4. LG Foods Corp. vs. Hon.

Philadelfa

FACTS: On Feb. 26, 1996 Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino
Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and
driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a
result of the accident. A case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed
against the driver befire the MTCC of Bacolod. Unfortunately, before the trial concluded.
The accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On
this account, the MTCC dismiss the criminal case. On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of
Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint 3 for damages against the petitioners
as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed
to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. 

In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,4 the petitioners as defendants denied

liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised
the required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, including
the deceased driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.

They eventually filed a motion to dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is
basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an employer" under the provision of
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there
must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to
hold them liable. 

Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua
non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of
action on the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not
make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was
filed, the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action.
which was already dismissed. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The CA
upheld trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cause of Action of the Vallejeras is founded on Article 103 of
the RPC or derived from Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.

HELD:
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the "act
or omission by which a party violates the right of another." Such act or omission gives
rise to an obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts.11
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;12 and 2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law;13 the
intentional torts;14 and culpa aquiliana15); or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action.16 Either of these
two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender.17

Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194
of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold
the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the employer's
defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if
the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily
liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate.
It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee.22

Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was
caused by the negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves
were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their]
employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident."

Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary
liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their
employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly
liable.23 Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely
because death intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the
spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary
liability based on quasi-delict.

5. Barredo vs. Garcia

FACTS:
On May 3, 1936, a head-on collision occurred between a taxicab driven by Pedro
Fontanilla and a carratela. The carratela was overturned and one of its passengers 16
year-old boy Faustino Garcia suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A
criminal case was filed against Fontanilla and he was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years. The court in the criminal
case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino
Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000
plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's
negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road,
and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found that he was
careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the
Automobile law and speeding.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil
action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case.

The CA disagrees in that the liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not
a civil obligation arising from the crime of Fontanilla but an obligation imposed in
Article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision
of his servant or employee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs may bring a separate action against Barredo, Fontanilla’s
employer thus making him primarily and directly responsible under Article 1903

HELD:
YES. The defendant Barredo maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by
the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to
said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not
been exhausted.

Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate

legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality
that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the
wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
employers may be safely anchored.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.

2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts
in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that
not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt

In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he
had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable
for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility
because of his own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under article
1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the
civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second,
Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to
choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they
were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose
the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in
prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without property which
might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers
and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the
public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the
services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the
latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard
has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for
their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much
more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director
who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person
 who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director."

6. Elcano vs. Hill

FACTS: It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102
of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision
of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis
stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son,
the appellees filed the motion to dismiss the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence

The action for damages was dimissed on the ground that the present action is not only
against Sec. 1 Rule 107 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it was barred by prior
judgment which is now final and or in res judicata.

ISSUE:
a. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
b. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against
Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence
complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee
from his father, was already legally married?

HELD:

A. NO. According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had
its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and
perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed
Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising
 from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence,
the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that
giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should
be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on
human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29
to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity
and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous
relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We
do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally,
to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold,
in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant
action against him.

B. YES. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which
is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the
obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from
causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article
399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be
sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation.
(See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites
judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable
for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which
cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa,
supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding
the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that
Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
milling, subsidiary to that of his son.