Case #16: GSIS v Heirs of Caballero, G.R. Nos.

158090, October 4, 2010

Ponente: PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
Spouses Caballero secured a loan from GSIS and executed a real estate mortgage
covering the 800 sqm. lot with 2-storey building. After failure to redeem the property, GSIS
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. Negotiation as to the repurchase by
Caballero of the subject property went on for several years, but no agreement was reached
between the parties.
Subsequently, GSIS scheduled the subject property for a public bidding and was awarded
to Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corporation (CMTC) as the highest bidder. New TCT was
issued in the name of CMTC.

ISSUE:
Did GSIS file a compulsory counterclaim?

HELD:

No, GSIS did not file a compulsory counterclaim.

Under Rule 6, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, a compulsory counterclaim is one which
(a) arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-
matter of the opposing party’s claim; (b) does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; ad (c) subject to the qualification on
the jurisdictional amount with regard to counterclaims raised in the RTC.

In the instant case, the evidence needed by the respondent to cause the annulment of the
bid of award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish
petitioner's claim for the recovery of rentals. The Court agrees that the petitioner's counterclaim
for the recovery of the amount representing rentals is permissive. Since petitioner failed to pay
the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The
judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which
he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this
Court.
Case #17: Quintanilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101747, 24 Sept. 1997
Ponente: Franisco, J.

FACTS:
Quintanilla, engaged in business of exporting cane products, executed a Real Estate
Mortgage on a parcel of land in favor of RCBC to secure a credit line. For failing to comply with
the demands, RCBC sought to foreclose the real estate mortgage including payment for
Quintanilla’s subsequent credit accommodations. Rejecting RCBC’s claim, Quintanilla filed an
action for specific performance, damages and attorney’s fees with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. RCBC filed an answer denying petitioner’s claim and set up a
counterclaim for the payment of all her other outstanding loans.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner’s claim. RCBC appealed
to the CA imputing error to the trial court in not granting its counterclaim. The CA affirmed the
RTC ruling in so far as the foreclosure was limited to only a certain amount but modified the
same by granting the counterclaim. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for a partial reconsideration,
arguing for the first time that respondent RCBC’s counterclaim is permissive in nature for which
the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction due to the nonpayment of the docket fees.

ISSUE: Is RCBC’s counterclaim compulsory or permissive in nature?

HELD: The counterclaim is compulsory in nature.

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the
following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim
largely the same?; (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?; (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim?; and (d) Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate
that the counterclaim is compulsory.

In the instant case, respondent’s counterclaim necessarily arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of petitioner’s claim which is to enjoin the foreclosure of the
latter’s other credit accommodations in excess of P25,000.00. It thus satisfies the “compelling
test of compulsoriness” which requires “a logical relationship between the claim and
counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court. Both claims
are merely offshoots of the same basic controversy. Moreover, respondent’s counterclaim does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties upon whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction and the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
Case #18: Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Paras, G.R. No. 161909, 25 Apr. 2012
Ponente: Bersamin J.

FACTS:
Felix Paras boarded a bus owned and operated by Inland Trailways. Inc. and driven by
Calvin Coner. A vehicular accident happened involving Inland bus and another bus owned and
operated by Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. As a result of this, Paras suffered injuries. Paras
filed a complaint for damages based on breach of contract of carriage against Inland.
Inland, on the other hand filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco and Apolinar
Miralles. It sought for exoneration of its liabilities to Paras, asserting that the latter’s cause of
action should be directed against Philtranco considering that the accident was caused by
Miralles’ lack of care, negligence and reckless imprudence. RTC found out that there’s no
negligence on the part of Inland thus it is not guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
RTC ordered Philtranco and its driver to solidarily pay Paras the damages he suffered.
Philtranco contends that Paras could not recover moral damages directly from it considering that
it was only being subrogated for Inland. It says that its liability only attaches once Inland is also
adjudged liable.

ISSUE:
Is RTC correct in ordering Philtranco and its driver to solidarily pay Paras the damages
even if the complaint against Inland is dismissed?

HELD:
Yes, RTC is correct in contending that the third-party defendants solely liable to Paras.

In Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, the third-party claim need not be based on the
same theory as the main claim.There need not be any legal relationship between the third-party
defendant and any of the other parties to the action. Impleader also is proper even though the
third party’s liability is contingent, and technically does not come into existence until the original
defendant’s liability has been established.
In the present case, Paras' cause of action against Inland (breach of contract of carriage)
did not need to be the same as the cause of action of Inland against Philtranco and its driver in
the impleader. It is settled that a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party defendants
those who may be liable to him in tort for the plaintiffs claim against him, or even directly to the
plaintiff.