A.C. NO.

10050
December 3, 2013
VICTORIA
C.
HEENAN,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Victoria Heenan
(Victoria) against Atty. Erlina Espejo (Atty. Espejo) before the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
violation of lawyers oath, docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.
The Facts
Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her
godmother, Corazon Eusebio (Corazon). Following the introduction, Corazon
told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in need of money and wanted
to borrow two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) from her
(Victoria). Shortly thereafter, Victoria went to the house of Corazon for a
meeting with Atty. Espejo where they discussed the terms of the loan.
Since Atty. Espejo was introduced to her as her godmothers lawyer,
Victoria found no reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same
meeting, Victoria agreed to accomodate Atty. Espejo and there and then
handed to the latter the amount of PhP 250,000. To secure the payment of
the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a
check1 dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five thousand
pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On due
date, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the deposit of the check for
the reason that she was still waiting for the release of the proceeds of a
bank loan to fund the check. However, after a couple of months of waiting,
Victoria received no word from Atty. Espejo as to whether or not the check
was already funded enough. In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejoissued check dated July 10, 2009 in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(PhP 50,000)2 representing the interest which accrued due to the late
payment of the principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but, to
her dismay, the check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo
failed to pay despite Victorias repeated demands. Worried that she would
not be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit to
her account the first check in the amount of PhP 275,000, but without
notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact. However, the said check was also
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Victoria thereafter became more
aggressive in her efforts to recover her money. She, for instance,
personally handed to Atty. Espejo a demand letter dated August 3, 2009.3
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint
against Atty. Espejo on August 18, 2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.4
Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon
City Prosecutors Office which she personally received and continued to
ignore Victorias demands. She attended only one (1) scheduled preliminary
investigation where she promised to pay her loan obligation.5

In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8,

2009 in the amount of two hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP
275,000.). However, to Victorias chagrin, the said check was again
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.6 Atty. Espejo did not file any
counter-affidavit or pleading to answer the charges against her. On
November 17, 2009, the case was submitted for resolution without Atty.
Espejos participation.7 Victoria thereafter filed the instant administrative
case against Atty. Espejo before the CBD. On March 1, 2010, the CBD,
through Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order8
directing Atty. Espejo to submit her Answer to Victorias administrative
complaint failing which would render her in default. The warning,
notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did not submit any Answer. On May 5, 2010,
IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala (Commissioner VillanuevaMalala) notified the parties to appear for a mandatory conference set on
June 2, 2010. The notice stated that non-appearance of either of the parties
shall be deemed a waiver of her right to participate in further proceedings.9
At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared.10
Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued an Order11 noting Atty.
Espejos failure to appear during the mandatory conference and her failure
to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was declared in default.
Victoria, on the other hand, was directed to file her verified position paper,
which she filed on June 11, 2010.12
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Report and Recommendation13 dated July 15, 2010, the CBD
recommended the suspension of Atty. Espejo from the practice of law and
as a member of the Bar for a period of five (5) years.
The CBD reasoned:
The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due
notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his deficiency for his
oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.
Moreover, respondent[s] acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds and
despite repeated demands [she] failed to comply with her obligation and
her disregard and failure to appear for preliminary investigation and to
submit her counter-affidavit to answer the charges against her for Estafa
and Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that also warrant
disciplinary action against respondent.
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution14
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the CBD with the modification
lowering Atty. Espejos suspension from five (5) years to two (2) years.
Atty. Espejo was also ordered to return to Victoria the amount of PhP
250,000 within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest
reckoned from the time the demand was made. The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondents grave misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to
Return to complainant the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal
interest reckoned from the time the demand was made.
On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of the
Resolution pertaining to Resolution No. XX-2012-419 along with the records
of this case.15
The Courts Ruling
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part.
Atty. Espejo did not deny obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse
allegations that she issued unfunded checks to pay her obligation. It has
already been settled that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned.16
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to their clients. In Tomlin II v. Moya II, We
explained that the prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the
duties of a lawyer, thus:
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the
complaint but offered no justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay.
Complainant made several demands, both verbal and written, but
respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he
acknowledged his financial obligations to complainant, respondent never
offered nor made arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he
refused to recognize any wrong doing nor shown remorse for issuing
worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct. Respondent must
be reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of
his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations.17
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless
checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no
moment. As We have held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross
misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not
ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his nonprofessional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or
removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyers
professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit
and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.18
In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of a series of worthless
checks, which is exactly what Atty. Espejo committed in this case,
manifests a lawyers low regard for her commitment to her oath, for which
she may be disciplined. Thus:
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness
for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the
remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of

such act to the public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyers
low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined
her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession
she should hold in high esteem.
xxxx
In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless
checks for which he was convicted in the criminal case filed against him. In
Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of
law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani
v. Dino having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks
in payment of a piece of property the title of which was only entrusted to
him by the complainant.19
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified
refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the
complaint of Victoria and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference.
This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct
unbecoming a lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer
must maintain respect not only for the courts, but also for judicial officers
and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP:
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to
heed the orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaintaffidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference. Although
respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another
chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored
this directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is
justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected
to uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes. Further, a
lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also
to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP.
Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP
to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys.20
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejos issuance of worthless checks and her blatant
refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and the
IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. CANON 11 A LAWYER
SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND

TO JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY

OTHERS.
We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2)
years, as recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the
circumstances. We, however, cannot sustain the IBPs recommendation
ordering Atty. Espejo to return the money she borrowed from Victoria. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the
officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondents administrative
liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which
the parties may to choose me against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only
question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the
attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus,
this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be
returned to the complainant.22
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross misconduct
and violating Canons 1, 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years
affective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8269

December 11, 2013
PHESCHEM
INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTYs. LLOYD P. SURIGAO and JESUS A. VILLARDO III, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Complaint for Disbarment1 filed by Pheschem Industrial
Corporation (Pheschem) on May 11, 2009 against lawyers Lloyd P. Surigao
(Atty. Surigao) and Jesus A. Villardo III (Atty. ,Villardo) (respondents), for
gross, malicious and oppressive violation of their duties under the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On September 30, 2009, the respondents filed
their comment,2 and on November 23, 2009, this Court referred the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.3
Factual Antecedents
Pheschem is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of
hydrated lime, an industrial chemical, andhas been operating a limestone
quarry in Palompon, Leyte on a 25-year mining permit since 1985. Toward
the end of its said permit, it allegedly encountered harassment from the
town officials when it tried to renew the same, although it also surmised
that its troubles began after it refused passage through its quarry to the
logging trucks owned by the Chairman of BarangayLiberty, Palompon,

Leyte, Eddie Longcanaya (Chairman Longcanaya). Pheschem claims that it

only wanted to avoid any suspicion from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) that it was consenting to illegal logging
activities in its quarry area. Nonetheless, in retaliation, and without a local
ordinance or resolution, Chairman Longcanaya began imposing a fee of
P100.00 for each dump truck of Pheschem that entered its quarry site,
which Pheschemrefused to pay. On May12, 2008, Chairman Longcanaya led
the barangayresidents in blockading Pheschems quarry site to prevent its
trucks from hauling out limestone to its manufacturing plant in another part
of town.
Pheschem sought the help of Atty. Surigao, then Vice-Mayor of Palompon,
but instead of helping the former, Atty. Surigao joined the blockade. Not
only that, in a dialogue he called between Pheschem and
thebarangayofficials, Atty. Surigao harangued Pheschem with a litany of
complaints from the barangayresidents, whileignoring the DENRs
certifications that Pheschem committedno violations, as well as DENRs
explanation that Pheschem couldnot be denied an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) as long as it substantially complied with the
requirements therefor.
On June 2, 2008, the Sangguniang Bayanof Palompon, allegedly upon
instigation of Atty.Surigao, passed Municipal Resolution No. 068-020608,4
entitled,"An Omnibus Opposition to Any and all Re-application of Pheschem
Industrial Corporation for MiningPermit or License, or Issuance of an
Environmental Compliance Certificate, or Business License, or Mayors
Permit, Inter Alia." Then, on June 27, 2008 Atty. Surigao even appeared as
collaborating counsel in a labor case for adismissed employee of Pheschem
named Pablito Moldez.5 It appears that Atty. Surigao was also theprivate
counsel of the respondent i n G. R. No. 161159, entitled "Pheschem
Industrial Corporation v. PablitoMoldez," decided by this Court on May 9,
2005.6 Pheschem now insiststhat Atty. Surigao should have inhibited
himself from the Sangguniang Bayansdeliberations on Resolution No. 068020608 due to conflict of interest.
Unable now to haul limestone from its quarry site in Barangay Libertyto its
plant, despite being a holder of an ECC from the DENR and a still subsisting
mining permit from the Provincial Governor, Pheschem opened a new
quarry in BarangayCantandoy, but again Atty. Surigao and other town
officials blocked and stopped its operations. Undaunted, Pheschem opened
a third quarry, this time in BarangaySan Miguel, but again the town officials
led by Palompon Mayor Eulogio S. Tupa (Mayor Tupa) and joined by Attys.
Surigao and Villardo, a Sangguniang Bayanmember, seized two (2) dump
trucks belonging to Pheschem. This was pursuant to a "Cease and Desist
Order for the Land Development (Leveling) Project at BarangaySan Miguel"
dated July14, 2008, issued by Mayor Tupa to EngineerTimoteo Andales
(Engr. Andales), Operations Manager of Pheschem. Engr. Andales had
obtained an ECC in his name to level a property owned by Jess Tangog
(Tangog) in BarangaySan Miguel, Palompon. Mayor Tupa charged that it
was actually Pheschem which was levelingthe property, but instead of
moving the scraped limestone within the said property to even out the
ground surface to prepare the same for residential development, the

limestone was hauled to its plant in Barangay Cantandoy to makehydrated

lime. The aforesaid order reads as follows:
Without necessarily admitting the legality of the issuance of the ECC that
was given to you dated 4 July 2008 by EMB Region 8, a clear provision in
the said ECC (ECC-r8-0806-070-5010) states that permits/clearances from
other
concerned
agencies
shall
be
secured
prior
to
project
implementation;(par. 3, p. 4, ECC)
Upon verification in the area, subject-matter of your Land Development
(Leveling) Project [of] which you are the proponent located in Barangay
San Miguel, Palompon, Leyte and [for] which you were issued the abovementioned ECC, youhave already started with your operations sans the
above-mentioned condition sine qua non.
Moreover, because of your operations now you have already violated other
conditionalities in the said ECC, to wit:
1. You have not secured a Development Permit from the LGU ([I][A][3],
ECC);
2. You have failed to provide silttraps tocontain silt-laden run-off from
draining to the adjacent road[.]
Moreover importantly, we know that you arenot doing leveling activities
only. You are actually hauling rawmaterials (limestone) to be supplied to
Pheschem Industrial Corporation for processing into lime at its Cantandoy
Plant. By doing so, you have clearly violated Presidential Decree 1586 and
Republic Act 7942 (because you know for a fact that Pheschemshould have
an approved quarry site which should have a separate ECC to be valid).
Your application for a Land Development (Leveling) Project is a facade and
a vivid circumvention of the aforementioned laws.
Finally, you are the Operations Manager of Pheschem Industrial Corporation
and that your application asthe contractor/supplier of raw materials
(limestone) to your employer violates Municipal Resolution No. 068-020608.
Your actions have gravely put into jeopardy the security, safety of the
Palomponganons, and the environment of Palompon.
It is in this light that you are AT ONCE TO CEASE AND DESIST from
continuing your operation in thearea subject-matter of the ECC and/or to
haul, transfer, deliver to Pheschem Industrial Corporation anyraw materials
which you might or will produce because of your leveling activities.
Your continued operation will be an explicit violation of this Order and shall
be dealt with accordingly.
The PNP, Palompon, Leyte through P/Insp Judito N. Cinco is directed to
immediately serve this Order to Engr. Timoteo Andales at his addressas
indicated hereinabove.7
On November 25, 2008, Pheschem through its plant manager, Engr.
Andales, pleaded with Atty. Surigao torelease its trucks, but Atty. Surigao
responded by furnishing Pheschem with a copy of Municipal Resolution No.
170-211008, entitled, "Strongly Requesting the Office of the Mayor to
Cancel the Mayors Permit and/or Business License Issued to Pheschem
Industrial Corporation and/or Tomas Y. Tan."8 According to Pheschem, it
was at this time that Atty. Surigao demanded as a pre-condition for the
release of its trucks that Pheschem pay its workers a cost of living

allowance (COLA) and a separation pay of one months salary per year of
service. Pheschem refused the demand.
On December 5, 2008, Pheschem represented by its Plant Manager, Engr.
Andales, and Engr. Esperidion C. Pascua, Assistant Plant Manager, filed
Special Civil Action (SCA) Case No. 0045-PN with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17, for "Injunction, Prohibition,
Mandamus with Damages, with prayer for immediate issuance of 72-hour
and 20-day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction."9 Named as respondentswere Mayor Tupa, Vice-Mayor Atty.
Surigao, the Sangguniang Bayanof Palompon, Leyte, represented by Atty.
Surigao, Municipal Councilor Atty. Villardo, SPO1 Manolito R. Ilustre, SPO1
Joel M. Suca, Herville V. Pajaron (Pajaron) of the Municipal Environment
and Natural Resources Offices (MENRO) of Palompon, HESG German Cliton,
Diosdado Perales and BarangayChairman Longcanaya.
On December 8, 2008, the RTC issued a 72-hour TROas well as commanded
the respondenttown officialsto release Pheschems trucks and to stop
obstructing its quarrying operations.10 The next day, the respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration, but on December 22, 2008, the RTCwent on
to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the municipal officialsof
Palompon, including herein respondents, to stop interfering in Pheschems
quarry operations,11 to wit:
WHEREFORE, after hearing the pros and cons of both parties in the aboveentitled case onthe application of petitioner for preliminary injunction, this
court hereby grants the same with the following specific orders.
1. Enjoining the respondent incumbent Municipal Mayor of Palompon and all
or any person under his direction, and all theother respondents herein from
stopping, interfering, preventing[,]and doing acts of harassmentsagainst
the herein petitioner or any of its officers, employees and laborers or its
vehicles and properties in the operation [of] its quarry sites and plant site in
the Municipality of Palompon[.]
2. Prohibiting the Vice-Mayor, Atty. Lloyd Surigao, and the Sangguniang
Bayan of Palompon from interfering, doing acts of harassmentsand other
acts which will hamper the legitimate operation of petitioners quarry sites
and plant.
3. Enjoining and prohibiting Barangay Chairman Eddie Longcanaya from
collecting the Php100.00 peso imposition and from further setting up road
blocks to prevent petitioner from using the subject road.
SO ORDERED.12
In apparent defianceof theabovewrit, on January6, 2009Atty. Surigao,
accompanied by Pajaron, head of Palompons MENRO, and several
policemen, entered Pheschems quarry site and seized three (3) of its dump
trucks.13 On January 9, 2009, Mayor Tupa, Atty. Surigao, and Pajaron
executed a Joint Complaint Affidavit14 seeking to cancel Pheschems
provincial quarry permit. But in a Resolution15 dated March 20, 2009, the
Office of the Provincial Governor of Leyte dismissed the complaint.
On January 13, 2009, the day Pheschem was to resume its operations at
the San Miguel quarry site, it obtained the release of its equipment,16 but
again on January 16, 2009, the trucks were impounded for the third time in
the act of hauling limestone from Tangogsproperty in Barangay San Miguel,

Palompon, allegedly for violation of Sections53 and 55, in relation to

Sections108 and 110, of the Mining Act of1995, as well as the Municipal Tax
Code of 2004, and the conditions of the provincial quarry permit.17
On May 11, 2009, Pheschem filed the instant disbarment complaintagainst
herein respondents, "for gross, malicious and oppressive violation of their
duties under the Code of Professional Responsibility." Meanwhile, on July
22, 2009, the RTC issued a resolution in SCA CaseNo. 0045-PN denying
thereinrespondentsmotion to dissolve the preliminary injunction which was
premised on the expiration of Pheschems quarry permit.18 The
RTCreiterated its order to lift the blockade at Pheschems San Miguel quarry
and to release thetrucks and their accessories impounded by the municipal
and police officers. Then on January 15, 2010, the RTCgranted Pheschems
motion to enforce its December 22, 2008 and July22,2009 orders. On
February 5, 2010, the RTCdenied therein respondentsmotion to inhibit as
well as affirmed its Order datedJanuary 15, 2010.19
From the above orders, three certioraripetitions were filed in the Court of
Appeals (CA), namely: CA-G. R . S P No. 04547, seeking to lift the writ of
preliminary injunction and the order to lift the barangay road blockade; CAG. R . SP No. 04592, praying to dismiss SCA CaseNo. 0045-PN for lack of
cause of action; and CA-G.R. SP No. 04901, praying to set aside the
RTCorder denying the motion to inhibit, ordering the release of Pheschems
trucks and batteries, and reiterating the enforcement of its orders of
December 22, 2008, July 22, 2009, January15, 2010 and February 5,
2010.20
Meanwhile, on January 5, 2011, IBPInvestigating Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala (Commissioner Villanueva-Maala) issued her Report and
Recommendation in A.C.No. 8269,21 wherein she recommended that the
disbarment complaint against the respondentsbe dismissed for lack of
merit, to wit:
From the facts adduced, we find that respondents merely performed their
duties as public officials. Misconduct in the discharge of official duties as
government official, generally is not disciplinable unless the misconduct of
the government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as
a lawyer or toshow moral delinquency. In the case at bar, we find the
orders issued by respondents in the regular performance of their official
duties were all based on the facts, evidence and the law. There is nothing
on record thatshows thatthe assailed orders were motivated with malice, illintent or bad faith.
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
we
respectfully
recommend
that
this
administrative complaint against ATTY. LLOYD P. SURIGAOand ATTY. JESUS
A. VILLARDO IIIbe DISMISSEDfor lack of merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.22 (Citation omitted)
On July21, 2012,the IBP Boardof Governorsissued Resolution No. XX-2012308 adopting and approving IBP Commissioner Villanueva-Maalas report
and recommendation:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2012-308
Adm. Case No. 8269
Pheschem Industrial Corporation vs.
Atty. Lloyd P. Surigao and

Atty. Jesus A. Villardo III

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED[,]the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner inthe above-entitled case, herein madepart of this Resolution
as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record andthe applicable laws and rules, considering that the
complaint lacks merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED.23
On October 12, 2012, Pheschem moved for reconsideration of the dismissal
of its disbarment complaint,24 upon the following grounds:
I. The acts committed by the Respondents were not done in the regular
performance of their official duties because they were manifestly in excess
of their legal authority.
II. The acts committed by the Respondents were not done in the regular
performance of their official duties, because the competent agencies
themselves found that Complainant never committed any actual violation of
law.
III. The acts committed by the Respondents were not done in the regular
performance of their official duties, because their attack on the
complainants Environmental Compliance Certificate had been found to be
without any merit by the competent agencies. IV.The Respondentsassertion
that the Complainant was not a valid contractor because [it] had no Mayors
Permit is self-serving because it was the municipality itself that refused to
issue the same.
V. The acts committed by the Respondents were not done in the regular
performance of their official duties, because their disobedience to the
injunctive writ issued by the Court was in manifest violation of law.
VI. The acts committed by the Respondent Atty. Surigao were not done in
the regular performance ofhis official duties, because he actively used his
office [to] make the Sanggunian act against the Complainant on a private
case.25
The respondents in their Comment-Opposition filed on November 28, 2012
maintained that the above motion is a mere rehash of Pheschems
arguments before the IBP Investigating Commissioner.26 On March 21,
2013, IBP Governor Leonor L. Gerona-Romeo (IBP Governor Gerona
Romeo) rendered an"extended" resolution, consisting of only one page,
stating as follows:
The very comprehensive and accurateMotion for Reconsideration of
Complainant is impressed with merit. Respondentsactions although
apparently done in the performance of their duties constitute arbitrary acts
beyond the scope even of discretionary authority which border
onharassment. Such is unethical per professional standards of lawyers.
Board Resolution dated July 21, 2012 is therefore REVERSED. Respondents
are SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for one (1) month.
SO ORDERED.27
On March 21, 2013,the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-327 adopting
IBP Governor Gerona-Romeos ruling to suspend the respondentsfor one
month:
RESOLVED
to
unanimously
GRANT
Complainants
Motion
for
Reconsideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2012-308 dated July 21, 2012 is

10

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE[. I]nstead[,] Atty. Lloyd P. Surigao and
Atty. Jesus A. Villardo III are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) month.28
On April 29, 2013, the respondents manifested29 to the IBP Board of
Governors that on February 19, 2013, the CA had lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction in SCA Case No. 0045-PN, having found grave abuse
of discretion in the issuance of the RTC orders subject of the consolidated
petitions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 04547, 04592 and 04901:30
We find and so rule that the RTCs Order dated 22 December 2008,
granting respondent PHESCHEMS application for writ of preliminary
injunction, the Resolution dated 22 July 2009 denying the dissolution of the
injunctive writ so issued, and Order dated 15 January 2009,enforcing the
same injunctive writ, constituted manifestly grave abuse of discretion.31
It was only on July 3, 2013 that the respondents received a copy of the IBP
Resolution No. XX-2013-327 suspending them for one month from the
practice of law. They forthwith filed a Manifestation with Motion for
Reconsideration32 on July 11, 2013 wherein they reiterated, invoking the
CA decision, that they were only genuinely motivated in their actuations
against Pheschem to implement the environmental laws. They pointed out
in particular that Quarry Permit No. 8, which Engr. Andales had assigned to
Pheschem, was not for limestone but for rock asphalt. On August 6, 2013,
Pheschem filed its Comment, again insisting that the respondents employed
illegal "vigilante methods" instead of legal processes in discharging their
duties as town officials. Pheschem also mentioned its pending motion for
reconsideration from the CA decision.
Our Ruling
We resolve to dismiss the complaint for disbarment against the
respondents.
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found
based on the facts, evidence and the law that the respondents were merely
performing their duties as town officials; that their conduct was not of such
a character as to affect their qualification as lawyers or demonstrate their
moral delinquency; and that nothing in the record shows that they were
motivated by malice, ill-intent or bad faith.
In its Motion forReconsiderationto theabove reportfiledon October 15, 2012,
Pheschem insisted that the respondentsacts were manifestly in excess of
their legal authority; that the regulatory agencies which granted them
permits did not violate any law and the respondentsattack on its ECC was
without merit; that the respondentsinsistence that Pheschem operated
without a local permit was self-serving because it was themwho refused
Pheschem a permit; that the respondents acted in defiance of the injunction
granted by the RTC; and,that Atty. Surigao used his office to harass
Pheschem in a private case. As to the town officialsauthority to stop its
quarrying operations, Pheschem argued that under Section 17(b) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No.7160, or the "Local Government Code,"
municipalities are not entrusted with power over mined resources but only
the DENR and the provincial and city governments. These competent
agencies did not find any violations by Pheschem, thus, the respondents
had no right to demand that Pheschem obtain certain permits from the

11

municipal government, such asa Mine Processing Permit, a Development

Permit, and an Ore Transport Permit.
Although IBP Governor Gerona-Romeo agreed with Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala
that
the
respondentsactions
against
complainantPheschem were done in the performance of their duties as
municipal officials, she nonetheless overruled Commissioner VillanuevaMaalas recommendation to dismiss the disbarment complaint against them.
She however failed to cite any specific facts, circumstances and laws, as
required under Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rulesof Court, which rendered
their actions arbitrary and "beyond the scope even of discretionary
authority which border on harassment," despiteher observation that "[t]he
very comprehensive and accurate Motion for Reconsideration of
Complainant is impressed with merit.x x x."33
In theirPosition Paper,34 the respondentsadamantly maintained that they
were merely performing their duties as Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang
Bayanmember of Palompon, Leyte, respectively, insisting that their
actuations toward Pheschem were in response to complaints from both
officials and residents of the affected barangaysseeking to stop the
unabated dynamite blasting and quarrying operations of Pheschem. In fact,
at a dialogue with Pheschems officers held on May 1, 2008, a report of the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau was presented showing that Barangay
Liberty is located in a geo-hazard area within the Palompon Forest Reserve
declared under Presidential Proclamation No. 212 as a watershed area
critical to the water supply of the municipality.
The respondents also pointed out that for 24years, the Municipalityof
Palompon did not demand that Pheschem regularly renew its local quarrying
permits. But now that Pheschemwanted to operate new quarries in new
sites, but with its unrenewed mining lease now about to expire,
theSangguniannow insists that it must first secure new permits and licenses
from the regulatory agencies. Its permit for the Cantandoy quarry had
expired and was not renewed for itsfailure to submit the required
documents, particulary a locational clearance for its kiln and hydrating
plant. But despite the lack of a permit, Pheschemproceeded to open a new
quarry in San Miguel, doing so by making it appear that it was merely
levelingthe site to prepare it for residential development, yet in reality it
was hauling the limestone to its processing plant. Moreover, its quarry
permit and limestone processing permit from the Governor of Leyte also
expired in April and May of 2009, along with its 25-year Mining Sharing
Lease Agreement. The municipality also charged that Pheschem
misdeclaredits income in the previous years.
Since Pheschems operations in SanMiguel did not have renewalmining and
quarrying permits, Mayor Tupa issued a CeaseandDesist Order on July 14,
2008, charging that Pheschem violated both Palompons municipal zoning
and land use ordinance, in view of the quarrys proximity to the Manuel B.
VelosoMemorial Hospital and the Doanne Baptist School, and because its
new ECC from theDENR was not for mining but only for land leveling of
Tangogsproperty in BarangaySan Miguel. The ECC itself was issued not to
Pheschem but to Engr. Andales in his personal capacity, who misled the

12

Environment Management Bureau (EMB) that Tangogs property was being

leveledfor residential, not quarrying, purposes.
As to the injunctive writ issued by the RTC, the respondents insist that the
writ was not final and executory in view of their timely motion for
reconsideration. And although the RTC eventually denied the same, three
petitions for certiorarihad been filed in the CAinCA-G.R. SP Nos. 04547,
04592 and 04901,to dissolve theinjunction. The respondents also clarifythat
the seizure of Pheschems trucks was effectedby the municipalofficers
deputized by the Provincial government in relation to Tangogsproperty.
Concerning the COLA whichAtty. Surigao sought for Pheschems workers, he
admitted that he did urge Pheschem to pay the same, but not as a
condition for the release of its impounded trucks. The respondents also
denied that they singled out Pheschem, since there is no other entity
operating a quarry in Palompon. As to Atty. Surigaos appearance as
counsel for a former employee of Pheschem in a labor case, he pointed out
that the case preceded Pheschems injunction suit by several years.
To their manifestationto the IBP Board of Governors dated April 29,2013,35
the respondents attached a copy of the consolidated decision of the CAin
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 04547, 04592 and 04901, which ordered the lifting of the
injunction in SCA Case No. 0045-PN. The CAhas ruled that Pheschem has
no existing vested right to continue operating its quarries.
We agree.
The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police
power to local government units, as agencies of the State, in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation.36 Thisdelegation is embodied in the general welfare clause,
Section16,37 of R.A.No.7160. Police power is essentially regulatory in
nature, and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if
exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the
ambit of this power.38 Consistent with this principle, the CA held in the
aforesaid petitions that the quarry permit issued by the Governor of Leyte
to Pheschem is contingent on its compliance with the terms and conditions
of the ECC. Thus, the quarry permit cannot be said to have vested in
Pheschem an absolute, unconditional right to quarry or to mine, such that if
it fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions ofthe ECC, there
would be no right to quarry or mine to speak of. The CA stressed that a
license or permit is not a contract between the sovereign and the grantee,
but a special privilege, a permission or authority to do what would be within
its terms; that it is neither vested nor permanent that can at no time be
withdrawn or taken back by the grantor.39
The CA also cited Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan,40 where it
was held that although the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, Malay,
Province of Aklan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay
had passed resolutions favorably endorsing the project of the Province of
Aklan to reclaim several hectares of foreshore land in Caticlan, Malay, the
Province of Aklan must still comply with the terms and conditions contained
in the said resolutions of the Sangguniang Barangayof Caticlan and
Sangguniang Bayanof Malay. The Court invoked the duty of local
governments to ensure the quality of the environment pursuant to

13

Presidential DecreeNo. 1586, which established the Environmental Impact

Statement System.
In Republic of thePhilippines v. The City of Davao,41 invoked in Boracay,
we affirmed that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 7160, a local government
unit is endowed with powers to perform not just proprietary but also
governmental functions which concern the health, safety and the
advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally.
The local government unit exercises governmental powers and performs
governmental duties as an agency of the national government. Thus, in
relation to Section 16 of R.A. No. 7160, Section 447 of the Local
Government Code, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of
the municipality, grants the Sangguniang Bayanthe power to, among other
things, "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants xxx," to wit:
xxxx
(2)Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within
the jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan
for the municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city,
subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning
ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or
zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating the construction,
repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in
accordance with the provisions of this Code;
x x x x42
In the complaint before us, the Sangguniang Bayan of Palompon passed on
June 2, 2008 Resolution No. 068-020608, wherein it manifested its
opposition to any and all re-application by Pheschem for mining permit or
license, or, issuance of anECC, business permit, or mayors permit.
Notwithstandingthe same, on July4, 2008, the DENR issued ECC No. ECCR8-0806-070-5010 to Engr.Andales for the proposed Land Development
(Leveling) Project located at BarangaySan Miguel, Palompon. The DENREMB explained in a letter43 dated July 7, 2008 to then Acting Mayor of
Palompon, Atty. Surigao, that although Pheschem could still re-apply for an
ECC as long as it substantially compliedwith the pertinent requirements,
they "wish to emphasize that the nature of ECC is not a permit but more of
a planning tool. As such, it does not exempt the proponent from securing
other permits/clearances from other Government Agencies including LGUs.
Instead, it may serve as guide for other GA[s]or LGUs whether or not to
issue their respective permits and/or clearances. x xx."44 The DENR-EMB
also assured Atty.Surigao that they "fully respect [his]actions in manning
[his]municipality includingthe granting or denial of Business and/or Mayors
permit to anyone."45
On September 10, 2008, notwithstanding Resolution No. 068-020608 of the
Municipality of Palompon, the Governor of Leyte granted Quarry Permit No.
08-2008 to Engr. Andales to extract and dispose of rock asphalt resources,
not limestone, in San Miguel, Palompon, from September 10, 2008 to March
10, 2009. Engr. Andales later assigned his quarry rights to Pheschem. On
October 17, 2008, the Governor of Leyte also issued Quarry Permit No. 019

14

to Pheschem from October 17, 2008 to April 17, 2009. But a certification
dated October 16, 2008 by Engr. Romeo N. Cartalla of the Munieipal
Planning and Development Council of Palompon disclosed that the site is
not a mining or quarry area but a residential zone. Also, San Miguel has
already been declared as within the Palompon Forest Reserve under
Presidential Proclamation No. 212, and identified as such under R.A. No.
7586, otherwise known as the National Integrated Protected Areas Systems
Act.
Lastly, in addition to the violations by Pheschem of the terms and
conditions of the ECC and quarry permit, the respondents alleged that its
Mining Lease Agreement and quarry permit have expired, and there is no
showing that they have been renewed.
In conclusion, rather than this Court penalizing the respondents for their
supposed abusive and arbitrary actuations not befitting the moral character
required of members of the bar, there is ample showing that their conduct
was pursuant to the diligent performance of their sworn duties and
responsibilities as duly elected officials of the Municipality of Palompon,
Leyte. They therefore deserve commendation, instead of condemnation,
and not just commendation but even encouragement, for their vigilance and
prompt and decisive actions in helping to protect and preserve the
environment and natural resources of their Municipality.
WHEREFORE, the disbarment complaint filed by Pheschem Industrial
Corporation against lawyers Lloyd P. Surigao and Jesus A. Villardo III is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5119

April 17, 2013
ROSARIO
BERENGUER-LANDERS
and
PABLO
BERENGUER,
Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY.
PEDRO VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and
Pablo Berenguer (complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin
(Florin), Marcelino Jomales (Jomales) and Pedro Vega (Vega).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda BerenguerAguirre, Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer (Berenguers) are
the registered owners of a 58.0649-hectare land in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon. Sometime in April 1998, a notice of coverage was issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regarding the acquisition of their
landholding pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Berenguers protested and applied for
the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice to lift coverage
based on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively for
livestock pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 09.2

15

On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the
application for exclusion, cancelled the Berenguers certificates of title on
the land and issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award3 (CLOAs) in favor
of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development
Cooperative (BARIBAG).
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied
their application for exclusion from the CARPs coverage in the Order4 dated
February 15, 1999 based on the Investigation Report dated February 9,
1999 submitted by the DAR Region V Investigation that said area sought to
be excluded is principally devoted to coconuts and not the raising of
livestock.5
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal6 with the Secretary of
DAR.
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition7 for the
implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999 before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). This was granted by Florin, as
RARAD, in an Order8 dated March 15, 1999. Accordingly, Florin directed the
issuance and implementation of the Writ of Possession.9
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration,10
claiming that they were denied due process as they were not furnished with
a copy of BARIBAGs petition for implementation. Florin denied the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit in an Order11 dated March 22, 1999.
On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed12 to the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB). BARIBAG, on other hand, filed a Motion for the Issuance of
a Writ of Possession.13 The Berenguers opposed14 the motion saying that
the execution would be premature in view of their pending appeal before
the DARAB. Nevertheless, BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the Appointment
of a Special Sheriff.15
In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S.
Navarro denied the Berenguers appeal.
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution,17 which granted BARIBAGs
Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance of
the writ of possession prayed for.
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside18 the
Resolution dated April 8, 1999, arguing that: the DARAB already acquired
jurisdiction over case when they seasonably filed an appeal before it; and
that Florin should have waited until the DARAB has decided the appeal. In
an Order19 dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the said motion prompting
the Berenguers to move for her inhibition20 on ground of partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court
of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51858, which was denied
outright on procedural grounds, to wit: (1) copy of the assailed order bears
the words "certified true copy" but the name and authority of the person
certifying is not indicated as required in SC Circular No. 3-96, and the
signature therein is illegible; (2) only one of the petitioners signed the
certification on non-forum shopping which is an insufficient compliance of
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court; and (3) there is nonexhaustion of administrative remedies as the assailed order of the Regional
Director is not directly reviewable by the CA.21

16

Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53174, which questioned the Orders dated
March 15, 1999 and March 22, 1999 issued by Florin. The petition was also
denied on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode of appeal.22
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession23 in favor of
BARIBAG.
Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of
possession pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court in spite of the
Berenguers protestations.24
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash25 the Writ of Possession,
to no avail.
On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint26 for the
disbarment of respondents Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant
Regional Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V,
for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the commission of the
following acts:
A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY
RENDERING AN UNJUST JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS;
B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION EX-PARTE
AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING AND SIGNING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION
WITHOUT CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY ISSUED BY THE PROPER OFFICER
FULLY KNOWING THAT SHE HAS NO AUTHORITY AND TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE RULES AND IN CONTRAVENTION WITH
THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD; FURTHER, HIDING THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS INSPITE OF REQUEST FOR A COPY;
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY PETITIONERS
THRU COUNSEL AND FAILING AND REFUSING TO CONDUCT A HEARING AS
PRAYED FOR BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND REFUSING TO FORWARD THE
APPEAL TO THE PROPER APPELLATE BOARD;
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS TO
THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS AND LAWYER; ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO
CITE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER
OF ARREST WITHOUT HEARING CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF COURT;
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF
THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION,
PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
WRIT OF POSSESSION TO THE PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS AND
PETITIONERS.27
Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of
possession is anchored on the CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, and
not on a final and executory decision that would require a certification of
finality as prescribed by the DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus (De
Jesus), as Berenguers counsel, was not furnished with a copy of the writ
because it was not yet issued at the time when it was requested; (3) there
was no intent to hide the writ; (4) when the writ of possession was finally
signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and enforcement; (4) it
was unfair to impute illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as DAR lawyers

17

in view of the DARs denial of the motion for a cease and desist order and
because of the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duty; (5) the petitions for certiorari filed with the CA were both dismissed;
and (6) the findings of DAR and the issuance of the CLOAs remain
undisturbed. Florin also claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus who wants her
disbarred and not the Berenguers.
In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against him arguing
that: (1) the writ of possession is not illegal in the absence of a court order
stating its invalidity; (2) he did not participate in the issuance of the writ of
possession because he did not appear as the farmers counsel; (3) the Legal
Division he heads has no control or influence over the DARAB; and (4) his
presence in the execution of the writ of possession was to ascertain that no
violations against any law are committed by the person/s executing the
writ.30
Jornales Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima
facie infirmity; (2) he is not privy to the issuance thereof; (3) he has no
supervision and control over the DAR which issued the writ; and (4) he has
no authority to determine the writs validity or invalidity. Jornales admitted,
however, that he was in the meeting presided by the PNP Provincial Director
of Sorsogon prior to the writs implementation in his capacity as Regional
Assistant Director for Operations of DAR Region V and not as a lawyer. He
added that the disbarment complaint against him is not only malicious for
lack of legal basis but is also meant to harass and intimidate DAR
employees in implementing the CARP.32
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply,33 the case was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan)
Recommended34 that Florin be "suspended from the practice of law for
three (3) years for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, Orders and
Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants."
Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges
against Jornales and Vega be dismissed for failure of the complainants to
substantiate the charges against them.35
Commissioner San Juans recommendation against Florin is based on the
findings36 of the CA in its Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 53174,37 which reads:
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of
Appeals was treated as a petition for review and the court found the
following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject
properties being devoted to pasture and livestock and already classified as
residential and industrial land, hence, outside the coverage of Republic Act
6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) The generation and issuance
of Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA) was therefore void;"
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent
Hon. Isabel E. Florin who is exercising delegated jurisdiction from the
DARAB has no jurisdiction over Petitioners Properties as held in Krus na

18

Ligas Farmers Coop vs. University of the Philippines; G.R. No. 107022, 8
December 1992, which is squarely in point with the case at bar."
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the
Court ruled thus "Assuming that the lands are indeed agricultural, we
cannot understand why the DAR awarded them to members of respondent
Baribag and not to the farmers in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of the
CARL x x x."
The court further stated "We cannot xxx close this discussion without
mentioning our observation on the actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator Isabel Florin. Just why she issued a writ of execution and
eventually a Writ of Possession in favor of respondent Baribag puzzles us no
end. She knew that Baribag is not a party in petitioners application for
exclusion filed with the Office of DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug.
Obviously, she never acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also knew that
petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary from the Order of Regional
Director Dalugdug dismissing petitioners application for exclusion. Clearly,
such order was not yet final and executory when she issued the assailed
writs of execution and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would
be set aside."38
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVII2006-282 modifying the recommended penalty, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
for knowingly rendering an unjust Judgment, Orders and Resolutions,
adverse and prejudicial to the interest of the complainants, Atty. Isabel F.
Florin is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. The
charges against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Peter Vega are
DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges
against Respondents.39
In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over
BARIBAG at the time it filed a petition for the implementation of the Order
dated February 15, 1999; (2) the DARAB has jurisdiction to issue the
CLOAs; (3) as RARAD, she has concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB; (4) the
Berenguers were not denied due process; and (5) the Berenguers never
questioned the regularity of the DARs acquisition of their landholding nor
did they file a petition for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to BARIBAG.
This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but
modifies the penalty to be imposed.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefore.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the

19

admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney

for a party without authority so to do. x x x.
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any
fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant
unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration
of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.42 (Citations omitted)
In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary
sanction against the three (3) respondents as members of the bar. The
grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the charges against the
respondents, however, are intrinsically connected with the discharge of
their quasi-judicial functions. Nevertheless, in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,43
the Court already ruled that if a misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then
he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
xxxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of
private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government
service. This is clear from Canon 644 of said Code. Lawyers in government
are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus,
they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional
obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the
public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any
act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing.1wphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper
of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.45 (Citations omitted
and emphasis ours)
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,46 the Court ruled that an administrative
case against a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as provincial
adjudicator of the DARAB may be likened to administrative cases against
judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government.47
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government, performs official functions of a RARAD that are akin to those of
judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be likened that of a judge

20

whose decision, including the manner of rendition, is made subject of an

administrative complaint.
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative
Order No. 06-00 provides:
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the
President, or the Court of Appeals shall have the following effects:
(a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.
The appeal shall stay the order appealed from unless the Secretary directs
execution pending appeal, as he may deem just, considering the nature and
circumstances of the case (Executive Order No. 292 [1987], Book VII,
Chapter 4, Sec. 21).
xxxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR
Secretary clearly stayed the implementation of Regional Director
Dalugdugs Order dated February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is the DAR
Secretary who has jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal. Records
reveal that there was no order by the DAR Secretary directing execution of
the Order dated February 15, 1999 during the pendency of the Berenguers
appeal.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances
when execution may be had, namely: (1) after a decision or order has
become final and executory;48 (2) pending appeal, only upon good reasons
to be stated in a special order after due hearing;49 and (3) execution of
several, separate or partial judgments.50
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:
Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.Execution shall issue upon
an order, resolution or decision that finally disposes of the action or
proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of course and upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that
a resolution, order or decision has been served to the counsel or
representative on record and to the party himself, and has become final and
executory, and, upon motion or motu proprio, issue a writ of execution
ordering the DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer to enforce the same. In
appropriate cases, the Board or any of its Members or its Adjudicator shall
deputize and direct the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the
Philippines or any of their component units or other law enforcement
agencies in the enforcement of any final order, resolution or decision.
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. Any motion for execution of the
decision of the Adjudicator pending appeal shall be filed before the Board
which may grant the same upon meritorious grounds, upon the posting of a
sufficient bond in the amount conditioned for the payment of damages
which the aggrieved party may suffer, in the event that the final order or
decision is reversed on appeal, provided that the bond requirement shall
not apply if the movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper litigant. (Emphasis
ours)
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director
Dalugdug denying the Berenguers application for exclusion from CARP is

21

yet to become final and executory as it was seasonably appealed to the

DAR Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that will show whether
BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the Rules.
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof
that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an
injustice,51 the facts on hand prove otherwise. Florins issuance of the writ
of execution and writ of possession in order to fully implement Regional
Director Dalugdugs Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes
ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued only after
the subject judgment or order has already become final and executory.52 As
aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin ordered the issuance of
such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the DARAB.53
Consequently, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of suspension.
As to the penalty
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or
deliberate intent to do injustice will be administratively sanctioned.54 In this
case, it appears, however, that this is the first time that Florin has been
made administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice or
bad faith attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same
does not negate the fact that Florin executed an act that would cause an
injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ of
execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment
but an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty
recommended and instead impose the penalty of suspension for three (3)
months55 without pay. As also held in Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr.,56 three (3)
months suspension without pay was imposed against a judge after finding
out that the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with bad
faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees
and adopts the finding of the IBP that no sufficient evidence was adduced to
substantiate the charges against them. Hence, the complaint against them
should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN
is found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, she is penalized with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for
three (3) months effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against Atty.
Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient
evidence.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-06-2261 [OCA IPI No. 04-1905-P]

December 11,
2013
ELPIDIO SY, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation,
Complainant,

22

vs.
EDGAR ESPONILLA, Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge, and
JENNIFER DELA CRUZ-BUENDIA, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
Manila, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This case is one among many where the irregularities complained of are
evident and blatant yet its resolution has been protracted for years. While
this Court has already ruled on the liability of the respondents in its October
30, 2006 Decision,1 it directed another administrative investigation to
search for the "missing link" which -if found -would have established the
culpability of the perpetrator of these irregularities.
On March 30, 2004, complainant Elpidio Sy (Sy), President of Systems
Realty Development Corporation, filed a verified Complaint2 charging
respondent Edgar Esponilla, Legal Researcher and then Officer-In-Charge of
Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 54), and Atty.
Jennifer Dela Cruz-Buendia (Atty. Dela Cruz-Buendia), Clerk of Court and
Ex-officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, with Gross
Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty. The complaint was filed in
connection with the withdrawal of deposits for monthly rentals deposited
with Branch 54 in Civil Case No. 90-55003 entitled Maria Gagarin, et al. v.
Bank of the Philippine Islands and Systems Realty Development
Corporation.
Complainant had previously filed an ejectment case with Branch 1 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila against Jaime Ang Tiao and Maria Gagarin
who were eventually ejected from the property. On appeal, the case was
assigned to Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 32)
where supersedeas bond and monthly rentals covering the period from
September 30, 1994 to January 3, 1997were deposited. Simultaneously,
Ang Tiao and Gagarin filed with Branch 54 a case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 90-55003, contesting the validity of a deed of sale executed between
Systems Realty Development Corporation and BPI.3 The plaintiffs deposited
with Branch 54 the sum of P264,000.00 to cover rental deposits from June
30, 1989 to August 5, 1994.
Upon a purported Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits (Ex-Parte
Motion) in Civil Case No. 90-55003 filed by Atty. Walfredo Bayhon (Atty.
Bayhon), counsel for plaintiffs Ang Tiao and Gagarin, the late Judge
Hermogenes R. Liwag (Judge Liwag) issued the subject Order dated
November 11, 1994, allowing the withdrawal of the deposits amounting to
P260,000.00, viz.:
Finding the Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits filed by plaintiffs,
thru counsel, to be well-taken, the same is hereby GRANTED, and the Clerk
of Court, or her duly authorized representative, is hereby ordered to release
to plaintiffs, or their duly authorized representative, the deposits made by
such parties in the concept of rentals from May, 1989 to August, 1994 in
the estimated aggregate sum of P260,000.00.
It is well to emphasize here that such deposits were made in the concept of
monthly rentals for the plaintiffs occupancy of the premises in controversy,

23

here and in the ejectment suit now on appeal with Branch 32 of this same
Court. It would appear, however, from the attachments to the Motion to
Withdraw Rental Deposits that sufficient supersedeas bond was already
posted in that appealed ejectment bond case by the plaintiffs hereto,
defendants therein, in the total sum of P260,000.00. Surely, the rental
deposits made in this case become superfluous and serve no legal purpose.
It is actually duplicitous and its non-release would actually prejudice the
plaintiffs.4
Judge Liwag was then the Pairing Judge of Branch 54 where Civil Case No.
90-55003 was docketed and the questioned Order was issued. He was
likewise then the Presiding Judge of Branch 55 where, as the investigation
would later show, Atty. Bayhon filed the Ex-Parte Motion. The assailed
Order was also typed by an employee of Branch 55. Based on this Order,
Ang Tiao was able to withdraw P256,000.00 from the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manilaasevidenced by a disbursement
voucher5 dated November 14, 1994 certified by respondent Atty. Dela
Cruz-Buendia and approved by then Acting Court Cashier Corazon L.
Guanlao.
Complainant alleged that the withdrawal of the rental deposits was irregular
because the claim in the Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits that
the amount withdrawn from Branch 54 was superfluous and duplicitous is
false. He asserted that Atty. Bayhon falsely alleged that there was already a
sufficient supersedeas bond posted with Branch 32 to justify the withdrawal
of the rental deposits made in Branch 54.6 Complainant pointed out that
there could have been no such duplication because the deposits made with
Branch 54 covered the period from June 30, 1989 to August 5, 1994, while
those made in Branch 32 were for the period covering September 30, 1994
to January 3, 1997.7 Complainantthus concluded that when Judge Liwag
granted the Ex-Parte Motion, he did not first ascertain the veracity of the
allegations therein.8Complainant explained that he could not have objected
to the false allegations made by Atty. Bayhon because he was not furnished
a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion and the same was never set for hearing.9
It is of material significance in the case at bar that the Ex-Parte Motion does
not appear anywhere in the records of Branch 54 on Civil Case No. 9055003, andthe fact that these documents were not attached to the case
folio were discovered only when the records of the case were elevated to
the Court of Appeals.10
Complainant faulted respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia, who was then the
Assistant Clerk of Courtforbeing negligent and connivingwith the plaintiffs in
the said civil case when she allowedand facilitatedthe release of the
deposits without first verifying the authenticity of the Ex-Parte Motion and
Order.11 Complainant also charged respondent Esponilla with gross
negligence for failing to safeguard vital case records and connivance with
the plaintiffs in the same civil case.12
Respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia denied the charges against her and asserted
that the functions of a clerk of court are purely ministerial in nature. As
such, a clerk of court does not possess the discretion to follow or not to
follow orders of the court.13 Respondent Esponilla, on the other hand,
prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed. He alleged that he was

24

not the Officer-In-Charge of Branch 54 when the Order granting the ExParte Motion was allegedly issued by Judge Liwag on November 11, 1994.
Esponilla was designated as Officer-In-Charge only in March 1995.14
On November 9, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred
the instant complaint to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila for investigation, report and recommendation.15 In a Report and
Recommendation16 dated February 1, 2006, then Executive Judge Antonio
M. Eugenio, Jr. submittedthe following findings:
Respondent Edgar Esponilla cannot be faulted for any of the acts
complained of as he was appointed officer-in-charge of Branch 54 only in
March 1995 and the questioned order was issued by Pairing Judge
Hermogenes Liwag on November11, 1994.Nor did he have a hand in the
preparation and release of the check to the plaintiffs on November 14, 1994
or sometime thereafter.
xxxx
As to respondent Clerk of Court, we likewise find her explanations
meritorious.In the instant case, the duty of the Clerk of Court and/or
respondent Buendia xxx is ministerial.
Upon receipt of an order from a court, the Clerk of Courts duty is to make
sure that the order is complied with. x xx For a Clerk of Court to question a
ruling or order of a judgeis an invitation for contempt.
xxxx
The pivotal issue that should be addressed is why Atty. Walfredo Bayhon
filed the motion in the first place and why then Pairing Judge Hermogenes
Liwag favorably acted on it without looking into the truth of the allegation of
"duplicity and superfluity."
xxxx
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the administrative complaint
filed against respondents Edgar Esponilla and Jennifer de la Cruz[-]Buendia
be dismissed for lack of merit.
It is further recommended that Atty. Walfredo Bayhon be asked to explain
the circumstances behind his filing of the Ex-Parte Motion and to provide
the Supreme Court with a true copy of the motion.17
In a Memorandum18 dated June 5, 2006, the OCA submitted its evaluation
and recommendation adopting the findings and recommendation of
Executive Judge Eugenio, as follows:
RECOMMENDATION: In view of the foregoing discussions, it is respectfully
submitted that the administrative complaint filed against respondents Edgar
Esponilla and Atty. Jennifer dela Cruz-Buendia be DISMISSEDfor lack of
merit.
Consequently, it is further recommended that Atty. Walfredo Bayhon be
asked to EXPLAINthe circumstances behind his filing of the Ex-Parte Motion
and to provide the Court with a true copy of themotion.19
In a Decision20 dated October 30, 2006, this Court dismissed the
administrative case against respondent Esponilla for lack of merit.The Court
ruled that Esponilla not being the Officer-In-Charge when the subject
documents were allegedly processed with Branch 54 cannot be faulted for
the missing documents in the folio of Civil Case No. 90-55003.21 The Court
also did not find proof that Esponilla participated in the preparation and

25

release of the check to the plaintiffs.22 For lack of evidence,the Court was
not convinced that Esponilla connived with either the plaintiffs in the civil
case or with the other respondents to perpetuate fraud against the
complainant.23
Respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia was found guilty of simple negligence in the
performance of her duties and was fined in the amount of OneThousand
Pesos (P1,000.00), with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely.24 Atty. Bayhon, for his part, was
ordered to explain within ten (10) days from receipt of the Decision the
circumstances behind the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion and to provide the
Court with a true copy of the Motion.25 The Court required Atty. Bayhons
explanation in order to shed light on the circumstances leading to the
issuance of the November 11, 1994 Order and the release of the rental
deposits.26
The Court, in the said Decision, stated that the duties27and functions of
clerks of court as officers of the law are generally administrative in nature
and do not involve the discretion on the use of judicial powers.28 It ruled
that while respondent Dela Cruz-Buendias duties as then clerk of court
were purely ministerial, "ordinary prudence [would have called] for her to
[have] at least [verified] the authenticity and origin of the alleged Order of
Judge Liwag because from the copies on record, we note that the same
does not bear the seal of the Court nor the standard certification by the
branch clerk of court. She should have been vigilant considering that the
Order dealt with withdrawal of deposits."29
The Court further noted the finding of the OCA that per the investigationof
Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas, "the purported Order of Judge Liwag was actually
prepared in Branch 55 by one Baby Manalastas."30 Since this finding does
not fully explain why the said Order and the Ex-Parte Motion were not filed
in the case folio of Civil Case No. 90-55003, the OCA was directed to
conduct an investigation against the then clerks of court of Branches 54 and
55 during the period material to this case in order to explain the
circumstances behind their improper management of court records and
documents.31
In a Motion for Reconsideration32 dated December 28, 2006, respondent
Dela-Cruz-Buendia averred that she should not be found guilty of simple
negligence. She argued that her delegated duty in relation to the
withdrawal of the rental deposits the physical preparation of the checks
issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court was ministerial and she had no
choice but to prepare the subject check based on the Order lest she be
cited for contempt. She stated that she did not have to verify the
authenticity of the Order because it is presumed to have been regularly
issued. Besides, she argued that the Order submitted to the Office of the
Clerk of Court "was a duplicate original copy, appeared to be authentic on
its face, showed no palpable nor patent, no definite nor certain defects, duly
signed by the Honorable Judge Hermogenes Liwag, counterchecked by the
subordinate personnel involved in the preparation of vouchers, namely:
Corazon L. Guanlao, Court Cashier and Rosa S. Rayo."33She allegedly
signed and issued the check after the voucher was prepared and signed by
the Acting Court Cashier and Clerk-in-Charge; the attachments, including

26

the duplicate original copy of the Order, were attached to the voucher. With
a "duplicate original copy" of the Order, respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia
argued that there was no need to further require a "certified true copy."
The Court, in a Resolution34 dated January 31, 2007, resolved to deny the
motion with finality as no substantial matters were raised to warrant a
reconsideration thereof. Respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia filed a subsequent
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration35 which was Noted Without Action
by the Court in its March 19, 2007 Resolution.36
In a Compliance/Explanation37 dated September 28, 2007, Atty. Bayhon
explained that he was not in a position to comply with the Courts resolution
because he had long ceased to be the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 90-55003. He further averred that he had already turned
over the records of the case to Ang Tiaos family when he withdrew as
counsel in 1997 to join a multinational corporation. Atty. Bayhon also
requested that he be allowed to adopt in totothe pleadings and arguments
raised in his Answer38 and Position Paper39 submitted to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in view of a disbarment complaint filed against
him also by herein complainant Sy. Both of these pleadings submitted to
the IBP however failed to shed light into the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of the assailed Order which granted the Ex-Parte Motion which
allegedly could not now be located by Atty. Bayhon. He also sustained his
averment that there is nothing on record to establish that he made an
allegation that the deposits made with Branch 54 were superfluous and
duplicitous.
On January 3, 2008, the OCA submitted its Report and Recommendation40
to the Court, in compliance with the Resolution41 of the Third Division
directing the OCA to conduct an investigation on the mismanagement of
court records in Branches 54 and 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. It
submitted the following findings:
It would appear that the incident in Civil Case No. 90-55003 was an isolated
anomaly. The case involved rental deposits amounting to almost
P260,000.00 that were released by virtue of a November 11, 1994 order
issued by Judge Liwag, which order granted the Ex-Parte Motion to
Withdraw Rental Deposits filed by Atty. Bayhon. According to the October
30, 2006 decision of the Court, the order granting the motion was drafted
by Ms. Baby Manalastas, a court stenographer in RTC Branch 55 who has
since migrated to the United States.
Based on the information gathered by the audit team, the Clerk of Court of
RTC Branch 54 for the period November 1994 was Atty. Emerenciana O.
Manook. Atty. Manook, who now serves as Clerk of Court VI of RTC, Branch
23, Allen, Northern Samar, was the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 54,
Manila from July 1,1989 to March 29, 1995.
On the other hand, the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of RTC Branch 55 for the
period November 1994 was Ms. Isabelita D. Artuz. Ms. Artuz served as OIC
of the branch from September 1994 until November 1996 xxx.42
In light of these findings, the Court, in another Resolution43 dated February
11, 2008, adopted the following recommendations of the OCA:
1.That Atty. Emerenciana O. Manook, Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 23, Allen,
Northern Samar, and Ms. Isabelita D. Artuz, Office of Court of Appeals

27

Associate Justice Fernanda L. Peralta, be DIRECTED TO COMMENT on the

November 11, 1994 order issued by former RTC Branch 55 Manila Presiding
Judge Hermogenes Liwag granting the Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits
filed by Atty. Walfredo Bayhon xxx;
2.Thataction on the September 28, 2007 comment/explanation submitted
by Atty. Walfredo C. Bayhon relative to the incident be DEFERRED pending
the submission of Atty. Manook and Ms. Artuz of their comments.44
On June 17, 2008, Ms. Artuz submitted her explanation.45 While she was a
Legal Researcher at Branch 55 when the subject irregularity was allegedly
committed, she admitted that she was not familiar with Civil Case No. 9055003. She also did not know of any irregularity surrounding the issuance
of the questioned Order as it dealt with a case docketed with Branch 54,
and not with Branch 55. Sifting through her averments, the Court found a
relevant information that in the past, Branch 54 used the sala of Branch 55
where Judge Liwag was then Presiding Judge.46
In a letter47 dated September 26, 2008 submitted by Atty. Manook the
Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 54 during the time material to the case
she claimed that "[a]fter [a]careful scrutiny of the records, [she found] that
in xxx Civil Case No. 90-55003 x x x, the Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw
Rental Deposits was filed by Atty. Walfredo Bayhon with Branch 55, RTC
Manila. It was never filed with Branch 54, RTC Manila." She added that she
could not remember encountering the Ex-Parte Motion and was puzzled why
the Order of Judge Liwag was typed by Baby Manalastas a court
stenographic reporter assigned to Branch 55 when the Order involved a
case filed with Branch 54.
In a Memorandum48 dated February 3, 2009, the OCA founda prima
faciecase of irregularity in granting the Ex-Parte Motion due to the following
factors:
1. [t]he Motion and the subject Order could not be found in the records of
Branch 54;
2. [t]hey could not be produced either by Atty. Bayhon;
3. [t]he Motion was filedwith Branch 55, never with Branch 54, while the
Order was typed or drafted by a stenographer of Branch 55, not by a
personnel of Branch 54; and
4. [c]omplainant in the civil case was not even furnished a copy of the
Motion which was not even set for hearing.49
On March 25, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution50 requiring Atty. Bayhon
to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for filing the
Ex-Parte Motion with Branch 55, and not with Branch 54. He was also
required to comment on the allegation that complainant was not furnished a
copy of the Ex-Parte Motion and to exert his best efforts to submit the
subject Ex-Parte Motion to the Court. The Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals was also directed to furnish the Court a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion
which was appealed thereto from Branch 54 on July 11, 1996.51
Despite the Show Cause Resolution,52 Atty. Bayhon failed to file his
explanation and comment as required. Thus, in a Resolution53 dated
December 1, 2010, he was fined in the amount of P500.00 and directed to
submit the required comment and explanation. In the same Resolution, the
Court also required the Presiding Judge of Branch 54, to submit to the Court

28

a copy of the subject Ex-Parte Motion in view of the Court of Appeals

remanding the case to the said branch. Hon. Reynaldo A. Alhambra, then
Pairing Judge of Branch 54, informed the Court that the subject Ex-Parte
Motion was not attached to the expedienteper certification of the Branch
Clerk of Court, Atty. Noel Antay.54 The OCA, for its part, reported in a
Memorandum55 dated April 4, 2011 that upon the certification56 of Ms.
Adora Millo, the Officer-In-Charge of Branch 55, a copy of the Ex-Parte
Motion could not be produced since the civil case involving the Ex-Parte
Motion is not in its docket. The OCA Memorandum further stated, viz.:
We had also directed the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila to verify from the record of the disbursement voucher
relative to the release of the rental deposit if acopy of the said ex-parte
motion is attached. As certified by xxx Atty. Clemente M. Clemente, the
Assistant Clerk of Court, the voucher discloses that nosuch document is
attached x x x.57
The finding of the OCA that the Ex-Parte Motion was also not attached to
the disbursement voucher is significant. It could be argued that such
document may not be a necessary attachment in the issuance of a check by
the Office of the Clerk of Court. However, the fact that all the employees
involved from the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion to the eventual issuance
and withdrawal of the check certify that the Ex-Parte Motion does not exist
in the records within their respective custody casts serious doubt as to the
regularity surrounding the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion.
Meanwhile, Atty. Bayhon again failed to comply with the Resolution of
December 1, 2010. Thus, in the August 24, 2011 Resolution58 of the Court,
Atty. Bayhon was required to comply with the December 1, 2010 Resolution
within ten days fromnotice, and to submit his memorandum within thirty
days from notice. Since Atty. Bayhon yet again failed to comply, the Court
issued another Resolution59 dated April 16, 2012 requiring him to comply
with the same December 1, 2010 Resolution within ten days from notice,
otherwise the Court will order his arrest for non-compliance therewith.
On October 5, 2012, Atty. Bayhon finally filed a Very Respectful Apology
and Compliance60 with the OCA. While he apologized to the Court for the
late submission of his response and compliance with its resolutions, he
merely reiterated his previous string of excuses that in no way could have
shed light to the circumstances in question:
1.that he ceased to be the counsel for plaintiff Ang in 1997 when he left his
law practice;
2.that in view of his withdrawal as counsel, he no longer has possession and
access to the subject Ex-Parte Motion as he had already turned over the
files to Angs children and had lost contact with them; and
3.that due to these circumstances, he cannotproffer intelligent answers and
explanations to the questions being posed on him by the Court.
We are not persuaded.
It is clear that the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion by Atty. Bayhon triggered
the series of irregularities that have studded the case at bar: the Ex-Parte
Motion was never shown to have been set for hearing; there is no record
that the opposing party was notified; the Ex-Parte Motion was granted in an
Order issued by the late Judge Liwag under Branch 54, but the Ex-Parte

29

Motion could not be found in the case folio from the said branch; it was
later found that the Ex-Parte Motion was filed with Branch 55 where the
case was not docketed; the Order granting the Motion was typed by a court
stenographic reporter of Branch 55; nonetheless, the Motion could not be
located among the files of Branch 55.
The Court had sought the explanation of Atty. Bayhon to shed light on the
circumstances surrounding the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion, and to exert
his best efforts to furnish usa copy of the said motion. The compliance of
Atty. Bayhon was sought as early as October 30, 2006 the date when the
Court promulgated its Decision pertaining to the liability of herein
respondents. It was in light of the Courts recognition that some form of
irregularity was committed in this case that prompted it to look at all angles
and request an explanation from every relevant source of information.
However, Atty. Bayhon, instead of shedding light in the discussion, only
proffered unresponsive answers that were mostly reiterations of his
averments in the pleadings he had earlier submitted to the IBP. As aptly
observed and succinctly described by the OCA:
Atty. Bayhons explanations are unsatisfactory. His words are evasive and
carefully selected as to free him from any liability. They do not directly
confront the nagging questions, merely offering as excuses his resignation
as counsel of record and turn-over of documents to his clients, and blaming
his adversarys negligence. However, he himself isto be greatly blamed for
not promptly and fully complying with the directives of the Court,
particularly the 25 March 2009 Resolution and the subsequent resolutions
which dragged this case for so long a time. He refused to answer why he
filed the subject motion at Branch 55, not at Branch 54. He did not
comment on the allegation that the complainant in the civil case was not
furnished a copy of the said motion which was not even set for hearing. He
did not exert his best efforts in locating or producing the motion for
submission to the Court. And he complied with the resolutions rather
belatedly, or after he was threatened by the Court with arrest. It appears
that he took the Courts directives lightly.
Worse, Atty. Bayhon completely ignored the sanction ofthe Court in its 01
December 2010 Resolution imposing upon him a fine of P500.00. After
almost two (2) years and several resolutions reiterating the said resolution,
he has not paid the fine or even mentioned the penalty in his 01 October
2012 compliance.
A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere
request, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure
to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character,
but also disrespect for the Courts lawful order and directive.61 This
contumacious conduct of refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by
the Court has likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to
remain with, if not contempt of, the system.62 As a lawyer and an officer
ofthe court, Atty. Bayhon should have been more than conscious and aware
of his duty to strictly follow the Courts orders and processes without
unreasonable delay.63
We agree with the accurate and incisive discussion of the OCA on all points,
except for thepenalty imposed. The OCA imposed upon Atty. Bayhon an

30

additional fine of P2,000.00 to the original fine of P500.00 for noncompliance with the directives of the Court. This additional fine was also
imposed for Atty. Bayhons continuously ignoring the several Court
resolutions reiterating the payment of the original fine.64
Atty. Bayhon should be imposed a stringer penalty. The disobedience and
the consequent delays he incurred had protracted the pace of the
administrative investigation in the case at bar. While Atty. Bayhon may
have apologized to this Court a number of times, his sincerity is not
reflected in the manner that he would deal with the Court after each
tendered apology: he would again not comply, and hence cause delay, to a
subsequent resolution in clear violation of the Lawyers Oath65 which
states, among others, that a lawyer "will conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."
Aside from not complying with the resolutions of the Court, the evidence on
record is clear that Atty. Bayhon also violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibilitywhich states that "[a] lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."It is significant that
Atty. Bayhon has consistently claimed that there is no proof to show that he
ever claimed that the amounts deposited with Branch 32 were superfluous
and duplicitous66 the reason used as a basis for the issuance of the
assailed Order.He also stated that from his recollection, if there was a
motion to withdraw cash deposits with Branch 54, there was also a
simultaneous request to the trial court to replace the money with a
supersedeas bond.67 He further stated that "no trial judge worth his salt,
Judge Liwag in this instance, would have allowed such a withdrawal without
a corresponding replacement."68
On its face, however, the following Order of Judge Liwag shows that the
deposits were allowed to be withdrawn due to their "superfluity and
duplicity" vis--vis the supersedeas bond already posted with Branch 32,
and not because the amount withdrawn with Branch 54 was replaced by a
supersedeas bond:
xxxx
It is well to emphasize here that such deposits were made in the concept of
monthly rentals for the plaintiffs occupancy of the premises in controversy,
here and in the ejectment suit now on appeal with Branch 32 of this same
Court. It would appear, however, from the attachments to the Motion to
Withdraw Rental Depositsthat sufficient supersedeas bond was already
posted in that appealed ejectment bond case by the plaintiffs hereto,
defendants therein, in the total sum of P260,000.00. Surely, the rental
deposits made in this case become superfluous and serve no legal purpose.
It is actually duplicitous and its non-release would actually prejudice the
plaintiffs.69
Atty. Bayhons unsubstantiated claim that the deposits withdrawn were
replaced by a supersedeas bond is a legal incredulity. It is a preposterous
excuse that does not only attempt to mislead the Court it was proffered in
an attempt to evade the directive of the Court to produce a copy of the ExParte Motion which may open another can of worms. The Order clearly

31

states that the attachments to the Ex-Parte Motion showed that there was
already a "supersedeas bond" posted with Branch 32 in the amount of
P260,000.00, that is why Judge Liwag ordered and authorized the
withdrawal of the same amount of P260,000.00 from Branch 54. It is
precisely the claim of herein complainant that it was fraudulent
misrepresentation on the part of Atty. Bayhon to make it appear that the
Branch 54 deposits were superfluous because the deposits made with
Branches 32 and 54 were separate, distinct and covered different periods
a false claim that Atty. Bayhon has continuously denied making in the ExParte Motion. But instead of producing and submitting to this Court a copy
of the Ex-Parte Motion to conclusively prove that he did not make such a
false averment, Atty. Bayhon hides behind the rules of evidence claiming
that without the subject Ex-Parte Motion, this allegation against him is but
hearsay.
The OCA appears to be right when it observed that Atty. Bayhon seems to
have a selective memory,70 since he remembers only the matter pertaining
to the supersedeas bond, but has claimed that he no longer remembers the
other circumstances surrounding the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion.71 To be
sure, Atty. Bayhon has never denied having filed the controversial Ex-Parte
Motion, but as pointed out by the OCA:
x x x His explanation about the circumstances surrounding its filing is
unsatisfactory as he did not exert his utmost efforts to locate the
Motionfrom his clients or from the courts. He did not even mention in his
"Explanation/Compliance" that he tried to contact his clients to verify if they
still have in their possession a copy of the Motion.72
For failing to explain, in good faith, the circumstances surrounding the filing
of the Ex-Parte Motion which he himself filed, for proffering misleading
claims in the course of the subject administrative investigation, and for not
having shown and proved that he exerted his best efforts to secure and
submit a copy of the subject Ex-Parte Motion -all in violation of the
resolutions issued by this Court -Atty. Bayhon violated the Lawyer's Oath
and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any violation of the Lawyer's Oath, viz.:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. -A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any unlawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so.xx x
We believe that the proven acts and omissions of Atty. Bayhon in the case
at bar warrant the imposition of the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for six ( 6) months. He has attempted to mislead the Court, and his
non-compliance with the resolutions of the Court dated March 25, 2009,
December 1, 2010 and August 24, 2011 shows nothing but an indifference

32

to our directives which cannot be taken lightly, especially that it has

affected and protracted the investigation and resolution of an administrative
matter where his explanation and assistance is a crucial factor.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Walfredo C. Bayhon is hereby found guilty of violating
the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. This Court imposes upon Atty. Bayhon the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to
commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision. This penalty of
suspension is imposed in addition to the fine of :PS00.00 under the
December 1, 2010 Resolution of this Court. Atty. Bayhon is further
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court
Administrator to be disseminated to all courts throughout the country, to
the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Walfredo C.
Bayhon's personal records, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
its information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9116

March 12, 2014
NESTOR
B.
FIGUERAS
and
BIENVENIDO
VICTORIA,
JR.,
Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez
assailing the February 19, 2009 Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the practice
of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule 12.03,2 Canon 12,3
Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution7 of the IBP
Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity in charge
of the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City.
On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a
civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag8 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a
concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of
way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was
built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits
the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or
vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community
street.9 The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the
legal counsel for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record
and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision10
on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association,

33

represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On

February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577
dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the
appellants brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for
extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the
grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions
for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution
became final.
Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and
Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint12
for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18
thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his
duties as an officer of the court.
In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,13 respondent denied
administrative liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented
the homeowners association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was
actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in
charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling
counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon
discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions
were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took
responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with
Federico Santander at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever
was caused to the Association.
Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in
the election for President of the homeowners association in 1996, Figueras
and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association
dues and other assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members
of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued
by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case
against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the
association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy of
the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by
the Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to
harass him. Respondent added that complainants have no personality to file
the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was
likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.
As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the
disbarment case for lack of merit, the imposition of sanctions on
complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of the baseless
complaint for disbarment.
On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found
respondent liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18
thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice

34

of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.14
On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution
No. XVIII-2009-1415 adopting the recommendation with modifications as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution [as] Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule
18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months. The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby deleted.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was
denied in IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.16 The IBP
Board of Governors noted that respondents motion was a mere reiteration
of matters already discussed and there were no substantial grounds to
disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.
Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether
the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule
12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that
the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper.
The Court finds no merit in respondents contention that complainants have
no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his
clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to harass him.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only
the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment
cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyers
misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the
outcome."17
In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that "[a]ny interested person or
the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings." The right to
institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it
necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the
only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.
The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the
performance of his duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowners
Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed the first motion for
extension of time to file appellants brief 95 days after the expiration of the
reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the
appeal of the homeowners association. To justify his inexcusable
negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer
and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is
belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA an
Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law

35

firm, stating that a previous motion had been filed but "due to the health
condition of the undersigned counselhe was not able to finish said
Appellants Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by
him."19 Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the
case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of
protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the
appellants brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of
his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to
unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:
Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyers failure
to file brief for his client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court
held:
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence.1wphi1 (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The
respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him
to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the
speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional
Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA
515).
It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should
be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of
sound judicial discretion.22 The penalties for a lawyers failure to file a brief
or other pleading range from reprimand,23 warning with fine,24
suspension25 and, in grave cases, disbarment.26 In the present case, we
find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months. Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for
one month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with the
extent of respondents violation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found
administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from
the practice of law for one (1) month effective from finality of this
Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation
shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and
spread on the personal record of respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

36

A.C. No. 9906

July 29, 2013
ATTY.
LESTER
R.
NUIQUE,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO SEDILLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The Court resolves the Complaint1 for disbarment filed by Atty. Lester R.
Nuique (complainant) with the Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Eduardo Sedillo
(respondent) who is charged with: ( 1) violating the prohibition on
representing conflicting interests; (2) using abusive language against and
disrespecting the court; and (3) spreading rumors against a colleague in the
legal profession.
Factual Antecedents
The complainant alleged that, sometime in 1992, the respondent became
the lawyer of Kiyoshi Kimura (Kiyoshi), a Japanese citizen, and his wife
Estrelieta Patrimonio-Kimura (Estrelieta) m a case for collection/recovery of
overpayment against Carlos Amasula, Jr. (Amasula).2 Since the spouses
Kimura had to leave the country, the case was prosecuted by their
representative Manuel Patrimonio (Manuel), Estrelietas brother. The
spouses Kimura obtained a favorable decision in the trial court, but the case
was still on appeal with this Court at the time when the instant complaint
was filed. The respondent remained the counsel of record of the spouses
Kimura until July 2007 when Kiyoshi terminated his services.
Kiyoshi, during the course of his marriage to Estrelieta, purchased several
real properties in Dumaguete City, some of which were registered under the
name of Estrelieta and Manuel. Sometime in September 2006, Kiyoshi and
Estrelieta had a falling out. Apparently, Estrelieta and Manuel falsified
Kiyoshis signature to make it appear that he loaned P1,500,000.00 from
the Development Bank of the Philippines and, as security for the said loan,
surreptitiously mortgaged a parcel of land he owned.3
Sometime in November 2006, Kiyoshi engaged the services of the
complainant. Kiyoshi, acting through his representative Danilo Estocoming
(Danilo) and Kazuhiro Sampie (Kazuhiro), filed a complaint against
Estrelieta and Manuel for falsification.4 The respondent appeared as counsel
of Estrelieta and Manuel.
On February 22, 2007, a civil action for accounting, sum of money and
attachment was filed by Kimura Business Concepts, Inc., an assignee of
Kiyoshi, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch 44,
against Estrelieta and Manuel. The respondent likewise entered his
appearance as counsel for Estrelieta and Manuel in the said case.5 Further,
sometime in February 2007, Kiyoshi intervened in Civil Case No. 13866,
entitled Nelson Patrimonio v. Development Bank of the Philippines, then
pending before the RTC. The respondent opposed Kiyoshis motion for
intervention in Civil Case No. 13866.
The respondent likewise assisted Estrelieta in instituting a habeas corpus
case against Danilo and Kazuhiro, alleging that they were detaining Kiyoshi

37

against his will. The habeas corpus case, however, was dismissed after
Kiyoshi appeared in court and testified that he was not detained by Danilo
and Kazuhiro. The complainant averred that the respondent disrespected
the court when, in the motion for reconsideration6 which he prepared, he
stated that he "would have taken the resolution with a grain of salt."7
The complainant further alleged that, after the habeas corpus case was
dismissed, the respondent had spread rumors against the complainant; that
the complainant supposedly detained Kiyoshi and provided him with
women.
In its Order8 dated February 15, 2008, the Commission directed the
respondent to file his answer to the Complaint. In his Answer with
Counterclaim,9 the respondent denied that he was guilty of representing
conflicting interests, asserting that it was Manuel who sought his legal
assistance and not Kiyoshi. He explained that the civil case against Amasula
was actively handled and personally pursued by Manuel, albeit in
representation of the spouses Kimura. He stressed that there has been no
personal and active intervention by Kiyoshi or of Estrelieta in any of the
stages of the case. The respondent claims that, for all intents and purposes,
his client is Manuel and the spouses Kimura were merely
"litigationbeneficiaries-in-waiting." Further, with respect to the falsification
case against Estrelieta and Manuel, the respondent claims that the same
was instituted by Danilo and Kazuhiro and not Kiyoshi.
As to the charge of disrespect to the court, the respondent claims that the
phrase "with a grain of salt" is but a common phraseology that is neither
offensive nor disrespectful. The respondent further denied having spread
rumors to malign the complainant.
On May 2, 2008, the Commission set the case for mandatory conference on
May 27, 2008.10 Only the respondent appeared during the scheduled
mandatory conference.11
On December 2, 2008, the complainant manifested to the Commission that
he is no longer interested in pursuing his complaint against the respondent,
praying that he be allowed to withdraw the same.12
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On February 9, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and
Recommendation13 which found the respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests. Thus:
Based on the complaint and the answer thereto, this Commission finds that
there is no question that the respondent is the counsel in the case filed by
Kiyoshi and Estrelieta against the building contractor, Carlos Amasula. Such
engagement remained until July 31, 2007 when Kiyoshi executed his
"Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Termination of Attorney".
Thus, when respondent entered his appearance as counsel for Estrelieta
and her brother Manuel in the Falsification complaint (I.S. No. 2007-61),
the respondent was still the counsel of Kiyoshi in the Amasula case. The
defense of the respondent that his client was actually Manuel and not
Kiyoshi and Estrelieta goes contrary to basic principles of law. The
respondent admitted that Manuel was acting as mere agent of Kiyoshi and
Estrelieta by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney. The respondent,

38

therefore, can not deny that Manuels principals, Kiyoshi and Estrelieta,
were his real clients.
xxxx
Furthermore, when Estrelieta and Manuel were subjected to preliminary
investigation for the Falsification charges which was filed by Kiyoshi through
his representative Danilo Estocoming and Kazuhiro Sampie, respondent
consciously and deliberately ran in conflict with his duty to Kiyoshi by
appearing as counsel for Estrelieta and Manuel. The respondent continued
to represent Estrelieta and Manuel opposite Kiyoshi when probable cause
was found against his clients, on appeal with the Department of Justice and
even when the information was filed against them (Criminal Case C-170).
The same situation existed with Civil Case No. 2007-14067 as the
respondent appeared opposite Kiyoshi despite the fact that he was still
Kiyoshis counsel in the Amasula case.14 (Citation omitted)
The Investigating Commissioner absolved the respondent from the charge
of disrespect to the court, asserting that the use of the phrase "with a grain
of salt" is not offensive. The Investigating Commissioner likewise pointed
out that no evidence was presented to show that the respondent had
spread rumor to malign the complainant.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a Notice of Resolution15 dated June 27, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, finding the same to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.
The respondent sought to reconsider the Resolution dated June 27, 2011,16
but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in its Resolution17 dated
January 3, 2013.
Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondent should be administratively
sanctioned based on the allegations in the Complaint.
Ruling of the Court
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court agrees with the findings
and the recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross
misconduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)

39

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any

fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.18 Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant
unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration
of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.19
Concomitant to the foregoing, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that:
Rule 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client."20 It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full
disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise,
his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible.21 Such
prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the
nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree.22
In Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba,23 the Court explained the concept of conflict
of interest. Thus:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when,
in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires them to oppose. Developments in jurisprudence
have particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyers conduct
lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to
fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one
client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client,
there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation
to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment.24 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
Based on the established facts of this case, the Court finds substantial
evidence to conclude that the respondent violated the prohibition on
representation of conflicting interests. It is uncontroverted that the
respondent was still the counsel on record of Kiyoshi and Estrelieta in the
case against Amasula at the time when he represented Estrelieta and
Manuel in the complaint for falsification filed by Kiyoshi. Further, the
respondent likewise appeared as counsel for Estrelieta and Manuel in the
case for accounting, sum of money and attachment that was filed by
Kimura

40

Business Concepts, Inc., the assignee of Kiyoshi, despite being the counsel
of Kiyoshi in the case against Amasula. Clearly, the respondent violated the
prohibition against representing conflicting interests.
The respondents representation of Estrelieta and Manuel against Kiyoshi,
notwithstanding that he was still the counsel of Kiyoshi and Estrelieta in the
case against Amasula, creates a suspicion of unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the performance of his duty towards his clients. Under the
circumstances, the decent and ethical thing which the respondent should
have done was to advise Estrelieta and Manuel to engage the services of
another lawyer.
The respondent should be reminded that lawyers are expected not only to
keep inviolate their clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice.25
Further, contrary to the respondents claim, the fact that the civil case
instituted by Kiyoshi and Estrelieta against Amasula is totally unrelated to
the subsequent cases in which he represented Estrelieta and Manuel against
Kiyoshi is immaterial. The representation of opposing clients in said cases,
even if unrelated, is tantamount to representing conflicting interests or, at
the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot
allow.26
Moreover, in Anion v. Sabitsana, Jr.,27 the Court stated:
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a
situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action
or in an unrelated action. The prohibition also applies even if the lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer
has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use
the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the
other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. To be held accountable under
this rule, it is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom
would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.28 (Citation
omitted)
Likewise, the respondents claim that it was Manuel who was his client in
the case against Amasula and not Kiyoshi, since it was Manuel who sought
his services and was the one who actively and personally pursued the said
case, is untenable. It is but a futile attempt on the part of the respondent to
extricate himself from his predicament. Manuel was merely the agent of
Kiyoshi and Estrelieta in the case against Amasula. That Manuel was the
one who actively prosecuted the said case is of no consequence; the real
parties in interest in the case against Amasula were the principals of
Manuel, i.e., Kiyoshi and Estrelieta.1wphi1
The Court notes that the complainant had already manifested before the
Commission that he is no longer interested in pursuing his complaint
against the respondent. Nevertheless, the Court is not bound by such
desistance as the instant case involves public interest.29 The exercise of the
power is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties,

41

but to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of
unworthy practices in his profession.30
Accordingly, as aptly found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner and the
IBP Board of Governors, an administrative sanction against the respondent
is warranted. In similar cases involving representation of conflicting
interests, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers either by reprimand, or
by suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to two (2)
years.31
In the case under consideration, both the Investigating Commissioner and
the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. Considering that this
is the respondents first offense, the Court adopts the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors and hereby
suspends the respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Atty. Eduardo Sedillo
GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in violation of
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into the records of Atty. Eduardo
Sedillo and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the
Philippines, for their information and guidance.
Atty. Eduardo Sedillo is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his
receipt of this Resolution so that the Court can determine the reckoning
point when his suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9860

September 11, 2013
JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY
ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, and
KARENOROLA,
Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Courts resolution is a disbarment complaint1 filed against
respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).
The Facts
Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary
Angelyn Orola-Belarga (Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip
(Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola (Trinidad),
married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).2

42

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar

Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother
of the above-named complainants and the son of Emilio.3
In the settlement of Trinidads estate, pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding
No. V-3639, the parties were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M.
Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel,
Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty.Ely F. Azarraga, Jr.
(Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the
other heirs4 of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as
collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in
behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidads estate. In
the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio
moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought
the appointment of the latters son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in
an Order5 dated September 20, 2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on
October 10, 2007, respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating
counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of
the RTC Order.6
Due to the respondents new engagement, complainants filed the instant
disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP),
claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to
represent conflicting interests in the subject case;7 and (b) Section 20(e),
Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed
upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio.8 Complainants further claimed
that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of
Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondents appearance, the same
was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered his
appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007.9 In this accord, respondent
failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not
able to obtain their written consent as required under the Rules.10
For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending
that he never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs
of Antonio. He pointed out that the records of the case readily show that
the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of
Antonio were exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga.11 He averred that
he only accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on her
behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June16 and
July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of
charge.12 In fact, he obtained Maricars permission for him to withdraw from
the case as no further communications transpired after these two hearings.
Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in
the same case.13 He added that he had no knowledge of the fact that the
late Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information
was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance.14
Finally, he clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was
more of a mediator, rather than a litigator,15 and that since no settlement
was forged between the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on
December 6, 2007.16 In support of his assertions, respondent submitted the

43

affidavits of Maricar17 and Atty. Azarraga18 relative to his limited appearance

and his consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel for
Emilio.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15, 2008submitted
by IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.(Investigating
Commissioner), respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting
interests only with respect to Karen as the records of the cases how that he
never acted as counsel for the other complainants. The Investigating
Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance
was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed
to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of the Heirs
of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.20
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no
violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves
admitted that respondent "did not acquire confidential information from his
former client nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in
the course of his previous employment."21 Considering that it was
respondent's first offense, the Investigating Commissioner found the
imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended
that he be severely reprimanded for his act with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.22
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
aforementioned report in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated
December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding the same to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules but imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP Resolution No.
XX-2013-1725 dated January 3, 2013.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBPs finding that respondent violated Rule
15.03 of the Code, but reduced the recommended period of suspension to
three (3) months.
Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY
IN ALL HIS DEALINGS ANDTRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from
representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in
any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on
totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public
policy and good taste.26 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and

44

double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their

secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.27 In Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court
explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests
of two or more opposing parties. The test is" whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty
to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will
be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyers immutable duty to a former
client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers
employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the
lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after
the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.30
Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBPs
finding that respondent represented conflicting interests and, perforce,
must be held administratively liable therefor.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for
Maricar as claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special
Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the
Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having
committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when respondent
proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement
as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very
interest of the Heirs of Antonio particularly, Karen in violation of the
above-stated rule.
Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to
him cannot fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on
conflict of interests, as enunciated in
Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect
to opposing parties in the same case.1wphi1 In other words, a lawyer
cannot change his representation from one party to the latters opponent in
the same case. That respondents previous appearances for and in behalf of
the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be
given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency
is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith
and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.31

45

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was

more of a mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a
settlement among the family members render the rule inoperative. In fact,
even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04,32
Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written
consent of all concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or
arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect
as the records show that respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full
disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilios counsel to all the Heirs
of Antonio particularly, Karen and equally secure their express written
consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out
that a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of
the parties to it.33 Accordingly, for respondents violation of the aforestated
rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.
In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner
was increased from severe reprimand to a suspension of six(6) months by
the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However,
the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation
showing the bases of the IBP Board of Governors modification; as such, it
contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules which specifically
mandates that "the decision of the Board upon such review shall be in
writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based."34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the change in the
recommended penalty without any ample justification therefor. To this end,
the Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance
of the requirement to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the
requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the facts
and the reasons on which the same is based is akin to what is required of
courts in promulgating their decisions. The reasons for handing down a
penalty occupy no lesser station than any other portion of the ratio.35
In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months to be more appropriate
taking into consideration the following factors:
first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is undisputed that
respondent merely accommodated Maricar's request out of gratis to
temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006
hearings due to her lawyer's unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed
that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs
aside from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after
his first appearance as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be
said that he acted in good faith; and fourth, complainants admit that
respondent did not acquire confidential information from the Heirs of
Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge obtained in the course
of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner
prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio. Notably, in IlusorioBildner v. Lakin, Jr.,36 the Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of three months to the counsel therein
who represented parties whose interests are hostile to his other clients in
another case.

46

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY

of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03,Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

A.C.
No.
9537
June
10,
2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2489)
DR.
TERESITA
LEE,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated July 21, 2009 filed by Dr.
Teresita Lee (Dr. Lee) against respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando (Atty.
Simando) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2489, now A.C. No.
9537, for violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics of Lawyers.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of complainant Dr. Lee from
November 2004 until January 8, 2008, with a monthly retainer fee of Three
Thousand Pesos (Php3,000.00).2
Sometime during the above-mentioned period, Atty. Simando went to see
Dr. Lee and asked if the latter could help a certain Felicito M. Mejorado
(Mejorado) for his needed funds. He claimed that Mejorado was then
awaiting the release of his claim for informer's reward from the Bureau of
Customs. Because Dr. Lee did not know Mejorado personally and she
claimed to be not in the business of lending money, the former initially
refused to lend money. But Atty. Simando allegedly persisted and assured
her that Mejorado will pay his obligation and will issue postdated checks
and sign promissory notes. He allegedly even offered to be the co-maker of
Mejorado and assured her that Mejorado's obligation will be paid when due.
Atty. Simando was quoted saying: "Ipapahamak ba kita, kliyente kita";
"Sigurado ito, kung gusto mo, gagarantiyahan ko pa ito, at pipirma din
ako"; "Isang buwan lang, at hindi hihigit sa dalawang buwan ito, bayad ka
na."3
Due to Atty. Simando's persistence, his daily calls and frequent visits to
convince Dr. Lee, the latter gave in to her lawyer's demands, and finally
agreed to give Mejorado sizeable amounts of money. Respondent acted as
co-maker with Mejorado in various cash loans, to wit:4
Date:

Amount

November 11, 2006 Php 400,000.00

November 24, 2006 200,000.00

47

November 27, 2006 400,000.00

December 7, 2006

200,000.00

December 13, 2006 200,000.00

Total:

Php1,400,000.00

When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee's repeated demands,
Mejorado failed and refused to comply with his obligation. Since Atty.
Simando was still her lawyer then, Dr. Lee instructed him to initiate legal
action against Mejorado. Atty. Simando said he would get in touch with
Mejorado and ask him to pay his obligation without having to resort to legal
action. However, even after several months, Mejorado still failed to pay Dr.
Lee, so she again asked Atty. Simando why no payment has been made
yet. Dr. Lee then reminded Atty. Simando that he was supposed to be the
co-maker of the obligation of Mejorado, to which he replied: "Di kasuhan
din ninyo ako!"5
Despite complainant's repeated requests, respondent ignored her and failed
to bring legal actions against Mejorado. Thus, in January 2008, complainant
was forced to terminate her contract with Atty. Simando.
Subsequently, complainant's new lawyer, Atty. Gilbert Morandarte, sent a
demand letter dated June 13, 2008 to Atty. Simando in his capacity as the
co-maker of some of the loans of Mejorado.
In his Letter dated June 30, 2008, respondent denied his liability as a comaker and claimed that novation had occurred because complainant had
allegedly given additional loans to Mejorado without his knowledge.6
Dr. Lee then accused Atty. Simando of violating the trust and confidence
which she gave upon him as her lawyer, and even took advantage of their
professional relationship in order to get a loan for his client. Worse, when
the said obligation became due, respondent was unwilling to help her to
favor Mejorado. Thus, the instant petition for disbarment against Atty.
Simando.
On August 12, 2009, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to submit his Answer
on the complaint against him.7
In his Answer8 dated September 17, 2009, Atty. Simando claimed that
complainant, who is engaged in lending money at a high interest rate, was
the one who initiated the financial transaction between her and Mejorado.
He narrated that complainant asked him if it is true that Mejorado is his
client as she found out that Mejorado has a pending claim for informer's
reward with the Bureau of Customs. When he affirmed that Mejorado is his
client, complainant signified that she is willing to give money for Mejorado's
financial needs while awaiting for the release of the informer's reward.
Eventually, parties agreed that Mejorado will pay double the amount and
that payment shall be made upon receipt by Mejorado of the payment of his
claim for informer's reward.9
Meanwhile, Atty. Simando stressed that Dr. Lee gave Mejorado a total of
Php700,000.00 as an investment but he signed as co-maker in all the
receipts showing double the amount or Php1,400,000.00.10

48

Respondent claimed that complainant is a money-lender exacting high

interest rates from borrowers.11 He narrated several instances and civil
cases where complainant was engaged in money-lending where he divulged
that even after defendants had already paid their loan, complainant still
persists in collecting from them.12 Respondent asserted that he knew of
these transactions, because he was among the four lawyers who handled
complainant's case.13
Respondent averred that from the time that Mejorado and Dr. Lee had
become close to each other, the latter had given Mejorado additional
investments and one (1) Silverado Pick-up at the price of P500,000.00 and
fifty (50) sacks of old clothings. He claimed that the additional investments
made by Dr. Lee to Mejorado were given without his knowledge.
Atty. Simando further alleged that with Dr. Lee's investment of around P2
Million which included the Silverado Pick-up and the fifty (50) sacks of old
clothings, the latter required Mejorado to issue five (5) checks with a total
value of P7,033,500.00, an amount more than the actual value which
Mejorado received.14
Atty. Simando added that while Dr. Lee and Mejorado agreed that the
issued checks shall be presented to the bank only upon payment of his
informer's reward, Dr. Lee presented the checks to the bank despite being
aware that Mejorado's account had no funds for said checks. Atty. Simando
further denied that he refused to take legal action against Mejorado. He
claimed that complainant never instructed him to file legal action, since the
latter knew that Mejorado is obligated to pay only upon receipt of his
informer's reward.
Finally, Atty. Simando insisted that he did not violate their lawyerclient
relationship, since Dr. Lee voluntarily made the financial investment with
Mejorado and that he merely introduced complainant to Mejorado. He
further claimed that there is no conflict of interest because he is Mejorado's
lawyer relative to the latter's claim for informer's reward, and not
Mejorado's lawyer against Dr. Lee. He reiterated that there is no conflicting
interest as there was no case between Mejorado and Dr. Lee that he is
handling for both of them.15
In her Reply dated October 30, 2009, Dr. Lee denied that what she entered
into was a mere investment. She insisted that she lent the money to
Mejorado and respondent, in his capacity as co-maker and the transaction
was actually a loan.16 To prove her claim, Dr. Lee submitted the written
loan agreements/receipts which categorically stated that the money
received was a loan with due dates, signed by Mejorado and respondent as
co-maker.17 She further claimed that she did not know Mejorado and it was
respondent who brought him to her and requested her to assist Mejorado
by lending him money as, in fact, respondent even vouched for Mejorado
and agreed to sign as co-maker.
Complainant further emphasized that what she was collecting is the
payment only of the loan amounting to One Million Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php1,400,000.00) which respondent had signed as co-maker. Thus,
respondent's claim that his obligation was already extinguished by novation
holds no water, since what was being collected is merely his obligation

49

pertaining to the loan amounting to Php1,400,000.00 only, and nothing

more.
Finally, complainant lamented that respondent, in his comments, even
divulged confidential informations he had acquired while he was still her
lawyer and even used it against her in the present case, thus, committing
another unethical conduct. She, therefore, maintained that respondent is
guilty of violating the lawyer-client confidentiality rule.
Both parties failed to appear during the mandatory conference on January
15, 2010. Both parties requested for resetting of the mandatory conference,
however, both failed to agree on a certain date. Hence, the IBP, so as not
to delay the disposition of the complaint, terminated the mandatory
conference and instead required the parties to submit their respective
position papers.18
On March 18, 2010, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Simando guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility. It recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On December 29, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD to suspend Atty. Simando
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
Respondent moved for reconsideration.
On March 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors granted respondent's
motion for reconsideration for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant the
penalty of suspension. The Resolution dated December 29, 2010 was
reversed and the case against respondent was dismissed.
RULING
We reverse the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors.
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a lawyer is
guilty of representing conflicting interest:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in
behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the
other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed
by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of
the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation
to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment.19
In the instant case, we find substantial evidence to support respondent's
violation of the above parameters, as established by the following
circumstances on record:
First, it is undisputed that there was a lawyer-client relationship between
complainant and Atty. Simando as evidenced by the retainer fees received
by respondent and the latter's representation in certain legal matters
pertaining to complainant's business;
Second, Atty. Simando admitted that Mejorado is another client of him
albeit in a case claiming rewards against the Bureau of Customs;

50

Third, Atty. Simando admitted that he was the one who introduced
complainant and Mejorado to each other for the purpose of entering into a
financial transaction while having knowledge that complainant's interests
could possibly run in conflict with Mejorado's interests which ironically such
client's interests, he is duty-bound to protect;
Fourth, despite the knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two
clients, respondent consented in the parties' agreement and even signed as
co-maker to the loan agreement;
Fifth, respondent's knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two
clients was demonstrated further by his own actions, when he:
(a) failed to act on Mejorado's failure to pay his obligation to complainant
despite the latter's instruction to do so;
(b) denied liability despite signing as co-maker in the receipts/promissory
notes arising from the loan agreement between his two clients;
(c) rebutted complainant's allegations against Mejorado and him, and even
divulged informations he acquired while he was still complainant's lawyer.
Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel for one party
(complainant as creditor) against the adverse party (Mejorado as debtor)
who is also his client, since a lawyer is prohibited from representing
conflicting interests. He may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflict with that of
his present or former client.
Respondent's assertion that there is no conflict of interest because
complainant and respondent are his clients in unrelated cases fails to
convince. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though
unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites
suspicion of double-dealing.20 Moreover, with the subject loan agreement
entered into by the complainant and Mejorado, who are both his clients,
readily shows an apparent conflict of interest, moreso when he signed as
co-maker.
Likewise, respondent's argument that the money received was an
investment and not a loan is difficult to accept, considering that he signed
as co-maker. Respondent is a lawyer and it is objectionable that he would
sign as co-maker if he knew all along that the intention of the parties was
to engage in a mere investment. Also, as a lawyer, signing as a co-maker,
it can be presupposed that he is aware of the nature of suretyship and the
consequences of signing as co-maker. Therefore, he cannot escape liability
without exposing himself from administrative liability, if not civil liability.
Moreover, we noted that while complainant was able to show proof of
receipts of various amounts of money loaned and received by Mejorado,
and signed by the respondent as co-maker, the latter, however, other than
his bare denials, failed to show proof that the money given was an
investment and not a loan.
It must be stressed that the proscription against representation of
conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise
with respect to the same general matter however slight the adverse interest
may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyers private
activity or in the performance of a function in a non-professional capacity.

51

In the process of determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an

important criterion is probability, not certainty, of conflict.21
We likewise note that respondent offered several excuses in order to avoid
payment of his liability.1wphi1 First, in his Answer to complainant's
demand letter, he claimed there was novation which extinguished his
liability; Secondly, he claimed that the amount received by Mejorado for
which he signed as co-maker was merely an investment and not a loan.
Finally, he alleged that it was agreed that the investment with profits will be
paid only after Mejorado receives the payment for his claim for reward
which complainant violated when she presented the checks for payment
prematurely. These actuations of Atty. Simando do not speak well of his
reputation as a lawyer.22
Finally, we likewise find respondent guilty of violating Rule 21.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.23 In his last-ditch effort to impeach the
credibility of complainant, he divulged informations24 which he acquired in
confidence during the existence of their lawyer-client relationship.
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez25 that the termination of the relation of
attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason
for the rule is that the clients confidence once reposed cannot be divested
by the expiration of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer
should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do
anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which
he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the
client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.
Accordingly, we reiterate that lawyers are enjoined to look at any
representation situation from "the point of view that there are possible
conflicts," and further, "to think in terms of impaired loyalty" that is to
evaluate if his representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client.26
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to ADOPT the
findings and recommendation of the IBP in Resolution No. XIX-20 10-733
suspending respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando for six ( 6) months from
the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and
guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of
this Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Simando is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of
this Decision so that we can determine the reckoning point when his
suspension shall take effect.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173188

January 15, 2014
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE
CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased),
substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA, PASTORA, Heirs of

52

FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and

ARMANDO,
all
surnamed
CADAVEDO,
Petitioners,
vs.
VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We solve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to
the October 11, 2005 decision2 and the May 9, 2006 resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) inPetitioners, CA-G.R. CV No. 56948. The CA
reversed and set aside the September 17, 1996 decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, of Dipolog City in Civil Case No. 4038,
granting in part the complaint for recovery of possession of property filed
by the petitioners, the Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente
Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty. Victorino (Vic) T.
Lacaya, married to Rosa Legados (collectively, the respondents).
The Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively,
the spouses Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square
meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay,
Pian, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued Homestead Patent No. V15414 on March 13, 1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July
2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the
spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames) Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name
of the spouses Ames.
The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action5
before the RTC(then Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the
spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of
homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price.
The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo
Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was
substituted by Atty. Lacaya.
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the
nullity of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the
spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land law. The amended
complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a
contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads:
10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a
lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the
case at bar, they will pay the sum of P2,000.00 for attorneys fees.6
In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the
subject lot to the spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya,
appealed the case to the CA.
On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil Case
No. 1721was pending, the spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their
children. The spouses Ames TCT No. T-4792 was subsequently cancelled
and TCT No. T-25984was issued in their childrens names. On October 11,
1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot with the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the names of their children.

53

On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No.

1721,reversing the decision of the RTC and declaring the deed of sale,
transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses Ames null and void ab
initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ames TCT No. T-4792
and to reissue another title in the name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case
eventually reached this Court via the spouses Ames petition for review on
certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP.
Thus, the DBP caused the publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the
subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-25984(under the name of the spouses
Ames children). Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo
of the foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the
Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 14, 1981.
With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya filed
on September 21, 1981 a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTCs resolution of the motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint7
before the RTC against the spouses Cadavedo for Quieting of Title or
Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to cancel TCT No. T25984 (under the name of the spouses Ames children).
On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution in Civil Case No. 1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed
in possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for
one-half of the subject lot as attorneys fees. He caused the subdivision of
the subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and selected the
more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half
to the spouses Cadavedo.
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the
portion assigned to the respondents and ejected them. The latter responded
by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as Civil Case No. 215. This
incident occurred while Civil Case No. 3352was pending.
On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable
settlement (compromise agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment
case), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya
acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved
the compromise agreementin a decision dated June 10, 1982.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an
action against the DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No.
3443 (Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC subsequently denied the petition,
prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case to the CAvia a petition
for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition in its decision of January 31,
1984.
The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA
decision in Civil Case No. 3443. However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No.

54

41051was issued in the name of the spouses Cadavedo concerning the

subject lot.
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action9
against the respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise
agreement. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4038 and is the root of
the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the
respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that
they be ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half
portion from 1981;and that the RTC fix the attorneys fees on a quantum
meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya
incurred while handling the civil cases.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo
executed a Deed of Partition of Estate in favor of their eight children.
Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled and TCT No. 41690 was issued
in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the proceedings and
status of Civil Case No. 3352.
The Ruling of the RTC
In the September 17, 1996 decision10 in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC
declared the contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and
unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to 5.2691 hectares and
ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining
5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.
The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by Atty.
Lacaya, the agreed attorneys fee on contingent basis was P2,000.00.
Nevertheless, the RTC also pointed out that the parties novated this
agreement when they executed the compromise agreement in Civil Case
No. 215 (ejectment case), thereby giving Atty. Lacaya one-half of the
subject lot. The RTC added that Vicentes decision to give Atty. Lacaya onehalf of the subject lot, sans approval of Benita, was a valid act of
administration and binds the conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned out
that the disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as
it was done precisely to remunerate Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover
the property itself.
These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-half
portion of the subject lot, as Atty. Lacayas contingent fee,excessive,
unreasonable and unconscionable. The RTC was convinced that the issues
involved in Civil Case No. 1721were not sufficiently difficult and complicated
to command such an excessive award; neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to
devote much of his time or skill, or to perform extensive research.
Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents possession, prior to the
judgment, of the excess portion of their share in the subject lot to be in
good faith. The respondents were thus entitled to receive its fruits.
On the spouses Cadavedos motion for reconsideration, the RTC modified
the decision in its resolution11 dated December 27, 1996. The RTC ordered
the respondents to account for and deliver the produce and income, valued
at 7,500.00 per annum, of the 5.2692hectares that the RTC ordered the
spouses Amesto restore to the spouses Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988
until final restoration of the premises.
The respondents appealed the case before the CA.

55

The Ruling of the CA

In its decision12 dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTCs September 17, 1996 decision and maintained the partition and
distribution of the subject lot under the compromise agreement. In so
ruling, the CA noted the following facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served as the
spouses Cadavedos counsel from 1969 until 1988,when the latter filed the
present case against Atty. Lacaya; (2) during the nineteen (19) years of
their attorney-client relationship, Atty. Lacaya represented the spouses
Cadavedo in three civil cases Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case No. 3352, and
Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the first civil case lasted for twelve years and even
reached this Court, the second civil case lasted for seven years, while the
third civil case lasted for six years and went all the way to the CA;(4) the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a compromise agreement
concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty. Lacaya ultimately
agreed to acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC approved the compromise
agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of the litigation expenses in Civil
Case No. 1721; and (7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly recognized that
Atty. Lacaya served them in several cases.
Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon 20.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should
guide the determination of the lawyers fees), the CA ruled that the time
spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses
Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him losing other
employment resulting from his engagement, the benefits resulting to the
spouses Cadavedo, and the contingency of his fees justified the compromise
agreement and rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement
reasonable.
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred
in: (1) granting the attorneys fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383
hectares of the subject lot to Atty. Lacaya, instead of confirming the agreed
contingent attorneys fees of 2,000.00; (2) not holding the respondents
accountable for the produce, harvests and income of the 10.5383-hectare
portion (that they obtained from the spouses Cadavedo) from 1988 up to
the present; and (3) upholding the validity of the purported oral contract
between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya when it was champertous
and dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.13
The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyers compensation for
professional services, especially those contained in the pleadings filed in
courts, control the amount of the attorneys fees to which the lawyer shall
be entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In this case, the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latters contingent
attorneys fee was P2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This
agreement was clearly stipulated in the amended complaint filed in Civil
Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly stipulated fee
and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating their
contract.
The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as Atty.
Lacayas contingent attorneys fee is excessive and unreasonable. They

56

highlight the RTCs observations and argue that the issues involved in Civil
Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the alleged contingent fee of one-half of
the subject lot was agreed by the parties, were not novel and did not
involve difficult questions of law; neither did the case require much of Atty.
Lacayas time, skill and effort in research. They point out that the two
subsequent civil cases should not be considered in determining the
reasonable contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for his
services in Civil Case No. 1721,as those cases had not yet been instituted at
that time. Thus, these cases should not be considered in fixing the
attorneys fees. The petitioners also claim that the spouses Cadavedo
concluded separate agreements on the expenses and costs for each of
these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya did not even record any
attorneys lien in the spouses Cadavedos TCT covering the subject lot.
The petitioners further direct the Courts attention to the fact that Atty.
Lacaya,in taking over the case from Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the
litigation expenses in exchange for one-half of the subject lot should they
win the case. They insist that this agreement is a champertous contract that
is contrary to public policy, prohibited by law for violation of the fiduciary
relationship between a lawyer and a client.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. 215 (ejectment case) did not novate their original stipulated
agreement on the attorneys fees. They reason that Civil Case No. 215 did
not decide the issue of attorneys fees between the spouses Cadavedo and
Atty. Lacaya for the latters services in Civil Case No. 1721.
The Case for the Respondents
In their defense,14 the respondents counter that the attorneys fee
stipulated in the amended complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya
for his legal services. They argue that the questioned stipulation for
attorneys fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if granted, would inure
to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty. Lacaya.
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused
the survey and subdivision of the subject lot immediately after the spouses
Cadavedo reacquired its possession with the RTCs approval of their motion
for execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly
ratified and confirmed the agreement on the contingent attorneys fee
consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215
(ejectment case) approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the
legally designated administrator of the conjugal partnership, hence the
compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the partnership and
could not have been invalidated by the absence of Benitas acquiescence;
and (5) the compromise agreement merely inscribed and ratified the earlier
oral agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died.15 He was
substituted by his wife -Rosa -and their children Victoriano D.L. Lacaya,
Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-Ocampo, Reymar L. Lacaya, Marcelito L. Lacaya,
Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-Barba,
Rosalie L. Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-Camaongay.16
The Courts Ruling

57

We resolve to GRANT the petition.

The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping cases prior
to the present controversy. In three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as
the spouses Cadavedos counsel. For ease of discussion, we summarize
these cases (including the dates and proceedings pertinent to each) as
follows:
Civil Case No. 1721 Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of
contract of sale of homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of
execution was granted on October 16, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3352 Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or
Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with Application for
Preliminary injunction), filed on September 23, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3443 Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with
Preliminary Injunction), filed on May 21, 1982.
Civil Case No. 215 Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment
Case), filed between the latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The
parties executed the compromise agreement on May 13, 1982.
Civil Case No. 4038 petitioners v. respondents (the present case).
The
agreement
on
attorneys
fee
consisting
of
one-half
of
the
subject
lot
is
void;
the
petitioners
are
entitled
to recover possession
The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorneys fee consisting of
one-half of the subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners.
We rule in the NEGATIVE for the reasons discussed below.
A.
The
written
agreement
providing
for
a
contingent
fee
of
P2,000.00
should
prevail
over
the
oral
agreement
providing
for
onehalf of the subject lot
The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of
P2,000.00 and not, as asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot.
The stipulation contained in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya
clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency
basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer P2,000.00 as
attorneys fees should the case be decided in their favor.
Contrary to the respondents contention, this stipulation is not in the nature
of a penalty that the court would award the winning party, to be paid by the
losing party. The stipulation is a representation to the court concerning the
agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latters
compensation for his services in the case; it is not the attorneys fees in the
nature of damages which the former prays from the court as an incident to
the main action.
At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and
agreed as well by both parties, the alleged contingent fee agreement
consisting of one-half of the subject lot was not reduced to writing prior to
or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacayas engagement as the spouses
Cadavedos counsel in Civil Case No. 1721.An agreement between the
lawyer and his client, providing for the formers compensation, is subject to
the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As the rules stand,

58

controversies involving written and oral agreements on attorneys fees shall

be resolved in favor of the former.17 Hence, the contingency fee of
P2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged
oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot.
B.
The
contingent
fee
agreement
between
the
spouses
Cadavedo
and
Atty.
Lacaya,
awarding
the
latter
one-half
of
the
subject
lot, is champertous
Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed
entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter onehalf of the subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless void.
In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to
represent the spouses Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the
litigation expenses, without providing for reimbursement, in exchange for a
contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This agreement is
champertous and is contrary to public policy.18
Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated
form), is a common law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval
period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was directed "against wanton and in
officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler
has no interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without
justification or excuse."20 Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized
by "the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the
intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions, however, add a
second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the
lawyer must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of,
the litigation."22
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to
medieval practice of assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of
wealth and influence in the expectation that such individuals would enjoy
greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in exchange for which
they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."23 "In
order to safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and
maintenance were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a
common law rule was developed, striking down champertous agreements
and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds of
public policy."24
In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from
American decisions, for public policy considerations.25 As matters currently
stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the litigation in his own
account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to
receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to
the law."26 The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting
with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting
the case at the lawyers expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from
acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these
arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the
outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own recovery
rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take

59

care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in
violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his clients cause."27
In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down the contingent fee
agreement between therein respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his
client for being contrary to public policy. There, the Court held that an
reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is against public
policy, especially if the lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his
expense in consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing in
dispute. It violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his
client.29
In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in
this case expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and,
impliedly, the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly agree with a client
that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation.31 The same
reasons discussed above underlie this rule.
C.
The
attorneys
fee
consisting
of
one-half
of
the
subject
lot
is
excessive
and unconscionable
We likewise strike down the questioned attorneys fee and declare it void
for being excessive and unconscionable.1wphi1 The contingent fee of onehalf of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the services of Atty.
Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721.Plainly, it was intended for only one action as
the two other civil cases had not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil
Case No. 1721 took twelve years to be finally resolved, that period of time,
as matters then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a large fee in
the absence of any showing that special skills and additional work had been
involved. The issue involved in that case, as observed by the RTC(and with
which we agree), was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive
skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against
the sale of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition.
That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedos counsel in the two
subsequent cases did not and could not otherwise justify an attorneys fee
of one-half of the subject lot. As assertedby the petitioners, the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate arrangements for the costs and
expenses foreach of these two cases. Thus, the expenses for the two
subsequent cases had been considered and taken cared of Based on these
considerations, we therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorneys
fee excessive and unreasonable.
D.
Atty.
Lacayas
acquisition
of
the
one-half
portion
contravenes
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by
purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation
in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession.32 The same
proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.33
A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or
when it is subject of the judicial action.34 Following this definition, we find

60

that the subject lot was still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya acquired the
disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the following established
facts:(1)on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) on September
23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses
Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion filed for
the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses
Cadavedo took possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon
after, the subject lot was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions,
and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of the subdivided portions; and (5)
on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the compromise
agreement.
From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee
agreement or an agreement subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya
acquired the disputed one-half portion (which was after October 24, 1981)
while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 1721were already pending before the lower
courts. Similarly, the compromise agreement, including the subsequent
judicial approval, was effected during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352.
In all of these, the relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed between
Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.
Thus, whether we consider these transactions the transfer of the disputed
one-half portion and the compromise agreement independently of each
other or resulting from one another, we find them to be prohibited and
void35 by reason of public policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts which are contrary to public policy and those expressly prohibited
or declared void by law are considered in existent and void from the
beginning.37
What did not escape this Courts attention is the CAs failure to note that
the transfer violated the provisions of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,
although it recognized the concurrence of the transfer and the execution of
the compromise agreement with the pendency of the two civil cases
subsequent to Civil Case No. 1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA
gave weight to the compromise agreement and in so doing, found
justification in the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction
as a valid exception to the prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil
Code,39 contrary to the CAs position, however, this recognition does not
apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in
writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in
the action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation.40 The
payment of the contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the
litigation involving the clients property but only after the judgment has
been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.41
In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the
disputed one-half portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot
was still under litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still existed
between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition
provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the exception

61

provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding the

compromise agreement on the basis of the unproved oral contingent fee
agreement.
Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedos cause
pursuant to the terms of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in
effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if not more, stake as the
spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it
undermines the fiduciary relationship between him and his clients.42
E.The
compromise
agreement
could
not
validate
the
void
oral
contingent
fee
agreement;
neither
did
it
supersede
the
written contingent fee agreement
The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya
in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm
Atty. Lacayas acquisition and possession of the disputed one-half portion
which were made in violation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As earlier
discussed, such acquisition is void; the compromise agreement, which had
for its object a void transaction, should be void.
A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy is in existent and void from the
beginning.43 It can never be ratified44 nor the action or defense for the
declaration of the in existence of the contract prescribe;45 and any contract
directly resulting from such illegal contract is likewise void and in
existent.46
Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written
contingent fee agreement providing for attorneys fee of P2,000.00; neither
did it preclude the petitioners from questioning its validity even though
Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced thereto and
although the MTC approved it in its June 10, 1982 decision in the ejectment
case. The MTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the void compromise agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case
could not have attained finality and can thus be attacked at any time.
Moreover, an ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of
possession de facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action for
recovery of possession founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CAs
position, the petitionersin filing the present action and praying for, among
others, the recovery of possession of the disputed one-half portion and for
judicial determination of the reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his
services were not barred by the compromise agreement.
Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorneys fees on a quantum meruit basis
In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect,
impliedly set aside any express stipulation on the attorneys fees, and the
petitioners, by express contention, submit the reasonableness of such fees
to the courts discretion. We thus have to fix the attorneys fees on a
quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruitmeaning as much as he deservesis used as basis for
determining a lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x
taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees."47 "Its
essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be

62

charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to

notify him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid
compensation"48 for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to
prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust
for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.49
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court50 and Canon 20 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,51 factors such as the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the time spent and the extent of the
services rendered, the customary charges for similar services, the amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service, to name a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness
of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled.
In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in
considering and setting Atty. Lacayas fees based on quantum meruit: (1)
the questions involved in these civil cases were not novel and did not
require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the
performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services
for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988
when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases
(Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court;
the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third
(Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA;
and (4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of
230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.
All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTCs considerations
in appreciating the character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in
the three cases, subject to modification on valuation. We believe and so
hold that the respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately
one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits previously received from
the disputed one-half portion, as attorneys fees. They shall return to the
petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.
The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation
should be for the benefit of the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal
situation when the law itself holds clear and express protection to the rights
of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot). Premium
consideration, in other words, is on the rights of the owner, not on the
lawyer who only helped the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the
other way around; otherwise, the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a
property right over the disputed property. If at all, due recognition of parity
between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the disputed
property, which in this case, the Court properly accords.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the
petition. We AFFIRM the decision dated September 17, 1996 and the
resolution dated December 27, 1996of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, with the MODIFICATION that the
respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and Rosa Legados, are
entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the
subject lot) as attorneys fees. The fruits that the respondents previously
received from the disputed one-half portion shall also form part of the

63

attorneys fees. We hereby ORDER the respondents to return to the

petitioners the remainder of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot
that Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired pursuant to the compromise agreement.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6732

October 22, 2013
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBIWEVRO),
FOR
SAN
PEDRO,
ILOILO
CITY,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR,
SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of
law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of
disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose,
Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in existent decision of Branch 64
of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional
Office, represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC,
received a written communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor
in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the decision
dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley
Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt,
reiterating the request for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings
Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death
of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of
Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration
of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC
had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was
the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had
decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was
one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr.
Hunt sent a letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the
purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of

64

the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been

presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document
attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document,
Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to
communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the
investigation of the falsification.6
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an
affidavit on March 4, 2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent
who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations
against the respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose
Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his
constitutional right to remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to
Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared and gave his
sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the
Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the investigation, with a
recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of
public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and
for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the
Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against
the respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a
Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office
of the Bar Confidant.12
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counteraffidavit,13 whereby he denied any participation in the falsification. He
insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirleys petition for the
annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws
involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in
June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what
appeared to be a court decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him
that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy
Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that
Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to
people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his documentation problems as
an OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that
one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had
executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with
the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband,
Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at
the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondents
counter-affidavit as his comment, and referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

65

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A.
Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent
guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorneys Oath and Code
of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged
the purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special
Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive
death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth
and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the
petitioner;18 and that the respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy
Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly:
Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it
was one Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof
thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa
(sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the decision
was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction
of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch except for the
names and dates? Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent
did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right to remain
silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made this known in
the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere
afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his
sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident.19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,20 the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by suspending the
respondent from the practice of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-70921 denying the respondents motion for reconsideration and
affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then
forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule
139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents
comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the
complainants reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to
require the respondent to file a reply to the complainants comment within
10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original
records of the case within 15 days from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the
respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in
consideration of a sum of money.
The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the
imputation. He insisted that he had had no hand in the falsification, and
claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He
implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto
Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW,

66

hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous means to

achieve his ends.
However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in
the illicit generation of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos
categorical declaration on the respondents personal responsibility for the
falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not overcome
by the respondents blanket denial, which by nature was negative
evidence.23
Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible
specifics and did not command credence.1wphi1 It is worthy to note, too,
that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after the Court, through
the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to comment.24
The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more
than an after thought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs.
Jalipa that declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in
the falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance was outrightly
worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered unreliable due
to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn
statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is
immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost
verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in
the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a
non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the
administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status
of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the
Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that
they should do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the
confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity.26 The
Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among
them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their
Attorneys Oath for them to:

67

x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same;
x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as
lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal
profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only to the
deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him
who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of
ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and
omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but
also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties
that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles
that the privilege to practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is
immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and
obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed
either in a professional or private capacity.28 The test is whether the
conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.29 WHEREFORE, the Court
FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N.
PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon
receipt of this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST.
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated
proceedings to be initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the
country and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5239

November 18, 2013
SPOUSES GEORGE A. WARRINER and AURORA R. WARRINER,
Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RENI M. DUBLIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the administrative Complaint1 filed on March 14, 2000 by
complainant-spouses George Arthur Warriner (Warriner) and Aurora R.
Warriner against respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin for gross negligence and
dereliction of duty.

68

In their Complaint filed directly before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this
Court, complainants alleged that they secured the services of respondent in
the filing of a Complaint for damages captioned as Aurora M Del RioWarriner and her spouse-husband George Arthur Warriner, plaintiffs, versus
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. and docketed as Civil Case No. 23,396-95
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 16; that during
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 23,396-95, respondent requested the RTC
for a period of 10 days within which to submit his Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence; that despite the lapse of the requested period,
respondent did not submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that
respondent did not file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. s
motion to declare complainants to have waived their right to file Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent belatedly filed a Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence which the RTC denied; that respondent did
not oppose or file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.s move
to dismiss the Complaint; and that the RTC eventually dismissed Civil Case
No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein complainants. In a Resolution2
dated June 26, 2000, we directed respondent to file his Comment to this
administrative Complaint. Upon receipt of the Resolution on August 24,
2000,3 respondent requested for an extension of 30 days which was
granted.4
However, as of August 5, 2002, or after a lapse of almost two years,
respondent had not yet filed his Comment. Thus, we resolved to require
respondent to "show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution requiring
said comment, both within ten (10) days from notice."5 Respondent
received our directive but chose to ignore the same.6 In another
Resolution7 dated August 4, 2003, we imposed a fine of P1,000.00 on
respondent and reiterated our directives requiring him to file his Comment
and to submit an explanation on his failure to file the same. However,
respondent again ignored this Courts directive. Thus, on February 15,
2006, we increased the fine to P2,000.00 but respondent continued to
ignore our Resolutions.8 Consequently, on March 10, 2008, we resolved to
order respondents arrest and detention until he complies with our
Resolutions.9
This time, respondent heeded our directives by submitting his
Compliance10 and Comment.11 Respondent claimed that he failed to file
his Comment to the instant administrative case because he lost the records
of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 and that he tried to get a copy from the RTC to
no avail.
In his Comment belatedly filed eight years after the prescribed period,
respondent averred that complainant Warriner is an Australian national who
married his Filipino spouse as a convenient scheme to stay in the country;
that he rendered his services in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 free of charge;
that he accepted the case because he was challenged by Warriners
criticism of the Philippine judicial system; that he doubted the veracity of
Warriners claim that the construction being undertaken by E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd. indeed caused the erosion of the soil towards his property;
that Warriner was his only witness during the trial; that the reluctance of

69

other witnesses to testify for Warriner strengthened his suspicion of the

veracity of Warriners claim; that upon inquiries, he discovered that the bits
of evidence presented by Warriner were fabricated; that the barangay
officials do not wish to participate in the fraudulent scheme of Warriner;
that he visited Warriners property and saw that Warriner authored the
damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches
provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.; that he had a heated
argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with a
disbarment suit; that based on his discovery, respondent did not wish to
submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that complainants no
longer saw him or inquired about the status of the case; that he did not
withdraw from the case because complainants no longer visited him at his
law office; that if he withdraws, Warriner would only hire another lawyer to
perpetrate his fraudulent scheme; and that he could not be held
administratively liable for filing a belated Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence as he only did the same to protect the legal profession and in
accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful
causes.
In a Resolution12 dated July 16, 2008, we found respondents explanation
for failing to comply with our directives not fully satisfactory hence, we
admonished him to be more circumspect in his dealings with the Court. At
the same time, we referred the Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The parties submitted their respective Position Papers before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline.
In their Position Paper,13 complainants insisted that respondent mishandled
their case before the RTC by filing a motion to admit the formal exhibits
almost three months after the prescribed period; that respondent did not
present complainants Marriage Contract and General Power of Attorney
that would have allowed Warriner to represent his wife while the latter is
out of the country; that complainants marriage is not for convenience; that
complainants have a son out of said marriage; that respondent was paid for
his services; that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. did not secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) before undertaking the
construction; that Warriner was not the sole witness for the prosecution;
that the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 would show that a
representative from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and the Barangay Captain were likewise presented; and that these
witnesses proved that Warriners claim was not a fabrication.
In his Position Paper,14 respondent contradicted his earlier assertion in his
Comment filed before the Court that Warriner was his only witness in Civil
Case No. 23,396-95 by claiming this time that aside from Warriner, he also
presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a representative from
DENR. He conceded that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed failed to
secure an ECC but claimed that this alone would not prove that E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. did not institute corrective measures to prevent
soil erosion and damages to neighboring houses such as Warriners. He
insisted that it is the natural topography of the place which caused the soil
erosion which again contradicted his earlier allegation in his Comment

70

before this Court that it was Warriner who caused the soil erosion by
destroying the ditches constructed by the developer. Moreover, he alleged
that the estimate of damages provided by Benings Garden which he offered
as an exhibit in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was a fabrication as there is no
such entity in Laurel St., Davao City.
In their Supplemental Position Paper,15 complainants argued, among
others, that since more than eight years have lapsed, it is possible that
Benings Garden relocated to another address but it does not mean that it
never existed.
In his Report and Recommendation,16 the Investigating Commissioner17
found respondent guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95 in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and thus recommended
respondents suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XIX-2010-44218 dated
August 28, 2010, approved with modification the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of
Governors noted that aside from mishandling the case of complainants,
respondent also showed his propensity to defy the orders of the court, thus
it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
year.
Respondent moved for reconsideration insisting that the IBPs Resolution is
not supported by facts. He maintained that his actuations did not amount to
a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the filing of
the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, although belated, exculpated
him from any liability. He asserted that the exhibits were fabricated thus he
deliberately belatedly filed the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence in the
hope that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. He denied
defying lawful orders of the RTC or this Court. He insisted that defiance of
lawful orders connotes total, complete or absolute refusal and not mere
belated filing. He argued that he did not oppose or file comment to the
Motion to Dismiss as he deemed the same proper considering the fabricated
allegations of his clients. Respondent argued that the penalty recommended
by the IBP is not commensurate to his infractions. He alleged that the
records of this case would show that he did not utterly disregard the orders
or processes of the Court or the IBP. He claimed that this Court should have
deemed his failure to timely file a Comment as a waiver on his part to file
the same, and not as defiance of this Courts orders. Besides, he insisted
that the only issue to be resolved by the IBP was the alleged mishandling of
Civil Case No. 23,396-95; the IBP should not have delved on whether he
disregarded or was disrespectful of the Courts orders because he was not
given any opportunity to rebut the same.
Finally, respondent posited that his penalty is oppressive, excessive and
disproportionate. He argued that with his suspension, the other cases he is
handling would be affected.
Complainants also filed their Motion for Reconsideration insisting that
respondent should be disbarred or suspended for five years from the
practice of law. To this, respondent filed his Comment asserting that the
Investigating Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he stated in his
Report and Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument with

71

the complainants. He averred that after the filing of the Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence and until the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23,396-95,
he had no occasion to meet the complainants. He maintained that he had
nothing to be remorseful about and that there is absolutely no evidence
that would justify his suspension. He maintained that "being basic and
elementary in any legal procedure, a failure or refusal to submit comment is
but a waiver to so comment and puts the controversy submitted for
resolution based on the evidence available at hand x x x. It is unfortunate
that the Supreme Court did not consider respondents failure or omission as
having such effects, but such failure cannot be considered as a
contemptuous act x x x."
The IBP Board of Governors, however, was not persuaded hence it denied
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 6, 2013, respondent filed before this Court An Ex Parte
Manifestation (Not a Motion for Reconsideration)19 insisting that his failure
to timely file comment on the administrative case does not constitute
defiance of the Courts directives but is only "a natural human expression of
frustration, distraught and disappointment" when this Court and the IBP
entertained a clearly unmeritorious Complaint. In any case, he averred that
on April 12, 2013, the IBP Davao City Chapter presented him with a
Certificate of Appreciation for his invaluable support to the local chapter. He
claims that
x x x Even a feeble minded average person will find it ridiculously hilarious
and comical that the [IBP] National Office condemns undersigned for his
acts allegedly inimical to the profession but will be praised to the heavens,
so to speak, by the local chapter of the same organization for his invaluable
support to that same organization whose object, among others, is to
discipline its members to be respectful and [subservient] to the rule of law
by serving justice in an orderly and dignified manner. Weight and credence
must be accorded the recognition and appreciation by this local chapter
being logically considered as having the first hand observation and, thus,
the personal knowledge of undersigneds personal character, integrity,
uprightness, reputation and sacrifices in the practice of his legal profession.
As a gesture of meek obedience, respondent will not pray for the
reconsideration and setting aside of that resolution adopted by the
Honorable Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for
one (1) year, erroneous, disproportionate and harsh as it may be.
Undersigned only prays that, by way of protecting the prestigious image of
the [IBP], measures be adopted to prevent it from becoming a laughing
stock of professional organizations in the Philippines worthy for the books of
wonders by its inconsistent, ridiculous and contradictory stance of
disciplining its members exemplified by the predicament of respondent in
this instant proceeding on the one hand but on the other hand is extolled by
its local chapter to high heavens for his "invaluable support" of the tenets
and foundation of that very same organization that condemns him. THIS IS
HILARIOUSLY COMICAL AND ABSURDLY ODD.
Our Ruling
Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95.
Records show that the 10-day period given to respondent to submit his

72

formal offer of documentary evidence pursuant to the RTC Order dated

November 11, 1997 lapsed without any compliance from the respondent.
Consequently, the RTC, in its January 23, 1998 Order deemed respondent
to have waived the submission of his formal offer of exhibits. Instead of
asking the RTC to set aside the above Order, respondent filed on February
3, 1998 a Motion to Admit the Belated Formal Exhibits in Evidence. As to be
expected, the RTC denied the motion. At the same time, it directed E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. to file its Motion to Dismiss by way of Demurrer
to Evidence. Again, respondent failed to comment or oppose the Motion to
Dismiss despite the opportunity given by the RTC. As a result, Civil Case
No. 23,396-95 was dismissed.
Plainly, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 which provide:
Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Worse, it appears that respondent deliberately mishandled Civil Case No.
23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein complainants. Culled from the
pleadings respondent submitted before this Court and the IBP, respondent
admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits
because he believes that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that
the same would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If
respondent truly believes that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by
his clients were fabricated, then he has the option to withdraw from the
case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause
such as "[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct
with the matter he is handling"20 or "[w]hen the client insists that the
lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules."21 Respondent
adverted to the estimate of damages provided by Benings Garden as a
fabrication as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City.
Unfortunately, respondent anchored his claim that Bening's Garden does
not exist merely on the claim of Rudolph C. Lumibao, a "sympathetic client"
and a part-time gardener. Complainants refuted this allegation by claiming
that Bening's Garden must have relocated its business considering that
more than eight years have passed since the estimate was secured.
Complainants also pointed out that since the filing of this case, respondent
has thrice relocated his office but this does not mean that his practice has
ceased to exist.
We also agree with the IBP that respondent has a propensity to disobey and
disrespect court orders and processes.1wphi1 Note that we required
respondent to submit his Comment to this administrative Complaint as
early as year 2000. However, he was only able to file his Comment eight
years later, or in 2008 and only after we ordered his arrest. "As an officer of
the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is
not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly
and completely.22
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that respondent is also prone to
resorting to contradictions in his effort to exculpate himself. In his
Comment filed before this Court, respondent claimed that Warriner was his

73

only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95. However, in his Position Paper
filed before the IBP, he admitted that aside from Warriner, he also
presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a representative from
DENR. Next, he claimed in his Comment filed before this Court that he had
a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him
with a disbarment suit. The Investigating Commissioner took this into
account when he submitted his Report and Recommendation. Surprisingly,
respondent claimed in his Comment to complainant's Motion for
Reconsideration before the IBP that the Investigating Commissioner erred
and was inaccurate when he stated in his Report and Recommendation that
respondent had a heated argument with the complainants. Moreover,
respondent claimed in his Comment before this Court that Warriner
authored the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention
ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. However, he again
contradicted himself when he claimed in his Position Paper that the natural
topography of the place was the cause of the erosion. At this juncture,
respondent must be reminded that as a lawyer and an officer of the Court,
he "owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court."23 He "shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."24
Under the circumstances, and considering that we had already admonished
respondent and had him arrested for his adamant refusal to obey our
directives, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six
months, as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner, and as we
similarly imposed in Hernandez v. Padilla25 and Pesto v. Millo,26
commensurate to respondents infractions. Besides, we wish to emphasize
that "suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment but a means to
protect the public and the legal profession."27
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Reni M. Dublin is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six months effective upon receipt of this Resolution with a WARNING
that a similar violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to
report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of
respondent as a member of the Bar and copies furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9149

September 4, 2013
JULIAN
PENILLA,
COMPLAINANT,
vs.
ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed against respondent
Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. for violation of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of

74

Professional Responsibility, and for gross misconduct in the performance of

his duty as a lawyer.
The antecedent facts follow:
Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and
Evelyn Garin (the spouses) for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile.
Despite full payment, the spouses defaulted in their obligation. Thus,
complainant decided to file a case for breach of contract against the
spouses where he engaged the services of respondent as counsel.
Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund
of complainants payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment,
respondent advised complainant that he would file a criminal case for estafa
against said spouses. Respondent charged P30,000 as attorneys fees and
P10,000 as filing fees. Complainant turned over the relevant documents to
respondent and paid the fees in tranches. Respondent then filed the
complaint for estafa before Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Respondent attended the
hearing with complainant but the spouses did not appear. After the hearing,
complainant paid another P1,000 to respondent as appearance fee.
Henceforth, complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the
subsequent events and transactions that transpired.
Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution,
respondent told him that they have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to
Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a favorable resolution of the case.
Complainant claims that despite initial reservations, he later acceded to
respondents suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for P950 and
delivered it to respondents office.
Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa
case against the spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a
motion for reconsideration was "needed to have [the resolution] reversed."2
Respondent then prepared the motion and promised complainant that he
would fix the problem. On February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for
lack of merit. Respondent then told complainant that he could not do
anything about the adverse decision and presented the option of filing a
civil case for specific performance against the spouses for the refund of the
money plus damages. Complainant paid an additional P10,000 to
respondent which he asked for the payment of filing fees. After complainant
signed the complaint, he was told by respondent to await further notice as
to the status of the case. Complainant claims that respondent never gave
him any update thereafter.
Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to
follow-up the status of the case and meet with respondent at his office. He
admits, however, that in one instance he was able to talk to respondent
who told him that the case was not progressing because the spouses could
not be located. In the same meeting, respondent asked complainant to
determine the whereabouts of the spouses. Complainant returned to
respondents office on January 24, 2005, but because respondent was not
around, complainant left with respondents secretary a letter regarding the
possible location of the spouses.

75

Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several
letters conveying his disappointment and requesting for the return of the
money and the documents in respondents possession. Complainant then
sought the assistance of the radio program "Ito ang Batas with Atty. Aga"
to solve his predicament. Following the advice he gathered, complainant
went to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan
Trial Court and Regional Trial Court (RTC). Complainant learned that a civil
case for Specific Performance and Damages was filed on June 6, 20023 but
was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He also found out that the filing fee was
only P2,440 and not P10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga of
the same radio program also sent respondent a letter calling his attention
to complainants problem. The letter, like all of complainants previous
letters, was unheeded.
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant
administrative case praying that respondent be found guilty of gross
misconduct for violating the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and for appropriate administrative sanctions to be imposed.
Respondent harps a different tale.
In an Answer4 filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case
be dismissed for lack of merit. He denied charging complainant P10,000 as
filing fees for the estafa case and claimed that he charged and received only
P2,000. He also countered that the payment of P30,000 made by the
complainant was his acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case.
Respondent likewise denied the following other allegations of complainant:
that he assured the success of the case before the prosecutor; that he
asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the prosecutor;
that he promised to fix the case; and that he charged P10,000, as he only
charged P5,000, as filing fee for the civil case.
Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part
when he failed to inform petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was
willing to return the money and the documents of complainant. What
allegedly prevented him from communicating with complainant was the fact
that complainant would go to his office during days and times that he would
be attending his daily court hearings.
The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only
complainant and his counsel attended.5 The conference was reset and
terminated on June 9, 2006. The parties were directed to file their verified
position papers within 15 days,6 to which complainant and respondent
complied.7
On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply8 praying for the dismissal of the
case for lack of factual and legal bases. He stated that he had performed his
duties as complainants counsel when he filed the criminal case before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and the civil case before the
RTC of Caloocan City. He averred that he should not be blamed for the
dismissal of both cases as his job was to ensure that justice is served and
not to win the case. It was unethical for him to guarantee the success of
the case and resort to unethical means to win such case for the client. He
continued to deny that he asked complainant to give the prosecutor a bottle

76

of Carlos Primero I and that the filing fees he collected totalled P20,000.
Respondent argued that it is incredulous that the total sum of all the fees
that he had allegedly collected exceeded P30,000 the amount being
claimed by complainant from the spouses.
In its Report and Recommendation9 dated September 12, 2008, the IBPCBD recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for six months "for negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and
transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility," viz:
In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep
sticking out like a sore thumb rendering them difficult to escape notice.
One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation
of the contract for repair of the Volks Wagon (sic) car. It is basic that when
an act or omission emanates from a contract, oral or written, the
consequent result is a breach of the contract, hence, properly actionable in
a civil suit for damages. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating
Prosecutor, the liability of the respondent is purely civil in nature because
the complaint arose from a contract of services and the respondent
(spouses Garin) failed to perform their contractual obligation under the
contract.
xxxx
Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and
damages (after the dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa) in the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City where the actual damages claimed is
P36,000.00.
It is also basic that the civil complaint for P36,000.00 should have been
filed with the MTC [which] has jurisdiction over the same. One of the "firsts"
that a lawyer ascertains in filing an action is the proper forum or court with
whom the suit or action shall be filed. In June 2002 when the civil complaint
was filed in court, the jurisdiction of the MTC has already expanded such
that the jurisdictional amount of the RTC is already P400,000.00.
xxxx
Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondents client as
evidenced by the letters marked as Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G" and "H" which
were all received by complainants secretary, except for Exhibit "H" which
was received by Atty. Asong, not to mention Exhibit "M" which was sent by
"Atty. Aga". These efforts of the complainant were not reciprocated by the
respondent with good faith. Respondent chose to ignore them and reasoned
out that he is willing to meet with the complainant and return the money
and documents received by reason of the legal engagement, but omitted to
communicate with him for the purpose of fixing the time and place for the
meeting. This failure suggests a clear disregard of the clients demand
which was done in bad faith on the part of respondent.10
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-646, adopting and approving the recommendation of the IBPCBD. The Resolution11 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported

77

by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration12 and asked that the
penalty of suspension be reduced to warning or reprimand. After three
days, or on April 27, 2009, respondent filed a "Motion to Admit Amended
Motion for Reconsideration Upon Leave of Office."13 Respondent asserted
that the failure to inform complainant of the status of the cases should not
be attributed to him alone. He stressed that complainant had always been
informed that he only had time to meet with his clients in the afternoon at
his office in Quezon City. Despite such notice, complainant kept going to his
office in Tandang Sora. He admitted that though he committed lapses which
would amount to negligence in violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04, they
were done unknowingly and without malice or bad faith. He also stressed
that this was his first infraction.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.14 On August 15, 2011, respondent filed a second Motion for
Reconsideration15 which was no longer acted upon due to the transmittal of
the records of the case to this Court by the IBP on August 16, 2011.16
On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution17 and noted the
aforementioned Notices of Resolution dated December 11, 2008 and June
26, 2011. On December 14, 2011, it issued another Resolution18 noting the
Indorsement dated August 16, 2011 of Director Alicia A. Risos-Vidal and
respondents second Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 2011.
We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional
negligence under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, with a modification that we also find respondent guilty of
violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyers Oath.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a
patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an
attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber
which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.19
The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his
oath and the following provisions under the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
a)
Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client;
b)
Rule 15.[06, Canon 15 A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body;
c)
Rule 16.01[, Canon 16 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from his client;
d)

78

Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him;
e)
Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;
f)
Rule 18.03[, Canon 18 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable;
and
g)
Rule 18.04[, Canon 18 A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information.20
A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that
respondent violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Complainant correctly alleged that respondent
violated his oath under Canon 18 to "serve his client with competence and
diligence" when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of
the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of
contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed,
respondent committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for
specific performance and damages before the RTC. The complaint, having
an alternative prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed
with the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction over complainants
claim which amounts to only P36,000. As correctly stated in the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect
on April 15, 1994[,] vests in the MTCs of Metro Manila exclusive original
jurisdiction of civil cases where the amount of demand does not exceed
P200,000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses and costs (Sec. 33), and after five (5) years from
the effectivity of the Act, the same shall be adjusted to P400,000.00 (Sec.
34).21
The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the
remedy adopted in the criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil
complaint were so basic and could have been easily averted had he been
more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant. What
aggravates respondents offense is the fact that his previous mistake in
filing the estafa case did not motivate him to be more conscientious,
diligent and vigilant in handling the case of complainant. The civil case he
subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later turned
out to be a basic jurisdictional error.
That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent
was plainly negligent and did not apprise complainant of the status and
progress of both cases he filed for the latter. He paid no attention and
showed no importance to complainants cause despite repeated follow-ups.
Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases.
His lack of professionalism in dealing with complainant is also gross and
inexcusable. In what may seem to be a helpless attempt to solve his
predicament, complainant even had to resort to consulting a program in a

79

radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at the very least,
get his attention.
Respondents negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond
contention. A client pays his lawyer hard-earned money as professional
fees. In return, "[e]very case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts
it for a fee or for free. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. He must
constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would
be binding upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted with the
rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has
the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and
competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the clients cause."22
Similarly, under Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of
the status and developments of the case and all other information relevant
thereto. He must be consistently mindful of his obligation to respond
promptly should there be queries or requests for information from the
client.
In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update
complainant of the status of the cases he filed because their time did not
always coincide. The excuse proffered by respondent is too lame and flimsy
to be given credit. Respondent himself admitted that he had notice that
complainant had visited his office many times. Yet, despite the efforts
exerted and the vigilance exhibited by complainant, respondent neglected
and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 to keep his
client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable
time to the clients request for information.
Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that
"[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him." The legal profession dictates that
it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest
degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the clients interest.
The most thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to
safeguard the interest of the client. The honor bestowed on his person to
carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyers Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the
entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent
responsibility of not only satisfying the basic requirements but also going
the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the pursuit
of justice. Respondent has defied and failed to perform such duty and his
omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyers Oath.
All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against
lawyers, it is the complainant who has the burden to prove by
preponderance of evidence23 the allegations in the complaint. In the instant
case, complainant was only able to prove respondents violation of Canons
17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Lawyers Oath. Complainant failed to substantiate
his claim that respondent violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.06 of the Code of

80

Professional Responsibility when respondent allegedly instructed him to give

a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno in order to get
a favorable decision. Similarly, complainant was not able to present
evidence that respondent indeed violated Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 by
allegedly collecting money from him in excess of the required filing fees.
As to respondents proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and
18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Lawyers Oath, we find the same to constitute gross misconduct for
which he may be suspended under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and
approving the Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby
AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.
is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18,
and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
well as the Lawyers Oath. This Court hereby imposes upon respondent the
penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS to commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be more circumspect and diligent in
handling the cases of his clients, and STERNLY WARNED that a commission
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court
Administrator to be disseminated to all courts throughout the country, to
the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.s
personal records, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5359

March 10, 2014
ERMELINDA LAD VOA. DE DOMINGUEZ, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact,
VICENTE
A.
PICHON,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the
widow of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in
Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck
owned by the Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant decided to file
charges against the Municipality of Caraga and engaged the services of

81

respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On three (3)

occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant the
following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit:
(1) June 3, 1996 -P3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 -Pl,800.00; and September
2, 1996 - P5,250.00 or a total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4)
years, however, no complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the
Municipality of Caraga.1
Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service
and received the amount of P10,050.00. He, however, explained that their
agreement was that complainant would pay the filing fees and other
incidental expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and ready
for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorneys fees of
P100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the signing of the complaint, he
advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriffs
fees and the 30% of the attorneys fee, but complainant failed to do so.
Atty. Agleron averred that since the complaint could not be filed in court,
the amount of P10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while awaiting the
payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorneys fee.2
In reply,3 complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the
filing fee and asserted that the filing fee at that time amounted only to
P7,836.60.
In the Report and Recommendation,4 dated January 12, 2012, the
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of four (4) months.
In its April 16, 2013 Resolution,5 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of only one (1) month.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
except as to the penalty imposed.
Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his
client with competence, and to attend to his clients cause with diligence,
care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.6
He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.7
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint
against the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it
was already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the
appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment
of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such justification,
however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from liability. As
stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention
whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant

82

had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a
way to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the
filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked
professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed incompetence
when he failed to file the appropriate charges.1wphi1
In a number of cases,8 the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable
for disciplinary action such as suspension ranging from three months to two
years. In this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. ARNULFO
M. AGLERON, SR. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in
the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180677

February 18, 2013
VICTORIO
P.
DIAZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LEVI STRAUSS [PHILS.], INC.,
Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
It is the tendency of the allegedly infringing mark to be confused with the
registered trademark that is the gravamen of the offense of infringement of
a registered trademark. The acquittal of the accused should follow if the
allegedly infringing mark is not likely to cause confusion. Thereby, the
evidence of the State does not satisfy the quantum of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
Accused Victorio P. Diaz (Diaz) appeals the resolutions promulgated on July
17, 20071 and November 22, 2007,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA),
respectively, dismissed his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 30133 for the
belated filing of the appellant's brief, and denied his motion for
reconsideration. Thereby, the decision rendered on February 13, 2006 in
Criminal Case No. 00-0318 and Criminal Case No. 00-0319 by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 255, in Las Pifias City (RTC) convicting him for two
counts of infringement of trademark were affirmed.3
Antecedents
On February 10, 2000, the Department of Justice filed two informations in
the RTC of Las Pias City, charging Diaz with violation of Section 155, in
relation to Section 170, of Republic Act No. 8293, also known as the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (Intellectual Property Code), to
wit:

83

Criminal Case No. 00-0318

That on or about August 28, 1998, and on dates prior thereto, in Las Pinas
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, with criminal intent to defraud Levis Strauss (Phil.) Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as LEVIS), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, knowingly and intentionally engaged in commerce by
reproducing, counterfeiting, copying and colorably imitating Levis
registered trademarks or dominant features thereof such as the ARCUATE
DESIGN, TWO HORSE BRAND, TWO HORSE PATCH, TWO HORSE LABEL
WITH
PATTERNED
ARCUATE
DESIGN,
TAB
AND
COMPOSITE
ARCUATE/TAB/TWO HORSE PATCH, and in connection thereto, sold, offered
for sale, manufactured, distributed counterfeit patches and jeans, including
other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of said patches and
jeans, which likely caused confusion, mistake, and /or deceived the general
consuming public, without the consent, permit or authority of the registered
owner, LEVIS, thus depriving and defrauding the latter of its right to the
exclusive use of its trademarks and legitimate trade, to the damage and
prejudice of LEVIS.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 00-0319
That on or about August 28, 1998, and on dates prior thereto, in Las Pinas
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, with criminal intent to defraud Levis Strauss (Phil.) Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as LEVIS), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, knowingly and intentionally engaged in commerce by
reproducing, counterfeiting, copying and colorably imitating Levis
registered trademarks or dominant features thereof such as the ARCUATE
DESIGN, TWO HORSE BRAND, TWO HORSE PATCH, TWO HORSE LABEL
WITH
PATTERNED
ARCUATE
DESIGN,
TAB
AND
COMPOSITE
ARCUATE/TAB/TWO HORSE PATCH, and in connection thereto, sold, offered
for sale, manufactured, distributed counterfeit patches and jeans, including
other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of said patches and
jeans, which likely caused confusion, mistake, and /or deceived the general
consuming public, without the consent, permit or authority of the registered
owner, LEVIS, thus depriving and defrauding the latter of its right to the
exclusive use of its trademarks and legitimate trade, to the damage and
prejudice of LEVIS.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The cases were consolidated for a joint trial. Diaz entered his pleas of not
guilty to each information on June 21, 2000.6
1.
Evidence of the Prosecution
Levi Strauss and Company (Levis), a foreign corporation based in the State
of Delaware, United States of America, had been engaged in the apparel
business. It is the owner of trademarks and designs of Levis jeans like
LEVIS 501, the arcuate design, the two-horse brand, the two-horse patch,
the two-horse patch with pattern arcuate, and the composite tab arcuate.
LEVIS 501 has the following registered trademarks, to wit: (1) the leather
patch showing two horses pulling a pair of pants; (2) the arcuate pattern

84

with the inscription "LEVI STRAUSS & CO;" (3) the arcuate design that
refers to "the two parallel stitching curving downward that are being sewn
on both back pockets of a Levis Jeans;" and (4) the tab or piece of cloth
located on the structural seam of the right back pocket, upper left side. All
these trademarks were registered in the Philippine Patent Office in the
1970s, 1980s and early part of 1990s.7
Levi Strauss Philippines, Inc. (Levis Philippines) is a licensee of Levis. After
receiving information that Diaz was selling counterfeit LEVIS 501 jeans in
his tailoring shops in Almanza and Talon, Las Pias City, Levis Philippines
hired a private investigation group to verify the information. Surveillance
and the purchase of jeans from the tailoring shops of Diaz established that
the jeans bought from the tailoring shops of Diaz were counterfeit or
imitations of LEVIS 501. Levis Philippines then sought the assistance of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for purposes of applying for a search
warrant against Diaz to be served at his tailoring shops. The search
warrants were issued in due course. Armed with the search warrants, NBI
agents searched the tailoring shops of Diaz and seized several fake LEVIS
501 jeans from them. Levis Philippines claimed that it did not authorize the
making and selling of the seized jeans; that each of the jeans were mere
imitations of genuine LEVIS 501 jeans by each of them bearing the
registered trademarks, like the arcuate design, the tab, and the leather
patch; and that the seized jeans could be mistaken for original LEVIS 501
jeans due to the placement of the arcuate, tab, and two-horse leather
patch.8
2.
Evidence of the Defense
On his part, Diaz admitted being the owner of the shops searched, but he
denied any criminal liability.
Diaz stated that he did not manufacture Levis jeans, and that he used the
label "LS Jeans Tailoring" in the jeans that he made and sold; that the label
"LS Jeans Tailoring" was registered with the Intellectual Property Office;
that his shops received clothes for sewing or repair; that his shops offered
made-to-order jeans, whose styles or designs were done in accordance with
instructions of the customers; that since the time his shops began operating
in 1992, he had received no notice or warning regarding his operations;
that the jeans he produced were easily recognizable because the label "LS
Jeans Tailoring," and the names of the customers were placed inside the
pockets, and each of the jeans had an "LSJT" red tab; that "LS" stood for
"Latest Style;" and that the leather patch on his jeans had two buffaloes,
not two horses.9
Ruling of the RTC
On February 13, 2006, the RTC rendered its decision finding Diaz guilty as
charged, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Victorio P. Diaz,
a.k.a. Vic Diaz, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of twice violating Sec.
155, in relation to Sec. 170, of RA No. 8293, as alleged in the Informations
in Criminal Case Nos. 00-0318 & 00-0319, respectively, and hereby
sentences him to suffer in each of the cases the penalty of imprisonment of
TWO (2) YEARS of prision correcional, as minimum, up to FIVE (5) YEARS

85

of prision correcional, as maximum, as well as pay a fine of P50,000.00 for

each of the herein cases, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law.
Also, accused Diaz is hereby ordered to pay to the private complainant
Levis Strauss (Phils.), Inc. the following, thus:
1. P50,000.00 in exemplary damages; and
2. P222,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.10
Ruling of the CA
Diaz appealed, but the CA dismissed the appeal on July 17, 2007 on the
ground that Diaz had not filed his appellants brief on time despite being
granted his requested several extension periods.
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Diaz is now before the Court
to plead for his acquittal.
Issue
Diaz submits that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
WHEN IT APPLIED RIGIDLY THE RULE ON TECHNICALITIES AND OVERRIDE
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE BY DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONER
FOR LATE FILING OF APPELLANTS BRIEF.11
Ruling
The Court first resolves whether the CA properly dismissed the appeal of
Diaz due to the late filing of his appellants brief.
Under Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the appellant is required to
file the appellants brief in the CA "within forty-five (45) days from receipt
of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are
attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten,
mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies
thereof upon the appellee." Section 1(e) of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court
grants to the CA the discretion to dismiss an appeal either motu proprio or
on motion of the appellee should the appellant fail to serve and file the
required number of copies of the appellants brief within the time provided
by the Rules of Court.12
The usage of the word may in Section 1(e) of Rule 50 indicates that the
dismissal of the appeal upon failure to file the appellants brief is not
mandatory, but discretionary. Verily, the failure to serve and file the
required number of copies of the appellants brief within the time provided
by the Rules of Court does not have the immediate effect of causing the
outright dismissal of the appeal. This means that the discretion to dismiss
the appeal on that basis is lodged in the CA, by virtue of which the CA may
still allow the appeal to proceed despite the late filing of the appellants
brief, when the circumstances so warrant its liberality. In deciding to
dismiss the appeal, then, the CA is bound to exercise its sound discretion
upon taking all the pertinent circumstances into due consideration.
The records reveal that Diazs counsel thrice sought an extension of the
period to file the appellants brief. The first time was on March 12, 2007,
the request being for an extension of 30 days to commence on March 11,
2007. The CA granted his motion under its resolution of March 21, 2007. On

86

April 10, 2007, the last day of the 30-day extension, the counsel filed
another motion, seeking an additional 15 days. The CA allowed the counsel
until April 25, 2007 to serve and file the appellants brief. On April 25,
2007, the counsel went a third time to the CA with another request for 15
days. The CA still granted such third motion for extension, giving the
counsel until May 10, 2007. Notwithstanding the liberality of the CA, the
counsel did not literally comply, filing the appellants brief only on May 28,
2007, which was the 18th day beyond the third extension period granted.
Under the circumstances, the failure to file the appellants brief on time
rightly deserved the outright rejection of the appeal. The acts of his counsel
bound Diaz like any other client. It was, of course, only the counsel who
was well aware that the Rules of Court fixed the periods to file pleadings
and equally significant papers like the appellants brief with the lofty
objective of avoiding delays in the administration of justice.
Yet, we have before us an appeal in two criminal cases in which the
appellant lost his chance to be heard by the CA on appeal because of the
failure of his counsel to serve and file the appellants brief on time despite
the grant of several extensions the counsel requested. Diaz was convicted
and sentenced to suffer two indeterminate sentences that would require
him to spend time in detention for each conviction lasting two years, as
minimum, to five years, as maximum, and to pay fines totaling
P100,000.00 (with subsidiary imprisonment in case of his insolvency). His
personal liberty is now no less at stake. This reality impels us to look
beyond the technicality and delve into the merits of the case to see for
ourselves if the appeal, had it not been dismissed, would have been worth
the time of the CA to pass upon. After all, his appellants brief had been
meanwhile submitted to the CA. While delving into the merits of the case,
we have uncovered a weakness in the evidence of guilt that cannot be
simply ignored and glossed over if we were to be true to our oaths to do
justice to everyone.
We feel that despite the CA being probably right in dismissing the excuses
of oversight and excusable negligence tendered by Diazs counsel to justify
the belated filing of the appellants brief as unworthy of serious
consideration, Diaz should not be made to suffer the dire consequence. Any
accused in his shoes, with his personal liberty as well as his personal
fortune at stake, expectedly but innocently put his fullest trust in his
counsels abilities and professionalism in the handling of his appeal. He
thereby delivered his fate to the hands of his counsel. Whether or not those
hands were efficient or trained enough for the job of handling the appeal
was a learning that he would get only in the end. Likelier than not, he was
probably even unaware of the three times that his counsel had requested
the CA for extensions. If he were now to be left to his unwanted fate, he
would surely suffer despite his innocence. How costly a learning it would be
for him! That is where the Court comes in. It is most important for us as
dispensers of justice not to allow the inadvertence or incompetence of any
counsel to result in the outright deprivation of an appellants right to life,
liberty or property.13
We do not mind if this softening of judicial attitudes be mislabeled as
excessive leniency. With so much on the line, the people whose futures

87

hang in a balance should not be left to suffer from the incompetence,

mindlessness or lack of professionalism of any member of the Law
Profession. They reasonably expect a just result in every litigation. The
courts must give them that just result. That assurance is the peoples
birthright. Thus, we have to undo Diazs dire fate.
Even as we now set aside the CAs rejection of the appeal of Diaz, we will
not remand the records to the CA for its review. In an appeal of criminal
convictions, the records are laid open for review. To avoid further delays,
therefore, we take it upon ourselves to review the records and resolve the
issue of guilt, considering that the records are already before us.
Section 155 of R.A. No. 8293 defines the acts that constitute infringement
of trademark, viz:
Remedies; Infringement. Any person who shall, without the consent of
the owner of the registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature
thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
advertising of any goods or services including other preparatory steps
necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark
or a dominant feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit,
copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action
for infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter set forth:
Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts
stated in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of
whether there is actual sale of goods or services using the infringing
material.
The elements of the offense of trademark infringement under the
Intellectual Property Code are, therefore, the following:
1. The trademark being infringed is registered in the Intellectual Property
Office;
2. The trademark is reproduced, counterfeited, copied, or colorably imitated
by the infringer;
3. The infringing mark is used in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
or advertising of any goods, business or services; or the infringing mark is
applied to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with such goods,
business or services;
4. The use or application of the infringing mark is likely to cause confusion
or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the goods or services
themselves or as to the source or origin of such goods or services or the
identity of such business; and

88

5. The use or application of the infringing mark is without the consent of the
trademark owner or the assignee thereof.14
As can be seen, the likelihood of confusion is the gravamen of the offense
of trademark infringement.15 There are two tests to determine likelihood of
confusion, namely: the dominancy test, and the holistic test. The
contrasting concept of these tests was explained in Societes Des Produits
Nestle, S.A. v. Dy, Jr., thus:
x x x. The dominancy test focuses on the similarity of the main, prevalent
or essential features of the competing trademarks that might cause
confusion. Infringement takes place when the competing trademark
contains the essential features of another. Imitation or an effort to imitate
is unnecessary. The question is whether the use of the marks is likely to
cause confusion or deceive purchasers.
The holistic test considers the entirety of the marks, including labels and
packaging, in determining confusing similarity. The focus is not only on the
predominant words but also on the other features appearing on the labels.16
As to what test should be applied in a trademark infringement case, we said
in McDonalds Corporation v. Macjoy Fastfood Corporation17 that:
In trademark cases, particularly in ascertaining whether one trademark is
confusingly similar to another, no set rules can be deduced because each
case must be decided on its merits. In such cases, even more than in any
other litigation, precedent must be studied in the light of the facts of the
particular case. That is the reason why in trademark cases, jurisprudential
precedents should be applied only to a case if they are specifically in point.
The case of Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,18 which involved an alleged trademark infringement of jeans
products, is worth referring to. There, H.D. Lee Co., Inc. (H.D. Lee), a
corporation based in the United States of America, claimed that Emerald
Garments trademark of "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" that it used on its jeans
products was confusingly similar to the "LEE" trademark that H.D. Lee used
on its own jeans products. Applying the holistic test, the Court ruled that
there was no infringement.
The holistic test is applicable here considering that the herein criminal cases
also involved trademark infringement in relation to jeans products.
Accordingly, the jeans trademarks of Levis Philippines and Diaz must be
considered as a whole in determining the likelihood of confusion between
them. The maong pants or jeans made and sold by Levis Philippines, which
included LEVIS 501, were very popular in the Philippines. The consuming
public knew that the original LEVIS 501 jeans were under a foreign brand
and quite expensive. Such jeans could be purchased only in malls or
boutiques as ready-to-wear items, and were not available in tailoring shops
like those of Diazs as well as not acquired on a "made-to-order" basis.
Under the circumstances, the consuming public could easily discern if the
jeans were original or fake LEVIS 501, or were manufactured by other
brands of jeans. Confusion and deception were remote, for, as the Court
has observed in Emerald Garments:
First, the products involved in the case at bar are, in the main, various
kinds of jeans. These are not your ordinary household items like catsup, soy
sauce or soap which are of minimal cost. Maong pants or jeans are not

89

inexpensive. Accordingly, the casual buyer is predisposed to be more

cautious and discriminating in and would prefer to mull over his purchase.
Confusion and deception, then, is less likely. In Del Monte Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, we noted that:
.... Among these, what essentially determines the attitudes of the
purchaser, specifically his inclination to be cautious, is the cost of the
goods. To be sure, a person who buys a box of candies will not exercise as
much care as one who buys an expensive watch. As a general rule, an
ordinary buyer does not exercise as much prudence in buying an article for
which he pays a few centavos as he does in purchasing a more valuable
thing. Expensive and valuable items are normally bought only after
deliberate, comparative and analytical investigation. But mass products, low
priced articles in wide use, and matters of everyday purchase requiring
frequent replacement are bought by the casual consumer without great
care....
Second, like his beer, the average Filipino consumer generally buys his
jeans by brand. He does not ask the sales clerk for generic jeans but for,
say, a Levis, Guess, Wrangler or even an Armani. He is, therefore, more or
less knowledgeable and familiar with his preference and will not easily be
distracted.
Finally, in line with the foregoing discussions, more credit should be given
to the "ordinary purchaser." Cast in this particular controversy, the ordinary
purchaser is not the "completely unwary consumer" but is the "ordinarily
intelligent buyer" considering the type of product involved.
The definition laid down in Dy Buncio v. Tan Tiao Bok is better suited to the
present case. There, the "ordinary purchaser" was defined as one
"accustomed to buy, and therefore to some extent familiar with, the goods
in question. The test of fraudulent simulation is to be found in the likelihood
of the deception of some persons in some measure acquainted with an
established design and desirous of purchasing the commodity with which
that design has been associated. The test is not found in the deception, or
the possibility of deception, of the person who knows nothing about the
design which has been counterfeited, and who must be indifferent between
that and the other. The simulation, in order to be objectionable, must be
such as appears likely to mislead the ordinary intelligent buyer who has a
need to supply and is familiar with the article that he seeks to purchase.19
Diaz used the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" for the jeans he produced
and sold in his tailoring shops. His trademark was visually and aurally
different from the trademark "LEVI STRAUSS & CO" appearing on the patch
of original jeans under the trademark LEVIS 501. The word "LS" could not
be confused as a derivative from "LEVI STRAUSS" by virtue of the "LS"
being connected to the word "TAILORING", thereby openly suggesting that
the jeans bearing the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" came or were
bought from the tailoring shops of Diaz, not from the malls or boutiques
selling original LEVIS 501 jeans to the consuming public.
There were other remarkable differences between the two trademarks that
the consuming public would easily perceive. Diaz aptly noted such
differences, as follows:

90

The prosecution also alleged that the accused copied the "two horse
design" of the petitioner-private complainant but the evidence will show
that there was no such design in the seized jeans. Instead, what is shown is
"buffalo design." Again, a horse and a buffalo are two different animals
which an ordinary customer can easily distinguish. x x x.
The prosecution further alleged that the red tab was copied by the accused.
However, evidence will show that the red tab used by the private
complainant indicates the word "LEVIS" while that of the accused indicates
the letters "LSJT" which means LS JEANS TAILORING. Again, even an
ordinary customer can distinguish the word LEVIS from the letters LSJT.
xxxx
In terms of classes of customers and channels of trade, the jeans products
of the private complainant and the accused cater to different classes of
customers and flow through the different channels of trade. The customers
of the private complainant are mall goers belonging to class A and B market
group while that of the accused are those who belong to class D and E
market who can only afford Php 300 for a pair of made-toorder pants.20 x x
x.
Moreover, based on the certificate issued by the Intellectual Property Office,
"LS JEANS TAILORING" was a registered trademark of Diaz. He had
registered his trademark prior to the filing of the present cases.21 The
Intellectual Property Office would certainly not have allowed the registration
had Diazs trademark been confusingly similar with the registered
trademark for LEVIS 501 jeans.
Given the foregoing, it should be plain that there was no likelihood of
confusion between the trademarks involved. Thereby, the evidence of guilt
did not satisfy the quantum of proof required for a criminal conviction,
which is proof beyond reasonable doubt. According to Section 2, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such
a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Consequently, Diaz should be
acquitted of the charges.
WHEREFORE, the Court ACQUITS petitioner VICTORIO P. DIAZ of the
crimes of infringement of trademark charged in Criminal Case No. 00-0318
and Criminal Case No. 00-0319 for failure of the State to establish his guilt
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

91