Santos v Pizardo (Torts)

FACTS:
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in
connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by
Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the van's driver and
three (3) of its passengers, including a two- month old baby, and caused physical
injuries to five (5) of the van's passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a
reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by
the municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron
Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City,

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial Court: dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action
had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it
construed petitioners' cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of
the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to
file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
(2) CA: dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal

ISSUE:
Has the action prescribed?

RULING:
No.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with
petitioners' claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime.
Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit,
such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based
on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the
offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from
crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.

WHEN PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION EX DELICTO WILL OPERATE AS A BAR TO AN

ACTION TO ENFORCE INDEPENDENT CIVIL LIABILITY; PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. — At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the
remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of
action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does
not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially
as the latter action had been expressly reserved. The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca
Bus Company was decided upon a similar set of facts. . . . We held that the dismissal of
the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the
employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the
discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of
the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final
judgment convicting the employee. Seen in this light, the trial court should not have
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the
complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering
petitioners' allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil
liability arising from crime. This does not offend the policy that the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind
this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the
same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for damages
based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for
petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only recourse
available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent
with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons. 

L.G. Food Corporation & Victorino Gabor v. Hon. Philadelfa B. Pagapong-

Agraviador & Sps. Flontrentino and Teheresa Vallejera
GR No. 158995
September 26, 2006

GARCIA, J,:

FACTS:
On Feb. 26, 1996, Charles Vallejera (Charles), a 7-yr old son of the spouses
Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera (Sps. Vallejera), died as he was hit by a
Ford Fiera van owned by LG Food Corp (LG) and driven at the time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Ferrer (Ferrer). An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide was filed against the driver before the MTCC Bacolod City. However, as the
accused driver committed suicide, the case was dismissed.
Claiming that the petitioners should be held civilly liable as they failed to exercise
the necessary diligence required of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee, the sps. Vallejera later on filed a complaint for damages
against them. LG on the other hand, prayed, by way of an Answer w/ Compulsory
Counterclaim, for the dismissal of the complaint. They argued that they had exercised
the required due diligence and maintained that for their liability to attach their driver
must first be convicted. Thus, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal
action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled. Hence,
they argued that there is lack of cause of action on the part of the Spouses. They also
argued that since the Spouses Vallejera did not make a reservation to institute a
separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in
question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action w/c was already
dismissed. The RTC and the CA both denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the spouses Vallejeras’ are correct in relying on the civil code in
asserting their claim for damages.

HELD:
YES. From the allegations of their complaint, it is clear that quasi-delict was the
spouses’ choice of remedy against the petitioners. An act or omission causing damage
to another may give rise to 2 separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender:

1) Civil liability ex delicto and

2) Independent civil liabilities, such as those
a) Not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law, intentional torts and culpa
aquiliana) or
b) Where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent
and distinct from the criminal action.

Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender. The
victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from culpa criminal under Art. 100 of the RPC, and an action for quasi-
delict (culpa aquiliana) under Arts 2176-2194 of the Civil Code.

The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his
initiatory pleading or complaint and not with the defendant who cannot ask for
the dismissal of the plaintiff’s case of action or lack of it based on the defendant’s
perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Art. 103, RPC.

If, as in this case, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the
employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the employer’s defense
of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the
action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable
only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee. According to Art. 2177, these are
alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the
possibility of arising indirectly from the crime or directly from tort.
Culpa criminal = er subsidiary liable
Quasi-delict = er primarily liable

Under Art. 2180 of the CC, the liability of the employer is direct/immediate. It is
not considered upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing
of insolvency of such employee. Furthermore, the circumstance that no reservation
to institute a separate civil action for damages was made when the criminal case
was filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was
dismissed w/o any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, it is as if
there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place.

Maniago v. CA
G.R. No. 104392, February 20, 1996
Mendoza, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in
transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper
to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one of his buses figured in a
vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo
Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and multiple physical injuries against petitioner’s driver, Herminio
Andaya. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado
against petitioner Maniago. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in
the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver and
because no reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had been made in
the criminal case. But the lower court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that
pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal
action.

Issue:

whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent may

nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner (on the grounds of quasi-
delict) under the following provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.

Held:

No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be
reserved as required by Rule 111, § 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with,
§1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately
all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to
have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those
which arise “from the offense charged.” In other words, the right of the injured party
to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes
(ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be
reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.

On the basis of Rule 111, §§1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1)
when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of
the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3)
such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has
not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the
acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based
on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of
Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
(Dumuk v. Daquigan, et al., G.R.
No. 47926, August 13, 1990).
MARCOS BORDAS, vs. SENCENO CANA DALLA AND PRIMO TABAR

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Instance of Cebu
which grants the defendants-appellees’ motion to dismiss the civil case filed by the
plaintif-appellant on the ground that no reservaation was made by the plaintiff-appellant
in the criminal action.
Facts:
Defendant-appellee Senceno Canadalla was driving a jeepney owned and
registered by Primo Tabar who is also his employer when he allegedly sideswiped
plaintiff-appelle Marcos Bordas. Thereafter, Canadalla was charged before the City
Court of Cebu with the offense of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.
While the criminal case filed against him was pending, plaintiff-appellant filed a separate
civil action for damages based on culpa aquilana against Canadalla and his employer,
Tabar. The defendant-appellees filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground
that the complaint for damages was filed without proper reservation in the criminal
action to institute a separate and independent civil action as provided by Sections 1 and
2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the civil case filed by Bordas.
He then appealed to the Court of First Instance who in turn affirmed in toto the order
appealed from. Hence, this petition on a pure question of law.
Ruling:
Petition is granted.
There is no need for the plaintiff-appellant to make a reservation of his right
to file a separate civil action since the civil action contemplated is not derived
from the criminal liability of the accused but one based on culpa aquiliana. The
trial court was in error in considering the conviction of the accused as a prejudicial
question to the civil liability of Canadalla and Tabar. Distinction should be made
between the civil liability arising out of criminal negligence which is governed by
the Penal Code and the responsibility for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is
separate and distinct from the former. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff-applelants’s
action, being one for culpa aquliana (Article 2176), may not be classified as a civil action
arising from the criminal offense of Canadalla.
 As stated in Section 2, Rule 111 of Rules of Court (as amended on January 1,
1985), “in the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Coded of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action may be broiught by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of criminal prosecuion, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.”

OBLICON Doctrine: Independent civil actions require prior reservation

GR Nos. 119771
San Ildefonso Lines vs CA Date: April 28, 1998
Ponente: MARTINEZ, J.
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth
EDUARDO JAVIER Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE
and SURETY CORPORATION
Nature of the case: APPEAL from the decision of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the RTC, dismissing the motion of petitioners to suspend the
civil proceedings filed by private respondent on the ground that to such motion would
render the independent character of the civil action meaningless.
FACTS
A Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of
herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular
mishap totally wrecking wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2)
passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig charging
the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages
against petitioner SILI with the RTC, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured
under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages.
In response, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil
Proceedings grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against petitioner Javier
in the RTC and the failure of respondent PISC to make a reservation to file a separate
damage suit in said criminal action. This was denied by the RTC and was elevated to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the lower court’s decision. CA rules thus:
"A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
"To subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution - whether it be conviction or acquittal - would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in
Art. 31, that this action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.”
ISSUE/S
1) WON an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code can be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case
2) WON a subrogee of an offended party can maintain an independent civil action
during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an
independent civil action was made in the criminal action
RATIO
1. NO. On the chief issue of "reservation", at the fore is Section 3, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court which reads:
"Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. -- In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence."
It is easily deducible from the present wording of Section 3 as brought about by the
1988 amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure -- particularly the phrase "
which has been reserved" -- that the "independent" character of these civil
actions does not do away with the reservation requirement. In other words,
prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent
civil actions can be instituted.
Justice Jose Y. Feria, remedial law expert and a member of the committee which
drafted the 1988 amendments, whose learned explanation on the matter was aptly
pointed out by petitioners, to wit:
"The 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which is deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously
instituted xxx.
Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action includes not only
recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also damages under Article 2176
of the said code. xxxxxxxx In any event, the offended party is not precluded
from filing a civil action to recover damages arising from quasi-delict before
the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his right to file such a
separate civil action, just as he is not precluded from filing a civil action for
damages under Articles 32, 33 and 34 before the institution of the criminal
action, or from reserving his right to file such a separate civil action.
Sharing the same view on the indispensability of a prior reservation is Mr. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, whose analysis of the historical changes in Rule 111 since the
1964 Rules of Court is equally illuminating:
“The independent civil actions contemplated in the present Rule 111 include
the quasi-delicts provided for in Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, in addition to the
cases provided in Arts. 32, 33 and 34 thereof. It is necessary, however, that the
civil liability under all the said articles arise 'from the same act or omission of
the accused.' Furthermore, a reservation of the right to institute these
separate civil actions is again required, otherwise, said civil actions are
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the former are waived or
filed ahead of the criminal action."
 A deeper reading of the "Yakult Phils. vs. CA" case relied upon by respondent court
reveals an acknowledgement of the reservation requirement.:
"Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation
in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution
presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case
was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by
the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence"
The distinct factual scenario in "Yakult" simply does not obtain in this case. No
satisfactory proof exists to show that private respondent PISC's damage suit was
instituted before the prosecution presented its evidence in the criminal case pending
in the Pasig Regional Trial Court. Neither is there any indication that the judge
presiding over the criminal action has been made aware of the civil case. It is in this
light that reliance on the "Yakult" case is indeed misplaced.
2. NO. Private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is
not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based
on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained
of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of
Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the
procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the
civil case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
"MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed by
petitioners is GRANTED.
Notes
1-C 2015-16 (ABUZO)

DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. v Hon. Velez

FACTS:
A case for estafa was filed against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to
private respondent Villegas the amount of P608,532/46. Villegas entrusted this amount
to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI for deposit with the teller of
petitioner.
Subsequently, Villegas filed with a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner
DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of
the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the
following grounds(1) that there is a pending criminal case in RTC branch 37,arising from
the same facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum
shopping.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the civil case but after an MR by Villegas, the
case was reinstated.

Issue:
(1) whether the plaintiff’s failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in
the complaint is a ground to dismiss the case.
(2) whether the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa
without having reserved the fling of the civil action.

HELD:
1. NO. (not important) Respondent Villegas failure to attach a certifcate of non
forum shopping in her complaint did not violate Circular No.28-91, because at the
time of filing, the requirement applied only to petitions filed with the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is
inapplicable for the reason that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994, three
days before April 1, 1994, the date of e4ectivity of the circular.

2. Yes it could. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the
commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for
damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.

The remedies would be filing a civil action with criminal action, separate civil
action or independent civil action.

RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal

action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
 When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the
amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefore shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action
has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action. chan robles
virtual law library

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever state it may be found before
judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered
in the criminal action.

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases

provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Casupanan vs. Laroya Case Digest

Facts: 

Two vehicles, one driven by Laroya and the other owned by Capitulo and driven by
Casupanan, figured in an accident. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage toproperty. On the other hand, Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was
filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a
motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the
pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismiss the civil
case. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a motion for reconsideration. They insisted that
the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal case. The MR was denied. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 before the RTC.

The RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which
disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. It
further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
Finally, it declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil
case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion. 

Issues:

1. Was the petition for certiorari a proper remedy?

2. Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly
file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against
the private complainant in the criminal case. Was there a forum-shopping?

Held:

1. Yes. The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not
state in its order of dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the
complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice. Absent a
declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice.
Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.

Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not
appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule
65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground
that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

2. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a
favorable judgment. Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought. However, there is no
forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the
filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action
for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions
arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The
criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code
while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code.

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance
of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another.
Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these
articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a
criminal case may invoke these articles.

Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
(2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may
be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim
in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such
separate civil action.

Conclusion

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may
be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if
such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission.
The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is
deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule
on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently
of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend
the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases,
the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances,
the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons.
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that
is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period
continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177
of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy
which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo
is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of
forum-shopping is erroneous.  (Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26,
2002

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS REQUIRE NO PRIOR RESERVATION

The requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not anymore apply to the
independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Such
actions may be filed at anytime, provided the plaintiff does not recover twice upon the
same act or omission (Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc., v Antonio San Andres,
G.R. No. 200444, August 15, 2018).

Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc., v. Antonio San Andres

G.R. No. 200444, August 15, 2018
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners Supreme Transportation Liner Inc (Supreme) and Felix Ruz (Ruz) assail the
decision of the CA affirming the judgment of RTC which dismissed their counterclaim on
the ground that it would be tantamount to double recovery of damages.

On Nov. 5, 2002, at around 5:00 AM, Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger bus,
Mabel Tours Bus owned by Antonio San Andres (San Andres) along Maharlika
Highway, Brgy. Malabanban Norte, Candelaria, Quezon. While traversing the highway,
the Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo and immediately swerved to the left but
in the process, hit head-on the bus owned by petitioner Supreme which was driven by
Ruz.

San Andres filed a complaint for damages against herein petitioners alleging actual
damage to Mabel Tour Bus and unrealized profits. Subsequently, petitioners filed their
Answer with Counterclaim, they alleged that San Andres has no cause of action against
them since the vehicular accident was caused by the driver of San Andres operating the
Mabel Tours Bus. By way of counterclaim, Supreme alleged that it suffered damages.

In the course of trial, Jessi Alvarez filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property against Ernesto Belchez. Belchez was convicted.

RTC dismissed San Andres’ complaint as well as petitioners’ counterclaim for not
reserving the right to institute a separate civil action. Petitioners appealed, however, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners’ countercliam was correctly denied by the RTC

HELD:
NO. The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not have been dismissed by the
RTC and the CA despite their failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action in
the criminal case they had brought against respondent's driver. However, whether or not
they could recover damages upon their counterclaim presents a different story, as they
should first show that they will not recover damages twice for the same incident.

The CA concluded that the petitioners' cause of action should be limited to the recovery
of civil liability ex delicto by virtue of their having initiated against the respondent's driver
the criminal complaint for criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. The CA was seemingly of the opinion that the petitioners' recourse against the
respondent was limited to recovering from him, as the driver's employer, his subsidiary
liability under and pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the CA
pointed out that the petitioners' failure to reserve the civil aspect of the criminal case
proscribed them from instituting a separate civil action based on Article 2176 of the Civil
Cod
. The CA thereby erred. It incorrectly appreciated the nature of the petitioners' cause of
action as presented in their counterclaim.

Contrary to the conclusion thereon by the CA, the petitioners' cause of action was upon
a quasi-delict. As such, their counterclaim against the respondent was based on Article
2184, in relation to Article 2180 and Article 2176, all of the Civil Code

The error committed by the CA emanated from its failure to take into consideration that
the omission of the driver in violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code could
give rise not only to the obligation ex delicto, but also to the obligation based on culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under the factual antecedents herein,
both obligations rested on the common element of negligence. Article 2177 of the Civil
Code and Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court allow the injured party to prosecute
both criminal and civil actions simultaneously. As clarified in Casupanan v. Laroya:
 Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or
ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action.
The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right
to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil
Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the
Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the
civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action

EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR. and GRETCHEN

OPPENCOJUANGCO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GEORGE F. SISON and LUIS R.
MAURICIO, respondents.

FACTS:
In the 14 June 1972 issue of the GRAPHIC, a weekly magazine of general circulation in
the Philippines, under the column Social Climbing by one "Conde de Makati," later
identified as George F. Sison, the following item appeared:

ONCE UPON A time a beautiful Blue Lady (GOC) used to frequent the office of the
Honorable Sir.
Because of her well-known beauty and charm, the frequency of her visits did not pass
unnoticed by our Lady of the House by Pasig. An investigation by her battery of
personal "spies" revealed the beautiful Blue Lady was "following up" her three-million-
peso to from one of our leading government-lending institutions.
"Ang mahal naman ng hanyang ...! exclaimed our Lady of the House.
Aba, floating rate yata tayo ngayon. Even my friend Marquessa de Culi-Culi has upped
her price by 50 percent, "kasi ang mahal na bilihin ngayon, kahit bulak at alkohol."

Claiming that the publication alludes to petitioners-spouses and that it is false, malicious
and constitutes a vicious attack on petitioner-wife's virtue, honor and character as it
imputes her not only the corrupt and immoral act of "following up" a alleged loan, but
also the commission of corrupt and immortal acts of adultery and/or prostitution,
petitioners filed on 11 July 1972 with the then Court of First Instnce (now Regional Trial
Court) of Quezon City a civil action for Damages based on Libel against the Graphic
Publishing Co., Inc., as owner; J. Antoni Araneta, as publisher; Luis R. Mauricio, as
general manager and editor; and Conde de Makati, as writer, of the GRAPHIC
magazine. On 29 December 1972, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed with the above
court a criminal case for libel against defendants Sison, Mauricio and Araneta.
On 7 March 1973, after issues in Civil Case No. Q-16725 joined and the accused in
Criminal Case No. Q-2713 arraigned, petitioners filed therein separate motions to
consolidate the criminal case with the civil case in Branch XVI alleging that the evidence
to be presented in both would be the same much valuable time and effort of the court as
well as that of the parties would be saved by such consolidation; and, moreover Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides, inter alia, that in libel the civil
action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice-versa,
provided, however, that the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is
first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.

Only defendants Mauricio and Araneta, now private respondents, filed their opposition
to the motions. They claim that petitioners, having filed a separate civil action, have no
legal standing to intervene in the criminal case; there is no provision in the Rules of
Court authorizing the consolidation of the criminal case with the separate civil action;
the rule contemplate the consolidation of the hearing of two (2) or more cases pending
before the same judge, and not when the cases are before different courts or different
branches of the same court.

Trial court allowed the consolidation. Defendants filed an MR which was denied. They
appealed to CA which set aside the trial court’s order.

ISSUE:
May a criminal case for libel and an independent civil action for damages arising
therefrom, filed pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, be consolidated for joint trial?

RULING:

Yes. Under Section 3 of Rule 111 which was subsequently amended, and is now
Section 2 thereof, it is clear that the Civil action for recovery of damages arising
from a crime, or ex delicto, may filed separately from the criminal case either
before the institution of the latter, which may be done without reservation, after
such institution, provided, however, that a reservation that effect has been made.
If in the meantime the criminal action is instituted, the civil action which has been
reserve cannot be commenced until final judgment has been render in the former. This
restriction does not, however, apply to the cases provided for in Section 3. Thus, in the
case provided for in Articles 32, 33 (as in the instant case), 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the civil action may be filed even at the institution of the criminal case,
provided that prior proper reservation had been made.
Subsection (a) of Section 2 refers to civil cases filed before the institution of the criminal
cases. Since it makes reference to first paragraph of Section 1, and the latter
necessarily include the cases under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
expressly recognized in the second paragraph thereof which reads:
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.

It follows without saying that an independent civil action for the recovery of civil
liability, authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code, filed before
the institution of the criminal case, may be consolidated with the latter, subject to
the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in the criminal case. If this
is permitted, there is neither rhyme nor reason why, given the existence of the condition,
an independent civil action under any of the said Articles, but filed after the institution of
the criminal case, may not be consolidated with the latter. This second scenario is
equally and logically addressed by the reasoning behind the provision for the first
situation.

Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court authorizes consolidation of

actions involving common questions of law or fact pending before the court. The
purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the
trial court, and save unnecessary costs or expense; in short, the attainment of justice
with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.

It is self-evident that Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 involve
common or Identical questions of fact and law, and that they would even have the same
witnesses. These considerations alone justify the exercise by the court of its discretion
to consolidate the cases for joint hearing to attain the salutary purpose of consolidation.

There is yet a further consideration why in the instant case consolidation of Civil Case
No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 should be allowed. What is involved is the
crime of libel. As correctly stated by petitioners, per the third paragraph of Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the criminal case for libel and the civil action for
damages arising therefrom must be filed in the same court.

If the court referred to is a multi-sala court, it may happen, as in this case, that the
criminal and civil actions are raffled or assigned to different salas. In this situation,
consolidation one with another earlier filed would not only be practical and economical
— it would subserve the very purpose of the law Consolidation of cases assigned to
different branches of a court had earlier been recognized. In Raymundo, et al. vs.
Felipe, et al., We held:
[A]lthough consolidation of several cases involving the same parties and subject matter
is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes a matter
of duty if two or more cases are tried before the sam
e judge, or even if filed with the different branches of the same court of first instance,
provided one of such case has not been partially tried.

BERNABE CASTILLO v. CA, GR No. L-48541, 1989-08-21

Facts:
Petitioners and private respondents figured in a vehicular accident on May 2, 1965 at
Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan, which caused injuries to their persons and damage to their
respective vehicles.
According to the petitioners, the accident happened as follows:... petitioner Bernabe
Castillo was driving his jeep... on the right lane of the McArthur Highway with Generosa
Castillo, his wife, father
Serapion Castillo, seated in front and Eulogio Castillo, then a minor child, as
passengers, bound northward for Binmaley, Pangasinan at the rate of 25 kilometers per
hour.
Just past San Nicolas... bridge, Villasis, he noticed, from a distance of 120 meters more
or less, a speeding oncoming car... along the same lane (facing north) he was driving,
overtaking a cargo truck ahead of it. 
He switched on his headlights to signal the car to return to its own right lane as the way
was not clear for it to overtake the truck.
The car turned out to be driven by the private respondent, Juanito Rosario, with his wife,
Cresencia Rosario.  The signal was disregarded, as the car proceeded on its direction
southward on the right lane (facing... north).
n order to evade the impending collision, petitioner Bernabe Castillo swerved his jeep to
the right towards the shoulder and applied on the brakes, and leaving his feet on it,
even, immediately after the impact.
P
Private respondents, o... have their own version of the accident and thus asseverate as
follows:... the private respondents, together with their small daughter, were on their way
from San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to Olongapo City... where they resided at the time
and where Juanito
Rosario, a member of the US Navy, had been temporarily stationed.  They rode in the
family car.
Juanito Rosario who was driving the car, and his two passengers, were along
MacArthur Highway in Barrio Bacag, Villasis, Pangasinan, going towards the south,...
they saw ahead of them a big heavily loaded cargo truck.
Juanito Rosario decided to overtake it. 
But before doing so, he first saw to it that the road was clear and as additional
precautionary measure, he blew his horn several times at the time he was overtaking
the truck.
Then as the car was about to overtake the slow moving cargo truck, the car's front left
tire suddenly burst due to pressure causing the car to swerve to the left and naturally
making steering and control difficult
But barely had the said defendant parked his car on the left shoulder of the road and
just as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the
jeep driven by Bernabe Castillo which came from the opposite... direction.
a civil case for the recovery of damages for the injuries sustained by petitioners and for
the damage to their vehicle as a result of the collision, was instituted by the petitioners
in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
While this case was pending, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed an information
dated September 29, 1965 against Juanito Rosario
Respondent Juanito Rosario was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court in the
criminal case.
the Court of
Appeals,... acquitting him from the crime charged
In the meantime, private respondents thru counsel, filed a "Request for Admission"[4]
on April 3, 1972 in the civil case,... petitioners filed a "Manifestation",[5] admitting the
allegations in the "Request for Admission" with some... qualifications.
the Court of First Instance of Manila... dismissing the complaint of the petitioners
against private respondents as well as the counterclaim of private respondents against
the petitioners.
petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
the Court of Appeals affirmed
Issues:
Is an action for damages based on quasi-delict barred by a decision of the appellate
court acquitting the accused, the body of which lays the blame on the plaintiff but in its
dispositive part declares the guilt of the accused not proved... beyond reasonable
doubt?"
Ruling:
There is no dispute that the subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is separate
and distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence.
According to a number of cases,[10] a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or... crime.  A distinction exists between the
civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual.  The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a... crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delictos or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code.  Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case."
Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for
the recovery of damages.  In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that no
negligence was committed by Juanito Rosario to warrant an... award of damages to the
petitioners.
It was the Court of Appeals' findings that the collision was not due to the negligence of
Juanito Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of
the road where the car was, which was actually the proximate cause of the... collision. 
With this findings, the Court of Appeals exonerated Juanito Rosario from civil liability on
the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist.
Finally, in a long line of decisions, this Court has held time and again that the findings of
facts by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court.
Finding that the questioned decision does not fall under any of the exceptions cited
above, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals.

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 48541, August 21, 1989,176), the
Supreme Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal
where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist,
in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability.

NARCISO GUTIERREZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ, MARIA V.

DE GUTIERREZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ, ABELARDO VELASCO, and SATURNINO
CORTEZ, defendants-appellants.
 G.R. No. 34840
September 23, 1931

FACTS:
 A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in
the municipality of Las Piñas, Province of Rizal.
 The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by
Saturnino Cortez.
 The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of
age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel
Gutierrez.
 At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother, together
will several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were
accommodated therein.
 A passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, was en route from
San Pablo, Laguna, to Manila.
 The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Narciso Gutierrez
suffering a fracture right leg which required medical attendance for a
considerable period of time, and which even at the date of the trial appears not to
have healed properly.

ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of an automobile is liable for its negligent
operation by one of his children

HELD:
 Yes
 It may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur, that
he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the
bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the
accident.
 The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license
to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his
son.
o Pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father
alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages
caused by the minor.
 The head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the
general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his
children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is
occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other
members of the owner's family than the child driving it.
o The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry
other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business,
 so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the
relationship of master and servant.
 The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and of his chauffeur
Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis, namely, that of contract which, we
think, has been sufficiently demonstrated by the allegations of the complaint, not
controverted, and the evidence.
o The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court
concerning the position of the truck on the bridge, the speed in operating
the machine, and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur.
 The case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite
directions, with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the
other, with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident.
 The defendants Velasco and Cortez further contend that there existed
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, consisting principally of his
keeping his foot outside the truck, which occasioned his injury.
o It is sufficient to state that, aside from the fact that the defense of
contributory negligence was not pleaded, the evidence bearing out this
theory of the case is contradictory in the extreme and leads us far afield
into speculative matters.
 A total sum for the plaintiff of P5,000 would be fair and reasonable. The difficulty
in approximating the damages by monetary compensation is well elucidated by
the divergence of opinion among the members of the court, three of whom have
inclined to the view that P3,000 would be amply sufficient, while a fourth member
has argued that P7,500 would be none too much.

Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et

al., G.R. No. 104408, June 21, 1993

Facts:
MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area and
Musa was its driver .  The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year
high school student at the University of the Philippines Integrated School.

At around a quarter past one in the afternoon of August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27,
which was driven by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in
Quezon City.  An eye witness said the girl was already near the center of the street
when the bus, then bound for the south, hit her. She fell to the ground upon impact,
rolled between the two front wheels of the bus, and was run over by the left rear tires
thereof. Her body was dragged several meters away from the point of impact.  Liza
Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center, but efforts to revive her proved futile.
Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. However,
for the civil liability, Souses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages
against MMTC, Musa, MMTC Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). They subsequently amended their
complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the MMTC, as a defendant
therein.

To free themselves from liability, petitioners attempted to prove that it exercise

diligentissimi patris familias in the selcetion and supervision of employees through oral
evidence.

The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Rosales, but made MMTC primarily liable and Musa
secondarily liable.

Issue:
Whether or not MMTC is solidarily liable with Musa.

Ruling
Yes!
Petitioner’s attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and
supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress
the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the
apparent biased nature of the testimony.

Although, MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective

employees on vehicle maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed
that applicants are given tests to determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and
vision, there is no record that Musa attended such training programs and passed the
said examinations before he was employed.  No proof was presented that Musa did not
have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of daily inspections, allegedly
conducted by supervisors, ever presented.

The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other
documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses,
notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial court and the opposing counsel,
argues strongly against its pretensions.

As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its
employee in view of Art. 2180.  Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee
what it may pay.  This does not make the employee’s liability subsidiary. It only means
that if the judgment for damages is satisfied by the common carrier, the latter has a right
to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence
which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Hence, the spouses Rosales have
the option of enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa. 

From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that “the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.” We ruled in Gelisan v. Alday that
“the registered owner/operator of a public service vehicle is jointly and severally liable
with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence
of injuries sustained in the operation of said vehicle.” In Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appealsit was held that “to escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict committed by an
employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of
care.”  Finally, we held in the recent case of Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals that “the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle . . .
for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and
several or solidary with the driver.”

Rationale for Imposing Vicarious liability

What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a
deliberate allocation of a risk.  The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a
practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are placed
upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business.  They are placed upon
the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all
past experience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought to
profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them;
and  because he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices,
rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the
community at large.  Added to this is the makeweight argument that  an employer who
is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the selection,
instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that the
enterprise is conducted safely.

SPS. Hernandez vs. Dolor

FACTS:
December 19, 1986 Lorenzo Dolor Jr. was driving an owner type jeep heading to
Anilao, he collided with a passenger jeep driven by petitioner Juan Gonzales. Dolor and
a passenger died, with several injured.
Respondents filed a complaint against Gonzales being negligent and that petitioners
were negligent in selecting and supervising their employees.

TC found that Gonzales only received his license 3 months prior to accident, before that
he had a student permit. Gonzales was driving at a fast pace and that the owner type
jeep was moving at a moderate speed.

TC rendered decision holding petitioners liable. CA affirmed and modified ruling.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS:

W/N CA was correct in finding spouses Hernandez solidarily liable with Gonzales
although they were not in the jeep when the accident occurred.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI:

Petition denied Spouses Hernandez are liable.
“Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry” as per Art. 2180. Art. 2194 states responsibility of
two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
Petitioners are practicing boundary system in order to hide employer-employee
relationship.

G.R. No. 147791             September 8, 2006

PETITIONER: CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES

RESPONDENTS: REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE

PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE INC., BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO.,
and WILFREDO DATINGUINOO

FACTS:

On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her

granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for
Pasay City. However, they never reached their destination because their bus was
rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South Expressway. The strong
impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their knees to the seats in front of them.
They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the bus and
extricated their legs from under the seats. They were brought to the Makati Medical
Center to be treated.Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for damages against
CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13.

On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding CDCP and BLTB
and their employees liable for damages. BLTB, Wilfredo Datinguinoo, Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr.,
shall pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P79,254.43 as actual damages
and to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees or a total of P89,254.43; and
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines and defendant Espiridion
Payunan, Jr., shall pay the plaintiffs the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
to plaintiff Rachel Fletcher and Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff
Rebecca Estrella.

Unsatisfied with the award of damages and attorney's fees by the trial court,
respondents moved that the decision be reconsidered but was denied. Respondents
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court
but modified the amount of damages, the dispositive portion of which provides: the
interest of six (6) percent per annum on the actual damages of P79,354.43 should
commence to run from the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the
complaint on February 4, 1980; thirty (30) percent of the total amount recovered is
hereby awarded as attorney's fees; and Defendants-appellants Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr.
are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellants Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher the amount
of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) each as exemplary damages and P80,000.00 by way
of moral damages to Rachel Fletcher.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable for the
damages sustained by respondents.
(2) Whether or not the damages, attorney's fees and legal interest awarded by the
CA are excessive and unfounded.
(3) Whether or not CDCP can recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix.

RULING:

(1) NO.

The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa

aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In this regard, Article 2180
provides that the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or
omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible. Consequently, an action
based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the employer for an employee's act or
omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary,
but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. In the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed to prove that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Payunan, Jr.

It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals that the owner of the other

vehicle which collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger
of the same. Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner]
springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle]
arises from quasi-delict. 

As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did
not stake out their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory,
much less on that of breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to
allege alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on
such causes of action so long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not
recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the
plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the holding
that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate
and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.

In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in
a "solidary" or "joint and several" obligation, the relationship between the active and the
passive subjects is so close that each of them must comply with or demand the
fulfillment of the whole obligation.
 (2) YES. Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.
The award of moral damages in favor of Fletcher and Estrella in the amount of
P80,000.00 must be reduced since prevailing jurisprudence fixed the same at
P50,000.00. While moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the
expense of the defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the
suffering inflicted.

NO. The Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondents exemplary damages in

the amount of P20,000.00 each. Exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to
moral and compensatory damages. Article 2231 of the Civil Code also states that in
quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. In this case, petitioner's driver was driving recklessly at the time its truck
rammed the BLTB bus. Petitioner, who has direct and primary liability for the negligent
conduct of its subordinates, was also found negligent in the selection and supervision of
its employees.

NO. Regarding attorney's fees, we held in Traders Royal Bank Employees

Union-Independent v. National Labor Relations Commission that: There are two
commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and
extraordinary. In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for
damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The
basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such
as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but
to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part thereof.

The Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation as they may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages when
exemplary damages are awarded; when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's valid, just and demandable claim; and in any
other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.

(3) NO.

As regards the liability of Phoenix, CDCP's claim against Phoenix already

prescribed pursuant to Section 384 of P.D. 612, as amended, which provides that a
written notice of claim must be filed within six months from the date of the accident.
Since petitioner never made any claim within six months from the date of the accident,
its claim has already prescribed. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.