been issued by the court. He cannot
simply wait for his clients to make an inquiry about the developments in their case. Close coordination between counsel
and client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the
case. His act is clearly a violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As stated on the Canon,
a lwayer shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him and he shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.His excuse that he did not appear in court because the spouses failed to appear in court is not tenable. His
attendance at the hearing should not be made to depend on the whether the spouses Aranda will come or not.ATTY.
EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
Facts:
Petitioner Marciano P. Brion, Jr., in this petition for disbarment, avers that respondent violated the court’s decree of
perpetual disqualification imposed upon respondent Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. (in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo
Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr.) from assuming any post in government service, including any posts
in government-owned and controlled corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member
of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal consultancy
agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a Special Consultancy Agreement.
Respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as well as the Special Consultancy Contract.
However, he raises the affirmative defense that under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 27,
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Series of 1993, services rendered pursuant to a consultancy contract shall not be considered government services, and
therefore, are not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has transgressed the letter and spirit of the court’s decree in the Atienza case.
Held:
By performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual employee, albeit in the guise of an advisor or
consultant, respondent has transgressed both letter and spirit of the Court’s decree in Atienza.
The Court finds that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and functions of a non-advisory nature,
which pertain to a contractual employee of LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his reply, there is a difference between a
consultant hired on a contractual basis (which is governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s. 1993) and a contractual employee
(whose appointment is governed, among others, by the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointment and other Personnel
Actions). The lawyer’s primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. That duty in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the
legal orders of the courts. Respondent’s disobedience to this Court’s order prohibiting his reappointment to any branch,
instrumentality, or agency of government, including government owned and controlled corporations, cannot be
camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a special consultancy contract.
Hence, Atty. Brillantes was suspended and ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00).
Facts:
· Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October 1970 in Cebu City. Magdalena was a medical
technology student while Segundino was a law student.
· On March 1971, Magdalena and Segundino had sexual congress. Thereafter, they had repeated acts of
cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.
· In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his studies to Dava City.
· Magdalena discovered in January 1973 that she was pregnant. The two went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz to
apprise Magdalena’s parents that they were married although they were not. The respondent convinced Magdalena’s
father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations where he secured his birth
certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
· Segundino reassured Magdalena that he would marry once he passed the bar examinations. The latter gave birth
to their child on September 4, 1973.
· Segundino passed the bar examinations that was released April 25, 1975. After the oathtaking, Segundino stopped
corresponding with Magdalena. Magdalena went to Davao to contat Segundino. Segundino told her that they could not
get married for lack of money.
· In December 1975 Magdalena followed Segundino in Bukidnon only to find out that their marriage could not take
place because he had married Erlinda Ang.
· Segundino followed Magdalena in Davao and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation
with his wife, Erlinda Ang.
· Magdalena Arciga then filed a disbarment case on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to
fulfill his promise of marriage to her.
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Issue: Whether or not Segundino Maniwang should be disbarred on the ground of grossly immoral conduct.
Ruling: No, Segundino Maniwang shouldn’t be disbarred. The Supreme Court found that respondent’s refusal to marry
the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. The complaint for disbarment against
the respondent is hereby dismissed.
Facts:
According to the complainant, respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the
attorney’s fees, the latter would received in representing Spouses Yap whom he referred, in an action for partition of the
estate of the spouses’ relative. Their agreement was reflected in a letter dated 11 August 1995. However, respondent
failed to pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney’s fees amounting to 17% of the total estate
or about PhP 40 million. Instead, the complainant was informed through a letter dated 16 July 1997 that Spouses Yap
assumed to pay the same after the respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney’s fees from 25% to 17%. He then
demanded the payment of his commission which the respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that the respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of his
profession for having abandoned his legal wife with whom he has two children, and cohabited with another with whom
he has four children. He also accused the respondent of engaging in money-lending business without the required
authorization from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
In his defense, the respondent disputed the 11 August 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that the Spouses
Yap assumed to pay.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pefianco is in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Lawyer’s Oath.
Held:
Respondent’s defense that forgery of the 11 August 1995 letter was belied by his 16 July 1997 admitting to have
undertaken the payment of the complaint’s commission but passing on the responsibility to the Spouses Yap. Clearly,
the respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the CPR which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide
a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case
at bar.
Furthermore, the respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his
mistress with whom he begot four children. The Supreme Court found credence to IBP’s findings that the respondent
violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR.
The respondent was found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath; Rule 1.01, Canon 1; and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
CPR. The respondent was suspended from active practice of law for one year.
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Cordova v. Cordova
I. Terms
Held: Yes. He was suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence that he has continued supporting his family, and has
given up immoral conduct.
As a requirement to the admission in the Bar, a candidate must show that he is of good moral character. As held in In
Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the continued possession ... of a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " Good moral
character is not limited to the discharge of one’s duties as a laywer.
Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations
before his own daughter and the community at large.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
(Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
In 1918, Marcelino Lontok was convicted of the crime of bigamy. The SC affirmed the decision. In 1921, he was granted
pardon by the Governor-General on condition that he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct.
The Attorney General, however, seeks to have Lontok disbarred because he has convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. He contends that while the pardon removes the legal infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain.
Lontok, on the other hand, contends that the pardon reaches the offense for which he was convicted and blots it out so
that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.
Held:
No. "A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is
an innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and
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disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity.
There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interest vested in others
in consequence of the conviction and judgement." (Ex parte Garland [1866], 4 Wall., 380)
Petition of the Attorney-General denied. However, if Marcelino Lontok should again be guilty of any misconduct, the
condition of his pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject to disbarment. (In Re: Lontok, April 7,
1922, 43 Phil 293)
-no digest
IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES AC NO. 439, SEPTEMBER 30, 1982
Facts
This is a petition filed by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the practice of law and the inclusion of his
name in the roll of attorneys after having served his sentence for being convicted of falsification of public document
wherein the court found that petitioner, as a member of the bar and in his capacity as a notary public, acknowledged the
execution of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for
probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the genuineness of the document was impugned by the
forced heirs of the alleged testatrix, and the court, finding that the document was a forgery, denied probate to the will.
On December 27, 1967, petitioner was granted by the President of the Philippines "absolute and unconditional pardon"
and restored him "to full civil and political rights.
Since August 23, 1968, petitioner had repeatedly sought readmission to the practice of law, the first of which was denied
by this Court in a minute resolution dated August 30, 1968.
On December 12, 1977, he filed another petition, attaching thereto copies, among others, of the following documents,
to wit: the resolution of the Negros Oriental Bar Association signed by 78 members thereof, indorsing his plea for
reinstatement.
It may be recalled that on January 17, 1978, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar transmitted to the Honorable
Supreme Court for its favorable consideration the above stated petition for reinstatement.
Subsequent to its being served with a copy of the resolution of the Supreme Court, the Integrated Bar received a
petition dated February 14, 1978 signed by 'the people of the Municipality of Bindoy, Province of Negros Oriental'
vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces in the Roll of Attorneys accusing the lawyer of having a querida
and misbehaviours.
Issue
Held
The Court sustains the conclusion of the Solicitor General that petitioner has sufficiently proven himself fit to be
readmitted to the practice of law. True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by the President does not of itself
warrant his reinstatement.
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has
received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements of reinstatement had been held to be the same as for
original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original evidence.
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The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is whether applicant is 'of good moral character' in the sense
in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the
privileges of the office of an attorney. Petitioner's conduct after disbarment can stand searching scrutiny. He has
regained the respect and confidence of his fellow attorneys as well as of the citizens of his community. The favorable
indorsements of both the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its Negros Oriental Chapter, the testimonials expressed
in his behalf by the provincial governor of Negros Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, his active participation in civic and social undertakings in the community attest to his moral reform and
rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement. Petitioner, now 69 years of age, has reached the twilight of his life. He has
been barred from the practice of his profession for a period of 21 years. Adequate punishment has been exacted.
Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges with all his honor ... that if reinstated in the roll
of attorneys he will surely and consistently conduct himself honestly, uprightly and worthily." Indeed, there is
reasonable expectation that he will endeavor to lead an irreproachable life and maintain steadfast fidelity to the
lawyer's oath.