Emilia R. Hernandez v. Atty.

Venancio Padilla
A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012, J. Sereno, Second Division
FACTS:
Complainant Emilia Hernandez filed a disbarment case against her lawyer,
Atty. Venacio Padilla for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case. She
alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Padilla on appeal on an ejectment
case, and the latter filed a memorandum on appeal, instead of a notice of appeal,
causing their [with her husband] appeal to be dismissed. No MR was also filed.
She also alleges that respondent never informed them of the adverse decision on
their case.
Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of the complainant and
he only met her husband. According to him, complainant’s husband asked and
pleaded him to prepare a memorandum on appeal because the appeal period
would lapse within two or three days. Thus, he honestly believed that a
memorandum on appeal is the required pleading. According to respondent, it is
no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer
for a fee, thus no client-lawyer relationship was established. In fact, as proof
thereof, thereafter, the complainant’s husband never contacted him.
ISSUES:
WON respondent is liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
Yes. A perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court
revealed that respondent had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants
therein, including complainant and her husband. As to the alleged non-existence
of lawyer-client relationship; acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s
cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the
client with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.
Moreover, regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be
necessary, it was respondent’s duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in
appeals from RTC decisions
Respondent as a litigator was expected to know the procedure. Canon 5 of
the Code, carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and
to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles.
Moreover, under Rule 18.02 of the Code, a lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation. Thus, the supposed lack of time to acquaint
himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence. Respondent also
violated Rule 18.04, which provides that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s
request for information.

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 If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least
respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal
of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer the
counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that
he could no longer contact them. His failure to take this measure proves his
negligence.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them [Rule 18.03],
otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for
disciplinary action. SUSPENDED 6 months and sternly warned.
[A.C. No. 5098 : April 11, 2012]

JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR.,

RESPONDENT.

Facts:
Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) had previously engaged the legal services of
Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale
over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr.
Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a
civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L.
Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty.
Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the
civil case.
Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and
execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any
confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment
complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the
disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had
instigated the complaint for this reason.

In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner
after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record and Respondent
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of
Governors denied his motion.
The Issue

Whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting

interests.
The Court’s Ruling

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The SC agreed with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner
and the IBP Board of Governors. The SC rules that the relationship between a
lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust
and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her
lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based
on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer,
for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings
and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the
above rule is present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf
of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new

relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer
would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment

On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, substantial evidence proved
Atty. Sabitsanas violation of the above rule, as established by the following
circumstances on record:

One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect
her interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice
of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed
in the complainants favor.

Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latters legal
interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty.
Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Caetes interest clashed with the
complainants interests.

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 Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two
clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Caete.

Four, Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting interests

between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a
case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Caete; second, he impleaded
the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for
the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed
for the complainant.

By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against
another client in the same action; he also accepted a new engagement that
entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property
in which his legal services had been previously retained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct
for representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year
from the practice of law.

Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Pefianco

[A.C. No. 6116, August 2012]

Facts:
Engr. Tumbokon referred a case to respondent attorney. In turn, respondent
undertook to give the former 20% commission, later reduced to 10% of the
attorney’s fees the latter would receive in representing the Sps. Yap in an action
for partition. Their agreement was reflected in a letter dated August 11, 1995.

Thereafter, respondent failed to pay the agreed commission notwithstanding

receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about P40
million. Engr. Tumbokon was informed through a letter dated July 16, 1997 that
Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his
attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his
commission which respondent ignored.

As a result, Engr. Tumbokon filed this disbarment case. Complainant further

lleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of
his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom

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he has two children, and cohabited with Mae Flor Galido, with whom he has four
children. He also accused respondent of engaging in money-lending business5
without the required authorization from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25%
contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11,
1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay
complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus,
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint

Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated the CPR.

Ruling:
Yes.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must
perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the
Code.11Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the
above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.

In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the
execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter
admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but
passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule
9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in
certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal
family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children
notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be
retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.13 Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's

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finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.”

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have
been sufficiently established. A “business” requires some form of investment and
a sufficient number of customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a
consistent basis. The lending of money to a single person without showing that
such service is made available to other persons on a consistent basis cannot be
construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions,
We are minded that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution
and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar, or the
misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under scandalous
circumstance, which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the
case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year as recommended.

Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco, Complainants, v. Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo,

Respondent
A.C. No. 6368, 13 June 2012

FACTS:
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco filed a complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of
the Bar, and violation of duties and oath as a lawyer. From 15 April 1997 to 22
July 1997, the respondent – with the connivance of Andres Magat – willfully and
illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud against the complainants
by using false pretenses and deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite
the titling of land belonging to the Miranda Family of Tagaytay City, who are the
acquaintance of the complainants.
It started when the respondent convinced the complainants to finance and
deliver to him PhP 495,000.00 as advanced money to expedite the titling of the
subject land. He further committed misrepresentation by presenting himself as
the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the land. He also led
complaints to believe that he has contracts at NAMRIA, DENR, CENRO and the
Register of Deeds which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and

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were only made to induce the complainants to give and deliver the said amount.
Upon receipt of the money, he did not comply with his obligation to expedite the
titling of the land but instead use the money for personal use. The complainants
demanded the return of the money to no avail.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR)?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent committed the acts complained
of. He, himself, admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the
complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly
purchase. He used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants
into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never
denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in the
amount of PhP 495,000.00.
The Supreme Court finds the respondent in violation of the Rule 2.03, Canon 2
and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the CPR. The respondent was suspended from practice
of law for one year and return the amount of PhP 200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco
and Teresita Bengco with 10 days upon receipt of decision. The respondent is
required to submit to the Supreme Court proof of compliance.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR

FACTS: This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila
and Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have
received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment
of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar. The OCA conducted a judicial
audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, where the Audit Team found that the list of
cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not
appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed by RTC-
Shariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the
records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14.
In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En Banc (1) docketed this
administrative matter as A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232,4 and (2) preventively suspended
Judge Indar pending investigation of this case. Justice Gacutan also sent a letter
dated 23 July 2010 addressed to Atty. Umaima L. Silongan (Atty. Silongan), Acting
Clerk of Court of RTC-Cotabato, directing her to serve the notice of hearing
scheduled on 10 and 11 August 2010 to Judge Indar and to report the steps taken
to effect service of the same. Atty. Silongan submitted a Return of Service,

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informing that the notices sent to Judge Indar had remained unserved, as the
latter left Cotabato City in April 2010 and his location since then was unknown.
This administrative matter was re-raffled to Justice Abraham
B. Borreta (Justice Borreta). Justice Borreta set the hearing on 27 to 29 June 2011.
The registered mails addressed to Judge Indar were returned for the following
reasons: (1) addressee out of town, move to another place and (2) addressee
unknown.
ISSUE: whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.
RULING: YES.
It is settled that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied
to administrative proceedings. It is enough that the party is given the chance to
be heard before the case against him is decided. In this case, Judge Indar was
given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there is no
proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the
Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received by one
Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices
was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and
capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar. Further, Judge Indar cannot
feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because aside
from the fact that the Courts Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his
preventive suspension was reported in major national newspapers. Thus, there
was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges against him. However,
Judge Indar still failed to file his explanation and appear at the scheduled
hearings.
Public office is a public trust.20 This constitutional principle requires a judge, like
any other public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the
Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and
integrity.21 Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards. In
this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases
which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to
show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had
been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4)
hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision.
As found by the Audit Team, the list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil
Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed,
pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In other
words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions
on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such
cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential
requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross
misconduct. In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous annulment of
marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct any judicial proceedings on the

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cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in
his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements
of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for
voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge perform official duties honestly.
The Court notes that this is not Judge Indar’s first offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-
1953,25 the Court imposed on him a fine of P10,000 for violating Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, when he issued a preliminary injunction without any
hearing and prior notice to the parties. In another case, A.M. No. RTJ-07-
2069,26 the Court found him guilty of gross misconduct for committing violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly fined him P25,000.
Indisputably, Judge Indars gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a
breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful act.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.
In addition, Judge Indar’s dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that
the annulment cases underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws,
and established jurisprudence violates the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court. Such violation is also a ground for
disbarment. Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and
dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyers Oath, and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves
disbarment. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, guilty
of Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he is DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of all benefits due him, except accrued leave benefits, if any, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Judge Indar is
likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.

STATE PROSECUTORS II JOSEF ALBERT T. COMILANG and MA. VICTORIA SUEGA-

LAGMAN, - versus - JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY.
EN BANC, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012

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Facts:
State Prosecutor Comilang, by virtue of Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor (ORSP) Order was designated to assist the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Calamba City in the prosecution of cases. He appeared before Judge Belen of
the RTC of Calamba City manifesting his inability to appear on Thursdays because
of his inquest duties in the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Laguna. He moved that
all cases scheduled for hearing on February 24, 2005 before Judge Belen be
deferred because he was set to appear for preliminary investigation in the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office on the same day.

Instead of granting the motion, Judge Belen issued his order requiring him
to (1) explain why he did not inform the court of his previously-scheduled
preliminary investigation and (2) pay a fine of P500.00 for the cancellation of all
the scheduled hearings. In response, State Prosecutor Comilang filed
his Explanation with Motion for Reconsideration, followed by a Reiterative
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Early Resolution. Judge Belen
directed him to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and to pay the
postponement. In his comment, State Prosecutor Comilang explained that the
contents of his Reiterative Supplemental Motion were based on his personal
belief made in good faith and with grain of truth. Nonetheless, Judge Belen
rendered a Decision finding State Prosecutor Comilang liable for contempt of
court and for payment of penalty. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, he filed a motion to post a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the
said Decision, which Judge Belen granted.

State Prosecutor Comilang filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing
Judge Belens Order and Decision which was granted. Notwithstanding the TRO,
Judge Belen issued an Order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his
refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to appear to explain why he should not
be cited indirect contempt of court. In his Compliance, State Prosecutor Comilang
cited the CAs injunctive writ. He also manifested that he was waiving his
appearance on the scheduled hearing for the indirect contempt charge against
him. Nevertheless, Judge Belen issued an Order directing State Prosecutor
Comilang to explain his defiance of the subpoena and why he should not be cited
for indirect contempt. Judge Belen likewise ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to
issue a subpoena for him to appear regarding his failure to comply with
previously-issued subpoenas for the hearing on the non-filing of his supersedeas
bond. State Prosecutor Comilang movedto quash the subpoenas, and for the
inhibition of Judge Belen. Judge Belen denied the motion to
quash subpoenas, held State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt of
court for his failure to obey a duly served subpoena, and sentenced him to pay a
fine and to suffer two days' imprisonment. He was also required to post a
supersedeas bond.

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 Aggrieved, State Prosecutor Comilang filed a complaint-affidavit before the
OCA charging Judge Belen with manifest partiality and malice, evident bad faith,
inexcusable abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the show
cause orders, subpoenas and contempt citations, in grave defiance to the
injunctive writ issued by the CA.

In its Report, the OCA found Judge Belen to have violated Section 4, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court by failing to separately docket or consolidate with the
principal case the indirect contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang. It
also found Judge Belen to have blatantly violated the injunctive writ of the CA
when he issued the orders requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain why he
failed to post a supersedeas bond which, given the antecedents of his
administrative cases, showed manifest bias and partiality tantamount to bad faith
and grave abuse of authority. Judge Belen was likewise found to have violated the
following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 2 A JUDGE SHOULD
AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Canon 3 A JUDGE SHOULD
PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES. Rule 3.01 A judge shall be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence.OCA recommended, inter alia, that Judge
Belen be adjudged guilty of manifest bias and partiality, grave abuse of authority
and gross ignorance of the law and accordingly, be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with
prejudice to reemployment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and controlled
corporations and government financial institutions.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Belen's actuations showed manifest partiality and
bias, evident bad faith, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law
warranting his dismissal from service as RTC Judge of Branch 36, Calamba City.

Ruling: The Court concurs with the findings and recommendations of the OCA,
but only in part.
Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu
proprio by the court through an order or any other formal charge requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt; or (2) by
a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings. In the second instance, the verified petition for contempt shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately unless the court in its discretion orders
the contempt charge, which arose out of or related to the principal action, to be
consolidated with the main action for joint hearing and decision. In this case, the

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contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but by Judge
Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State Prosecutor
Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. As
such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition for contempt be
docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated with the principal action
find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the
contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang to be docketed separately or
consolidated with the principal action.

Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining
the implementation of his Order and Decision. In requiring State Prosecutor
Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas to
compel his attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt
proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-
compliance with the issued subpoenas, Judge Belen effectively defeated
the status quo which the writ of preliminary injunction aimed to preserve. Judges
are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith
as judicial competence requires no less. Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive
order of a higher court constitutes contempt.

Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a
mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with
law. Hence, with the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belens previous
infractions, which are all of serious nature and for which he had been severely
warned, the Court therefore adopts the recommendation of the OCA to mete the
ultimate penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and
gross ignorance of the law.

* Sorry if this is kind of long. There are comparative cases discussed here, so best
if we will include that.
Mendoza vs Deciembre

Facts:
Before the Court is the Petition filed by Eugenia Mendoza (complainant) dated
September 19, 2000, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre (respondent)
for his acts of fraudulently filling up blank postdated checks without her authority and
using the same for filing unfounded criminal suits against her.
Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office Manila, averred that: On
October 13, 1998, she borrowed from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent, the
amount of P20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest, secured by 12 blank checks,
drawn against the Postal Bank. Although she was unable to faithfully pay her obligations

12
on their due dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's Metrobank account
from November 11, 1998 to March 15, 1999 in the total sum of P12,910.00. Claiming that
the amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties, interests and other
charges, respondent warned complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No. 47253
filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount of P16,000.00. Afraid that respondent
might sue her in court, complainant made good said check and respondent was able to
encash the same on March 30, 1999. Thereafter, complainant made subsequent
payments to the Metrobank account of respondent from April 13, 1999 to October 15,
1999, thereby paying respondent the total sum of P35,690.00.
Complainant further claimed that, later, respondent filled up two of the postal
checks she issued in blank, Check Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of P50,000.00
each and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January 20, 2000 respectively, which
respondent claims was in exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that complainant received
on November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted however that she never borrowed
P100,000.00 from respondent and that it was unlikely that respondent would lend her, a
mail sorter with a basic monthly salary of less than P6,000.00, such amount. Complainant
also claimed that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal Office by filling up,
without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans.
In his Comment dated January 18, 2000, respondent averred that his dealings with
complainant were done in his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he filed
a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. Blg.) 22 against complainant, he
was only vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was
complainant who deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment to their
November 15, 1999 transaction involving P100,000.00 and covered by two checks which
bounced for the reason account closed; the October 13, 1999 transaction was a separate
and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment case against him to get even
with him for filing the estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's claim
that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by complainant is a complete lie; the
truth was that the checks referred to were already filled up when complainant affixed her
signature thereto; it was unbelievable that complainant would issue blank checks, and
that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she was able to maintain several
checking accounts; and if he really intended to defraud complainant, he would have
written a higher amount on the checks instead of only P50,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not Atty Deceimbre should be disbarred?
Held:
Yes, Atty Deciembre should be disbarred.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, but finds that disbarment and not
just indefinite suspension is in order.
The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State
upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. A high sense of morality, honesty
and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar. They must conduct

13
themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere
and at all times.
The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the
transactions entered into by respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield
respondent, as a lawyer, from liability.
A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for
acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable
opinion of the public. Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not
divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the
standards required of members of the legal profession. Specifically, respondent has
transgressed provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Funa, respondent failed
to mention in his Comment dated January 18, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October
8, 2001 and in his Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, the P100,000.00
loan which complainant supposedly contracted on November 16, 1999. It is also
questionable why the checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 which
were supposedly issued to secure a loan contracted about 18 months earlier, i.e.
November 16, 1999, were made without any interest. The same is true with the checks
dated January 15 and 20, 2000 in the total sum of P100,000.00, which were supposed to
secure a loan contracted on November 15, 1999, for the same amount. Considering these
circumstances and the sequence of dates when respondent filed his criminal cases
against complainant, and complainant her disbarment case against respondent, what
truly appears more believable is complainant's claim that respondent was merely utilizing
the blank checks, filling them up, and using them as bases for criminal cases in order to
harass complainant.
The Court also notes that the checks being refuted by complainant, dated January
15 and 20, 2000, May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 20011 had its dates, amounts
and payee's name all typewritten, while the blanks on the check for P16,000.00 dated

14
March 30, 1999 which complainant used to pay part of her original loan, were all filled up
in her handwriting.
It is also observed that the present case was not the only instance when
respondent committed his wrongful acts. In Olbes, complainants therein contracted a
loan from respondent in the amount of P10,000.00 on July 1, 1999, for which they issued
five blank checks as collateral. Notwithstanding their full payment of the loan, respondent
filled up four of the blank checks with the amount of P50,000.00 each with different dates
of maturity and used the same in filing estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 cases against complainants.
The Court, in imposing the penalty of indefinite suspension on respondent, found his
propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation as reprehensible and his misuse
of the filled up checks, loathsome.
In Acosta, complainant therein also averred that on August 1, 1998, she borrowed
P20,000.00 from respondent with an interest of 20% payable in six months and
guaranteed by twelve blank checks. Although she had already paid the total amount of
P33,300.00, respondent still demanded payments from her, and for her failure to comply
therewith, respondent filed a case against her before the City Prosecutor of Marikina City,
using two of her blank checks which respondent filled up with the total amount of
P100,000.00. Unfortunately, the complaint was dismissed by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Navarro on October 2, 2001 on the ground that the said transaction did
not involve any lawyer-client relationship. As correctly observed by Commissioner Funa,
such conclusion is erroneous, for a lawyer may be disciplined even for acts not involving
any attorney-client relationship.
As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he
demands excessive payments from his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank
checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents for his material gain; and
then he uses said checks as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his borrowers
in order to harass them. Such acts manifest respondent's perversity of character, meriting
his severance from the legal profession.
While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld
whenever a lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired, the seriousness of
respondent's offense compels the Court to wield its supreme power of disbarment.
Indeed, the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. This is because in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.
As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal
profession, the severance of his privilege to practice law for life is in order.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS
MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code

15
of Professional Responsibility. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is
ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant which
shall forthwith record it in the personal files of respondent; all the courts of the
Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof
to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. v Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr.

DOCTRINE: All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the
courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence
they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrer's display of
improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of
his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the
court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold.

FACTS:
* Complainant Atty. Barandon filed a complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary
action against respondent Atty. Ferrer alleging that:
1.Atty. Ferrer filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that
contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that
Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon for
alleged falsification of public document when the document allegedly
falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994,
at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned
in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the
document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial
Court(MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently
drunk, threatened
Atty. Barandon saying,”Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kas
ama anglahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa
Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-
rito.”
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document
without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of

16
 Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a
notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until
proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case
against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge
for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter
in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness;
and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that
Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked
Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who worked
with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department
of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly
harassed him with inflammatory language.

In his defense, Atty. Ferrer stated the following in his answer with motion to
dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for
examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats
against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer's clients
filed a case for falsification of public document against
Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon,
vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver document had been
falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks
against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was
improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or
cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations
that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he
degraded the law profession. The latter had received various
citations that speak well of his character.

5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed
against Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make
the latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping
when he filed this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel
and grave threats subject of the criminal cases.

IBP Commissioner- Recommended the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer

17
The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove
Atty. Ferrer's violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the
falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the
document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The
Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening
remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and
litigants before the start of hearing.

IBP Board of Governors- adopted Commissioner's Resolution but reduced the

penalty of suspension to only one year. MR was denied.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges
against him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.

HELD: The Court AFFIRMS the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law
for one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to

conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow
lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule
8.01, the Code provides: A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of

the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation
with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and
that Atty. Barandon authored the same.

Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper
forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer.

The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their
pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.

18
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the
legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives at

Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not
present convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He
merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not
report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the
police blotter on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against
Atty. Ferrer.

Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and

discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants
waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member
of the legal profession. The Court cannot countenance it.

Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be

dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial
forum. Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can
only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public
respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the
way he chose to express his indignation.

Foodsphere vs Mauricio
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat
processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery
products under the brand name CDO, filed a Verified Complaint [1] for
disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as
Batas Mauricio (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang
Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television
program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program
Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2)
violation of lawyers oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating
prosecutors.

19
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:

On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a
grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On
June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver
spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms
inside the can.

Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug
Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of
parasites in the Liver spread.

Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the

BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses
Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused
to heed the demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy and,
in any event, outrageous.

Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses

incurred by the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer
was turned down. And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the
attention of the media.

Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In
the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy
of the front page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang
Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12 [2] which complainant found to contain articles
maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products.
Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the
P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-
offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.

Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which
would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his BATAS Foundation. And respondent
directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television
program.

The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN [3] seeking the withdrawal of their
complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. [4]

20
Respondent, who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later
wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.

On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract [5]

asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24
weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program
Profile [6] of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking
complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot
buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c)
season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.

As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements

in the tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three
spots of 30-second TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total of
P23,100. Acting on complainants offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his
Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed
with the publication of the articles/columns. [7]

On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- BATAS NG

BAYAN at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest
sponsored by said program, which announcement was transcribed as follows:

OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si

Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo,
tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin
po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod?
Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot
kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa
nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa
lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong
sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? [8] (Emphasis
and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put
complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of
Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER
SPREAD! In another article, he wrote IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN! [9]
which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And
still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another
article entitled DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO. [10]

21
 Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING
HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles:
[11] (a) Uod sa liver spread, Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276); [12] (b) Uod,
itinanggi ng CDO, Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277); [13] (c) Pagpapatigil sa
CDO, Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278); [14] (d) Uod sa liver spread
kumpirmado, Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279); [15] (e) Salaysay ng nakakain
ng uod, Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280); [16] (f) Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy,
Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281); [17] (g) Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO
guards, Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284); [18] (h) Brutalidad ng CDO guards,
Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285); [19] (i) CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP,
Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287); [20] (j) May uod na CDO liver spread sa
Puregold binili, Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288); [21] (k) Desperado na ang
CDO, Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); [22] (l) Atty. Rufus Rodriguez
pumadrino sa CDO, Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291); [23] (m) Kasunduan ng
CDO at Pamilya Cordero, Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292); [24] (n) Bakit
nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO, Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293). [25]
In his September 8, 2004 column Anggulo ng Batas published in Hataw!,
respondent wrote an article Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread. [26]

And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television

program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what
complainant claimed to be the same baseless and malicious allegations/issues
against it. [27]

Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several

others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the
Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time of the filing of the
present administrative complaint. [28]

In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his
Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the
Department of Justice, [29] alleging:

xxxx

2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?

xxxx

2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting
for miracles to happen?

22
 2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office
would ever act on his complaint?

xxxx

8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez,
and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his
boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?

9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that

justice would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the
injustice of the system;

10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in
Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past
of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City had
campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing products of the
Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?

11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior
displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare
complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials
of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and relatives incognito to
file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant, and
they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that
Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here; [30]

And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction [31] which
respondent filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the
newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
respondent alleged:

xxxx

5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside
their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no
jurisdiction over this action. [32] (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against

respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04, [33] before
the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.

23
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order
notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against complainant
[34] and to malign complainant through his television shows.

Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings
in his October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation: [35]

I.
xxxx

In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio,
et al., the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued
by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:

Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
included in the instant plaintiffs motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants
failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the
said plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and
that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person acting for and
in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising
and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more
specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products.

Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by

the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the
issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on
13 December 2004.

Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive
therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from further publishing, televising and/or
broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more
specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products,
respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the
prohibited subject matter in his column Atty. Batas, 2004 in the December 16 and
17, 2004 issues of the tabloid Balitang Bayan Toro (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the
Complaint).

The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the
Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.

II.

xxxx

24
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent
Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice. In said pleading,
respondent made the following statements:

xxxx

The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on

the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors
connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and
fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design
to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by
respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative
of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer
[s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o
[j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers.

III.

The Kasunduan entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein

complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and
signed by herein respondent.

xxxx

In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs
recognized that the said Kasunduan was not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint
filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.

However, even after the execution of the Kasunduan and the consequent
dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent
inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule
herein complainant. On record are the numerous articles of respondent published
in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-
1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles
against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining order
issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny
that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the
tabloids.

Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service,

that is, to expose the defects of complainants products to the consuming public.
Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent.

25
Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainants failure to give in
to respondents request that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television
programs of respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible.
Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles
against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously
violated the spirit behind the Kasunduan which he himself prepared and signed
and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright
when he prepared said Kasunduan and then turned around and proceeded to
lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement.
Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could
have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant
was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The
actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct
contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. [36] (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20,
2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.

The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.

The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every
lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity of the legal profession, [37] which confidence may be eroded by
the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.

By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he
engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint
against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his BATAS Foundation and
seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status
quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of
any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his
attacks against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent
violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates
lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes. For he defied said status quo order, despite

26
his (respondents) oath as a member of the legal profession to obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.

Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and

candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate
language.

Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong: [38]

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of
the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of
their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from
all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers
language even in his pleadings must be dignified. [39] (Underscoring supplied)

By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the
legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and the
dignity of the legal profession. [40]

The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be

underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., [41] the therein complainant engaged
therein-herein respondents services as she was impressed by the pro-poor and
pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality, [42] only to later find
out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee,
no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was
suspended for six months.

27
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him
over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same
could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.

Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for

reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by
vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant.
[43]

To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is,
in the premises, sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and
breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon
his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts.

AVELINO ANGELES v. ATTY. AMADO IBANEZ

This is a complaint for disbarment for notarizing the "Extrajudicial Partition

with Absolute Sale" without a notarial commission and in the absence of the
affiants.

Facts:

Atty. Amado Ibañez allegedly notarized an "Extrajudicial Partition with

Absolute Sale" without having the authority to notarize such as he did not have a
commission as notary public at that time. The petitioners further denied
executing the said document or, that they ever appeared before respondent Atty.
Ibañez for this purpose. He stated that his failure to require the presence of the
parties to the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" is wholly justified
because of the assurance of complainant Rosalina Angeles that the signatures
appearing in the said document were indeed those of her co-heirs. The
respondent also alleged that almost all the complainants submitted their
residence certificates, the numbers of which were recorded in the
acknowledgement portion of the document.

28
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with
Absolute Sale" in the absence of the affiants.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and
the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the "Extrajudicial
Partition with Absolute Sale" in the absence of the affiants. Respondent himself
admits that he merely relied on the representation of Rosalina Angeles that the
signatures appearing on the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" subject of
the present complaint are those of her co-heirs. Respondent claims that he
reposed confidence upon Rosalina Angeles because she is his confidential
secretary. Unfortunately for respondent, he cannot exculpate himself from the
consequences of his recklessness and his failure to comply with the requirements
of the law by relying on his confidential secretary. Time and again, the Supreme
Court have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public that the affiants
must personally appear before them. The physical presence of the affiants
enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the
acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act
and deed. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent’s notarial
commission should not only be suspended but respondent must also be
suspended from the practice of law.

Adm. Case No. 3066 October 26, 1999

J.K. MERCADO AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., and SPOUSES
JESUS and ROSARIO K. MERCADO, complainants,
vs.
EDUARDO DE VERA and JOSE RONGKALES BANDALAN, respondents.
Adm. Case No. 4438 October 26, 1999
ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, petitioner-complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MERVYN G. ENCANTO, ATTY. NUMERIANO G. TANOPO, JR., ATTY. JOSE
AGUILA GRAPILON, ATTY. BEDA G. FAJARDO, ATTY. RENE C. VILLA, THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its COMMISSION ON BAR
DISCIPLINE, as represented by ATTY. MERVYN G. ENCANTO, incumbent National
President; ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR P. MERCADO-ALCANTARA; SPOUSES JESUS
K. MERCADO and ROSARIO P. MERCADO; and J.K. MERCADO AND SONS
AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
The petition for disbarment filed by J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural
Enterprises, Inc. ("Mercado and Sons"), and the spouses Jesus K. Mercado and

29
Rosario P. Mercado against Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is an offshoot of an action
for "dissolution/liquidation of conjugal partnership, accounting, support with
support pendente lite, annulment of contract, reconveyance or recovery of
possession of conjugal share, partition, damages, and attorneys fees" filed by
Rosario P. Mercado ("R. Mercado") against Jesus K. Mercado ("J. Mercado"),
Mercado and Sons, and Standard Fruits Corporation ("Stanfilco"). The case was
assigned to the sala of then Judge Bandalan. Representing R. Mercado was Atty.
De Vera.
Judge Bandalan decided the case in favor of R. Mercado. She was awarded the
sum of a little over P9 million. J. Mercado and Mercado and Sons filed a timely
notice of appeal. Stanfilco, for its part, filed a motion for reconsideration. Judge
Bandalan granted the motion for execution pending appeal filed by Atty. De Vera.
On even date, the judge likewise granted Atty. De Vera's "motion to note
plaintiffs counsel's statement of claim of Attorney's lien (charging and retaining)
and motion to direct Provincial Registry of Deeds of Davao to annotate such liens
on the certificates of titles of the Mercado spouses." Later, a writ of execution
was issued. Two days after, notices of garnishment under execution pending
appeal were served by the sheriff on the respective managers of RCBC, Claveria,
Davao City; RCBC, Tagum, Davao Del Norte, Traders Royal Bank, City Hall Drive,
Davao City; and Traders Royal Bank, R. Magsaysay Ave., Davao City. It would
appear that a total amount of P1,270,734.56 was garnished.
Sometime later, R. Mercado terminated the services of Atty. De Vera, offering the
amount of P350,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. She, at the same time,
demanded an accounting and the turn-over of the money still in the possession of
Atty. De Vera. The latter refused to heed the demand, claiming that pursuant to
the decision, he should, in fact, be entitled to P2,254,217.00 by way of attorney's
fees. Failing to recover what she had felt was lawfully due to her, R. Mercado filed
disbarment proceedings against Atty. de Vera.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. de Vera should be held administratively liable.
RULING:
Yes. Atty. de Vera should be held administratively liable.
While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer,
nevertheless, is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services
rendered. So, also, he must be protected against clients who wrongly refuse to
give him his just due. In Albano vs. Coloma, this Court has said:
Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully
recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his
brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in
money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to
the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part
of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after
putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he

30
 represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this
Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every
effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of his
hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.
Correlatively, a lawyer is entitled to a "lien over funds, documents and
papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession. Under
Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility he may
"apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client." In both
cases, however, it is to be assumed that the client agrees with the lawyer in
the amount of attorney's fees. In case of a disagreement, or when the client
disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer for being unconscionable, the
lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees; instead, it should behoove the lawyer to file, if he still
deems it desirable, the necessary action or the proper motion with the
proper court to fix the amount of his attorney's fees. If a lawyer were
allowed to unilaterally apply the funds in his hands in payment of his
claimed compensation even when there is a disagreement between him
and his client would not only be violative of the trust relationship between
them but can also open the door to possible abuse by those who are less
than mindful of their fiduciary duty.
The Court cannot ignore the findings made by the IBP Board of Governors, in its
resolution, hereunder reproduced; viz:
The records show that complainant Mrs. Mercado, assisted by her erstwhile
counsel, respondent de Vera was able to withdraw garnished funds from
the banks in the total amount of P1,270,734.56 on January 14, 1987 and
January 16, 1987 (Exhs. "CC" and "DD", "30" and "31"). Said withdrawals
were in consequence of an Order dated January 12, 1987 issued by Judge
Bandalan (Exh. "K" or "15"). As prayed for by complainant Mrs. Mercado
per motion for execution pending appeal (Exh. "G" or "14") filed in her
behalf by respondent de Vera, she was almost 73 years old, in poor health
and needed the amount for her daily subsistence and medical needs.
There was an open admission by respondent de Vera as borne by his entire
testimony, that he was with Mrs. Mercado in the banks to assist her to
withdraw the garnished funds.
Complainant Mrs. Mercado's testimony on June 13, 1989 that she was
staying in a boarding house (TSN, June 13, 1989, page 14) and that the
money, then about P911,374.95 out of the garnished amount of
P1,223,874.95 after depositing P300,000.00 with Metro Bank and TRB (TSN,
September 5, 1989, pages 31 to 36, Exhs. "MM" & "NN") are more than
enough reasons not to withdraw or encash the garnished amounts in the
form of Manager Checks. If not only for respondent de Vera's prodding and
insistence, complainant Mrs. Mercado would not have withdrawn and
encashed such a huge amount of money, only to bring it to an unsafe

31
 boarding house which understandably could not provide a guarded and
safer depository of such huge amount of money, as in banks. Why would
complainant Mrs. Mercado withdraw from the banks the whole amount of
P1,223,873.95, and on the same day, deposit P300,000.00 in other banks
and carry with her P911,374.95?
The scheming plot of respondent de Vera is too obvious to escape notice.
With so much money contained in six bags, respondent de Vera invited the
aging complainant Mrs. Mercado to his house, convinced the old lady to
leave the money with him as accordingly, she did not have a room in her
boarding house and that it would be safe if she left the money with him.
xxx xxx xxx
That respondent de Vera was, upon his unilateral estimation, entitled to
about P2.250 Million in attorney's fees, would not exculpate him from the
condemnable act of infidelity in the custody of his client's funds. He was
duty bound to turn over and render a full accounting of what he received in
satisfaction of the judgment rendered in favor of complainant Mrs.
Mercado in Civil Case No. 17215. The relation between client and attorney
is one of trust and confidence.
Regrettably, Atty. De Vera would appear to have indeed gone over the bounds of
propriety when he refused to turn-over to his client the amount in excess of the
P350,000.00 he was, in effect, allowed to retain. His disagreement with the client,
of course, entitled him to take proper legal steps in order to recover what he
might feel to be his just due but, certainly, it was not a matter that he could take
into his own hands.
The Court is not prepared to conclude, however, that the circumstances detailed
by the IBP would create an impression, as so suggested in the resolution of 23
March 1993, that respondent lawyer somehow had much to be responsible for in
the turn of events that led to his possession of the funds of his client. In any
event, the proven actuations of Atty. De Vera, in the view of the Court, would
sufficiently warrant a commensurate disciplinary action.
LIGAYA MANIAGO v. ATTY. DE DIOS
A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010
Nachura, J. / En Banc

FACTS:

Complainant filed a disbarment case against respondent for engaging in the

practice of law despite having been suspended by the Court. Complainant alleged
that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City. The accused was represented by
Atty. De Dios, with office address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City.

32
Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty. De Dios had an
outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was,
therefore, prohibited from appearing in court.
In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against
her client, Miyata. She, however, denied that she was under suspension when she
appeared as his counsel in the cases. Respondent explained that an administrative
case was indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman, docketed as A.C. No. 4943,
where she was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the
suspension immediately upon receipt of the Courts Resolution on May 16, 2001
up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001,
respondent formally informed the Court that she was resuming her practice of
law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting
Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on
March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to desist from practicing law and revoking
her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the directive
was rather questionable, respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in
due deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for
Clarification with the Supreme Court on account of Judge Farrales letters to all
courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities in Zambales, which gave the
impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of law and
that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is revoked.
On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Courts
consideration. The OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was
not automatic, following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and
Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado,
complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and
Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al.,
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s)
of his compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the
practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after
evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a
resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the
practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was unfortunate that this procedure was
overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice
of law without submitting the required certifications and passing through the OBC
for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives from the
Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on the
matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of
law.

33
ISSUE: WON respondent should be disbarred for resuming her practice of law
without submitting the required certifications and passing through the OBC for
evaluation – a flagrant violation and disobedience to lawful orders of the Court.
RULING:
NO. The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC. As much
as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same
time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to
exercise his profession unreasonably.
The Court hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed in
the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of
law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended
from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision
imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15
days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension,
respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through
the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has
desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any
court during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the
Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts
where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
respondents compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by
the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a
more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
RAMIENTAS VS REYALA
Before Us are Manifestations[1] filed by the abovequoted parties in response to
Supreme Court (SC) En Banc Resolution[2] dated 7 March 2006, wherein we
resolved to require them to manifest, within ten (10) days from notice, whether
they are willing to submit the case at bar for decision/resolution on the basis of
the pleadings already on record.

The present controversy stemmed from an Administrative Complaint[3] filed by

Noriel Michael J. Ramientas on 16 February 2004 before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, seeking the disbarment of

34
respondent Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala. The complaint was anchored on respondent
Reyalas alleged violative acts: (1) submitting a pleading before the Court of
Appeals bearing the forged signature of another lawyer; and (2) her continuous
handling of a case while working in the Court of Appeals; both contrary to a)
Articles 171,[4] 182,[5] 184[6] and 355[7] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); b) the
Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers; and c) conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer.

Hearing on the merits thereafter ensued.

In its Resolution No. XVII-2005-171 passed on 17 December 2005, the IBP Board
of Governors resolved to adopt the recommendation of Atty. Edmund T. Espina,
Investigating Commissioner, finding respondent Reyala guilty of the
abovementioned violative acts. It, however, modified the recommended penalty
to be imposed from six (6) months suspension (from the practice of law) to two
(2) years, with the corresponding warning that a repetition of any breach of her
professional duties will be dealt with more severely.[8]

On 13 February 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant, SC, received a letter dated
30 January 2006, from Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan, Director for Bar Discipline of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, addressed to SC Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, stating therein that:

We are transmitting herewith the following documents pertaining to the above[9]

case pursuant to Rule 139-B:

1. Notice of the Resolution;

2. Records of the case consisting of Volume I 1-185 pages.

In the interregnum, however, respondent Reyala submitted[10] to the IBP an

Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution suspending her.

On 7 March 2006, the SC En Banc, acting on the letter and transmittal, resolved to
require complainant Ramientas and respondent Reyala to manifest whether they
are willing to submit the case for decision/resolution based on the pleadings and
documents already on record.

Both parties submitted their compliance thereto.

In his Manifestation,[11] complainant Ramientas acceded to the submission of

the case for decision/resolution based on the pleadings already on record.

Respondent Reyala, on the other hand, demurred[12] to such submission for the
meantime considering that the Motion for Reconsideration she earlier filed

35
before the IBP remained unresolved to date. Further, she stated that when she
scheduled said motion for hearing, she was informed[13] by the IBP that it was
precluded from acting on the aforesaid motion as it had already transmitted to
this Court the whole records of the particular case together with Resolution No.
XVII-2005-171, which recommended that she be suspended from the practice of
law for two (2) years. Thus, she prayed that her motion for reconsideration be
decided first by the IBP Board of Governors before submitting the case for
decision/resolution to this Court.

Prefatorily, a reading of the By-Laws of the IBP will reveal that a motion for
reconsideration of its resolution or order is a prohibited pleading. 2 of Rule III of
the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP provides
that:

SEC. 2. Prohibited Pleadings. The following pleadings shall not be allowed, to wit:

xxxx

c. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of resolution

or order.

xxxx

Parenthetically, at first glance, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the rules
governing the disbarment and discipline of attorneys, shows that there is no
provision regarding motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP Board of
Governors suspending respondent lawyers. However, worth noting is the fact that
neither does it particularly proscribe the filing of such motions. 12 (b) of Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. x x x

xxxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,

determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. (Emphasis
supplied.)

xxxx

Hence, this impasse.

36
 A judicious review of our current jurisprudence will reveal that
said impasse is more ostensible than real. Our pronouncement in the case of
Halimao v. Villanueva,[14] promulgated close to two decades after the effectivity
of the IBP By-Laws,[15] effectively amended the latter in so far as motions for
reconsideration of IBP resolutions in disciplinary cases against lawyers are
concerned.

In the Halimao case, we took the occasion to articulate our stance respecting
motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in
disciplinary cases against lawyers. This Court was confronted therein with
somewhat the same set of circumstance as the case at bar in that after the IBP
Board of Governors transmitted to us its resolution adopting the
recommendation of the investigating commissioner dismissing the disbarment
complaint against respondent Villanueva for being barred by res judicata,
complainant Halimao filed a motion for reconsideration. The latter opposed such
motion on the ground that Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court does not provide for
such a possibility of review. In resolving the issue, this Court, through Mr. Justice
Mendoza, held that:

Although Rule 139-B, 12 (c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration,

nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may
therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such
motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the
judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a
misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[16] (Emphasis
supplied.)

Clearly, the aforequoted ruling amended the IBP By-Laws in that it effectively
removed a motion for reconsideration from the roster of proscribed pleadings in
the level of the IBP. It must be remembered that it is well within the Courts power
to amend the By-Laws of the IBP 77 of the same vests in this Court the power to
amend, modify or repeal it, either motu proprio or upon recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors.

Prescinding from the above, though the aforequoted ruling involves 12 (c)[17] of
Rule 139-B, nothing in the decision contradicts its application to 12 (b) of the
same rule, thus, it now stands that a motion for reconsideration of IBP resolutions
may be filed by an aggrieved party within the period stated.

A point of clarification, however, is in order. While in the Halimao ruling we

nevertheless treated the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villanueva as
his Petition for Review before this Court within the contemplation of Rule 139-B,
12 (c), such action on our part was necessitated by expediency. In the case at bar,
acknowledging the raison d'tre for the allowance of motions for reconsideration

37
of resolutions of the IBP in disciplinary cases against lawyers, which is the
exhaustion of administrative remedies as expressly recognized by the same
Halimao ruling, the remand of the case at bar back to the IBP is in order. This
course of action rests upon the presumption that when the grievance machinery
is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same
correctly,[18]

Certainly, prudence dictates that the IBP be given the opportunity to correct its
mistakes, if any, by way of motions for reconsideration before this Court takes
cognizance of the case. This is to further insure that the grievance procedure will
be allowed to duly run its course a form of filtering process, particularly
respecting matters within the competence of the IBP, before we step in.

In fine, though such remand will hold back the advancement of the case,
nevertheless, it bears emphasizing that it is equally important that the IBP be
afforded the opportunity to set things as it should be. Observance of this basic
principle is a sound practice and policy and should never be compromised at the
altar of expediency.

In concurrence with the above, now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby

resolved, that in accordance with our ruling in Halimao v. Villanueva,[19]
pertinent provisions of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Bar Discipline, as contained in the By-Laws of the IBP, particularly 1 and 2, are
hereby deemed amended. Accordingly, 1 of said rules now reads as follows:

SECTION. 1. Pleadings. The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified
answer, verified position papers and motion for reconsideration of a resolution.
[Emphasis supplied.]

And in 2, a motion for reconsideration is, thus, removed from the purview of the
class of prohibited pleadings.

Further, the following guidelines shall be observed by the IBP in respect of

disciplinary cases against lawyers:

1. The IBP must first afford a chance to either party to file a motion
for reconsideration of the IBP resolution containing its findings and
recommendations within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt by the parties
thereon;

2. If a motion for reconsideration has been timely filed by an

aggrieved party, the IBP must first resolve the same prior to elevating to this
Court the subject resolution together with the whole record of the case;

38
3. If no motion for reconsideration has been filed within the period
provided for, the IBP is directed to forthwith transmit to this Court, for final
action, the subject resolution together with the whole record of the case;

4. A party desiring to appeal from the resolution of the IBP may file a
petition for review before this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of said
resolution sought to be reviewed; and

5. For records of cases already transmitted to this Court where there

exist pending motions for reconsideration filed in due time before the IBP, the
latter is directed to withdraw from this Court the subject resolutions together
with the whole records of the cases, within 30 days from notice, and, thereafter,
to act on said motions with reasonable dispatch.

Consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth, let the whole record of this
case be immediately remanded to the IBP for the proper disposition of
respondent Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyalas motion for reconsideration.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave
to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law
until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s
free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On
that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines
and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however,
whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine
bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2,
Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and
a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines.

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Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately
affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State
(through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession,
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the
conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients
repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted
as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with
the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in
accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular
standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates
that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing
satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar
examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to
practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is
a continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession
and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

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Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still
practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a
privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This
is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions
"(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure
from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but
also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of
the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,
subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof
of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a
member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS

FACTS:

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 This is a disbarment case filed by Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac against her
nephew, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro Manila, for "his
failure to adhere to the standards of mental and moral fitness set up for members
of the bar.
In January 1985, respondent induced complainant who was then 85 years old
to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for safekeeping. Acting
on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her time deposits
with the Philippine National Bank and transferred them to UnionBank, where the
respondent was working. Complainant made the deposit under the name of
respondent’s wife and in trust for seven beneficiaries, including his son.
Upon maturity of the time deposit, complainant made a demand on
respondent to return the P588,000.00 plus interest but respondent could only
return P400,000.00 to be paid on installment. Complainant acceded to
respondent's proposal as she was already old and was in dire need of money.
On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a memorandum of
agreement stating that the money will be paid back in instalments through post-
dated checks.
Complainant was only able to encash the check for P64,800.00 as the others
were dishonoured for lack of funds.
On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against
respondent and a corresponding information was filed against him by the
provincial fiscal.
On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion to Lift
Suspension for Two Years, alleging that complainant has executed an affidavit
withdrawing the complaint for disbarment.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent may be disbarred

Held: Yes.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:
"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause."
Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his
oath as an attorney when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him
all her money, and later refused to return the same despite
demand. Respondent's wicked deed was aggravated by the series of unfounded

42
suits he filed against complainant to compel her to withdraw the disbarment case
she filed against him. Indeed, respondent's deceitful conduct makes him
unworthy of membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of a
lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession.
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by
complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of
the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by
the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration
of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal
of the charges. In the instant case, it has been sufficiently proved that respondent
has engaged in deceitful conduct, in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP to be too mild. Such offense calls for the severance of
respondent's privilege to practice law not only for two years, but for life.

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