• Daging vs. Davis, A.C. No.

9395, November 12,

2014

FACTS: Daging was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased
from Benjie Pinlac a building space in Baguio City where she operated the bar. Meanwhile,
Daging received a retainer proposal from Davis and Sabling law office signed byAtty. Davis and
Atty. Amos Sabling. They eventually signed the said agreement. Because Daging was delinquent
in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease. Together with Novie Balageo
(Balageo) and Atty. Davis, Pinlac went to Daging’s music bar, inventoried all the equipment
therein, and informed her that Balageo would take over the operation of the bar. Daging averred
that subsequently Atty. Davis acted as business partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her
business name, which they later renamed Amarillo Music Bar. Daging likewise alleged that she
filed an ejectment against Pinlac and Balageo before the MTCC in Baguio City. At that time,
Davis and Sabling law office was still ger counsel as their retainer agreement remained
subsisting and inforce. However, Atty. Davis appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment
case and filed on behalf of the latter, an answer with opposition to the prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. Atty. Davis countered that Balageo has been their client before
they had retainer agreement with Daging. In an administrative case before the Supreme Court for
disbarment against Atty. Davis, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a report and
recommendation finding Atty. Davis guilty of betrayal of his client’s trust and for the misuse of
the information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of
another person. He recommended that Atty. Davis be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year. The IBP adopted this report but lowered the suspension to 6 months.

WHETHER OR NOT Atty. Davis should be suspended

HELD: YES. It is undisputed that Daging entered into a retainer agreement dated March 7, 2005
with his law firm. And during the subsistence of said retainer agreement, Atty. Davis represented
and defended Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the ejectment case. In
fact, Atty. Davis event prepared and filed on behalf of Balageo an answer with opposition to the
prayer for the writ of preliminary injunction. It was only on August 26, 2005 that Atty. Davis
withdrew his appearance for Balageo. Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that
respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
provides: Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. “A lawyer may not, without
being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with
that of his present or former client.” The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is
absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to
represent conflicting interests. In Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba, this Court emphasized that lawyers
are expected not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. Respondent
argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her case is actually
handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction between Atty.
Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal matter complainant
entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he could not have taken advantage
of an information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement. The court is not
impressed. In Hilado v. David, reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr., this Court held that
a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged the services of
his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and undermines the
integrity of justice. Thus, respondent’s argument that he never took advantage of any information
acquired by his law firm in the course of its professional dealings with the complainant, even
assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that complainant is a client
of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo
that he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal
tussle; otherwise, they would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, 199 SCRA 321 (1991) 

A verified complaint for disbarment was filed with then Secretary of National Defense Juan
Ponce Enrile on January 2, 1974, by Ramona L. Vda. de Alisbo and Norberto S. Alisbo against
their former counsel, Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., charging him with deceit, malpractice, and
professional infidelity. It appears that on March 16, 1970, Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent
Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., as his counsel to commence an action to recover his share of the
estate of the deceased spouses Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma which had been adjudicated
to him under the judgment dated April 29, 1961 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental, in Civil Case No. 4963, because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of the
judgment in his favor within the reglementary five-year period (Sec. 6, Rule, 39, Rules of Court).
On April 18, 1970, Jalandoon prepared a complaint for revival of the judgment in Civil Case No.
4963 but filed it only on September 12, 1970 or five (5) months later. It was docketed as Civil
Case No. 9559, entitled: “Ramon S. Alisbo, Teotimo S. Alisbo and Pacifico S. Alisbo vs. Carlito
Sales, in his own capacity and as Judicial Administrator of the deceased Pedro Sales.” The
complaint was signed by Jalandoon alone.

On August 21, 1973, defendant Carlito Sales filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the action for revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 had already prescribed. On
October 3, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription as the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 became final on May 30, 1961
yet, and, although a complaint for revival of said judgment was filed by Ramon Alisbo on
September 12, 1970, before the ten-year prescriptive period expired, that complaint was
null and void for Ramon Alisbo was insane, hence, incompetent and without legal capacity
to sue when he instituted the action. The subsequent filing of an Amended Complaint on
December 8, 1972, after the statutory limitation period had expired, was too late to save the
plaintiff’s right of action. Thereafter, nothing more was done by any of the parties in the case.

On January 2, 1974, the complainants charged respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr. with
having deliberately caused the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9559 and with having concealed from
them the material fact that he had been the former legal counsel of Carlito Sales, their adversary
in the probate proceedings. The respondent filed a general denial of the charges against him.
Ramon Alisbo was already insane or incompetent when he hired Attorney Jalandoon to file Civil
Case No. 9559 for him. Attorney Jalandoon concealed from Alisbo the fact that he (Atty.
Jalandoon) had been the former counsel of Carlito Sales in the probate proceedings where Alisbo
and Sales had litigated over their shares of the inheritance. However, according to Attorney
Jalandoon, it was only on October 6, 1972, when Civil Case No. 9559 was called for pretrial, that
he discovered his previous professional relationship with Sales. At that time, the ten-year
prescriptive period for revival of the judgment in favor of Alisbo had already expired. He
thereupon asked Alisbo’s permission to allow him (Jalandoon) to withdraw from the case. He
also informed the court about his untenable position and requested that he be allowed to retire
therefrom. His request was granted.

The solicitor general found that while Atty. Jalandoon’s mistakes in handling Alisbo’s case were
deliberate or made with malice because there is no proof of collusion or conspiracy between
them and those who benefit from the dismissal of the civil case but on the other hand Jalandoon
stood to gain substantially if he had succeeded in having the judgment revived and executed, still
those errors are so gorss and galring that they could not have resulted from mere negligence or
lack of due care.

WHETHER OR NOT Atty. Jaladoon violated the rule on conflict of interest

HELD:
YES. The impression we gather from the facts is that Attorney Jalandoon used his position as
Alisbo’s counsel precisely to favor his other client, Carlito Sales, by delaying Alisbo’s action to
revive the judgment in his favor and thereby deprive him of the fruits of his judgment which
Attorney Jalandoon, as Sales’ counsel, had vigorously opposed. Thus, although Atty. Jalandoon
prepared Alisbo’s complaint for revival of judgment on April 18, 1970, he delayed its filing until
September 12, 1970. He postponed filing the action by asking the Court instead to resolve
pending incidents in said Civil Case No. 4963. By doing that, he frittered away what little time
was left before the action would prescribe. The original complaint which he filed in the names of
Ramon Alisbo and his brothers was only partially defective because of Ramon’s incompetence.
By dropping the other plaintiffs, leaving alone the incompetent Ramon to prosecute the action,
respondent made the second complaint wholly defective and ineffectual to stop the running of
the prescriptive period. After filing the complaint, Attorney Jalandoon sat on the case. While he
allegedly found out about Ramon Alisbo’s insanity on July 17, 1971 only, he amended the
complaint to implead Alisbo’s legal guardian as plaintiff on December 8, 1971 only, or almost
five (5) months later. By that time the prescriptive period had run out. The surrounding
circumstances leave us with no other conclusion than that Attorney Jalandoon, betrayed his client
Ramon Alisbo’s trust and did not champion his cause with that wholehearted fidelity, care and
devotion that a lawyer is obligated to give to every case that he accepts from a client. There is
more than simple negligence resulting in the extinguishment and loss of his client’s right of
action; there is a hint of duplicity and lack of candor in his dealings with his client, which call for
the exercise of this Court’s disciplinary power.
Heirs of Falame vs. Atty. Baguio, 548 SCRA 1 (2008) 

Facts: On 15 July 1991, their father, the late Lydio “Jerry” Falame (Lydio), engaged the services
of respondent Atty. Baguio to represent him in an action for forcible entry. Complainants
recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the complaint in the
first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to file their
respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a
special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh
Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame
dated 23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the
property subject of the first civil case. Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial
Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained
the services of respondent as his legal adviser and counsel for his businesses until Lydio’s death
on 8 September 1996. However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and
Noemi Falame, respondent filed a case against complainants allegedly involving the property
subject of the first civil case. Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as
counsel in any case or transaction. Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the
termination of the first civil case and his acceptance of the second civil case, respondent pointed
out that the first civil case was not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of
Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of
property was at stake. Respondent further averred that in contrast the second civil case is one
involving the spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all
surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendants—a
case which arose from the wrongful acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydio’s
death. The Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner recommended for the
dismissal of this administrative case finding that the charge lacks specification as to what part of
the lawyer’s oath was violated by Atty/ Baguio and what confidence was disclosed. Civil Case
No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years since the complainants
became owners of Lydio Falame’s properties, is a suit against the complainants, not as
representatives of Lydio Falame, but as owners of their respective aliquot interests in the
property in question.

WHETHER OR NOT Atty. Baguio violated the rule on prohibition against conflict of interest

HELD:
YES. In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as
defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and
respondent was established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him. The case of
Hilado v. David tells us that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or
charged for. As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio
solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same
property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position
that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited
the property, committing acts which debase respondent’s rights as a co-owner. The fact that the
attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio’s death or through the completion of the
specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a
position opposed to that of Lydio. Precedents tell us that even after the termination of his
employment, an attorney may not act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate
to his client’s disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. And while complainants
have never been respondent’s clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydio’s
ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil case. For representing Raleigh’s
cause which is adverse to that of his former client—Raleigh’s supposed co-ownership of the
subject property—respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Having previously
undertaken joint representation of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent should have diligently studied
and anticipated the potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted.

• Aniñon vs. Sabitsana, Jr., A.R. No. 5098, April 11, 2012

FACTS: In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously engaged
the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of
Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty.
Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her
for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido
Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he
obtained from her in filing the civil case. Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the
complainant in the preparation and execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having
received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment
complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment
complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint
for this reason. The IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana
administratively liable for representing conflicting interests.

WHETHER OR NOT Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting

interests.

HELD:
YES. The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is dutybound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client.6 Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is
to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility quoted below: “Rule 15.03.—A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above
rule is present in a given case: One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or
claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus,
if a lawyer’s argument for one. client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the
other client, there is a violation of the rule. Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in
the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment.” On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we
find substantial evidence to support Atty. Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule, as established
by the following circumstances on record: One, his legal services were initially engaged by the
complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal
advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the
complainant’s favor. Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal
interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had
knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s interests. Three, despite
the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the
engagement from Zenaida Cañete. Four, Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting
interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case
against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant as
the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale
that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.

• Orola vs. Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013 

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga
(Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad
Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio). Meanwhile, complainant Karen
Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio),
the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the son of Emilio. In the settlement
of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC)
and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were represented by the following:
(a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Heirs of Trinidad; (b) Atty.
Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the
other heirs of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as collaborating
counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially
appointed administrator of Trinidad’s estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of
Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his
stead, sought the appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an
Order dated September 20, 2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007,
respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case
and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order. d the instant disbarment complaint before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code,
as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject case;7 and (b) Section 20(e), Rule
138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the
Heirs of Antonio. Complainants further claimed that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of
Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s appearance, the
same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered his appearance for
Emilio on October 10, 2007.9 In this accord, respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the
affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as required under the
Rules. Atty. Ramos clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a
mediator, rather than a litigator,15 and that since no settlement was forged between the parties,
he formally withdrew his appearance. The Investigating Commissioner observed that while
respondent’s withdrawal of appearance was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent
nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of the Heirs of
Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code. On the other hand, the Investigating
Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as
complainants themselves admitted that respondent “did not acquire confidential information
from his former client nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of
his previous employment.”21 Considering that it was respondent’s first offense, the Investigating
Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead,
recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his act with warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

WHETHER OR NOT Atty. Ramos is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of

Rule 15. 03

HELD:
YES. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof. It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former
client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client.
The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only
on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP’s finding that respondent
represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by
him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the
Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for
having committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to
represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case,
he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio — particularly, Karen — in
violation of the above-stated rule. Respondent’s justification that no confidential information was
relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict
of interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with
respect to opposing parties in the same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot change his
representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the same case. That respondent’s
previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly
accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with
no intention to represent conflicting interests. In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months to be more appropriate
taking into consideration the following factors: first, respondent is a first time offender; second,
it is undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricar’s request out of gratis to
temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyer’s
unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late
Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit
shortly after his first appearance as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that
he acted in good faith; and fourth, complainants admit that respondent did not acquire
confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge
obtained in the course of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner
prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio.

• Mabini Colleges vs. Pajarillo, A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015

In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided into
two opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was composed of Romulo M.
Adeva, Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I. Andrade. The other faction, called
the Lukban Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel
N. Lukban. In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary with a
total monthly compensation and honorarium of P6,000. Mabini Colleges obtained a loan from
Rural Bank of Paracale. On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the
loan application because the Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who
were allegedly not registered as stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the complainant.
On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order which
nullified the appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group as members
of the Board of Trustees of the complainant. As a result, complainant sent a letter to RBP to
inform the latter of the SEC Order. On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the complainant
acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and informing the latter that the SEC Order was
referred to RBP’s legal counsel, herein respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only
upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP.
On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment against the
respondent for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor,
fairness, and loyalty. Atty. Pajarillo countered that he merely served as the corporate secretary of
Mabini Colleges and not its legal counsel. On February 14, 2013, the Investigating
Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation2 finding respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests and recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for at least one year. The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for RBP in
the case for annulment of mortgage filed by his former client, the complainant herein.

WHETHER OR NOT respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered

his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by complainant
against RBP.

HELD:
YES. Indeed, respondent represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.” This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of
a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases.6 Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition on
representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice In Maturan v. Gonzales, 8 we further explained the
rationale for the prohibition: The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney
and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar
with all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points of
the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded
with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client’s secrets. A lawyer
must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will
suffer by the loss thereof. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a
lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients.10 It also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a
controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in
which he appeared for the former client.11 This rule applies regardless of the degree of adverse
interests.12 What a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence
or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he
previously represented him.13 A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the
same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the
former client consents to it after consultation.

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent represented conflicting
interests when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by the
complainant, respondent’s former client, against RBP.   The finding of the Investigating
Commissioner that respondent was compensated by complainant for his retained legal services is
supported by the evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant
was respondent’s former client. And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by
his former client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests
since respondent failed to show any written consent of all concerned (particularly the
complainant) given after a full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting interests The Court
also also note that the respondent acted for the complainant’s interest on the loan transaction
between RBP and the complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the
latter of the financial capacity of the complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the
case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the interest of the complainant, his
former client. Contrary to the respondent’s claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and
information in connection with the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant were
public records. Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his
client is irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict of interest.

• Quiambao vs. Bamba, 468 SCRA 1 (2005)

In this administrative case for disbarment, complainant Felicitas S. Quiambao charges

respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time
representing her in another case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty and double-dealing.

From June 2000 to January 2001, the complainant was the president and managing director of
Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-owned corporation engaged in providing
security and investigation services. She avers that she procured the legal services of the
respondent not only for the corporate affairs of AIB but also for her personal case. Particularly,
the respondent acted as her counsel of record in an ejectment case against Spouses Santiago and
Florita Torroba filed by her on 29 December 2000 before the Metropolitan Trial Court. About six
months after she resigned as AIB president, or on 14 June 2001, the respondent filed on behalf of
AIB a complaint for replevin and damages against her before the MeTC of Quezon City for the
purpose of recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her as a service vehicle. This he did
without withdrawing as counsel of record in the ejectment case, which was then still pending. In
his Report and Recommendation 6 dated 31 August 2004, the investigating commissioner of the
IBP found the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests based on the following
undisputed facts: first, the respondent was still complainant’s counsel of record in the ejectment
case when he filed, as legal counsel of AIB, the replevin case against her; and second, the
respondent was still the legal counsel of AIB when he advised the complainant on the
incorporation of another security agency, QRMSI, and recommended his former law partner,
Atty. Gerardo Hernandez, to be its corporate secretary and legal counsel and also when he
conferred with Leodegario to organize another security agency, SESSI, where the respondent
became an incorporator, stockholder, and president.

WHETHER OR NOT the respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting

interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.

HELD:
YES. In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed the replevin case on behalf
of AIB he was still the counsel of record of the complainant in the pending ejectment case. We
do not sustain respondent’s theory that since the ejectment case and the replevin case are
unrelated cases fraught with different issues, parties, and subject matters, the prohibition is
inapplicable. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously
constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the
respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued representation
in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his
clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Neither can we accept
respondent’s plea that he was duty-bound to handle all the cases referred to him by AIB,
including the personal cases of its officers which had no connection to its corporate affairs. That
the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of
the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative. 16 Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to
act either as an adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become their client. They
have the right to decline such employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 17 Although there are instances where lawyers cannot decline
representation, 18 they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client
and a prospective one. despite his apprehension or awareness of a possible conflict of interest
should he join QRMSI, the respondent later allowed himself to become an incorporator,
stockholder, and president of SESSI, which is also a security agency. He justified his act by
claiming that that while both AIB and SESSI are engaged in security agency business, he is
serving in different capacities. As the inhouse legal counsel of AIB, he “serves its legal interest
the parameter of which evolves around legal matters” such as protecting the legal rights and
interest of the corporation; conducting an investigation or a hearing on violations of company
rules and regulations of their office employees and security guards; sending demand letters in
collection cases; and representing the corporation in any litigation for or against it. And as
president of SESSI, he serves the operational aspects of the business such as “how does it
operate[], how much do they price their services, what kind or how do they train[] their security
guards, how they solicit clients.” Thus, conflict of interest is farfetched.